Concepts of Space

Max Jammer
1969 edition adds two pages to introduction of the 1954 edition and merges the
appendix into the text , adding one page (199). There are actually quite a few
untranslated passages embedded in the text. My translations are rough and literal.
Comments and corrections welcome. Page numbers refer to '69 edition. The
1994 edition from Dover (261 pages) adds a Chapter 6, but is otherwise the same.
Chapter I The Concept of Space in Antiquity
Only the one untranslated passage occurs in this chapter.
p. 26. Moritz Cantor referes to this passage and says : "Bei der Unbestimmtheit
dieser Angabe mssen wir allerdings dahin gestellt sein lassen, ob man glauben
will, es seien in jener Schrift Gedanken enthalten gewesen, welche dem Begriffe
von Raumkoordinaten nahe kommen."
[From the indefinitness of these statements we must indeed allow to be stated,
whether one will believe it, that there may have been in those writings, thoughts
which came near to the concept of space coordinates.]
Chapter II Judeo-Christian Ideas about Space
p. 29 With reference to these words Fabricius adds the following interesting
remarks: "Deum Hebraei non dubitant, quia a nullo continetur, ipse vero
immensa virtute sua continet omnia, appellare "mak.om" sive locum, ut saepe fit
in libello rituum Paschalium quem edidit Ritangelius." J. A. Fabricius, ed., Sexti
Empirici opera (Leipzig, 1840-41), p. 681
[The Hebrews do not hesitate to call God (god), because contained by nothing,
himself by his truly immeasurable power containing all, "mak.om" or (sive)
"place" as often done in little book of Paschal ritual which Ritangelius edited]
(why is this particularly interesting?)
p. 33 Reuchlin's De verbo mirifico[on the wonderful, marvelous word]
p.34 Rainoldes' Censura librorum apocryphorum Veteris Testamentis. [judgement,
critique of the apocryphal books of the old testament]
footnote 27 Thomas Campanella, Medicinalium justa propria principia libri
septem (Lyons, 1635) [the correct proper principles of medicine book seven]
p.35 mundus mathematicus seu spatium [mathematical world or space]
p. 35 In his Metaphysicarum rerum juxta (sic. justa?) propria dogmata : ["of
metaphysical things close to or near like individual or special doctrines or
dogmas" or, perhaps, "correct proper dogmas of metphysical matters"]
Campanella characterizes this mathematical world or space as the "omnium
divinitas substentas, portansque omnia verbo virtutis suae . . ."
[divinity of all things standing firm and bearing all things by word of his strength
(of his word) or in his excellent name]
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Companella states that space is in God, but God is not limited by space, which is
His "divina creatura." The idea of the identification of space with at least an
attribute of the Divine Being gains new impetus in the second book, where we
read: "Spatium, entia locans invenio primum immortale, quia nulli est
contrarium." In Campanella's conception, space becomes an absolute, almost
spiritual entity, characterized by divine attributes.
[Space, giving place to existing things I find (to be) first immortal, because it has
no contrary .]
p. 36 " , . . horum clarissimus erat Thomas Campanella Stylensis, cujus in corpus
Telesii ingenium transmigrasse dicebatur."
[was of the highest intellect, who is said to have transmigrated into the body of
Telesi.]
p. 37 "Ego sum lux mundi"
According to Saint Bonaventure, God is "spiritualis lux in omnia-moda
actualitate." [spiritual light in every way actual ]
p.39 "ultimum continentis immobilis," in contrast to Aristotle's "ultimum
immobile continentis." [highest or final containing immobile or immobile
container] Which one is which I don't know; nor what exactly the distinction is
supposed to mean.
p. 40. The assertion, "Unumquodque primum corporum est locus et forma
inferiori sub ipso per naturam lucis, " is proved by a series of syllogisms.
[and each one of the prime bodies is position and form begotten by light further
down beneath itself]
Footnote 52."Cuius expositio est quod locus est ultimum continentis immobilis;
illud autem ultimum caeli est ultimum per comparationem ad id ad quod
determinatur locus unicuique inferiori sub ipso, sicut manifestum est de naui et
palo fixo in aqua. mutat enim superficiem corporis continentis, scilicet aquae, non
tamen mutat locum quia caeli non mutat partem, per comparationem ad quam
determinabatur ei locus. unde caeli ultimum locus est. Hoc autem habet naturam
lucis. Illud enim ultimum est continens et conseruans, cum sit locus . . ."
[ Of which the explanation is that location/space is highest of the containing
immobile (things); however that highest (place) of heaven is highest by
comparision to that to which each lower place is determined/confined under
itself, just as (it) is clear regarding a ship and attached pole (mast?) in water. It
moves indeed (on?) surface (acc) of containing body, water of course, still it
(does) not change place because (it does) not change part of heaven , by
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comparison to that which that place was defined . whence (the) place of heaven is
(the) highest place. This however has nature of light. That indeed highest is
containing and preserving, as is place. ]
p. 42. The answer lies, according to (Henry) More, in the nature of space, the
clear understanding of which can alone save philosophy from an otherwise
inevitable atheism. "Atque ita per eam ipsam januam per quam Philosophia
Cartesiana Deum videtur velle e Mundo excludere, ego, e contra, eum introducere
rursus enitor et contendo."
[and so going through that same gate through which Cartesian Philosophy wishes
to see God excluded from the world, I , on the contrary, strive and contend to
introduce Him again.]
p. 43. Descartes contended that the walls of a vessel that is exhausted of air must
necessarily collapse. "Si quaeratur, quid fiet, si Deus auferat omne corpus quod in
aliquo vase continetur, et nullum aliud in ablati locum venire permittat:
Respondendum est: Vasis latera sibi invicem hoc ipso fore contigua.? Principia
philosophiae, II, 18.
[if asked, what will happen, if God withdraws every body which is contained in
some vessel, and allows no other to come in place of the removed (bodies): the
response is: the sides of the vessel themselves in turn (or mutually) by this same
way shall be touching]
p. 44. Sed vasis latera non fierunt contigua!
[but in fact the sides of the vessel are not made contiguous]
The existence of space is guaranteed by its very measurability "par aunes ou par
lieues." [by elles or by leagues]
p. 47. because Non entis nulla est Affectio, according to the Reasonings of your
beloved Master.
[not being nothing is an affection]
p. 48. The attributes of space are attributes of God. A list of these attributes is
given in More's Enchiridion metaphysicum:
Neque enim Reale duntaxat, (quod ultimo loco notabimus) sed Divinum quiddam
videbitur hoc Extensum infinitum ac immobile, (quod tam certo in rerum natura
deprehenditur) postquam Divina illa Nomina vel Titulos qui examussim ipsi
congruunt enumeravimus, qui & ulteriorem fidem facient illud non posse esse
nihil, utpote cui tot tamque praeclara Attributa competunt.
Literally: [For not only the Real (concerning which we write below) but also this
infinite and immobile Extension will be seen a kind of Divinity (because i.e the
Extension so certainly found in things produced naturally) when we have
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enumerated those Names or Titles which agree perfectly and which produce
greater confidence that a thing cannot be nothing, inasmuch as what so many
very clear Attributes are agree.]
Ed Cryer suggests: [This infinite and motionless Extension (which is found so
certainly in nature) will appear not only Real (on which we shall comment at the
end) but somewhat Divine after we have enumerated those Divine Names, or
Titles rather, which agree so precisely with each other, and which will provide
further proof that a thing cannot be nothing when so many such distinct Attributes
coincide in it.]
Cujusmodi sunt quae sequuntur, quaeque Metaphysici Primo Enti speciatim
attribunt.
[Of such kind are those (i.e. titles) which follow, and which Metaphysicians
attribute to Prime Being as species.]
Ut unum, Simplex, Immobile, Aeternum, Completum, Independens, A se extens,
Per se substens, Incorruptibile, Necessarium, Immensum, Increatum,
Incircumscriptum, Incomprehensibile, Omnipraesens, Incorporeum, Omnia
permeans & complectans, Ens per Essentiam, Ens actu, Purus Actus.
[As one, Single, Immovable, Eternal, Complete, Independent, Self Caused, Self
Subsisting, Incorruptible, Necessary, Vast, Uncreated, Unbounded,
Incomprehensible, Omnipresent, Incorporeal, All Pervading and Embracing ,
Existing in Substance, Being in Actuality, Pure Action.]
Non pauciores quam viginti Tituli sunt quibus insigniri solet Divinum Numen, qui
infinito huic Loco interno, quem in rerum natura esse demonstravimus, aptissime
conveniunt: ut omittam ipsam Divinum Numen apud Cabbalistes appelari
"mak.om," id est, Locum.
Literally: [ Not fewer than twenty Titles (there) are (with) which we are
accustomed to mark the Sacred Will, how boundless this internal Place, which is
revealed in natural things, agreeing most suitably: even if I might lay aside that
same Divine Will, (which is) among Cabbalistes called "mak.om," that is, Place.]
Ed Cryer suggests: [There are no less than twenty Titles which are used to
distinguish the Divine Power, and these agree most aptly with this infinite internal
Place, which we have shown to exist in nature. To say nothing of the fact that the
Divine Power itself is called by the Cabbalistes "mak.om", i.e. Place.]
Note: "mak.om," (with the dot is under the k) is a Hebrew word meaning "place".
More, Enchiridion metaphysicum, part I, chap. 8. [handbook of metaphysics]

p. 48 Zimzum is introduced as though we all knew what it means. It is a Hebrew

word which means "contraction". footnote 72. "Deus creaturus mundos contraxit
praesentiam suam," Kabbala denudata (Salzbach, 1677), part II, p. 150
[God to create the world contacted (lit. withdrew) his presence]
p. 49. Indeed, a similar intellectual process was most probably in fluential on the
philosophy of Spinoza. With reference to his fundamental dictum; "Quidquid est,
in Deo est et nihil sine Deo esse neque concipi potest,"
[whatever is, is in God and nothing without God is able to be nor to be conceived
(grasped or imagined, contained or held)]
footnote 73 "Ethica more geometrico demonstrata,"
footnote 74 Der Briefwechsel des Spinoza im Urtext
footnote 76 Der Spinozismus in Jdenthumb oder die von dem heutigen
Jdenthumb und dessen geheimen kabbala vergtterte Welt
Spinoza admits in a letter to Oldenburg: " . . . omnia, inquam, in Deo esse et in
Deo moveri cum Paulo affirmo
[everything, I say, in God to be and in God to be moved as by Paul affirmed]
. . . et auderem etiam dicere, cum antiquis omnibus Hebraeis, quantum ex
quibusdam traditionibus, tametsi multis modis adulteratis conjicere licet."
[and I dare (intend) now to declare, with all the ancient Hebrews, so much as
from that same tradition, even if it is permitted to thrown together many mixed
(heterogeneous) methods (of argument or modes of thought)]
Leibniz: "Verissimum est, Spinozam Cabbala Hebraeorum esse abusum."
[It is most true, Spinoza Cabbala of Hebrews to be wasted or abused] (I don't
quite get this one)

Chapter 3
The Emancipation of the Space Concept from Aristotelianism
p. 55 Themistius Paraphrasis in libros quatuor Aristotelis de caelo.
[Aristotle's De Caelo paraphrased in four books]
p. 57 It is this tendency, inherent in the moving body and not in the medium or in
space, that corresponds to the "impetus" in the case of forced motion. Philoponus'
explanation of the fall of heavy bodies shows a remarkable resemblance to the
explanation of gravity suggested by Copernicus:
"Equidem existimo gravitatem non aliud esse,
quam appententiam (sic., perhaps appetentiam ) quandam naturalem partibus
inditam a divina providentia opificis universorum,
ut in unitatem integritatemque suam sese conferant in forman (sic., perhaps
formam) globi countes." De revolutionibus orbium coelestium, liber I cap. IX.
[Indeed I think gravity not to be different,
than (a) longing for a certain natural region introduced by divine providence of
architect (framer, artisan, workman) of worlds ,
in order that in unity and oneness they (i.e. things) gather themselves in form of a
dense mass (globi) collected together]
p. 58 Damascius' treatise Peri arithmou kai topou kai chronou [On the numbers
and places and periods (of time).]
p.58 - Simplicius Corollarium de loco of Commentaria to Aristotle's Physics
p. 59 For example, Themistius in his Paraphrasis in libros quatuor Aristotelis de
caelo says:
"Sed conversio,
immo omnis motus,
super manente ac quiescente aliquo omnino celebratur. 1
[but on the contrary,
rather all that is moved,
performs entirely over some other remaining and resting (thing).]
In iis autem,
quae De Animalium Motu a nobis dicta sunt,
monstratum est id,
quod manet ac quiescit,
illius autem partem esse non posse,
quod super ipso movetur."
[In the same however,
1 =>celebratur
celebr.atur
V 1 1 PRES PASSIVE IND 3 S
celebro, celebrare, celebravi, celebratus V (1st) TRANS [XXXAO]
celebrate/perform; frequent; honor/glorify; publicize/advertise; discuss/bandy;

such things in De Animalium Motu" have declared to us,

(where) it is demonstrated,
insofar as (something) moves and rests,
however that cannot be part, which over itself is moved]
(i.e. that over which it is moved cannot itself be part of the thing moved)
p. 60 an object which appears to be at rest to an observer who regards himself as
being moved would appear to be retrogressing to the same observer if he regards
himself at rest.
Footnote 15. "Si aliquibus latis pluribus inaequali celeritate simul transportetur in
easdem partes et oculus, quae quidem oculo aequali celeritate feruntur, videbuntur
stare, tardiora vero in contrarium ferri, celeriora vero in praecedentia. - Si
aliquibus latis appareat aliquid, quod non feratur, videbitur illud non latum
retrorsum ferri." I. L. Heiberg and H. Menge, ed. Euclidis opera omnia (Leipzig,
1883-1916) vol. 7, Optica, p. 110
p.64 M. Guttmann draws our attention in this connection to the following phrase
in Leibniz's Epistolae ad P. des Bosses: "Substantia nempe simplex etsi non
habeat in se extensionem, habet tamen positionem, quae est fundamentum
extensionis."
[Certainly simple substances even if they have not extension in themselves,
have yet position
which is the foundation of extension.]
p. 65 modus tollens 2
p. 67 It will be recalled that Galilei also discusses the problem in his Discorsi e
dimostrazioni matematiche, intorno a due nuove scienze, [Discourses and
mathematical demonstrations about to two new sciences]
p. 69 "Indivisibile indivisibili additum non facit maius," [ Indivisible added to
indivisible does not make larger]
2 Modus Tollens (M.T.)
A rule of inference of the form:
pq
~q
_______
~p
Example: "If it had rained this morning, then the grass would still be wet. But the grass is not
wet. Therefore, it did not rain this morning."
A simple truth-table shows that any argument of this form must be valid.

p. 73 That this problem was really one of the major incitements to Copernicus'
drastic revision of the accepted cosmological conception may be seen from
various remarks in his De revolutionibus orbium caelestium (1543). In chapter V
of the first book he says:
"Cumque caelum sit,
quod continet et caelat omnia,
communis universorum locus,
non statim apparet,
cur non magis contento quam continentj,
locato quam locantj motus attribuatur."
My literal translation: [while to heaven (movement may be attributed ),
which contains and finishes all,
common place of all things,
(it) does not immediately appear,
why not rather to contained than containing,
to located than locating, movement may be attributed (i.e. to containing and
locating as well as to heaven).]
Ed Cryer suggests: [While there is the sky, which contains and carves all things ,
the common location of everything, it is not immediately apparent why movement
is not rather attributed to the content than the container, the located rather than the
locater.]
My translation seems to be right.
B. T. Raven suggests:
[And since the sky (space?) would be,
what contains and covers (celat)all things,
the common place of all (entium?),
it is not immediately apparent,
why motion should not be attributed rather to the contained than the containing, to
the located than the locating.]
In chapter VII of the same book .... He writes: "Addo etiam, quod satis absurdum
videretur, continenti sive locanti motum adscribi, et non potius contento et locato,
quod est terra."
[I add also,
that it should be seen sufficiently absurd,
to containing or to location, motion to be ascribed,
and not rather to contents and to place
which is earth]
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he feels justified in saying: "Prima et suprema omnium est stellarum fixarum

sphaera, se ipsam et omnia continens, ideoque immobilis; nempe universi locus,
ad quem motus et positio caeterorum omnium syderum conferatur."
[First and highest of all is the sphere of fixed stars in itself itself and all
containing, therefore immobile; truly universal place, on which confering motion
and position on all remaining (caeterorum) stars ]
p. 74 So, for example, among the errors condemned in 1277 there is this: "Quod
Deus non possit movere Coelum motu rectu. Et ratio est quia tunc relinqueret
vacuum."
[That God is not able to move heaven by rectilinear motion (motu rectu)
and (the) reason is because then it would leave behind empty (place, locum).]
p. 75 ... from Richard of Middleton's Super quattuor libros sententiarum
quaestiones subtilissimae. [four books about the most subtle questions of
thinking]
Footnote 46 gives Latin text.
p.82 ... Cusanus comes to the conclusion: "Qui igitur est Centrum mundus?
scilicet est Deus benedictus, ille est Centrum terrae, et omnium sphaerarum."
Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, II, 11 [of learned ignorance, on teaching
ignorance?]
[What therefore is the center of the world?
One may know God has approved it, that is the center of the earth, and of all
spheres].
However, from the purely physical point of view, the identification of the center
of the universe with its circumference is an obvious absurdity. To Cusanus the
world has neither a center nor a circumference. "Quia minimum cum maximo
coincidere necesse est. Centrum igitur mundi coincideret cum circumferentia.
Non habet igitur mundus circumferentiam." So it is clear that the earth is not the
center of the universe or of space. "Terra non est centrum mundi."
[because minimum with maximum is necessary to coincide.
The center therefore of the world concides with the circumference.
the world therefore shall not have a circumference. The earth is not the center of
the world.]
p. 83... Nicolaus of Autrecourt had to renounce his untimely thesis: "Quod non
potest evidenter ostendi nobilitas unius rei super aliam."
[because evidently not able to be made clear nobility of one thing above another]

Cusanus, objecting the spatial hierarchy of values, states explicitly: "Neque dici
debet, quod quia terra est minor sole et ab eo recipit influentiam, quod propterea
sit vilior."
[Neither ought it to be said
that because this earth is smaller than the sun and from it receives influence
that for this reason it should be meaner.]
p 84. Even in Cardan's De subtilitate, space is still conceived in accord with
Aristotelian tradition as the concave survace of the limiting body. "Est igitur
locus ultima corporis superficies, corpus contentum ambicus." Jerome Cardan,
De subtilitate, lib. I.
[final place is therefore surface of body,
body contained (by encircling thing).]
p. 85. Scaliger presupposes the vacuum as a necessary condition of motion. "In
natura vacuum dari necesse est." J. C. Scaliger, Exotericarum exercitationum
liberi ad Hieronymum Cardanum (Lutet, 1557)
[in nature empty (place) is necessary to allow]
"Idemque esse vacuum et locum; neque differre, nisi nomine."
[and also to empty and place; neither differing, except only in name.]
Telesio
If a body leaves its place or is expelled from it, place itself does not leave, nor is it
expelled, but remains the same, promptly becoming the receptacle of another
body.
Itaque locus entium quorumvis receptor fieri queat
et in existentibus entibus recedentibus expulsisve
nihil ipse recedat expellaturve,
sed idem perpetuo remaneat
et succedentia entia promptissime suscipiat omnia,
tantusque assidue ipse sit,
quantaquae (sic.) in ipso locantur sunt entia;
perpetio (sic.) nimirum iis,
quiae (sic.) in ea (sic. eo?) locata sunt,
aequalis,
at eorum nulli idem sit nec fiat unquam,
sed penitus ab omnibus diversus sit.
[Accordingly the place of any body whatever can be made the receiver
and in leaving the being which withdraws or driven out
nothing at all of itself may be withdrawn or expelled,
but remans always the same
and readily recieve all succeeding beings,
as much may continue to be itself,
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as in itself beings are located;

perpetually doubtless the same,
which are in that place,
equal (equally?),
but of them none may be nor ever be made the same,
but deeply may be separated from all]
Ed Cryer suggests: Thus a location could become the receiver of any beings at all
and in the withdrawal or expulsion of existing beings would itself not withdraw or
be expelled one jot, but would stay constantly the same and take in most readily
all things that come there, and be always as large itself as great as be the beings
located in it; constantly indeed on a par with the things located in it, and yet never
being or becoming the same as any of them, but deeply separated from all things.
Telesio. De natura rerum juxta propria principia libri novem (Naples, 1586), I,
25. [On the Nature of Things According to Their Own Principles]
p. 86. The considerations adduced by Telesio show clearly the new spirit of Italian
natural philosophy of the sixteenth century. Nothing less than the formulation of
a new physics is at issue. But another obstacle has still to be removed before
these ideas could be assimilated and a new machanics reared on their basis. The
traditional substance-accident doctrine, the great bulwark of scholastic thought,
had to be set aside. It was not enough to revise the physical foundations of the
theory of space; it had to be provied with a new metaphysical foundation as well.
Franciscus Patritius undertook this task.
Quid ergo est?
hypostasis, diastema, est (sic.), diastasis (sic.), ectasis (sic.) est, extensio est,
intervallum est, capedo est, atque intercapedo.
Ergo quantitas? Ergo accidens? Ergo accidens ante substantiam? & ante corpus?
Architas uterque, & senior Pythagorae auditor, & iunior Platonis amicus,
& quicos (sic.) secuti sunt scriptores categoriam,
hoc spacium non cognovere. Patritius, Nova de universis philosophia libris
quinquoginta comprehensa (Venice, 1593), fol. 65.
[What is it then?
basis/foundation, distance/interval, it is, diastasis (Gr. separation), it is ectasis(?
ect, outside), it is extension/stretching/spreading, it is interval/distance, it is
capedo (from capio?, seized, grasped, received, contained), but on the other hand
intercapedo (interval?).
Therefore quantity? Therefore accident? Therefore accident before substance? &
before body?
Architas, both disciple of the elder Pythagoras & friend of younger Plato,
& who (?) had followed categories (Aristotle's categories?) of writers (?)
this space did not know.]
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p. 87. Patritius "Id enim ante omnia necesse est esse, quo posito alia poni possunt
omnia; quo ablato alia omnia tollantur."
[It (space) however before all is necessary to be existing (existance),
which postulated all others can be placed,
which removed all others are removed]
Ed Cryer suggests: For this must be before all other things. Posit this and all other
things can be posited; take it away and all other things are taken away.
"Nulla ergo categoriarum spatium complectitur; ante eas est, extra eas omnes est."
[None however of the categories includes space,
it is before them,
it is beyond them all.]
Itaque aliter de eo philosophandum est quam ex categoriis. Spatium ergo extensio
est hypostatica per se substans, nulli inhaerens. Non est quantitas. Et si quantitas
est, non est illa categoriarum, sed ante eam ejusque fons et origo. Patritius,
Pancosmia. De spatio physico, 65 f.
[and so of that ought to be philosophized other than (aliter .. quam) from the
categories.
Space therefore is hypostatic3 extension , subsisting of itself,
adhering in nothing.
It is not quantity.
And if it (extension) is quantity,
it (that quantity) is not (one) of categories,
but before it (i.e. that one of the categories) and fountain and origin of the very
same thing (i.e of that category).]
p. 89 It is therefore only natural that Bruno expresses a new conception of infinite
space on the ground that "Si non superficies sed spatium quoddam locus est,
nullum corpus neque ulla corporis illocata erit sive maximum, sive minimum sive
finitum sit ipsum, sive infinitum."
[If a certain place (or, if a defined place) is not surface but, so to speak, (or a kind
of) space,
no body nor anything will be unlocated by body whether largest,
whether least whether itself limited,
whether unlimited.]
p. 90. Campanella develops Patritius' theory of space still further, maintaining
that space is the immovable basis of all existence: "basin omnis creati, omniaque
praecedere esse saltem origine et natura."
[foundation of all created,
3 hypostatize; to construe (a conceptual entity) as a real existent: reify
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and to precede all existence at least by origin and nature.]

Thomas Campanella, De sensu rerum (1620), I, c. 12 At another place he calls
space "locus, basis existentiae, in quo pulcrum Opificium, hoc est mundus, sedet."
[place, base of existence,
in which the beauty of the Workman,
that is the world,
remains.]
In Campanella's view space is homogeneous and undifferentiated, penetrated
corporeally and penetrating incorporeally. Its homogeneity excludes such
differentiations as "down" or "up", which attach to the diversities of bodies, rather
than to space. It goes without saying that the existence of "natural places" is
emphatically rejected. God created space as a "capacity," a receptacle for bodies.
"Locum dico substantiam primam incorpoream, immobilem, aptam ad
receptandum omne corpus," Physiologia (Paris, 1637) , I, 2.
[place, I say, (is) primary substance incorporal,
unmovable,
suitable for receiving each body.]
Gilbert in his Philosophia nova expresses these ideas in a concise way:
Sed non locus in natura quicquam potest; locus nihil est, non existit, vim non
habet; potestas omnis in corporibus ipsis. Non enim Luna movetur, nec Mercurii,
aut Veneris stella, propter locum aliquem in mundo, nec stellae fixae quietae
manent propter locum.
[but not place in nature (to do) anything (quicquam) is able;
place is nothing,
does not exist,
has no strength;
the power of every thing in body itself.
Indeed the moon is not moved,
nor Mercury,
or the star of Venus,
on account/by means of any place in the world
nor do the fixed stars remain resting because of place.]
William Gilbert, De mundo nostro sublunari philosophia nova (Amsterdam
1651), lib. II, cap. 8, p. 144.
p. 93 Further, Gassendi accepts Patritius' thesis of the priority of space over
matter: "Ideo videntur Locus et Tempus non pendere a corporibus, corporeaque
adeo accidentia non esse. "
[Therefore it is seen that Place and Time do not depend on body,
and not accidental to bodily things.]

13

Gassendi, Syntagma philosophicum(Florence, 1727), part II, sec. 1, lib. II, cap. 1.
According to Gassendi, this priority is not only logical or ontologica, but also
temporal, for he says explicitly: "Unum est, spatia immensa fuisse, antequam
Deus conderet mundum."
[one is,
immeasurable spaces have been,
before God made the world.]
It is certainly no fiction, not even the mode of a substance. "Cum ex deductis
constet posse quidem ea spatia dici nihil corporeum, seuquale (sic., sivequale)
substantia, aut accidens est, sed non nihil incorporeum ac specialis sui generis:
constat quoque esse ea posse, etsi intellectus non cogitet, ac non quemadmodum
chimaeram merum esse opus imaginationis."
[when by reason of deduction (deductive reasoning) certainly to be able indeed
these spaces are called nothing corporeal,
or if (it is) a kind of substance,
or is accident,
but not nothing incorporal and of its own special kind:
it is likewise understood,
constantly likewise able to be the same,
and yet (although) the intellect does not imagine (it),
and not as to be a chimaera, a mere work of imagination.]
Ed Cryer suggests: While it is agreed from deduced principles that those spaces
can be termed nothing corporeal at all, whether like substance or like accident, but
not "nothing incorporeal" and of their own special kind; it is agreed also that they
can be, even though the mind may not think them, and that they are not a mere
figment of the imagination like a chimaera.
p. 94 Epistolae tres de motu impresso a motore translato [three letters on
impressing motion by transfering from mover]

14

Chapter 4
The Concept of Absolute Space
p. 97 In "De quadratura curvarum" Newton writes: "Quantitates mathematicas,
non ut ex partibus quam minimis constantes, sed ut motu continuo descriptas, hic
considero . . . Hae geneses in rerum nature (sic., perhaps naturale) locum vere
habent et in motu corporum quotidie cernuntur."
[I consider here mathematical quantities not as consisting of parts as small as
possible, but as described by continuous motion .... These truly have beginning in
natural place of things and in movement of bodies ordinarily
understood/distinguished.]
For although Newton calls the laws of motion "axioms" (Axiomata sive leges
motus), [axioms or laws of motion] the term "axiom" as employed by Newton in
this context certainly does not have the modern meaning of an arbitrary
assumption; phrases like "lex tertia . . . per theoriam comprobata est" [third law ...
justified by theory] or "certa sit lex tertia motus" show clearly that Newton by his
use of the term axiom ... [let the third law of motion be fixed ]
These translations do not seem to me to support Jammer's thesis. Are axioms ever
actually arbitrary?
p. 104. Berkeley: Newton's cosmological assumption that the center of the world
is at rest escapes all possibility of experimental or observational verification. The
fact was clearly recognized by Berkeley, one of the great opponents of the theory
of absolute space. In "De motu" he writes:
"Uti vel ex eo patet quod,
quum secundam illorum principia
qui motum absolutum inducunt,
nullo symptomate scire liceat,
utrum integra rerum compages quiescat,
an moveatur uniformiter in directum,
perspicuum sit motum absolutum nullius corporis cognosci posse."
[As even from that it is seen (patior, to be visible) that ,
while following from the principles of those
who induce absolute motion
no symptom is allowed to be known,
whether the entire framework (compages, a joining, connection, structure) of
things may (be at) rest,
or be moved uniformly in direction,
evidently absolute motion of no body can be known.]
Ed Cryer suggests: As for instance is seen from the fact that, since, according to
(secundum) the principles of those who infer absolute motion, by no event can it
be known whether the whole structure of things is at rest or is moving uniformly
15

straight ahead, it is clear that absolute motion cannot be recognised in any

particular body.
p. 106. Thus Newton's first argument with regard to absolute motion is based on
the idea that real force creates real motion. To Newton, at least in this context,
forces are metaphysical entities conceived anthropomorphically. However, if we
leave out of account the import of forces for the determination of absolute space,
the notion of force in Newton's mechanics may be interpreted in the modern
functional way, as in Heinrich Hertz's Die Prinzipien der Mechanik (Leipzig,
1894, p. 32): "Was wir gewohnt sind als Kraft und als Energie zu bezeichnen ist
dann fuer uns nichts weiter als eine Wirkung von Masse und Bewegung, nur
braucht es nicht immer die Wirkung grobsinnlich nachweisbarer Masse und
grobsinnlich nachweisbarer Bewegung zu sein." [ What we ordinarily designate
as force or as energy is then for us nothing more than an effect of mass and
movement, it only requires not always to be the effect of coarsely demonstrable
mass and grossly obvious movement.]
p. 114 lapsis calmi is apparently a typo for lapsis calami, a slip of the pin.
pp. 119-120. In his "De Causa Gravitatis, et Defensio Sententiae Autoris de veris
Naturae Legibus contra Cartesianos" [ On the cause of gravity, and defense of the
author's opinion about the true laws of nature against Cartesians] Leibniz tried to
demonstrate that gravity is not explicable as a force acting at a distance, but is
reducible to the contiguous action of the surrounding ether. In other words, he
tried to reduce gravity to a centrifugal force, saying: "Etsi valde dudum
inclinaverim ipse ad gravitatem a vi centrifuga materiae aethereae circulantis
repetendam, sunt tamen aliqua quae dubitationes gravissimas injecere."
[Although formerly I may have greatly inclined myself to gravity from centrifugal
(center fleeing) force of returned (repetendam, falling back) encircling ethereal
matter, there are yet some which have in some way introduced serious doubts.]
Does this support Jammer?
p. 121ff.
The subject occurs in Huygens' first letter to Leibniz, which reads:
Je vous diray seulement, que dans vos notes sur des Cartes j'ay remarqu que vous
croiez absonum esse nullum dari motum realem, sed tantum relativum. Ce que
pourtant je tiens pour tres constant, sans m'arrester au raisonnement et
experiences de Newton dans ses Principles de Philosophie, que je scay (sic. say?,
know) estre dans l'erreur, et j'ay envie de voir s'il ne se retractera pas dans la
nouvelle edition de ce livre, que doit procurer David Gregorius.
[I will only say to you, that in your notes on Descartes I have observed that you
think incongruous (for) nothing to have been given real motion, but only relative.
That which however I hold very steadfast, without hendering the reasoning and
16

experiences of Newton in his Principles of Philosophy, which I know to be in

error, and I have a mind to see if he will retract in the new edition of his book,
which owes (perhaps, is bound to?) to agent (publisher?) David Gregorius. ]
On another page, Jammer offers his own translation of the Latin:
"that it would be absurd, if there exists no real, but only relative motion"
Leibniz's reply to this letter (June 22, 1694) is extremely interesting:
In addition to quaint spelling and obsolete words, these passages are riddled with
typographical errors.
Leibnez uses the word subjectum which looks like Latin but used interchangeably
with sujet . Since "subject of motion" doesn't mean much in English I translate
both subjectum.
Quant la difference entre le mouuement absolu et relatif, je croy (sic. croie? )
que si le mouuement ou plus tost (plutt) la force mouuante des corps est quelque
chose de reel comme il semble qu'on droit reconnoistre (sic. reconnatre?), il
faudra bien qu'elle [fem., i.e. la force] ait un subjectum .
[as to the difference between absolute movement and relative, I believe that if the
movement, or rather the force moving the body is something real (or has
something of real in it) just as it seems that ought to recognized directly, it will be
necessary that it ( i.e. the force) has a subjectum .]
[H. G. Alexander (introduction to Leibnitz-Clarke Correspondence) gives: "As
for the difference between absolute and relative motion, I believe that if motion,
or rather the moving force of bodies is something real, as it seems one must
admit, it is necessary that it has a subjectum."
I am pleased to see he also prefers not to translate subjectum.]
Car a et b (they have apparently been discussing two bodies, a and b) allant l'un
contre l'autre, j'avoue que tous les phenomenes arriveront tout le meme, quel que
soit celuy dans le quel on posera le mouuement ou le repos; et quand il y auroit
(sic.?) 1000 corps, je demeure d'accord que les phenomenes ne nous scauroient
(sic., sauroient = sauraient, from savoir, to be able) fournir (ny mme aux anges)
une raison infallible pour determiner le sujet du mouuement ou de son degr; et
que chacun pourroit (sic. pourrat?) estre conc part comme estant (sic. tant?)
en repos, et c'est aussi tout ce que je crois que vous demandes; mais vous ne
nieres pas je crois que veritablement chacun a un certain degr de mouuement on
(sic. ou?) , si vous vouls de la force; non-obstant l'equivalence des Hijpotheses
(sic.).
[Because a and b go (move) the one contrary to the other, I acknowledge that all
the phenomena happen all the same, whichever may be that in which they shall
suppose the movement or rest (i.e. which one is supposed to be at rest); and if
there should be 1000 bodies, I agree that the phenomena could not furnish us (not
17

even to the angels) an infallible argument to determine the subjectum of

movement or of its degree; and that besides ( part) each is able to be conceded
as being at rest, and it is thus all that which I know that you ask; but you would
not deny, I believe, that indeed each has a certain degree of movement or, if you
wish, of force; not withstanding the equivalence of the hypotheses.]
Il est vray que j'en tire cette consequence qu'il y a dans la nature quelque autre
chose que ce que la Geometrie y peut determiner .
[it is true that I draw out of it (en tire) this consequence that there is in nature
something else which the geometry is able to determine]
Et parmy plusieurs raisons dont je me sers pour prouuer qu'outre l'etendue et ses
variations, qui sont des choses purement Geometriques, il faut reconnoistre (sic.
reconnatre?) quelque chose de superieur, qui est la force; celle-cy n'est pas des
moindres.
[and among many reasons they give I avail myself for proving that beyond the
extension and its variations (variability?), which are pure geometric things, there
needs to be recognized something superior, which is force; the latter is not the
least]
Monsieur Newton reconnoist (sic. reconnat?) l'equivalence des Hypothese en cas
des mouuements rectilineaires ; mais a (sic., ?) l'egard des Circulaires, il croit
que l'effort que font les corps circulans de s'eloigner du centre ou de l'axe de la
circulation fait connoistre (sic. connatre?) leur mouuement absolu.
[ Monsieur Newton recognizes the equivalence of the hypotheses in the case of
rectilinear movement but in regard to circular, he believes that, the effort that the
revolving bodies make to remove themselves from the center or the axis of
rotation, makes known their absolute movement.]
Mais j'ay des raisons qui me font croire que rien ne rompt la loy generale de
l'Equivalence. Il me semble cependant que vous meme , Monsieur, estis autres
fois du sentiment de M. Neuton (sic.) l'egard du mouuement circulaire.
[ but I have some reasons which make me believe that nothing breaks the general
law of equivalence. It seems to me nevertheless that you yourself , Monsieur,
were formerly of the opinion of M. Neuton in regard to circular movement.]
Aexander gives: "For if there are 1000 bodies, I still hold that phenomena cannot
give us any infallible way of determining which are moving and in what degree;
and that each separately could be considered as being at rest . . . Mr. Newton
recognizes the equivalence of hypotheses in the case of rectilinear motion, but
with regard to circular motion he believes that the effort which revolving bodies
make to recede from the axis of rotation enables one to know their absolute
18

motion. But I have reasons for believing that nothing breaks this general law of
equivalence."
p. 122. But Huygens is opposed to any compromise. Thus he writes in a letter
dated August 24, 1694:
Pour ce qui est du mouvement absolu et relatif, j'ay admire vostre memoire, de ce
que vous vous estes souvenu , qu'autrefois j'estois du sentiment de Mr. Newton,
en ci qui regard le mouvement circulaire.
Ce qui est vray,
et il n'y a que 2 ou 3 que j'ay trouve celuy qui est plus veritable, duquel il semble
que vous n'estes pas eloigne non plus maintenant,
si non ence (sic. en ce?) que vous voulez,
que lorsque plusieurs corps ont entre eux du mouvement relatif, ils aient chacun
un certain degre de mouvement veritable , ou de force, enquoy je ne suis point de
vostre avis .
[as regards what is absolute or relative motion, I am astonished (wonder) at your
memory (or note), of that which you have recalled to your mind, that formerly I
was of the opinion of Mr. Newton, in that which regards circular movement.
Which is true,
and there are not but 2 or 3 (years?) since I have found that (opinion) which is
more true ,
from which it seems that you are not more distant now,
except (si non ence) that you want,
that when many bodies have among them relative movement, they have each a
certain degree of true movement, or of force, in which I am not at all of your
opinion.]
p. 123. Leibniz not only realized the inherent similarity, or near identity, of the
problem under discussion with the problem whether the Ptolemaic or the
Copernican system is preferable, but he even composed a treatise, Tentamen de
motuum coelestium causis, [Tentamen , trial, test, proof] whose intention is to
show how the arguments with regard to the mechanical relativity of motion
suggest the equifalence of the two rival cosmological systems. It seems that he
originally intended to publish this work in Rome during his visit to the Holy City.
But caution prevailed and he submitted only a Promemoria, whose theoretical
part begins with the statement:
"Ut vero res intelligatur exactius,
sciendum est Motum ita sumi,
ut involvat aliquid respectivum
et non posse dari phaenomena ex quibus absolute determinetur motus aut quies;
constitit enim motus in mutatione situs seu loci."
[that truly the matter may be understood exactly,
movement having been thus to be assumed,
19

so it involves to some degree respectively

and also not to be able to be given phenomena out of which absolute motion or
rest is determined;
movement consists therefore in change of position or location]
p. 123. Before Huygens' death in 1695, Leibnitz' final letter to him:
. . . Comme je vous disois (sic. disais?) un jour Paris qu'on avoit de la peine
connoistre (sic. connatre?) le veritable sujet du Mouuement vous me rpondites
que cela se pouuoit (sic. se pouvoir, to be possible?) par le moyen du mouuement
circulaire, cela m'arresta (sic. arrter?) ; et je m'en souuins (sic. souvenir, souvins,
I recalled?) en lisant peu prs la mme chose dans le liure de Mons. Newton;
mais ce fut lorsque je croyois dja voir que le mouuement circulaire n'a point de
privilege en cela .
. . . [When I said to you one day in Paris that it was worth the trouble to know the
true subjectum of movement you replied to me that is possible by means of
circular motion, that gave me pause; and I recalled it to myself through reading
very nearly ( peu prs) the same thing in the book of Mons. Newton; but that
was when, I believe, before seeing that circular movement had no privileged
position in that].
Andr Majorel suggests: "but that was when I already thought I knew/saw that
circular movement is not special in that."
Et je voy que vous estes dans le meme sentiment. Je tiens donc que toutes les
hypotheses sont equivalentes et lorsque j'assigne certains mouuements certains
corps, je n'en ay ny puis avoir d'autre raison , que la simplicit de l'Hypotheses
croyant qu'on peut tenir la plus simple (tout consider) pour le veritable.
[And I see that you are of the same opinion. I hold then that all these hypotheses
are equivalent and when I assign certain movements to certain bodies, I have not
in it nor am able to have other reason , than the simplicity of the hypotheses
believing that one can hold the more simple (everything considered) for the true.]
Ainsi n'en ayant point d'autre marque , je crois que la difference entre nous, n'est
que dans la maniere de parler, que je tache d'accomoder a l'usage commun, autant
que je puis, salva veritate.
[Thus not having noted point (?) of other, I think that the difference between us is
no more than the manner of speech, yet I strive to accommodate the common
usage, as far as I am able, salva veritate. 4 ]
4
From: A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names
A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names

20

Je ne suis pas mme fort elogne (sic. eloign?) de la vostre, et dans un petit
papier que je communiquay Mr. Viviani, et qui me paroissoit (sic. paratre,
appear, make plane?) propre persuader Messieurs de Rome a permettre
l'opinion de Copernic, je m'en accomodois .
[I am not so far from you, and through a little paper which I communicated to
Mr. Viviani, and which seems to me suitable to persuade the Gentlemen
(Messieurs) of Rome to permit the opinion of Copernicus, I have adjusted myself
to it] .
Cependant si vous estes dans ces sentimens sur la realit du mouument, je
m'imagine que vous deuris (sic. devriez?) en avoir sur la nature du corps de
differens de ceux qu'on a coustume d'avoir. J'en ay d'assez singuliers (?) et qui me
paroissent (sic. paratre?) demonstrs .
[Nevertheless if you are of these opinions on the reality of movement, I think that
you ought to have different (opinions) on the nature of bodies than one is
accustomed to have. I have them (opinions?) sufficiently unique (singuliers ?)
and which appear to me to be demonstrated.] .
p. 124.
Diu putavi in circulari motu haberi veri motus but Jammer translates this!

salva veritate
Latin for "saving the truth." If two expressions can be interchanged without changing the truthvalue of the statements in which occur, they are said to be substitutable salva veritate.
A Dictionary of Philosophical Terms and Names

21

Chapter 5
The Concept of Space in Modern Science
p. 128 "Coeli enarrant gloriam Dei", [the heavens explain fully the glory of God,
"the heavens proclaim the glory of the Lord"]
p. 129. Leonhard Euler grappled with the problem for more than thirty years. In
his Mechanica sive motus scientiae analytice exposita [analytical knowledge of
mechanics or movement expounded] Euler develops his mechanics on Newtonian
lines and introduces the concept of absolute space and absolute motion in the
spirit of the Principia. So his second definition reads: "Locus est pars spatii
immensi seu infiniti in quo universus mundus consistit. Vocari hoc sensu
acceptus locus solet absolutus, ut distinguatur a loco relativo, cuius mox fiet
mentio."
[Location (space) is portion of space immense or boundless in which the whole
world stands together, (comes about, is established, consists). Receiving location
is usually called absolute in this sense , in order to be distinguished from relative
location, of which next will be made mention.]
p. 130. in his "Rflexions sur l'espaces et le temps: emphasized the necessary
existence of absolute space; for he had come to the conclusion that some real
existing substratum is indispensable to the determination of motion. Since this
substratum appears not to exist in the casual surrounding material, it must be
space itself that exists in this capacity. "On en devroit plutt conclure, que tant
l'espace absolu, que le temps, tels que les Mathmaticiens se les figurent, toient
des choses relles, qui subsistent mmes hors de notre imagination." [one rather
ought to conclude , that as much absolute space, as time, such as the
mathematiciens imagine them, were real things, which subsist themselves
(memes) out of our imagination.]
Euler's demonstration of the reality of absolute space on the basis of the law of
inertia appears finally in his Theoria motus corporum solidorum seu rigidorum,
[theory of motion of bodies solid or rigid] though the Mechanica already insists
that the laws of motion presuppose the existence of absolute space. "Si hac
significatione expositae voces accipiantur, vocari solent motus absolutus,
quiesque absoluta. Atque hae sunt verae et genuinae istarum vocum definitiones,
sunt enim accomodatae ad leges motus, quae in sequentibus explicabuntur."
[whether in this meaning (significatione ) the expressions set forth are accepted,
(they are) ordinarily called absolute motion, absolute rest. But as these are true
and authentic, natural definitions of these expressions, they are indeed suitable to
laws of motion, which are in the following set forth.]
The law is formulated in Axioma 2
p. 131. as follows: "Corpus, quod absolute quiescit, si nulli externae actioni fuerit
subjectum, perpetuo in quiete perseverabit." [body, which absolutely rests, if it
be subject to no external action, persists perpetually in rest] In the "Explicatio"
22

immediately following we read, "cum enim in eo (i.e. elemento corporis) nulla

insit ratio, cur in unam potius directionem moveri incipiat, quam in omnes alias,
atque extrinsecus omnis causa motus adimatur, secundum nullam directionem
motum concipere poterit. Nititur igitur quidem haec veritas principio sufficientis
rationis." [when indeed in that (i.e. elementary body) nothing belong to ratio, why
in one preferable direction should begin to move, than in all others, but all
extraneous causes of motion to be withdrawn, it will be able to take up along no
direction of motion . This therefore indeed truly depends on the principle of
sufficient reason.]
p. 134 In this intuition rests the proof for the reality of absolute space. "In den
anschauenden Urteilen, dergleichen die Messkunst enthaelt, ist der Beweis zu
finden, dass der absolute Raum unabhngig von dem Dasein aller Materie und
selbst als der erste Grund ihrer Zusammensetzung eine eigene Realitt habe." [in
the intuitive judgment, such as the mensuration (Messkunst?) contains, is the
proof to be found, that absolute space may have a proper reality independent from
the existence of all matter and itself as the first foundation of its (i.e. matter's)
composition.] The idea that intuition lies at the basis of our geometric cognition
brings about a radical change in Kant's attitude toward these questions. The
problem of space now appears to Kant in a new light. It ceases to be a problem of
physics and becomes an integral part of transcendental philosophy. To Kant from
now on space is a condition of the very possibility of experience. In the inaugural
dissertation "De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis, "
[Concerning the form and principle of the sensible and (but yet) intelligible
world]
p. 139. It is interesting to note that the Encyclopdie of Diderot and d'Alembert
expresses much the same view. In the fifth volume, under the heading "Espace",
we read:
Cet article est tir des papiers de M. Formey, qui l'a compos en partie sur le
recueil des Lettre de Clarke, Leibnitz, Newton, Amsters. 1740. & sur les inst. de
Physique de madame du Chtelet. Nous ne prendrons point de parti sur la
question de l'espace; on peu voir, partout ce qui a t dit au mot Elmens (sic.
Elments?) des Sciences, combien cette question obscure est inutile la
Gomtrie & la Physique. [this article is taken from a papers of M. Formey,
which he has composed in part for the collection of letters of Clarke, Leibnitz,
Newton, Amsters. 1740. & in the ins. of Physics of Madame du Chtelet. We will
not take side at all (point) in the question of space; one can see, everything that
this has been said on the phrase "Elmens des Sciences", how much this obscure
question is useless to geometry & to physics.]
p. 142. In the forword to the first edition of his Die Mechanik in ihrer
Entwicklung he writes: "Vorliegende Schrift ist kein Lehrbuch zur Einbung der
Stze der Mechanik. Ihre Tendenz ist vielmehr eine aufklrende oder, um es noch
deutlicher zu sagen, eine antimetaphysische." [the present writing is no textbook
23

for training in the principles of machanics. Its approach is much more a

clarifiying or, more clearly stated, an anti-metaphysical one.]
In the concluding passage of his foreword to the seventh edition (1912) of his
Mechanik Mach says "Bezglich der Begriffsungetme des absoluten Raumes
und der absoluten Zeit konnte ich nichts zurcknehmen. Ich habe hier nur
deutlicher als vorher gezeigt, dass Newton zwar manches ber diese Dinge redet,
aber durchaus keine ernste Anwendung von denselben gemacht hat. Sein Coroll.
V. (Principia, 1687, p. 19) enthlt das einzig praktisch brauchbare
(wahrscheinlich angenhrte) Inertialsystem." E. Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer
Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1883) [in relation to the conceptional monsters of absolute
space and absolute time I can take back nothing. I have here only clearly as
before shown that Newton indeed said much about these things, however
throughout had made no serious application of the same. His Coroll. V. contains
the only practically useable (probably approximate) inertial system.]
p. 143. "Ueber den absoluten Raum und die absolute Bewegung kann niemand
etwas aussagen, sie sind blosse Gedankendinge, die in der Erfahrung nicht
aufgezeigt werden knnen." [about absolute space and absolute time no one can
state anything, they are mere "thought things", which in experience cannot be
pointed out.]
In the fourth edition of Die Mechanik Mach summarizes his ideas concerning
space in a very clear statement (which curiously is omitted in the later editions):
Fr mich gibt es berhaupt nur eine relative Bewegung und ich kann darin einen
Unterschied zwischen Rotation und Translation nicht machen. Dreht sich ein
Krper relative gegen den Fixsternhimmel, so treten Fliehkrfte auf, dreht er sich
relativ gegen einen anderen Krper, nicht aber gegen den Fixsternhimmel, so
fehlen die Fliehkrfte. Ich habe nichts dagegen, wenn man die erstere Rotation
eine absolute nennt, wenn man nur nicht vergisst, dass dies nichts anderes heisst,
als eine relative Drehung gegen den Fixsternhimmel. Knnen wir vielleicht das
Wasserglas Newtons festhalten, den Fixsternhimmel dagegen rotieren, und das
Fehlen der Fliehkrfte nun nachweisen? Der Versuch ist nicht ausfhrbar, der
Gedanke berhaupt sinnlos, da beide Flle sinnlich voneinander nicht so
unterscheiden sind. Ich halte demnach beide Flle fr denselben Fall und die
Newtonsche Unterscheidung fr eine Illusion.
[for me there is generally only relative movement and I can not make a distinction
in it between rotation and translation. If a body rotates relative to the fixed stars,
there appears a centrifugal force (Fliehkrfte, aversion force ), but if relative to
another body, but not to the fixed stars, the force disappears. I have no objection
if one calls the first rotation an absolute one if he does not forget that this means
nothing other than a relative turning against the fixed stars. Could we perhaps
hold fixed the water glass of Newton, rotating the fixed stars relative to it, and the
then demonstrate the disappearance of the aversion force? The experiment is
impossible, the thought generally meaningless, since both cases are sensibly
24

indistinguishable. I hold accordingly both cases to be the same and the

Newtonian distinction an illusion.]
p. 158. Von Staudt, whom Klein calls "einen der am tiefsten eindringenden
Geometere, die je gelebt haben," [one of the deepest penetrating geometers which
have ever lived]
p. 160 Footnote Rame konstanten Krmmungsmasses, Spaces of constant
curvature mass
p. 161 parturiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus [the mountains labor to bring
forth a ridiculous mouse]
p. 161. footnote 64 "Es muss also entweder das dem Raume zu Grunde liegende
Wirkliche eine discrete Manigfaltigkeit bilden, oder der Grund der
Massverhltnisse ausserhalb, in darauf wirkenden bindenden Krften, gesucht
werden." Riemann, Collected works, p. 286. [there must thus either the space
built on a foundation of ... Jammer has provided a translation taken from Weyl,
but I find it more a paraphrase than a translation.
p. 176 . Even Leibniz,
"Le nombre ternaire est dtermin . . . par une necessit gemtrique: c'est parce
que les Gomtres ont pu dmontrer qu'il n'y a que trois lignes droites
perpendiculaires entre elles, qui se puissent coupre dans un mme point."
[ The ternery (?) number is determined by a geometric necessity; it is because the
geometers are able to demonstrate that there are but three right lines mutually
perpendicular, which can intersect in a single point.]
Kant: Already in his Gedanken von der wahren Schtzung der legendigen Kraft
[thoughts on the true estimation of applied force?] he considers the possibility of
spaces having different dimensionalities.
Eine Wissenschaft von allen diesen mglichen Raumarten wre ohnfehlbar die
hchste Geometrie, die ein endlicher Verstand unternehmen knnte . . . Wenn es
mglich ist, dass es Ausdehnungen von anderer Abmessung gebe, so ist es auch
sehr wahrscheinlich, dass sie Gott wirklich irgendwo angebracht hat.
[A science of all these possible kinds of space would unfailingly, without doubt
the highest geometry, which a finite understanding could undertake... if it is
possible, that there are extensions of other measures, thus it is also very probable,
that God would have made them somewhere]
p. 180 In his [Henry Moore] Echiridion metaphysicum [Handbook of
metaphysics] he writes: "Ita ubicumque vel plures vel plus essentiae in aliquo ubi
continetur quam quod amplitudinem huius adaequat, ibi cognoscatur quarta haec
dimensio, quam apello spissitudinem5 essentialem."
5 Lewis and Short
Latin Lexicon

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[ thus wherever either more or less essential in anything where it is contained that
which compares width/thickness of these, there we become acquanted with this
fourth dimension, which I name the essential density/thickness]
p. 182 With regard to Christian teratology Zllner says: "Das sacrificium
intellectus welches die christlichen Wunder vom Verstande bisher verlangten, ist
durch die Entdeckung jenes neuen Gebietes der Physik - der
Transcendentalphysik - zum ungetrbten Genusse des Neuen Testamentes nicht
mehr erforderlich."
[the sacrificium intellectus which the Christian miracle previously demanded of
understanding, is through the discovery of that new region of physics - the
transcendental physics - no more required for the unspoiled, undiminished
(ungetrbten) profit, enjoyment (Genusse ) of the New Testament]
p. 189. De Broglie: He says:
Les donnes de nos perceptions nous conduisent construire un cadre de l'espace
et du temps o toutes nos observations peuvent se localiser. Mais les progrs de
la Physique quantique nous amnent penser de notre cadre de l'espace et du
temps n'est pas adquat la vritable description des ralits de l'chelle
microscopique. Cependant, nous ne pouvons gure penser autrement qu'en termes
d'espace et de temps et toutes les images que nous pouvons voquer s'y rattachent.
De plus, tous les rsultats de nos observations, mme celles qui nous apportent le
reflet des ralits du monde microsphysique, s'expriment ncessairement dans le
cadre de l'espace et du temps. C'est pourquoi nous cherchons tant bien que mal
nous reprsenter les ralits microphysiques (corpuscules ou systme de
corpuscules) dans ce cadre qui ne leur est pas adapt.
[the data of our perceptions leads us to construct a framework of space and time
in which all our observations can be localized. But the progress of (quantum?)
physics makes us agreeable to think of our framework of space and time is not
adequate to the true description of reality of the microsopic scale. Nevertheless,
we are not much able to think other than in terms of space and time and all our
images which we are able to invoke attach themselves to it. Moreover, all the
result of our observations, those same things which furnish to us the reflection of
the realites of the microphysical world, necessarily express themselves through
the framwork of space and of time. Therefore we find to represent to us
indifferently (as good as bad) the microphysic realities (corpuscles or systems of
corpuscles) through this framework which is not adapted to them.]

spisstdo, nis, f. id., thickness, density, consistency (post-Aug. and very rare): aris crassi, Sen.
Q. N. 2, 30, 4: mellis, Scrib. Comp. 4; 5: emplastri, id. ib. 81: non nimis liquida, id. ib. 37:
spissitudinem ejus absolvere, Pall. 12, 17, 2.

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Chapter 6
Recent Developments
p. 218 "metabasis eis allo genos" Greek
metabasis: moving over, shifting, e.g. of the body in walking, from one leg to the
other; change of position, transition from one subject to another
eis: prep. with acc. only. Radical sense, into, and then to:
allo: anything else,
genos, eos or ous, to: in Logic, opp. eidos (species),
class, sort, kind, ta

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