The Collector of Internal Revenue v. Antonio Campos Rueda Fernando, J.

: Facts: The collector of internal revenue held Antonio Campos Rueda, administrator of the estates of Marie Cediera, liable for certain amount as a deficiency and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, Spanish national having been a resident of Morocco Tangier until her time of death. Campos Rueda petitioned an exemption of tax but was denied on the ground that the law of tangier was not reciprocal to section 122 of National Internal Revenue Code. Rueda requested then another reconsideration petition but was denied on the grounds that Tangier is not, to an extent, a mere foreign country and not reciprocal to the section 122 of the National Internal Revenue code. The court of tax of appeals ruled that the statement foreign country used in section 122 of the said code, refers to government of that foreign power, although not an international power, does not impose transfer of death taxes upon intangible properties of our citizens not residing therein. Issue: Whether or not the requisite of statehood, or atleast, so much thereof, may be necessary for acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a foreign country, to fall within the exemption of section 122 of the Internal Revenue Code, is now ripe for adjudication. Decision: The Supreme Court affirmed the Tax Appeals ruling. Reason for decision: If a foreign country is, therewith, to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pounds formulation. Is is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society undergovernment with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands.

archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends to thewaters enclosed by the archipelagic baselines, regardless of their depth ordistance from the coast. It is further stated that the regime of archipelagic sealanes passage will not affect the status of its archipelagic waters or the exerciseof sovereignty over waters FACTS: The conversion of internal waters into and air space, bed and subsoil and the archipelagic waters will not risk resources therein thePhilippines because an archipelagic State has sovereign power that extends tothe waters enclosed by the archipelagic ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, v. baselines, regardless of their depth or COMELEC distance from the coast. Facts R.A. 9522 was enacted by the Congress The case hovered around the issue of the in March 2009 to comply with theterms unconstitutionality of the Republic Act of the United Nations Convention on the 9189 or the Overseas Absentee Voting Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III),which the Act of 2003. Atty. Romulo Macalintal Philippines ratified on February 27, 1984. appealed that certain provisions of the Such compliance shortenedone baseline, RA 9189 suffer from constitutional optimized the location of some infirmity and it was appropriated of a basepoints around the supplemental budget for the enactment of Philippinearchipelago and classified its provisions to which taxpayers such as adjacent territories such as the Kalayaan him have the right to restrain wastage of IslandGround (KIG) and the Scarborough public funds just for the enforcement of Shoal as regimes of islands whose an unconstitutional statute. According to islandsgenerate their own applicable him, Section 5(d) of RA 9189 - which maritime zones.Petitioners, in their states that an immigrant may exercise his capacities as citizens, taxpayers or right to vote as long as upon registration, legislators assailthe constitutionality of he provides an affidavit declaring his R.A. 9522 with one of their arguments intention to resume physical permanent contending thatthe law unconstitutionally residence in the Philippines not later than converts internal waters into 3 years from the date of the approval of archipelagic waters,thus subjecting these his registration - violates Section 1, waters to the right of innocent and sea Article V of the Constitution which lanes passageunder UNCLOS III, provides that a voter shall have resided in including overflight. Petitioners have the Philippines for at least one year and in contended that thesepassage rights will the place wherein they propose to vote violate the Constitution as it shall expose for at least 6 months. Petitioner cites the Philippine internalwaters to nuclear and ruling of Court in Caasi vs. Court of maritime pollution hazard. Appeals where the Court held that a "green card" holder immigrant to the ISSUE: United States is deemed to have Whether or not R.A. 9522 is abandoned his domicile and residence in unconstitutional for converting internal the Philippines which automatically watersinto archipelagic waters disqualifies him as a voter. Atty. Macalintal also questioned Section 18.5 HELD: of RA 9189 which states that the Petition Commission is empowered to proclaim DISMISSED. the winning candidates. The provision is The Court finds R.A. 9522 constitutional in contrast with Section 4, Article VII of and is consistent with thePhilippines the Constitution mandating that the national interest. Aside from being a vital election returns for the Presidency and step in safeguarding thecountrys Vice-Presidency be transmitted to the maritime zones, the law also allows an Congress and directed to the Senate internationally-recognizeddelimitation of President which both later will hold a the breadth of the Philippines maritime joint public session for the canvassing zones and continentalshelf. The Court and proclamation. And finally, petitioner also finds that the conversion of internal also questioned Sections 19 and 25 of RA waters intoarchipelagic waters will not 9189 which under it, the Joint risk the Philippines as affirmed in the Congressional Oversight Committee was Article 49 of the UNCLOS III, an formed to review, revise, amend and PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, V. HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. No. 187167, 16 July 2011, EN BANC (Carpio, J.)

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approve the implementing rules and regulations promulgated by the COMELEC whereas according to Section 1, Article IX of the Constitution, the COMELEC is an independent body and is not under the control of either the executive or legislative departments of the government.

which denotes fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has intention of returning. Having become an immigrant or permanent resident of a foreign county doesnt necessarily imply an abandonment of his domicile. Therefore, the law gives a chance to those who wish to exercise their right of suffrage by submitting an affidavit.

despite the fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country or countries, and which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or influence of the Commission.

Issues a) Whether or not Section 5(d) of RA b) The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of Section 19 of RA 9189 9189 violates the voters residency RA 9189 was upheld but reiterated that Authority of the Commission to requirement as stated in Section 1, the COMELEC has the authority to Promulgate Rules. The Commission Article V the Constitution. proclaim winning candidates for the shall issue the necessary rules and b) Whether or not Section 18.5 of RA Senators and Paty-list Representatives regulations to effectively implement the 9189 violates the mandate that but not as to the power to canvass the provisions of this Act within sixty (60) Congress has the authority to proclaim votes and proclaim the winning days from the effectivity of this Act. The the winning candidates in the candidates for the President and Vice- Implementing Rules and Regulations Presidency and Vice-Presidency under President which is solely lodged to the shall be submitted to the Joint Section 4, Article VII of the Congress. Congressional Oversight Committee Constitution. created by virtue of this Act for prior c) Whether or not Sections 19 and 25 of c) Parts of Sections 19 and 25 of RA 9189 approval. RA 9189 violates the independence of were declared void because the the COMELEC as mandated under COMELEC agrees with the petitioner In the formulation of the rules and Section 1, Article IX of the that they are an absolute independent regulations, the Commission shall Constitution. institution free from control of either coordinate with the Department of the executive or legislative departments Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and of the government. COMELEC agrees Employment, Philippine Overseas and Held The Court didnt find Section 5(d) and that the creation in the RA 9189 of the Employment Administration, Overseas Section 18.5 of RA 9189 constitutional Joint Congressional Oversight Workers Welfare Administration and the defective. The petition for Sections 19 Committee which is mandated to Commission on Filipinos Overseas. Nonand 25 of RA 9189 however was partly review, revise, amend and approve the government organizations and accredited granted and some of its portions were implementing rules and regulations Filipino organizations or associations declared void for being unconstitutional. promulgated by them is abroad shall be consulted. unconstitutional. Section 25 of RA 9189 Ratio Decidendi a) The court didnt find Section 5(d) of Section 5(d) of RA 9189 Joint Congressional Oversight RA 9189 unconstitutional because Committee. A Joint Congressional Section 2, Article V of the Constitution An immigrant or a permanent resident Oversight Committee is hereby created, provides that the Congress shall who is recognized as such in the host composed of the Chairman of the Senate provide a system for absentee voting of country, unless he/she executes, upon Committee on Constitutional qualified Filipinos abroad and this registration, an affidavit prepared for the Amendments, Revision of Codes and manifests that absentee voting is an purpose by the Commission declaring Laws, and seven (7) other Senators exception to the residency requirement that he/she shall resume actual physical designated by the Senate President, and for voters as stated in Section 1, Article permanent residence in the Philippines the Chairman of the House Committee on V of the Constitution. For a sense of not later than three (3) years from Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and practicality, if the Philippines will approval of his/her registration under this seven (7) other Members of the House of follow the residency requirement rule, Act. Such affidavit shall also state that Representatives designated by the it will be legally and constitutionally he/she has not applied for citizenship in Speaker of the House of Representatives: impossible to give franchise to vote to another country. Failure to return shall be Provided, That, of the seven (7) members overseas Filipinos who do not the cause for the removal of the name of to be designated by each House of physically live in the country. This will the immigrant or permanent resident from Congress, four (4) should come from the forfeit the whole point of creating the the National Registry of Absentee Voters majority and the remaining three (3) from RA 9189. and his/her permanent disqualification to the minority. vote in absentia. Also, as per the criteria of political laws, The Joint Congressional Oversight the concepts of residence and Section 18.5 of RA 9189 Committee shall have the power to domicile are synonymous. The canvass of votes shall not cause the monitor and evaluate the implementation Differentiating the terms, residence delay of the proclamation of a winning of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend involves the intent to leave when the candidate if the outcome of the election and approve the Implementing Rules and purpose for which the resident has taken will not be affected by the results thereof. Regulations promulgated by the up his abode ends. A person could go to a Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission. foreign country for work or pleasure but Commission is empowered to order the he will still go back to his domicile proclamation of winning candidates

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Section 1, Article V the Constitution include them in the National Registry Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of Absentee Voters, petitioner Nicolasof the Philippines, not otherwise Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this disqualified by law, who are at least petition for certiorari and mandamus. eighteen years of age, and who shall have 4. A little over a week before the May 10, resided in the Philippines for at least one 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, year and in the place wherein they the COMELEC filed a Comment, propose to vote, for at least six months therein praying for the denial of the immediately preceding the election. No petition. As may be expected, literacy, property, or other substantive petitioners were not able to register let requirement shall be imposed on the alone vote in said elections. exercise of suffrage. 5. On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified The returns of every election for overseas Filipinos, including dual President and Vice-President, duly citizens who care to exercise the right certified by the board of canvassers of of suffrage, may do so" , observing, each province or city, shall be transmitted however, that the conclusion of the to the Congress, directed to the President 2004 elections had rendered the of the Senate. Upon receipt of the petition moot and academic. certificates of canvass, the President of 6. The holding of the 2004 elections had, the Senate shall, not later than thirty days as the OSG pointed out, indeed after the day of the election, open all the rendered the petition moot and certificates in the presence of the Senate academic, but insofar only as and the House of Representatives in joint petitioners participation in such public session, and the Congress, upon political exercise is concerned. The determination of the authenticity and due broader and transcendental issue execution thereof in the manner provided tendered or subsumed in the petition, by law, canvass the votes. i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter Section 1, Article IX of the Constitution in future elections, however, remains The Constitutional Commissions, which unresolved. shall be independent, are the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on ISSUE: Elections, and the Commission on Audit. 1. Whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. NICOLAS-LEWIS VS. COMELEC 9189. EN BANC, G.R. No. L-162759 August 4, 2006 DECISION: 1. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is FACTS: GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court 1. Petitioners are successful applicants for rules and so holds that those who retain recognition of Philippine citizenship or reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such under Republic Act No. 9225, the applicants the right of suffrage, among Citizenship Retention and others. 2. Long before the May 2004 national and ReAcquisition Act of 2003, may local elections, petitioners sought exercise the right to vote under the registration and certification as system of absentee voting in Republic overseas absentee voter only to be Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee advised by the Philippine Embassy in Voting Act of 2003. the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of RATIO DECIDENDI: Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 1. In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 2003, they have yet no right to vote in prescribes residency requirement as a such elections owing to their lack of general eligibility factor for the right to the one-year residence requirement vote. On the other hand, Section 2 prescribed by the Constitution. authorizes Congress to devise a system 3. Faced with the prospect of not being wherein an absentee may vote, able to vote in the May 2004 elections implying that a nonresident may, as owing to the COMELEC's refusal to an exception to the residency

prescription in the preceding section, be allowed to vote. (Sections 1 and 2 Article V of the Constitution) 2. As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is "recognized as such in the host country" because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law" must be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting. 3. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, naturalborn citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. (Section 3 R.A. 9225) 4. Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing laws. (Section 5(1) R.A. 9189)

TECSON V. COMELEC G.R. No. 151434, 3 March 2004 VITUG, J. FACTS: 31 December 2003respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed

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candidacy for the position of Philippine President under Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ represented himself to be a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines with a birth date of 20 Aug 1939, and Manila as birth place. Various petitioners including Victoriano X. Fornier sought FPJs disqualification on the contention that he made material misrepresentation of being natural-born citizen when in fact both his parents were foreigners; his mother an American and his father, a Spanish national. Petitioners motion was dismissed by Comelec en banc. Fornier filed motion for reconsideration but was again denied. As a result, he assailed the decision before the Supreme Court through Article 7, Sec 4, Par 7 of the 1987 Constitution, which states that only the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. ISSUE: Whether or not FPJ was a natural-born Filipino citizen and was qualified to run for the position of Philippine President. DECISION: Evidence does not establish conclusively FPJs citizenship but the evidence preponderates in his favor to hold that he could not be guilty of misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy. Fornier v. COMELEC DISMISSED for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for dismissing the original petition. Tecson v. COMELEC and Velez v, Poe DISMISSED for want of jurisdiction. RATIONALE: 1987 Constitution aimed to correct irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution outlined in Article 4, Sec. 1 that the following are Filipino citizens: o Those who are citizens of the Phil. upon adoption of this Constitution o Those whose parents are citizens of the Philippines (Jus Sanguinis) o Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching age of majority o Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

The public documents submitted are deemed trustworthy. There is no jurisprudence to prove that an illegitimate child cannot inherit his fathers citizenship.

remained away until after the expiration of eighteen months after the ratification of the treaty, continued to be a Spaniard, and did not, even though he intended to return, become a citizen of the islands under the new sovereignty, and therefore is not eligible to admission to practice at In the matter of the petition of the bar under the rules established by the J.GARCIA BOSQUE for admission to military and civil authorities of the the practice of law in the Philippine Philippine Islands. Islands REASON BEHIND THE DECISION: G.R. No. 666, January 14, 1902 From the conduct on the part of the Arellano, C.J.: petitioner, it is evident that he elected to take the first of the two courses open FACTS: to him under his right of option The Philippine Archipelago was ceded contained in Article 9 of the agreement. to the new sovereign by having agreed Neither the Government nor the courts upon by the parties to the Treaty of can place any other construction upon Paris on December 10, 1898. The the facts above related. Having left the subjects of the ceding power are placed islands he had no occasion to make any under a compulsory subject to the new declaration of his intention to preserve sovereign. his Spanish nationality, which he carried with him on his departure. This With respect to these the special nationality could be forfeited only by a agreement contained in article 9 was continued residence in the ceded established, by virtue of which it was territory and a failure to make a agreed to accord the subjects the right declaration of intention to preserve it of electing to leave the country, thus within the term fixed therefor. The freeing themselves of subjection to the conditions which gave rise to the new sovereign, or to continue to reside presumptive change of nationality were in the territory, in which case the residence and the lapse of eighteen expiration of the term of eighteen months without express declaration to months without their making an the contrary; these two conditions not express declaration of intention to being fulfilled there was no change of retain their Spanish nationality resulted national status. Neither by the in the loss of the latter, such persons Government of Spain nor by that of the thereby becoming subjects of the new United States could the petitioner be sovereign in the same manner as the regarded as a Filipino subject. By natives of these Islands. absenting himself from the territory he continued to be a Spaniard. The period of eighteen months began to run from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty that is to say, from April 11, 1899, and MA V. FERNANDEZ expired on the corresponding day of G.R. No. 183133 October, 1900. The petitioner absented July 26, 2010 himself from these Islands on May 30, PEREZ, J.: 1899, and remained absent therefrom during the whole period. It was in The Facts January, 1901, that he returned to these Islands. Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is eligibleto Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and admission to practice his profession in the 1957, respectively.[3] Philippine Islands They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for DECISION: Under the Treaty of Paris of 1898, almost sixty (60) years; they spent their between the United States and Spain, a whole lives, studied and received their Spanish resident of the Philippine Islands, primary and secondary education in the who left there in May, 1899, without country; they do not speak nor understand making any declaration of intention to the Chinese language, have not set foot in preserve his allegiance to Spain and Taiwan, and do not know any relative of

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their father; they have not even traveled Records further reveal that Lechi Ann abroad; and they have already raised their and Arceli were born also in Surigao City respective families in the Philippines.[4] in 1953[12] and 1959,[13] respectively. The Office of the City Civil Registrar During their age of minority, they issued a Certification to the effect that the secured from the Bureau of Immigration documents showing that Arceli elected their Alien Certificates of Registration Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986 (ACRs). [5] were registered in its Office on 4 February 1986. However, no other Immediately upon reaching the age of supporting documents appear to show twenty-one, they claimed Philippine that Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR citizenship in accordance with Section nor that she subsequently elected 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, Philippine citizenship upon reaching the which provides that (t)hose whose age of majority. Likewise, no document mothers are citizens of the Philippines exists that will provide information on the and, upon reaching the age of majority, citizenship of Nicolas and Isidro. elect Philippine citizenship are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August ISSUE/COMPLAINT 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of election of Philippine citizenship and Immigration received the Complainttook his oath of allegiance before then Affidavit[14] of a certain Mat G. Catral Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte.[6] On Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Catral, however, did not participate in the Public, Surigao City, Surigao del proceedings, and the Ma family could not Norte.[7] In 1978, Valeriano took his but believe that the complaint against oath of allegiance before then Judge them was politically motivated because Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao they strongly supported a candidate in City, the fact of which the latter attested Surigao City in the 2004 National and to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005.[8] Local Elections.[15] Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.[9] On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement. Individual certifications[10] all dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that all of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous registrations are no longer available because of the mandatory general registration every ten (10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbent Barangay Kagawads in Barangay Washington, Surigao City.[11]

government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration? Positioned upon the facts of this case, the question is translated into the inquiry whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and spent as Filipinos. The resolution of these questions would significantly mark a difference in the lives of herein petitioners. Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration

After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations, the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), composed of the public respondents, rendered a Judgment dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. On 9 November 2004, the Legal ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 Department of the Bureau of Immigration and 22 August 2001, respectively.[19] charged them for violation of Sections 37(a)(7)[16] and 45(e)[17] of The Board ruled that since they elected Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise Philippine citizenship after the enactment known as the Philippine Immigration Act of Commonwealth Act No. 625, which of 1940, as amended. The Charge was approved on 7 June 1941, they were Sheet[18] docketed as BSI-D.C. No. governed by the following rules and AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416) regulations: reads, in part: 1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. That Respondents x x x, all Chinese 625, providing that the election of nationals, failed and continuously failed Philippine citizenship embodied in a to present any valid document to show statement sworn before any officer their respective status in the Philippines. authorized to administer oaths and the They likewise failed to produce oath of allegiance shall be filed with the documents to show their election of nearest civil registry;[20] and Philippines (sic) citizenship, hence, Commission of Immigration and undocumented and overstaying foreign Deportation (CID, now Bureau of nationals in the country. Immigration [BI]) Circular dated 12 April 1954,[21] detailing the procedural That respondents, being aliens, requirements in the registration of the misrepresent themselves as Philippine election of Philippine citizenship. citizens in order to evade the requirements of the immigration laws. 2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August 1956[22] of the CID, requiring the filing of a petition for the cancellation of their DECISION: Should children born under the 1935 alien certificate of registration with the Constitution of a Filipino mother and an CID, in view of their election of alien father, who executed an affidavit of Philippine citizenship; election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the

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3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 182, 19 August 1982; and DOJ Guidelines, 27 March 1985, requiring that the records of the proceedings be forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of Justice for final determination and review.[23] As regards the documentation of aliens in the Philippines, Administrative Order No. 1-93 of the Bureau of Immigration[24] requires that ACR, E-series, be issued to foreign nationals who apply for initial registration, finger printing and issuance of an ACR in accordance with the Alien Registration Act of 1950.[25] According to public respondents, any foreign national found in possession of an ACR other than the E-series shall be considered improperly documented aliens and may be proceeded against in accordance with the Immigration Act of 1940 or the Alien Registration Act of 1950, as amended.

on July 6, 1889. His father was Basilio Roa Uy Tiong Co, a native of China, and his mother was Basilia Rodriguez, a native of this country. His parents were legally married in the Philippine Islands at the time of his birth. The father of the appellant went to China about the year 1895, and died there about 1900. Subsequent to the death of his father, in May, 1901, the appellant was sent to China by his mother for the sole purpose of studying (and always with the intention of returning) and returned to the Philippine Islands on the steamship Kaifong, arriving at the port of Cebu October 1, 1910, from Amoy, China, and sought admission to the Philippine Islands. At this time the appellant was a few days under 21 years and 3 months of age.

After hearing the evidence the board of special inquiry found that the appellant was a Chinese person and a subject of the Supposedly for failure to comply with the Emperor of China and not entitled to procedure to prove a valid claim to land. Philippine citizenship via election proceedings, public respondents In view of the fact that the applicant for concluded that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo, admission was born in lawful wedlock Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann are On appeal to the Insular Collector of undocumented and/or improperly Customs this decision was affirmed, and documented aliens. the Court of First Instance of Cebu in these habeas corpus proceedings Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did remanded the appellant to the Collector not submit any document to support their of Customs Under the laws of the claim that they are Philippine citizens. Philippine Islands, children, while they Neither did they present any evidence to remain under parental authority, have the show that they are properly documented nationality of their parents. Therefore, the aliens. For these reasons, public legitimate children born in the Philippine respondents likewise deemed them Islands of a subject of the Emperor of undocumented and/or improperly China are Chinese subjects and the same documented aliens. rule obtained during Spanish sovereignty Issue: WON Roa is a citizen of the Philippines Roa v. Collector of Customs Series of Conflicting SC Decisions re Held: YES, The nationality of the appellant Citizenship having followed that of his mother, he Date: October 30, 1912 was therefore a citizen of the Philippine Ponente: Justice Trent Islands on July 1, 1902, and never having expatriated himself, he still remains a Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the citizen of this country. Court of First Instance of Cebu recommitting the appellant, Tranquilino We therefore conclude that the appellant Roa, to the custody of the Collector of is a citizen of the Philippine Islands and Customs and declaring the Collector's entitled to land. The judgment appealed right to effect appellant's deportation to from is reversed and the appellant is China as being a subject of the Chinese ordered released from custody, with costs Empire and without right to enter and de oficio. reside in the Philippine Islands. There is Ratio: no dispute as to the facts. Tranquilino Roa, was born in the town of His mother, before her marriage, was, as Luculan, Mindanao, Philippine Islands, we have said, a Spanish subject.

Section 4 of the Philippine Bill provides: That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. On the death of her husband she ipso facto reacquired the nationality of the country of her birth, as she was then living in that country and had never left it. She was then the natural guardian of Tranquilino. Upon the dissolution of a marriage between a female citizen of the United States and a foreigner, she ipso facto reacquires American citizenship, if at that time she is residing in the United States. There is no statutory declaration on the question as to whether or not her minor children would follow that of their widowed mother. If the children were born in the United States, they would be citizens of that country. If they were born in the country of which their father (and their mother during coverture) was a citizen, then they would be a citizens of that country until the death of their father. But after his death, they being minors and their nationality would, as a logical consequence, follow that of their mother, she having changed their domicile and nationality by placing them within the jurisdiction of the United States. But, of course, such minor children, on reaching their majority, could elect, under the principle that expatriation is an inherent right of all people, the nationality of the country of "no principle has been more repeatedly announced by the judicial tribunals of the country, and more constantly acted upon, than that the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of the claimant of it." Quoted with approval in the case of Boyd vs. Thayer (143 U.S., 135)

G.R. No. L-46593 RAMON TORRES V. TAN CHIM. Laurel, J.:

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Tan Chim, the petitioner here, arrived at the port of Cebu on January 18, 1937, and sought admission as a minor son of Alejandro Tan Bangco. After hearing, the Board of Special Inquiry decided to deny him entry on the ground that the status of his father had not been passed upon by the Secretary of Labor. A petition for habeas corpus was filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (civil case No. 308), which ruled that Alejandro Tan Bangco was a Filipino citizen jus soli, having been born in Manila on February 27, 1893. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, by decision of February 27, 1893, upheld the conclusion of the lower court and declined to overrule the doctrine in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, 23 Phil. 315, in the following commendable language: It is urged upon us by the SolicitorGeneral that we reexamine and reverse the doctrine laid down in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, because the law, we are now informed, had been misconstrued and misapplied by this court in that case. A suggestion of this kind should be sympathetically received but for the fact that the principle of territoriality or jus soli adopted in Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, does not have to be set aside by this Court for the reason that the principle is no longer predominating in this jurisdiction after taking effect of the Constitution of the Philippines, which has mainly adopted the contrary principle of jus sanguinis. If, however, what is suggested is that the case at bar because of the embodiment of a new policy on citizenship in the Constitution, we are of the opinion that this cannot be done unless we give a retroactive effect to the Constitution. We hold that the present case is still governed by, and should be decided on the authority of Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, for the following reasons: 1. As already observed, the present case is similar to Roa vs. Collector of Customs, supra, in that the facts determinative of citizenship in both relate to events which had taken place before the advent of American sovereignty. We cannot reverse the doctrine in Roa vs. Collector of Custom, supra, and convert Roa into an alien, after our final pronouncement in 1912 that he was a Filipino. If we depart from the rule there established notwithstanding the almostexact analogy between the two cases,

nothing short of legal anachronism would conclusion, we said that, our opinion follow, and we should avoid this result. finds corroboration in the rule indicated in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 2. While we profess no idolatrous 315, 324-325), which is now a legal reverence for precedents (Philippine provision embodied in paragraph 7, Trust Co. vs. Mitchell, 59 Phil. 30), we Article 1, of Commonwealth Act No. 63, should not overlook the fact that the rule to the effect that a Filipino woman does laid down in the Roa case had been not lose her citizenship by marrying a adhered to and accepted for more than 20 foreigner belonging to a nation the laws years before the adoption of our of which do not allow her to acquire the Constitution; not only this Court but also husbands nationality. It should be noted inferior courts had consistently and that in this Baldello case we relied invariably followed it; the executive and however indirectly on Roa vs. Collector administrative agencies of the of Customs, supra and cited Government had theretofore abided by it; Commonwealth Act No. 63, which Act is and the general public had acquiesced in but a partial expression of the modern it. Withal, our decisions should not be, as tendency in the United States to accord to a given period of time, upon the same distinct personality to married woman or similar facts and under the same or providing that the marriage of an similar circumstances, as fluctuating as to American woman to a foreigner does not engender the phenomenon described by operate loss of American citizenship. Mr. Justice Thompson, of the Supreme (Vide Act of Congress of September 22, Court of Virginia as ignis fatuus. (Perkins 1922, 42 U. S. St.-at-L. p. 1022, ch. 411, v. Clemente et al. 1 Pat and (Va.) 153.) sec. 3, 8 U.S. C. A. sec. 9; Act of Congress of March, 1931, 46 U.S. St.-at3. When in Roa vs. Collector of Customs L. p. 1511, ch. 442, sec. 4.) we declared the applicant therein to be a citizen of the Philippines, that declaration In Yu Ching Po vs. Gallofin, G.R. No. was a statement of a general principle 46795, promulgated on October 6, 1939, applicable not only to Tranquilino Roa we held that a person born in the individually but to all those who were in Philippines of a Filipino-mestizo father the same situation, that is to say, to all and a mestiza-Chinese mother, persons born in the Philippines before the notwithstanding vagueness in point of ratification of the treaty of peace between paternity and maternity, because the United States and Spain, of Chinese according to our decision, no dicen si es father and Filipino mother; residents of hijo de padre filipino y de madre china, o the Philippines at the time mentioned in si lo es de padre chino y de madre the treaty of peace, although in their filipina, is a Filipino citizen, for the minority; thereafter, going to China for reason that under Article 17, paragraph 1 the purpose of studying, and returning to of the Civil Code, which was in force in the Philippines to live here. This was the that year, he was a Spanish subject, rule at the time of the adoption of our which nationality he conserved. Constitution. With it, the bench and the bar were familiar. The members of the Our attention has been called to the case Constitutional Convention were also of Paz Chua vs. Secretary of Labor, G.R. aware of this rule, and in abrogating the No. 46451, promulgated September 30, doctrine laid down in the Roa case, by 1939, where we affirmed the decision of making the jus sanguinis the the Court of First Instance of Manila predominating principle in the denying the writ of habeas corpus and determination of Philippine citizenship, holding that the applicants therein were they did not intend to exclude those who, not entitled to enter and reside in the in the situation of Tranquilino Roa, were Philippines on the basis of Philippine citizens of the Philippines by judicial citizenship. declaration at the time of the adoption of the constitution. With due respect to my brethren in the majority, I would say that when this 4. In the case of Commonwealth of the Court continues to uphold a ruling known Philippines vs. Gloria Baldello, G. R. No. to be erroneous, with no plausible excuse L-45375, promulgated April 12, 1939, we therefor but public acquiescence therein, held that a Filipino woman, abandoned it may soon find itself compelled to make by her husband who was a native of more mistakes in an effort to justify the Mexico but who was neither a Mexican previous ones. We may thus be building not American citizen, retained her one error upon another until, by their Filipino citizenship, and in arriving at this accumulation, we shall come to a point

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when going further would be perilous and Commissioner of Immigration to be dealt In the May 1998 elections, she ran for turning backward impossible. with in accordance with law. governor but Valles filed a petition for her disqualification as candidate on the I therefore vow to reverse the Roa Considering that the common law ground that she is an Australian. doctrine and the decision of the Court of principle or rule of jus soli obtained in Appeals based thereon. England and in the United States, as ISSUE: embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment Whether or not Rosalind is an to the Constitution of the United States Australian or a Filipino. which provides that "All persons born or Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor naturalized in the United States, and G.R. No. 47616 subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the HELD: Facts: state wherein they reside.", has never On 15 October 1941, a decision was been extended to this jurisdiction (section YES. promulgated in the case of Tan Chong vs. 1, Act of 1 July 1902; sec. 5, Actof 29 Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. August 1916); considering that the law in The Philippine law on citizenship adheres 47616,whereby this Court affirmed the force and applicable to the petitioner and to the principle of jus sanguinis. judgment of the Court of First Instance of the applicant in the two cases at the time Thereunder, a child follows the Manila, which had granted the writ of of their birth is sec. 4 of the Philippine nationality or citizenship of the parents habeas corpus applied for by Tan Chong, Bill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by regardless of the place of his/her birth, as on the ground that he, being a native of Act of 23 March 1912, the Court is of the opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which the Philippines, of a Chinese father and a opinion that the petitioner in the first case determines nationality or citizenship on Filipino mother, is a citizen of the and the applicant in the second case, who the basis of place of birth. were born of alien parentage, were not Philippines. On the same date, in the case of Lam and are not, under Sec. 4 of the Philippine Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born a year Swee Sang vs. Commonwealth of the Bill (Act of 1 July 1902), as amended by before the 1935 Constitution took into Philippines (G.R. No. 47623), this Court Act of 23 March 1912 , citizens of the effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the rendered a decision dismissing the Philippine Islands. principal organic acts by which the petition of the applicant for naturalization Sec. 4 of the Philippine Bill (Act of 1 United States governed the country. filed in the Court of First Instance of July 1902), as amended by Act of 23 These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, Zamboanga, on the ground that the applicant, having been born in Sulu, March 1912, which provides that only 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of Philippines, of a Chinese father and those "inhabitants of the Philippine Aug. 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Filipino mother, is a citizen of the Islands continuing to reside therein who Law. Philippines. The dismissal of the petition were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of implies and means that there was no need April, 1899, and then resided in said Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of of naturalization for the applicant who is Islands, and their children born the Philippines who were Spanish subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided a Filipino citizen. On 21 October 1941, a motion for held to be citizens of the Philippine therein including their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private reconsideration was filed in both cases by Islands. respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, the Solicitor General. The latter contends that even if the petitioner in the first case The petitioner in the first case was born was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, and the applicant in the second were born in San Pablo, Laguna, in July 1915, of a Camarines Norte.... Thus, under the in the Philippines, of a Chinese father and Chinese father and a Filipino mother, Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones a Filipino mother, lawfully married, still lawfully married, left for China in 1925, Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be they are not citizens of the Philippines and returned to the Philippines on 25 a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the under and pursuant to the laws in force at January1940 ( 15 years ). time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, the time of their birth, and prays that both decisions be set aside and the judgments *Jus Soli - The principle that nationality herein private respondent Rosalind is determined by the place of birth. Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the appealed from be reversed. Philippines. Issue: 1.) What is the law in force during The signing into law of the 1935 the petitioners birth? Valles v. COMELEC Philippine Constitution has established 2.) Is Tan Chong a citizen of the the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for Philippines? FACTS: the acquisition of Philippine citizenship, Held: Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May xxx Accordingly, the decision of this Court in 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father the first case confirming the lower court's and an Australian mother. In 1949, at the So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, judgment is set aside; the judgment of the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came which confers citizenship by virtue of Court of First Instance of Manila to settle in the Philippines, where she blood relationship, was subsequently appealed from is reversed; the petitioner later married a Filipino and has since then retained under the 1973 and 1987 is recommitted to the custody of the participated in the electoral process not Constitutions. Thus, the herein private only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a

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Filipino citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.

Philippine citizenship is procedurally and Philippines on 13 March 1961, and was jurisdictionally permissible? permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on 13 April No. Under our laws, there can be no 1961. On the date of her arrival, her action or proceeding for the judicial friend filed a bond of P1,000.00 to declaration of the citizenship of an undertake, among other things, that Ms. individual. Courts of justice exist only Yeung would actually depart from the for settlement of justiciable controversies. Philippines on or before the expiration of Such judicial declaration of Philippine her authorized period of stay in this citizenship is beyond the judicial power country or within the period as in his the Commissioner of The Republic of the Philippines v. of the court. Hence, such power is limited discretion only to what the Constitution, itself, Immigration or his authorized Nora Fe Sagun prescribes. representative might properly allow. G.R. No. 187567 [2] Whether or not respondent has After repeated extensions, petitioner was FACTS: Respondent is the legitimate effectively elected Philippine citizenship allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 child of Albert S. Chan, a Chinese in accordance with the procedure February 1962., She contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto national, and Marta Borromeo, a Filipino prescribed by law? Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen citizen. She was born on August 8, 1959 in Baguio City and did not elect No. Respondent failed to comply with the on 25 January 1962. Philippine citizenship upon reaching the legal requirements for a valid election. age of majority. In 1992, at the age of Specifically, respondent had not executed She brought this action for injunction 33 and after getting married to Alex a sworn statement of her election of with preliminary injunction, because of The only the contemplated action of respondent to Sagun, she executed an Oath of Philippine citizenship. Allegiance to the Republic of the documentary evidence submitted by confiscate her bond and order her arrest Philippines. Said document was respondent in support of her claim of and immediate deportation, after the notarized by Atty. Cristeta Leung on alleged election was her oath of expiration of her authorized stay. December 17, 1992, but was not recorded allegiance, executed 12 years after she and registered with the Local Civil reached the age of majority, which was Issue unregistered. Registrar of Baguio City. 1. Can Ms. Yeung, having been admitted Due to the denial of her passport The mere exercise of suffrage, continuous as a temporary alien visitor based on her application, since there was annotation and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, deliberate and voluntary representation that she had elected Philippine and other similar acts showing exercise of that she will enter and stay only for a citizenship, she sought a judicial Philippine citizenship cannot take the period of one month, and thereby secured declaration of her election of Philippine place of election of Philippine a visa, go back on her representation to stay permanently without first departing citizenship and prayed that the Local citizenship. from the Philippines (under Section 9 of Civil Registrar of Baguio City be ordered COURT DECISION: the Immigration Act) as she had to annotate the same on her birth promised? certificate. After conducting a hearing, the petition is the trial court rendered the assailed WHEREFORE, Decision on April 3, 2009 granting the GRANTED. The Decision dated April 3, 2. Can Ms. Yeung's marriage to Mr. Yao petition and declaring respondent a 2009 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino 3 of Baguio City in Spcl. Pro. Case No. citizenship is not denied, have an effect Filipino citizen. 17-R is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. of making her a Filipino, since it has not However, a petition for review on The petition for judicial declaration of been shown that she "might herself be certiorari filed by the Solicitor General; election of Philippine citizenship filed by lawfully naturalized", it appearing clearly the latter arguing that respondents respondent Nora Fe Sagun is hereby in the record that she does not possess all the qualifications required of applicants petition before the RTC was improper on DISMISSED for lack of merit. for naturalization by the Revised two counts: for [one], law and No costs. Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act jurisprudence clearly contemplate no 473)? judicial action or proceeding for the declaration of Philippine citizenship; and Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto for [another], the pleaded registration of Aguinaldo Lim and Lau Yuen Yeung Held the oath of allegiance with the local civil versus registry and its annotation on The Commissioner of Immigration 1. No. Section 9 of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming respondents birth certificate are the (G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971) into the Philippines as temporary visitors, ministerial duties of the registrar; hence, legitimately become Filipino citizens or they require no court order. Facts acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change ISSUES: Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a temporary of nationality naturally bestows upon visitor's visa to enter the Philippines as a them the right to stay in the Philippines [1] Whether or not an action or non-immigrant for a period of one month. permanently or not. proceeding for judicial declaration of She was permitted to come into the

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2. Yes. For an alien woman who marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage: Provided, that she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473. The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a citizen. In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship is conferred should not be confused with the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the Philippines in order to factually establish his claim to citizenship. His citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be lawfully naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish that status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines: Provided, that his father is such citizen from a declaration that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens by operation of law; the former becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

PHILIPPINES, appellant. FACTS:

oppositor

and HELD:

On petition to declare Zita Ngo also known as Zita Ngo Burca "as possessing all qualifications and none of the qualifications for naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473 for the purpose of cancelling her Alien Registry with the Bureau of Immigration".1 She avers that she is of legal age, married to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen, subject of Nationalist China; that she was born on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao. By constitutional and legal precepts, an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen, does not by the mere fact of marriage - automatically become a Filipino citizen. Thus, by Article IV of the Constitution, citizenship is limited to: (1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution. (2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine Islands. (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines. (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship. (5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. And, on the specific legal status of an alien woman married to a citizen of the Philippines, Congress in paragraph 1, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law legislated the following: Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Issue: Whether Zita Ngo Burca is deemed a Filipino citizen in accordance to the provisions in the Revised Naturalization Law vis--vis the Constitution of the Philippines.

No. Petitioner did not meet the requirements specified in the Revised Naturalization Law. The petition is fatally defective for failure to contain or mention the essential allegations required under Section 7 of the Naturalization Law, such as, among others, petitioner's former places of residence, and the absence of the affidavits of at least two supporting witnesses. We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefor by filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2, and none of the disqualifications under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board or official, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent court of justice certifying or declaring that an alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void. We note that the petition avers that petitioner was born in Gigaquit, Surigao that her former residence was Surigao, Surigao, and that presently she is residing at Regal St., Ormoc City. In court, however, she testified that she also resided in Junquera St., Cebu, where she took up a course in home economics, for one year. Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires that a petition for naturalization should state petitioner's "present and former places of residence". Residence encompasses all places where petitioner actually and physically resided. 13 Cebu, where she studied for one year, perforce comes within the term residence. The reason for exacting recital in the petition of present and former places of residence is that "information regarding petitioner and objection to his application are apt to be provided by people in his actual, physical surrounding". And the State is deprived of full opportunity to make inquiries as to petitioner's fitness to become a citizen, if all the places of residence do not appear in the petition. So it is, that failure to allege a former place of residence is fatal.

ZITA NGO BURCA, petitioner and appellee, v. REPUBLIC OF THE

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We find one other flaw in petitioner's petition. Said petition is not supported by the affidavit of at least two credible persons, "stating that they are citizens of the Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a resident of the Philippines for the period of time required by this Act and a person of good repute and morally irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the provisions of this Act". Petitioner likewise failed to "set forth the names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the case". 16 The necessity for the affidavit of two witnesses cannot be overlooked. It is important to know who those witnesses are. The State should not be denied the opportunity to check on their background to ascertain whether they are of good standing in the community, whose word may be taken on its face value, and who could serve as "good warranty of the worthiness of the petitioner". These witnesses should indeed prove in court that they are reliable insurers of the character of petitioner. Short of this, the petition must fail.

Filipino citizen based on its conclusion that if administrative bodies are possessed with such power (to determine the absence of disqualifications on the status of citizenship), there is stronger reason for the court to have jurisdiction over the case." The Government thru the Solicitor General submitted that in the case of Moy Yu Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, this Court, while holding that an alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto becomes a Filipino provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4, Commonwealth Act No. 473, reiterated the rule that "a judicial declaration that the person is a Filipino citizen cannot be made in a petition for naturalization and that, in this jurisdiction there can be no independent action for the judicial declaration of citizenship of an individual." Issue: Whether a judicial declaration that a person is a Filipino citizen can be made in a petition for naturalization Held: The sole and only purpose of the petitioner is to have the petitioner declared a Filipino citizen will be grant, this court clearly stated: Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Courts of justice exist for settlement of justiciable controversies, which imply a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or omission violative of said right, and a remedy, granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right. As an incident only of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to a controversy, the court may pass upon, and make a pronouncement relative to their status. Otherwise, such a pronouncement is beyond judicial power. Thus, for instance, no action or proceeding may be instituted for a declaration to the effect that plaintiff or petitioner is married, or single, or a legitimate child, although a finding thereon may be made as necessary premise to justify a given relief available only to one enjoying said status. At times, the law permits the acquisition of a given status, such as naturalization, by judicial decree. But, there is no similar legislation authorizing the institution of judicial proceeding to declare that a given person is part of our citizenry. (Tan Yu Chu v. Rep. supra)

YUNG UAN CHU vs. REPUBLIC GR L-34973, April 14, 1988 SECOND DIVISION, PARAS (J): 4 concur Facts: This is an appeal by the Government seeking the reversal of the Decision of the then Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos City dated December 7, 1971 granting the petition for naturalization of Yung Uan Chu alias Lina Yung Yu Hui Tin. After trial, a decision was rendered on December 7, 1971 finding petitioner Yung Uan Chu baptized as Lina Yung, known in school in her registered name as LinaUan Chu and now as Mrs. Lina Y. Cupang, as possessed of all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications of a Filipino citizen and therefore authorized to take her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to register the same in the proper civil registrar. The sole issue raised by appellant is whether or not the lower court erred in concluding that it has jurisdiction to declare petitioner a

Hence, a "judicial declaration that a person is a Filipino citizen cannot be made in a petition for naturalization because under our laws there can be no action or proceeding for the judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual. Such a declaration or pronouncement is beyond the court's jurisdiction." In Moy Ya Lim Yao (41 SCRA 292-388) the Court adverted to the administrative procedure which up to the present is followed in the Commission of Immigration and Deportation. The steps to be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration are embodied in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958 of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Berrera to the effect that "The alien woman must the a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her husband to the effect and thus secure recognition of her status as a Filipino citizen. Judicial recourse would be available to the petitioner in a case of adverse action by the Immigration Commissioner. Although as already stated, administrative proceedings should have been undertaken by the appellee, still, in the instant case, we find no necessity therefor because in this judicial proceeding, it is clear she is already a Filipino citizen. The appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED and the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation is hereby ordered to CANCEL applicants alien certificate of registration.

GR # 92191 92 July 30, 1991 Antonio Y. Co House of Representative Electoral Tribunal and Jose Ong, Jr. GR # 92202-03 July 30, 1991 Sixto T. Balanquit, Jr. Petitioner V. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representative and Jose Ong, Jr. Facts: Respondent Jose Ong, Jr was proclaimed winner of the May 11, 1987 congressional election for the 2nd district

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of Northern Samar. Petitioners, Antonio Y. Co and Sixto T. Balanguit, Jr are both losers in the said election. Both filed an election protest to House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET) on the grounds that private respondent Jose Ong, Jr is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines. HRET ruled in favour of the private respondent on its decision dated November 6, 1989 and subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners on November 12, 1989 was also denied by HRET, in its resolution dated February 22, 1990. Hence, these petition for Certiorari.

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, Penned by Justice Gutierrez, Jr with section 6 of the Constitution. HRET Bidin, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea and rendered its decision dismissing the Davide ,Jr. , Concur. petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative in the said election. BENGSON vs. HRET and CRUZ ISSUE: G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001 Whether or not Cruz, a natural-born Issue: Whether or not, private respondent, Jose Petitioner: ANTONIO BENGSON III Filipino who became an American Ong, Jr is a natural born citizen of the Respondent: House of Representatives citizen, can still be considered a naturalPhilippines? Electoral Tribunal and TEODORO C. born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. CRUZ, respondents. Held: Petitions were dismissed, the questioned, FACTS: HELD: decision of the House of Representative The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at YES. Filipino citizens who have lost their Electoral Tribunal is affirmed, and issue in this case, in view of the citizenship may however reacquire the respondent Jose Ong, Jr is declared a constitutional requirement that no same in the manner provided by law. natural born citizen of the Philippines due person shall be a Member of the House of C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by to the following events: Representatives unless he is a natural- which Philippine citizenship may be 1. His grandfather, Ong Te, arrived born citizen. reacquired by a former citizen: 1. in the Philippines from China in 1895 and Naturalization, 2. Repatriation, and 3. established residence in the municipality Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Direct act of Congress. of Laoang, Samar, were he bought lands Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in from the fruit of hard work. 1960 of Filipino parents. In 1985, Repatriation may be had under various 2. Private Respondent Father, Jose however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine statutes by those who lost their Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 Corps and without the consent of the citizenship due to: a. desertion of the and was brought by Ong Te to Samar in Republic of the Philippines, took an oath armed forces; b. services in the armed the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his of allegiance to the USA. As a forces of the allied forces in World War childhood in the province of Samar were Consequence, he lost his Filipino II; c. service in the Armed Forces of the he establish relationship with his citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act United States at any other time; d. neighbors, absorb Filipino cultural values Providing for the Ways in Which marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and practices and was baptized into Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or and e. political economic necessity. Chritianity. Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a 3. Jose Ong Chuan met a natural Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship Repatriation results in the recovery of the born Filipino, Agripina Lao, the they fell by, among other, rendering service to or original nationality. This means that a in love and got married on 1931 accepting commission in the armed naturalized Filipino who lost his according to Catholic faith and practice. citizenship will be restored to his prior forces of a foreign country. 4. The couple bore eight children status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On and one of them is the private respondent Whatever doubt that remained regarding the other hand, if he was originally a who was born in 1948. his loss of Philippine citizenship was natural-born citizen before he lost his 5. The private respondent father erased by his naturalization as a U.S. Philippine citizenship, he will be restored filed an application for naturalization in citizen in 1990, in connection with his to his former status as a natural-born the Court of First Instance of Samar in service in the U.S. Marine Corps. Filipino. R.A. No. 2630 provides: February 15, 1954. On April 28, 1957, The CFI of Samar, declared Jose Ong In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Chuan a Filipino Citizen and on May 15, citizenship through repatriation under RA Philippine citizenship by rendering 1957, CFI declared its April 28, 1957 2630 [(An Act Providing for service to, or accepting commission in, decision as final and executory and that Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship the Armed Forces of the United States, or Jose Ong Chuan may already take his by Persons Who Lost Such Citizenship after separation from the Armed Forces Oath of Allegiance. A certificate of by Rendering Service To, or Accepting of the United States, acquired United naturalization was issued to Jose Ong Commission In, the Armed Forces of the States citizenship, may reacquire Chuan. United States (1960)]. He ran for and was Philippine citizenship by taking an oath 6. His Elder brother, Emil was elected as the Representative of the 2nd of allegiance to the Republic of the elected as a delegate to the 1971 District of Pangasinan in the 1998 Philippines and registering the same with

Constitutional Convention. Emils Status as a natural born citizen was challenged. The Constitutional convention delegates which in drafting the constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the basis of the mothers citizenship formally and declared Emil Ong, (the respondent full brother) as a natural born citizen.

elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running for reelection.

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Local Civil Registry in the place where citizen, and accordingly her petition for he resides or last resided in the Philippine citizenship is unnecessary. Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other Reason for the Decision: citizenship. The pronouncement of the court was evidently aided by paragraph 7, Having thus taken the required oath of article 1, of Commonwealth Act 63, that allegiance to the Republic and having a Filipino woman does not lose her registered the same in the Civil Registry citizenship by marrying a foreigner of Magantarem, Pangasinan in belonging to a nation the laws of which accordance with the cited provision, Cruz do not allow her to acquire the husband's is deemed to have recovered his original nationality. Were it not for this rule, if a status as a natural-born citizen, a status Filipino woman loses her nationality which he acquired at birth as the son of a simply by marrying a foreigner, even Filipino father. It bears stressing that the without acquiring the foreigner's act of repatriation allows him to recover, citizenship, then she would become or return to, his original status before he destitute of nationality. And evidently the lost his Philippine citizenship. purpose of the said rule is to prevent such condition of statelessness in a Filipino woman married to an alien, a policy that is perfectly applicable in the present case. Loss of Citizenship Gloria Baldello for Naturalization as a Philippine Citizen. G.R. No. L-83882 The Commonwealth of the Philippines, January 24, 1989 appellee Vs Gloria Baldello, petitionerIN RE PETITION FOR HABEAS Ponente: Moran, J: CORPUS OF WILLIE YU, petitioner, vs. MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, Facts: A Filipino citizen, Gloria BIENVENIDO P. ALANO, JR., MAJOR Baldello, married a Mexican native, PABALAN, DELEO HERNANDEZ, GabinoOrdorica, on November 12, 1921. BLODDY HERNANDEZ, BENNY The Mexican native was acknowledged REYES and JUN ESPIRITU SANTO, as to serving for the United States Army respondent. based in the Philippines. The couple Facts: continually been living together until the The present controversy originated with Mexican native, Ordorica abandoned a petition for habeas corpus filed with the Baldello, consequently, the latter sued out Court on 4 July 1988 seeking the release and obtained an order from the court from detention of herein petitioner. After declaring Ordorica presumptively dead manifestation and motion of the Solicitor for the purpose of the law as his General of his decision to refrain from whereabouts being unknown for eleven filing a return of the writ on behalf of the years. Shortly after, Baldillo, filed a CID, respondent Commissioner thru petition in the court of first instance in counsel filed the return. An internal manila wherein she sought to return to resolution of 7 November 1988 referred the Filipino citizenship. The petition was the case to the Court en banc. In its 10 denied and she appealed. November 1988 resolution, denying the The court discovered that upon petition for habeas corpus, the Court the marriage was taken part, Ordorico disposed of the pending issues of (1) was neither a Mexican nor an American, jurisdiction of the CID over a naturalized discerning that he failed to comply with Filipino citizen and (2) validity of the requirements to be naturalized citizen warrantless arrest and detention of the of the United Sates, at the same time same person. forfeited his Mexican citizenship by his Petitioner's own compliance reveals that service to the US, and therefore appeared he was originally issued a Portuguese to be a stateless individual. passport in 1971, valid for five (5) years Issue: and renewed for the same period upon Whether or not Gloria Baldello presentment before the proper Portuguese be deliberated as a Filipino citizen consular officer. Despite his considering that he married a stateless naturalization as a Philippine citizen on individual. 10 February 1978, on 21 July 1981, Ruling: petitioner applied for and was issued Therefore, the court so ordered that Portuguese Passport No. 35/81 serial N. appellant Gloria Baldello, is a Filipino 1517410 by the Consular Section of the

Portuguese Embassy in Tokyo. Said Consular Office certifies that his Portuguese passport expired on 20 July 1986. While still a citizen of the Philippines who had renounced, upon his naturalization, "absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty" and pledged to "maintain true faith and allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines," he declared his nationality as Portuguese in commercial documents he signed, specifically, the Companies registry of Tai Shun Estate Ltd. filed in Hongkong sometime in April 1980. Issue: Whether or not Willie Yu still to be considered as a naturalized Filipino citizen. Ruling: To Court ruled that the foregoing acts considered together constitute an express renunciation of petitioner's Philippine citizenship acquired through naturalization. In Board of Immigration Commissioners us, Go Gallano, express renunciation was held to mean a renunciation that is made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to inference or implication. Petitioner, with full knowledge, and legal capacity, after having renounced Portuguese citizenship upon naturalization as a Philippine citizen resumed or reacquired his prior status as a Portuguese citizen, applied for a renewal of his Portuguese passport and represented himself as such in official documents even after he had become a naturalized Philippine citizen. Such resumption or reacquisition of Portuguese citizenship is grossly inconsistent with his maintenance of Philippine citizenship.

G.R. No. 120295 June 28, 1996 JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE, respondents. Ponente: Justice PANGANIBAN, 1996 FACTS: Petitioner Frivaldo filed his certificate for Candidacy for Governor about 3 weeks before the election. Private Respondent Lee, another candidate for the said position, filed a petition to disqualify Frivaldo by reason of not being a citizen of the Philippines. A week before the election, Second Division of COMELEC promulgated a resolution granting the petition of Lee. A motion for Reconsideration was filed by Frivaldo which remained unacted until after the elections. Thus, his candidacy continued

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and he was voted during the elections. Few days after the Election, COMELEC En Banc affirmed the promulgated resolution of the SecondDivision. Frivaldo garnered the highest number of votes in the said election. Lee filed a petition praying for his proclamation as Governor. Lee was then proclaimed as Governor. Frivaldo filed a petition for annulment of the proclamation of Lee and for his own proclamation alleging that he had already taken his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines which he filed a couple of months ago before the election. Frivaldos motion was recognized and was then proclaimed as Governor. Lee filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by COMELEC En Banc. ISSUES: Private Respondent Lee filed this instant petition for Certiorari, Preliminary Injunction, and Annulment of the COMELEC decision and resolution. W/N Frivaldos repatriation was valid and legal. If it is, was it able to cure his lack of citizenship. DECISION: The Court dismissed the petition and affirmed the decision of COMELEC. Under Sec. 39 of the Local Government Code, an elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines. The court held that the law does not specify any particular date or time when the candidate must possess citizenship. At the same time, literally speaking, such qualification of citizenship should thus be possessed when the elected official begins to govern. In the instant case, Frivaldo when he took his oath of allegiance under the provisions of P.D. No. 725, at 2:00 p.m. on June 30, 1995, he automatically reassumed his his citizenship on that very day which coincidentally also the day when the term of the governor began, he was therefore already qualified to be proclaimed, to hold the office and to discharge the functions and responsibilities thereof as of said date.

States of America. He then filed a petition dated March1, 1996 before the RTC of Marikina to regain his status as a Filipino Citizen. He was then repatriated upon the approval of the RTC. ISSUE:

claimed that his Filipino Citizenship was already restored, and he was qualified to run as mayor in the May 10, 2004 election.

On the date of hearing, the parties were required to submit their Memorandum within 3 days. Private Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction respondents filed their Memorandum, in deciding over repatriation cases. while petitioner did not file one within the required period, however, he filed a HELD: Reply Memorandum subsequently. NO. RTC has no jurisdiction over repatriation cases, thus the courts order was thereby not binding. Instead, the Special Committee on Naturalization should handle and decide over these cases as the said committee was revived on June 8, 1995. In a prospective effect, the case of Angat is under the jurisdiction of said committee since the petition was filed on March 1, 1996 and pursuant to the LOI No, 270 PD 725 constituted by the committee providing repatriation of Filipino women who had lost their Philippine Citizenship and of natural born Filipino who had lost their Philippine citizenship by political and economic necessity. On March 22, 2004, a Resolution promulgated by COMELEC, First Division adopted the recommendation of Atty. ZacariasZaragosa Jr., regional election director for Region V and hearing officer of this case, disqualifying the petitioner Altajeros as candidate for mayoral position of San Jacinto, Masabate in the May 10, 2004 local and national election. On March 25, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and attached additional documents to prove that he had completed all the requirements for repatriation which thus entitled him to run for an elective office. On May 7, 2004, COMELEC en banc promulgated a Resolution denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit and affirming the Resolution of the COMELEC, First Division,hence a Petition for Certiorari was filed by the petitioner on May 10, 2004, the election day itself. ISSUES: Whether or not the respondent COMELEC erred in disqualifying and denying the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Altajeros for mayoral position in San Jacinto, Masbate, and cancelled and deleted his name from the certified list of candidates for the May 10, 2004 elections. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in denying the Motion For Reconsideration filed by petitioner Altajeros for utter lack of merit.

CASE TITLE: ALTAJEROS VS. COMELEC, JOSE ALMIE and VERNON VERSOZA, G.R. NO. 163256, November 10, 2004 PONENTE: FACTS: On January 15, 2004, private respondents Jose AlmieAltiche and Vernon Versoza, registered voters of San Jacinto, Masbate, filed with the COMELEC, a petition to disqualify and to deny due course or cancel the certificate of candidacy of petitionerAltajeros on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen and that he made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy that "[he] was not a permanent resident of or immigrant to a foreign country." Azcuna, J.

ANGAT V. REPUBLIC G.R. No. 132244 September 14, 1999

On January 26, 2004, petitioner filed an Answer stating among others, that he did not commit false FACTS: representation in his application for candidacy as mayor because as early as Petitioner Angat is a natural born citizen December 17, 1997, he was already who lost his Philippine Citizenship issued a Certificate of Repatriation by the through naturalization in the United Special Committee on Naturalization and

DECISION: The petition filed by Altajeros, seeking nullification of the Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc on May 7, 2004 which denied the Motion For Reconsideration of petitioner and affirmed the Resolution of COMELEC,

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First Division on March 22, 2004, is he has not yet perfected the process of hereby DENIED. repatriation. He failed to comply with the requirements under Section 2 of R.A. RATIO DECIDENDI: 8171 which provides that repatriation Under the terms provided in shall be effected by taking the necessary Sections 39 and 40 of Republic Act 7160 oath of allegiance to the Republic of the also known as Local Government Code Philippines and registration in the proper of 1991, it is required that an elective civil registry and in the Bureau of local official must be a citizen of the Immigration. Philippines, and he must not have a dual citizenship; must not be a permanent resident in a foreign country or must not JOEVANIE ARELLANO TABASA, have the acquired the right to reside Petitioner, abroad. vs. Although petitioner Altajeros had HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU petitioned for his repatriation as a OF IMMIGRATION and Filipino citizen under Republic Act No. DEPORTATION and WILSON 8171 on December 17, 1997, this did not SOLUREN, Respondents. restore to him his Filipino citizenship, because Section 2 of the aforecited FACTS: Republic Act No. 8171 specifically Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a naturalprovides that repatriation shall be born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, effected by taking necessary oath of When petitioner was seven years old, his allegiance to the Republic of the father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a Philippines and registration in the proper naturalized citizen of the United States. civil registry and in the Bureau of By derivative naturalization petitioner Immigration. also acquired American citizenship. Petitioner failed to prove that he has fully Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on complied with the requirements of August 3, 1995, and was admitted as a Section 2 Republic Act 8171 to perfect "balikbayan" for one year. Thereafter, his repatriation and reacquire his Filipino petitioner was arrested and detained by citizenship. Respondent has not BID on May 23, 1996, because of his submitted any document to prove that he outstanding federal warrant of arrest has taken his oath of allegiance to the issued on January 25, 1996 by the U.S. Republic of the Philippines and that he District Court for the Northern District of has registered his fact of repatriation in California, for violation of Section 1073, the proper civil registry and in the Bureau "Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution," of Immigration. of Title 18 of the United States Code. He The COMELEC Rules of is charged with one count of a felon in Procedure provides that insufficiency of possession of a firearm, in violation of evidence to justify the decision is a California Penal Code, Section 12021(A) ground for a motion for reconsideration (1), and one count of sexual battery, in (Rule 19, Section 1). The evidence violation of California Penal Code, referred to in the above provision and to Section 243.4 (D) be considered in the Motion for The petitioner successively executed an Reconsideration are those which were Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 submitted during the hearing and attached and took an oath of allegiance to the to the respective Memoranda of the Republic of the Philippines on June 13, parties which are already part of the 1996. records of the case. In this regard, the evidence of petitioner Altajeros were not ISSUE: able to overcome the evidence of the Whether petitioner has validly reacquired private respondents. Philippine citizenship under RA 8171? Petitioner Altajeros in his Motion For Reconsideration attempted to introduce to RULING: the record new pieces of evidence, which Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was introduction is not anymore allowed in a cancelled after his admission into the Motion for Reconsideration. country, became an undocumented alien Assuming that the new evidence of who can be summarily deported. His Altajeros are admitted, with more reason subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such for cancellation of his certificate of deportation especially considering that he candidacy for his act of misrepresentation has no legal and valid reacquisition of himself as a Filipino citizen when at the Philippine citizenship. time he filed his certificate of candidacy, REASON FOR DECISION

the only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity. The court considered petitioners "repatriation" as a last ditch effort to avoid deportation and prosecution in the United States. The appellate court concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us.

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents. GR 135083; May 26, 1999 FACTS: Candidates for vice-mayor of the City of Makati during the May 11, 1998 Elections were Manzano, Mercado and Daza. The results of the election were as follows: Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853 Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894 Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States. In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on

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September 14, 1955, and is considered an American HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy ISSUE: Whether under our laws, he is and it is not a self-executing provision. disqualified from the position for which This law aims to facilitate the he filed his certificate of candidacy. reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. In Sections 2 and 3 of DECISION: On August 31, 1998, the Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not COMELEC en banc rendered its concerned with dual citizenship per se, resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one but with the status of naturalized citizens commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC who maintain their allegiance to their en banc reversed the ruling of its Second countries of origin even after their Division and declared private respondent naturalization. Congress was given a qualified to run for vice-mayor of Makati mandate to draft a law that would set City in the May 11, 1998 elections. specific parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is RATIO DECIDENDI: NO. Manzano was done, it would be premature for the not disqualified from the position for judicial department, including this Court, which he filed his certificate of candidacy to rule on issues pertaining to dual because it was clear that he renounced his allegiance. citizenship as an American and chose the Philippine citizenship as implied by his actions (e.g. participation in elections) G.R. No. 198742 and expressed by the declarations he TeodoraSobejana-Condon, Petitioner made in the certificate of candidacy. Such Vs. Commission on Elections, Luis M. election of citizenship removed any Bautista, Robelito V. Picar and Wilma P. disqualification he might have had as a Pagaduan, Respondents dual citizen. Facts: At bar is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of G.R. No. 160869 May 11, 2007 Court seeking to nullify Resolution dated AASJS (Advocates and Adherents of September 6, 2011 of the Commission on Social Justice for School Teachers and Elections en banc. The petitioner is a Allied Workers) Member-Hector natural-born Filipino citizen having been Gumangan Calilung, Petitioner, born of Filipino parents who became a vs. naturalized Australian citizen owing to The Honorable Simeon Datumanong, in her marriage. After filing the an his official capacity as the Secretary of application to re-acquire Philippine Justice, Respondent citizenship before the Philippine Embassy in Australia on December 2, 2005 which Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition was approved and took her oath of be issued to stop respondent from allegiance to the Republic of the implementing Republic Act No. 9225, Philippines, on September 18, 2006, the entitled "An Act Making the Citizenship petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Renunciation of Australian Citizenship Foreign Citizenship Permanent, and issued the order dated September 27, Amending for the Purpose 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be Commonwealth Act No. 63, As an Australian citizen. The petitioner Amended, and for Other Purposes." sought elective office and won the May Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No. 9225 is 10, 2010 elections as Vice-Mayor in her unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, hometown of Caba, La Union where she Article IV of the 1987 Constitution that obtained the highest number of votes and states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is took her oath of office on May 13, 2010. inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law." Soon thereafter, private respondents, all registered voters of Caba, La Union, filed ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9225 separate petitions questioning the unconstitutional for granting dual petitioners eligibility before the RTC. citizenship to natural born- citizens who The petitions similarly sought the have lost their Philippine citizenship by petitioners disqualification from holding reason of their naturalization as citizen in her elective post on the ground that she is foreign countries, and thus said act a dual citizen and that she failed to becomes inimical to the national interest? execute a personal and sworn

renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath as imposed by Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225. Issue: Whether or not the sworn renunciation of foreign citizen in Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 is a mere pro-forma requirement. Held: Section 5 (2) of R.A. No. 9225 states that Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and (2) those seeking elective office in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The petitioner took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and a year before she initially sought elective public office; she filed a renunciation of Australian citizenship but admittedly was not under oath contrary to the exact mandate of Section 5 (2) that the renunciation must be sworn before an officer authorized to administer an oath. At the outset, it bears stressing that the Courts duty to interpret the law according to its true intent is exercised only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning. The first and fundamental duty of the court is to apply the law. As such, when the law is clear and free from any doubt, there is no occasion for construction or interpretation; there is only room for application. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office to make a personal and sworn renunciation with or before filing a certificate of candidacy. Hence, Section 5 (2) of R.A.No. 9225 compels to execute a personal and sworn renunciation. Petitioners argument therefore loses its point.

Bar Matter No. 2112 July 24, 2012 In Re: Petition Re-Acquire the Privilege to Practice Law in the Philippines, Epifanio B. Muneses, REYES, J.: Facts of the Case

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Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in March 21, 1966. He lost his privilege to practice law when he became a citizen of the United States on August 28, 1981. On September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and ReAcquisition Act of 2003by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington D.C., USA. On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying the he be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should be granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines Ruling: Yes. A Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country and later reacquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 remains to be a member of the Philippine bar. However, as stated by the Court in a similar petition by Dacanay (Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007), the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No 9225 provides the need to apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with by Muneses, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law. Thus, the petition of Atty. Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyers Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees. G.R. No. 128195. October 3, 2001. *ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE D. ALOVERA,**Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Roxas City, THE REGISTER OFDEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR, LANDREGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,** respondents. FACTS: Sometime in March 1936, Rafael, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes,Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal and Jimmy, all

surnamed Dinglasan sold toLee Liong, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square meters,designated as Lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at thecorner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street, Roxas City However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz anaction against the heirs of Lee Liong for annulment of sale and recovery of land. The plaintiffsassailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition against aliens acquiringownership of private agricultural land, including residential, commercial or industrial land.Rebuffed in the trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether Lee Liong has the qualification to own land in the Philippines. RULING: The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during theeffectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution, aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession. Thus, Lee Liong, a Chinesecitizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or privatedomain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of nonFilipinos. In this case,however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid. WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 36274. In lieu thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, anddismisses the petition, without prejudice.

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila. Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the Philippines; that respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same; and that respondents purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property. Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but merely reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds. ISSUES: (1) Does the respondent, who is an alien, have the right on acquisition of the Antipolo property in accordance with the 1987 Constitution? (2) Is the respondent entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property? HELD: (1) No. Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states: IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION Save in cases of hereditary succession, OF PROPERTY ELENA no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, BUENAVENTURA MULLER corporations, or associations qualified to v. acquire or hold lands of the public HELMUT MULLER domain. FACTS:

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Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. (2) No. Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.

Issue: Whether or not pronouncement of the RTC and CA be reversed in aid of granting the petitioners plea for certiorari. Ruling: Wherefore, the decision of the RTC and CA were reversed, however SET ASIDE and new one was entered DISMISSING the complaint against the petitioner. Reason for the Decision: The decision of the RTC and CA were both reversed and dismissed on the consequence that they both focused on the property relations of the petitioner and responded in light of the Civil Code and Family Code, which was less appropriate for the case. They should have observe the applicable constitutional principles which in fact were more decisive, evidently stated on Section 7 Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution; Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.1avvphi1 Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain. Hence, by virtue of the aforecited constitutional provision, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands.19The primary purpose of this constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.20 Our fundamental law cannot be any clearer. The right to acquire lands of the public domain is reserved only to Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty percent of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.21 Hence, dismissing the complaint of the petitioner.

of the City of Paraaque threatened to sell at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings should MIAA fail to pay the real estate tax delinquency. on 6 February 2003, at 5:10 p.m., MIAA filed before this Court an Urgent Ex-Parte and Reiteratory Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order. The motion sought to restrain respondents from auctioning the Airport Lands and Buildings. On 7 February 2003, this Court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) effective immediately. The Court ordered respondents to cease and desist from selling at public auction the Airport Lands and Buildings. ISSUE: Whether or not MIAA exempted to pay taxes?

Subject: Ownership of Land Philip Matthews, petitioner Vs. Benjamin Taylor and Joselyn Taylor, respondent Ponente: Nachura, J Facts: Joselyn Taylor, a Filipino Citizen, married Benjamin Taylor, an American citizen on June 30, 1988. During the subsistence of the marriage, Joselyn bought a parcel of land in Boracay which subsequently developed into a resort. Shortly after, the marriage fell apart. July 20, 1992, Joselyn entered to a contract as lessor, to Philip Matthews, as lessee involving the Boracay property. Therefore, Philip Matthews presumed possession of the property and renamed to his favor. Claiming without knowledge of the agreement, Benjamin Taylor, as the husband and appealed as co-owner of the parcel of land, instituted an Action of Declaration of Nullity of Agreement of Lease with damages against the petitioner and Joselyn. The RTC rendered judgment by declaring the agreement was null and void. The CA ordered RTC to allow petitioner to answer his claim to which the latter asserted the agreement entered was in good faith since Joselyn appeared to be the owner. However, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The petitioner appealed elevating to the SC, filing a review for certiorari.

MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY (PETITONER) VS COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF PARANAQUE, CITY MAYOR OF PARANAQUE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD NG PARANAQUE, CITY ASSESSOR OF PARANAQUE AND CITY TREASURER OF But some portions of the Airport Lands and Buildings leased to taxable persons PARANAQUE (RESPONDENTS) like private parties are subject to real estate tax by the City of Paraaque. FACTS: On 17 July 2001, the City of Paraaque, through its City Treasurer, issued notices of levy and warrants of levy on the G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989 Airport Lands and Buildings. The Mayor

RULING: MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local governments. Reason for the Decision: MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. The real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. Section 133 also recognizes the basic principle that local governments cannot tax the national government, The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, which its Charter calls the "principal airport of the Philippines for both international and domestic air traffic," are properties of public dominion because they are intended for public use. As properties of public dominion, they indisputably belong to the State or the Republic of the Philippines.

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RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL, petitioners, vs. FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., respondent. FACTS Vamonte wrote Belmonte requesting to be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. and to be furnished with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. The deputy of General Counsel of the GSIS replied that in his opinion that there exists a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts. Having not received reply of GSIS, Velmonte wrote to respondent another letter saying that due to failure to reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." Valmonte et al filed a special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction to invoke their right to information a pray that Belmonte be directed: a. To furnish Valmonte et al the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of then First Lady Imelda Marcos b. To furnish petitioners with certified copies of the documents evidencing their repective loands c. To allow petitioners access to public records for the subject information ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS. Held: Petition granted. GSIS is to allow access to documents and records evidencing

The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided: The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. 1. Public Interest The right to information is not absolute. People's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law." Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of the former First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos. Is it in public interest/concern? The GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.' It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the

GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were above board. 2. Information sought must not be excluded by law A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus proceedings,viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law. a. No Law cited on privilege of confidentiality Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information. Yet, Belmonte has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. b. Right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated. It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny Whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people. GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope

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of the right to information. Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings. However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos." Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.

After about three (3) and a half years of marriage, such disharmony eventuated in private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. He claimed that there was failure in their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal ISSUE: separation, support and separation of Whether or not, the Philippine property. Government has authority to declare reimbursement of the deposited amount On January 15, 1986, and its interest, from the respondent bank. Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure HELD: of marriage of the spouses. However, on The Court held that the June 27, 1986, or more than five month Philippine government is competent to after the issuance of the divorce decree, file grievance against respondent bank in private respondent filed two complaints accordance to the Doctrine of Parens for adultery before the City Fiscal of Patriae (a doctrine that grants inherent Manila alleging that, while still married power and authority for the state to to said respondent, petitioner had an protect persons who are legally unable to affairs with certain William Chia as early act on their own behalf.) as 1982 and with yet another man named The government as protector of Jesus Chua sometime in 1983. the rights of its people holds an inherent supreme power to enforce laws that ISSUE: promote public interest and can thus take the money that is intended for the people. WON the private respondent can The legislature or government of the prosecute petitioner on the ground of State, as parens patriae, has the right to adultery even though they are no longer GOVERNMENT OF THE PHIL. enforce all charities of public nature, by husband and wife as decree of divorce virtue of its general superintending was already issued. ISLANDS V. MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. DECISION: AJORAS DE MANILA The judgment appealed from is G.R. No. 9959 affirmed, with costs against the appellant. The private respondent, being no longer 35 PH 728, 751-753 Petition Granted. married to petitioner has no legal 13 December 1916 The Court ordered respondent standing to commence the adultery case TRENT, J. bank to return the amount to the rightful under the posture that he was the heirs with interest in gold or coin in offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Philippine peso. FACTS: On 3 June 1863, a devastating REASON FOR THE DECISION: earthquake hit the Philippines. The Spanish The law specifically provided that in dominions/authority provided monetary PILAPIL vs IBAY SOMERAGR prosecution for adultery and assistance for the victims of the G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 concubinage, the person who can legally earthquake amounting to $400,000 which file the complaint should be the offended was received by the National Treasury. spouse and nobody else. Though in this The fund given was used for its REGALADO, J.: case, it appeared that private respondent objective; however, $80,000 was left is the offended spouse, the latter obtained from the consumed fund and was thus a valid divorce in his country, the Federal turned over to the Monte de Piedad bank, FACTS: Republic of Germany, and said divorce which was in turn invested as jewelries, equivalent to the same amount. Petitioner Imelda and its legal effects may be recognized in In June 1983, the Department of ManalaysayPilapil, a Filipino citizen was the Philippines in so far as he is Thus, under the same Finance called upon the same bank to married with Private Respondent Erich concerned. consideration and rationale, private return the $80,000 deposited from before. EkkehardGeiling, a German national in respondent is no longer the husband of The Monte de Piedad declined to comply Germany. The couple lived together for

with this order on the ground that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement because the Philippine government is not the affected party. On account of various petitions, the Philippine Government filed a suit against Monte de Piedad to recover the $80,000 plus interest, for the benefit of listed persons and their heirs. Respondent refused to submit, hence, this petition.

some time in Malate, Manila where their only daughter, Isabella PilapilGeiling, was born on April 20, 1980.

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petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

and by the so-called Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Government was CO KIM CHAM vs. EUSEBIO Commonwealth restored. VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON DECISION: It was adjudged and decreed G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945 that a writ of mandamus issue, directed to FACTS: Petition for mandamus in which the respondent judge of the Court of First petitioner (Co Kim Cham) plead that the Instance of Manila, ordering him to take respondent judge of the lower court be cognizance and continue to final ordered to continue the proceedings in judgment the proceedings in Civil Case civil case No. 3012 of said court, which No. 3012. were initiated under the regime of the socalled Republic of the Philippines RATIO DECIDENDI: YES. In political and established during the Japanese military 1. international law, all acts and proceedings occupation of these Islands. The respondent judge refused to take of the legislative, executive and judicial cognizance of and continue the departments of a de facto government are proceedings in said case on the ground valid. Being a de facto government, that the proclamation issued by General judicial acts done under its control, when Douglas MacArthur had the effect of they are not political in nature, to the invalidating and nullifying all judicial extent that they effect during the proceedings and judgments of the court continuance and control of said of the Philippines under the Philippine government remain good. All judgment Executive Commission and the Republic and judicial proceedings which are not of of the Philippines established during the political complexion were good and valid Japanese military occupation, and that, before and remained as such even after furthermore, the lower courts have no the occupied territory had come again jurisdiction to take cognizance of and into power of true and original sovereign. continue judicial proceedings pending in NO. The proclamation has not the courts of the defunct Republic of the 2. Philippines in the absence of an enabling invalidated all the judgments and proceedings of the courts of justice law granting such authority. During the Japanese occupation, no during the Japanese regime, and this is substantial change was effected in the impliedly confirmed by Executive Order organization and jurisdiction of the No. 37, which has the force of law, issued different courts that functioned during the by the President of the Philippines on Philippine Executive Commission, and in March 10, 1945, by virtue of the the laws they administered and enforced. emergency legislative power vested in him by the Constitution and the laws of ISSUES: 1. Whether or not under the rules the Commonwealth of the Philippines. of international law the judicial acts and Said Executive order abolished the Court proceedings of the courts during a de of Appeals, and provided "that all case which have heretofore been duly facto government are good and valid. 2. Whether the proclamation issued appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be by General Douglas MacArthur , in transmitted to the Supreme Court final which he declared that all laws, decision." This provision impliedly regulations and processes of any of the recognizes that the judgments and government in the Philippines than that of proceedings of the courts during the the said Commonwealth are null and void Japanese military occupation have not and without legal effect in the areas of the been invalidated by the proclamation of Philippines free of enemy occupation and General MacArthur of October 23, control, has invalidated all judgments because the said Order does not say or and judicial acts and proceedings of the refer to cases which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the said courts; and 3. Whether or not the courts of the Japanese occupation, but to cases which Commonwealth, which are the same as had therefore, that is, up to March 10, those existing prior to, and continued 1945, been duly appealed to the Court of during, the Japanese military occupation Appeals; and it is to be presumed that by the Philippine Executive Commission almost all, if not all, appealed cases

pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all, appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese regime. 3. YES. If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of postliminy, may continue the proceedings in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points out in speaking of said principles a state or other governmental entity, upon the removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties substantially unimpaired. Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is not change merely by change of sovereignty."

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