Preface

In one of the most infamous episodes of twentieth -century intellectual history , the linguist -anthropologist Benjamin Lee Whorf argued (i ) that language shapes thought and reality , (ii ) that the tense system of a language can tell us about the metaphysics of time entailed by that language, and (iii ) that for the Hopi , among other cultures, the tense system (if it can be called that) is so radically different from ours that those cultures may not have a concept of time at all . " I find it " gratuitous , writes Whorf ( 1956, p . 57), to assume that a Hopi who knowsonly the Hopi language andonly thecultural ideasof his own societyhasthe samenotions to be intuitions, of time andspace , often supposed that we have , and that are generallyassumed to be universal . In particular , he has no generalnotion or intuition of TIME as a smoothflowing continuum in which everything in theuniverse at anequalrate , out of future proceeds , througha present , into a past ; or, in which, to reverse the picture, the observer is being carriedin the streamof duration continuouslyawayfrom a pastand into a future. . . . The Hopi language is seento containno words forms, constructions , grammatical or expressions that refer directly to what we call " time," or to past , present , or future or lasting , or to motion askinematic ratherthandynamic(i.e. asa continuous translationin space andtime ratherthanasan exhibitionof dynamiceffort in a certainprocess in sucha way ), or thatevenreferto space as to excludethat elementof extension or existence that we call "time ," and so by implication leavea residuethat could be referredto as " time." Hence , the Hopi language containsno reference to " time," eitherexplicit or implicit . I think that Whorf was more right than wrong in the abovepassage . Oh, I don ' t mean that he was right in thinking that the Hopi are so different from us. The ' past few decades work in generative grammar has shown us that the differences among human languagesare superficial at best. Moreover , it is now pretty clear that evenon the surfacethe Hopi have a temporal systemnot unlike our own. ( See Malotki 1983 for a discussion.) Still , I think Whorf was on target on a number of points. I think he was correct in thinking that one can argue from the sttucture of human language to the nature of reality , and I think he was most likely correct in seeing a close connection between language and thought .

xiv

Preface

But there is anotherpoint on which I think Whorf was right in the above of theHopi his description . I think thaton a certainlevelof deepanalysis passage - notjust for theHopi, but for all of us. That wasbasicallycorrect tensesystem is, I think that a closestudyof Englishdoesnot supportthe thesisthat thereis with thatis compatible sucha thing astense- at leastnot the sortof tense system of time. More to the point, I doubtthat theories currentlyfavoredphilosophical notionor intuition of TIME asa smooth weactuallyhavea " general flowing continuum rate at an in which everythingin the universe equal , out of future proceeds " that wehave" no words also sure . I am into a , , , througha present quite past that refer directly to what we or expressions forms, constructions grammatical " call "time ," or to past , or future. , present to Theseare pretty provocativeclaims. At leastWhorf had the good sense to us room thus exotic our to in restrict his claims ( , ) allowing eyes peoples . But who would suppose that exoticpeoples concede may haveexotic realities to pastandfuture, etc.? thatallowsusreference thatwedon' t havea tense system Isn' t it obviousthat we do? to future and lacksreference Evenif it couldbe shownthat our tensesystem about the nature abouttime itself , why shouldwe draw conclusions pastevents ' of reality?Can t we simply saythatthereis tense , andthereis time, but they ? don' t havemuchto do with eachother ' intuition- that thereis a What I will try to showis that Whorf s unargued . His error andreality is basicallycorrect between closeconnection language . Oncethat error naturallanguages between the differences wasin exaggerating kind of cultural relativism to the to be driven for us no reason there is is corrected , 's does of The structure thesis . Whorf from followed that language original not differ does havemetaphysical , but the structureof language consequences , or between in relevantwaysbetweenEnglish andHopi, betweenFrenchandFarsi thesame all share andUrdu. It followsthathumans Chinese metaphysics . the same reality Thus, oneof the centralgoalsof this book is to illustratehow onecanstudy . The specific from a linguistic/semantical perspective questions metaphysical Atheorists is thewell-entrenched to investigate issuethatI havechosen disputebetween andB-theoristsaboutthe natureof time. , thereis a permanent ; rather , thereis no genuinechange Accordingto B-theorists of unchangingevents , ordered(lined up, if you will ) by an sequence -than -events . Forexample / later-thanrelation earlier , WorldWarI (andall the sub which in this of the event as real as is , in it contained ) just preface your reading World that When we sun . turn is just asreal asthe eventof the deathof the say War I is past, we meanthat it is earlier than the event of our utterancethat

Preface

WorldWar1is past . Whenwe saythatthedeath of thesunis future, we mean that thedeathof the sunis laterthanour utterance that the deathof the sunis future. " - events are In this sense , B-theoristsconsiderreality to be " untensed not intrinsically , present , or future ; rather past , theysimplyexist(outthere somewhere , ), ' and ' future' and 'past aremerelywaysof talking aboutwherethoseeventslie relativeto the utterance eventsin which we speakaboutthem. This view may seem counterintuitive , but it is mostlikely thereceived view in bothphysicsand , havingbeenadvocated philosophy (or saidto havebeenadvocated ) by figures . rangingfrom Albert Einsteinto BertrandRussell , on the otherhand Accordingto A -theorists , time is not a frozensequences of unchanging . The picturegivenby A -theoristsvariesfrom theoristto events theorist , but 1 will be defendingan alternativedueto A. N. Prior (andperhaps to SaintAugustinebeforehim) in which, strictly speaking , thereis no futureand " or no past" out there . Wecansaythatit will betruethata certainstate anywhere of affairs (say , the deathof the sun ) will hold andthat it wastrue that a certain stateof affairs (say , World War I ) held, but that this doesnot involveour referring to future and past eventsor to therebeing sucheventsfor us to refer to. Accordingto this idea(often calledpresentism future ), what makessomething or pastis how the world stands right now. The allegedproblemswith eachof thesetwo positionsare now fairly well out. The chief problemwith the B-theoryis that it fails to accountfor mapped the indexicalnatureof our temporaldiscourse . As an illustration, suppose that 1know 1haveanimportantappointment at 20 ' clock, but thatbecause watch my hasstopped 1do not know that it is now 2 0' clock. 1blissfully think out loud: " I havean appointment at 2 o' clock." Suddenly that it is 2 , the radio announces ' 0 clock. 1nowthink out loud: " Oh no, 1haveanappointment now! IIThealleged problemfor the B-theoristis that thereis no way to distinguishthe contentof thesethoughts /utterances with B-theory semantical relations . As far as the B' ' ' the sameas ' the time of this utterance , now just means theoryis concerned , ' ' ' which is just to say 2 o clock . Something hasgonewrong. The response of the B-theoristsarelimited to two generalroutes . strategies ' t have doesn First , onecansaythatsemantics to do with so , anything metaphysics we canallow indexicalityin the semantics without it infectingour metaphysics . Second in my example , onecansaythatthetwo sentences of the2 0' clock meeting , despite , actuallyhavethe samesemantics appearances , or at leastthe same " content " semantic ." Theextra" meaning in the sentence with theindex supplied ical is not really semantical ; however and , it may be psychological , psychology doesnot havethe samemetaphysical commitments that semantics does . In this book 1 will arguethat both of thesestrategies fail - that semantics cannotbe

Preface

from semantics . bedivorced divorced from metaphysics , andindexicalitycannot defective . is will be that conclusion aBtheory metaphysics inherently My to theA -theory: first, that On the otherside , therearetwo centralobjections it allegedlyfalls victim to a logical paradoxobserved , by J. ME . McTaggart ' t be of tense because it cannot within a semantics that it can and second , , integrated ' ' account for temporalanaphora , suchas then , that apparently (expressions ' for complex it alsocan t account referto timesin thepastandfuture) andtherefore relatedto temporal tenses ). I will arguethattheobjections (e.g., thepastperfect 's and McTaggart , and that a objectionsturn out to be related anaphora into a semantics of tensethat can be of incorporated theory temporalanaphora . The idea will be to developa theory of doesnot havefuture and pastevents " in which "E are not referring expressions - type temporalanaphora temporalanaphors -clauses - e.g., when but ratherstandproxy for temporalconjunctions will be that . conclusion treated in a nonreferential which can then be ( way) My . to theA theory thereareno compellingsemantical objections . If thereis a fact of the matteras for theA -theorywill not endthere My case useris exploiting (andhow the language to what semantical theorya language if language usersactuallyhave(tacit) and that knowledge useris representing ), knowledgeof their semanticaltheory (and of how they are representingit ), then theremay be psycholinguistic probesthat canhelp us detenninewhether . As we will or aBtheory semantics the speaker is usinganA -theorysemantics from and evidence from see , acquiredlinguistic deficits acquisition language knowledgeis consistent supportsthe ideathat the structureof our semantical only with theA -theorypicture. of this book are The main theses , then, the following: . We can gain insight into the metaphysics of time by studyingthe semantics of language of natura1language , wherethis constitutes (in part) our knowledge . that knowledge world relationsandhow we represent . TheB-theoristcannotaccount indexicals of temporal for thesemantics ; hence , . is undennined the possibility of aBtheory metaphysics . TheA -theoristcananswer and abouttemporalanaphora semantical objections . about the paradox McTaggart objections metaphysical . Psycholinguistic aboutthe semantical evidence theory that humansactually . favors A -theorymetaphysics andhence theA theorysemantics employalsofavors will obviouslyrequirethatwe do sometechnical theses Defendingsomeof these on the both work , philosophicalendandon the linguistic end. This need will . Philosophers mewith a dilemma haspresented matters to go into technical andwill find theempiricaldiscussion puzzleovertheneedfor formal fragments

Preface

xvii

of grammatical tenseandanaphora to be mind-numbingly detailed . Linguists will puzzleover all the attentiongiven to the McTaggartargumentand truthvalue links , and will find the empirical discussionof tensephenomena and . Thereis no helping this, I ' m afraid. I have anaphora surprisinglycondensed tried to give the minimumlevel of detailnecessary to secure , and my argument I havereliedheavilyon notesto point theway to furtherdiscussion of manycrucial issues . Readers interested in digging deeperwill haveto pursuethe references . My goalsherearesimply to layout theform of the argument andto give . enoughdetail to showhow the pieceshangtogether As I havealreadyhinted, my centralconcernin this project is not with the A -theoryandtheB-theory , or evenwith thephilosophyof time. Rather , my goal in this exercise is to illustratean approach to metaphysics in which semantical are central . Fifty yearsagoperhaps no theory andthe philosophyof language one would havebotheredmaking this final point, sinceanalyticphilosophers thentook it for grantedthat language (andthe philosophyof language ) would stand at thecenterof anyphilosophical endeavor . In subsequent decades thephiwasremovedfrom this centralposition to be , sometimes losophyof language to be replacedby nothing replacedby the philosophyof mind and sometimes -branch at all (leaving the various sub es of analytic philosophy to spin off in numerous unrelated directions ). It is not all badthat the philosophyof language lost its placeat the centerof . The view of language that guidedmostof the mid-century analyticphilosophy research was mistaken . Further , in my view, fundamentally , manyof thesupposed whichwereto flow from thephilosophy of language weretenuous consequences at best . Today hassomeclaim to makein metaphysicsor , if the philosophyof language elsewhere . , it mustbe carefullyargued , andthatis all to the good Yet, asthecenturydrawsto a closethe philosophyof language hasreturned in a newform. It hasbeensuccess , in my view, andintegrated fully naturalized into thesemantics of naturallanguage andlinguistic theory . ( Fora surveyof relevant literatureand a glosson this naturalizationproject .) , seeLudlow 1997a in this form the of does have claims , Returning philosophy language powerful to makeaboutour variousphilosophical endeavors , notjust in the metaphysics of time, but alsoin the theoryof causality , in the theoryof action , andin value . I hopethat this book will serveto illustratejust how centralthe philostheory is, and how, executed , the philosophyof language ophy of language correctly deserves to reclaimits placeat the very heartof analyticphilosophy .

Acknowledgements

WhenI conceived of this project , in 1991 , the ideawasto put togethera short that would two different theories of tense within anabsolute manuscript develop semantics for naturallanguage andwould showthe connection between those theoriesand two leading theoriesof time. In 1992I circulated a short draft that contained the core of the idea(althoughnot workedout in detail manuscript . That draft received a number of helpful comments from Barry Schein ) , Ed Zalta, andRichardLarson . , which led to somesignificantrevisions In the fall of 1993the revisedmaterialwaspresented at a seriesof lectures at the University of Padua , and it benefitedgreatly from the criticisms and comments of some of theparticipants i , Mario Mignuce , (includingPaoloLeonard andErnesto . ) led to the first Napoli) Theselectures(andthe discussion periods 1994draft, which I againcirculatednarrowly. Again I was fortunateto have , and in particular importantfeedbackfrom RichardLarsonandBarry Schein from Ernie Lepore. Incorporatingthosecomments I revised the manuscript , . . Although I received again Late in 1994I submittedit to The MIT Press helpful commentsfrom two anonymous reviewers , and althoughthe project was " " to greenlighted, it wasclearto me that a lot of technicalproblemsremained be workedout. revisionsof this material, particularly the development of the Subsequent technicaldetails in a courseon the semantics of tensewhich I , werepresented andLinguistics taughtat in the Diploma Programin Philosophyof Language at the University of Venicein the summerof 1995 at and a seminar on tense , whichI taughtin theDeparbnent of Linguisticsat StonyBrook in 1996 . Theless technicalportionsof this materialwerepresented in mini-courses that I taught at the University of Novi Sad , Jugoslaviain 1997and at the Fourth Central in Summer School Generative , the Czech European Linguistics, in Olomouc . 1997 , Republic

Acknowledgements

Portions of chapters5- 10 were presentedin talks at the Departmentof attheUniversity of Maryland of Linguistics ( 1995 ), attheDepartment Philosophy , HumboldtUniversityin Berlin ( 1995 Conference ), attheInter-UniversityCenter on Truth in Bled, Slovenia ( 1996 ), at the Conferenceon the Question of at the of Venice Club ( 1996 ), andat the Moral Sciences Temporality University at Cambridge ). University( 1997 Thepenultimate draft, completed in late 1997 , wasagaincirculatedfor comments . Onceagain assistance andencouragement came from Richard , invaluable Larsonand Ernie Lepore as well as from Lori Gabe , , , andJason Repetti Segal . Crucially me that, while I hadperhaps , LarsonandRepettiboth convinced Stanley ironedout thetheoryto my satisfaction wasutterly opaque . , theexposition I accordinglyspentthe nextsix monthstrying to streamline the manuscript , remove technical details makethebookmoreuserfriendly. To this , andin general in venues to experiment with waysof presenting end , the springof 1998I usedseveral the material : the Universityof Milan, the ScuolaNormaleSuperlore in on tense UCLA ' s of . Pisa , anda workshop sponsored by Department Linguistics The last yearanda half of work on this book wasdonein someidyllic set , tings. In the spring of 1997I was a visiting scholarat CambridgeUniversity whereapartfrom the MSC talk, I benefitedgreatly from discussingtheseissues with HughMellor, JeremyButter field , IsaacLevi (who wasalsovisiting), andMichaelPotter . (I might addthattheoffice I wasprovidedat Cambridge was furnishedwith portraitsof J. ME . McTaggart , C. D. Broad , andG. E. Moore quite inspirational for someoneworking on the reality of time.) In the fall , work continuedat the Universityof Venice , whereI held the FulbrightChair in of / . I am indebted to AnnaCardinaletti , Michal Philosophy LanguageLinguistics Starke , and Guglielmo Cinquefor logistical and intellectual supportwhile in . I am also indebtedto my department Venice chair, Ed Casey , and to the administration at SUNY Stony Brook for supportingmy leavesof absence during this period. Certainindividualsdeserve thanksfor contributions that aresomewhat more existentialin nature . Lori Repetti and our daughterChiaradeservesomesort of awardfor toleratingme while I workedon this. Fortunatelyfor Chiara , she wasnot aroundduring the first four yearsof this effort. I shouldadd that Lori providednot only existentialsupportbut also somecrucial additionsandcorrections - particularly in the sectionson the natureof I -languageand in the sectionon eliminatinggrammatical tense . A differentsort of existentialcontribution camefrom Noam ChomskyandRichardLarson , who (apartfrom providing me with commentson portions of the manuscript ) taught me to be in my thinking, and more importantly, by their examples , taught courageous

Acknowledgements

mehowto havethekind of mentalstrength to grind out thearguments necessary of a . I nowrealize required minority intellectual , however , thatthefoundation position of what I learnedfrom them I had alreadylearnedfrom my father. It washe who taughtme abouthavingat leastone new ideaeveryday , andhow to staywith eachnew idea, sometimes for years it until it cameto , reworking fnrition. He alsotaughtmethat , evenafterall this work , onehasto expecta high rateof failure amongradicalideas . As this projectis way out on several philo, crashin a most spectacular sophicallimbs andcould, eventomorrow way, the I can this book to is father . H the only person imaginededicating my projectin this booksucceeds of havingit dedicated to them. , no oneelseis moredeserving " ' ' " If the projectfails . . . well, asmy fatherwould say , it s all in a day s work.

Introduction

The A -Series vs. the B - Series

is, in part, the studyof what is real. The layperson often supposes Metaphysics thatwhenphilosophers worry aboutwhatis realtheymustworry aboutwhether " tables do worry aboutthese , chairs , anddinnerplatesarereal. Some philosophers but there are a number of other , questions metaphysicalissuesthat philosophers about too. worry of interestis a classof metaphysical Amongthe areas surrounding questions ? thenature of time. Forexample , is timereal?If so, is thefutureasrealasthepast Can we changethe future? If yes, why? If not, why not? If time is real, then whatexactlyis it? Is time, assomehavesuggested ? , reallyjust physicalchange If so, then how do we makesenseof this changeapartfrom its occurring in ? As with time? But if change takesplacein time, thenhow cantime be change about the nature of time are othermetaphysical , questionsquestions notoriously are still debated difficult. Certainproblemsposedby the pre-Socraticphilosophers the natureof time , andthe numberof metaphysical puzzlessurrounding continues to multiply. in thephilosophyof time. This work will focusonjust oneof themanyissues as far back asthethird century(by Theissue which in some form was discussed , ' -century the NeoplatonistIamblichus), hasbeenat the centerof the twentieth discussionof the philosophyof time. Briefly , the problemis asfollows: lWo . Accordingto esto the philosophyof time canbe distinguished broadapproach Russell Einstein Reichenbach and others oneapproach , , , time is , adoptedby , andtenseless events . Futureevents of unchanging , pastevents , simplya sequence and presenteventsare all equally real. McTaggart( 1908 ) called this the Bseriesconceptionof time; others , including Mellor ( 1981 ), havecalled it the the alternative untensed . to , it is fundamental approach conceptionAccording

Introduction to the notion of time that events , or perhapspropositions, have genuine temporal status. So, for example, there is a fundamental metaphysical distinction between events that are future and those that are present or past. This fundamental difference is supposedly deeper than a simple ordering of events by the earlier than / later -than relation . McTaggart referred to this as the A -series conception of time ; others have characterized it as the tensed conception . Following Gale ( 1967), we might find it useful to distinguish the A - seriesand the B - series according to the following criteria . A - series B - Series

The B-seriesis reducibleto theA series . Temporalbecomingis intrinsic to all events . Thereareimportantontological differences between pastandfuture. is analyzable Change solelyin terms of A -series relations(past , present , future).

TheA -seriesis reducibleto the B series . . Temporalbecomingis psychological The B-seriesis objective . All events areequallyreal. is analyzable Change solely in terms -than of B-seriesrelations(earlier , later-than . )

As we will see and sufficient conditions , thesecriteria do not provide necessary for identifying theA -seriesandthe B-series ; indeed , someof the criteria will haveto be relaxedif logical conundrums areto be averted . For now, however . But , theycanprovideuswith a usefulway of thinking aboutthedistinction what exactlyis at stakein this distinction ? like these havebeenpursued thehistoryof philosophy Questions , throughout notjust because of their intrinsic interest but alsobecause hasoften metaphysics beenseen asa pointof departure for otherphilosophical . Questions investigations aboutthe metaphysics of time havebeenthoughtto haveconsequences for the of the of mind the of , , philosophy language philosophy philosophy religion, the philosophyof science and other branch esof philosophy . , epistemology , As we will seein chapter10, the decisionbetween the A theory andthe B. But how doesonedecidebetweenalternatives theoryis rich in consequences like these ? One answerwould be that questionsabout the natureof time are bestaddressed . For example , Einsteinheld aBseries conception by physicists ' t we of time} He presumably hadgoodphysicalreasons for doing so. Shouldn thereforedefer to Einstein, or to whatevercurrent physical theory dictates ? Putnam( 1967 to adoptsucha view: , p. 247) appears

Introduction I concludethat the problemof reality and the determinateness of future eventsis now solved . Moreover . . . . Indeed , it is solvedby physicsand not by philosophy , I do not believethat thereare any longeranyphilosophicalproblemsaboutTime; thereis only thephysicalproblemof detennining theexactphysicalgeometry of thefour- dimensional continuumthat we inhabit.

On the other hand this passage , Sklar ( 1981 , p. 2493 ), specificallyaddressing from Putnam notes that such a reflects some of , position ignorance the nature of the scientificenterprise : I thinkthatsuch a naive viewis aswrong asit canbe . Just asacomputer is onlyasgood ' ' one asitsprogrammer in, garbage out can extract ( Garbage ) onlysomuch metaphysics -viewmust fromaphysical asone in.Whileourtotalworld , of course , beconsistent theory puts withourbest available scientific theories mistake to read off a metaphysics , it is a great 's overt fromthetheory mistake to , andaneven superficially appearance graver thefactthatmetaphysical have intotheformulation of the neglect presuppositions gone framed . , asit is usually , in thefirstplace theory If Sklar is correct to be undertaken , thereis still a philosophicalinvestigation , evenif it is to be a part of the scientific programof physics .4Othershaveargued that subjectmattercalled " time" in physicsreally hasnothingto do with the metaphysical of time but is just an appropriation of the tenDto conception discuss certainaspects of light relationswithin the theorys themosttelling problemis that it is not obviousthat currentphysics Perhaps as to physicists . As Sklar ( opposed ) actuallyfavorsonepositionover the other " the philosophyand , p. 275) hasnoted , the scientifictheorycan change ( 1974 the A -theory andthe B-theory , ] in a new perspective put the dispute[ between butit cannot resolve thedispute in anyultimatesense ." Furthennore Sklar 1981 , ( ), Stein( 1968 thatnon-B-theory ), Dieks( 1988 ), andShimony( 1993 ) haveargued of the specialtheoryof relativity arepossible .6 interpretations In sum, evenif philosopherswish to passthe burdenof metaphysicalinquiry ontothephysicist theburden . There , thephysicistsimplycannotshoulder are still metaphysical to be answered and it is not to , questions up physicists aloneto answer them.' But what exactlycanphilosophybring to the table ? Philosophers , after all, havebeen for more than 2000 without much debating metaphysical puzzles years success . Dummett . 12 the 1991 situation as follows: , p ) puts ( apparent Themoves andcounter moves arealready familiar been made , having repeatedly by thephilosophers thecenturies . Thearguments of onesideevoke a response in through certain of thespectators of thecontest of theother sidesway of them others , those ; but -outblowhasbeen wehave nocriterion to decide thevictors . No knock delivered . We must award thedecision onpoints . ; andwedonotknowhowto award points

Inb"oduction

Or, asVoltaireput it (lesspugilistically is a dance ) 200yearsearlier , metaphysics of elegantstepsin which we endup backwherewe started . Is thereanythinga canbring to this dance besides andelegantsteps ? philosopher purespeculation One strategyin philosophyhasbeento reject the ideaof metaphysics as a startingplaceandto arguefor movingfrom the bottomup - from the theoryof . thoughtto metaphysics The generalideais broadlyKantianin character . Wecanneverknow things " astheyare" in themselves our , sincethemind is activelyinvolvedin organizing . The best we can do is elucidate the or structure of reason . experience categories For example to Kant time was not itself a of in , according , property things themselves ; rather, it was imposedupon our experienceby the mind. Of course , from this perspective it would be futile to beginan investigation into the nature of time apartfrom a consideration of the natureof thoughtor reason . And indeed after an into the nature of time as a of human reason , investigation category hadtakenplace , therewould be little left to do in the way of metaphysics , save to dotthei ' s andcross thet ' s. Or, to usea metaphor dueto Dumrnett , perhaps ' s task is like that of the the philosopher who cannot tell us what , optometrist we will seewhenwe look about corrective , but who, by providing us with adequate lenses . , cannonetheless help us to seemoreclearly In thetwentiethcentury haveconceded to , a numberof analyticphilosophers Kant thegeneral view in which aninvestigation into metaphysics cannotbeconducted into the natureof thought , but haverejected apartfrom an investigation Kant' sconception of thought of reason . In its place , with its attendant , categories thatthoughtis inherently . Thus , theyhave theyhaveproposed linguisticin nature that the properstartingplacefor investigation shouldbe the language proposed in which we think, andthis hasgenerallybeentakento be naturallanguage .8 the B esto thephilosophy of time , Interestingly theoryandA theoryapproach esto the semantics of tensein naturallanguage . parallel two distinct approach On the one hand, there are approach es to the semanticsof tense(see , e.g., Reichenbach 1947 even s in accounting for complex ) that appealto reference ~ tenses andtemporalanaphora . On theotherhand esto tense , thereareapproach that are morein the spirit of Prior ( 1967 es in which ' past' , , 1968 ) - approach ' ' ' ' , andin which thereareno pastand present, and future areprimitive operators 9 future events se . per If onesupposes that thereis an interesting connection between metaphysics andthe semantics of naturallanguage that the semantics , and if one supposes of naturallanguage canhelp illuminate our metaphysics , thenonemight hope that the semantics of tensecanhelp illuminatethe metaphysics of time. For example 's one that the choice between Reichenbach , might suppose theoryof tense

Introduction

andPrior' s theoryof tense mighthaveprofoundmetaphysical (favoring consequences eitherthe B-seriesor theA -seriesconception of time). HereI amnot advocating anapproach , like thatof Dumrnett( 1991 ), in which -up from thetheoryof meaning we aresupposed to reason bottom to metaphysics . It seems to me that the construction of a theoryof meaningwithout someprior sense of ontology would haveus climbing blind. That is, without somesense of theconstituent structure of the world we would haveno ideaof how the theory of meaningis to link up our language with the world. Nor am I advocating the oppositeposition in which we are to sort out our ontology before we undertake the constructionof a theory of meaning . It is only throughthe theory of meaning thatwe areableto differentiate theelements of our ontology . For example is ableto tell us that something , evenif a priori metaphysics in the world hasan abstract property foo, whatin our ontologytells us thatfoo is a temporal - that it hassomething to do with the natureof time? property that we havepartial knowledgeof the natureof reality , I assume Accordingly andpartialknowledge of thetheoryof meaning , andthatour taskis to solve a kind of complexequationinvolving information from semantics on the one sideandmetaphysics on theother . Whatwe knowaboutthenatureof reality will , but it is also the casethat semantictheory help shapeour semantictheories will help to shedlight on the natureof reality. Of coursemanyphilosophers will hold that eithermetaphysics or the theory of meaningmustbe morefundamental thanthe other , but to me this hasall the " " . Theremay be somedeeptruth about makingsof a chickenor egg argument whetherchickens or eggsaremorefundamental , but no serious biologistwould in such a debate nor I , ( hope ) would any seriousphilosopherbe exercised engage . Likewise shouldworry less , in my opinion, philosophers by the question aboutwhethermetaphysics or the theoryof meaningis morefundamental and shouldworry moreaboutthe relationsthat musthold between themin view of whatwe alreadyknow abouteach . relationholdingbetween metaphysics , whenI saythatthereis aninteresting Roughly andsemantics I meanthat concrete about the nature of reality questions canbeilluminated what we know about semantic and that , by theory important in semantic questions theorymay be adjudicated by certainof our metaphysical intuitionsabouttheconstitution of reality. Clearlymoreneeds to be said , and 4 will takeup theissuein detail. Of course to serve , this bookis intended chapter asan illustrationof this generalpoint. Indeed in support , the goal of this book is to providea semantical argument of the A theory conceptionof time. Or, better, the goal is to arguesimultaneously for theA -theoryconception of time andfor a theoryof tensethat I will

Introduction

. As will be seen between call theA -theoryof tense , if the connection language will be mutuallyreinforcing . andthe world holdsup, thenthesetwo doctrines main will be as follows: First there are certain semantical , My argument weaknesses inherentin the B-theory semantical , the Bposition. Specifically theorist cannotadequatelyaccountfor the indexical natureof temporal discourse . Since the B-theory of time cannot be detachedfrom the B-theory the B-theory metaphysics . semantics , this effectivelyundennines hasweaknesses On theotherside , it hasbeenheldthattheA theorysemantics of its own. Accordingly , to the extentthey exist, , I arguethat thoseweaknesses . The A -theoryconceptionof time thus remainsa plausible areeasily repaired . andundamaged alternative to the B-theoryconception But I will arguefurther that independent psycho linguistic evidencesupports the thesisthat theA -theorysemantics is in fact the semantical theorythat internalizeand" know" (in a sense to be spelledout usersof naturallanguage in chapter2). will unfold, let us first briefly review To get a betterideaof how this argument . the semantical facingboth theA -theoryandthe B-theory challenges

:for theB-Theorist : Temporal TheSemantical Challenge

My wedding anniversaryis March 12. Supposethat I have memorizedthis date . Maybe I had it inscribedin my weddingring. So I know the following : is March 12. My weddinganniversary I am in my office late in the afternoononeday next March. I Now suppose " may say to myself: My fifth anniversaryis March 12. I should think about ." I might thenwonderhow muchtime I present buyingmy wife an anniversary to find today' s dateanddiscoverto my horror that it have . I takeout a calendar is today!" is March 12! I shout" My fifth anniversary : it is clearthat I hadtwo distinct utterances In this little episode ( 1) is March 12. My fifth anniversary (2) . is today My fifth anniversary that I did not havewhen It is alsoclearthat whenI uttered(2) I hadknowledge in the difference to be reflected I uttered( 1), andthis extraknowledge appears that ( 1) and(2) havedifferent semantical between( 1) and(2). Thus, it is arguable contents . As intuitive asthis mayseem , therearesomepowerfularguments

Introduction

to showotherwise- to showthat the semantic contents of ( 1) and(2) designed arethe same . - for example Indeed , the standard philosophicaltreatmentof indexicals , , 1977 by Perry( 1969 been to ) andKaplan( 1977 , 1979 for , 1990 a ) - has argue distinctionbetweenthe contentof a demonstrative and its character expression or role. Thecontent wouldbetheindividualor objectrefelTed to by thedemonstrative /role would be the additionalcognitive significance , andthe character " " theexpression (sometimes theextra linguistic meaning is usedto characterize element like (2). Although the literatureis ) suppliedby the indexicalin cases sometimes unclearon this point, it appears thatthese authors areadvocating that character /role shouldnot be part of the semantic content(or literal truth conditions . ) of the utterance Whatdoesthat mean ? If the semantics of naturallanguage takesthe form of a T-theory and hence the semantics of a sentence , is givenby theorems like (3), ' - theportionfollowing ' if and thentheright-handsideof thetheorem only if states the literal truth conditionsof the sentence on the left-handside .

(3) 'Snow ' is trueif and is white is white . onlyif snow In thiscase arethatsnow , thetruthconditions is white . If weassume a framework of thiskind(I will explain andargue for it in chapter 2), thenonewayof -Perry thesis is assaying thatcharacter /roledoes notmake takingtheKaplan it intotheright hand sideof aT-theory theorem .loForexample , thetruthconditions ' wouldbenotasin 4 butakin ofa sentence like 'I amhungry to (5). ( ) (4) 'I am ' is trueif and now now . hungry onlyif I amhungry (5) An utterance u, attimet, by speakers , of 'I amhungry now ' is ttue if and only if s is hungry att.
Herethe only things that makeit into the truth conditionsare the individuals andthetime t. Theextraindexicalelement foundin ' I ' and' now' mustlie somewhere outsidethe semantics . proper As we will seein chapter3, thereare many arguments for keepingthe semantics free of character /role. For starters leadsto , havingit in the semantics headaches in modal constructions . But, as we will also see , theseheadaches - therearewaysto retain canbe ameliorated and indexicalityin the semantics alsocopewith technicalproblemsaboutmodality .

Introduction

of indexicality treatment , 1am going to arguethat the received Accordingly . Obviously from semantics notbedivorced - that indexicalityshould is mistaken , that canbe madecarelessly this is not an argument , anda greatdealof groundwork will haveto be laid. the natureof language concerning leadsto certainanalyses For example , leavingindexicalityin the semantics . This is alleg in would be . A case naive that appear (4) above point shockingly ' ' of I am hungry by me to a hearerH canhardly , sincean utterance edly naive that 1am saying 4 H be interpreted by using( ) - that would forceH to conclude . The advicewe aregivenby PerryandKaplan that H is hungry , is to , therefore within the contents and retain view of indexicals this naive only sweepaway the truth conditions(asin (5 . The problem with this brief chain of reasoningis that it restson assumptions aboutthe nature of languagethat 1 considerto be fundamentally mistaken is communication . If thefunctionof language , thentheobjectionhassome asopposed is for communication that language merit. But why shouldwe suppose discussed at will be ? Indexicals our to, say , representing thoughts length aboutthe nature in chapter3, but it is alreadyevidentthat certainassumptions will haveto be laid our first. This will be donein chapter1, which of language in chapter of the natureof semantics for the discussion will lay the foundations 6 in 3. Later in of indexicals treatment 2 andfor the , chapter , we will chapter . for the B-theorist seepreciselywhy this problemis insurmountable

for theA-Theorist TheChallenges

. The first is a philosophical for theA -theorist Therearetwo centralchallenges . by McTaggart challengeinvolving an allegedparadoxoriginally discussed has no the A theorist is that in nature more semantical Thesecond challenge turn out to be related . These two problems for temporalanaphora way of accounting . , but we canbeginby treatingthemseparately
The McTaggart Paradox : Is the A -Theory Contradictory ? One of the earliest and most influential critiques of the A -theory is found in ' ' McTaggart s ( 1908, 1927) argument for the unreality of time . McTaggart s argument begins with the observation that certain pairs of properties are such that it would be inconsistent for one object to have both properties. Forexampleal though a table can be both round and red, it cannot be both round and square, for roundness and squarenessare inconsistent properties . Likewise , according to McTaggart, it would be inconsistent for certain events(e.g ., the death of Queen

Introduction

Anne) to be both pastandfuture. Thus , in suchcases , if we affinn (6), we have stated that is inconsistent if not contradictory . something (6) future(X ) & past (X ) But according to McTaggart this is exactlywhattheA -theoryentails , for a given eventE will at somepoint be past , at somepoint be present , andat somepoint be future.II Thus , we havethe following conjunction : (7) future( E) & past (E ) & present (E) Theinitial reaction to this partof theargument is oftenthatit is absurd , for surely one is not sayingthat E is alwaysfuture and alwayspastand always , present but ratheroneis asserting (for example ) thatE is futureat a certaintime segment t, present at sometime t * , andpastat another time segment tIeBut according to this moveis a cheat to smugglingin B-theoryresources McTaggart ; it amounts ; theA -theoristcan' t appealto a sequence of eventsor times. The B-seriestime line cannotbe introduced hereto savetheA -theorist . Let ussetthisparadox on thebackburnerfor themoment andturnto theproblem of temporalanaphora . As we will see arelinked, andonly , thetwo problems for theA -theoristcanwe cometo by solvingtheproblemof temporalanaphora . grips with the McTaggart argument The Problem of Temporal Anaphora Consider the following example(partee1973 , 1984 ): (8) 1turnedoff the stove . Clearly (8) doesnot merelymeanthat at sometime in the past1turnedoff the stove . Withouta doubttherehave been in my past . According manysuchepisodes to Partee 1973 8 is ( thereis animplicit reference ), ( ) informativebecause to some time or somereferenceevent . 1 might equally well haveuttered ' I turned off the stovethen' (with ' then' serving as a temporalanaphorreferring to some of time or eventin thepast segment ). This problemseems to lie at the heartof anotherobjectionto Prioreantheories : that they arenot ableto accountfor complextenses . The objectionis that, for example , [ PAST into the simplepast [ PAST [ S ll ] simply collapses . To see this, first consider thecasewheretime is discrete . Let us call the minimumunit

Introduction

." Then of time a " chronon , at best , [ PAST [ S ]] is true iff S wastrueat leastone chronon ago. But then [ PAST[ PAST[ S ]]] is true iff S was true more than ' t seemto . But this doesn onechrononago capturewhat we intendedto sayby ' like I hadleft ' . a pastperfectsentence of pastness Onemight try to get aroundthis difficulty by talking aboutdegrees ' ' . I hadleft mightbeaboutanevent , buteventhis moveis boundto fall short . Plus in the past at anyarbitrarydistance , thereis the strongintuition that there ' ' eventhere- thatonecouldvery well continue I hadleft . . . really is a reference ' out on a Priorean with ' whenSmith arrived . How is that to be cashed theoryif ? of temporalreference thereis no way to avail ourselves The Solution is to develop to the problemof temporalanaphora The solutionthat I will propose - essentially a theory of temporal a notion of E type temporalanaphora . or events to times reference not involve that does anaphora In the caseof ordinary E-type pronominal anaphora , as in (9), the idea is ' thatthepronoun' He doesnot referto somesalientindividual, but ratherstands of (9) is something , sothattheanalysis alongthe proxy for a definitedescription linesof (9'). (9) A mancamein the room. He trippedover the chair. ' (9 ) A mancamein theroom. The manwho camein theroomtrippedoverthechair. ' ' , not a description Crucially, The manwho cameinto the room is a Russellian ' is not aboutsome in 9 sentence the second hence ) , ( particular ; referringexpression claim abouttheworld- i .e., thattheworld a general individualbut makes contains exactlyonemanwho cameinto theroom, andhetrippedoverthechair. ageneralpropositionand in (91 sentence Wecansaythatthe second ) is therefore difference . This not a singular or object-dependent may not seem proposition certain contexts in it is we will see as like a big deal; however , , very important verbs . For for example , within the scopeof modalsandpropositionalattitude consider , ( 10 ). example ) ( 10 . I believethat a unicornis in the gardenandthat it is eatingmy roses and I havesuccess If the pronoun' it ' is a referring expression fully utteredan to the exisare committed that we then it , appears proposition object dependent

Introduction

tenceof unicorns . However , if the pronounstands proxy for a description , asin ' a la Russell( 1905 ( 10), thenif we treatdescriptions ) we arenot forcedto admit theexistence of unicorns . ' ( 10) I believethat a unicornis in the gardenandthat the unicornin the gardenis . eatingmy roses A similarstrategy canbeexecuted for temporalanaphora . Theoperative idea is thattemporalanaphors like 'then' do not referto timesbut ratherstandproxy -clauses for temporalconjunctions like when . So, for examplein ( 11), the pronoun ' then' doesnot refer -clausethat to a time, but is a placeholderfor a when be extracted from the text. Thus might , ( 11 ) might havethe glossgivenin ( 12 ).

( II ) 't Sam addressed Bill. Bill didn then . respond

( 12) Samaddressed Bill . Bill didn' t respond whenSamaddressed him. -clausedoesnot refer to a time, but will , the when Crucially, on this proposal a general express that the proposition proposition(at leastgeneralin the sense is not dependent times or events described therein uponparticular ). Furthermore , the generalnatureof thesepropositionswill be crucial when they areembed ded in intensionalenvironments like thosecreated by modalsandby propositional -attitudeverbs , andalso, I shallargue , in the scopeof temporaloperators like ' past ' and'future' . In brief, whengeneral areembedded in such propositions environments the resultsare innocentclaimsto the effect that statesof affairs certaindescriptions did hold or will hold. Nothingfollows aboutthere matching or times. beingpastor future events
I realize that so far this is a big promissory note. It certainly sounds incredible that a when-clause need not refer to a time . But , as we will see , the idea can be cashed out handlly using only off -the- shelf philosophical resources. These resources(including the distinction between general and singular propositions ) will be introduced and incorporatedinto a full theory of E- type temporal anaphora in chapter 8. Of course, in most casesthe temporal anaphor is implicit ( as in ' Bill didn ' t ' respond ) and the number and range of temporally anaphoric constructions is vast. I will not be able to chart the entire territory , but I will survey enough of them in chapter 8 to suggesthow the theory of E- type temporal anaphora might be developed. In addition , one of the central hypotheses of chapter 8 will be

Introduction

has a when-clause that every sentence , or a temporal adjunct of someform ' ' ' ' (e.g. before. . . , after. . . ), or a temporalanaphorthat standsin for a when haseither an explicit in naturallanguage clause . Accordingly, every sentence . or an implicit temporaladjunctclause This insight turns out to lie at the root of the connectionbetweentemporal ' 's . The idea andMcTaggart , very simply, is that one s initial paradox anaphora wasbasicallyon track. One wantsto intuition aboutthe McTaggartargument in (6) by addingthatX is future the contradiction to avoid that it is possible say . at a certaintime andpastat another (6) future(X ) & past ( X) in aBseries That moveis certainlyblockedfor theA -theoristif timesareconstrued A -theorymaneuver way, but that doesnot meanthat thereis no analogous . The idea , is thattheA -theoristwill wantto invokeE-typetemporal , in short . anaphora of the fonn given for a representation : ( 13) is shorthand Hereis the gambit ' in ( 13). ) ( 13 X is future. ' ( 13) X is FUT when [ . . .] . deliversthe following truth conditionsfor ( 13'): But thenthe semantics ( 13* ) . ' X is FUT when . . . ' is true iff X will be true when . . . . [ ] [ ] Similar considerations apply to ( 14). ) ( 14 . X is PAST : It will havethe following truth conditions ( 14* ) ' X is PASTwhen . . . ' is true iff X wastrue when . . . . [ ] [ ] The trouble is that we canneverget to the point wherewe havea conjunction of two conflicting A -theory tensedclaims. Clearly ( 13* ) and ( 14* ) are not incompatible -clauses . In short will havedifferentcontents , once , sincethe when to get will fail the E- typetemporalanaphora we introduce , McTaggart argument . off the ground

Introduction

ThePlanof theBook
I will be taking on temporalindexicalsandtemporal , the lines of argument Clearly lead us anaphora directly to the semanticsof indexicals and anaphors and , of semantics . Thereis no question generally ultimatelyto thevery foundations that the argumentsgiven by B-theoristslike Mellor haverestedupon a semanticalfoundation : the work of David Kaplan and John very respectable on indexicals . for . However Perry , for all its respectability example , I believe that it is a foundationof sand , not rock, andthat it is fundamentallyunstable . , I will beginwith a detaileddiscussion of the natureof semantics . Accordingly of semantics is goingto be original; for NothingI sayaboutthe foundations the mostpart, it will involveelucidating a numberof ideasaboutindexicalsand that have been advanced anaphors , andit will alsoincorporate by GarethEvans a generalsemanticalpicture that hasbeenproposed by JamesHigginbotham anddeveloped of my peers in thephilosophy of language . This work by a number remains a minority position however I and will need to , anddefendthe , develop . leadingideasin somedetailhere to the semantics of indexicals Underlyingthis alternative approach , for example , thereis anevendeeper issue about the nature of . philosophical language Is it a socialobjectconstructed for purposes of communication ? Or, asChomsky hasproposed a naturalobject which is part of our biologicalen, is language dowment andnot necessarily at all?My answer to this question for communication will haveconsequences for the semantics of indexicals , so my first steps will haveto be thoughthis terrain. , the generalplan will be to movegraduallyfrom a discussion Accordingly of the natureof languageto a generaldiscussionof the semantics of natural . After adding someneededtechnical resources to the semantics language ,I will takeup thegeneral issueof theconnection between and the world , language thendeveloptheA -theory andB-theory semantical theories , andthenproceed to a discussion of the challenges facedby theA -theoryandthe B-theory . " " All thesepreliminaries may seemlike a very long march just to arriveat a discussion of theproblemposed by indexicalityfor the B-theoristandtheproblem for the A -theorist posedby temporalanaphora , but in my view the march is unavoidable . The issues herearevery subtleandvery deep , andany attempt to skirt foundational is goingto resultin anexchange questions ofuncompelling claimsandcounterclaims . Impatientreaders may want to begin with the challengeto the B-theory in 6 and thedefense of theA -theoryin chapters 7 and8 andthenwork backward chapter ' . That s fine by me. Theorderof exposition herereflectsmy understanding

Introduction

the friendliest or most of the logical precedence of the issues , not necessarily . enticingpathfor the reader Here of thebook. , then , is the complete organization aboutthe natureof language In chapter1, I first take up generalconsiderations " "Ia of called for , opting ) ( language by Chomsky conception language / representational as an innatecomputational systemthat is part of our biological of communication . but is not necessarily evolvedfor purposes endowment of . the possibility that I -language the I thendiscuss might language thought thesemantic In chapter 2, I beginto develop theoryat a very simplelevel, beginning shouldtaketheform of with a discussion of why a referentialsemantics . Amongtheissues thatwill bepivotalin anabsolute truth conditionalsemantics later chapters is the questionof whetherT-theoriescandisplay senses (and if and the so, how), the distinctionbetweenmodestandrobustT-theories , possibility - theories thatdon' t theories of predication of ontologically parsimonious . to properties requirereference In chapter 3, I devote sometime to showinghowresources forpropositional into andfor the theoryof indexicalscanbe incorporated attitudeenvironments to will be necessary developmy . ( Bothsetsof resources an absolute semantics in which for ananalysis of indexicals of tense .) Crucially semantics , I will argue I will also that . Gareth Evans are treated , argue they disquotationallyFollowing that ' I am we canrely on certaintrackingabilitiesto underwriteour knowledge ' saida ' esthe samepropositionas ' I washungryyesterday hungrynow express theory of indexicals day later. Of coursethe real challengefor any alternative as well as Kaplan' s theory can. is whetherit can handlemodal environments thatwouldallow anEvansian linesof investigation Hence , I alsodiscuss possible environments thathavebeen accommodate the modal of indexicals to semantics . broughtto attentionby Kaplanandothers of semantic commitment 4, I returnto the questionof the metaphysical In chapter when commitments arise where the , showing exactly metaphysical theory certain and an absolute semantical one is utilizing example theory exploring cases . to includea semantics In chapter5, I extendthe generalsemantical apparatus will . As we see 1947 of tensein the spirit of Reichenbach , this semantical ( ) it in has robust , is committed consequences particular metaphysical theory of McTaggart of time in the sense to aBtheory metaphysics ( 1908 ). In chapter6, I developthe criticism of the B-theorysemantics by constructing . I arguethat thereareprofounddifficulties surrounding the problemof indexicality - difficulties that may well be the analysisof temporal indexicals . insurmountable

Introduction

In chapter 7, I construct a semantics of tense in thespiritof Prior( 1967 , 1968 ), some of the of the view (inparticular againexploring metaphysical consequences , showingthat it is committedto a versionof theA -theoryof time that Prior himself advocated ). I thenarguethat the Prioreansemantical theorycaneasily avoidthe difficulties with temporalindexicalsthatplagueReichenbachian theories . I thencanvass a numberof standard of objectionsto Prioreansemantics tenseandarguethat thoseobjectionscanbe overcome . In chapter 8, I takeup thetreatment of temporalanaphora in theA -theoryand " E" a of . The idea is that, ratherthan develop theory type temporalanaphora to time or to and future events areimplicit referring , temporalanaphors points past when -clauses (or, moregenerally , implicit temporalconjunctions ). I then extendthis ideato a numberof cases of complextemporalanaphora . Finally, I ' . apply the theoryto the refutationof McTaggarts paradox In chapter 9, I expand the investigation of therelativemeritsof theA -theory andthe B-theory , drawingin particularon datafrom research into the acquisition of tense . I arguethat the availableevidenceclearly leansin favor of the Priorean semantics andits attendant A -theoryconception of time. Finally, I argue that, if onewantsto takethe phenomenology of time seriously , the revisedversion of theA -theory presented in chapters 7 and 8 comportsquite nicely with at leastsomeof the leadingphenomenologies of time. In chapter1O of thephilosophical andlinguisticconsequences , I takeup some of the theory first the , for the natureof pursuing philosophicalconsequences , and memory and then pursuing somelinguistic consequences logic , epistemology - in particular theprospects for eliminatingthelinguisticnotionof tense . altogether It is admittedlya long andtortuousjourney to get to the issues of indexicality andtemporalanaphora , not to mentionthe relativemeritsof the A -theoryand the B-theory , but onceagaincarefulgroundworkand stagesettingwill be crucial to the arguments in the end. As I havealreadynoted presented , somewill want to jump ahead andseewhat the destination looks like. For the rest of us, the long marchbeginsdirectly.

Chapterl -The Nature of Language

1.1 I -Language vs. E - Languagel

es betweentwo conceptions ) distinguish Chomsky( 1986 of the natureof language : I -language andE-language . An I -language is not a spoken or writtencorpus of sentences , but is rathera stateof an internalsystemwhich is part of our .2Thus biologicalendowment , I -language arenot to beconfused representations with spoken or written natura11anguage sentences . They are , rather , datastructures in a kind of internal computational systemwith which humansare born andwhich theyhaveco- optedfor communication andfor otherpurposes .3 From the E - language , on the otherhand perspective is a , a natura11anguage kind of social object the structureof which is purportedto be established by ' ' 4 convention (howeverconventionis to beunderstood ), andpersons mayacquire of competence in their knowledge varyingdegrees anduseof that socialobject . ' s view such I gatherthat, on Chomsky socialobjectsdo not exist andwould , ' be of little scientific interest if they did existisTo seewhy Chomsky s basic ideais right, considerthe problemof trying to individuatesuchsocial . objects For example , simply considerthe linguistic situationin Italy. We speakof "the " Italian language , and we say it is distinct from Spanish , but why ? In large measure andStandard , CastillanSpanish Italian aremutually intelligible when reador spokenslowly. Why don' t we saythat they areregionalvariantsof the samelanguage ? In variousregionsof Italy, variousdialectsare spoken . For example , a different dialectis spoken in Parma thanin Venice . For all practicalpurposes , these dialectsareno moremutually intelligible thanCastillanSpanish andStandard Italian. Why do we saythat both aredialectsof Italian? Why not saythat they are separate on equalfooting with StandardItalian (and Castillan languages " " ? ), not merely dialects Spanish

1 Chapter
asoffi In Italy, somedialects(e.g., Friulian andSardinian ) are recognized ? What . What makesthosedialects special ciallanguagesby the government dialectisn' t? The answer in a way that the Venetian , of makesthemlanguages Max . As decision is a distinct as a what counts is that course ( , language political " ." ) Politicalidentity is a dialectwith anarmyanda navy said Weinreich , a language E-language identity. precedes But this isn' t just an observationabout the distinction betweenlanguage anddialect; it also appliesto the distinction betweendialect andidiolect. My whereI teachand lives whereI live, speaks wife , who teaches slightly differently ' ' and ' ' ' ' thanI do. For example merry differently , shepronouncesMary , marry , . Do we speakthe samedialect? How them all the same . I pronounce beforewe can saythat we do? is necessary muchdivergence . a couchanda chair of fuzzyboundaries This isn' t a case , suchasthatbetween have will dependupon factorsthat The problem is that sufficient divergence to do with whether andeverything are what we with to do saying actually nothing . to identify with eachother we feel disposed Nor is the problem resolvedsimply by throwing out talk of E-languages . Whatportionof thenoises andrevertingto talk aboutE-idiolects andE-dialects I makecountasbelongingto my idiolect? If I coughin the middleof a particular utterance , doesthe extranoisebecome part of my idiolect? How do we distinguish we had an error ? But suppose errors from simple partsof my idiolect , would that exhaust . If we wrote down everythingI ever (correctly) uttered theory my idiolect? Would everythingI everhavesaidor everwill sayexhaust Don' t we haveto considerwhat I might say or could say? But idiolect? my ? of that from the E-language how do we makesense perspective . that I speakdifferently at home and at school Doesit follow Or suppose variesslightly with everyperson ? Sincemy speech that I employtwo idiolects I talk to, why not saythat I havea different idiolect for eachof my conversation ? And sinceI speakto them differently at different times, . . . . It partners shouldbe clear wherethis is going. Why not saythat I employ a different idi of idiolect(andlanguage ?At thatpoint, theconcept olecteverytime I openmy mouth 6 . has ) effectivelycollapsed if we arethinking Clearly thereis no way to sort out anyof thesequestions . or inscriptions utterances or idiolectin termsof somesetof external of language , but Wecanmakechoicesaboutwhatcountsasan error or a possibleutterance or to be are choices these on the E-language prescriptive stipulative going perspective we can is no there is that . The difficulty stipulateeverythingthat way : from the following two examples we needto. Consider Chomsky1986

The Natureof Language

( 1) Johnfiled everyletter without readingit. (2) What letterdid Johnfile without readingit? Somehow of English- even thoseof us who neverremember , speakers to say ' whom' ratherthan' who' in dativecase - know thatif we deletethepronoun' it ' in thesetwo sentences the effectson meaningareratherdifferent: ' ( 1) Johnfiled everyletter without reading . ' (2 ) What letterdid Johnfile without reading ? ' ' ' Sentence in a way that sentence (2 ) is ambiguous ( 1) is not. Both ( 1) and(2') havethe meaningin which the filing wasdonewithout some( ) reading arbitrary the meaningof (2) - it can still be understood , but (2') alsopreserves taking place asaskingwhatletterJohnfiled withoutreadingit (thefiled letter ). Who us taught that? Factslike theseareubiquitousin naturallanguage , andit would be impossible for anyinstitutionto prescribe or stipulateevena smallsubset of them . The AcademieFran aise is to dictate that a certainset of propertiesthat ~ supposed cover the Frenchlexicon and the pronunciationof the words in it . However , ' t dictate the Academiedoesn as much as it thinks it does . At bestit dictatesa small rangeof superficialrulesaboutFrench . All the while, it relies on shared tacit knowledgeof I -language which , providesthe substrate uponwhich those rules are . What theAcademiehasis a collectionof proclamations prescribed parasitic about what the structureof Frenchshould be but which is not even sufficientto constitutea respectable candidate E-language . In short , the only way out of theseimbrogliosis to give up talk of language andidiolect asa naturalobjector to think aboutthemechanism thatexplainsthe that eachof us obviouslyhas ! The only sensible linguistic competence way to do that is to suppose the lines : that somethingalong suggested by Chomsky our linguisticcompetence is atbibutable to aninternalcomputational that system is part of our biological endowment . That systemand the representations encoded in it areobjectsthat we canstudyandaboutwhich we canhavetheories . . Anything elseis just vaporware

1 Chapter For? 1.2 What Is I -Language

" for the The question" What is I -language for ? hasprofound consequences in advanced attitudes of the and for indexicals of theory propositional theory viewthe standard On ordinarily presupposing chaptersof this book. subsequent of language thatthepurpose - it is assumed anE-language pictureof language that a semanticaltheory is communication , and henceit is assumed ) must respect (including the theory of indexicalsand propositionalattitudes . of function language the communicative of ' I am hungrynow' is In the caseof indexicals , an utterance , for example thatholdsat all timesandfor all speakers to its meaning takento havea component is hungryat the time of its utterance of the sentence that the i.e. ). ( , speaker " of the indexicalcharacter " nowness . the e. more ( g, Allegedly, insertinganything of the utterance ) into the meaningwould throw off your communicative . The communicative on their answeringmachines partnerswhen you left messages thusrequiresthat propositionalcontentnot vary function of language from individual to individual or from time to time. functionof language thatthecommunicative Thereis probablyroomto argue (if it exists) doesnot put such seriousconstraintson propositional content. to becalledinto question itself needs to methatthebasicpremise However , it seems is correct the I that , it we . Specifically , once suppose perspective language communication shouldbefor aboutwhy I languages immediatelyraisesquestions - or , for that matter , why they shouldbefor anythingat alIiS The issuecanbe put in a generalway. If onetakesthe E-language perspective it is entirely convention human are established , that languages beingsby by the case In this canhavea certainend. that languages to suppose sensible . Persons endis established tacitly) simply agree(perhaps by humanintentions in orderto further the endof communicating to follow certainlinguistic conventions . with oneanother But if we reject the E-language picture in picture and adoptan I -language , humanintentions which the language faculty is part of our biological endowment ' t enterinto the -language is to have I individual . If an don equation simply ' be established it must convention human t be established it can ; somesort of end, by . by biology. Herewe areon very tricky terrain doctrine in biology is a controversial In the first place , teleologicalexplanation . Thereis a strongtemptationto appealto evolutionarytheoryto establish value of a biologicalsystem , by arguingfor selectional thepurpose (for example this . But ) of a faculty to which we want to attribute somepurpose requires - in particular aboutevolutionarytheory , it requires somestrongassumptions

The Natureof Language

a gradualistapproach to evolution . In the caseof attributinga communicative endto language it also assumes that we havea faculty dedicated , to communication to just an ad hocbundleof abilitiesthat we employin order (asopposed to communicate ). Theissueaboutgradualism is, of course , familiar from recentwriting on evolutionary . On one side , Stephen theory JayGould et al. hold that humanevolution hasbeenfar from gradualandthat in manycases organsthat evolvedfor certain weresubsequently co - opted for quitedifferent .9Humans purposes purposeS are not uniquein this respect ; evolution is typically of this character . Hence , for example membranes that evolvedfor thermalregulationmight be co-opted , for the purpose of flight . In the contextof the language faculty, the ideais that we cannotreason backward from thecurrentwaysin which we usethelanguage faculty to the conclusionthat the language . faculty evolvedfor thosepurposes And evenif we could, thereis no reason to suppose that the language faculty is for thosepurposes . Biology, asChomskyandLasnik therebyanoptimalsystem "' ' ( 1993 ) haveobserved , is typically messy , intricate , the resultof evolutionary ' ' and accidental , circumstances and tinkering shaped by by physicalconditions thatholdof complexsystems with variedfunctionsandelements ." Perhaps , then , I -language is a very imperfectsystem for purposes of communication . More to thepoint of indexical , its handling with philosophical expressions maynotcoincide intuitionsabouthow anoptimal system of communication oughtto be built. Ontheothersideof thisissue Pinker andBloom( 1990 thatevolution , ) have argued is in fact a muchmoregradual andthatit makes to think process goodsense of the language to the selectional advantage faculty ashavingevolvedin response of communication . But evenif we accept theirarguments for gradualism and thethesis thattheI -language in response to selectional facultyevolved , pressures it doesnot follow that I -language evolvedfor purposes of communication . For thatit evolved in orderto serve , it is still possible asa mediumof thought example PI ). Or, in view of the rich metricaltheoryfound (seesection1.3 andappendix O in variousI -Ianguagesi it could evenhaveevolvedfor purposes of producing . Clearly thereare advantages to having communicative poetic soundpatterns abilities to havingotherabilities ; however , thereareadvantages , andif oneis to backward from the existence of I to some selectional argue language advantage onemustarguecarefullythatthe main advantage is its communicative function andnot someotherfunction. In summary : Thelanguage ) is not a productof humanintentions faculty (I-language but rathera productof humanbiology, so any end that we attributeto I -language mustbebiologicallybased . This means thatanargument for thecommunicative function of language would requirean evolutionarystory aboutthe

Chapter1

of communication of having a language selectional faculty for purposes advantage a controversialview aboutthe natureof evolutionary . This strategyassumes that communication is the only (or the chiet) theory; further, it assumes evolved . Finally if we wereto assume thatI -language functionof I language , even to it is a distance of human communication for the express , very long purpose mustcontainonly the conclusionthat the propositionalcontentof an utterance users . Evolutionarytinkering may infonnation that is stableamonglanguage . well havefound an alternative strategy

?II of Thought 1.3 Is I -Language theLanguage in thisbook to thelineof argumentation it is notcrucial , it turnsout Although of thought wouldhelp I-language andthelanguage between thatequivalence comers . usto cutsome to distinguish Justto beclear , thehavingof , we need thought(or, better thatall human . No onewouldsuppose ) from cognitionin general thoughts . Thequestion that is not what is at issue in I but takes , cognition place language world are those about the : When wehave is this , thoughts simply thoughts in our to befoundelsewhere tokens I -language , or aretheytokens interpreted ? architecture cognitive overwhatgets thiscouldeasilyslideintoa terminological Because dispute " I am " of argument to admit for tobecalled ) , ( purposes willing perfectly thought states that interest is in . is stipulative thatmy definition cognitive My primary I amcalling of thisinvestigation theworld to beabout , andfor purposes purport " However " of defining on the side there is a fair bit of . such states , history thoughts ' sclaimthatintention with Franz Brentano in this , beginning way thoughts a broad I am not mental . But the mark of the , advocating ) is again ality(aboutness between anequivalence andcognition of I -language ; I amsuggesting equivalence states and and those I-language certain thoughts cognitive representations . theworld thatareabout ? Prima of thought bethelanguage Withthisclarification , couldI-language connection if thereis a close thateven not, on theground facie , onemightsuppose of be some there must and between thought language reality language ?Indeed this . Butwhysuppose and theworld I-language between thatmediates , me as redundant strikes medium of an of thepostulation intermediary thought . atbest andunmotivated : If there is a for thisreason is redundant of a thirdmedium Thepostulation of thoughtLar) , then ontothelanguage fromI-language thatmaps mechanism it cando no to I -language eithertheLOTmustbeisomorphic (in whichcase

TheNature of Language

23

morethanI -language can of the LOT arerecoverable ) or the properties from 1 via some . In either case I language representations , language algorithm representations for servingasthelanguage already carryall theinformationnecessary of thought . Oncewe movefrom theE-language of language to theI -language conception , most of the stock arguments natural conception against languagebeing the of thoughtcollapse . Forexample language , Jackendoff ( 1993 ) andPinker( 1994 ) -as raise severalarguments -LOT hypothesis that seemto leavethe I -Ianguage untouched . I ' ll consider these technical in appendix PI , but someless arguments formal arguments due to Pinker (ibid., p. 68ff.) are worth exploring here . For " babiescannot Pinker notes that , think in words because example they have " " not yet learnedany . . . cannotthink in wordsbecause , that monkeys they are " of learningthem , andthat manyhumanadultsclaim to do their best incapable haveconsequences thinking without words. Clearly thesearguments for any thesisthat I -language is the language of thought . If humanbabiesandchimps are thinking thoughtsbut haveno I -language , that certainly undermines any identificationbetweenI -language and thought ; likewise if humanadultshave . But aresuchthingspossible ? thoughtswhich arenonlinguistic Oneproblemwith babiesis knowingpreciselywhentheybeginhavinggenuine thoughts(in the sense ) . Thereis no questionthat cognition specifiedabove is takingplacein the womb, but whendo babies havethoughtsaboutstates of affairsin theworld? I know of no illuminating developmental studies on this . It is one to find evidence of a question thing , or of the permanence conceptof number of objects , or of the ability to identify one' s mother , but by what line of argument canit be shownthat thesearegenuinerepresentational ? thoughts And insofaraswe areinclinedto call thesethoughts(andthe moresophisticated andworld-relatedthe cognitionthe moreapt we areto do so) it becomes lessclear that babiesdon' t havethe relevantI -language . For representations , linguistic comprehension example precedes productionby a goodbit (as any knows here(from ChomskyI 995b ). On thetheoryof I -language parent adopted ), sentences areconstrued asorderedpairsof representations , {PF , LF} , in which " -articulatory the PF representations interfacewith the " perceptual component " " -intensional andthe LF representations interfacewith the conceptual . system It is entirely possiblethat the I -language is intact in babies but that the system -articulatorycomponent interfaceof PF representations with the perceptual is not yet developed . , thispossibilityalsoundennines aboutintelligentadults By theway arguments with no apparent linguistic abilities. Suchindividualsmaywell havefull -blown -intensional linguistic abilities, which may well be servicing the conceptual

1 Chapter
. The opposite of speech , yet be incapable system productionandcomprehension true: an individual be and to wellalso be may producing may responding sentences but if the LF are not formednaturallanguage , being representations utilized asthoughts(thatis, if theyarecausallyinert in plansandactions ) he or but no thoughts . In effect, suchan individual to havelanguage shewill appear would havecausallyinert thoughtforms. . On the onehand The caseof animalsraisesmoresubtleissues , we want to " and " Fido thinks his dish is to saythis is to ascribea , empty presumably say thoughtto Fido. It is certainly a cognitive stateaboutthe world. On the other . SohowcanFido' s thought is supposed to beuniqueto humans hand , I -language ?CouldFido (or at leastchimps I -language beaninterpreted ) have representation ' . The evidence ? Here, I tendto be in Pinker s camp rudimentaryforms of I language animals lackanything thatnonhuman remotelylike our language suggests come all think? . So how faculty they thatnature Thequestion is vexingonly if onesupposes only oneway provides marine animals . For example to solvea problem , we know that various employ variousmethodsof propelling themselves (contrastthe squid with the manta ray), yet it is perfectly correctfor us to saythat they all swim. We also know maleandfemale(our to be sexed differentwaysfor animals thatnature provides a X and Y chromosome ), yet we arenot blundering strategy being minority strategy " " " ." The whenwe say That is a malechicken or That is a femalespider ' ' ' ' as point is that the terms swim and male covera broadclassof phenomena is that ' thinks' is a bit to species . What I wantto suggest we movefrom species like this. We areperfectlywithin our rights to saythat Fido is thinking, just as we arewithin our rights to saythat Samthe squidswimsandthat Charlottethe ' ; wejust haveto keepin mind that Samdoesnt swim like we spideris a female than we are, do, that Charlotte is sexedby different biological mechanisms than we do. mechanisms different that Fido thinks and , crucially, by of thoughtmayhave . His language of thought Fido maywell havea language somerudimentarysyntax ) , and he may (as the Greekphilosopherssupposed ' t human of isn . But his inferential of some becapable language thought reasoning that Fido and to suppose . It ' s that simple. It is entirely reasonable I -language co - opt othercognitivesystems otheranimals ) (with relevant syntactic properties to do their thinking. They may evenhavefacultiesthat evolvedfor that express to be different. It is entirely possiblethat we have . But humans appear purpose it evolvedfor that of thinking (or perhaps the for co optedI language purpose andhasbeenco optedfor communication , the rudimentary ). In any case purpose for I -language our use of not tell the do Fido and of against chimps thoughts . the kind of robustthinking of which we arecapable

The Natureof Language

In regardto adulthumans who purportto havenonlinguisticthoughts , Pinker anecdotal stories aboutfamous creative givesseveral individualswhoclaimsome role for imageryin their thinking. Of course , for everysuchanecdote thereis an anecdote that deliversjust the oppositeconclusion . One famousexample , , is the caseof BertrandRussell reportedin Monk 1996 , who claimedto be incapable of thinking imagistically.12 Clearly there are individual differences our use of in concerning images cognitionandcreative problemsolving, but this ' t entail individual doesn differences in the language of thought . Evenif weconcede for thesake of argument thattherearementalimages , and 13 thattheseimages arefundamentally and not text based we still have pictorial , to beon guardagainst a fallaciousstepin reasoning . It is surelytruethatimages canbe usefulin our thinking. Doesit follow thatour thoughts areimagistic ? For example , mapsare very useful in planninginvasionsand family vacations , but whenwe aredeliberatingwhetherto go north or southon Thesday it doesnot follow that our thoughtsarein any way composed of maps . Likewise, in working out an argument I may find it usefulto doodlepictureson a pieceof " that I am having" doodlistic , but no one would suppose paper . Why thoughts shouldwe choose to identify thoughtsandimageswhenthe imageshappen to be mental ? I may dreamof a snakebiting its tail , andthis may inspire a thoughtabout -based the structureof carbon molecules , but it doesnot follow that the dream andits attending a thought . The thoughtcamelater. This fact imageconstituted is actuallyevincedin Pinker' s account of how RogerShepard cameup with his -rotationexperiments famousimage : between andawakening , suspended Earlyonemorning in a state of lucidconsciousness sleep -dimensional a " spontaneous , Shepard kineticimage of three images experience in space ." Within moments and before majestically turning , Shepard fully awakening hada clear ideafor thedesign of anexperiment . (Pinker 1994 added , p. 71; emphasis ) I am perfectlywilling to concede that the kinetic imagehelpedShepard come to havethe thoughtthat he did. Something mustinspireus to havethe thoughts that we do. Weblunder that theseinspirationalimages , however , whenwe suppose mustbe thoughts themselves . In any case , we haveknown for nearly400 yearsthat imagesare very poor candidates for thoughts . Descartes observed thatalthough wehavethoughts about -sidedfigures of them (thousand . Evenamong chiliagons ) we do nothaveimages theBritish Empiricists of images with thoughts , theequation wasunraveling by the time of Berkeley . It washe who observed that vaguethoughts(say , about the conceptof a triangle) are often associated with a very clear image(say ,a

Chapter1

red equilateraltriangle), andthat thoughtsaboutparticularindividuals(say ,a . with a can be associated lost friend ) very vagueimage long -grained to be too coarse Moreover , images , asFodor( 1975 ) observed appear . I may havethe thoughtthat SantaClausis bearded to serveasthoughts , and the however that is an of Santa this may well be accompanied , ; image by image we red cheeked . Here that Santa is sameimagethat accompanies my thought be identi : the thoughtscannot . Conclusion haveone imageandtwo thoughts . fied with images If imagesdon' t work, could somethingelsebesideslanguageserveas the -Laird ( 1983 ? One idea, advanced mediumof thought ), is that we by Johnson " " Mental do the work. necessary nonlinguistic mentalmodels to mightintroduce . The only problemwith this family modelscanbe asfine grainedaswe please in pictorial form, nec is that suchmodels of strategies , while often presented essarilyhavea syntacticstructurethat is crucial to our interpretationof them , they aresuccessful ). Moreover (Rips 1986 only insofarastheymimic the syntactic the thoughtsthey are intendedto model. form we would useto express of of ~ thoughtis conceptually That is, our expression prior to the construction . a modelfor the thought of thoughtmust It is certainlyanempiricalquestionasto whatthe language alternative . in favorof theI language look like, butthereis a heavypresumption andmentalmodels Thenonlinguisticalternatives , fail to getout , suchasimages of language of the blocks , andoncewe areworking with an I -language conception redundant . is of language thought simply any intermediary Obviously there is a lot more to be said about the identification of I -language to havegivenknock-down . I don' t presume of thought with the language PI ). Rather for thethesishere(or evenin appendix evidence , my goal hasbeen thesis who find the For those its plausibility. to suggest , someof the plausible in this book will unfold muchmorerapidly. arguments

Chapter 2 The Fonn of the Semantic Theory

2.1

The Nature of Semantic Knowledge

Oneof the key assumptions of this work is the ideais that part of thejob of semantics is to characterize the semantic that an agenthas . " Semantic knowledge " is not intendedto suggest a thesislimited to how an agentrepresents knowledge to himself or herself . Rather that agents meaning , it is assumed standardly haveknowledge aboutthingsin the world (tables , chairs , etc.), andthat a great dealof semantic of this sort of knowledge . So, for example knowledgeis a species ' refersto snow of Englishmight knowthattheword ' snow , a speaker (the stuff in the world), andthis bit of knowledgewould be an exampleof genuine semantic . knowledge " Talk of " semantic to setoff alarmbells among knowledge hasa tendency ' to be referring no doubt because these , take ' knowledge philosophers philosophers Ito a Cartesian of knowledge thattheagent could conception knowledge havecompletelyindependently of anyenvironmental . Thatis not what relations is intended here . The ideais that onecanperfectlywell haveknowledge of the externalworld (asnotedabove and that one can know that link ) things expressions of the languagewith thosethings in the externalworld; semanticrules in point! beingcases ' s semantic It will alsobe assumed that muchof an agent is "tacit knowledge "which the agentmay not assent to having knowledge knowledge , but knowledge which nonetheless underwrites abilities which the agenthas . This sort of in syntactictheory knowledgehasbeenproposed , whereit is arguedthat tacit of certainlinguistic principlesexplainsour linguistic competence .3 knowledge herethat tacit knowledgeof a numberof semantic , it will be assumed Analogously rulesunderliesour semantic abilities. Varioustheoriesof tacit knowledgearepossible(e.g., tacit knowledgeasa dispositionto act in a certainway), but hereI shall be adoptingthe view that

2 Chapter
genuine tacit knowledge is in some sense represented by the knower in the

-stable is asemi fonDof a datastructure- thatis, thattherepresentation syntactic ' . / brain statein the agents rnind
Again , the claim is not that the object of semantic knowledge is the representation . Rather, it is that the object of semantic knowledge is related to the representation ' ' in an interesting way . So, for example, my knowledge that snow refers to snow does not consist solely in my representation of snow, since the representationitself is a syntactic object. Rather, the object of my semanticknowledge is snow itself , since that is what my representation determines.

? Semantics 2.2 Why anAbsolute

So far , I have discussedsemantic theory in very general terms and have left open the question of what form such a theory should take. In this section I will argue " " that semantic theory should take the form of an absolute truth theory, in the form of a truth -conditional semantics. This general approach is controversial , but for the most part the controversy has been due to misunderstandings. The controversy has been fostered in part by a failure to articulate the difference between the goals of absolute truth conditional semantics and the goals of alternative semantic theories. I will therefore begin by trying to get clear on how an absolute semantics differs from the other candidates, and why an absolute semantics is best suited for the kinds of concerns that arise in the semantics of natural language. Let me begin by identifying three broad classesof semantic theories: . structural semantics . model -theoretic semantics . absolute truth -conditional semantics. As indicated above, I will be defending the third type of semantic theory . To see why , we need to take a closer look at the other two alternatives.

Structural Semantics advocated theories havebeen semantic Structural ), KatzandFodor by Katz( 1972 , 1987 ). The key ideabehind ( 1972 ), andJackendoff ), Katz andPostal( 1964 ( 1963 for a all theseproposalshasbeenthe notion that providing a semantics natural languageexpressionrequiresthat one provide a mappingof that expression of thought thelanguage ontosome ). language (possibly representational For example , and Katz and Postal 1964 , Katz and Fodor 1963 , in Katz 1972 " marker ontoa " semantic theideais to mapa givennaturallanguage , expression

The Fonn of the Semantic Theory

which is in turn a symbolin a particularrepresentational . (Following language " Semantic " . In turn Lewis 1972 , we cancall this language Markerese ) , Semantic Markerese is designed sothatambiguous of a givennaturallanguage expressions aredisambiguated in Markerese . In addition relationsandsynonymy , entailment relationsbetween naturallanguage are to follow by virtue expressions supposed of theforms of their Semantic Markerese . counterparts Lewis ( 1972 ) raisedanimportantandwidely accepted objectionto sttuctural semantics . Accordingto Lewis, if we providea mappingof Englishexpressions ontotheexpressions of Markerese of Markerese , theexpressions will still stand in needof interpretation . Whatwe haveat bestis a mappingfrom onesystem of notation onto another , but what we wantedwas someindication of what the . systemof notationis about Lewis' s point canalsobecharacterized asa point aboutthe semantic knowledge that we have . We all cometo know the referenceof variousEnglish expressions , andit is naturalto expecta semantic whatit is theoryto characterize that we havecometo know. But noticewhat kind of knowledge is attributedto the speaker whenall one hasaremappingsinto Markerese . As Lepore( 1983 ) notes like ( 1). , at bestonegetstheorems ( 1) ' ' into the language of Semantic Markerese Fragola in Italian translates asS. We might evenfollow currentfashionandrenderthe expressions of Semantic Markerese ascapitalizedversionsof their naturallanguage , asin counterparts ' ( I ). ( 1') ' ' into the language of Semantic Markerese as Fragola in Italian translates FRAGOLA. But clearly neitherof thesetheorems characterizes what a speaker of Italian is ' ' do not tell us that sayingwhenhe or shesays fragola . That is, thesetheorems ' ' . fragola means strawberry This generalpoint is not particularlycontentious . Evenadvocates of sttuc tural semantics haveessentially thatthekind of semantic granted theorytheyare andthe world. What is offering will not yield a connectionbetweenlanguage contentious to the advocates of sttucturalsemantics is the questionof whether -world thereis anyreason for a semantic to characterize sucha language theory connection . Katz ( 1972 , p. 183 ) hastakenpreciselythis tack, arguingthat it is not the business of semantics to " study the relationsbetweenobjectsof one sortor anotherandthe expressions of a language that speakaboutthem."

Chapter2 There is no point in debating the question of which enterprise gets the honorary title semantics. There may well be an important place for the type of enterprise advocated by Katz , Jackendoff, and others. My main concern is to note that such an enterprise will not addressthe sorts of concerns raised earlier in this chapter and hence cannot exhaust our interest in language. In particular , such an account cannot help us to characterize the very basic knowledge that underlies our ability to know what the expressions of our language are about. Some readers may find this discussion old hat , but for all its familiarity it seemsto me that the moral has been lost on many semanticists. As we shall seein the next section, precisely the sameconcerns can be raised against model theoretic semantics.

Model-Theoretic Semantics -theoretic thatit canovercome haveargued semantics of model Manyproponents -theoreticsemantics can - that model thelimitationsof the structuralsemantics the world. and relation between the characterize success language fully -theoreticsemantics doesin Thequestion , is whethera model , aswe shallsee . Specifically world connections fact provideus with language , it hasbeenobserved -theoretic others that model and 1990 1983 ), ( ), ( Higginbotham by Lepore that havebeenraisedagainst falls victim to the sameconsiderations semantics ' . Let s see theories . structured why representation -theoreticsemantics thecontentof anexpression A model might characterize asin (2). (2) ' of ' fragola' in every The contentof the Italian word ' fragola is the extension possibleworld. ' ' asin (3). , onemight find fragola characterized Alternatively (3) ' ' ' The contentof the Italian word ' fragola is that which fragola is true of in . everymodel of Englishwhoknows , a nativespeaker But, asHigginbotham ) hasstressed ( 1990 no of and the Italian a bit of , could meanings virtually Italian words syntax only of the content about while know both (2) and(3) knowing essentiallynothing ' . Thekind of ' wouldnothave sucha speaker , butwhichwould knowledge fragola ' is ' 4 . be crucial to understanding , ) ( by expressed fragola (4) ' ' . fragola refersto strawberries

The Fonn of the Semantic Theory

-theoreticsemantics The point to be stressed hereis that model fails in exactly the same that structural semantics fails. What we expecta semantic way theory 's to deliver is a characterization of the speaker about the connection knowledge betweenlanguageand the world. Structural semanticsdoesnot deliver this because it only gives us a mappingfrom one languageonto someother of . Model-theoreticsemantics system representation likewise fails, because it nevermakes theconnection between andthe world; at bestit givesus language a mappingfrom expressions -theoretic of a given language onto certainmodel . objects It might be objectedthat we canalwaysspecifyan intended model , andthat theactualworld shouldbetheintended model .4But Lepore( 1983 ) hasobserved thatthis movewill not work. If thereis to be anintended model , thenwe should like to know how to identify it. But, on the faceof it , this is no easytask(ibid., ): p. 184 Howmuchabouta worlddo we need to knowbeforewecandistinguish it from all otherworlds ? Presumably a lot. There is a class of worldsin whichthe presumably number of trees in Canada iseven and one in which thenumber is odd . Sofararewefrom able to single outtheactual worldfromall others being thatwedonoteven knowwhich class it fallsin. Butdoweneed to distinguish theactual worldfromall others to understand ourlanguage ? However is a wayof specifying , I thinkthere anintended model . Whatis needed ' snow ' is is a recursive that will tell us that intendedto refer to snowin theory ' ' the model , white is to be true of white thingsin the model , andsoon. Suchan intendedmodel must also specify the intendedinterpretationof complexexpressions - indeedan infmite numberof them in the model . Therearetheories that cando this; after all, that is preciselywhatT-theoriesdo! In effect, talk of intended modelsamounts to a kind of handwavingat preciselythe point where T-theories arerequired . -theoreticsemantics Noneof the aboveis to suggest that model is useless or flawedin anysense . Whatis suggested is thatclaimsmade on its behalfareoften -theoreticsemantics excessive . In particular , onemust be wary of claims that a model s canprovidea theoryof language world connections .

Absolute Truth-Conditional Semantics - thatof Davidson Onthetheory I will bepursuing theory ( 1967a ) - a semantic is a system of rulesthatyields theorems of thefollowingform : (T) s is trueiff p.

Chapter2

aboutwhich in the object language(i.e., the language Heres is an expression in the metalanguage is theorizing the investigator (the ), andp is an expression . The to state the is the ) might metalanguage theory using investigator language . Of course be English, or it might be someother language , sincethe theory is the theoristalreadyunderstands a that has to be in it the stated , language metalanguage . called a T-schema above(sometimes The schema ) saysthat the sentences ' ' is true if andonly if it is the casethat p. The phrase is true if andonly if is actually is that eithers andp areboth true . What it means a very weakconstraint . or they areboth false like the following: For example , the systemof rulesmight yield theorems

(i) ' is trueiff snow ' Snow is white is white . (ii ) ' is trueiff ' Snow . is green is white grass
-theories) that yield only theorems like (i ) are said to be interpretive Systemsof rules ( T , becausethe expressionsin the metalanguagesuccess fully give the contents of the expressions in the object language. T-theories that yield theorems like ( ii ) are said to be non- interpretive T-theories. Here I will be interested only in interpretive T-theories, i .e., those that deliver the contents of the object- language expressions. I assumethat those theories are the ones that speakersexploit in the generation and comprehension of language. for the origin and As it turns out , this assumption has some strong consequences nature of our semantic knowledge . For example, it follows that we must have knowledge of a certain class of constraints on T theories. If we did not , we would be unable to construct interpretive T- theories. Of course we must know more than just the rules of an interpretive T-theory. We must know that our theory is .6Larson interpretive and that it can be exploited in the comprehensionof language " " and Segal ( 1995) argue that it follows that we must be hard wired to construct interpretive T- theories and to exploit them in language comprehension. For our current interests, the key idea in aT -theory is that one can have a theory that will provide the language- world connections for any expression of the language (or part of language) under study. Typically , this is accomplished via an axiomatic theory in which certain axioms give the referents of the tenninal symbols of a sentential phrasemarker and other rules show how the semantic values of the tenninal symbols contribute to the semantic value of the nontenninal nodes of the phrase marker. It will be helpful to consider a concrete example of a T-

The Form of the Semantic Theory

. Thefollowingexample from LarsonandSega11995 will suitourpurposes theory in this . nicely regard Sincewe will beconsidering a relativelysimplefragment of naturallanguage , -free phrase -structuregrammar the syntaxwill be described by a context , using rewriting rulesof the fonn A ~ BC thata nodeof category , thisrulestates A mayhave thedaughters Roughly B andC:

A ~ / / / / """" B C
SyntaxS -+ SI andS2 S -+ SI or S2

In this and subsequent fragments , we will proceed by specifying the syntax and then stating the semantic (interpretive) rules for the fragment .

S --+it is notthecase thatS1 S --+NPVP NP--+~ VP--+~ ,~ , ~.@ !b

Semantics Herewe introducethe predicate Val(A , B), which is to be readas "A is the semanticvalue of B." .The theory will include two kinds of axioms : axiomsthat assignsemanticvaluesto the lexical items (i.e., words) and axioms that showhow we candetermine the semantic valueof a mothernodeA , valuesof its daughter nodesB andC. Examples giventhe semantic of axioms for the lexical itemsaregivenin (5).7 (5) a. Val(x, mg ) iff x = Dick Val(x, ~ ) iff x = Sally b. Val(x, ~ ) iff x leaps Val(x , ~ ) iff x walks

34

2 Chapter

in (6) and(7). nodes aregiven of axioms for thenontenninal Examples (6) a. Val x, Val Val , [sNPVP]) iff for some ) and (x, VP) (x, NP (T b. over overcategories a ranges Val , andfi ranges (x, afi]) iffVal(x, fi) (where items and lexical ) categories (7) a. thatVal Val Val (T, 82) , [s81~ 82]) iff it is boththecase (T, 81) and (T b. Val Val , 82) , 81) orVal( T , [s81QI82]) iff either (T (T c. thatVal that81]) iff it is notthecase Val , [sit is notthecase (T, 81) (T in thestructure value of the8 node howthesemantic Forexample , rule(6a ) shows s ' / NP " " " VP

is detennined by the semantic values of the NP and the VP. The rule says, in effect , that the semantic value of S will be true just in case there is something that is both the semanticvalue of the NP and the semanticvalue of the VP. Similar considerations apply to the rules in (7) . For example , (7b ) tells us that in the structure

5 " / 1 " " " or 52 51

is the~emantic the semantic value of S will be the true just in caseeither,theTrue value of S 1 or the True is the semantic value of S2.8
The ideais that we canusetheseaxiomsto derivethe truth conditionsof a . In orderto carry out thesederivations of the objectlanguage sentence , we will needto introduceproductionruleslike thoseshownin (8) and(9) .

TheFo Inl of theSemantic Theory (8) Production Rule (SoE) ...a ... aiffp therefore . . . 13 ...

35

( Thebasicideaof this rule is that we can substitute p for a at any stepin a derivation in case a iff , just p holds.)

(9) Production Rule (Soi )

x, x = (X and . . . x . iff forsome

. . .

therefore . iff .. .a ... It is important to keep in mindthatthese arenotlogical rules , andthatthesteps in each derivation aremuch moretightlyconstrained thantheywouldbeif the full resources of logicwere atourdisposal . Forexample to , wearenotallowed substitute unless been in a logically equivalent expressions theyhave generated in thederivations .9These aresimply rules for deriving previous T-theorems step . " " Given ruleslike (8) and(9), andtheaxioms above one can simple , prove T-theorems of theaxioms to thestructural by recursive application description -language of theobject sentence . To see howthiswill work a simple , consider 'Dickwalks : thederivation forthestructural of thesentence example descriptions ': or it is notthecase thatSallyleaps Val(T Dick][vp walks it is notthecase , [S that[S3 [S ]] or [S2 .[NP [Np ][vp Sally ]]])) iff . . . leaps ( 1) either Va I (T walks , [s.[NPDick it is notthecase ][vp that[S3 ]]) orVaI , [S2 (T [NP ] [vp )])) Sally leaps of (7b)] [instance (2) either VaI walks thatVaI (T, [s.[NpDick ] Vp ]]) or it is notthecase , [S3 (T [NP ] [yp ])) Sally leaps [from( 1 ) and(7c ), by SoB ] (3) either for some x, Va1 walks (x, [NPDick ]) andVa1 (x, [yp ]) or it is notthecase thatfor some x, Va1 and Va1 x (x, [Np ]) ( ,[yp Sally ]) leaps of SoB [from(2) and(6a ), by applications ]

36 (4) eitherfor somex, Val(x, I } ig ) andVal(x, ~ ~ somex, Val(x, Smly ) andVal(x, ~ ) of SoE] and 6b from 3 [ ( ) ( ), by applications

2 Chapter

or it is not the casethat for

(5) eitherfor somex, x = Dick andx walksr it is not the casethat for somex, x = Sally andx leaps of SoE] ), and(5b), by applications [from (4), (Sa

(6) that either Dickwalks orit isnotthecase Sally leaps

[from (5) by Soi] This fragment , obviously extremely simple, is introducedhereto give some eswe . In thetechnicalappendix arederivedin aT-theory flavor of how theorems . T theoriesof greatercomplexity will examine Of course , it is crucial to the project that we establishthat aT -theory can of a truth-conditional . Crucially, the theorems - world connections deliverlanguage relationsbetween . That is, theyexpress arealsodisquotational semantics of the object languageand the world. For example , ( 10) tells us expressions that the Englishexpression spelleds now - # i s- # w h it e is true iff snowis white. ( 10) ' snowis white' is true iff snowis white. the relation andthe world, describing like ( 10 Thus , statements ) straddle language the two. between aredisquotational As LeporeandLoewer( 1981 , , sinceT-theories , 1983 ) note . semantic that knowledge intuitively accompanies they support reasoning from a fact like ( 10') allowsinferences T-theorem how a disquotational Consider to a fact aboutthe world, andfrom a fact aboutthe world to a aboutlanguage . fact aboutlanguage ' ( 10) ' der Schnee ist wei(i ' is true iff snowis white ' der Schnee ist weip' is true iff snowis white ' der Schnee ist weip' is true : snowis white therefore ' der Schnee ist weip' is true iff snowis white snowis white ist weip' is true : ' der Schnee therefore

TheForm of theSemantic Theory

37

Not all theorieshavethis feature . We sawabovethat structuralsemantics , however -theoreticsemantics andmodel do not havethis property . We caneas othersemantic theories thatwouldnotbedisquotational ily imagine , e.g., theories which issuetheorems like ( 11). ( 11 ) ' der Schnee ist weip' is true iff ' snowis white' is true. 'derSchnee ' abouttheexpression By itself, ( 11 ) doesnot tell usenough ist weiJ3 , for one could know ( 11) but not know the conditions under which it is true. Likewisewith ( 12 ). ( 12 ) ' der Schnee ist wei~' is true iff the Englishtranslationof ' der Schnee ist ' wei~ is true. -language Also, it will not do to simply translate the object sentence into some . So for uninterpreted , ( 13 . language , ) would not be disquotational example ( 13 ) ' snowis white' is true iff SNOWIS WHITE is true. Exampleslike this simply fail to deliver the semanticvaluesof expressions , because . they arenot disquotational As obviousasthis featureofT -theories , therearethosewho have mayappear -world connections that T theories lack the to make suggested . ability language For example , ChierchiaandMcConnell Ginet ( 199O to hold that , p. 82) appear suchconnections could not be delivered : -styledefinition Whata Tarski of truthdoes is to associate sentences with a description of theconditions under whichtheyaretruein a certain . It thereby seems metalanguage to shifttheissue of meaning fromtheobject to themetalanguage without really language is. tellinguswhatmeaning " object However to saythataT-theoryconsists , it is not accurate in " associating -language with metalanguage . Rather expressions , the idea is expressions that thetruth conditionsarestatedin the metalanguage . The contrastis equivalent to that between ( 14 ) and( 15 ). ( 14 ) ' snowis white' is true iff snowis white. ( 15 ) ' snowis white' is ' ' associated with themetalanguage expressionsnowis white . Clearly the latter sort of claim is lessinformative than the former. Crucially, it fails to be disquotational -world , and thereforefails to provide a language

Chapter2
like ( 14) rather . But, just ascrucially, aT-theorydeliverstheorems connection than ( 15) . -world connections In additionto providinglanguage , T-theoriesarecompositional havestressed . As both ChomskyandDavidson , speakers typically have . How canthis of an infinite numberof expressions of the meanings knowledge can' t represent aninfinite ?Wepresumably be, giventhat we havefinite memories numberof rules. The ideabehinda compositionalsemantic theory is that 's a finite number of in terms of to state theagent it mustbepossible theory meaning of longer themeanings of rulesfor determining of axioms plusa finite number of a finite . Youknow the meanings of their parts from the meanings expressions numberof words , andyou know somerules for combiningwords into mean of aninfinite numberof sentences . Theresultwouldbeknowledge ingful expressions . from a finite base Put anotherway, insteadof attributingknowledgeof an infinite numberof T-sentences of fonD shownin ( 16), we can attributeknowledgeof axiomsfor eachof the lexical entries , and then combinatorialaxiomsthat showhow the . of the parts canbe derivedfrom the contents contents of the sentences ( 16 ) a. ' the cat died' is true iff the cat died. b. ' the cat that atethe rat died' is true iff the cat that atethe rat died. c. ' the cat that atethe rat that lived in the housedied' is true iff the cat that ate the rat that lived in the housedied.

1ruth Theories vs. Robust 2.3 Modest

Dummett ( 1975 ; 1991 , chapter5) hasarguedthat the theory I havesketched . The thus far would constitutea modest , rather than a robustsemantictheory the semantic about tell us it because is modest , something might though theory . For example thatanagenthas , it falls far shortof telling us everything knowledge ' refers ' snow tell us that above envisioned , thekind of semantic may theory . to snow , but it doesnot tell us aboutthe knowledgewe useto identify snow underlie that the abilities fails to it therefore to Dummett , explain According . our semantic competence

The Fonn of the Semantic Theory

Onemight reply that theabilities that underliesemantic arenot competence part of semantics properbut ratherpart of someotherandperhaps deeper psychological . However , this reply seems theory is not , sinceour concern unhelpful with drawingpretheoreticalboundaries around thevarious butrather disciplines with investigating theknowledge semantic or otherwise ( semantic ) thatunderlies . competence 's , however to takeDummett , thereis no reason Ultimately point asan objection to T theories . To think of it asan addendum to the overallprojectwould be moreuseful . Sooner or later will beinterested , semanticists in thepsychological abilities that underwritethe knowledgethat, for example , Val(x , ~ ~ iff x . We might then regardT-theory axiomsto be descriptionsof semantic laughs at a certainlevelof abstraction . For certainpurposes knowledge , therewill beno harmin our operating at this level of abstraction . For otherpurposes , important cluesto the natureof semantic at higherlevelsof knowledgemay be obscured abstraction . Whatexactlywoulda robustaxiomlook like?Higginbotham ( 1989 ) hasmade someproposals in this regard that such , suggesting axiomswould include the kind of informationthat recentresearch hasproposed to be part of our lexical . For example , Higginbotham knowledge , following Hale and Keyser( 1987 ), " of the ' ' the following " elucidation proposes meaningof the term cut : aV thatapplies e, involving trulyto situations x who apatientyandanagent , bymeans of some instrument z, effects in e a linearseparation in thematerial of y. integrity Thus a , robustT theoryaxiom would incorporate the informationthat hasbeen the subjectof muchrecentwork on the natureof the lexicon, both in linguistics (Hale andKeyser1987 , 1993 ; Grimshaw1990 ; Pustejovsky1995 ) and in natural andRaskin1987 language (Nirenberg andBergier processing ; Pustejovsky 1991 andBriscoe1989 ; Boguraev ).10 The properperspective , then , is not to view robustandmodestsemantic theories ascompetitors , but rather to seethat they are theoriesof the samephenomenon atdifferentlevelsof abstraction andidealization . Oncetheyareviewed in this way, the insightsgainedfrom the investigation of the lexicon become a potentially powerful tool in the evaluationof competingT-theories and ultimately , in detennining moreprecisely whattheontologicalcommitments of such theoriesmight be. 2.4 PsychologicalEvidencefor the Nature of SemanticKnowledge If we pushour investigation no furtherthantheconstruction of truth-conditional semantic theories, we may find that it soon stalls. Supposethat we have

2 Chapter
intuitions; perhaps you haveB-theoryintuitions andI conflicting metaphysical . With adequate with theA -theory , haveintuitions that areconsistent ingenuity theories for a givennatural semantic several to construct it maybepossible possible with differentmetaphysical , theories (byhypothesis phenomenon language Hwe view semantics them? between to some ). Is there way pick consequences that an agenthas asthe studyof theknowledge , it providesus a fair bit of leverage this: T-theories . The questionbecomes in adjudicatingbetweencandidate Which of theT-theoriesdoesthe agentactuallyknow? Evans( I985b) hasgiven an exampleof what sortsof considerations might . . For the time being, let us think only aboutfinite languages becomerelevant ' is limited to twenty In fact, let s imaginean agentwhoselinguistic competence . sentences . The first, TI , introduces for this language Wecanimagineat leasttwo T-theories : , beginningwith thesesix andcontinuingin obviousfashion twentyrules ( 1) [5Dick walks] is true iff Dick walks (2) ] is true iff Dick leaps [5Dick leaps (3) ] is true iff Dick sings [5Dick sings (4) ] is true iff Dick runs [5Dick runs (5) ] is true iff Dick laughs [5Dick laughs (6) [5Janewalks] is true iff Janewalks
In 1' 2, on the other hand, there are only eleven rules. There is one rule for each of the names, and one for each of the properties, and one rule for the nontenni nal node:

(1 ) iff x = Dick VaI (x, ~ (2) VaI (x,~ ) iff x = Jane (3) VaI (x, ~ ) iff x = Sally

The Form of theSemantic Theory (4) Va1 (x, Sm1 ) iff x = Spot (5) Va1 (x, ~ ) iff x walks (6) Va1 (x, ~ ) iff x leaps (7) Va1 (x, ~ ~ iff x sings (8) Va1 (x, mna ) iff x runs (9) Va1 (x, ~ gb ) iff x laughs
( 10) Val( T , [8NP VP]) iff , for somex , Val(X, NP) andVal(x, VP) ( 11) Val(x, [a (:i]) iffVal (x, (:i) (wherea ranges overcategories over , and(:i ranges andlexical items categories ) 's Both TI andT2 success fully yield interpretiveT-theoriesfor this speaker . Is thereanyreason to preferoneoverthe other? That is, is thereany language reason to suppose that the speaker knowseitherTI or T2?Accordingto Evans , theremay well be empiricalconsiderations . For favoringone of the.proposals thatwe hada recordof theorderin whichthespeaker , suppose example acquired thelanguage . Suppose , for example , at some showed point thespeaker suddenly the ability to understand the following four new sentences : Dick laughs . Janelaughs . . Sally laughs . Spotlaughs On theoryTI , this wouldhaveto beexplained thatthe speaker by thehypothesis had suddenly learned four newandunrelated rules. On theoryT2, the explanation wouldsimplybethatthespeaker hadacquired thesemantic rule for thepred ' .'1 icate ' laughs Likewise, considerlossesof semantic . Suppose that a speaker competence losesthe ability to understand the four expressions above . On TI , the suddenly

Chapter2

lost thetacit knowledge hadsuddenly wouldhaveto bethatthespeaker explanation of four different and unrelatedrules. On T2, the explanationwould be of a singlerule hadbeenlost. that knowledge like T2, which admittwo kindsof rules notethatin theories LarsonandSegal rules for and for rules ), it is entirely ( expressions predicate referringexpressions deficits that affectoneclassof possiblethat thereshouldbe acquiredlanguage seemto be possible . Indeed rules and not the other ; as , not only do suchcases Larson and Segalnote, there in fact seemto be suchcaseson record. They andZettin 1989 ) in which a subjectsuffereda point to a casestudy(Semenza lost the ability to dealwith " purely referential severe headinjury and subsequently ." In effect, the subjectlost the ability relations semantic nondescriptive to know rulesof the form of ( 1)-(4) in T2. become morecomplex Of course , asthe linguistic theoriesunderconsideration . A number more interesting , the possiblepsychological probesalsobecome for elements of psycholinguistic rangingfrom probeshavebeenproposed of words . Whetherthespecific constituents to themorphological clausalboundaries probesofferedthusfar turn out to be fruitful , the importantconsideration is the ideathat we can for our purposes , in principle, appealto suchconsiderations . in groundinga particularversionof semantic theory to bearon the thatwe canbring a numberof considerations In sum , it appears we realizes . a what T of , may find it useful Specifically theory speaker question sciences esof the cognitive to enlist datafrom other branch , andfollowing in above envisioned the hypotheticalsituations , we may find relevantevidence and of with the the interactionof semantic , acquisition theory language theory deficits. with the theoryof acquiredlanguage
2.5 ? Do T- Theories Display Senses

from the suggestion T-theorieshasstemmed , Much of the interestin absolute 12 truth conditions than the more due to severalauthors , that T theoriescandeliver of expressions , but that they candeliverthe truth conditionsin a way that " " or " " shows . of expressions displays the sense ' ' and ' like ' Cicero sinceFregethattwo expressions It hasbeenargued Thlly havethe samereferentbut havedistinct senses , for they havedifferent modes / fully in different of presentation that is, they presentthe referentof Cicero ' havedifferentsenses ' and' ' Cicero no there is supposedly Because . , Thlly ways about a belief 17a both who believes someone the beliefs of in ( )( irrationality Ciceroundera certainmodeof presentation ) (a belief aboutthe same ) and( 17b individual undera differentmodeof presentation ).

The Formof the Semantic Theory

( 17 ) a. Cicerois bald. b. Thlly is not bald. With respect to T-theories , thequestion asto whetherthetheorems naturallyarises of sucha theorydeliveronly thereferents of expressions or thesenses too. Thatis, doestheright-handsideof aT-theorytheorem simplygivethereference of theexpression on theleft, or doesit alsogivethereference in a waythatshows or displaysits sense ? This questionturnsout to haveimportantconsequences . Indeed , someauthorshavesuggested that the ability of T-theoriesto display senses is centralto whethera T-theory can serveasa meaningtheory . For example , LeporeandLoewer( 1987 conditions ) claim that therearecertainadequacy whicha theoryof truthmustmeetin orderto functionasa theoryof meaning suitablefor interpretinga language L. On their view, if aT-theoryis to serveas a meaningtheory , it mustbe the sort of T-theorythat candisplaysenses . But canT-theoriesdisplaysenses ?Accordingto LeporeandLoewer( 1987 , T-theoryfor an agent(call herArabella ), an adequate p. 104 ) will containtheorems ( 18 ) and( 19 ) without containingtheorems (20) and(21).

(18 ) 'Cicero ' istrue isbald iff Cicero isbald . (19 ) ' ' iff Tullyisbald . Tullyisbaldistrue (20 ) 'Cicero ' istrue isbald iff Tullyisbald . (21 ) ' ' iff Cicero isbald . Tullyisbaldistrue
Thereasoning is thatArabellamaybelieve thatCicerois baldbut not thatThlly is bald , soaT theorythatgenerates will not correctlycharacterize (20) asa theorem ' s semantic Arabella . The dangerof introducing(20) into a semantic competence to be that it leadsto a falsebelief attributionin theoryfor Arabellaappears the following fashion : (a) Arabellautters' Cicerois bald' .

44

2 Chapter

(b) that ' Cicerois bald' is true (from (a) andcertainassumptions Arabellabelieves ' aboutArabella s truthfulness , etc.). (c) that ' Cicerois bald' is true iff Tully is bald (by hypothesis Arabellabelieves ). (d) aboutclosure that' n1l1y is bald(from (b), (c), andassumptions Arabellabelieves ). that Arabella actually believesa Notice that step(c) relies on the assumption 13 that is interesting . This assumption theoremof the T theory , sinceit suggests of a not a semanticist Arabella(presumably ) musthavebeliefsabouttheorems thatArabella(unless . Sinceit is implausibleto suppose particularkind of T-theory matters of such sheis trainedin semantics , it appears ) hasconscious knowledge " " of (20} - a to entailthatArabellamusthavesomesortof tacit knowledge . laid out this with the is consistent that theory chapter entirely possibility - indeed .14 which I have been one to Now we needto avoida confusion , party . Clearly of the expressions The ideais not thattheT-theorywill statethe sense , IS aT theorycannotdo that. If we go by what is literally stated , (20) attributes . Both areliterally talking to an agentthan( 18 no moresemantic ) does knowledge aboutthe sameindividual. . Dummett( 1973 aswhat is displayed is not the same But whatis stated ) and Evans( 1981 , ) havearguedthat this distinctionwasmadeasfar back asFrege ' s distinctionbetween andDummett( 1973 , p. 227) hasinvoked saying Wittgenstein : andshowingto elucidatethe distinction of a wordor symbol to givethesense when is purporting . . . even , whatheactually Frege therelation notclearly whohas states is whatthereference , for anyone [is] : and grasped his holdon thenotionof sense sense andreference between , this fact makes : in of thereferent of presentation is themode . Thesense of anexpression precarious this. . .. In a a particular is, wehave to choose whatthereference wayof saying saying of theexpression to convey in whichweareconcerned case , we , thesense , or stipulate the sense : we thereferent iswhich of stating what thatmeans shall choose might displays fromtheTractatus a famous here borrow , for Frege , wesay , andsaythat pairof terms is. whatits sense show of a wordis, andthereby whatthereferent ' s distinctionbetween Of course , Wittgenstein sayingandshowingis notoriously about rather than difficult , so perhaps , I should , Wittgensteinexegesis worry . try to elucidatea similar sort of distinctionwithin my framework the semantic In the beginningof this chapter , I madea distinctionbetween that the in which has and the that an agentrepresented way knowledge agent

The Fonn of the Semantic Theory

' refersto snow and . For example , an agentmight know that ' snow knowledge , thatknowledge in themind / brain . mightberepresented by a kind of datastructure ' refersto snow firstLet' s call the first sort of knowledge(e.g., that ' snow ) -orderknowledge orderknowledge of meaning . Canan agentalsohavesecond of meaning(tacit or otherwise )? That is, can the agentnot only know certain axiomsof aT-theorybut also(i ) know that he knowsthe axiomsand(ii ) know that he is representing the knowledgein a way that displaysa certainsense ? It seems to me that the answer hasto be yes. We know that the way we package our claims canradically affect the way . For example , whetherI choosethe name ' Cicero' or ' Tully ' peoplebehave for my utterance . Similar considerations may well affectthe behaviorof my interlocutor to the we semantic information. How apply way tacitly represent we represent our semantical for our knowledgemay well haveconsequences behavior . It seems to follow that a correctT-theorynot only mustcorrectlycharacterize our semantic but mustdo it in a way that correctlycharacterizes knowledge -orderknowledgeof how the semantical our second . knowledgeis represented -orderknowledge Thisraises a number of interesting issues abouttacitsecond and aboutthe transparency of the way our T-theory axiomsarerepresented . What seems is that there is such second order . What remains beyond dispute knowledge to be investigated . (another day) is the natureandreliability of this knowledge
2.6 A Word on Predication

In chapter 4 wewill consider some alternative axiomatizations . Fornow , it is worth - the VP axioms - are noting that the axioms for the predicatesgiven above not whatmanypeopleareaccustomed to. That is, peopleworking in semantics areaccustomed to thinking of predicates asreferring to either propertiesor to setsof individuals . In the lattercase , we would expectto find axiomslike (22) . (22) Val(x, ~ ~ iff x = { x: x walks}

That is not whatis offeredup here in this , andit is not the pathtakenelsewhere book. Nor needit be. Instead thatin a sentence like 'Jane walks' , I am supposing the semantic valueof ' walks' is Jane . Thus valueof the predicate , the semantic will depend on the sentential contextin which it appears . Wecanthink of thisapproach asincorporating anideadiscussed by Carruthers ' s Tractatus who attributesit to Wittgenstein . The core of this idea is ( 1989 ),16

Chapter2

thatpredicates do not refer to their extensions ; rather , their senses specifyrules of classification which are applied to the referent of the subjectexpression . " -token Therule appliesto thatreferentin virtueof some" property possessed by the referentof the subjectexpression : . . . thesense of a predicate is not. . . a mode of thinkingabout a referent . It is rather a ruleof classification to thereferent of thename in virtueof some , applying property 'F' istoknow token which thatthingpossess . Onsuch aview es apredicate , tounderstand thedifference between whichareF andthings whicharenotF, where thisknowledge things in thegrasp of theruleof classification consists whichconstitutes thesense of 'F' . . Carruthers 1989 170 ,p ( ) What is the advantage of this approach ? The difficulty with directly referring to extensions is thatonly by virtueof our understanding thepredicate arewe able to identify the extension . And, indeed no one knows the extension of ' x , really walks' ; theclosest we cancometo specifyingthatextension is by sayingthat" it " is the setof all thosethingsthat walk in effect, that we musthavesomerule of classification which is prior to the setof thingsthat walk. It is worth noting, asCarruthers does needs to appeal to some , that everyone " " suchnonreferring we run into the third man problemdiscussed , otherwise predicates in Plato' s Parmenides dialogueandemphasized early in the twentieth F. H. . a semantical and Consider standard centuryby Wittgenstein by Bradley . On suchaccounts the referent of the treatmentof predicatesas extensions , (the extension ) muststill be relatedby subjectandthe referentof the predicate ' -of' . But thenwe wantto knowif thispredicate therelational predicateis-an-element . If it does on an infinite regress too mustrefer , for , thenwe haveembarked ? how is this newreferentto be relatedto thetwo that areaIreadyon the table Finally, I shouldmakeit clearthattheintroductionof nonreferring predicates for procedural semantics . doesnot amountto abandoning referentialsemantics valueof the predicatewith a procedure or a I am not identifyingthe semantic rule of classification. That rule is in the background(after all , Carruthersis of the predicate , not its referent ). I am still after a theory talking aboutthe sense -to-world connections . The point hereis that properties that deliverslanguage ' andextensions ) don t haveto be part of that picture. (setsof objects

Chapter Attitudes

3 and Indexicals

Section2.6 told a bit aboutwhatthe pictureneednot include. However , a number of resources will haveto beincludedif we areto tacklethesemantics of tense . I will now beginaddingthoseresources . Sofar, my exposition of truth-conditional semantics hasfocused on very simple . However constructions , it is crucial to theprogramin this book that something be said aboutindexicals(at a minimum, abouttemporalindexicals ) . in , it is requiredthat indexicalsbe handledin a nonstandard particular way; temporal indexicalscan' t be treatedasreferringexpressions their , andfurthermore indexicalcharacter mustbe reflectedin the semantics . (More on this in a bit.) -attitudeconstructions Somethingsmustalsobe saidaboutpropositional . In laterchapters I am goingto arguethattense areindexicalpredicates morphemes thattakeinterpreted . Accordingly ..Fs ) astheir arguments logicalforms(D , I need to saysomething abouttheconstruction of I LFs andabouttheir usein the treatment -attitudereports of propositional . As will be seen , the ILF theoryof the attitudes leadsto a certainshift in perspective in our understanding of what must be stableamonglanguage users for us to saythattheyaresayingor thinking the same will serve uswell whenwe turn to theproblem thing. This shift in perspective of indexicals . Accordingly is to , my plan attitudes beginwith propositional andthenmoveon to the general of theproperhandlingof indexicals . question

3.

PropositionalAttitudes

Oneof the centralproblemsin the semantics of naturallanguage hasbeenthe " or " " for the semantics of " opaque problemof accounting hyperintensionalenvironments . To illustratetheproblem thecontrast between , consider ( 1) and(2). ( 1) a. Max met [NP ]. JudyGarland

Chapter3

b. Max met [NP Frances Gumrn ]. (2) a. Max believed[sthat JudyGarlandwasa fine actress ]. b. #Max believedfsthat Frances Gumrnwasa fine actress ]. If it is true that JudyGarlandis Frances Gumrn , then ( la ) entails( 1b) . Indeed , asa general rule, co-referringtenDScanbe substituted for eachotherwithout affecting thetruth valueof the sentence in which they occur . The examples in (2) ' t follow an exception to this generalrule. (2a) maybe true, but it needn constitute that(2b) is true. Let ussaythatopaque arepreciselythoseenvironments environments of co-referringtenDSfails. wheresubstitution values Partof our taskin constructing aT-theoryis to determine the " semantic " of the constituents of naturallanguage sentences . Ordinarily, semanticists would like to saythat the semantic valueof a referringexpression is the thing that it refersto. But noticethat the semanticist cannot saythis in the apparently ' ' ' ' individual faceof (2). JudyGarland and Frances Gumrn both refer to the same semantic value that , we wouldexpect ; hence , thetenDShavethe same ; hence without semantic effect. However thetenDSshouldbe intersubstitutable , asthe in (2) show is wrong. , that expectation examples is not the only difficulty facing The semantic valueof referringexpressions to the . It is alsounclearwhatsemantic values shouldbeassigned thesemanticist . clauses of belief reports . Consider(3), for example embedded (3) ]] [s Galileobelievedthat [s the Earthmoves es a relation betweenGalileo and somesort of object, Intuitively, (3) express esa relationbetween ? Onepossible but what sortof object proposalis that it express and(4). Ga1ileo andthe clauseitself- in otherwords Ga1ileo , between (4) ] [s the Earthmoves But this doesnot seemplausible , since(4) doesnot carry asmuchinfonnation . For example asthebelief reportintuitively does , I might , pointing at the moon utter (5). (5) believedthat sthat moves ]] [s Ga1ileo

AttitudesandIndexicals

ButI mightalso utter(5) when atthesun . Thetrouble is this : if thecontent pointing of thebeliefattribution in bothcases is simplythesyntactic in (6), object thenthese twobeliefattributions arenotdistinguished in thesemantics . (6) [sthatmoves ] There have been to thisproblem in theliterature of semantics many responses overthelastthreedecades . Oneresponse hasbeen to argue thatpropositional -attitude like(3) express relations between and sets ofpossible reports agents worlds in whichtheEarth (for example , thesetof all worlds moves ).1Another has been to that an attitude like(3) express response esarelation argue between report Galileoanda Russellian of theEarthitself and proposition consisting theproperty of moving ! There are onthese , of course twoproposals , variations . In recent literature of authors , however , a number , including Higginbotham , 1991 andLudlow( 1993 ( 1986a ), Segal ( 1989 ), Larson andSegal ), andLarson analternative ( 1995 ), have in whichthesemantic suggested proposal problems -attitude withpropositional verbs arising such verbs mightberesolved bytaking to express relations between and forms markers agents interpreted logical (phrase whose nodes arepaired with semantic values ). " wouldbethe Forexample , theILF for "The Earth moves syntactic phrase marker in (7) (abstracting fromdetailhere values to ), with semantic assigned each node of thetree . Wemighttherefore the ILF as in 8 where each represent ( ), node is paired withits semantic value . (7) S - - - - - -- -----, , - ----,,- - ---. NP VP "The Earth " (8) (S, True ) - - - -.. -----, - - ------~ --, TheEarth (NP ) , TheEarth (VP ) . " " ( The Earth, TheEarth ) " " ( Moves, TheEarth ) "Moves "

Chapter3

Suchobjectsin effect representa semanticvalue togetherwith its linguistic " modeof ." Unlike the naive syntactic theory discussedabove , presentation the beliefs both of values can the semantic ILF theories , , by including distinguish " " the two different acts , because reportedas Galileo saidthat that moves of pointing pick out different semanticvalues(the moon in one caseand the sunin the other , we get the ILF in ). Thus, in the casewhereI point at the moon ILF in we the 10 I at the sun where . In the case 9 , ( ). ( ) get point (9)

5 True , ) ( ~ / " " ~ . . . Moon V The P Moon N The P , , ) ( ( ) " " " The Moon M oves t" hat The Moon , , ) ( )( ( S True , ) . . . . " , . . '-. .. V The Sun P N The Sun P , ) , ( ) ( " " " The Sun M oves The t" hat Sun , ) , ) ( (
) (10
ILF theories thus provide an alternative to the treatments of propositional - attitude constructions that traditionally make use of possible - world semantics , . Becausethey eschewtheseresources , Russellian propositions, or Fregeansenses ILF theories are more austere they attempt to cover as much of the data (or more ) with fewer theoretical resources. Furthermore , because of their austerity , they can be embedded in a truth - conditional semantics for natural language of the kind advocated in chapter 2. My A -theory of tense will regard tenses as being predicates of propositionlike objects. Strictly speaking, however, propositions will not do - propositions , ' as ordinarily construed, are eternal; they don t change over time . Instead we will be looking for proposition -like objects that are not eternal- objects whose truth values can shift over time . Before the A -theory can be incorporated into a truth conditional semantics, then, it will be necessaryto introduce technical resources that will do the work that propositions are routinely designed to do yet will be

Attitudesand Indexicals

non-eternal . Accordingly, I will be proposingthat ll..Fs can serveasthe arguments of tensein addition to being the objectsof the attitudes . Clearly I L Fs will playa centralrole in my semantics , soit is critical that I layout the details of ll..F formation carefully. (HereafterI will indicate ll..Fs with structuraldescriptions enclosed in closedbrackets( ' [] . . . [] ' ); e.g. the ll..F in (8) would be ' ' abbreviated as [] [sThe Earthmoves ] [] ). LarsonandLudlow ( 1993 thatthell..F theoryconsistof threeparts ) propose : ' ' ' and'claims ' -attitudeverbssuchas' believes axiomsfor propositional thinks , , ; an axiom for V Ps containinga complement clause ; and a recursivedefinition -attitude verbsin ( 11) exploit the idea of I L Fs. The axiomsfor propositional that thesepredicates arerelational . Intuitively, x will be an agentandy will be an ll ..F . ( 11 ) a. Val x,y), believes ' ) iff x believes ,0 y. b. Val x,y), .thi ' ) iff x thinks y. ~ ,0 c. Val x,y), claims ' ) iff x claimsy. ,0 Axiom ( 12) introducesI LFs in the interpretationof V Ps of the generalform [vpVS ]- that is, VPs containinga clausalcomplement . ( 12 ) Val(x , [vpV S], 0 ' ) iff for somey, Val x,y), V, 0 ' ) andy = [] S[] w.rit. 0 '. Finally, thereis a generalinductivedefinition of the interpreted logical form of a with respectto a sequence 0 ' .3ll..Fs are constructed" on the fly " by having theT-theoryrun throughthecomplement clause thesemantic value , detennining of eachnode , and then constructingthe corresponding ILF. AT -theoremfor ' Smithbelieves Jones walks' would look like ( 13). ( 13 ) Val(T, [S Jones [N Smith ] [vp [vbelieves ] [s[Np P ] [vp [vS~ Jones ' [] [S [Np ] VpV ~ ~ ]] [] w.rit. 0 ' ) iff Smith believes ]]], 0

Construction of thell ..F([][s[N Jones asfollows: The ~ 1U ] VpV ] ]] [)) proceeds P truth definition must be appliedto the embedded clauseto determinethe semantic valuesof eachnodeof the embedded . Recallthat the embed p-marker dedp-markerin this caseis just asshownin ( 14 . )

Chapter3

~
~ We can get the semantic value of each node from a derivation utilizing axioms like those employed in chapter 2. Given the calculation of these semantic values, the ILF shown in ( 15) can be constructed. ( 15)

(S, True ---- ) - - - -' - - - "

) ( 14

- ..--., Jones ( NP ) I ., Jones } ~ .s

- - - , Jones ) (VP I , Jones (V ) I , Jones ) (l : alb in ( 16 shown derived thetheorem ). , wehave , then Finally ( 16 ) believes Smith believes Jones walks is trueiff Smith S True ( , -- ) --- ---""" ' "' -' - - .--., Jones ) , Jones ( VP ) (NP I I , Jones ) , Jones (V ) (Jones I , Jones ) (walks thatexhibitinarenottheonlyenvironments attitudes Overtpropositional areto beextended to askhowILF theories effects , andit is quitenatural tensionality in itself is abook acomplete . Of course other environments tothese , story intensional handle so called howtheframework I canat leastshow buthere might . constructions transitive

AttitudesandIndexicals

' ' Theseconstructions involve intensionalverbs , suchas seeks, that do not takeclausal showintensionality effects . Consider complements yet nevertheless 17 . 19 ( )-( ) ( 17) Johnwantsa donkey . ( 18 ) Johnseeks a donkey . ( 19 ) Johnlooks for a donkey . Of course , everythingturnson whetherthe clausein thesecases is really missing , andeversincethe Middle Ageslinguistsandphilosophers havetoyedwith the ideathat theremight actuallybe an implicit clausein thesesentences .4 Oneway to makesense of the hiddenclauseanalysiswithin the framework outlinedhereis to suppose that the LF representations of thesesentences actually have a hidden clause in them- perhapssomethingalong the lines of ' ' ( 17)-( 19). ') ( 17 Johnwants[PRO(to have ) a donkey ]. ' ( 18) Johnseeks a donkey[ pRO(to find) a donkey ]. ' ( 19) Johnlooks for [PRO(to find) a donkey ]. -attachment The evidence for the hiddenclauseincludesan adverb ambiguity which is most evident in cases like ( 17). Consider(20). , (20) Johnwantsa donkeytomorrow . Intuitively it is not the wanting which is to take placetomorrow , but the having . This is naturallyaccounted for if we assume an implicit clause ' ), , asin ( 17 andallow an additionaladjunctionsite for the adverb :

' (20) John wants [[PRO (to have ) a donkey ] tomorrow ].

Of course ananalysis of this form makes a very strongclaim uponour syntactic , andthis claim hasto be argued .s theory throughon standard syntacticgrounds Butif thesyntactic claimcanbesustained to unburden theseman , thenit is possible tics of the needfor heavymachinery to handletheseintensionalenvironments .

Chapter3

In short to propositionalattitudesand subjected to an , they canbe assimilated ll...F analysis . I do not introduce this analysisof intensional transitive verbs merely to showhow onecanachieve semantical austerityandstill treatattitudeconstructions . In chapter8, I will explorea similar sort of strategyfor the semantics of tense in support of a particular of tense . Once , introducing implicit clauses theory will haveto obeythe constraints of currentsyntactic againthe implicit clauses I but can I have shown here that the moveis quite , theory providedthey , hope . , if not yet entirelycommonplace legitimate Questionsabout ~ Fs The ll..F theory sketched in this sectionhasled to a numberof misunderstandings . One of thesehasto do with the relationbetween an ll..F andthe agentto whom an attitudeis ascribed . As wasnotedin chapter1, we routinelyascribe beliefsto dogsandothercreatures thatdo not havelanguage - certainly not anI -language similar to whathumans have . A numberof individualshavesupposed that an ll..F is intendedto mirror the structureof someobject in the mind/ brainof the ascribee ; as Segal this is mistaken . I may 1989 and Larson and Ludlow 1993 , ( ) ( ) argue supposition " " Fido believes is an ll..F with words his dish , but , employing say empty English I do not therebysuppose thatthereareEnglishlexical itemslocatedsomewhere that what is happening in in Fido' s language of thought . I do not evensuppose .6 Fido' s language of thoughtmustbe" similar " to thell..F thatI haveconstructed For all I know, Fido may havea language of thoughtthat is radically different from my own. " I am his dish is empty WhenI say" Fido believes sayingthat Fido believes in it . If we were interestedonly in a particular ll..F with English expressions modestT-theoriesthis would be the endof the discussion , but we might want to know more aboutthe psychologicalabilities which underlieour useof the ' ' ' '. to express term ' believes Exactly what is going on if believe isn t supposed ? How that is going on in Fido' s head a relationbetweenan ILF andsomething that underlies our understanding the robust do we go about background theory elucidating ' ' ' ' of believes? As we sawearlier , the elucidationof a verb like cuts ' ' . is nontrivial. As we will see , believes is evenmorecomplex without I -language Sincewe canfaithfullyascribeattitudesto creatures , it 's in the creature asdescribingepisodes is crucial that ll..Fs not be understood of thoughtbutratherasprovidinginformationfor thebenefitof a hearer language ' s menta1life . Put anotherway, who wantsto constructa theoryof the creature the emphasis shouldbe on the relation betweenthe ascriptionand the hearer

;and Attitudes Indexicals

ratherthanon therelationbetween the ascriptionandthe agentto whomthe attitude is ascribed . LarsonandLudlow ( 1993 ) makea preliminarysketchof how that could be that a system , suggesting possible governingbelief ascriptions (andour ability to usethe phrase' x believesy ' ) will involve at leastthe following threecomponents : . the tacit theoryof belief . thetacit theoryof the goalsof belief ascription . the tacit theoryof belief-ascription . logistics Thepreliminarysketch asfollows: Consider a speakerS proceeded , who wishes to ascribean attitudeto an agentA for the benefitof a hearerH. In orderfor S to succeedSandH mustsharea theoryof what beliefs are , for it is the shared .S ontology of beliefs that will guide the way in which beliefs are ascribed mustalsohavetacit know, . That is, S must ledgeof the goalsof belief ascription havea theory that allows him or her to determinewhat featuresof A' s belief will assistH in the relevantway. Finally, S musthavea tacit theorythat allows him or her to deliverthe kind of ascriptionthat will be helpful to H. -sense Thecommon thatspeakers tacitly theoryof belief will statetheproperties ascribeto beliefs , including their relationsto othercomponents of thought andto action. The theoryof the goalsof belief ascriptionwill statethe theorya ' s interest a hearer . In almosteverycase speaker deploysin detennining , thegoal of a speakerSis to causea hearerH to form a certaintheory aboutthe belief structure of an agentA. Finally, thetheoryof belief-ascriptionlogisticswill statewhich expressions mustbe usedin a givencontextto achieve . This specificbelief-ascriptiongoals theory interactswith I L Fs directly and incorporatesthe knowledgerequired for determining which U shouldbe usedin reportinga givenattitude . For example ' s interests it is H sometimes the , dependingupon referential component , of an ILF and sometimes the syntacticcomponent that will be important to the goalsof ascription . We canidentify several rules of thumb in characterizing which component of an U will be relevantin a givenattitudereport ! For example , if H is interested in informationthatA hasaboutthe world (for example from , the distance Earthto Venus of theU will be of primaryimportance ), thentheobjectualcomponent to the goalsof belief ascription . H will thereforebe indifferent to the "the "the choice between Star " and Star " in anattitude Morning Evening ascription Venus . in explainingor predictingA 's , if H is interested concerning By contrast behavior(for example to an utterance of "The Morning , whetherA will assent

Chapter3

" A will actin a waycompatible Staris theEvening Star with theknowledge , or whether H that the Morning Staris the EveningStar then well be interested ), may ' in the syntactic A s belief. that S usesto characterize expressions In cases of the latter kind, whereprediction or explanationof behavioris ' s choice of the goal, Larson and Ludlow envisionthe speaker syntacticconstituents in an ILF to involvea two- stage with to process respect the hearerH. In the first stage the way in which H modelsA' s belief structure , S detennines " " . Then S negotiates with H the expressions to be usedin speaking of the of that model . Both involve sub es. For example components steps complex process ' s modelof A' s belief structureS would in H to draw at , inferring appear leaston all of the following: . S' s knowledge of H' s interests . general -sense thatH believes of common thatS supposes principles psychology . knowledge which S knowsH to haveaboutA . in the behaviorof A - for example that S knowsH to be interested , in Suppose A will train her telescope on a particularregionof the dawnsky. Then, whether -sense H to share of common , whichS supposes , by general psychology principles - one S may infer that H will deploy a fine-grainedmodel of A' s psychology that distinguish es Morning Starbeliefs from EveningStarbeliefsS may also . ForexampleS information supplieddirectly by H or someothersource rely upon may learn that H knows that A is unawarethat the Morning Star is the . EveningStar In the secondstageof selectingan ILF, S andH must agreeon expressions ' s belief structure . Expressions of H' s modelof A used to speak of thecomponents " " in thediscourse will betacitly negotiated by participants usedin attitudeascriptions of all kinds. The , following quitegeneral principlesholdingof discourses a to speakof which discourse way participantsnegotiate generalprocessby " " entrainment is sometimes called ) currently a subject by psychologists objects( Brennan and Clarke 1992for a discussion in psycholinguistics . (See of research of to the studyof how states .) Ultimately, this work must be extended will have in expression andof why subtledifferences mindcometo bedescribed . for the truth of an attitudeascription greatconsequences it be a serviceable All this is preliminary , though may enoughtreatmentof ' and of related ' the surfaceof our useof the verb believes what lies beneath ( this collection what a resource verbs . But notice attitude ) powerful propositional of abilities canbe: theseabilities allow us to keeptrack of a singlebelief cases . For example in manyformal guises , LarsonandLudlow ( 1993 ) examined contents differentobjectual in whichI LFswith differentstructures ) might (indeed " belief or "the same - for example be usedto characterize , whenI hear report

Attitnde .~ : andIndexicals

A andB uttersentences of different structure andI saythatA saidwhatB said ,8 'believes ' triestoelucidate Therobust of the track of asingle theory abilitytokeep -clauses beliefundertheguises of differentthat , A similarsortof ability will have to beemployed in thetheory of indexicals ,
3.2 Indexicals

One of the most vexing issuesfor semantical theory hasbeenthe questionof ' and' now' . howto treatindexicalexpressions like ' I ' , ' you' , ' this' , ' that' , ' here , All theseexpressions , but they refer in a appearto be referring expressions ' ' -sensitive very context way. I as utteredby me picks out a ratherdifferent individual than ' I ' asutteredby you. , thereis somestablemeaningto an indexical like ' I ' (e.g., "the utterer Clearly " that allowsusto of thesentence determine who is beingspoken of in different ) ' ' . contextsThis part of the meaningof I might be calledthe " character " " " of the indexical(Kaplan 1977 ) or the role ( perry 1977 ). Whetherwe choose to call it thecharacter else is whether , therole, or something this , thebig question extraelement is to be considered of the semantics of indexicalexpressions . part The receivedview hasbeenthat character /role is not part of the semantics - thatit is notpartof thepropositional contentof anutterance . This view proper is associated , but alsowith theoristsworking notoriouslywith KaplanandPerry within absolute truth-conditionalsemantics . Forexample , LarsonandSegal , that T theories canotherwise despite holding , hold thatthe character displaysenses /role of a demonstrative doesnot makeit into the theorems of aT-theory . " " that T-theoriesbe conditionalized , LarsonandSegalpropose Specifically so that the extrameaningwe associate with the character of an indexicalmust befixed outside of theT-theorybiconditionalproper . As anillustration , consider the casewhereKatherineHepburnutters(21) andCary Grant , gesturingat Ms. , utters(22). Hepburn (21) I needa haircut . (22) Sheneeds a haircut . On the proposalof Larson and Segal( 1995 , p. 220), the conditionalized Ttheorems for thesetwo utterances will be (21') and(22'), respectively . ' (21 ) Ifu is an utterance of [S I ] [ypneeda haircut [NP ]] andx is the uttererofu , then u is true iff x needs a haircut .

Chapter3

' (22 ) Ifu is an utterance of [S She a haircut [NP ] [ypneeds ]] andx is the object demonstrated a haircut . by the uttererof u, thenu is true iff x needs ' ' Notice that in (21 ) and (22 ) the truth conditions themselvesare identical. -Perry line, Larsonand Segal(p. 220) argue Consistent with the basicKaplan asfollows: What are theactual truthconditions of theparticular utterances ([21]) and ([22 ])1In both theRHSs cases of theconditionals is "x needs a haircut ." Whois xi it is Katherine of ([21 demonstrated of ([22]). As , theutterer ]) andtheobject Hepburn by theutterer farasourtheory is concerned x thatenters intothetruthconditions . No , it is thisobject that of is no content enters into the , particular way specifying object given descriptive . truthconditions to keepcharacter ? Partof the /role out of the semantics Why this eagerness ' ' answer to thisquestion liesin Perrys ( 1977 ) critiqueof Fregestheoryof demonstratives . The objectionis that for a Fregean semantical , by extension theory(and for semantic with similar there is , any ) theory goals simplynothingthatcan describe thesense of anindexicallike ' I ' . Evenif we areprepared to believethat there are distinct senses that can explain the difference in cognitive significance between' Cicero' and 'Tully ' , thereis nothingthat is going to do all the work that we expectthe character /role of an indexicalto do. from Frege Therootproblemis illustrated , p. 296 ( 1956 ): by a famous passage ' theword'today If someone wants to say thesame asheexpressed , today yesterday using ' ' . Although hemust thiswordby yesterday thethought is thesame , theverbal replace mustbedifferent sothatthesense beaffected , whichwouldotherwise by expression ' .Thecase like 'here thediffering times of utterance is thesame withwords , isreadjusted ' ' in writing and there. In all such cases themere , asit is given , is notthecomplete wording conditions of thethought of certain , buttheknowledge accompanying expression thethought for its correct of utterance asmeans of expressing , areneeded , whichareused movements here . Thepointing of fingers , hand , glances maybelong apprehension theword'I ' will express different in the too. Thesame utterance thoughts containing false . mouths of different men , of whichsome , others maybetrue with a thought is goingto identify thesense of a sentence As Perrynotes , if Frege if the sense of the indexical is to be identified either he is in trouble . Roughly , content with its character /role or with somesortof descriptive , thena sentence ' ' ' ' containing yesterdaywill haveto havedifferent containing today anda sentence . No descriptivecontentis and henceexpress different thoughts senses ' ' ' ' of able to reflect the distinct senses to be yesterday and today while going ' ' es the thought that yesterdaywas fine express preservingthe consequence the day before . that ' todayis fine' expressed

AttitudesandIndexicals

hasto give. EitherFregemustgive up theidentificationof senses Something with thoughts(in which casethe semanticalmachineryseemsincapableof of our thoughts giving thesemantics ) or Fregemustgiveup the ideathatthetwo utterances the same express thought. But then we run into trouble with our what we thought . Canit really be that we can' t express ability to communicate ? todaywhat we thoughtyesterday Anotherproblemwith trying to keepcharacter /role in the semantics hasto do with the embedding of demonstratives in modals . As Kaplan( 1977 ) hasargued , if the characterof a demonstrativemakesit into the truth conditions, what arewe to sayaboutexamples like (23)? (23) You arethe personI ' m addressing with this utterance . ' We surelydon t want it to be a consequence that (24) is true, for (24) appears to be necessarily true whereas 23 is not. ( ) (24) The personI ' m addressing with this utterance is the personI ' m addressing with this utterance . environments whereanotherpersonis my addressee Clearly therearecounterfactual . Someone elsemight havebeenstanding beforeme. But (24) doesnot to allow this . appear possibility Still, despite these seems . , the conclusion powerfulobjections unsatisfactory Recallthis familiar story: In a houseof mirrors at a man , someone might point who is aboutto be attackedby a dog, saying ' He is being attackedby a dog' , andI may assent to thisjudgement . , not realizingthat I am aboutto be attacked ' ' who says You areaboutto be attacked Intuitively, someone by a dog is saying . To saythat this extra information lies somethingmore than the first speaker outside dIeprovince of semantics seems to beswrendering all tooquickly . Speaking 's to the of directly , Higginbotham( 1995 import Kaplan modality argument , p. 248) argues that "the quirksof modalityshouldnot. . . be allowedto undermine the thesisthat what we sayandthink is literally androbustlyexpressed by the wordsthat we use ." Havewe surrendered ? I tendto think that we have . Let mebegin prematurely widt themodalityargument . Onesolutionwouldbeto argue thatthis talk of evaluating thesentence in a counterfactual environment to a shorthand reallyamounts a modalized that asserts thepossibility way of sayingthatwe evaluate proposition dtatI am not addressing : you

Chapter3

(25) It couldhavebeenthatyou arenottheperson I ' m addressing with this utterance . a propositionin a counterfactual It is arguable that this is all it means to evaluate situation . Wecan' t, afterall , travelto otherpossible worldsto evaluate (23) . in 4 and for now I want I will return to this issue 6 to mark ; ( chapters merely this asa possibleway out.) But why does(25) help? Don' t we get the samedifficulties when we unpack ' ' ? Consider(26). you asbefore (26) with this utterance It could havebeenthat the personI ' m addressing is not the ' . with this utterance personI m addressing . We havea definite description( ' the person We must movewith cautionhere ' andwe havea modal ' it could havebeen I ' m addressing with this utterance ) ( that' ), and we needto be on guardfor the possibility that the descriptionhas . takenwide scopeoverthe modal needarisein (26) if we take the descriptionto havescope No conundrums ' over the modal , asin (26 ). ' (26 ) ' x] It could havebeenthat x with this utterance [the x: personI m addressing ' . with this utterance is not the personI m addressing " is in " evaluation would be to showthat counterfactual In sum , the strategy modal sentences fact parasiticon our ability to evaluate (in the corresponding ' in a ' actualworld, not someother world) . That is, to evaluate I am speaking 'I counterfactual situationwouldbenothingmorethanevaluating mightnot have ' worldswould . Our graspof otherpossible beenspeakingin theactual situation . If thatis right, of therelevant modalized sentences thenbeposterior to our grasp admit of scope thenwe would merelyneedto showthat suchmodalsentences canhave , andto showthat thereis no problemif the descriptions ambiguities to thesemodals(asin (26' . wide scopewith respect of Kaplan therearewaysto answerthe modalarguments , but what Perhaps ' ? Despite for banishingcharacter /role from the semantics of Perry s arguments ' the elegance of Perry s critique of Frege , Evans( 1981 ) hasarguedthat it falls short :
's that graspingthe same . . . there is no headlongcollision betweenFrege suggestion and the fundamental criterion different of us on different , things daysmay require thought of differenceof thoughtswhich restsupon the principle that it is not possiblecoherently . For thatprinciple, properly towards the same to takedifferentattitudes thought

AttitudesandIndexicals stated , precludesthe possibility of coherently taking different : attitudes towardsthe same thoughtat the sametime.

's ' On Evans of Frege , we neednt think of thoughtsasholding at interpretation slices of time; we can think of them as enduring. Thus, our ability to grasp themaswe moveaboutin theworld requires thatwe haveanability to keeptrack of themfrom differentvantage : points 's ideais thatthesame state different of usatdifferent Frege epistemic mayrequire things times circumstances forceustochange ; thechanging in order to keep holdof a constant - wemust reference and aconstant runtokeep still. From thispointof view thought , ' ' theacceptance ond2of ' Yesterday was fine anacceptance ondl of 'Today is fine , given canmanifest thepersistence of a beliefin just thewayin whichacceptance of difference 'Thesunsets ' can utterances of thesentence in theWest . This idea , whetheror not it is properly attributedto Frege ,9is appealingfor a number of reasons . Thoughts to bepersistent , afterall, aresupposed , andour ability to graspthemmusttherefore be quite dynamic . The ideacanbe refraInedas - what the truth conditions follows: Thereis the objectualcontentof a thought state . Then thereis theway in whichthetruthconditions arerepresented . literally In chapter 2, I spokeof suchrepresentations asdisplayingthe sense of the utterance or thought . It would be anerrorto suppose thatthe sense is to be identified with a singlerepresentation at a particulartime. On thecontrary , a singlethought a sense must be in differentwaysfrom differentspatio having single represented . If this ideais appliedto T theorems temporalperspectives , the way a theorem is represented candisplaya sense beidentifiedwith thesense ; however , it cannot , for that sense mustbe displayed in differentwaysat differenttimes .10 What would underliethe ability to keeptrack of senses ? Herewe might opt ' thatwasofferedin for anextension of theunderlyingtheoryof 'believes Larson -Ludlow andLudlow 1993anddiscussed in theprevioussection . On the Larson , the idea was to explain our ability to know when two that-clauses proposal attribute the samebelief or count as sayingthe samething. In that case , the to different puzzlewasto showhow usingdifferentwordsin an ILF presented hearers could countashavingattributedthe sameattitudeto an agent . The answer '- a wasfound in a rich theoryunderlyingthe useof ' believes theorythat ' s interests the 's took accountof the hearer , , sharedknowledge speaker goals ' s beliefs andso aboutthe structureof the agent on. , 's The relation betweenthat analysisof propositional attitudesand Evans for indexicals shouldnowbeobvious . Indeed routinely , sinceattitudereports proposal include indexicals what is called for is someamplification of the ILF , theory that can explain how we keeptrack of when two indexical utterances (beliefs ) say(mean ) the same thing.

Chapter3

-Ludlow machinery will beusefulhere . Whatwe , muchof theLarson Clearly will needto do is expand on thetacit theoryof belief ascriptionlogistics , which held that our ability to ascribe beliefsinvolved , amongotherthings , . S' s knowledge of H' s interests , . general -sense thatS supposes H to believe , principlesof common psychology and . knowledge that S knowsH to haveaboutA . ' s interests It seems that we neednot only a theoryof the hearer but alsoa theory ' of the hearers spatiotemporal . When what the agent perspective reporting saidor thought . If on , I needto know wherethe heareris relativeto the agent an agentsays ' It is fine today' , when I report this to a heareron Wednesday ' stemstatement butrelativeto thehearer I will wantto reportthesame Thursday ' ' , then , poral position. Thus we get A saidthat it wasfine yesterday. Roughly we will wantthe theoryto keeptrack of the following: . S' s knowledge of H' s spatiotemporal position ' . S s knowledge of H ' s andA' s relativepositions . H ' s knowledgethat S knowsA' s spatiotemporal assumptions position (with standard aboutcommonknowledge ). when Whatgoesfor attitudereportsandindirectdiscourse goesfor determining two indexical I languagetokeningsexpressthe samethought. Thesetokenings , after all, are alsoreportsof a certainkind, sincethey aretokeningsof an . The twist is that in suchcasesthe agent I -languagesentence to oneself , the " are all the sameindividual. The " andthe " hearer " that arise , puzzles speaker heredo so because the tokeningstakeplaceat different times and at different . Accordingly , just asthough , we mustadjustto thenewtemporal position places . the original tokeninghadbeenmadeby anotherperson "tracking theexactnature of these Clearlya lot of work mustbedoneto elucidate " abilities. Evans 1982 hasmadea start but , ( ) realisticallythis picturemust - at leastif we are research befleshedout by a full scale program psychological . In themeantime interested in therobustunderlying , whatwouldthemodest theory look like? semantical theory . The first is that we simply introduce It seems to me that therearetwo possibilities informationinto theT theorems thedescriptive , thusobtainingtheorems like (21") and(22") for (21) and(22). " (21 ) of [S I ] [vpneeda haircut If u is an utterance ] ] thenu is true iff the uttererof [NP u needs a haircut.

Attitudes and lndexicals

" (22 ) If u is an utterance of [S She a haircut [NP ] [vpneeds ] ] thenu is tl1leiff andthe a haircut. objectdemonstrated by the uttererof u needs As we will seein chapter6, there are seriouslimitations to this sort of approach . For now I just want to put the strategy on the table. , we cansimply disquotationally enterthe indexicalexpression Alternatively into theright-handsideof a biconditional . For example , we might haveaxioms andtheorems like (27) and (28). (27) Val(x, ' I ' ) iff x = I (28) Val(T, ' I walk' ) iff I walk ' t we . Wouldn Admittedly, this ideaappearsnaive get absurdresultswhen interpreting theutterances of others ? For example , if Smithsays" I walk," it is no thatutterance assayingthatI walk. goodfor meto haveaT-theorythatinterprets But that is preciselywherethe abovesort of axiom seems to lead. Likewise, if someone sendsme an email on Tuesdaysaying" Smith went " to the dentisttoday , if I only readthe email today(several dayslater) it is no . Thus goodfor meto interpretthis assayingthatSmithwentto thedentisttoday , axiomslike (29) for temporalindexicalspresumably arealsoout of court. (29) Val(x, ' today' ) iff x is tl1letoday On the other hand, perhapsthis objection is given far more weight than it is due. In the first place , if we aretalking aboutI -language , andif (asI suggested in section1.3) theprimaryuseof I -language is not communication but thought , thenaxiomslike (27) and(29) aresuitedto a broadrangeof I -language tokenings . Suchaxiomsarealsoentirely suitablefor the interpretation of any speech we produce . The only drawback for suchaxiomsappears to be associated with of others . usingthemin interpretingthe utterances But evenasappliedto theinterpretation of othersit is far from clearthatthese sortsof axiomsareinadequate . For example , onestrandof thinking would be " their thatwhenwe interpretotherswe try to " simulate .II That is, perhaps thoughts ' " when we interpretanothers utterance we try to project ourselves into" ' thatpersons egocentric . If that is how we interpretothers , thenof course space we wanttheaxiomsto reflecttheegocentric of the . Anything perspective speaker lesswould get in the way of our ability to simulate , andhenceunderstand , our . interlocutor

Chapter3

. Perhaps A lessradical solutionis alsoavailable , when we interpretthe remarks for the position the axiomsof our T-theoryto account of another , we amend axiomslike (30), . Accordingly of thespeaker , we mighthaveconditionalized valueof Y asutteredby Z. where' Val( X, Y, Z)' saysthatX is the semantic (30) " " if s is my interlocutor , thenVal(x, here , s) iff x is there(nears) of others This sort of paraphrase might allow us to track the indexicalutterances from different spatialandtemporalvantage points, just aswe did in determining the samething.12 whentwo tokeningsexpressed when we take up the issueof temporalinI shall return to thesestrategies the plausibility dexicalsin chapters 6 and7. For now, I merelywantto suggest thattheymight helpusto avoidtheprimafacie andto propose of these strategies . -calledcharacter /role from the semantics solutionof banishingso unattractive thatwould of language traditionin thephilosophy Thereis nowanentrenched themoff andtIying to castthem in semantics haveusfaceproblems by bracketing . (Suchexorcisms andinto psychology out of semantics usuallyareaccompanied " directedat thosewho seecloseconnections " between of by charges sloppythinking .) Wettstein1986andKaplan 1990arecanonicalexamples thesedisciplines of this phenomenon , but I too havebeencaughtup in the game(seeLudlow -wall-off strategy in the is almostneversuccessful 1989 ). This sortof divide-and I) here(where naturalsciences , andit is hardto seewhy it shouldbe successful we areat leastkneedeepin naturalscience ). Artificial disciplinaryboundaries . simply do not solveproblems from the theory to me unwiseto try anddivorcesemantics In sum , it seems that also sense of a in the robust of meaning cognitivesignificance ( incorporates theory , I think it is equally unwise (if ) . As will be seenin the next chapter . from metaphysics not impossible ) to try anddivorcesemantics

Chapter 4 Drawing Metaphysical Consequences from a T- Theory

The ideathat the studyof language canprovideinsightsinto metaphysics hasa in the of . It seems to havebeenoperative long pedigree asfar history philosophy back asthe pre-Socraticphilosopher Parmenides ,I and it hasbeencommonin twentiethcenturyphilosophy . A numberof linguists havealso flirted with the idea that the study of natural for metaphysics . Perhaps language themost mighthavestrongconsequences notoriousexample , notedin the prefaceto this volume, is the caseof Whorf to drawconclusions abouttheHopis' metaphysics ( 1956 ), who attempted of time from their temporallanguage . Therearealsoa numberof morerecent , if more tentative , claimsaboutthelink between semantics andmetaphysics . Bach( 1981 , 1986 of therelationbetween ), for example , hasspoken semantics andthe" metaphysics " of English , andhasspecificallyaddressed the questionof what metaphysical are entailed the semantics of tense . But although Bach consequences by " offersslogans like " No semantics without metaphysics ! ( 1986 , p, 575), helater retreats with remarkslike the following: ' I venowsaida little (butperhaps more thanenough some of thekindsof things ) about weseem to need in ourontology for English anda littlebit (notnear how ) about enough wemightgetthem intoa semantics for English . It would beimmoral of me as a linguist ' aphrase fromMontague claims (I mstealing one about whether ) tomake wayortheother or notthese sorts of things co I Tespond to realthings in therealworld or conceptual , perceptual thatareindependent of language atall. (ibid., p. 592 categories , or nothing ) It is, of course a central of the , work that it is far from immoral assumption present to draw metaphysical from a semantic consequences theory (so long as " it is an " absolute . Yet this theory), whetherone is a linguist or a philosopher , if it is to be helpful, mustbe clarified. Although philosophers assumption and have for a connection between andmetaphysics linguists longpressed , language they havenot alwaysbeenclear about what sort of connectionthere is supposed to be, muchlesswhy thereshouldbe sucha connection .

4 Chapter
are supposed and metaphysics Therefore , we needto get clear on how language : to consider . Therearetwo questions to hangtogether . Justwhat kinds of metaphysical conclusions canbe drawnfrom the kind of 2 and and how canwe identify the spe outlined in 3 semantic , theory chapters
cific metaphysical commitments of the theory ? . Can such a semantic theory be revised to avoid metaphysical commibnents

4.1 The Nature of the Metaphysical Commitment in semantic Onestandard theoryhasbeento definethedomainof relevant procedure that such . However of statingthe theory , it is arguable objectsin advance issues .A and contentious over the most a procedure interesting simply papers of such canoften be raisedaboutwhat a semantic numberof questions theory andsuchform actuallycommitsus to. To simply stipulatea domainin advance } havealreadybeenanswered questions requiresthat the mostinteresting be drawn from semantic can thatmetaphysical I havesuggested consequences theory, but I havesaid little about what featuresof the semantictheory give . The shortanswerto the questionis that we commitments rise to metaphysical valuesin a correct will be committedto whateverobjectsserveas a semantic . T-theoryfor naturallanguage laid out in To be moreprecise , on the basisof considerations , let us suppose level of abstraction (at a certain chapter2, that thereis a correctT theorythat describes . The axiomsandtheorems that an agenthas ) the semantic knowledge - implicitly quantifying values of thatT-theorywill introducecertainsemantic for ( 1'), wherethe 1 is shorthand . For example over thosesemanticvalues ,( ) valuesis madeexplicit. quantificationover semantic metalinguistic ( 1) Val (x, ~ ) iff x = snow ' (I ) For all x , Val (x , ~ ) iff x = snow ' in ( 11 thequantification Because , ( 1) commitsusto theexistence ) is not vacuous I . So far, nothing saysthat a true semantictheory must employ ( 1 ); of snow commitment however , any theory that doesemploy it will havea clear metaphysical . claim canbe madeaboutthe ontological commitments A fairly straightforward in this book. It is, with apologies theoriesof the form discussed of semantic . value to Quine( 1953 ), that to be is to be a semantic

from a T-Theory DrawingMetaphysical Consequences

4.2 Sample Cases

Consider how two distinct semantic theoriesmight introducedifferentkinds of objectsas semanticvalues , and might hencehavedifferent ontological commitments . The Commitment to Properties Consider , for example , the adjective' red' and the two ways of giving the semantics for the adjectiveshownin (2) and(3). (2) Val(x, ~ (3) Val(x, ~ iff x = thepropertyof beingred iff x is red

In thefirst case thereis reference to thepropertyredness - a kind of abstract object . In thesecond case in section 2.6) it appears thatreference (discussed to redness hasbeencircumvented . Evenif axiom (3) is employedin giving the truth conditionsfor a true sentence of English , thereis merelya commitmentto one or more objectsthat happen to be red! The differencebetween(2) and (3) reflects theintuitive difference between axiomsthatintroduce reference andthose that introducesomething moreakin to predication . (2) refers that , in the sense it identifiesa specificsemantic valuefor ' red' . (3), on the otherhand , doesnot refer to a particular property; rather , it predicatessomethingof thosevalues that satisfy ' red' . Forexample introduced in theappendix , thetechnicalfragments esavoidreference to properties andsets . Froma technicalpoint of view, therewould be no barrierto introducingthe ax .ioms shownin (4) instead .4 (4) a. Val(x, dQ &, 0 ) iff x = propertyof beinga dog Val(x, ~ , 0 ) iff x = propertyof beinga cat Val(x, ~ , 0 ) iff x = propertyof beinga man Val(x , woman , 0 ) iff x = propertyof beinga woman b. Val(x, hm , 0 ) iff x = the propertyof barking Val(x , ~ ~ , 0 ) iff x = the propertyof walking c. Val(x, ~ , 0 ) iff x = the seeingrelation Val(x, ~ , 0 ) iff x = the likes relation

68

4 Chapter

: The nontenninalaxiomswould thenhaveto be modified accordingly (5) a. Val(T, [5NP VP], 0 ) iff for somex, p, Val(x, NP, 0 ) andVal(p, VP, 0 ) andx hasp b. Val(p, [vpV NP], 0 ) iff for somer, Z, Val(r, V, 0 ) andVal(z, NP, 0 ), andp is thepropertyof bearingr to z like (6). wouldyield theorems into thefragment of roleslike these Thesubstitution (6) Jones Smith] VpVsees ]] is true iff Smithhasthe propertyof bearing ] [NP [5 [NP the seeing relationto Jones asthe would havethe same axiomatization This alternative empiricalcoverage different it would have 2 but introduced in chapter , axiomatization profoundly . The chief differencewould, of course commitments , be its commetaphysical itions. is arguedon a priori alternativeaxiomatizations to it is also . Of course , possible arguefor onepositionor grounds metaphysical . The questionis, just how far canwe get with a the otheron linguistic grounds ? alone priori metaphysics that properties for supposing reasons On the onehand , thereareindependent of to cases has exist. 1983 ) pronominal apparent pointed Wright ( oughtto like (7). in examples reference to properties (7) . A : At leastJohnis honest B: Yes , he certainlyis that. to routinelyquantifyoverproperties And Chierchia( 1984 ) hasnotedthat we appear like (9). like (8) andin reasoning in examples (8) Johnis everythinghis motherwantedhim to be. (9) Johnis everythingthat Mary is. Mary is intelligent. Johnis intelligent. is particularly compelling. In the first place , the But noneof thesearguments us to use allows reference . Pronominal is weak from anaphora usually argument to several to pick up reference , asin ( 10 ). objects plural anaphors

from a T-Theory DrawingMetaphysical Consequences

( 10 ) A: Baccala is delicious andsois polenta . B: OK, I ' ll try them .

But similar plural anaphors are not available for alleged property references Consider ( 11) .

( 11 ) A : Johnis tall andhonest . B: #Yes / those . , he certainlyis them The allegedquantificationover propertiesin (8) is also suspect , asonecannot continuethe utterance in the usualway by listing the thingswe aresupposedly . Compare quantifyingover ( 12 ) with ( 13 ). ( 12) I tried everythingmy motheraskedme to try : the chicken , the beef , the tuna ,.... surprise ( 13 ) #Johnis everythinghis motherwantedhim to be: kindness , thriftiness , the of a . . . . , property being Republican It is simplyno goodto list theproperties , butthosearethethingsthatwe aresupposed to be quantifyingover . Thereis something very wrongwith the ideathat we arequantifyingoverproperties here . Similarconsiderations undermine theargument from inferences like thosein 9 . We ( ) may well havesecondorderquantificationin suchexamples , but there is no apparent . quantificationoverproperties If theusualarguments for andagainst arenot persuasive , perhaps properties we cangainsomeleverage what constraints thesemantic by seeing theorymight . placeon our choice LarsonandSegalhavegivenan example of a linguistic argument that might decidebetweenan analysislike that in chapter2 and the property analysis . to them the , difficulties whenone attempts According propertyanalysisencounters " e. . ' Smith to develop anaccount of " coordination constructions walked ( g, ' andswam). For example , onecanextendthe fragmentLl to handleconstructions suchasthosein ( 14). ( 14 ) Val(x, [sVPl . and VP2], 0 ' ) iff Val(x, VPl , 0 ' ) andVal(x, VP2, 0 ') On theotherhand values of sentences , if thesemantic areto berendered asproperties the account becomes much morecomplex perhaps , , following Larson andSegal , alongthe lines of ( 15 ).

Chapter4

( 15) Val(p, [sV Pl ~

') ' ) andVal(p2, VP2, 0 VP2], 0 ' ) iffVal (pl , V Pl , 0

As Larson and Segalnote, this will require the introduction of somekind of ? Intuitively mechanism . But whatsortof mechanism -combining , whatis property them into new andcombine wantedhereis a rule that will takeproperties properties thathaddie originaltwo properties d1at areexemplified only by d1ose objects into die to work . But how is this mechanism , andhow is it to be integrated . is far from clear in an intelligible way? The answer axiomsof die T-d1eory like conjunction cases Wemaynot evenneedto consider ; thepropertyanalysis , in view of the kinds of constraintswe would may not get off the ground " the axiomsof a . We wantto saythat an agent" knows like to put on T-theories T-d1eory )? , but what doesit meanto know an axiom like ( 16 ( 16) Val(x, ' red' ) iff x = redness andtime. Redness , if diereis sucha thing, is anabstract space objectwell outside of suchthings (if suchknowledgeis possible Our knowledge , ) is, of necessity knowledge our havefor d1at we of other sorts mediated , example knowledge by ' of the meaningof ' red , and , our havinga rule of classifica , by extension that x is . tion that allows us to identify red things Strictly speaking , knowing is. thanknowingwhatredness red is morefundamental But if knowing that x is red is more fundamentalthan knowing what redness . It isn' t needed is, onehasto wonderwhatwork die propertyis doing here to accountfor our semantical , therecan be ; hence , that is for sure knowledge thereare . Perhaps motivationfor positingsuchproperties no purely semantical to me that properties other motivations(say , in physicaltheory), but it seems .6 into our ontology for admission arevery poor candidates , but Keepin mind that our goal hereis not to argueagainstpropertytheory to metaphysics ratherto showhow the questionis refraInedon this approach of semantical a questionof simultaneously it becomes solving the constraints intuitions. Neither setof imposedby our metaphysical theory andconstraints must the is a priori privileged constraints ; satisfyboth. A similar resultingtheory of predicationto the situationholds whenwe movefrom the investigation . within the semantical role of names theory Names I saidearlier in this chapterthat to be is to be a semanticvalue. Although the claim is straightforward , in this formulation it is also a claim with somevery

from a T-Theory DrawingMetaphysical Consequences

. Justhow strongthethesisis becomes strongconsequences clearwhenwe consider an axiom like ( 17 ). ( 17 ) Val (x, Peiasus ) iff x = Pegasus If our true semantictheory includesan axiom like ( 17), we are committedto an ontologythat includesPegasus ! Presumably is a (Meinong 1904 ), Pegasus kind of nonexistent . We well recoil from this sort of commitment object may , but we mustobserve that inconsistencies in the theory of Meinongianobjects havebeenexorcised in recentyears- for example 1980 , in Parsons , in Routley 1980 , in Zalta 1983 . Thus , andin Zalta 1988 suchproposals , in evaluating , what we haveto go on are our metaphysicalintuitions and whateverpurchasesemantical theorycangive us. As far asthesemantical , nothingsaysthatT-theories that theoryis concerned ' correctly characterizean agent s semanticknowledgemust employ axioms ' like ( 17). Indeed , undera numberof plausiblecircumstances , the agents semantic . In particular knowledgemay divergefrom ( 17 ) significantly , if we attend to robustT-theories whentrying to ascertain our ontologicalcommitments , 's thena carefulstudyof theagent aboutnonexistent knowledge maydeflectconcerns . objects Onepossibility is that closerinvestigationwill showthat the lexical entry ' is much for ' Pegasus morecomplexthan is reflectedby ( 17). This would not be an unusualstateof affairs. Recentwork on the lexicon suggests that words arein fact highly structured . For if the lexicalentrywereto encode , objects example the rich structureof a Russelliandescription commitments , the metaphysical would doubtless be much more austere . For example , the entry for the " " word we pronounce peg~s~s would be the following: on a naiveRussellian ' N: the x: x is white, x is winged, . . .J' . For a richly structuredlexical [ picture entry like this, there would not evenbe a single semanticaxiom. Rather , the axiomsfor ' the' , ' white' , ' winged' , etc., would comeinto play. The problemsinherentin descriptive theoriesof names arewell knownisof ' course not decisive . For example , but perhaps much of , ) argument Kripke s ( 1980 turnson our metaphysical intuitions aboutrigidity . But we havealready seenin section3.5 that there may be ways to accommodate rigidity without giving up on the cognitivecontentof a term.9 For example madeby Dummett( 1973 , following a suggestion ), we might let the descriptiontake wide scopeover any modaloperatorsin the sentence . ' in the prefaceto Namingand Necessity DespiteKripke s protestations ( 1980 ),

4 Chapter
" " oneprobably can go somedistancetowards capturing the relevantrigidity ' of sucha stipulation intuitions in this way. Clearly, Kripke s characterization " " . At worst, the stipulation the case ! (ibid., p. 13) overstates as unaccountable for, not unaccountable is unaccounted (just as many other scopeand movement for). That something arenot yet accounted restrictionsin generative grammar for by currenttheoryis the noon in empiricalinquiry. It is not accounted .over . to despair to investigate is something , not something ' that rigidity effects haveto bow to Kripke s argument Nor doesonenecessarily and that henceapparent modals no which contains in ( 18) ( are apparent ) . for by scope rigidity cannotbe accounted ) ( 18 . Aristotle wasfond of dogs situations undervariouscounterfactual ) canbe considered Accordingto Kripke, ( 18 consider when we is that here the But can. as it , assumption unargued surely contentof the the descriptive situations ) undervariouscounterfactual ( 18 a sentence to evaluate whatit means . Weneedto consider name mustremainconstant . Thereis no a priori reasonwhy a situations underother counterfactual shift in the descriptivecontent a correlative include cannot evaluation proper 10 . of the name towards Of course , this gambit againstKripke requiresa particularperspective rigidity andtransworld identity. The ideawould be that we do not simply an individual, but ratherthat transworld individuals are rigidly designate " in variousworlds. Theindividual " manifestations from descriptive constructed . Theoriesof transworld is synthesized , asit were, from thesemanifestations , 1972 ) ). Smith( 1983 by Hintikka ( 1969b identityin thisveinhavebeenproposed ' s and Hintikka like efforts technical between hasdrawnan interesting parallel " ." theoriesof how individualsare constituted / Husserlian Kantian of the is not intendedto be anythinglike a seriousdefense This discussion . That would takeanotherwork asleastaslengthy theory of names descriptive . Rather anddetailedasthis one , the point is to illustratethe shift in perspective to be we are if , andmetaphysics that follows , semantics allowing epistemology will commitment of our in an interestingway. The precisenature connected aboutthe plausibility of suchobjects not turn solely on a priori argumentation or our intuitions aboutrigidity ; it will alsoturn on a carefulelucidationof the ' . The point is agent s lexicon and of the correspondingsemanticknowledge not closed is , it is ; indeed that within this framework the questionof names . work to be done . Thereis still muchinteresting very muchopen

from a T-Theory DrawingMetaphysical Consequences

Events It is well known that Davidson( 1967b of eventson ) arguedfor the existence thebasisof thelogical fonn of actionsentences . Roughly wentas , thereasoning follows. Onecaneasilymakethe inferencefrom ( 19 ) to (20).

( 19 ) John atethechips . gracefully

(20) Johnatethe chips. Davidsonproposed that this inferencewasa logical inference , andthat the inference could be madeformally oncethe underlyinglogical fonn of 'Johnate the chips gracefully' was revealed . Davidsonsuggested that its logical form shouldbe asin (21).

(21 ) (3e )[ate , thechips (John , e) & graceful (e)] assaying , (21 thatthere ) canbeunderstood wasanevent Roughly e whichwas aneatingof the chipsby John . The conclusion(20) follows , ande wasgraceful
reduction . Davidson took this to beonepieceof evidence by simpleconjunction for the existence of events . But noticethat it is not evennecessary that therebe explicit eventquantification in the object language . What mattersis whetherthereis quantification overevents in themetalanguage . For example in appendix , in thefragmentintroduced T2 we havesemantic ruleslike (22). (22) a. Val(T, [sNPVP], 0 ' ) iff , for somee, Val(e, VP, 0 ' ), andfor somex , x is the of e and Val ') agent (x, NP, 0 b. Val(e, VpVNP], 0 ' ) iffVal (e, V, 0 ' ) andfor somey, y is the themeofe and Val(y, NP, 0 ') c. Val(e, Vp V ADV ], 0 ' ) iff Val(e, V, 0 ' ) andVal(e, ADV, 0 ') The crucial quantificationfor our purposes is the metalinguisticquantification over the e position. H theseaxiomsarecorrect , and if at leastsomeof the action sentences we utteraretrue, thenwe arecommitted to theexistence of events . It mightbeargued thatwe areindeed committed to something whenwe quantify into the e position , but that is a far cry from sayingthat we arecommitted

4 Chapter

. It is certainlytruethatwe arenot committedto events to theexistence of events to be labeledwith little e' s. What we do the variables because happened simply know, however , is that we arequantifying , evenfrom simpleaxiomslike the above them to call we may choose over things (whatever ) that haveagents(cf. ' ' (22a and themes(cf. (22b , and of which adverbslike intentionally and ' aretrue. These ' 11 to me. for events certainlysoundlike candidates slowly is right, much of what we know aboutthe Notice too that, if this approach from we choose to call them structure of events ) will notbededuced (or whatever a priori intuitions aboutthe natureof events(whetherthey haveparts , whether constraints flow from the rather it will and so on have can , , ); they multipleagents of semantic . The demands the T-theory of constructing imposed by the demands . theorywill help to elucidatethe natureof ontology 4.3 ? Can aT . Theory Avoid Having Metaphysical Consequences

that onto In the preceding sectionI suggested might be tied logical commitment . In supportof this suggestion valuesintroduced to the semantic theory by the semantic oversemantic , it canbenotedthatthereis, afterall, implicit quantification oversemantic . If there is values in theaxiomsof thesemantic quantification theory values . to those values , thentheremustbe an ontological commitment However , it hasbeenarguedthat one can neutralizethe ontological commitments entailedby quantificationby treatingthe quantifiersassubstitutional like (23) will be truejust in case . The basicidea is that a sentence quantifiers ' ) is true. (23 ) (where is a concatenation symbol (23) . A dog barked ' (23 ) ' For someterm t, t ' is a dog' is true andt ' barked is true. ' ' with ' is a dog' and Sincethereis a term (say , Lassie) that whenconcatenated ' resultsin a true sentence 23' mustbe true. Noticethat this is accomplished ' barked ,( ) . without everquantifyingover actualdogs thatthis devicemight beusefulin a numberof contexts It hasbeenproposed , of intentional semantics the ), (Gottlieb 1980 including the philosophyof mathematics like ' Johnseeksa unicorn' (Ioup 1977 constructions ), and the treatment andattributes(Sellars1963 of classes ). caneliminate Thequestion , then , is whether quantification utilizing substitutional section . In this semantics in naturallanguage theontological commitment , . we shall seethat it cannot

DrawingMetaphysical Consequencesfrom aT -Theory A number of objections have been raised against substitutional quantification in connection with its compatibility with truth - conditional semantics and the Davidsonian program .12 I will not be addressing this concern; rather, I will be the addressing independent issue of whether substitutional quantification can free us from ontological commitment when doing semantics. The most notorious statement of the view that substitutional quantification doesnot embody a genuineconceptof existenceis found on p . 106 of Quine 1969: . . . substitutionalquantificationgives no acceptable versionof existence properly socalled . Substitutional does , notif objectual makes quantification quantification , goodsense S of truth andsubstitution explicablein tenD , no matterwhat substitution classwe take eventhat whosesolememberis the left-handparenthesis . To concludethat entitiesare that trivially, andthat far out, is simply to drop ontological questions beingassumed . Against Quine, Parsons( 1971a, p . 232) has argued that substitutional quantification in fact " has a genuine claim to expressa concept of existence." Parsons (ibid ., p . 233) responds to the above argument from Quine by arguing that there are two fonnal featuresof the category of singular tenD Sthat make substitutional quantification with respect to singular tenns far less trivial than substitutional quantification with respect to the left parenthesis: First [substitutionalquantification ] admitsidentity with the property of substitutivity salva veritate. Second that are distinguishable , it hasinfinitely manymembers by the ' . This hastheconsequence that ' (\7 thananyconjunction identityrelation 'x)Fx is stronger ' that canbe formedof sentences of the form 'Ft ' , while ' ( 3x )Fx is weakerthanany disjunction of suchsentences . After considering the specific case of introducing a predicative theory of classes , Parsons(ibid ., pp . 234- 235) concludes that the substitutional quantifier will in fact have certain ontological commitments : . . . in the casewherethe termsinvolvedhavea nontrivial equivalence relationwith infinitely " doctrine classes riseto a genuine , substitutional manyequivalence quantification gives " to beset 's andothers of being . It certain idealistic theories Quine alongside parallels ' s ldeen. of theexistence of physicalthings of perception in Husserl , suchasthe account What does Parsonshave in mind here? Parallels to Husserl are generally problematic , since there is wide variation in the interpretation of his work .13 By some accounts Husserl is an idealist ; by other accounts he is a realist ; by still others ( e.g . Hall 1982) he is neither. On each account, however, the theory of object perception is highly complex . There is , however, a section in chapter 1 of Ideas ( 1972) in which Husserl suggestsa deep connection between syntactical forms and Stoffen ( sometimes translated as ' matter ' , sometimes as ' elements' ) . One possible interpretation of

Chapter4

's Parsons suggestionmight be that certain syntacticpositions of a sentence for , the subject or noun phraseposition) might show a privileged ( example connectionto Stoffen. The word ' connection' is usedloosely here, since it somesort of chasmbetweenthe syntacticobject andStoffenwhenin suggests fact theseforms are better thought of as playing an active role in organizing the world. " " Theseare, as Dummett is fond of saying , and somemight , deepwaters addthat the watersalsoaremurky. Nevertheless , thereareclearly manycandidate in the idealisttradition andelsewhere notionsof existence , and in at least or beingis closelytied to certainkinds of somepartsof the tradition, existence fonD S . It stands to reason thatnot all syntactic syntactic representations privileged aresoprivileged , andthatthepositionsinto which we quantify substitutionally . A reconstruction of or subjectpositions ) may well be privileged (nounphrase like substitutional of beingcould easilyinvolveresources certainidealistconceptions . In short , the moveto substitutional quantificationdoes quantification that we areinterested eliminateontological commitmentin the sense not necessarily in.14 , in view of the kind of deflationarymetaphysical investigation Fundamentally that here , it shouldnot appear particularlybold or surprising beingproposed oversemantic aretiedto ouruseof quantification ourmetaphysical commitments wouldhardly . A moveto substitutional values in themetalanguage quantification . In fact, onemight askwhetherit is not preciselythe best this project undercut . quantificationwithin this program way of thinking aboutmetalinguistic howwe can"read" hasbeen in theservice of seeing in this chapter Thediscussion off a T-theory (and seeingthat if we haveagenuine consequences metaphysical T-theory we cannotavoid theseconsequences ) . But so far the discussion hasconcernedthe metaphysicalcommitmentsimposedon us by our use of I will extend this general strategy . In thenextfew chapters NPsandbasicpredicates es differentapproach T-theories thathaveincorporated to two morecomplex have different of tense andwhich, accordingly to thesemantics , very metaphysical commitments .

ChapterS The B - Theory Semantics

the basicsemantic frameworkand shownhow metaphysical Having sketched commitments canarisewithin that framework , I will now turn to the semantics of tenseand begin to explorein a generalway a classof semanticaltheories that areconsistent with the B-theorymetaphysics . I will beginwith what is essentially the receivedview: the Reichenbachian , which I call theory of tense theB-theorysemantics . 5.1 The BasicTheory HereI will utilize theresources of eventquantification to developa specificsemantic for discourse thatis consistent with B-series . theory temporal metaphysics Recallthe criteria that Gale( 1967 of time: ) gavefor that metaphysical picture . TheA -seriesis reducibleto the B-series . . Temporal . becomingis psychological . The B-seriesis objective . All events areequallyreal. . Change -than, later is analyzable S of B-series relations(earlier solelyin tenD than . ) A first attemptat a semantical with this picture would be to theory consistent " " for tensed truthconditions sentences . Thatis, we wanttherighthand give tenseless sidesof the T-theoremsto utilize only B-theory resources (e.g., the B series time line andthe before /afterrelation ), andwe wantthe right-handsides ' ' ' ' to befreeof A series (including past and future aswell astemporal predicates indexicals somewhat asin ( 1), wherewe takethe ). This ideacould be executed tenseoperators to be quantifyingoverarbitraryfuture andpasttimes.. ( 1) a. An utterance of ' Fredis hungry' at time t, is true iff Fredis hungryat time t

78

ChapterS

b. ' attimet is trueiff Fredis An utterance attimet' of 'Fredwashungry , hungry earlier thant
An utterance of ' Fredwill be hungry' at time t , is true iff Fredis hungryat ' time t later thant We might carry that generalidea over into our Val notation as in ( 1I), where Val(A ,B ,C) saysthat A is the semanticvalue of B relative to the utterance time C. ' (I ) a. Va1 , t) iffe is temporallybeforet (e, PAST b. t Va1 , t) iffe temporallyoverlaps (e, PRES c. Va1 (e, FUT, t) iffe is temporallyaftert Ironically , the simple semantics just sketchedis often the one that is sometimes , it pretty clearly is imputedto Prior. Whateverthe meritsof the analysis not onethat Prior could countenance ; it is repletewith quantificationoverpast andfuture times. of tenselike the oneI havejust sketched The main problemfor a semantics is thatit is suitable , present , andfuture. When , suchaspast only for simpletenses much become we getto morecomplextenses , suchasthefutureperfect , matters for sentences like we will need a semantics . For example moreinvolved , (2). (2) Smithwill haveswumin the lake. ' Clearly, the event of Smith s swimming is not past, nor is it merely future. ' What is suggested is that at somefuture point the eventof Smith s swimming that will haveto be dealt with are the . 1\ vo other complextenses will be past . Is there and the anythingwe can do to accommodate pastperfect present perfect these ? is to borrowfrom thework of Reichenbach OnepromisingB-theorystrategy in from its use and 1947 ) ( theory by a legion of linguistsin various grammatical 1976 Guenthner traditions , 1988 ), , includingAqvist ( ), Hinrichs( 1986 ), ( 1979 Hornstein ( 1990 ) . The central idea in ), and Giorgi and Pianesi ( 1997 's thatwe wasthataccounting for complextenses Reichenbach requires proposal

The B-Theory Semantics

makereferenceto three distinct temporalpoints (or, on somefonnulations, events time, E is the time of the event ): S, R, andE, whereS is the speech , and R is a (possiblyindependent time. As an illustration of the relationship ) reference . amongthesepoints, considerthe caseof the future perfect in (2) again thatthetimeof Smith' s swimming( E , (2) says Intuitively ) is laterthanthespeech time (S) but earlierthan someestablished reference time ( R ). time line (H ) on which pointsto the left areearlier Thinking of a schematic thanpointsto theright, we havethe following standard Reichenbachian analysis of the tenses2 : :+ --FJR / S- + present - S- + :+ --FJR past future: + --S- FJR -+ :+ --E- R- S- + pluperfect futureperfect --SE - R- + :+ future in future: + --S- RE - + future in past --R- SE - + or + :+ --R- ES - + 's We can introduceReichenbach proposalinto a truth-conditional semantics 3 in the following fashion . We beginby augmenting the Val predicate to be a six-placepredicate Va1 thatA is the semantic value , R, E, 0 ) asserting (A , BS of B at time of utterance S, reference time R, eventtime E, andassignment o. Axioms wouldincludethenonterminal axiomsshownin (3) to coverthecase of with intransitiveverbsandwould includethe axiomsshownin simplesentences . (4) for the tensemorphemes (3) a. Va1 NP 1 ' ], S, R, E) iff for somex , e, Val(e, 1 ' , S, R, E) andat(e, E) and , [IP (T for somex, x is the agentof e andVal(x, NP, S, R , E) b. Val(e, [.. 1VP], S, R, E) iffVal (e, I , S, R, E) andVa1 S, R, E) , (eVP c. Val(e, [vpV ], S, R, E) iffVal (e, V, S, R, E) (4) a. Va1 , S, R , E, 0 ) iff RIB is earlierthan S (e, PAST

80

5 Chapter

b. Va1 Etemporally ,S ,R , E, 0) iff S, R , and (e, PRES overlap c. Va1 than R /E , S, R, E, 0) iff Sisearlier (e, FUT d. Va1 PERFECTS than SIR , RE , 0) iffE isearlier (e, PRES e. Va1 PERFECI than Rand Risearlier than S ,S ,R , E, 0) iff Eisearlier (e, PAST f. Va1 than E and E isearlier than R , RE , 0) iff Sisearlier (e, FUTPERFECTS
g. Val(e, FUT IN PAST , S, R, E, 0 ) iff R is earlierthanS andR is earlierthanE to axiomatize the semantic Clearlyit wouldbedesirable theoryin sucha way that the complextenses could be derivedfrom the simplerones . For example , one might introducean axiom for ' had' that when usedin conjunctionwith a -tensemorpheme would yield the pastperfect , asin (5). past (5) a. Val(e, h ,@ ,d , S, R , E, 0 ) iff E is earlierthanR, andAt (e,E) b. Val(e, .:will , S, R , E, 0 ) iff S is earlierthanE, andAt (e,E) Consideragainthe case of ' Smithwill haveswumin the lake' . In combination , the axiomsgivenin (5) statethat S is earlierthanE andE is earlierthanR- in otherwords .4 , whencombinedthey yield the future perfect This Reichenbachian of tensealsoleadsto several naturalanalyses analysis ' ' ' ' ' of temporaladverbssuchas yesterday, today , and tomorrow' . For example event . Wemight introduce asfixing thetime of thereference , theycanbeconstrued the auxiliary axiomsshownin (6) . (6) a. Val(e, ~esterday , S, R, E, 0 ) iff R is the day beforeS b. Val(e, ~ , S, R, E, 0 ) iffR is the sameday asS c. Val(e, tomorrowS , R , E, 0 ) iffR is the day after S of numerous authors in this framework , we canlikewise Followingthe suggestions ' and ' after' asin 7 .5 suchas 'before ( ) incorporate temporalconnectives

The B-Theory Semantics (7)

a. VaI IPI .b ,[1P (T ~ IP2 ], S, R, E, 0) iffVaI VaI , IPI, S, RI, EI, 0) and (T , (T IP2 S R2 E2 0 ' and El is earlier , , , , ) than E2 b.
Val(T,[1P ! PI ~ 1P2 ], S, R, E, 0 ) iffVal ( T , ! PI, S, RI , EI , 0 ) andVal( T, 1P2 , S, R2, E2, 0 ) andEI is later thanE2 c. Val( T ! PI ~ 1P2 ,[1P ], S, R, E, 0 ) iffVal ( T , ! PI, S, RI , EI , 0 ) andVal( T , 1P2 , S, R2, E2, 0 ) andEI temporallyoverlaps E26 Thecrucialthing to seein theexposition thusfar is thatthetruthconditions have beenrestricted to events or timesandto a linearbefore /afterrelationholdingbetween them . In this sense thetheoryreflectsa genuine B-theoryapproach to time. Canthe approach be extended far enough ? 5.2 Extending the Theory TheB-theoryaxiomsofferedsofar only hint at how variousB-theorysemantics of tensehavebeendeveloped . The research in this areais vast , and to survey theentireliteratureherewould beimpracticable . Thereare , however , a few constructions that bear comment have in , if only because they figured disputes overA -theoryandB-theoryapproach esto tense . Aspect to seehow a theoryof aspect First, it is necessary canbe incorporated into this framework , andto seehow it will interactwith the rest of the theory . Herethe standard move(see 1991 , e.g., Comrie 1976 ; Parsons ; Kamp andReyle 1993 ) hasbeento regardaspect asa predicate of events . For example introduces , Parsons " andPROG for " in " the predicates CUL (for " culminates ) ( progress) to accountfor the perfectiveand the imperfectiveaspect . This idea , respectively canbe incorporated in a straightforward way with the introductionof axioms like thosein (8).

(8) -at Val ' ) iff in-progress , S, R (e, FROG , E, 0 (e, E) Val ' ) iff culminates at (eicUL, S, R, E, 0 (e, E)
This allows a single event variable to have both temporal and aspectual properties predicated of it . For example , with the axioms I have introduced thus

Chapter5

for ' Smithswam far, thederivation of aT-theorem such as(9) will bepossible '} yesterday (9) Va1 CUL]][vp Smith ] [ADV ]]]], S, (T, [IP [NP ][r[.[TNs PAST ] [ASP yesterday [y swims -at(e, E) R, E, 0 ' ) iff for some eS is laterthanRIB , andAt(e,E) andculminates is the ande is a swimming , andR is thedaybeforeS , andSmith by Smith of e agent beadded in similar fashion . Syntactically Other sorts of aspectual can , predicates as can be can be housed in the Int1 I nodes ; semantically , they () regarded they . thattaketheevent variable astheirargument predicates
TensedNominal~ The second extension onecanmakehasto do with the fact that not only verbs but alsonounphrases havebeenarguedto haveargument positionsfor times. that in ( 10) thereis goodreason For example , En~ ( 1986 , 1987 ) hasobserved ' means who wasa hostage like " everyone to suppose that ' hostages something

timet." during

) ( 10 . The hostages cameto theWhite House framework Thewayto incorporate thisideain theReichenbachian beingsketched hereis to havethe lexical axiom for the noun to introducea kind of reference eventof its own.9For example , we might try ( 11 ). ) ( 11 ' ' Val(x, hosta e, R') iff thereis ane', e' aneventof x beinga hostage , andAt (e , R ) & the propertreatment of suchcases Therearepuzzlessurrounding (seethe En~ to references for discussion ), but no puzzlesthat appear posespecialproblems like the onebeing for the introduction of this idea into an absolutesemantics sketched in this chapter . of Tense Sequence " discussed of tense interestis the " sequence Also of considerable phenomenon Stowell 1994 1982 Ladusaw 1977 Smith 1975 1978 ( ), En~ , ( ), ), ( ), ( Dowty by 1997 Hornstein 1990 Abusch 1995 1987 ), Giorgi and ), ( ), ( ( ), Higginbotham( in certain embedded The basic idea is that . Pianesi( 1997 ), and many others . Consider time getsshiftedfurtherinto thepast environments thereference ( 12) .

The B-TheorySemantics

( 12 ) Mary saidthat Biff wasill . ' Therearetwo readings to this sentence . In one with Mary' s , Biff s illnessoverlaps remarks ; in theother thatBiffhad beenill . Thepuzzlelies in trying , Mary reported to accountfor both readings . To get the shiftedreading hasbeento takethe internal , onegeneralstrategy event(the eventof Biff beingill ) asbeingpastrelativeto the matrix event(the eventof Mary speaking ). As Higginbotham( 1995 ) spellsout the idea, we want to saythat the eventof Mary speaking is pastrelativeto the utterance eventas in ( 13) (where< express esthe relation of temporalprecedence , u is the utterance event , and W is the contentof Mary' s utterance ), andthe eventof which is previousto this evente. Mary is speaking ( 13 ) (3e )[ say (Mary, We ) ande < u] ( 14 ) ' ill ' ' 3e ( )[ ( Biff, e ) ande < e ] ' ' anILF, Higginbotham ) and( 14 ) together , andusing [ I. . .1 Putting( 13 ] to indicate the shown in 15 for the shifted proposes analysis ( ) ). readingof ( 12 ( 15) ' ' (3e )[say , [1 ( Mary (3e )[ill ( Biff, e ) ande < e'] I], e), ande < u] Thepuzzlefor this analysis thenbecomes howto account for thenonshifted reading ' " . OnHigginbotham sproposal of thepasttense , p. 235) the appearance ( 1995 -reference in a complement clause canbeanappearance takes ; cross merely place asin the first case is present , but the tenseof the complement not ." That , past -tensemorphologyin thesecases- thus, the is, ' wasill ' only appearsto be past ' relationbetween e ande is not temporalprecedence but overlap . The result is shownin ( 16 ). ( 16 ) ' ' ' (3e )[say , [1 ( Mary (3e)[ill (Biff , e ) ande includese] I], e), ande < u] Of course , if this solutionis available , thensotoo is the optionof havingthe internal referencevariableR pick out somearbitrary pastreferenceevent . In the caseof ( 12 ), the identifiedeventmight be pastrelativeto Mary' s utterance ' s utterance or the speaker or it might be contemporaneous with either of these events ; all that is specifiedfor sureis that R is pastrelative to S and that E is E andR would remainundeter D1ined . pastrelativeto S. The relationsbetween

ChapterS
This idea characterized asthe " independent , subsequently theoryof embedded " IO and Ladusaw tenses was Smith 1975 ) and , ) ( 1977 ( by initially suggested I I is right, thenit is wasworkedout formally by Dowty ( 1982 ). Hthe approach " " of tense . of sequence to talk aboutgenuine ambiguity in cases really a mistake of havingmultiple internal What we arewitnessingis simply the phenomenon thanto muchcloserto vagueness reference eventsavailablefor R- something . ambiguity to so -calleddouble H this story works for SOTcases , how canit be extended ' ? In this case ' Biff said is in cases like access , Mary pregnant readings ' s utterance and shemust remain BifI at the time of had to be ; Mary pregnant . How is this to be is spoken time S, whenthe sentence at theutterance pregnant invokesomesort ? one wants to B resources with Presumably theory represented ' of referenceto an interval that includesboth the time of BifI s utteranceand ' s time S. the speaker Of course , herewe areignoring the really interestingempiricalquestionsadmit DAR readingsand concerning questions concerningwhich environments .12 intervalarise S to the relevant themechanism which reference My interest by the possible of some of but to a hereis not to solvetheseproblems , give sample framework . Theideais to illustratethe within theReichenbachian responses toolbox. As we will resources that arein theReichenbachian kindsof theoretical see , andsome , theA -theoristhasa rathermorerestrictedsetof tools available of the solutionsto thesepuzzlesmustbe different. esto the whirlwind tour of B-theoryapproach This hasbeena very superficial at of resources there are a number of tense . of the Clearly problem sequence relativeorderings events of theB-theorist(reference thedisposal , etc.), , possible that a solutionis within graspevenif difficulties remain so onemight suppose difficulties here . But if the B-theorist encounters in eachof theseareas , one to reference that theA -theorist(who doesnot haverecourse naturallysupposes events , or to anyotherB-theoryresources ) will , to therelativeorderingof events be in muchgreaterdifficulty. I will returnto this issuein chapter7.

of theTheory 5.3 Metaphysical Commitments

As I noted in section 5.1, this semantic theory for tense is tied to a certain metaphysical picture of time . If we take the metaphysical consequencesof semantic theory seriously, then we shall be committed to a metaphysics in which future and past temporal points can be referred to and in which they are, in some sense , just as real as the present.

The B-TheorySemantics

This is so, for, asarguedin chapter4, we will at minimumbe committedto thoseentitiesthatwe quantifyover , andmetalinguistic overtimes quantification ' t obvious it is is ubiquitoushere . If this wasn worth , perhaps noting that each of the axiomsthat containvariablesfor utterance , reference , and eventtimes , andE) is boundby implicit metalinguisticquantifiers (S, R . More important , in the aboveT-theory 3)-( 7 it is supposed that the valuesassigned to these -than variablesstandin certaintemporalrelationsto one another(earlier , laterthan, etc.). Thus, it seems that this semantictheory is committednot only to the existence of timesbut alsoto their standingin certaintemporalrelationsto oneanother(however thoserelationsareultimately to be cashed out). , however , the valuesof R, S, andE neednot be supposed to be time Perhaps . It is with minor to , . In fact, points , employeventsalone possible adjustments the only portion of our truth definition that appears committedto the idea that R, S, andE aretime pointsis the clause'At (e,E) ' in the axiomsin (3). Revised axioms , makinguseof only events , couldbe written alongthe lines of (3'). ' (3 ) a. Val(T, [IP NP 1 ' ], S, R, E) iff for somex, e, Val(e, 1 ' , S, R, E) ande = E andfor somex, x is the agentof e andVal(x, NP, S, R, E) b. Val(e, [r I VP], S, R, E) iffVal (e, I , S, R, E) andVal(eVP S, R, E) , c. Val(e, [ypV ], S, R, E) iffVal (e, V, S, R, E) In this casethe commitmentis only to the existence of events that standin certain relations to one another . TImes could be introduced temporal , of course , but 13 would consist of sets of events . they temporallyoverlapping to eitherevents or temporal Quiteapartfrom theobviouscommitments points (or both), theremay well be othermetaphysical commitments in lurking a full of thetheory . Oneinteresting discussed in Parsons 1991 development , , example concerns the metaphysical commitments of the axiom I inb' oduced for the progressive . Thecoreissue first notedby Aristotle, concerns the so-called , perhaps . It appears imperfectiveparadox possiblefor thereto be an eventof my drawing a circle thatin somesense is in progress but which is nevercompleted (perhaps I am run over by a busbeforeI finish the circle). However that , it seems on the proposalgivenin (8) thereis a circle suchthat therewasan in-progress eventof my drawingit . Cantherebe incompleteobjects ? Cantherebeincom? Parsons ( 1991 ) is inclinedto answerin the affinnative. Thereare pleteevents

Chapter5

to discuss es alternative ), but it is interesting (someof which Parsons strategies on how the theory is axiomatized note that, depending , we may well be committed andtemporalpoints. to morethanvanilla-flavoredevents For now, I will haveto set asidethesetantalizing metaphysicalquestions . My surveyof andfocuson the relativemeritsof the B-theoryandtheA -theory it hasbeendetailed of tensehasbeenbrief, but perhaps the B-theorysemantics enoughto supportan examinationof the basicphilosophicalpresuppositions in the nextchapter of the B-theory(andhence , detailedenough , aswill be seen for us to see ). just how andwherethe B-theoryfounders

Chapter

Problemswith the B-Theory Semantics

A number of objections to theB-theoryhavebeenraisedin thephilosophical literature in character , someof which aregenuinelysemantical . Chief amongthe problemscited is the worry that the B-theoristis unableto accountfor the indexicalcharacter of temporaldiscourse . As we will see , however , indexicality is not the only semantical . Thereis alsothe long-standingquestionof problem how the B-theoristis to treatconstructions that refer to linguistic tokens(constructions ' and ' Therewereno ' . like ' Thereis no language utterances ) Thesesemantical . (I seriously objectionsmayor may not be solvablein isolation doubtthattheindexicalityobjectionis solvable .) However , whentheobjections arecombined dilemma from whichthereis no escape . theyfonn a serious ' basic line of will be the : The B theoristcan t solve My argument following the problemof indexicality , andin any casethe mostpromisingtheoryoffered to providesemantics , if adopted , makesit impossible by the B-theoristis onethat for sentences aboutlinguistic tokens . After takingup theproblems individually, 1will showhow together theylead ' s dilemma to the B-theorist . ) 6.1 Problemswith the Indexical Nature of Temporal Discourse Let us returnto thecasediscussed in the introduction , in which 1know that my fifth anniversary is (this) March 12but do not know that todayis March 12. As " the examplewassetup in the introduction , 1 initially think out loud My fifth is March 12. 1 shouldthink aboutbuying my wife an anniversary anniversary " . 1thentakeout a calendar to find today' s dateanddiscoverto my horror present thattodayis March 12. 1subsequently shout" My fifth anniversary is today!" As in the introduction, we have the following two distinct utterances(or 1 on the table . ) language tokenings

Chapter6

( 1) . is (this ) March12 My fifth anniversary

(2) is today . My fifth anniversary thesame And, arguably semantical . ( They , ( 1) and(2) do not express knowledge different kinds of . knowledge) certainlyexpress The semanticaldifferencebetweenpropositionslike ( 1) and (2) seems to in I in In the semantical introduced 5. that the , theory chapter theory evaporate axiomsutilized for ( 1) and(2) would be ( 1') and(2'). ' ( 1) Val(e, March 12, S, R, E, 0 ' ) iffR = March 12 ' (2 ) Val(e, ~ ' ) iffR = S , S, R, E, 0 And sinceMarch 12 is identical to the time of utteranceS, thesetwo axioms deliverthe sameevaluation for ' March 12' and ' today' . ' ' Shortof disquotationally introducing today into the right-handsidesof the that the axiom is going to fall shortin characteriz truth conditions , it appears ' ' that the agenthas . But if we try to add today into ing the semantic knowledge the right-handside we have sold out the B , theory andadmittedthat A -theory . resources arerequiredto give the semantics for temporaldiscourse A relateddifficulty hasto do with (3), utteredafter a dreadedvisit to the ' s office. dentist (3) I ' m glad that' s over with. ' ' About preciselywhatam I glad? By hypothesis , that refersto the eventof my ' ' , and overwith means ) . On the standard past(andculminated going to the dentist B theoryanalysis to my sayingthat I am glad that my visit , this amounts ' s office culminated at sometime earlierthanS, the time of the utterance to thedentist If at . my utterance was 5 0' clock, this amountsto my sayingthat I ' m ? before5 0' clock. But is thatreallywhatI ' m gladabout gladthevisit culminated Evenif onecanpacksomemissingingredientinto the RHSsof the axioms , there is the dangerthat the missing ingredient will undenninethe B-theory that aBtheory . The missingelementon the RHShasto be something program cancountenance . What could that be? metaphysics Theseare not trivial problems . Although they havebeenlargely ignoredin the linguisticsliterature have exercised someof the leadingadvocates of , they B-theorymetaphysics .

Problems with the B-TheorySemantics

Whatis thebestresponse for theB-theoristhere ?TheleadingB-theorystrategy , basedon suggestions by Reichenbach ( 1947 ), Kneale( 1949 ), and Smart " truth conditions , 1966 ( 1963 ), hasbeento invokethe ideaof "token-reflexive , in which the missingingredientis an explicit reference to the tokenitself. For that" ' now' means , Reichenbach thesame as' thetime example (p. 284) suggests ' " at which this tokenis uttered. The token reflexivepart is the part wherethere is talk of " this token." By makingreference to the very tokeningof a sentence like ' I am hungrynow' , onecan situateit relativeto one' s own temporalposition . Noticethatthis is a muchricherstorythanthestorythatsurvives in thecontemporary Reichenbachian theoriesof tensesurveyed in chapter5. In the example of my fifth anniversary treatments , thedifferencein therespective of ' today' amounts to the differencebetween (4) and(5).

(4) ' ' is trueiff An utterance is today (tokening ) u atS of My fifth anniversary my is atS (March12 ). anniversary
( 5) This utterance (tokening ) u at S of ' My fifth anniversary is today ' is true iff my anniversary is the day of S- the time of this very utterance, The treatment in (5) is the one that Reichenbach seemsto have ( informally ) proposed , The treatment in (4 ) appearsto be the one adopted by contemporary linguists who have executed Reichenbach' s general program for the semantics of tense in natural language} But clearly (4) is too austere, Reichenbach correctly saw that one needsto say more, Generalizing the token -reflexive strategy, Smart ( 1966, pp , 133- 134) proposed treating the basic tensesin a similar way3: " " Let usreplace the words" is past ," ( Notethe by the words is earlierthanthis utterance " " " " " transitionto the tenseless is, ) Similarly, let us replace is present and now" by " is " " " " simultaneous with this utterance ," , , , , and is future by is later than this utterance Notice that I am here talking of self-referential utterances not self referential sentences , , (The samesentence can be uttered on many occasions ,) We can, following " " Reichenbach , call the utteranceitself a token, and this sort of reflexivity " token" Tenses , can also be eliminated as" he will run" canbe , sincesucha sentence reflexivity " he runsat somefuture time with " runs " andhence " he tenseless runs replaced by ( ) by " means " he runs tenseless later thanthis utterance ," Similarly, " he runs simultaneous ( ) with this utterance ," and " he ran" means" he runs (tenseless ) earlier than this utterance " , All thejobs which canbe doneby tenses canbe doneby means of the tenseless " ," way of talking andthe self-referentialutterancethis utterance This is all very well (or let us supposethat it is for now ), but theorems like ( 5) have to be generated with the help of axioms in the T- theory , Precisely where

Chapter6

?As Yourgrau to theutterance doesthereference (tokening ) enterinto thepicture difficulties involvedin trying to , thereareserious , note21) hasobserved ( 1987 of the demonstration constructa generaltheory that can introducethe needed utterance event . ' anattempt to construct a general To see theorythat Yourgrauspoint, consider event . We might startby sayingthat the allowsdemonstration of the utterance reflexiveclauseentersinto the RHS asin (6). (6) Val(e, ~ ' ) iffR is the same , S, R , E, 0 (I -language day asthis very utterance ) tokening to the utterance itself (or the 1 a reference So the RHS of the axiomintroduces . If onelearnsthe axiom in tokeningitself). But this is not acceptable language rule. If that is the case to learn it as a 6 one has , thenwhatis the force ( ), general ' ' ? If it is a demonstrative in thisveryutterance of thedemonstrative , then genuine ' demonstrative utterance it should ) of (6). If it isn t a genuine (tokening pick outthesame -reflexivetheorem canbe generated . , thenit is not clearhow thetoken This looks like a kind of a technical objection, but in fact it points to a . Specifically, when the very deepproblem with the token-reflexive response ' ' to smuggle anindexicalexpression B theoristattempts ) (suchas this utterance from theusualpathof keeping into theRHSof a theorem , theB-theoristis breaking . If the useof the indexical the literal truth conditionsfree of suchelements ' this' hasto be treated that at all it on the RHS is to makeany sense , appears in section3.2. But if as an indexical predicateof the sort that was discussed are possiblein this case indexical predicates , why not allow them in the case ? Still moreperplexingfor the B-theorist of temporalindexicals , the indexical ' ' like a indexical looks an awful lot elementin this utterance predicate temporal . It certainly isn' t spatial ; nothing in the perceptualenvironmentis being . It looks for all the world as if the extra indexical elementjust demonstrated ' means ' this utterance now, and asif the expression means somethingakin to ' ' the utterance ! now happening I don' t know if thesedifficulties canbe overcome , but a patternis beginning contentinto the RHS of . The B-theorist can ladle more expressive to emerge the truth conditionsof a tensedsentence , but the theory beginsto capturethe content of a tensed indexicalcharacter only at thepoint wheretheadded expression . If this is right, then looks strikingly asif it containsan indexicalpredicate that the B-theoristsimply cannotdo justice to the contentof tensed it suggests . But evenif this patterncan be brokenandthe problemof indexical language -reflexivetheory like the token of a strategy canbe solvedby means character ,

Problems with the B-TheorySemantics the token -reflexive solution leads directly to an even more intractable puzzle about sentencesimputing that there are no utterances or linguistic tokens.

" 6.2 "ThereAre No Utterances

In the previoussectionwe sawthat the bestchancethe B-theoristhasof capturing -reflexivetruth conditions indexicalcontentis by utilizing token . The resulting semantical for the B theoristis something like (7) . picture (7) a. This utterance of ' Fredis hungry' at time t is true iff Fredis hungryat t- the time of this very utterance . b. This utterance of ' Fredwashungry' at time t is true iff Fredis hungryat time ' t earlierthant- the time of this very utterance . c. This utterance of ' Fredwill be hungry' at time t is true iff Fredis hungryat ' time t later thant- the time of this very utterance . -reflexive strategyis designed The token to allow B-theoriststo both haveand eattheircake . Thatis, thetheoryis designed to allowB-theorists to situate events in their past /present /futurewithoutinvokingA -theoryresources . Unfortunately , theB-theoristdoesnot getto eator to keepthis cake . The theorems in (7) tell us that a specificutterance u* of ' Fredis hungry' is * true iff Fredis hungry at the very time that u is uttered . This is the deviceby which (assuming I am the speaker the can situate eventsrelative to ) proposal . thattheorems like those , theB theoristargues mytemporal position Furthennore in (7) givetenseless truthconditions the (i.~., B-theorytruth conditions ) because "RHSof thebiconditionalis effectively" detensed B series resources are only calledupon .4 In the previoussectionI notedthat thereis alreadysomeslippagein the Btheoristposition , sincethe RHS of the theoremis not completelypurgedof indexicalcharacter . But, whetherthese truth conditionsarereaily tenseless or not, it is most likely the casethat they simply fail to give the correcttruth conditions in a broad classof cases . If referenceto an utteranceis required, then - this extra bit of content therewill be cases wherethis extra requirement throwsa monkeywrenchinto the semantics . The basicproblemis not uniqueto token-reflexive treabnents of temporal . Castefiada 1967 . that it alsoarosein treabnents of in, p 87) showed ( language ' ' dexicalslike I :

Chapter6 , ' the same as"the personwho Reichenbach , claimsthat the word of means , for instance " formulatedthrougha normal uttersthis token . This claim is, however , false. A statement " " I am : if a personuttersthis sentence useof the sentence utteringnothing is contingent statement he falsifies the corresponding , but surelythe statement might, evenin formulatedby "The person sucha case , the statements , havebeentrue. On the otherhand " : evenif no oneasserts utteringthis tokenis utteringnothing areself-contradictory them , they simply cannotbe true.

thatthisargument Smith( 1993 ) andCraig( 1996a ) have argued subsequently of temporal . mutandis tothetoken reflexive mutatis analysis expressions applies -conditions -reflexive in cases like (8). truth of thisformfounder Token (8) . There is no spoken language -reflexive thetruthconditions and to Smith , onthetoken theory Craig According to come outasin (9). of (8) appear
(9) ' is true iff thereis no at time t of ' Thereis no spokenlanguage This utterance . at t- the time of this very utterance spokenlanguage Statement(8) is clearly false, but statement (9) allegedly incorrectly entails ' is 'Thereis no This appears falseis thatthesentence language necessarily spoken that have to bea technicalobjection , but Smith( 1993 ) ) andCraig( 1996a argued aroundit andthat, asa consequence thereis no way to maneuver , the objection tenseless of the token reflexive the undermines theory ultimately plausibility fix the relevant it not crucial that one hold that is one of time. For example , might the truth conditions to time by utteringa sentence , sinceit is equallypossible give asin ( 10 ). ( 10) ' ' This tokening(verbalor mental ) at time t of Thereis no spoken languageis . at t- the time of this very tokening true iff thereis no spoken language ' like Thereareno mental sentences fail whenwe consider But ( 10 ) will apparently ' to or verbaltokensof language, which, thoughclearly false , do not appear vehicle to anyproposed false . This objectioncanbe generalized be necessarily : written, spoken for the tokeningof a sentence , intuited, etc. , thought will not help either of certainsentence utterances , types6 Appealsto possible an event will be to situate not enough for a possible by me pasttenseutterance . It is no comfortto me that my dentistvisit lies in the pastrelativeto in my past a possible utterance by me at sometime. I haveto know thatthe eventlies in the of relief. /expression I amtokeningmy thought to the time relative past

Problems with the B-TheorySemantics

-tensesentences Similar considerations like ( 11 applyto past ). ( 11 ) Therewasa time in which therewasno spoken (wereno tokens ). language Theworry is that ( 11 to entailthatthereis some time in thepastin which ) seems 8 holds. But if the truth conditionsof (8) areas in (9), how is this possible ( ) ? Statement that (8) canbe true only if thereis an utterance (9) suggests of a particular token the very thing that (8) is asserting , but thatwould be to undermine . Hereit is naturalto notethe similarity between like examples (9) andsimilar ' ' cases from Kaplan ( 1977 , 1979 ) (e.g., I am herenow ) . If we want to follow 's talk of theutterance , thenwe wantto remove eventfrom theliteral Kaplan strategy truth conditions . Perhaps the mostnaturalway to do this in our framework -Segalmechanism wouldbe to invokethe Larson of conditionalized T-theorems 7 discussed in section3.2 of thepresent book. As appliedhere , the ideawould be to conditionalize (8) asshownin ( 12 ). ( 12 ) ' If u is utterance at time t of ' Thereis no spoken language, thenu is true iff thereis no spoken at t. language This fixes the evaluationto the time of utterance of the token, but it keepsthe outside of theT theorem . It alsoavoidsthe needto introducep0 quantification tential (possible but unactual .s ) utterances Crucially, thetruth conditionsdeliveredin ( 12 ) do not make(9) a necessary ' ' truth. In similarfashion the tense version There wasno spoken , past ( ) language would receivethe truth conditionsin ( 13). ( 13 ) ' thenu is true iff If u is utterance at time t of 'Therewasno spokenlanguage , ' thereis a time t earlierthant suchthat thereis no spoken at t '. language to utterances canthusbe resolved Thoughtheproblemof reference , noticethat we resolvedit by strippingthe reference to the utterance eventfrom the RHSs of the truth conditions . But we therebyundid the very movethat allowedus to accountfor the indexicality of utterances like ' My fifth anniversary is today' ! ' This is the B theorists dilemma .

's Dilemma 6.3 TheB-Theorist

The strategy the B -theorist used in solving the problem of sentenceslike ' There is DOlanguage' was to say that the utterance that anchored the time S did not make it into the truth conditions proper. But the most promising solution we have

Chapter6

-reflexivetheory - the token - crucially for the problemof temporalindexicals does make it into the that the utterance reliesuponthe assumption anchoringS : eitherremove the B theorist faces a rather dilemma truth conditions . Hence , nasty eventfrom the truth conditions(in which casethe talk of the utterance mostpromisinganswerto the problemof temporalindexicalshasto be abandoned which claim that thereis ) or allow suchtalk (in which caseutterances . end false no language up beingnecessarily ) The optionshereare limited. Higginbotham( 1995 ) hasattemptedto take the second horn of the dilemma , holding that talk of the utterance(tokening ) must makeit into the truth conditionsbut that someof the information need the sentence undercounter not makeit into the truth conditionsif we evaluate " " . Wecan to Higginbotham factualsituations , according , allow modaldiscards; when the sentence is evalu that is, we can allow information to be discarded atedin otherpossibleworlds. The generalidea behind using discardsis the following : The truth conditions ' are for ' Thereis no language , if we preciselythosegivenin (8); however in certainpossibleworlds (in particularthe evaluate that very samesentence worlds in which thereis no language ), the truth conditionsarethe leanerones that we get in ( 12). The ideaof modaldiscards (the lesscharitable may havemerit in somecases the amounts to that the mechanism ), counterexamples discarding might say ' s dilemma . Consider( 14). but it is hardto seethat it helpswith the B-theorist ( 14 ) . I would be relieved If therewerecurrentlyno language ' thatw is theactualworld andw is theworld in which I amrelievedthat Suppose . Thesense of relief I feel in world w' cannotstemfrom there thereis no language to be the time of my utterance being no languageat sometime t, which happens would I careaboutthat in w' ! world . w the actual of ( 14 in world ) Why ) ( Even if we could find a way to makethe modal discardsolution wort, we haveto keepin mind that a numberof otherproblemswhich we setasideearlier -reflexivetheory(with or withoutmodaldiscards token still nagthegeneral ). ' andthere in 'drisutterance theproblemof theindexicalcharacter Thereremains , the theory (andincorporatingit into a finitely remainsthe problemof generalizing 's horn of the B-theorist T theory axiomatized ) . Quitefrankly, the second dilemmais not a very appealing option. the As far asI cansee , only remainingoptionfor the B-theoristis to takethe ' first hornof thedilemmaandtry to arguethatwe don t needto keepthe indexical characterin the truth conditions at all- that our knowledgeof indexical

Problems with the B-TheorySemantics

-semantical character is extra . The strategy would be to saythat we knowledge havetensedthoughts(for example is today), but that we , that my anniversary ' t haveanA Deedn semantics and an A . This, asI understand theory theorymetaphysics it, is the moveadvocated : if we needtense by Mellor ( 1981 ). In short , we cankeepit in therealmof psychology (belief ) andout of therealmof truthconditionalsemantics andmetaphysics . In earlier chaptersI arguedthat metaphysics , semantics , and psychology arenot easilyseparated . This may be a goodtime to revisit that claim- particularly now that we know what is at stake .

6.4 On Mellor's WayOut

Mellor ( 1981 that tenseis indispensable , chapter5) concedes , andthat indeed we rely on it to explainour actions(for example , my actingthe way I do when I discover thattodayis March 12 ). But Mellor holdsthatit is enough thatmy beliefs betensed . Onhis view, a commitment to tensed beliefsentailsnothingabout therebeingtensed truth conditions for my tensed utterances , andcertainlynothing aboutreality' s beingtensed . The flaw in this line of reasoning is that beliefs too musthavea semantics , so it is hardto seewhy allegedproblemsthat occurat the level of language do not likewiseoccurat the level of belief.9That is, if thereis somecontradiction inherentin having temporalindexicalsin our semantics for naturallanguage , is there no contradiction if we allow them in oursemantics for belief?Indeed why , if theconsiderations in section1.3 above areon theright track , thenthelanguage of thought (i .e., the languagein which our beliefs are couched ) is simply 1languageto begin with ! One can hardly say that I -languageis untensedand that the language of thoughtis tensed if I -language is the language of thought . Evenif we reject the identity of I -language andthe language of thought , it seems to me that Mellor' s strategy is fatally flawed. In the first place , we have 's beensupposing that a semantical is a of the theory theory speaker knowledge 's of meaning . If thatis right- if thespeaker is partof thepicture- - and knowledge if knowledge andbelief aretensed , thenit is very difficult to seehow tense(and from the semantical ) is goingto be expunged indexicalityin general . theory Mellor clearly is forcedto adopta piCtureof semantical that cannot theory allow notionssuchasknowledge of truth conditions can , butjust how adequate ' sucha semantical theorybe? It certainlycan t serveasa theoryof meaning ; it would fail to delivertruth conditionsin a way that displayedthe senses of the sentences of the language , andthereforeit would fail oneof the minimum criteria of adequacy for a semantical in chapters 2 and3. theoryasdiscussed

Chapter6

considerations , afterall, maynot beinterested ( Mellor Quiteapartfrom these in the possibility that aT -theorymay be ableto serveasa theoryof meaning ), beliefsbut aBtheory semantics whatwould it meanto saythatwe havetensed ? If the world contains andmetaphysics , thenprecisely only B-theoryresources ? how do we avoidhavingaBtheory psychology
The illusion of a possible way out here is fostered by thinking that there could be psychological concepts that are, as it were, disembodied- cut off from the actual world in important ways. How can a psychological property (call itfoo ) that bearsno relation to tensein the actual world have anything to do with tense? It is no good to say that our abstract property foo is tensed because it is grounded in our time consciousnessor temporal perception . That merely keeps the question one step removed. Then we must ask what it is about time consciousness and temporal perception that makes them tensed. Why do we call consciousnessor perception tensedif it doesnot correspondto something tensed in the actual world ? The weaknessin such appealsto psychology can be characterizedin a general way. Impressed by the ability of psychology to explain isolated caseswhere we are deceived ( sticks that appearbent when seen in water, etc.), we ask psychology to account for catastrophic mismatches between our philosophical theory of the world and the way we perceive the world to be. But psychology cannot shoulder this burden. As Burge ( 1986) has argued, psychological states ( particularly IO ) are individuated in part by relations to the external world . perceptualstates In this case, that meansthat if the world is not tensedthen it is difficult to seehow our perception of the world could be tensed.II But if psychology cannot supply the missing tensed component, there is no avenue of retreat for the B - theorist. If tense is to be expunged from theseman tics , then it cannot be retrieved elsewhere. Here we have a clear case where both semantics and psychology place demands on our metaphysics, and aBtheory metaphysics appearsunable to meet the demand. Can the A theory alternative fare any better? This question will be addressedin the next chapter.

7 Chapter -. -The A Semantics Theory

7.1 The Appeal of the A -Theory Semantics The intuitive appealof theA -theorysemantics comesfrom its ability to handle the indexicalnatureof temporaldiscourse . Unfetteredby the burdenof delivering tenseless truth conditions , the A -theory can useindexical predicates in the metalanguage to delivertensed truth conditionsthat preserve the indexical character of temporalphenomena . Consider for , example , the temporalmorpheme PAST . On the B-theory , that referredto (or quantified over) pasteventsor times. In chapter6 expression we sawthe limitations of sucha strategy . What is the alternative ? The ideais that, on thebasisof thediscussion of indexicalsin section3.2, theA -theorycan treat PAST as an indexical predicatethat holds of a p, roposition-like object, -tensemorpheme of the past effectively displaying the indexical sense on the right-handsideof the T-theory axiom: ( 1) a. Val(x , PAST ) iff x wastrue b. Val(x, PRES ) iff x is true c. Val(x, PUT) iff x will be true Wecanhandletemporaladverbs in a similar fashion , takingthemaspredicates -like objectsratherthanas of proposition to : referring timesor events (2) a. Val(x, ~esterday ) iff x wastrue yesterday

98 b. Val(x, ~ ) iff x is true today c. Val(x, tomorrow ) iff x will be true tomorrowd . iff x is true now Val(x , ~

Chapter7

Theremay alsobe waysto reducetheseaxiomsto a handfulof indexicalpredicates ' ' , tomorrow might receivetruth conditionslike , or evenone. For example . In turn, ' today' might be defined Val(x , tomorrow ) iff x is oneday after today ' ' 1 that this decomposition by useof the indexical predicate now . Nor is it necessary take place in the truth conditions it might just as well occur in the lexicon. The crucial point is that theremustbe at leastoneA -theory predicate 's . situationin the speaker to situatethe described egocentricspace I say" I ' m when 6 in chapter , To illustrate , discussed , let mereturnto thecase " ' glad that s over with after a visit to the dentist. What I am glad aboutis that my visit to the dentistculminatedin the recentpast i.e., that it is no longerin ' or any other suchdevices reflexives token invoke to . We don t need my present to get this result; it falls out directly from the axiomsintroducedthusfar. , andreflect semantical shownin (3) display ratherdifferent senses The two theorems . character different of knowledge substantially (3) a. ] ]) Val(T, [sPAST )(e is the eventof my havinga root canalande culminates [(3e true was e culminates and canal a root of ) ] [] event iff [] [(3e)(e is the my having b. If u is an utterance , at t , of [s PAST[(3e)(e is the event of my having a root )(e is the eventof my havinga canalande culminates )]] , thenVal(Tu ) iff (3e < e t and root canalande culminates ) ' , whatI m gladaboutis something WhenI amgladthatmy visit to thedentistis over that hasthe truth conditionsshownin (3a), sincethosetruth conditions stateof affairs and of the described effectivelydisplaythe indexicalcharacter whether to indifferent somethingthat situateit in my past} I may be entirely . hasthe truth conditionsshownin (3b) shouldobtain Now, it is certainly the casethat A -theory axiomslike thosein ( 1) and (2) " axiomsin the sense in section2.3, andit is fair to ask discussed are " modest of the axiomsfor thesetemporal what the deeperanalysis the elucidation indexicalsis going to look like. That is, when we saythat a propositionwas true or will be true, exactlywhat arewe gettingat?

TheA -TheorySemantics

's As Dumrnett ( 1969 ) hasargued , a semantic for anagent theorythataccounts semantic mustshowhow portionsof the language knowledge arelearned from the evidence availableto the language learner . But now considerhow we learn -tenseexpressions to usepast suchas(4) . (4) Dinosaurs roamedthe Earth. Wedo not evaluate this sentence by imaginingsometime earlierthannow and whetherat thattime (4) is true. Rather detennining , we evaluate (4) by right now conductingthe sort of investigationthat is appropriatefor past-tensestatements like (4). (For example , we might studyfossil records .) Likewisefor any -tense otherpast statement . Wehavecertainprocedures for detennining whether -tensepropositionis true, andthese a past do not involve the evaluation procedures of a propositionat sometime past rather we ; , the proposition simply evaluate in a particular way- a way which is independent of how we evaluate -tenseandfuture-tense present . propositions Consider the future-tenseproposition(5). (5) The economywill recoverin the third quarter . sucha propositionby picking sometime in the third Clearlywe do not evaluate and whether it is true at that time that the economyis recovering quarter detennining . Rather we evaluate it by studyingthe currently availableeconomic , data . Crucially of (5) canproceed , our evaluation without our everattendingto -tensepropositionat somefuture time index. a corresponding present If this pictureof the underlyingrobusttheoryis correct , thenit immediately leads to a second for theA -theoryproposal - in fact, underdiscussion advantage a strikingepistemological . TheB-theoristis in theuntenable advantage position of asserting thatthereis actuallyreference to pastandfuturetimesand / or events . However , this flies in the faceof everythingwe know aboutreference . We are in neithera perceptual relationnor a causalrelationwith future events , andour causalconnectionwith mostpasteventsis tenuousat best . In regardto times , the ideathat therecould be referenceto suchabstractobjects surely requires to currentepistemological majoradjustments thinking. It is no goodto takethe standard andarguethattheB-theoristis using dodge ' reference ' in a loose and nonphilosophical sense . Pastandfuture eventsand timesarequantifiedoverwith impunity in the B-theoryfragment ; they serveas semantic valuesin the theory , and 4, thereis no escaping , aswe sawin chapter theonto to semantic . In short values logicalcommitment , thereis no escaping the

100

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comesa to theseentities commitment , andwith thatcommitment metaphysical to. must own B theorist that the burden up simply heavyepistemological Sofar, I havebeentalking abouttheA -theory(andits advantages ) at a pretty . it is time to go into a little moredetailaboutthesemantics level. Perhaps abstract

A-TheorySemantics 7.2 TheBasic

with thework of Prior( 1967 arecorrectlyassociated , of tense A -theorysemantics 's it is . misunderstood is still Prior but 1968 supposed Ordinarily widely ), position ' ' ' ' ' , that Prior took ' past , present, and future to be quantifiersover past 's on Prior that it is For , ordinarily supposed , andfuture times. example present ' ' thatS wastrueat sometime earlierthannow. But Prior [S] means theory PAST ' for his tenselogic, nor couldhe. He didn t believe nevergavesucha semantics similar to that discussed a kind of presentism . He endorsed in future or pastevents this book. in the introductionto The sourceof the confusionmay be that Prior neveractuallygavea semantics with Priorean for his tense logic. I will nowdo so, in a way thatis consistent which thetenses in a semantics to will be . basic develop strategy My metaphysics . as their like that take areindexicalpredicates arguments objects proposition truth and of eventquantification In chapter5 we saw how the resources couldbe exploitedasa frameworkfor a Reichenbachian conditionalsemantics introduced . In this section for tense semantics , we shall makeuseof someresources that tense will be The idea S. foOD 3 namely in chapter , interpreted logical . For that takesll..Fs as its arguments , asa predicate example canbe construed to havethe simple axiomsin (6), and we can takethe basictensemorphemes ' ' thepropositional we canhavethenontenninalaxiomfor sTNS S1 ] introduce . ll.. , an F) object(in this case (6) a. Val(x, rAm iff x wastrue b. Val(x, : EUI ) iff x will be true c. Val(x, : EUI ) iff x will be true d. Val(T, [8TNS SI ]) iff , for somex, Val(x , TNS) andx = OSlO a certainpicture aboutthe syntacticform of Of course , this analysisassumes at which - specificallythatthereis a level of representation theseconstructions

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thetense take clausal . Presumably these morphemes tense scope operators originated in S-Internal to Sat LF, sotherepresentations (e.g., at infl) andadjoined position wewill beconsidering areassumed to beLF representations in the sense discussed in appendix TI . It is sometimes thatthecomplex tenses falloutnaturally argued fromthenesting 'PAS of theprimitive tense T' , 'PRE S' , and'PUT' . Forexample expressions to suppose , it is natural thatthefuture couldbeconstrued ashaving perfect thesyntax would (7), thatthepast receive the 8 and thatthe perfect ( ), analysis wouldreceive theanalysis present perfect (9). (7) [sPUT [sPAST [S])] (8) [sPAST [sPAST [S]]) (9) [sPRES [sPAST [S])] ' andthe -tense If boththeauxiliary'had riseandtakeclausal past morpheme the result is the LF in 10 . , scope ( )

(10 ) [8had [8PAST [8Smith ]]] goes

As we will seea bit later turnsout to be inadequate , this proposal . It seems that someform of temporalanaphora is necessary to accountfor genuinecases of , future perfect pastperfect , etc. The additionalresources for necessary temporal will be introduced in chapter8. anaphora ' and ' when' disIf we like, we cantreattemporalconnectives suchas ' before 3 , asin ( 11 ). quotationally ( 11 ) a.

Val 82]) iffVal(T (T, [881~ Val , 81) when (T, 82) b. Val 82]) iffVal(T (T, [881:b Val ~ , 81) before (T, 82) c. Val (T, [881~ 82]) iffVal(T, 81) afterVal , 82) (T ' ' adverbs as yesterday , such Temporal , aresimplypredicates takingI LFsas as in 12 . , arguments ( )

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( 12) a. Val( T , ~ ADV (temp ) SID iff thereis anx, suchthatVal(x, ADV ) andx = [] SI [] b. ) iff x wastrue yesterday Val(x, ~esterday . (I will flesh out the details This is just an initial glossof anA -theory semantics Before T5. in chapter8 andin appendix ) developingthe theory further, 1 needto dealwith a numberof objectionsthat havebeenraisedin the literature . of semantics 7.3 SomeObjections to the A -Theory Semantics
In this section I will canvasssome of the semantical arguments against the Atheory semantics of tense in preparation for answering them in chapter 8. The arguments to be considered involve some alleged problems surrounding the nature of temporal anaphora and some alleged difficulties with the handling of nested temporal operators. Embedded Tenses and Nested Temporal Modifiers Hinrichs ( 1981) and Dowty ( 1982), considering earlier operator theories of tense ( principally that of Montague ( 1974 , observed that there are potential difficulties with a simple sentencelike ( 13) and its two possible LFs , ( 14) and ( 15) .

(13 ) . leftyesterday Smith ) (14 leaves ]]] [5Smith [5yesterday [5PAST ) (15 leaves ]]] [5Smith [5PAST [5yesterday
aretakento be quantifiers , the LF in ( 14 On a theoryin which tenses ) is interpreted on the previous that in the pastit wastrue that Smith departed asasserting . On the other . This obviouslydoesnot yield the correcttruth conditions day that Smith was true it hand , ( 15) will be interpretedas sayingthat yesterday of ( 13 with our understanding hadleft- clearly not consistent ). of a problemherestemsfrom the questionable The appearance assumption must therefore and are nested adverbials and that tensemorphemes temporal this. As reason to no . But thereis really take scopeover one another suppose

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The axiom for this structurecanbe written as( 16 ).4

S / " ", / / . . . .... TNS r " '....ADV S 6 leaves PAST Smith yesterday

, it is equallyplausibleto suppose ) notes Dowty ( 1982 that the adverbandtense shouldbe sisternodes morphemes , asin the following structure :

( 16 ) Val( T , sADV TNS S1 ]) iff , for some x, Val(x, ADV), Val(x, TNS), andx = OS 1[] The UnconstrainedNature of the A -Theory " Anotherimportantobjectionto theA -theoryhasbeenthatit is "unconstrained , ' that the devicein Prior s logic of nestingtemporaloperators meaning seems to over thesetof possible tenses .sTo seethis, suppose wildly generate thatthenesting of tenses , as in FUT [PAST[ S]], could provide an accountof the present ' . (As we will see , it doesnt evendo that, but let us setthis concernaside perfect for the moment .) If tenses can be nestedin this way to generate new complex ' t we nestthem tenses then can , ? For example why , why is there arbitrarily deep no tense to PAST [ pAST corresponding [ pAST [S]]] or to PAST [ FUT [ pAST [S]]] ? This is of genuine concern if we areinterested in anaccount of tense thatgoes someway towardsexplaininglinguistic competence . It is altogethertoo easy to constructtheoriesthat overgenerate the setof possiblesentences . What we would like to haveis a theory that is constrained the sentences enoughto generate of our language andonly thosesentences . , despitethe apparent unconstrained natureof the theory and Unfortunately its propensityto overgenerate the possiblenatura1language sentences , the theory to under too: it is allegedlyunableto accountfor a broad appears generate classof temporalphenomena . In particular resources to account , it hasno apparent for temporalanaphora . The Apparent Needfor Temporal Reference At lastwe cometo thecentralsemantical theories of tense . objectionto Priorean In the introduction we considered the exampleshownhereas ( 17) (Partee 1973 , 1984 ).

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( 17 ) . 1turnedoff the stove

Chapter?

) doesnot merely meanthat at sometime in the past1 turnedoff Clearly, ( 17 . Without a doubt there havebeenmany suchepisodesin my past. the stove to thereis implicit reference , ( 17 ) is informativebecause Accordingto Partee . 1might equally event (or quantificationover) somespecifictime or reference ' ' ' well haveuttered' I turnedoff the stovethen , with then servingasa temporal . of time or eventin the past referringto somesegment anaphor . Partee 1973 Similar considerations ) applyto ( 18) ( ( 18 ) . Smith did not turn off the stove -tensemorpheme assimplesentential If we think of negationandthe past operators for sentence ): ( 18 , thentherearetwo possiblerelativescopes ) ( 19 ]] ] [ not [ PAST[ Smith turnsoff the stove (20) ]]] [ not [ Smith turnsoff the stove [ PAST of these But neither right if we areutilizing thesemantics getsthetruthconditions we suppliedfor theory A . The problem is that ( 19) would be given the truth that [] [sSmith turnsoff the stove conditionsthat it is not the case ] [] wastrue the . (20) wouldbe assigned in otherwords , thathehasneverturnedoff the stove truth conditionsthat [] [s it is not the casethat Smith turnsoff the stove ][] was true (which could havebeensatisfiedby any pasttime when Smith refrained is whatwe are truthconditions from touchingthestove ). Clearlyneitherof these in ( 18 after . Rather ) that Smith failed to turn the stoveoff at , thereis the sense . somecrucial time - for example , whenhe left the housethis morning This problem seemsto lie at the heart of another objection to Priorean . The objection : their allegedinability to accountfor complextenses theories into the simple is that, for example , [ PAST[ PAST[ S ]]] simply collapses " ." . Recallthat in chapter5 we calledthe minimum unit of time a chronon past Then, at best , [ PAST [ S ]] is true iff S wastrue at leastonechrononago. But PAST PAST then [ [ S ]]] is true iff S was true more than one chronon ago. [ ' But this doesnt seemto capturewhat we intendedto say by a past-perfect like ' I hadleft ' . sentence of pastness Onemight try to get aroundthis difficulty by talking aboutdegrees ' I hadleft ' be fails. this move above was noted as however , might talking , ; . Plus, thereis the stronginin the past aboutan eventat any arbitrarydistance

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tuition thattherereally is a reference eventhere- that we could very well continue ' I hadleft ' ' . How is . . . with ' . . . whenSmith arrived that to be cashed out on a Prioreantheory if there is no way to avail ourselvesof temporal reference ? Beforewe look for solutions , we needto canvass onemore objectionto - this onea theA -theory . philosophical objection 7.4 The McTaggart Paradox: Is the A -Theory Contradictory ? ' Oneof theearliestandmostinfluentialcritiquesof theA theoryis McTaggarts ( 1908 , 1927 ). Arguing for the unrealityof time, McTaggart beginswith the observation that certainpairs of properties are suchthat it would be inconsistent for oneobjectto havebothproperties . For example a tablecanbeboth , although roundandred, it cannotbebothroundandsquare andsquareness , for roundness areinconsistent . Likewise, accordingto McTaggart properties , it would be inconsistent for something to be bothpastandfuture. Thus , for mostcases , when we affirm the truth of (21) we havestatedsomething that is inconsistent if not .6 contradictory (21) future(cI & past (cI ) > But accordingto McTaggart this is exactlywhat theA -theoryentails : an event E will at somepoint be past , at somepoint present , and at somepoint future} Thus , we havethe conjunction(22). (22) future( E) & past (E) & present (E) The initial reactionto this part of the argument is often that it is absurd . Surely one is not sayingthat E is alwaysfuture and alwayspastand ; alwayspresent rather that E hasbeenfuture, that it will be past , one is asserting , andthat it is . As intuitive asthis answermay seem currentlypresent , McTaggart( 1927 ) argues that it is illegitimate: " been " and"will be " ?Andwhat " " . . . what is meant by has is meant , ashere by is, when , it is used witha temporal for predication , andnotsimply ?When meaning wesaythatX has been Y, weare X to beY atamoment of past time . When asserting wesay thatX will beY, weareasserting X to beY ata moment of future time . When we that X isY (in say thetemporal sense of "is"), weareasserting X to beY ata moment of present time . ' s line of AccordingMcTaggart , theproblemwith the stepto propositions analysis like ' X is Y at a momentof pasttime' is that no momentof time is intrinsically , present , or future. As a result past , if it is now true that X is pastat a

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time laterthannowthatX is past of futuretime, it will alsohold at some moment . a contradiction is there at a momentof pasttime. Thus , again that(23) and(24) are thecontradiction Onemighttry to escape by suggesting but that (23) will be true and(24) hasbeentrue. nevertrue simultaneously (23) X is pastat a momentof pasttime. (24) X is pastat a momentof future time. that this merely startsus upon an infinite (and However , McTaggartsuggests . vicious) regress But thereareotherproblemsthat seemto stemfrom the rejectionof the B. theory The A -theory and the Myth of Passage problemin any assumption ), thereis a deepconceptual According to Williams ( 1951 " or "flows ." " of metaphors thattime passes Despitethenaturalappeal " " itself takes , whether to change thatmakereference , change placein time. Thus one regardstime as a movementof an eventalonga time line or whetherone usandflowing pastuslike a river, themetaphor thinksof thefutureapproaching . fails miserably Williams ' s objection is aimedat a conceptionof the A -theory in which a , andin which the eventis , andthenpast particulareventis future, thenpresent . of a kind change thoughtof asundergoing to the Atheory This generalobjectionwas anticipatedby a numberof adherents . Broad ( 1938 , arguedthat oneneednot recoil from such ), for example . Thetraditional truenatureof temporalbecoming the on clear one once gets objections of qualitative a it is is that of notion species becoming temporal philosophical a there is that . For example particularevent , it might be thought change . , andfinally became past , World War ll ) that wasfuture, then waspresent (say . But Broadthinksthatthis is a confused way to think abouttemporalbecoming this notes Broad to , is reduced , change If temporal change qualitative becoming musttake placeat a certainrate (or must at leasttake placein time). And if it takesplaceat a certainrate, it can hardly be maintainedthat one hasgiven a to the - one hasdoneso by appealing sensible analysisof temporalbecoming . of temporalnotion change ' According to Broad, eventsdon t changefrom future to presentto pastin from hot to tepidto cold. Rather , whenanevent thesame waythatwaterchanges

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becomes it becomes . Accordingly present , World War n wasnot an absolutely eventthat wasfuture, thenpresent , thenpast ; it simply became . absolutely Whatever the meritsof Broad' s suggestion it is clear that the , proposalasit stands doesnot go far enough- at leastnotfar enough to answer Williams' s concerns " " " . If " becomeabsolutely simply means pop into existence , then this sortof becoming mustalsotakeplacein time. Initially, a thing fails to ex .ist; then it comes into existence to ex .ist. Theproblemis perhaps ; thenit ceases not asobvious asin the caseof a fire pokerwhich is initially hot, then warm, andthen cool, but it is nevertheless a problemof the same . Broadmay generalcharacter " havesomething elsein mind by his useof the phrase"becomeabsolutely , but what it might be is difficult to see . Prior 's Defenseof the A -Theory Here . TheA -theoryis allegedlycommittedto a notion of , then , is the problem in the temporalstateof events . Mellor ( 1981 change the commitment , p. 90) describes asfollows: [for theA-theorist thechanging Change tense ] is basically location (A-series ) of things 'smovement and events fromfuture topast . . . .Thereality of theclockhand moving consists ' l ' and'2' in theevents of itspassing thefigures ultimately becoming successively andthen for all other ; andsimilarly present . past changes that tacitly appealto changeof Clearly it will not do to introduceaccounts this form. But what is the alternative ? Onepossiblesolutionis to simply maintain that somepropositionsare past, someare present , and someare future, andthat is that. When we saythat an object or an eventunderwenta temporal , we aresimply sayingthata proposition change theobjectwasfuture describing butis nowpast . Thatis, we aresayingthattheproposition hastheproperties was future, andis past, andthat further analysisis impossible . This is essentiallythe proposalput forward by Prior ( 1968 ), who argued that for something to change is just for it to fit the schema (C). (C) It wasthe casethatp , andis not now the casethatp . Problemsariseonly if we slide from this schema to taking its accompanying - 12 . "The flow of time," Prior argued(ibid., pp. 11 metaphor seriously ), ' is merely not whatis meant , onlybecause metaphorical movement by it isn t a genuine , ' butfurther because what ismeant of themetaphor byit isnt agenuine ; butdieforce change canstill beexplained - weuse themetaphor because whatwecalltheflowof timedoes fit theabove formula .

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-typearguments this versionof theA -theory against McTaggart Constructing . Considerthe following part of the McTaggartargument is going to be very delicate : it above , asI formulated , andat some E will at some . . . anevent , at some pointfuture pointpresent pointbepast . . . future theconjunction (E ). . Thus ) & present (E (E) & past , wehave , sinceE did On the Prioreanversionof theA -theorythis premiseis flatly false ' that to ; not go from being future to beingpresent beingpast simply isn t what to theclaimthatweareforcedto aninfiniteregress , to. Responding comes change ": conclusion hasdrawna "perverse thatMcTaggart Prior( 1967 , pp. 5--6 ) suggests which is plainlywrong 1), withatstatement with(in step (that Weare , tobegin presented is which to is corrected . This future and is event plainly , something ) , present past every future andpast eitheris futureandwill bepresent , or hasbeen event right (thatevery andis past futureandpresent ). Thisis then andwill bepast andis present , or hasbeen . It is then intended which 2) to something , is wrong , in themeaning (in step expanded This is then . which is (in alittlemore to something corrected expanded right complicated the obvious this in correct if we told that we are and is which to 3 , wrong ) something step whichis again it intosomething , andif weare to expand wrong , weshallhave way . to on have we shall similar at to stopthere , nothappy go ad infinitum , or any point contradictions we this in forward to move led , if wearesomehow Even get only way compel thantheirrun rather halfthetime getthese , andit is notobvious whyweshould moves the to make . Butwhydowehave asthecorrect wrong points stopping ningmates ' thetroubleit getsus ?At leastafterthefirst few times , whenwe ve seen in anycase ? version to thecorrect into immediately , whynotpass for talk of events , is to , roughly talk of propositions , the solution Swapping will be past , havebeenfuture, certainpropositions saythatcertainpropositions . Thereis no point in sayingthattheremustbe a time andlet thematterrestthere will be wasfutureor at whicha certainproposition atwhich a certainproposition . tense about of . To takethat stepis to blunderinto a confused way thinking past , for thereis a natural This generalanswer may not setwell with certainreaders that ' hasbeen to trained the least at ) suppose among philosophically pull ( ' ' ' future mustbe reducibleto the moreprimitive form is future anda particular . we areforcedto suchan analysis time index. But thereis no logical reason " Mellor ( 1981 ) arguesthat Prior cannotsimply sweepaway the stopping ' " that , Prior s havingto moveoff ; that, in effect give rise to contradiction points . This is a thesestoppingpoints showsthat he is trappedin a vicious regress need to we since now , equipourselves , andI wantto setit asidefor very subtleissue of thattheory with a bettergraspof theA theoryandthetechnicalexecution . I will return to the problemin beforewe canproperlytacklethe question section8.5.

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Presentism If we follow Prior ' s solution to the A - series paradox es, what conception of time does the above proposal leave us with ? How can we think about the Atheory metaphysics once we have abandonedthe notion of time as change from future to present to past? One plausible answer is that, borrowing a phrase from Dummett , we are " immersed in time " : Whattherealistwouldlike to do is to stand in thoughtoutside thewholetemporal process and describethe world from a point which hasno temporalposition at all, but surveys all temporalpositionsin a single glance - the standpointof the : from this standpoint descriptionwhich the realistwantsto give- the different pointsof time havea relation of temporalprecedence between themselves , but no temporalrelationto the standpoint of the description- i.e., they arenot beingconsidered aspast , present , or asfuture. The antirealist takes moreseriously thefact thatwe areimmersed in time: beingsoimmersed , we cannotframeany description of the world asit would appear to one who wasnot in time, but we canonly describe it asit is, i .e., asit is now. (Dummett1969 , p. 369) Notice that this version of the A - theory sharesa number of features with the antirealist position of Dummett . On both pictures we reject the reality of the future and the past (construed as future and past events) . We neverthelesshave a notion of temporality , albeit one that does not countenance a dynamic conception of temporality as change. Notice also that we have come to this conclusion via a rather different route than Dummett did. For him , the unreality of the past followed from the rejection of bivalence in semantical theory .8 Here we have found our way to the conclusion in our effort to find a consistent version of the A -theory. Our path did not involve the rejection of bivalence. All this having been said, we still have to rescue the A - theory of time . In particular it remains for us to show that the A -theory semantics is able to handle temporal anaphora. We take up this issue in the next chapter.

ChapterS Temporal Anaphora B - Series Resources without

Themainpredicament for applyingPriorean theories of tense to natura I language is thatsomehow oneneeds to makesense of temporal without anaphora appealing to future and pastevents ? On the face of it , this , times, etc. Can this be done demandlooks impossiblefor a true Prioreantheory to meet . The A -seriesapproach deniesus access to pastandfuture events , aswell asto pastandfuture times. In effect, it deniesus the resources that are the building blocks of all currentresearch into tense . How canwe havetemporalanaphora to events in the future andthe pastif thereareno suchevents ? . Oneof my goalsin this chapteris to do the impossible - to build a semantics of tensethat utilizes only A -seriesresources . More specifically , I shall try to constructa semantics for tensethat satisfies the following conditions : . It providesan accountof without referenceto past and temporalanaphora future events or times . It providesa way to build without the usualresources complextenses (reference events etc. . , )

8.1 E-TypeTemporal Anaphora

Basic Strategy The basic strategywill be to treat temporal anaphorsas a speciesof E-type . The differencebetween thesecases andE- typepronominal temporalanaphora will bethatpronominal stand for anaphora anaphors , whereas proxy descriptions -clauses stand for temporalanaphors proxy temporalconjunctions (e.g., when ) that might be extracted from previousdiscourse . For an example , consider( 1).

( 1) I turned off thestove then .

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' ' ), onemight hold that then refersto a momentor period ( 1973 Following Partee . It is possiblethat ' then' is standing of time; however , this is not necessary ' ' . For example , in (2) then could be standing proxy for a temporalconjunction ' ' ' ' proxy for whenI left the house, or whenyou told me to . (2) ] [swhen. . .]]] ] [s [s not [s PAST[s I turn off the stove a bit , the ideawill bethatby havinggeneral propositions Spinningout the strategy of tensewe can avoid commitmentto suchB-seriesresources asthe bearers canbeachieved . Temporal astimesandpastandfutureevents anaphora , temporal ), (or, moregenerally conjunctions by theintroductionof when clauses aboutthe world. which express generalpropositions " If this gambitis to work, ' when' cannotmean" at the sametime ; it mustbe are . takenasa kind of primitive, just asthe PAST , PRES , andPUT morphemes ' ' than the B fundamental as more That is, when must be understood being . ( Moreon this in a bit.) of simultaneity seriesconception

Preliminaries Phllosophical
Singular vs. General Propositions The basic idea here is that we shall want to distinguish propositions that are about some object from general propositions that, strictly speaking, are not about anyone or anything .) For example, we might ' ' supposethat the utterance He is tall , accompanied by a demonstration of some individual , would express a singular proposition about that individual . In contrast ' ' , the utterance No one lives forever , which is obviously not about anyone , would express a general claim about the world . Other casesare disputed. Does an utterance of a sentencewith a definite description ' ' (for example, The tallest man in the room is tired ) express a singular proposition , or a general proposition ? According to Russell ( 1910- 11), the es a general proposition - not a proposition about answer would be that it express rather a general claim about the world ( e.g ., but individual some particular , that there is one tallest man in the room and that he is tall ) . Others have argued that such sentences in fact express singular propositions . How this and other casesfallout is not really important to the current discussion; I just want to introduce the distinction for later use.

literatureusesthe terms Referencevs. Denotation A greatdealof semantic ' inter ' and ' reference ' denotation . This is unfortunate , for it ignores ably change in thedispute central that were considerations considerations someveryimportant Russell( 1905 between ). ( 1950 ) andStrawson

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Oneuseful way to understand the distinction between referring anddenoting - exploited by Evans( 1982 ), by Neale( 1990 ), and by Ludlow andNeale ' . Russell( 1910 ( 1991 - 11 ) - is to considerRussells theoryof psychology ) distinguished from knowledge by acquaintance knowledge , arguing by description that to haveknowledgeby acquaintance of a certain object, one must be directly with the object. Alternatively , to haveknowledge acquainted by description of a certainobjectoneneednot beacquainted with theobject ; oneneedonly know the objectasthe uniquesatisfierof a certaindescription . ' s view thesetwo On Russell of knowledgeare in fact quite different , species . A belief aboutsomeobjectknownby acquaintance is a belief in a singular . For example propositionwhich hasthat objectasa constituent , my belief that Jones is tall is a Jones as a constituent . my neighbor singularpropositionhaving It is a belief aboutJones . On the otherhand , I might believethat the thief who stolemy computer is tall, andthethief mayevenbeJones I knowthat , but unless Jones is the thief, or unlessI sawhim stealingmy computer belief will not , my be a singularpropositionbut rathera general . It will not be a belief proposition aboutJones(or anyoneelse , the object of my belief will be a general ); rather , that the world is suchthat thereis a propositionaboutthe world (essentially uniquethief of my computerandthat he or sheis tall). The same of naturallanguage . point canbe extended easilyto the semantics here the differencebetweena , Applied questionis whetherthereis a semantic sentence a description thatuniquelydetermines some individual(e.g., containing 'thethird ' ' ' a planet) anda sentence (e.g., Earth ). containing referringexpression Of course as to whetherdescriptions , therehavebeenimportant discussions 2 cannotat timesbe referringexpressions aswell, andclaimsto the effectthat a number of names arein factdescriptions in disguise discussions need ,3but these not detainushere . The importantpoint is that genuine and descriptions genuine aretwo entirely differentthings. The distinctionis introduced referringexpressions herebecause it will play an importantrole in our investigation of the two alternativemodelsfor tense . On the one hand , therewill be theoriesthat will introduce reference to specifictimesor events . Obviousreasons for theintroduction of temporalreference includeexpressions like (3)--(5).

(3) 't know I didn that . ~esterday

(4) I leave onthe 15th ofDecember .

(5) I'll leave at7o' clock .

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On theotherhand I will be developing , theparticularversionof A -theorysemantics will do without reference to futuretime andevents . It will haveto account for what appears to be temporalreference by claiming that (3)-( 5) merelyappear to containgenuinereferringexpressions . The problem(for theoriesof tensethat cannotavail themselves of temporal

reference occurrence of temporal , ) is compounded bythewidespread anaphora in (6)-{ 8). asillusttated (6) ' t knowthat I didn ~ .

(7) I ' ll leave when Smith does . (8) I left before Smith did. If anaphors thatprohibit aresimply ref, theories referring expressions temporal
: Temporal erenceare in a difficult position. However , there is an alternative " " E. be might anaphors type in the recentliterature E-TypeAnaphors Oneof the morehotly debated questions . Bound of semantics hasbeenthestatus of unbound , anaphoric pronouns behave like bound variables are in the of an and , they pronouns scope operator . in first-orderlogic. Sentences (9) and( 10 ) containboundpronouns

(9) . [Every dogt hasitsjday ) (10 . [Nomanthates hisjdog

Unboundanaphoricpronouns , arepronounsthat do not , on the other hand to get their variables nevertheless to be bound ) appear (superficially yet appear . Consider( 11 nounphrase contentfrom someantecedent ) and( 12 ). ( 11) [A dog1cameinto the room. I ~ bit me. ( 12 ) . Some [ dogs1cameinto the room. TheYibarked that examples reasons for supposing Evans( 1977 ( 11) and ) offeredseveral . His most cases of boundvariableanaphora asgenuine ( 12) cannotbeconstrued , telling argumentwas that if the quantified noun phrasein ( 12), for example

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boundthe pronoun' theYi' , the truth conditionswould simply comeout wrong. Consider( 13 ). ( 13 ) [Somex: dogsx](x cameinto the room & x barked ) Notice that ( 13 ) doesnot havethe sametruth conditionsthat ( 12 , for ( 12 ) has ) thatthe intersection impliesthat all thedogsbarkedwhereas ( 13) merelystates of the enteringdogsandthe barkersis nonzero . -variableanalysis Anotherdifficulty with the bound is that it asserts the possibility 's of an operator . One test for binding somethingoutsideof its scope this would be whethera quantifier like ' no x ' can bind a variablein the same circumstances . For example , it is pretty clearthat the operatorcannotbind the co-indexedvariablein ( 14), so one wonderswhy operators like thosein ( 13 ) shouldbe exceptional in this regard .

( 14 ) No intotheroom . The . [ dogslcame Yibarked

One possible alternative analysis of these anaphoric pronouns would be that , and that they refer to whatever object has they are actually referring expressions been raised to salience by the previous discourse. A view like this has been proposed by Lewis ( 1979, p . 243) : I may say 'A cat is on the lawn' undercircumstances in which it is apparent to all parties to theconversation thatthereis some oneparticularcatthatis responsible for thetruth of what I say I am looking out of the window, and you , and for my sayingit . Perhaps that I saidwhat I did because I sawa cat; andfurther (sinceI spokein rightly presume the singular ) that I sawonly one. What I said was an existentialquantification ; hence to anyparticularcat. Nevertheless it raisesthe , it involvesno reference strictly speaking salience of the cat that mademe say it . . . . Thus althoughindefinite descriptions - that - are not themselves is, idioms of existentialquantification , they referring expressions of particularindividualsin sucha way asto pavethe way for referring may raisethe salience that follow. expressions One objection to this view , discussed in detail by Helm ( 1982), suggests that certain facts undermine Lewis ' s idea that pronouns refer to objects raised to salience. As examples , Helm considers ( 15) and ( 16), where # indicates infelicity . ( 15) a. John has a spouse; she is very nice.

b. John is married : #she is very nice.

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( 16 ) a. I droppedten marblesandfound themall exceptone; it mustbe underthe desk . b. I droppedten marblesandfound only nine; #it mustbe underthe desk . Similar examples are notedby Geach( 1962 ), who considersthe contrastbetween ) and ( 17b ), andby Evans( 1977 ), who notesthe contrast pairs like ( 17a between 18a and 18b . ( ) ( ) ( 17 ) a. Every manwho ownsa donkeybeatsit. b. #Everydonkeyownerbeatsit. ( 18 ) a. Johnownsa donkey . It is brown. b. #Johnis a donkeyowner . It is brown. , and ) and( 15b ) aretruth-conditionallyequivalent Accordingto Helm, ( 15a ' ' an utteranceof either would, on Lewis' s theory , result in John s wife s being ' raised to salience . Helm concludes thatthetwo occurrences of thepronoun' she 4 shouldtherefore be equallyfelicitous if salience werethe relevantnotion. -to-saliencepicture cannot In any case , it seems fairly clear that the raised cases in which we would wantto be universallytrue, sincetherearenumerous on some that a is say pronoun anaphoric expression yet we would haveno way -dependent - that is, we haveno singularobject . of identifyinganobject thought A sentence like ( 19 ) would be a clearcaseof this. ( 19 ) A mancamein. & trippedoverthe chair. is that pronounsstandproxy for definite descriptions Oneattractivealternative . The idea that unboundanaphoricpronounsmight standproxy for definite hasbeenproposed ), Parsons ( 1978 ), Cooper by Evans( 1977 descriptions 5 . The basic idea is that the pronoun ), Davies( 1981a ), and Neale( 1990 ) ( 1979 in ( 19 ) may standproxy for the underlineddefinitedescriptionin (20) . (20) A mancamein. The manwho camein trippedoverthe chair.6

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One of the key advantages of such an analysis would be that it avoids the unwelcomeconclusionthat the anaphoricpronounis either a boundvariable or a referring expression . More to the point, the theory allows that one might understand a sentence containing an anaphoricpronounwithout therebeing someobject that is the referentof the pronoun . This is just a surfaceglossof the theoryof descriptive . , of course pronouns There havebeena numberof important objections to it , and the theory has been in a varietyof interesting . Fornow subsequently developed , it is enough ways that we placethe relevantmachineryon the table so that we canexploreways in which it might be incorporated into the theoryof temporalanaphora developed later in this chapter . De Re/ DeDicto Distinction We will alsoneedto makeuseof the celebrated dere/dedicto distinction . Repeating our earlierexample from Quine , a sentence " like (21) is ambiguous between a dere reading(211 ) anda dedictoreading(21 ). (21) The numberof planetsis necessarily odd. ' (21 ) de re: [the numberof planet [ej is odd] si necessarily " (21 ) de dicto: necessarily [the numberof planetsis odd] The receivedview of theseconstructions is that the de re/de dicto distinction is a reflex of a scopeambiguity to a , with the de re readingcorresponding caseof quantifying into an intensionalenvironmentand the de dicto reading to a caseof quantification within the scopeof an intensional corresponding . We can generalizethis idea as in (22), where a OP is a determiner operator , a quantifiednounphrase phrase(or, if oneprefers ) andej is a variablebound the OP . by

(22) dere: [DP1[Operator [. . . ej. . .]] dedicto : Operator [[DP ]j[. . . ej. . .]] 8.2 Development of theTheory
" I beginby inttoducingwhat canbe called " absolute tense , which is not to be confused with thetense of a naturallanguage utterance (thereason beingthatall natural utterances language maywell beaccompanied by possiblyimplicit when clauses ).

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Let us take the absolutetensemorphemes to be PAST , PRES , and PUT as . Thuswe havethe following (clause ) in isolation theyareappliedto a sentence ' of thesemorphemes (basicallyasin Prior s scheme ): syntaxfor the occurrence

(23 ) Absolute Present : PRES [S] Absolute Past : PAST [S] Absolute Future : FUT[S]
Relative Tense introduces the imnlicit when - clause. It narallel ~ the intrn . .

ductionof thereference event /timein Reichenbachian I theories as shown in ). (24)-(26 (24 ) Relative Present onReichenbach : E,R (simultaneous ) analysis on this : when . . . 5 [ ] [ ] syntax analysis ) (25 Relative Past onReichenbach analysisER onthisanalysis : [5] before [. . .] syntax (26 ) Relative Future onReichenbach : RE analysis onthisanalysis : [5] after[. . .] syntax
Complex Tenses in naturallanguage To get a handleon complextenses , we needto makesome aboutthesb "ucture of tensed sentences . Let usbeginwith two working conjectures : hypotheses (HI ) -clauses All naturallanguage . sentences have(possiblyimplicit ) when (82 ) -clause -clause . The structure of animplicit when is the same asanexplicit when clauses Thebasicintuitiondriving( H2 ) is thatif we areto positimplicit tensed not want to be in our theorymustbe asconstrained aspossible . Ideally, we do the position of proposingnew grammaticalrules or principles to accountfor -clauses thebehavior of these clauses . If therereallyareimplicit when , thenprima

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facie we shouldexpectthemto be internally structured just like explicit when clauses - the principle exception . beingthat they areunpronounced -clauses If (H2) holds, we can extrapolate the structureof implicit when by some observations about their . 1Woobservations making explicit counterparts areparticularlygermane here : (01 ) -clauses All explicit when aretensed . (02 ) -clauses All explicit when arecoordinated with the tenseof the matrix clause . To illustrate (01 ), we would neverfind an explicit constructionof the form ' I -clauses left the room whenJohnto be hungry' . When are neverinfinitival (at ' t find an leastin English we don ). To illustrate(02 ), for example , Englishsentence ' like I will haveleft the room when Johnhad arrived' . The lead tenses ' ' ' ' . ( will and had ) fail to matchin this case By (H2), it follows that implicit when-clauseswill havetheseproperties too. Accordingly constructions , thelogicalform of these (at a certainlevelof abstraction will be as follows: ) Pluperfect on Reichenbach analysisERS LF on A -theoryanalysis : PAST [S] beforePAST [ . . .] Futureperfect on Reichenbach analysisS- E- R LF on A -theoryanalysis : FUT[S] beforeFUT[ . . .] Futurein future on Reichenbach analysisS- RE LF on A -theoryanalysis : FUT[S] afterFUT[ . . .] Futurein past on Reichenbach : RE - S or R- SE analysis LF on A -theoryanalysis : PAST [S] whenPAST [. . .] or

in naturallanguage , present , andfuturetenses By (H 1) it shouldfollow thatpast donotconsist of the PAST PRES and FUT but should , , merely simple morphemes be morecomplexconstructions : Past on Reichenbach : E,R- S analysis LF on A -theoryanalysis : PAST [S] whenPAST [ . . .]

120
Present on Reichenbach analysisS,E,R LF on A -theory: PRES /asPRES [S] when [. . .] Future on Reichenbach analysisS- E,R LF on A theory: FUT[S] whenFUT[. . .] The T-theoryaxiomsfor the absolute tenses arethe following:

ChapterS

(Tl ) Val ' ) iff x was true ,0 (x, PAST (T2 ) Val ' ) iff x istrue ,0 (x, PRES (T3 ) Val ' ) iff x will betrue ,0 (x, FUT
Theaxiom for thetense is asfollows : phrase (TP) x, Val TNSS], 0 ' ) iff , for some , [TP (T = x Val x TNS 0 ' and S , , ( ) [] [] ? areasfollows : Thesemantics of thetemporal connectives ( WI ) Val , [8TPI ~ (T TP2 ' ) iffVal(T ' ) when Val ') , TPl , 0 ,0 ] ,0 (T, TP2

) ( W2 TP2 Val Val T ' ) iffVal(T ' ) before ') ,0 , TPl , 0 ] ,0 (T, TP2 ( , ~ TPI before ( W3 ) Val (T, [8TPI ~ TP2 Val ') ' ) iffVal(T, TPl , 0 ' ) after , TP2 ,0 (T ] ,0

: Example ' is trueiff 3e ' I hadeaten (e) & agent (le )][] wastruebefore [][( )(eating . [] [ . . . ] [] wastrue intothebroader theory a theory of aspect , wewill wantto incorporate Finally thatevents withtalkabout events concerned . 1have noquarrel ; 1ammerely . Events of aspectual notbethebearers of tense properties maywellbethebearers arereasons for avoiding thisview laterwewill see thatthere ). (although -based see e. . Parsons 1991 In event es to semantics ; Higginbotham ( , g, approach tohave thelogical formshown like(27 1989 1993 ; Schein ), sentences ) areargued in (28).

Temporal Anaphora without B -Series Resources

(27) A mankicked Bill . (28) (3e )(kicking(e) & [an x: manx] agent (x, e) & patient (Bill , e) & past (e that Clearly this analysispresents , sinceit argues problemsfor the A -theorist thereis an eventwhich is past . Is theresomeway to avoidthis consequence of the introductionof events ? Recallthe discussion of the de dicto/de re distinctionearlierin this chapter . Eventdescriptions will be innocuousso long asthey remainsafelywithin the . Depending scopeof TNS. The situationis parallel to that of modals upon the relativescope of anexistential , we might find ourselves quantifierandthemodal committedto someunwelcome entities . Consider(29) . (29) A unicornmay haveeatenmy vegetables . On theinnocent of this example , theexistential interpretation quantifierremains of the modal , asin (30). safelywithin the scope (30) [(3x)(x is a unicorn& x atemy vegetables possibly )] In the problematiccase , illustratedin (31), the existentialquantifiertakeswide overthe modal . ; the resultis an ontological commitmentto unicorns scope

(31 ) . my vegetables] (3x: x is a unicom )possibly [x atp

Similarconsiderations overevents applyto theintroductionof quantification in cases like (27). The innocentcase finds the eventquantificationsafelywithin -tenseoperator the scope of the past : (32) PAST [(3e )(kicking(e) & [an x: manx]agent (x, e) & patient ( Bill, e ]
The caseto be avoided (for the Priorean) is (28), where the event quantifier has scope outside of the temporal operator. However, so long as we exercise care, we can safely incorporate most of standard aspectual theories. Some modifica tions are necessary , however. Consider the following possible properties of events (Parsons 1991) :

(33) PROG at t (e,t) : e in progress

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(34) CUL(e,t) : e culminates at t

ChapterS

Canwegetrid of thetimereferences ? Easily here . Suppose weadopt (35 ) and(36 relation is actually redundant in theevent semantics used ). (ThePROG here it in thefollowinganalyses .) , andwewill notneed (35 ) PROG (e): e in progress (36 ) CUL(e): e culminates Wethen have available theanalyses thePRES and PROG morphemes (37 )-(42), where areomitted asredundant in these . particular analyses 37 ( ) Smithis drawing a circle . , e) & theme , e when[. . .] (3e )(drawing (e) & agent (Smith (circle (38 ) Smithwasdrawing a circle . PAST PAST , e) & theme , e ] when [(3e )(drawing (e) & agent (Smith (circle [. . .] (39 ) Smithdrewa circle . PAST , e) & theme , e) & CUL(e ] [(3e)(drawing (e) & agent (Smith (circle when . . . PAST [ ] (40) a circle . Smith hadbeen drawing e PAST & Smith PAST , e) & theme , e ] before [(3e )(drawing ( ) agent ( (circle [. . .] (41) haddrawn a circle . Smith PAST 3e e & , e) & theme , e) & CUL(e ] [( )(drawing ( ) agent (Smith (circle before PAST . . . [ ]] (42) will have drawn a circle . Smith e FUT[(3e & , e) & CUL(e ] , e) & theme )(drawing ( ) agent (Smith (circle before FUT[. . .]] ' in (39 to link theculmination Notice fromtheanalyses ), (41) and(42) thatwedont need " " time . timeto the reference

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Aktionsartencanbe incorporated in the usualways. States , achievements , canbedistinguished of events . , andactions accomplishments by internal predicates " " For example . If states aredistinctfrom , we canintroduce HOW (e) for states " " " " the progressive , we candistinguish PROG (e) from HOLD(e). Actions will " " ' ' " " admit CUL verbs like win will have RESULT ( e), achievement (e), andsoon. Thereare for supposing thataspect shouldbetreated , however , somereasons -like objects not asa predicate of events but ratherasa predicate of proposition . Chief amongtheseis the imperfective which was discussed in , paradox briefly chapter5. Consider(43). (43) Johnis drawinga circle. " is that on the event The " paradox semantics just given therewill be an existential is a circle x, suchthatJohnis drawing quantificationovercircles( There x), yet (43) canbeb11e evenif thereis no circle (say , if Johnis run overby ab11ck afterhecompletes a 15 arc . Unless we are to follow Parsons only degree ) prepared " " our eventsemantics 1991 and introduce will give incorrect ( ) , incompleteobjects b11th conditionsfor certainutterances of (43). -like analysisof the progressive Notice that a tense actuallycanfoil the imperfective . If I take tense to be a of sentences or of proposition paradox property ' -like entities the of (43) mayrunasshown in (43 ), andthesemantics , analysis of PRO G may be givenby the axiom (43* ). ' (43 ) PROG [Johndrawsa circle] (43* ) Val(x , PROG of becomingb11e ) iff x is in the process ' Thus iff ' Johndrawsa circle' is in the process , if we go this route , (43 ) is b11e of becomingb11e . The existentialquantifierremainsburledsafelyin the scope of the PROGoperator . Recallthat one of the centralobjectionsto a Prioreansemantics of tenseis that it is unconstrained . If complex tensesare derivedby nestingtensemorphemes . , then there is potentially no limit to the number of possibletenses 't That objectioncertainlydoesn to this version of a Priorean semantics , apply ' t nested for the simplereason that tensemorphemes aren at all! Theresultis a highly constrained view of possible tenses , based uponthepossible combinations of PAST . ( Here connectives I assume , PUT, andthetemporal that thereis no genuinepresent .) tense

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Chapter8 conj -clause conjunction

tense

matrix
PAST FUT PAST FUT PAST FUT

PAST FUT PAST FUT PAST FUT

when when before before after after

Past Future PastPerfect FuturePerfect Futurein Past Futurein Future

The picture is going to be a bit richer than this, sinceeverythingturns on the availableconstructions in the system of explicit temporalconjunctions . For example -clause wherematrix andwhen tenses canbe mixed , aretheresomecases of Futurein thePast on whether , to getfutureshiftedreading (say )?It all depends theexplicit system of temporalconjunctions will alsoallow ussuchmixing. For ? , do we havethe following paradigm example matrix conj-clause conjunction tense Futurein Past

PAST FUT after ' ' e.g.: Johnwasleavingafterthe party next week

It is arguablethat this caseis really talking about a past intention of John' s is going (thathe wasintendingto leaveafterthe partynextweek ), but whatever on in the explicit case what accounts for the apparent future , that is essentially '. shiftedreadingof ' Johnwasleaving The tensesystemmerelyrecapitulates the structures madeavailableby the of explicit temporal on thatsystem , andinheritstheconstraints system conjunctions . That, in effect, is what constrains the tensesystemon this theory . Temporal Adverbs Again If thereare going to be difficulties in executingthis versionof a A -theory semantics . , they aredoubtless going to comein the analysisof temporaladverbs ' Mattersbegin easily enough . As notedabove adverbs like , temporal yester ' ' ' . At worst, we might run into day and tomorrow canbetreated disquotationally a proliferationof suchadverbs andtheremight be someconcernabouta finite - but theseworriesstemfrom adverbs axiomatization for them like ' threedays ' and ' four ' andit is ago daysago , pretty clearthat we cancomeup with ways of decomposing thesewithout slipping into talk of B-seriesrelations .8 " " Onemight objectthat these adverbs , evenwhentreateddisquotationally , ' ' are referring expressions . For example , whetherwe wish to call yesterday

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indexical or not, and whetherwe think we can display its sense or not, some would saythat it still refersto a day. That is, it refersto a time in the past , and hence would go) we do not escape theneedfor theB-theoryconception (theargument of the past . The flaw in this objectionis that it simply begsthe critical questionby assuming ' ' tomorrow' etc. refer to that ' yesterday , , ). days (or to anything else On thetheorybeingdeveloped here adverbs aretreated aspredicates i.e. , these ( , with axiomslike Val(x , ):esterda ):) iff x wastrueyesterday (or, alternatively , one ), and not axiomslike Val(x, ):esterday day ago ) iff x = yesterday ) . On the assumptions madeexplicit in section2.6, predicates arenot referringexpressions on this theory . If this is right, a similar sort of disquotational treatment shouldbe available for theothertemporaladverbs aswell. Forexample , we might introduceaxioms like thosein (44). (44) Val(x, ~ ~ Val(x, n~ ) iff x is alwaystrue iff x is nevertrue

' and' alNow it might beargued that , evenif it is plausibleto treat ' yesterday ' as " " in the to try andtreat locatingadverbials , it is suspicious ways predicates sameway, for theysurelydirectly refer to specificdates . Following the exposition - beginning someof these cases ), let usconsider by KampandReyle( 1994 with calendar names as in . 45 , ( ) (45) The lastclassis July 4, 1995 . Is it really possibleto avoid referenceto times in this case ? I fail to seewhy not. Following the assumptions setout above must havean implicit , this sentence -clause when that the dateitself is merelya ; hence , it is naturalto suppose constituent of that clause :

(46) Thelastclass is when[... July4, 1995 ].

The ellipsedpart of the clausecould indicatesomefonn of conventional dating " calendar indicate. . . ." , suchas standard system systems ' ' ' ' Similarconsiderations , as applyto before and after with NP complements in (47).

(47) Thelastclass will bebefore July5.

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such as(47) tooaresimplycases of partially conjunctions Examples ellipsed temporal . (48) Thelastclass will bebefore [. . . July5] . thattemporal adverbs adverbials , it seems (even Accordingly ) need locating notberegarded asrefening and hence need not difficulties expressions pose conceptual for theA-theory . 'before ' and' after ' Wemightwishto treatthestandard B-theory predicates ascomposed outof more basic A-series relations . Theideahere wouldbethat ' is treated a sentence like (49) wouldhave a logicalformin which'before as of a tense a and when in clause as 50 . composed past ( ) morpheme simple (49) TNS TNS [SI] before [S2 ] ) (50 [sTNS [PAST [SI] when[S2 ]]] Noticethattheoriginaltense arenowconstrued asa singlemorpheme morphemes thattakes overtheentire . (Thesecond scope conjunction explicitmorpheme asa kindof scope marker for tense .) mightbeconstrued Thisis a little bit abstract thelogicalformthatwouldbegiven , soconsider ' I atebefore ' and' I will eatbefore for thesentences I left thehouse I leave the , ' house : ) (51 ST[ pAST is aneating is a leaving of thehouse [sPA [there ] when[there by me me by ]]] ) (52 is aneating is a leaving of thehouse [sFUT [pAST [there ] when[there by me me by ill ' t introduce Notice thatthisstorydoesn nested tenses theouter tense , since applies to theconjunction andtheinneroneapplies to the first . only conjunct ' wouldbe Theanalysis for ' after . A sentence thesurface analogous having form(53 thelogicalform(54 ) wouldhave ). (53 ) TNS [SI] afterTN S [S2 ] (54 ) [sTNS [ FUT [SI] when[S2 ]]]

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Onedifficulty for this generalstrategy is going to be handlingtemporaladverbs ' or ' often' in termsof ' ' ' ' ' ' like ' seldom past , present, and future . Technical ' ' difficulties beginto emerge with predicates like since , which hasthe following two senses : case1 I ' ve beenin EnglandsinceJanuary1 ( been therecontinuously ). case2 I ' ve beenin (to) EnglandsinceJanuary1 (beenthereonceor more ). ' ' If we attempta reductivestrategy , then sinceJanuaryl might be part of a restricted -clauses substitutional . (Seesection4.3 for a discussion quantifierover when of substitutional .) quantification The glossfor case1 might be asin (55), the glossfor case2 asin (56). (55) ' '-' -" ' ' ' ( Forall S, sit. PAST [ S after January1. . .J] is T) I ve beenin England -' ' when S is T (56) ' '- ' - " ' ' ' (For someS, sit. PAST [ S afterJanuary1 . . .]] is T ) I ve beenin -' ' Englandwhen S is T So far so good , but when we moveto adverbsof temporalquantification , we soonrun into difficulties. Consider(57)-( 58), for example . (57) Wego to Londonoften.

) (58 ' vebeen We to London sixtimes .

Onemight suppose that thesecases (certainly(58 finally force us into the introduction " of pastandfuturetimes; we say" six times , afterall. But if we were to look at translations of (58) into otherlanguages of times , thequick acceptance would certainly seempremature - consider Italian, in which one would say " sei volte" six turns . ( ) -ordertemporaladverbs Still , second do raiseinteresting issues . Note that in ' ' 57 and 58 it is not sufficient to over when clauses . ( ) ( ) quantify directly ' (57 ) ' '(For manyS) we go to Londonwhen S is T ' (58 ) ' '(For six S) we went to Londonwhen S is T

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As wasmentioned in note 14to chapter4, substitutional quantificationbreaks down in thesecases : there can be many when clausesthat describea single visit to London . But we do needsomeway of talking about" times," evenif we don' t wantto take them as being points of time in the senseof the B- seriesmetaphysics . Onceagain , it turnsout that we cansolvethe problemwith off the shelfphilo. Following a generalstrategyfor substitutionalquantification sophicalresources sketched in Ludlow 1985 , we cango secondorder andbuild times out of -clauses when as in . 59 , ( ) (59) In a givencontextc, for eachclauseS tns, thereis a unique , tensemorpheme - ' '- - ' - ' ' ' - tns- ' ' - Si " time" t S = .t. t : Si tns S when , [ ] [ ] is T } { , times arederivativeof our primitive notion of when. We say Intuitively, then thatA andB happen at the same time because we know thatA happens whenB . Further that when B also must , anything , ipso facto, happens happens happens " " at the same time thatA happens . happen -clause Furtherconstraints arenecessary mustuniquelyspecify , sincethe when whensomething . For it be true that I wentto London , happened example might ' cannotbe a relevantsubstitution ' I hada headache but whenI hada headache , . So apparently we endup with (591 instance ). ' (59 ) tns, thereis a unique In a givencontextc, for eachclauseS , tensemorpheme - ' '- - ' - ' '- - ' ' ' "time " t S = , .t. t { Si: tns [ S ] when tns [ Si ] is T, and - tns ' [ ' Si ' ] only when ' tns ' [ ' S ' ] ' is true} " clauses like " whenI celebrated This allowsthe extension of t to include" anchoring " butnot " whenI hadoneof ." , my manyheadaches my eighteenth birthday . This is crucial, sincewhatcountsashappening Noticethecontextual variablehere " at thesame time" depends . Wemight meanthe same uponour interests nanosecond or we we mean the same , , might meanduring the brief day might . history of the humanspecies -clauses notionof timesassets of when Giventhis revised , we cannow return andtreatthemasin (5T') and(58").9 to the non first ordertemporaladverbs " (57 ) ' - S is T .t. ' we go to Londonwhen For manyt , thereis an S, Set , S " (58 ) ' - S is T .t. ' we wentto Londonwhen For six t , thereis an S, Set , S

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Thus , whenwe saythat we havebeento Londonsix timeswe arenot sayingthat our trips feUon six distinct time points (that wouldn' t work in any case ; a single trip could overlapsix time points ), nor arewe talking aboutsix events . We aretalking aboutsix non-overlapping eventdescriptions . Thus, I might characterize thesix timesI havebeento LondonasbeingwhenI cameto talk at Kings, whenI cameon my Nth birthday , andso on. 8.3 More on E-Type Temporal Anaphora a number of similaritiesbetween ( 1984 AlthoughPartee ) observed temporaland nominal anaphora , shefailed to note one classof similarities: temporalconstructions 's ' thatmirror Evans andFrankshears example Johnownssomesheep ' them . The temporalanalogues areasshownin (60). (60) Jackgoesup the hill sometimes andthenhe comestumbling down with Jill . The traditional analyses of anaphora fail here . If temporalanaphora works as boundvariableanaphora does , thenwe havesomething like (60'). ' (60 ) t)[Jackgoesup the hill at t andhe comestumbling down with Jill (sometimes at t] 't 't But thatdoesn of (60) right, sinceit doesn getthetruth conditions specifythat ' eachtime hegoesup hecomes , it doesnt work to suppose tumblingdown. Likewise that eachof theseclauseshasan independent temporalquantifier. That " merelygetsus to (60 ). " (60 ) t)[Jackgoesup the hill at t] and(sometimes (sometimes t )[he comestumbling downwith Jill at t] ' Of course , this doesnt get the truth conditionsright either . What stands out in this instanceis the fact that E-type temporal anaphoraseemsto work quite 1 smoothlyhere : (60* ) t)[Jackgoesup the hill at t] and [ hecomestumbling downwith (sometimes Jill (after he goesup the hill )] Of course , it is alsopossibleto adoptthe treatment of temporalanaphora in DiscourseRepresentation Theory (DRT), in particular as it is developedby

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Hinrichs ( 1981 ). This is not the placeto , 1986 ) andby Kamp andReyle( 1993 and DRT (some of Erelative merits about the a debate type anaphora openup the extensionof much less about of this debateis takenup in Ludlow 1994 ), . This is not a book aboutanaphora thosetheoriesto temporalanaphora ; my interest hereis philosophical in temporalanaphora , andit turnson preciselyone . E-type anaphors to avoidtemporalreference concern : that theA -theoryneeds need . Theremay well of that workable and one ) way meeting present possible( be othersolutions , andit maybe that someof thosesolutionswill employDRT andStokhof( 1991 of Groenendijk resources ) , thedynamicsemantics (or, perhaps contentof those andChierchia( 1995 . At present , the philosophical , however escanhelpus to avoidtemporal . If suchapproach theoriesis cloudyon this issue ' ' of referenceI amusinghere reference ), I haveno objection (in thetechnicalsense to them.
8.4 Further Issues

In chapter 5, two of the more interesting extensions of the B -theory involved the " " incorporation of temporal reference in norninals and the phenomenon of sequence of tense. In this section I will show how these phenomena can be handled on the A -theory. I will then return to the philosophical objection raised by McTaggart and discussed in section 7.4 above.

Temporal Anaphora in Nominals an observation In section5.2 I discussed , dueto En~, that nominalsoften seem of their own- possiblyquite independently to havean implicit temporalreference " " from asa whole. Theexample of the temporalreference of thesentence hereas(61). is repeated that discussion (61) . cameto theWhite House The hostages There is an intuitive sensein which we wish the NP to pick out sometime of thevisit to theWhiteHouse- intuitively framethatis independent , thehostages during takenfrom the US Embassy at a certaintime andplace(say , the hostages . the Iranianrevolution ) difficulties for Atheory that thesesortsof cases It is sometimes present supposed of the because semantics , presumably they provideadditionalevidence . As we haveseen reference needfor temporal , armedwith E-typetemporal , however casesof temporal , one can accountfor a numberof apparent anaphora ? that here we do at all. Can reference without invoking cases reference

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JustastheB-theoryhadto beaugmented , we mustsaysomething moreabout the A -theory if we areto accountfor the temporalcharacterof certainnominals -clauses . Clearly the when that we haveintroducedthusfar will not do the of the matrix event(in the case job , sincetheyaremerelydescribing properties of (61), thevisit to theWhite House . What can be saidabouttemporalanaphora ) in NPs? Oneattractivepossibility would be to developthe idea , suggested by Bach andCooper( 1978 ), that therecan be implicit relative clauses in NPs. For example of (61) therewouldbeanimplicit relativeclause , in thecase with thepossible contentindicatedin (61'). ' (61 ) The hostages [NP in the US Embassy [NP ] [s (who werecaptured during the Iranianrevolution came to the White House . )]] Thecontentof therelativeclause wouldbeextracted from previousdiscourse or from sharedbackgroundinformation in a manneranalogous to the treatment of E-type pronouns .II In sum , we can againavoid the moveto temporalreference if we areprepared to accept a certaindegree of abstract StruCture .12 syntactic of Tense Sequence As wasdiscussed in section 5.2, sequence of tense involves cases like (62), where ' Biff s illnessmayhaveoccurred with Mary' s reportor mayhave simultaneously occurred at sometime previousto thereport. (62) Mary saidthat Biff wasill . thattheshiftedreadingwasthecorecase ( 1995 Higginbotham ) argued , andthat theunshifted involved theillusionof pasttense in thecomplement clause . reading ' s words "the In Higginbotham of the pasttensein a complement , appearance -reference clausecanbe an appearance takesplaceasin the first merely; cross case , but the tenseof the complement is present not ." , past solutionis available to theA -theorist Clearlythesame , butjust asclearlythere -tense is something aboutit. If thereis no past in these unsatisfactory morphology clauses , why doesit soundasif thereis? More urgently complement what are , the mechanisms which we tense in these ? cases by get illusory past If this approach is unattractive available , thereareothersolutions with theAtheory " " framework . For example , the independent theoriesof SOTdiscussed in chapter5 havenaturalanalogues within theA -theory . To seethis, consider thatthestructure of a sentence like (62) is actuallygoingto be something along the linesof (63) .

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(63) Biff was ill ( when) [ . . .]] when [ . . .]] [s Mary said that So

Chapter8

Focusing our attention on the internal complement clause, we know (following 02 above) that the principal constraint on when-clauses is that their lead tenses match those of the clauses with which they are conjoined . Hence, in the above ' ' example, we know that the when-clause paired with Biff was ill must be past '' tense. But that is the only constraint. The clause might have a content like as " Mary was speaking (giving us the unshifted reading), or it might have a content " " like when she visited him last week (giving us the shifted reading) . In each case, the content of the when-clause is going to be extracted from previous discourseor from some form of common knowledge ) in fundamentally the same way that the content of E- type pronouns are reconstructed. " " If this picture is right , then it is a mistake to think of tense being shifted or " of tense at all . Rather what is " of there being a sequence , happening is that , situation reconstructed the described clause is on how the , implicit depending may be cotemporaneous with any described past tense situation . It might be ' cotemporaneous with the described event of the matrix clause (Mary s speaking ), or it might be cotemporaneous with any other contextually salient pasttenseevent description (e.g ., when Mary saw Biff last week, or when Biff missed his meeting with Napoleon , or whenever) . Interestingly , this parallels the last ( and in my view the most promising ) of the B -theory solutions that we looked at: simply letting R pick up any past- or future -tense event.13 In sum, the extensions to the B - theory that we looked at in section 5.2 have analogous extensions in the A - theory. Importantly , the extensions are possible without the appeal to temporal reference, and hence there is no conceptual cost to the basic A -theory program . Other extensions will proceed in like manner. Whereas the B -theory appeals to temporal reference , the A - theory looks for implicit clausal structure to carry the E type temporal anaphora. Whether this strategy can be carried out is an open empirical issue; perhaps the positing of this implicit clausal structure will collide with general principles of linguistic 14 theory. But notice how striking it is that every construction for which researchers are inclined to posit temporal reference happens also to be a construction for which an implicit -clause story seemsplausible . Indeed, it is even more striking that the case for temporal reference routinely involves some sort of explanation that relies upon the requisite clausal structure to identify the supposedreferent " (e.g ., hostageswho were captured in the US Embassy during the Iranian " . revolution ) Perhapsthis is a clue that reference was never involved at all .

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As wasnotedin chapter4, reference doesnot comefor free. The epistemo burden involved in reference in these cases is logical positing , andI see great no efforts in the literatureto take responsibilityfor that burden . The positing of implicit clausesinvolvesa burdenof its own, and it will haveto be shouldered . But at leastwe havea model for how implicit clausescan be incorporated into current linguistic theory.ISCan the samebe said for the liberal ? postulationof reference

8.5 McTaggart Revisited

of the revisedAtheory Having equippedourselveswith a betterunderstanding ' , let us now returnto McTaggarts original objectionto theA -theory . Mellor ' in section7.4 above ( 1981 ) hasclaimedthat Prior s answer(discussed ) fails to the vicious . But does it fail? the escape regress really Generating regress requires that we be ableto movefrom (64) to sayingthatthereis a time at which x is future andthat thereis a time at which x is past (thus delivering the contradiction : x is future andx is past ). (64) x wasfuture andwill be past . ' Prior s response wasthat we neednot havemadethis step , but we arenow in a ' to make an even . We . In position stronger response don t needto avoidthe step a certainsense we could not makethe stepif we wantedto! Hereis the idea. (65) is shorthand for anLF representation of the form given in (65'). (65) FUT[S] ' (65 ) FUT[S] whenFUT[ . . .] But thenthe semantics deliversthe following truth conditionsfor (65') :

*) (65
[] S[] will betruewhen[] [. ..] [] will betrue

Similar considerations to(66 will have the truth conditions shown ), which apply *). in (66 (66 ) PAST [S ]

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(66* ) [] S[] wastrue when [] [ . . .] [] wastrue Wecannevergetto thepoint wherewe havea conjunctionof two conflictingAtheory tensedclaims. Clearly (65* ) and (66* ) are not incompatible , sincethe will havedifferentcontents when clauses . To illustrate , takea propositionlike Anne] [] . [] [(3e) e is the dying of Queen ' That propositionwasfuture andis now past , but we can t overlookthe temporal -clause . Thereis an implicit when , sothat whatwe actuallyhaveis anaphora when Anne wasborn) andit is past that the propositionwasfuture (say , Queen ). Thereis not eventhe illusion of a contradictionif , asI write thesewords (say we remember to includethe temporalanaphora . The reasonfor the failure of the McTaggartargumenthereis not one usually given, and I believeit is not one anticipatedby Mellor. The claim is not to strip awaythe tensefrom (63) and merelythat the B-theoristhasattempted from these constructions (64) . TheB-theoristmustalsostrip awaythetemporalanaphora -clauses . But, by hypothesis sentences haveimplicit when , all tensed . But if (63) and(64) comecomplete whichserve to do thework of temporal anaphora ' with when clauses , then they can t possiblycontradicteachother unless -clauses havethe samecontent . But they don' t. thosewhen Nor will it help to attemptto takethis to a metalevel- for example , by suggesting that a givensetof A -theorytruth conditionslike (66* ) is future at some time, presentat sometime, andpastat sometime. If we try to formalize such . claims , asin (67) and (68), we disguisethe actualstructureof suchclaims (67) (66* ) is PAST (68) (66* ) is FUT in this chapter to thetheorydeveloped , the truth Spelledout properlyaccording conditionsof (67) will be asin (67* ). (67* ) (66* ) wastrue when [ . . .] wastrue The B-theoristcanracealongthis pathindefinitely looking for a contradiction , a . is to contradiction but no level of embedding going generate

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This is the sense in which the theorydeveloped hereis stronger thanPrior' s with respectto the McTaggartargument . Prior had no recourseto temporal , andhencehe had to allow that at everyother stepin the McTaggart anaphora contradiction . This gavethe impressionthat argumentthere wasan apparent Prior had to keepmoving up a level to escape thesecontradictions , andhence that he wasforcedinto an infinite regress . ThoughI am not convinced that this wasa genuineregress , the entire questionis now rendered moot. The contradictionis nevergenerated . The McTaggart fails. argument

Chapter

9 the Investigation

Broadening

As shouldbe evidentfrom the previoustwo chapters , I think thepreponderance of evidence leans in favorof anA -theorysemantics of tense . I hopeit is alsoclear that I considerthis semantical evidence to supportthe A -theoryconceptionof time. In this chapterI wantto broaden the investigation somewhat by taking up thequestion of whetherevidence from psycholinguistics or evenfrom phenom canchange theverdict . However onthetable enology , therearea lot of arguments , andperhaps it is time to try andput themtogether in a singlepackage . Let us review someof the reasonsfor favoring a A -theory conceptionof time andtense . First, we havegoodreasons to suppose that thereis a close(if not isomorphic of tenseandthe metaphysics ) relation betweenthe semantics of time. As I rhetorically askedin previouschapters , what makessomething " if not that it has the semantics of " tense somereflex in the temporalcharacter of the externalworld? Moreover to the psychology of time consciousness , appeals connection between tense andtime. Mter all, what only delaytheinevitable " time" consciousness makessomething if not someconnection between those mentalstates andtemporalreality? Whatcanwe concludeaboutthe semantics of tense ?As we learnedin chapter 6, the B-theoristis going to haveprofounddifficulties in accounting for the indexicalcharacter of temporaldiscourse . Moreover , therearereally only three : optionsfor the B-theoristin this matter . The B-theoristcan follow a token-reflexive strategyin which the utterance eventitself makesit into the contentof a tensed utterance / thought . But, as we sawin chapter6, that packstoo much information into the biconditionalsof the T-theory , andwe sooncollide with the problemof utterances like ' thereis '. no spoken language . The B-theorist can try to cut the link betweenindexical meaningand the semantics of naturallanguage . But, aswe sawin chapters 3 and6, this strategy is a cheat .

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. TheB-theoristcandisquotationally into the introduce theindexicalpredicates . . But this amounts to becominganA -theorist axiomsof the T-theory can It seems to me that all the extantobjectionsto the A -theory semantics be dealt with. Insofarasthoseobjectionsturn on temporalanaphora , this does reference a theoryof temporal not forceusto accept ; to thecontrary , we canhave . Not only doessucha theory appearto a theory of E-type temporalanaphora coverthe facts; it also allows us to skirt someotherwiseembarrassing asymmetries andordinaryrefer~nce(for example between , it allows temporalreference us to avoid referenceto times or eventswith which we haveno causal
connection) . Thus, the A -theory semanticshas epistemological advantagesas well as what I would argue to be an empirical advantage (namely, its ability to adequately handle the facts about temporal indexicals ) . But what if we throw out temporal indexicals ? This is a funny bit of evidence to throw out , since by some lights these facts constitute the very core of the temporal phenomena that we want to account for . Furthermore, if I am right , the temporal morphemesPAST and FUT are themselves indexical predicates, so ignoring indexicality amounts to ignoring the phenomenon of tense tout court . For the sake of argument, however, let us say that these facts can be ignored . Also for the sake of argument, let us dismiss whatever purchase epistemological arguments may have. ( Never mind the fact that epistemological concerns led to the invention of Russellian descriptions and E -type pronouns in the first place.) If we throw out all the evidence adduced so far on behalf of the A -theory, do we get a stalemate? Or is there further evidence that weighs in favor of one position over the other? As it turns out , even if we decide to ignore temporal in dexicals and epistemological considerations, there remains some very suggestive psycholinguistic researchthat supports the A theory semanticsdeveloped in this book.

Considerations 9.1 Psycholinguistic

from Evans( 1985b a suggestion In section2.4 we considered ) that supportfor oneof two competingsemantictheoriesmight be found by appealingto psychological the possibility that evidence . In particular evidence , we considered in factsaboutlanguage be found for a particularsemantic acquisition theorymight deficits. In this section andin factsaboutacquiredlanguage , I will look studies on temporallanguage at somesuggestive , andI will show psychological in chapters that thesestudieslend supportto theA -theorysemantics developed 7 and8.

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What psychological will be decisivein adjudicatingbetweenthe questions alternative semantic theories for tense ? Intuitively, we will beinterested inquestions thatdetennine whetherthelanguage of theB-theoryor thelanguage of the A -theoryis morefundamental . For example to the B-theory , according , the semantics , PRES , andPUT tensemorphemes given for the PAST an presuppose of the before /after earlier than /later than . Alternatively understanding ( ) relation , ' and ' after' thesemantics for theA -theorymight give the semantics for 'before ' ' ' ' ' ' in termsof thepredicates past , present, future , andthe relationalpredicate ' when ' . If it couldbeshown thatknowledge of onesetof these relations emerged before the other we would have , for the semantic significantly strongevidence theorythat takesthoserelationsasprimitive. Evidencealsomight be found in the studyof acquiredlanguage deficits. As , do we losethe ability to understand basictensemorphemes linguistic abilities erode ' and' after' first, or do we losetheability to understand termslike 'before first, or do theseabilities alwaysdegrade ? If oneability degrades earlier together - th'([t it may thatthatability wasnot themorefundamental , thatmaysuggest -levellinguisticability requiringthe havebeena higher of other , more knowledge abilities. primitive linguistic As it turns out, there hasbeenextensivepsycholinguisticresearchon the , and a numberof the studiesare suggestive . acquisitionof temporallanguage However , for the mostpart, the psychologicalstudieshavenot beendesigned to answer thekindsof questions thatexercise ushere , andhencenot aUof them canhelp us choosebetweenour two semantic theories . This is not a criticism of thepsychological research . The focusof research is inevitablytied to the interests of the field, and thereis no reasonthat theseinterestsshouldbe in the ultimateoutcome of linguistic or metaphysical ? debates Still, some of theresearch hasbeenvery suggestive . For example , a greatdeal - whether of research hasgoneinto theinvestigation of our first question knowledge ' and ' after' of the meaningof ' before simultaneous with or after emerges ' and ' future' . our knowledgemeaningof ' past' , ' present Here the evidence , 'before ' and' after ' seems to suggest thatthechild' s abilityto comprehend emerges , the acquisitionof simpletenses significantlylater. Indeed emerges quite early ( by age2), and , asClark ( 1973 , asa lower limit childrendo not learn ) reports ' and ' after' the relationaltemporalterms' before until ageof5 !3 This orderof progression is nicely illustratedby Weist( 1986 ), who specifically -basedresources tracksthe development of temporallanguage using the event ' of Reichenbach s theory . Accordingto Weist , childrenmovethrougha seriesof "four temporalsystems the of the capacityto express during development " increasingly complex configurations of temporal concepts (p. 357) .

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's S time), andE (eventtime), time), R (reference (speech Utilizing Reichenbach of temporal Weistproposes that childrenproceed throughthe following stages . development events . stage1: R andE arefrozenat S; childrencanonly talk aboutpresent - 24 months 2 (age18 ) : ChildrendistinguishE from S (usingsimpletense stage formslike pastandfuture), but R is frozenat S, sothechildrencannottalk about events occurringrelativeto othertime points. from S, but when it is, E is restricted ): R may be distinguished stage3 (age3 years ' ' to R. (For example , a temporaladverblike yesterday might modify R, yet E will still be fixed relativeto S.) times. 4 (age4 years ) : R, S, andE canall be at separate stage ' morenaturalto take these results , however , it seems Contraryto Weists analysis . . On the face of it , there is no as supportingthe A -theory semanticsof tense , the orderof acquisitionshould principledreasonwhy, on B-theory semantics in this order to theB theory , PRES , andFUT tense ; according , thePAST proceed /afterrelation aresupposed to behigh-levelabilitiesrelativeto thebefore morphemes seems naturalwithin theframework . On theotherhand , thisorderof acquisition . The orderof acquisitionwould be ( 1) rule for of theA -theorysemantics -tense PRES tense ), (2) rulesfor PAST (if thereis a present morpheme morpheme and FUT tensemorphemes , then (4) rules incorporating , (3) rules for temporaladverbs level abilities involving temporalconjunctionsande-type higher . temporalanaphora literature Someof the interpretations givento dataof this sortin the psychological areinteresting aswell. Forexample , Cromer( 1968 ), ) andMcNeill ( 1979 4 that before children framework within a , age argued broadly Piagetian working " themselves - that theyaretemporally areunableto temporally" decenter . This observation brings to mind the remarksin egocentricin a certain sense the distinction ), I characterized chapter7 in which, following Dummett( 1969 the B-theory andthe A -theory as a distinction betweena perspective between " in which we are standingoutsideof time, surveying(asDummettwrote) all " " , and one where we are immersedin temporalpositions in a single glance " and the world ''asit is now." 4 only ableto describe temporality that research evidence . It alsoappears Acquisitiondatais not the only suggestive 's Parkinson deficits for on acquired , ) ( exampleamong patients linguistic ' and ' after' muchmorerapidly of ' before showsthat comprehension degrades et al. 1979 thanotherlinguistic forms (seeGoodglass ). This might be takenas ' and' after' arenot ' before at all but arerather that primitive predicates suggesting . tenses and such as the basic built out of simplernotions , temporalconjunctions

the Investigation Broadening

Therearealsonarrowerquestions to be investigated . TheA -theoryof tense , asdeveloped in chapter8, necessarily a notion of whenasa primitive incorporates to bedistinctfrom thenotionof occurringat the , andthis notionis supposed same time. This is a verysubtledistinction studies arenot , andmostpsychological to tease . Nevertheless haveobserved , someresearchers designed apartthetwo notions of ' when' , andhavenotedthat a particularsense just sucha distinction beforethechild hasa notionof temporal orderandsimultaneity . emerges For example , in a remarkable , Cromer( 1968 , p. 110 ) notesthatfirst passage usesof ' when' (suchas " When its got a flat tire, its needago to the. . . to the " aremorestatements station of co - occurringevents thanstatements of genuine ) 's " ' . Cromer conclusion is that perhaps theability to ' date simultaneity fascinating ' ' an eventby a contemporaneous eventis more primitive thanthe notion of serial ." Interestingly , asKelier-Cohen( 1974 , similar observations ordering ) noted ' i.e. that it doesn ' t mean" at the same aboutearly usesof ' when time" ) canbe , ( found in Chamberlain andChamberlain1904andin Jesperson 1940 . Clearlythis observation by Cromerandothersdoesnot by itself supportthe ' which is thesisthat thereis a nonsequential useof ' when prior to the notion of two events at the same time. The research to comeup with occurring necessary ' s observation conclusive resultsin this areawould be delicateindeeds Yet Cromer is promising thatthequestion , for it suggests mayhaveanempiricalanswer (andindeedthat initial observations supportoneof the key sup positionsof the A -theorysemantics ). I hopethatthekindsof questions raised herewill helpto focusfutureresearch on the acquisitionof eventstructure of , of tense , andof the general conception order . Thereis certainlymuchat stake in theanswer to properlyframed temporal aboutrelativeorderof acquisition . First, thesemantics of tense for natural questions well be illuminated the answer second if the ; , language may by general program followed in this book is correct of time could , ultimatelythe metaphysics be illuminatedby the answers we get to thesevery low-level questions . It may seem that answers to should turn on answers surprising grandmetaphysical questions to questions abouttheacquisitionof language children but I , by hopethe considerations outlined in this book will makesucha conclusionseemmore still surprising . , if nevertheless plausible

9.2 Saving the Phenomenology6

TheA -theoryis often supposed to be morefaithful to our intuitions abouttime thanthe B-theory is, but in the theory I developed in chapters 7 and 8 this advantage to be lost. After all like B the theorist I have , , may appear givenup the

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notion of genuinetemporalchange . Perhaps moresignificantly , I haverejected the reality of future andpastevents . Surely , thesemovesalsoconflict with our intuitions aboutthe natureof time! Or do they? A lot turnson whatwe meanby ' intuitions' . Therearethoseintuitionswhich wearetrainedto havein ourphilosophy classes , andthentherearewhatwe might " " -induced call untutoredintuitions . Obviously , I amunimpressed by philosopher intuitions in this domain . This leavesour untutoredintuitions. It is fair to ask whethertherearesuchthings , and , if thereare , what they might be. At a minimum we a that with our intuitionsto , might expect theory comports be consistent with the way we experience the world. That is, if we experience somethingsasfuture andothersaspast , we would saythat a theorywhich reverses " clashes that" direction with our intuitions . Likewise the , if we experience " then world ashavinga genuine future" outthere some , ( barring ) the explanation sortof theoryadvocated heremight well countasconflictingwith our intuitions abouttime. This talk of " experiencing the world," of course , landsus thick in phenome the method is controversial it seems to me , Although phenomenological , nology that it canbe instructivein cases like this, because it showsthat eventhe notion - particularly of how we experience the world hasto be handledwith delicacy in thecaseof the phenomenology of time. How do we experience time, then? Onemight suppose that the philosophi time is asa dynamicsystem in which events cally untutored way we experience movefrom the future to the presentandon into the past . That is certainlyhow a number of philosophershave written about our experienceof time. The on this scoreareendless . Williams ( 1951 , pp. 461- 462) catalogued metaphors themasfollows: Timeflowsor fliesor marches roll, hours . Moreexplicitlywemayspeak as , years pass if theperceiving mindwere whiletimeflowsby likea river , withtheflotsam stationary of events it; or asif presentness werea fixedpointer under whichthetape of happenings upon slides were a moving from film , unwinding ; or asif thetimesequence picture thedarkreelof thefuture intothedarkcanof thepast . Sometimes , andrewound , again , wespeak asif thetimesequence were a stationary onwhichwevoyage , plainor ocean 's or in a variegated rivergorge down whichwedrift; or, in Broad , asif it were analogy arowof house fronts which thespotlight of thepresent . "Theessence of nowness along plays " " "runslike fire the fuse of time . , Santayana , says along However of badphenomenology . A numberof phe , thesemay all be examples haveargued thatour experience of time is not like this at all, and , nomenologists more significantly, that our experience of time doesnot supportan independent -Ponty( 1962 future andpast . Onecasein point is the work of Merleau , p.

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411), who categorically rejects the idea that we experience time as flowing or that we experience an independent future and past: We saythat time passes or flows by. We speakof the courseof time. . . .If time is similar to a river, it flows from the pasttowardsthe present andthe future. The present is the of the past . But this oftenrepeated , andthe future of the present consequence metaphor is in a way extremelyconfused . For, lookingat thethingsthemselves , the meltingof the snowsandwhatresultsfrom this arenot successive events .... The point is that if we think of time as a series of successiveevents, we have to think of an observer of the earlier and later events. For example , standing on the banks of a river today and watching the water passby , I might say that there was an event of this water coming down from the mountains. But that supposes a witness up in the mountains , and our taking the perspective of that witness. ' Phenomenologically speaking, I really can t take that position . This blunder, in ' " Merleau - Ponty s view , has persisted from the time of Heraclitus to our own " " day, and the root of the blunder is our surreptitiously putting into the river a witness of its course" (ibid ., p . 411 ) . That move is simply out of court if we are interested in how we experience the world . If we concentrate on our experience of the world , we have to reject the idea that time is a process or that it involves reference to independent future and past events. Rather, we have to think of the future and past being , as it were, in the present. "Time ," writes Merleau - Ponty (ibid ., p . 412), is, therefore that I amcontentto record . , not an actualprocess , not an actualsuccession It arises from myrelationto things. Within thingsthemselves , thefuture andthe pastare in a kind of eternalstateof preexistenceandsurvival; the waterwhich will flow by tomorrow is at this momentat its source , what hasjust past is now a little further downstream in the valley. What is pastor future for me is present in the world. Note how smoothly this comports with the claim in chapter 7 that we evaluate past- tense and future - tense utterancesby considering current evidence. Indeed, how could we not evaluatetensedpropositions this way if the future and the past are " present in the world " ? Merleau - Ponty (ibid ., p . 413 ) also cautions against appeals to memory to try and make senseof time as a sequenceof events: . . . it haspassed unnoticedthat our bestreasonfor rejecting the physiologicalpreservation ' and of the pastis equally a reason for rejectingits ' psychological , preservation ' ' that reasonis that no preservation , no physiologicalor psychic trace of the pastcan makeconsciousness of the pastunderstandable . This tablebearstracesof my pastlife , for I havecarvedmy initials on it and spilt ink on it . But thesetracesin themselves do not refer to the past: they are present . . . . Nor can one, a fortiori , constructthe future

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out of contentsof consciousness : no actualcontentcan be taken , evenequivocally , as evidence the future. . . . concerning My appeal to Merleau - Ponty here is admittedly an appeal to authority , but the point is not to nail down one certain picture of how we experience time . Rather, the point is to illustrate that the picture of time as involving an independent future and past is by no means considered faithful to our experience by those who purport to be interested in the phenomenology of time . Accordingly , it cannot be said without sustained (and no doubt subtle) argumentation that the theory presented in chapters 7 and 8 clashes with the untutored way in which we experience the world . Very simply , the burden of proof rests with those who would advance the priority of one particular set of intuitions . 9. 3 Conclusion

Let us takestock. In chapter6 we sawthat therewereserious problemsfor any versionof the B-theorythat hopedto accountfor the phenomenon of temporal indexicals . As wasshownin earlierchapters , this limitation of theB theorycannot " be dismissed out of hand . If the world is " tenseless , then one cannotappeal to semantics or psychologyto deliver the missing tensedingredient , for semantics and psychologyare not disembodied cannot add enterprises they tense to a tenseless full A world. Only a /metaphysics seems to theorysemantics be capable of makingsense of our temporaldiscourse . In chapter 7 we sawthattheA -theorysemantics andmetaphysics couldclaim a number of strongepistemological . For the A , advantages example theoryfrees B that we us from the embarrassing theoreticclaim can actuallyrefer to times . It further frees andeventsin the future and in the causallydisconnected past us from the claim that to evaluate future tense sentences we must, as it ( ) past were travel into the future and evaluate the sentence at that , ) past( past(future) In A much more as tense time. short , the theorystoryseems plausible anaccount . of our semantical knowledge In thischapter our investigation leaves this conclusion we haveseen thatbroadening the intact. If we turn to cognitivepsychology and to generally theoryof we find that the evidence J , weighsheavily concept Ianguage acquisition specifically in favor of theA theoryof tense . Moreover theA -theory , by someaccounts with thephenomenology of time. I conclude that doesa better job of comporting theA -theory (of both tenseandtime) is the moreplausiblegeneraltheory and in future research on the natureof tenseandtime. that it shouldbe adopted

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This is a strong conclusion in a number of respects. As regards metaphysics the A - theory is certainly a minority view , and as regards semantics the Atheoryis virtually ignored . But the conclusion is also a strong one in that it entails a number of radical and far -reaching consequences for other domains of philosophy and linguistics . In the next chapter, I will outline some of these consequences and propose some directions for future research within this general framework .

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10

Consequences

So far , this investigation has been limited to some of the more immediate consequences of the A -theory. In particular , we have been interested in the consequences for semantical theory, and to a lesser extent for psychology . But , as was noted in the introduction , the doctrine of time is interwoven with virtually every branch of philosophy and indeed nearly every branch of human inquiry . For the most part these other forms of inquiry have been predicated on B -theory assumptions( either tacitly or explicitly ) . If those B -theory assumptionsare abandoned and replaced by an A -theory metaphysics, it is natural to wonder what some of the consequenceswill be. Because the consequenceswill be felt in areas ranging from the theory of causality and the philosophy of action to the philosophy of spaceto the philos ophy of religion , it would be impossible to do justice to all of the potential areasaffected.! Accordingly , I think it might be more useful for me to pick out one string of philosophical consequences , and one string of linguistic consequences , and follow them for a while in an effort to illustrate just how rich and complex they will be. 10.1 Philosophical Consequences

Logic and 1ruth -Value Links2 One of the most pressingissuesfor this particular defenseof the A -theory is the apparent lossof truth-valuelinks, andhencethe lossof an apparentlynatural account of certainlogicalinferences . As anillustrationof theproblem , consider 1 below discussed in 6. , already ( ) chapter

(1 ) Dinosaurs roamed theEarth .

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On the presentist versionof theA -theoryadopted here this , we do not evaluate " to sometime earlierthannow and " sentence whether , by traveling determining ' is true. Ratherthetruth of it is atthattime, ' Dinosaurs roamtheEarth , grounded - for example , existingfossils. by currentfacts This generalline of response is, of course , similar to onethat hasbeenpursued in Dummett most his 1969 ( ) andother antirealists, but by notably paper . thereis arguablya difficulty for the position It canbe held that thereareimportant truth-valuelinks between statements aboutthepastandstatements about the present , andthat antirealists (andA -theorists ) mustprovidesomealternative account of theselinks. For example like (2). , we routinely makeinferences (2) I am hungry . Next Tuesday it will be true that I washungry . in chapter 5, it is clearhow this On aBtheory semantic theorylike thatsketched canbe made . If I am hungrynow, thenthereis a time t = now sort of inference suchthat I am hungryat t. But thenfor anydatel' later thant it will be true at l' that I was hungry. Sincenext Tuesdayis later than t , next Tuesdayit will be . true that I washungry The A -theorist, on the other hand , will needto articulatealternative(antirealist . To illustrate links that can be drawn on for theseinferences truth value ) , Wright ( 1993 , chapter5) formalizesthe truth valuelinks groundingthe B-theory inferences asfollows:

for tl < t2 A ' tJ [PastiS is trueatt2iff (3tl)(S wastrueat tJ] ('v B 'tl)[Fut:S is trueat t) iff (3tJ(S will betrueattJ] ('v C ' tJ(FutiSwastrueattJ ] 'tJ [S is trueat t2iff ('v ('v D will betrueat tJ] 'tJ(PastiS 't) [S is trueat t) iff ('v ('v andsoon.3 atwhichS will be is a laterdate Thus , there , if FUT[S] is trueonMay 1, 1998 . true(byB), andsoforth

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- andpast -tensed Hereis thedifficulty for theA -theorist : Since future sentences areto be evaluated on the basisof the present , it is possibleto envisiona situation in which evidence that may havebeenpresent at 1 or eliminated . is erased andis hencenot availableat 12 ' That is, suppose that today (1 .) I commit some crime(say , I kill ColonelPlumwith a candlestick all evidence and ) andthenerase -up.4Now we appearto havea takeamnesia pills so asto alsoforget the cover ' situation where ' I am (success fully ) killing Col. Plum with a candlestick is -up is good true. The problemis this: If my cover therewill be absolutely , at 12 ' ' . Thus if the no factsto support thetruthof I killed Col. Plumwith a candlestick , statement is to be evaluated will not be 12 , the statement by facts holding at 12 true at 12 , Then, by (D ), it follows that ' I am (success fully ) killing Col. Plum ' is false with a candlestick our initial . , contradicting assumption The movethat looks fishy hereis the one wherewe saythat at 12 therewill ' t this amount beno factsto groundthetruth of the statement in question . Doesn to traveling into the future and evaluatingthe situation- and isn' t this precisely the sortof situationthat is supposed to be blocked ? Indeed all the A theoristis compel led to admit is the following : We begin , with thetruth (now) of ' Therewill beno factsto groundthetruth of ' I killed Col. ' . From this and our Plum with a candlestick truth-valuelinks, all that we can ' there are no facts to infer is that the following will be true at 12 : ground the ' . But this isn' t truth of ' I killed Col. Plum with a candlestick enoughto move backto a contradiction . : Gettingthe contradictionrequiresthe following additionalpostulate E ' ' /will be true at tiff S (V1 )[ Thereareno factsto groundthe truth of S is/was is/was /will not be true at t)] ' Usingthis, we caninfer thatit will not betruethat I killed Col. Plumwith a can ' ' dlestick at 12 , Now ( D usto thefalsity of I am(success ) carries fully ) killing Col. ' andwe haveour Plum with a candlestick contradictionis , It appears that theA -theoristmustfind anotherway to escape contradiction here . Onepossibleansweris that this worry abouttruth-valuelinks hasthings to suggest , asMcDowell ( 1978 upsidedown. Perhaps ) seems , the real issueis that the realist aboutthe pastneedstruth-valUelinks in orderto supporthis or her realism . Accordingly the burdenis on the realistto justify the appeal , perhaps to theselinks. McDowell (p. 132 , note 10 ) thinksthat no such justification canbe forthcoming : ' s viewof whatit is -value Thetruth link realist to have occurred is , say , for something . Heconceals thatfromhimselfwith a confused of with unintelligible thought being

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' s viewof the different fromours . Thustherealist reality knowledge acquiring powers of thepast canbedescribed , in , with onlymildcaricature , astheideaof another place . whichpast events arestill occurring , by God , watched , perhaps Like Wright ( 1993 , chapter3), I am inclined to think that this criticism is unfair . The realist aboutthe future andthe pastis underno compulsionto claim . We aretalking logic here , not epistemol specialknowledge acquiringpowers the two. ogy, andthe realistis quite happyto cut the link between led to accept Of course , an antirealistis not compel , by parity of reasoning like that in (2). Still , onewonders truth-valuelinks asgroundinglogical reasoning if not the usualtruth-valuelinks. Would whatcouldgroundsuchreasoning with suchlinks? Wright ( 1993 it evenbe possibleto dispense , p. 179 ) considers dim: the prospects -value nottobecompared tothose features of, say Thetruth linksare , classical logicwhich the in tuition ists. The intuitionistic modifications are modification deep -reaching undergo by with respect to ourordinary notion of validinference conservative ; buttheyarerelatively -value toleave links bebound .Wholesale of thetruth , in contrast , would rejection to workat of wassupposed us it seems with no clear , , language conception howtensed ' to betaken 'It will rainatnoon whoasserts tomorrow all. What , for instance , is someone withthatof any of hisutterance arenotheldtocoincide if thetruth -conditions assaying ' atnoon beacoherent tomorrow ?Maybe there could utterance of 'It israining revisionary -vaue of thetruth linksasthe around for tensed discourse , pivoting rejection programme of Bivalence intuitionist revisions of classical ; andperhaps logicpivotaround rejection . Butit does notseem . amount to say weshould beleft witha surprising likely . Is Let us suppose , then, that someform of truth-valuelinks areindispensable ? Wright considers two possibilities . therea way out for the antirealist here The first way out- the oneadvocated by Wright- is to refiguretruth-value to the antirealist aboutthe pastandfuture links in a way that is moresympathetic . Accordingto Wright, the antirealist shouldreject(A )-( D) andopt instead for links like (A * )-( D* ) . A* at tl is true)] esat t2is true iff ( 3tl)(what S expressed PastiSexpress (~ tJ [ What B* at t2istrue)] esat tl is trueiff (3tJ (whatS will express FutiS express (~ tl )[ What C* at tl is true)] esat t2is true iff (~ t .> S express (what FutiS expressed (~ tJ [ What D* at t2istrue)] S express esat tl is trueiff (~ tJ (whatPastiSwill e~press (~ tl )[ What andsoon.

Consequences

The difference is that the proposed * links supplant the tense inflection in ' be true ' with tenseinflections in the verb ' to express' . Wright ' s idea is that by doing this we can retain the truth -value links by giving up the stability of the truth predicate - - that is, by giving up on the timelessnessof truth . To illustrate with our example of Col . Plum: even if our evidence erasureprogram is successful, what ' I killed Col . Plum with a candlestick ' will express at . It follows unproblematically that what ' I am ( success12is (currently ) true , ' fully ) killing Col . Plum with a candlestick now expresses is true. No contradiction need arise. ' Wright s solution then is to allow that what we express by an utterance (tokening ) of S will not be eternally true in the traditional sense (whatever that comes to once we have given up the reality of the future and the past), but rather that what is said might flip - flop between true and false over time . This is a pretty strong conclusion . As Wright ( 1993, p . 201) puts the matter, "the prospect of rehabilitating something importantly akin to the classical notion of truth is , in effect , finally dashed ." Though I have not been reluctant to embrace ' strong conclusions in this book , one naturally wonders if there isn t a less radical way out. One alternative idea, which Wright attributes to Durnmett ( 1969), is that what S express es will shift over time . Truth could remain stable if we allowed that the content of an utterance (tokening ) was temporally unstable. Put another way, has a certain content C at I . but that very same 11 utterance perhaps an utterance at 11 has another content at 12 , Applied to the current problem of my killing Col . Plum , we might accept that what ' I killed Col . Plum with a candlestick ' will express at 12 is true but argue that it will express something rather different at 12 than it does as uttered now (at 11 ) , and we are in no position now to know what the content of that utterance , might be at 12 Wright ( 1993, p . 194) rejects this solution , not becauseof its paradoxical feel , but becauseof its alleged inability to cope with diachronic disagreements: ' s antirealist hasindeed . . . if Dummett found a way to explain how he can avoid dismissing the views of his earlierand later self, the threatened cost is an unability to explain how therecan be sucha thing asconflicting views held by protagonists who are in time. sufficientlyseparated ' s antirealistis therefore Dummett . Doeshis positionpermit opento a simpledilemma thereconstruction of somesortof general notionof diachronic , or does inconsistency it not? If it doesnot, that merely furnishes the realist with a further powerful objection - whataccount -won arewe nowto giveof thegrowthof humanknowledge , thehard defeat of and error in which we are to believe gradual superstition , etc. etc.? encouraged But if somesort of notion of diachronicinconsistency can be saved , the task will still

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which anindexical of t11lth does allow remain of showing thatthekindof clash conception in timedoes notobtain between hispresent to holdbetween statements widelyseparated . andhislater , andearlier opinions It seems to me that if onewantsto breakthe dilemmaandpursuethe shiftingarepossible contentstrategy , then one shouldhold that diachronicdisagreements butrejecttheideathattheycanbethoughtof asconflictsbetween positions held at I . andIrRather , the ideawould be that the relevanthistorical disagreements ." Thus, if I now dispute Plato' s doctrine of the are all " in the present conflicts with the contentof forms, it doesnot meanthat the view I hold at 12 somethingthat Plato said at 1 ., but ratherthat the conflict betweenour views at IrAlthough this subtleandcomplexgambit musttakeplaceastheyarecouched care that it inevitably must be with , I seeno reasonto suppose obviously played fails. In my view, then, we are left with two solutions to the problem of truthto beexplored in moredetailbeforetheyarefully valuelinks, bothof whichneed to seewhattheconsequences . Still, in theinterim, it wouldbeinteresting secured of thesegambitsmight be, sincethe A -theory will haveto makegood on at leastone of the two. In the next sectionwe will beginexploring someof these . consequences Externalism, Self. Knowledge , and Memory thatWright discuss esfor theproblemof truth-valuelinks turn Thetwo solutions aboutthe natureof memory that ripple into debates out to haveconsequences , and the doctrine of our self as it relates to the knowledge authority particularly . If (asPutnam( 1975 aboutmentalcontent of externalism ), and ), Burge( 1979 states social of our mental ) the contents upon depend manyothershaveargued for our ability to beconsequences factors andenvironmental , thentherearealleged the environment without first investigating to know the contentof our mentalstates ' t in the head" it is not " ain . That is, if (as Putnamsays , ) meanings basic . This wouldundermine self-knowledge clearhowwe canhaveauthoritative aboutthe natureof self knowledgethat havebeenwidely held at assumptions . leastsinceDescartes that thereis But Davidson( 1987 ), andothershaveobserved ), Burge( 1988 -order the second since self andauthoritative knowledge notension in externalism , knowledgeof our mentalstatesmustbe environmentallydeterminedas well. -orderthought as" I amthinkingthatwater thatmightbeexpressed Thus , a second " -orderthoughtinvolvingwateror twater is wet will bea second , depending upon . twater environment or a in a water environment whetherthe agentis

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This movehasled to a furtherdiscussion aboutexternalism andmemory , driven in partby arguments made 1989 and Ludlow . 1995 ( ) by Boghossian ( ) Memory comesin asfollows. Boghossian for the incompatibilityof externalism argues andself-knowledge based on the so-calledslow-switchingthoughtexperiments of Burge ( 1988 ). We are askedto imaginean agentwho unknowingly moves between Earthand1\ vin-Earthandis laterinformedthat switch eshadbeentaking . Would such an have authoritative of his mentalstates ? place agent knowledge , the agentwould not, sinceit appears Accordingto Boghossian possiblefor an , forget nothing, yet at sometime later agentS to know his thoughtsat time 1 than1( havingbeeninformedof the possibilityor prevalence of slow-switching ) be unableto saywhatthe contents of his thoughts wereat 1 . Boghossian : argues Theonlyexplanation to suggest whathe , I venture , for whyS will notknowtomorrow 's selfverifying is saidto knowtoday butthathenever knew . Burge , is notthathehasforgotten do not constitute . What other reason is there judgments genuine knowledge for whyourslowlytransported thinker will notknowtomorrow whatheis saidto know andauthoritatively ? directly today Ludlow ( 1995 this argument asfollows: ) reconstructs ( 1) (2) (3) (4) IrS forgetsnothing . , thenwhat S knowsat 1 \, S knowsat 12 S forgot nothing . S doesnot know that P at 12 . ThereforeS did not know that P at 1 \.

At which premiseshouldthe externalisttakeaim?Accordingto Burge( 1998 ), 's theweaklink in Boghossian is premise 3. Accordingto Burge , memory argument like " anaphoric links" to eventsin the pastthat allow providessomething us access to pastcontents . Thus we do haveresources that allow us access to the contentP at time 12 . Of course , if we rejectthereality of futureandpastevents , thentheBurgeposition " " into the is a non-starter . It cannotbe thejob of memoryto reachback , for the simplereasonthat thereis literally no pastto reach pastfor a content back to. The picture of memorythat we are left with is somewhat Humeanin - not in the sense character that memories aresimply vaguesense , impressions but in the sense that the contentof a memoryis fixed entirely by presentcircumstances andnot by its linking us to thepast . Boghossian cannotbe engaged on premise3. , Ludlow ( 1995b ) holdsthat the weakpremisein the argument Alternatively is the first one . The reasoning is that if the contents of our mentalstates aredetermined that the contents of , it is naturalto suppose by our socialenvironment

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our memories will depend . As we movefrom one uponour socialenvironment environmental conditionto another without evennoticingthe environmental (perhaps . Ludlow ), the contentsof our memorieswill shift accordingly change 's ibid. line this of to in the ( ) applies reasoning Boghossian argument following manner : . . .let's saythatattimet . I knowthatI amthinking thatarugula is bitter . Suppose thatat
timet2later diant I' I recalldIatinitialdIoughtaboutarugula , but , dueto undetected changes in my linguistic community, the contentof my thoughtsabout arugulahave shifted. is arguablycorrectin asserting that I do not know at t2what I knewat t I' but Boghossian " for this is that I " neverknew" he is incorrectin supposing that "the only explanation . It is entirelyconsistent with dIe socialextemalistview of my thoughtsin the first place memorythat I forgot nothing, but that the contentsof my memorieshavenonetheless . shifted Hofmann ( 1995) points out some apparentdifficulties with this move. It appears that memory fails to reflect the content of memory targets, and further that it is not reliable regarding the truth of my earlier thoughts . Hofmann puts the first problem this way : . . . if [thecircumstances of recollection , thenmemoryturns ] detennine memorycontent into an empty , absurdfaculty. This is so, sincememoryno longercando what it is supposed to do, namely . If , to recall the very samethoughtsone earlieron had entertained Peterhadcometo believeat I . somehow that arugulaonly growsin Mediterranean climate , and now, at 12 , recalls this thought , then what he recollectswill not be the same - accordingto the , but someother thoughtabout , say , tarugula thoughtaboutarugula conditions . newly adopted individuating Hofmann puts the second problem as follows : . . . equally embarrassing . So, for , the truth valuesof the memorieswill havechanged ' s belief at that Peter in Mediterranean climate will now, , example arugulaonly grows II whenrecollected . . . . For, at time 12 it will bea thoughtabouttarugula , turn into a falsehood ' . Evenworse which is a vegetable , if (let s assume ) that growsonly in tropical climates Peterrecollects thathehadhad , at I I' some , thenalsothis memoryhas arugula experience -thoughtabouttarugula turnedby now into a falsehood a memory , sinceit hasbecome which (let' s assume with. And, all of this has ) Peterneverhashadany direct encounter occurredwithout Peterbeing able to introspectivelybecomeawareof it . Memory, as ' . It is no of knowledge . socialexternalism will haveit, has' turnedpseudo longera source In response , Ludlow ( 1996) arguesthat, although memory is not faithful in certain , in most important respectsit will be. For example, the veracity of respects most of my beliefs will survive the switching cases . If I believe at t I that water is wet , then at t2I will have a belief that twater is wet. If my earlier beliefs were on the whole reliable , then my later beliefs should be as well . As for the fact that

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my recollection of the initial thought is that it was a twater thought, we simply neededto rethink the point of having memories in the first place: " of . . . is thereanyreason to suppose that it is thejob of memoryto " recordthe contents ?On thefaceof it, this assumption at issue . pastmentalepisodes begsthecentralquestion According to the extemalistconceptionof memorythat I haveproposed , it is not the , but ratherto provideinformationaboutpastepisodes job of memoryto recordcontents relativeto currentenvironmental conditions . Evenif therewerea mechanism whichcould, asit were of an initial mentalepisode andcarry it in memoryindefinitely , freezethe contents ' , I m not surethat it would haveany utility . Indeed , it would be a way of preserving the contentof a thoughtwhich we could no longerhave . (ibid., p. 316) However, the analysis of truth -value links proposedby Wright (the one that gives . If the switch is such up the timelessnessof truth ) allows an even bolder response as to make events on Earth in principle inaccessible to us, then it is simply no longer true that my original memory was a water memory . In a sense , then, a conception of memory that is sensitive to the current environment is crucial for preventing error , since otherwise it would be preserving contents that are no longer true. The second objection thus collapses. Alternatively , supposewe adopt the alternative way out canvassed( and then dismissed) by Wright : supposewe hold that the timelessness of truth is preserved , but that the contents of our statementsshift over time. This too gives us a way out. In the latter case, the episode of my thought E that occurs at to has water content when I am at tobut twater content when I am at tr Thus, the thought might not be identified with a single content , but rather with a series of contents at different times. What I was thinking at to would depend upon when I happen to recollect my thought- or , more generally, where I happen to be at later points of time . That is , a given episode of thought E occurring at to might be assigned different contents at different times , as follows . E ' s content to ~ o t. ~ O t2 XYZ t3 XYZ t4 XYZ ts H2O

Returning to the original Boghossian argument, we find that the Ludlow ( 1995b) reconstruction suppress essome important details. The full argument should have been as follows : (0) (I ) ( 2) ( 3) (4 ) If a first -order thought E has content P at t ., then it has content P at tr . If S forgets nothing , then what S knows at t . S knows at tr S forgot nothing . At t2 S does not know the content of E to be P. Therefore , at t . S did not know the content of E to be P.

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, the previouslyhiddenpremise(0) is seriouslyflawed, sinceE may Obviously well havethe contentP at time I . but something elsealtogether(say . , Q), at 12 ' s I content and Premise1 is flawedtoo, of course since what I know at I is E , , . . 't whatI know at 12 is E' s 12 content . No longerknowingthe 11 contentof E doesn count asforgetting any more than the fact that I can no longer know that E is -order now. But the crucial thing to seeis that, althoughmy second happening of shifts over time that shift is crucial since it allows , , knowledge my thoughts me to track the shifting contents of my first-orderthoughts . Memoriesthat are sensitiveto environmental conditionsare crucial for us to keeptrack of what we werethinking. This may seema surprising conclusion. Episodesof belief are no longer stableobjects ; they arenow highly dynamicandsensitiveto the communities that we inhabit over time. On the other hand , if the conclusionis surprisingit alsohasa certainelegance . Our revisedtheory of truth-valuelinks wasdriven . It is remarkablethat by our rejection of the reality of the future andthe past thenewway of thinkingabouttruth valuelinks shouldalsohelpto secure anapproach to memorythat is intimately interwovenwith widely held views about mentalcontentandself-knowledge . But, in view of the tight connections holding between timeandmemory between and mental and between , content , memory mentalcontent andself-knowledge wouldhavebeenif themove , therealsurprise to theA -theorywasphilosophically inert. Clearly , it is anythingbut that.

10 .2 LinguisticConsequences
The linguistic consequences for this proposalare . We havealready , of course , vast that the proposalsketched seen herehaswide-rangingconsequences for theanalysis of (implicit) temporalconjunctions relative clauses etc. Moreover , , , the consequences will not be flowing from the analysisof temporalanaphora . insignificant Ratherthandwell at lengthon someof theseobviousconsequences , in this sectionI want to pursuea much strongerand more provocative possibleconsequence : the possibility of eliminating the notion of tenseas a grammatical . categoryal together In this bookwe haveseen thatthereis no reference to futureor pasteventsthat(for example the tense it is such as , , doesnot needreference ) English system timesin thefutureor in thepastin orderto makesense of temporal adverbs , temporal tenses , complex , etc. Whatwehavearebasictemporal anaphora morphemes -like objects astheirarguments , PRES , FUT (pAST ) thatarepredicates takingproposition . Perhaps thetalk of temporality we cango onestepfurtherandexorcise

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' t havea familiar languages suchas Hopi. English doesn genuinefuture-tense ; rather , it relieson modalsto do (or sowe think) thework of afuturemorpheme tensemorpheme . As we move from English to other languages , we find that - in thoserarelanguages future-tensemorphemes wherethey arepurportedto exist- are alwayssuspicious , they appearto looking. In Romance languages -tensemorphemes havemodal elementspackedwithin them. Purportedpast areno lesssuspicious markers . , usuallybeingnothingmorethanaspectual The standard view supposes that we are using modalsandaspectual markers to express future tenseandpasttense(hence , to express thingsaboutthe future andthe past that? Why not suppose we are ),6but why shouldwe suppose or for just usingmodalsto express , modality(potentiality probability ) example andaspectual markers to express , for example aspect )? Perhaps (perfectaspect ' somewhere (maybeit wasAristotle s fault) bad philosophyinfectedlinguistic . Wemovedfrom theassumption thattheremustbea futureanda past theorizing to the conclusionthat theremustbe linguistic elements that allow us to speak aboutsuchthings. Perhaps this philosophicalassumption hasbecomea procrustean bed in which we categorizethings as temporalelements , when to a Martian linguist with no knowledgeof westernphilosophyof time, theseelements would look like ordinarymodalsandaspectual markers . No Future To makethis discussion a little lessabstract of thefuture , let ustakeup thequestion tensein Romance : What we aretaughtwhenwe learnSpanish , languages for example that in the regularform , is that therearefuture-tensemorphemes ' to asin (3) for a verb like ' hablar ( speak conjugate ). (3) hablare hablaras hablara hablaremos hablareis hablaran And we aretaught that the future - tense morphemes are as shown in (4 ) .

' ' from what we sloppily call ' temporal adverbs' , ' temporal anaphora , tensemor' phemes , and so on. This might sound crazy, but in a senseit is entirely natural , since that many natural languagesdon ' t have tense morphemes anyway. We need not look to un-

158 (4) - are - aras - ara - aremos - areis - aran

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Orperhaps wearetaught thatthefuture is attached to aninfinitivestem , ending

so that the actual morphemes are as shown in ( 5) .

(5) -e -as -a
-emos -eis - an

(6) he has ha hemos habeis8 han In the caseof (5) thereis nearidentity with (6) . In the caseof (4) the picture is that ratherthan a single unbrokenfuture-tensemorphemewe that emerges havea modalelementandan irrealis marker' ar' , so that the actualstructureis like (7). something (7) habl - ar - e habl - ar - as habl - ar - a habl - ar - emos habl - ar - eis habl - ar - an

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Someversionof this paradigmholds in eachof the Romancelanguages that " dialects " hasan apparent future tense . (It is worth noting that manyRomance 9 do not havea future tenseat all. ) Now it might be objectedthat, althoughthis story tells us something about ' the origin of the future tense , it doesnt saymuch abouthow tenseis actually in I -language . That is, it may be that the structureproposed in (7) represented haslong sincevanished the future as a single unstructured , and we now represent . As it turnsout, however to suppose that , thereis goodreason morpheme this sort of multiple-morpheme to this day. approach persists One pieceof evidenceon this scorecomesfrom EuropeanPortuguese , in which clitic pronouns canbe inserted between whatI havecharacterized asthe modalelementandthe irrealis element . That suggests that thesetwo elements arein fact distinct representations andarenot merelypart of a singleunbroken future-tenserepresentation . Furthennore dialectsthe very , in other Romance ' ' same elements attached to theverbstem (e.g. theauxiliary have) do not appear at all- as in certain southernItalian and Sardiniandialectsin which, e.g., ' I ' can be ' ' ' will speak as ' Ho a parlare , utilizing the auxiliary avere expressed (have ) followed by a prepositionandan infinitive. Here we loseeventhe illusion of a genuineunbroken future-tensemorpheme . this we can , Following generalstrategy proceedapacewith all the Indo. All the future tensefonDSappear to be modalin origin. I European languages wouldmerelysuggest thatperhaps theyremainmodals(or something verymuch like modals with theinterpretations ). This is certainlyconsistent commonly given to these elements in spoken . Indeed standard Italianpresent , in spoken language tenseis generallynot what one usesto express the future. For example , if one " wantsto say" I am going to th eatertomorrow , onesays(8) andnot (9). ./~ (8) Vadoal teatro domani (go- ISO-PRES to the theater tomorrow ) (9) Androal teatro domani (go- ISO-FUT to the theater tomorrow ) Whenthe future is used , it is most likely being usedto express possibility or as when one of " It mustbe around , uncertainty says( 10) (which hasthe sense 8 o' clock" ). ( 10 ) Saranno Ie otto (be 3PL Fut eight)

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In short notonly lookslike modality; in manycases , whatgetscalledfuturetense it actslike modality . But, onemight ask , what exactlyarethesemodalsreferringto, if not to the future? Oneideathat canbe found in the linguisticsliteratureis that modalssuchas ' will ' do not refer to the futurebut rather specifyanepistemicnotion similar to .10 This ideacanbeonly partiallysatisfactory for ourpurposes , however predictability , sinceoneis temptedto takethe talk of predictionor predictability as involving . predictionof thefuture, in which casewe landback wherewe started construed , Alternatively, we might considermodalsasreferring to dispositions ' I am asreal properties of the world. So if I saythat ' I will leave talking not aboutsomedistinct future out therebut abouta dispositionof the present . world- a certainpotentiality , asit were a moment aboutsimple, relatively primitive It might be useful to think for clocks . WhentheWickedWitch of theWestturnsoverthehourglass , theamount . But rather of sandleft on top reflectshow muchtime Dorothy hasremaining than think aboutthe remainingtime being spooledup out there in Dorothy' s ashaving a certain future, perhaps it would be betterto think of the hourglass aboutthe temporaldisposition propertywhich reflectssomething dispositional ' is full of sand of Dorothy . Whenthe top of the hourglass , Dorothy s positionis . As the sanddrainsinto the bottom, as the system precarious only somewhat ' . It is not losesits potentialenergy , Dorothy s positionis rathermoreprecarious because of someeventwaiting for her out therein the future. Rather , precarious because of the presentdispositionof eventsin the world. The it is precarious with Dorothy . certaindispositionalproperties hourglass merelyshares . ' t turn of course . We can in this treatment of Cautionis necessary , dispositions that will comeabout aroundandsaythat a dispositionof this sortis something to sayin places undercertaincircumstances ). The notion (asAristotle seemed to temporalnotions . But there without appeal of dispositionhasto be grounded be so . to doubt that can no reason is apparent grounded dispositions No Past . Again, morecomplexwhenwe moveto thepasttense The situationonly seems the so called is in mostnon-Indo-European just some languages past generally ? The marker . Is the sametrue for Indo European form of aspectual languages -tense is certainlygoodfor English case , in which our so-calledpast morphemes . (A prime exampleis the ' -ed' markers are deadringersfor perfectaspectual .) , which is takento showthat the eventin questionhasculminated morpheme

Consequences

Indeed ,just astherearenumerous reasons to besuspicious of thefuturetense , thereareplenty of reasons to be equallysuspicious of the past . For example , it is a notoriousfact that pasttensedoesnot behave like pasttensein counterfac tuals . Consider( 11 ). ( 11 ) If I hada million dollars .... This led Isard ( 1974 that the PASTmorpheme ) to speculate doesnot refer to thepastbut hasa moregeneralsense of " remote ." (In thecase of ( 11 ), the sense wouldbe" remotefrom reality." ) A somewhat similarideais pursued by latridou " that coversboth a generalnotionof " exclusion ( 1996 ), who develops possible worlds andtemporalintervals . In both cases thereis a sense that somedeeper third element - thattense underlies bothtense andcounterfactual can' t modality I I be a . simply primitive elementthat refersto the past es help to showthat thereis some Although theseapproach ~ hing more fundamental than the notion of tense , they probablydon' t go far enoughfor present . Obviously , evenif an eventis remote purposes , it is eitherremotein time or possibility , andwhatwe really wantto do is avoidthenotionof temporal order . Ideally, what we would like to sayabout (andtemporalremoteness ) altogether -tense so -calledpast is thatit is really telling ussomething aboutthe morphology kind of evidence that we currentlyhavefor our claims. On this score , we mightbenefitfrom thestudyof languages with evidentials .12 In these (whichrangefrom NativeAmericanlanguages to Bulgarian languages ), therearemorphemes which havethefunctionof indicatingsomething aboutthe source of the infonnationthat we havefor our claim. For example , a particular thatwe havefirst-handevidence for our claim. Another morpheme mightindicate -handtestimony is based on second might indicatethat our evidence . It is interesting to note that in somecases thesemorphemes are found in complementary distributionwith whateverresources theselanguages havefor expressing the past that what we aretaking to be tensemorphemes , perhaps or suggesting markers . aspectual might actuallybe evidentials " Hereis the idea. In the caseof modalswe haveso -called " root modals , or modals of obligation , whichareoftentakento bethecorecases of modality ; then therearealsomoresophisticated fonDSof modality (epistemic , metaphysical , etc.). Perhaps an analogousstory holds for evidentials . That is, perhapsevidentials thesource of informationis experience or testimony indicatingwhether arethe root evidentials and then there are more , abstract fonDSthat includeaspectual markers . A language like Bulgarian , then, which is often takento have

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, wouldsim morphemes past-tense morphemes, perfect aspect, and evidential of evidentials. ply have three kinds andonevidentiality with current workontense consistent Thisideais certainly in many thatthepresent . Izvorski( 1997 ) hasargued languages perfect es in fact to Turkish to from ) express whatshe (ranging Norwegian Bulgarian " " in ( 12 the . For of callsthe perfect evidentiality example , examples ) all express " " . arrived /evidently akinto I apparently a meaning ) ( 12 Turkish gel -mi -im comePERFISO Bulgarian do a J Az sam -P .PART 1 be Isg,PREScome Norwegian kommet leg har -P .PART PRES come 1 haveISO, "the is observed of evidentiality notes As Izvorski (ibid., p. I ), because perfect related or geo thatarenotall genetically in languages , it ally proximate graphic a is case connection evidential that the is quiteunlikely simply present perfect

" of accidental syncretism. What I am suggestingis consistentwith theseclaims , but it is much more general . Why not suppose that all past-tense morphology is simply a kind of evidential ? We have already seenthat , philosophically speaking, past- tense claims really amount to claims about evidence that is currently available in the world . Why not make the obvious next step and take so- called past tense morphology to , in fact , be a kind of evidential marker? All of this is extremely sketchy, of course. My point is not that any of this is an inevitable consequenceof the A -theory, but rather that this is a possible avenue of investigation that has beenopenedup . Whether this particular avenuewill . prove successful is far from clear, and I for one would be hesitant to speculate it out however does of tense for the elimination , If this general strategy , pan have argued I this book appearsto leave us in a paradoxical situation. Throughout from the semantics of tense to the nature of time , and now I am suggesting that the grammatical category of tense can be dispensedwith altogether. But this is not a genuine paradox; I am not kicking away the ladder that got us this far. There is a real grammatical phenomenon (or class of phenomena) that we sloppily call tense and which we supposeto be connected to temporal reference.

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Whatwe really haveon our handsis mostlikely not a singlephenomenon but a mixtureof modality andevidentiality . Likewise, what I havebeencalling temporal can perhaps more accuratelybe considered a combinationof anaphora and modal and evidential propositionalanaphora implicit conjunctions(e.g., -clauseconjunctions when we choose to call thesegrammatical ). But whatever how theyallow us to exorcise , we haveseen the future andthe past phenomena from semantical from metaphysics . theoryandconsequently If we sweepawaythe grammatical of tense in this fashion category , we do " world- at not therebyend up with a " detensed leastnot in the senseadvocated . To thecontrary by Mellor andotherB-theorists , by reducingtalk of tense to evidentialityand aspect we arefinally ableto locatethe indexicalcharacter of so-calledtemporaldiscourse in the world: it resides in the natureof evidentiality as well as in the , dispositionsand aspectual propertiesthat furnish the world.13 Justasmetaphysics hasno room for the future andthe past , linguisticsmay haveno call for a grammatical of tense . Still if the category , category grammatical of tenseis dissolved into morebasicandfruitful concepts , thoseconcepts will haveto preserve thebasicfeatures of theA -theory(includingthe indexical natureof so calledtemporaldiscourse the outcome ). Whatever , however , tense andtime will remainintimately linked. And if they areultimately dissolved , it stands to reason that they will be dissolvedsimultaneously , andthat the resulting semantical will in largemeasure r the resultingmetaphysical concepts mirrC ? . concepts
10. 3 Conclusion

I hopethat the illustrations I havegiven in this chapterhaveshownjust how rich andfar-reachingtheconsequences of adoptingtheA -theorywill be. I realize that a numberof philosophers andlinguistsmay look at the emerging questions , looseends for retreat , andphilosophical . On the other puzzlesasgrounds hand , I seea newandlargelyunexplored intellectualterritory openingup before us - one without nicely pavedroads andlogical conundrums , andwith dangers at nearlyeveryturn, but also one with new ways of thinking aboutold (often stalled ) philosophical , andcertainlyonein whichformerlydisconnected projects . philosophical puzzlesbeginto dovetailin marvelous ways Whetherphilosophers and linguists chooseto pursuethis coursemay depend in large measure on intellectual temperament . Do we stay on the well chartedB theoryapproach in which we ignorethe obviousbig problems(like failure to accountfor indexicality ) and are rewardedwith a stable class of

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mini-problems ? Or do we leavethatpathfor thewild andwoolly world tractable : I would thattheA -theoryoffersus?At this point I canspeakonly subjectively and to the rich the beaten to leave complexconsequences path explore prefer . of theA -theory . To the contrary This is not anindictmentof theideaof a communityof scholars , I am hoping that otherswill join in this investigationof the Atheory in part because onecanseehow vastandintricatethis new world is. This book is a partial testimony to that. We havehad to move through linguistics, the of selfknowledge , andon into investigations philosophyof mind, logic, andepistemology andmemory . In view of the breadthandcomplexityof this undertaking , it is really impossiblefor anyone personto work through the details or evenanticipatewhat the final outcomewill be. of theprogress More important , this needfor a communityeffort is evidence the stage hasoutgrown thathasbeenmadein philosophy , andof howphilosophy the field andwork out the wherean individual or a small groupcansynthesize details . No longer is it possiblefor an individual with the statureof Descartes or Leibniz to singlehandedly position. The problems arguethrougha philosophical so complex havebecomeso subtle , that the , andtheir interrelationships . Among research teams lonegeniusmustyield to collaborative interdisciplinary in has other things, this tells us that the ageof giants ; and passed philosophy . it is alsofor the best while that is sad , perhaps

PI Appendix Is I Language of Thought ?

the Language

In section 1.3, I briefly entertained the possibility that I -language might be the language of thought ( LOT) . Here I return to that theme and examine in more detail some arguments against the thesis that have been offered by Ray Jackendoff and by Steven Pinker. Once again I will be unable to draw strong conclusions , but perhaps it is enough to see that the thesis is not out of the question, and indeed that the extant argufnents against the thesis are very weak indeed. I will ' ' begin with Jackendoff s arguments and then move on to some of Pinker s. Jackendoff ( 1993, p . 185) argues that if natural language were the language of thought it would be a mystery why it is possible to translate from one language to another- say from Japaneseto English : The basicreasonfor keepinglanguage and meaningseparate is that pretty much anything we cansayin onelanguage canbetranslated into anyother thethought , preserving that the original language . This means that thoughtscan' t be embalmed in the conveys form of any single language - they mustbe neutralas to what language they are to be in. expressed Jackendoff concludes ( ibid ., p . 186) that a single independent thought " must be distinct from the linguistic garb in which it is clothed." Let us setasidefor the moment the question whether such meaning-preserving translations are possible. If they are possible, it is arguably becausethe LF representations of different languages (say, English and Chinese ) do not vary . Indeed , there is some speculation that the LFs for the two language markedly be identical , so it is hard to see what ice this argument is going to cut.) might Even less compelling , in my view , is Jackendoff ' s argument (ibid ., p . 187) to the effect that some thinking is not present to consciousnessbut is intuitive . It is no part of an I -language / thought identity thesis that all I - language thoughts be conscious. Why should they be?

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's Oneof Jackendoff to speak identification arguments appears directlyto thepossible of I -language with whathecallsl- concepts . Accordingto thatargument " structure of language is built out of thingslike nouns (ibid., p. 186 ), the syntactic " " ' andverbs andtenses , prepositional , but thought isn t built out of such phrases units thoughtconcerns ." That , actions , properties , andtimes thingslike objects is, thereis supposed to be a mismatch between (evenI -language ) and language . I to I have confess that find the . thought argument unpersuasive is built out of thingslike tenses , asJackendoff , that language , Suppose says ' and that thoughtconcerns things like times. Wouldn t our naturalsupposition be that the tenses of language concernthings like times? So what prevents1 with its tenses from the of ? ) ( language being language thought Of course mismatch esbetween , we havelong knownthat thereareapparent andsemantic . Forexample that , Williams ( 1983 ) hasargued syntactic categories in certain environments indefinite NPs like ' a lawyer' are not quantified expressions ' ' but predicates this , as , for example , in Mary is a lawyer . Suppose story is right} All that follows is that the interpretationof an NP will depend . This is no offenseto the LOT uponthe syntacticposition in which it appears thesis of acertain , for the LOT thesisis not committedto the view that something must have the same it is ; syntacticcategory always interpretation merely committedto the view that we can statethe principlesof interpretation for the in question . It is a trivial matterto havethe semantics reflect adifference language in syntacticposition . hassomething more in mind. Observingthat some But perhaps Jackendoff that" objectnounslike nounsdenote events , heargues objectsandothersdenote ' ' chair' and eventnounslike ' in syntax , which are not distinguished earthquake in thoughts ." Suppose that the thoughtsinvolving , mustbe radically distinguished the noun ' chair' are radically different from thoughts involving '. ' in the syntax ? earthquake Exactly why arethesenot radically distinguished for these sorts Jackendoff , afterall, proposes radicallydifferentlexicalconcepts of nouns . But what is the differencebetweena lexical conceptand the sort of ? to occurin syntax lexical entry commonlyassumed sincethe earliestdaysof generative It hasbeensupposed grammarthat the . In current lexicon and structuredlexical entriesarepartsof syntactictheory construed be it is even more that the lexicon , ) (robustly urgent partof the theory e. . . ? Because in current 1995b ) syntacticforms theory( g , Chomsky syntax Why virtue of severalvery are projectedfrom richly structuredlexical entriesby , last resort , etc.). Without the lexicon, there simplesyntacticprinciples(greed

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simply areno syntacticforms. Nor is theremuchpoint in sayingthat the conceptual of a nounor a verbis morerichly structured thanthecorresponding representation that we get in the linguistic lexicon. It is not clear representation " that thereareany featuresof " conceptual representationthat arenot relevant to thederivationof structure in the syntax . But in the second that , suppose place therewas somepropertyfoo that a given conceptual C hadbut representation which thecolTesponding lex .ical entryL did not requirefor thederivationoflinguisticforms in the syntax . Is thereanyreason to saythat L couldn't or should ' n t containthe additionalinformation? That is, is thereany reasonwhy L and C mustbe distinct? " Jackendoff to think thattherichly structured ( 1992 ) appears conceptual representations " that he " " . For example(p. gives are not part of straight syntax 30), we " should be clear. . . that [conceptualstructure ] is as different from " " straight syntax (the grammarof NPs, V Ps, etc.) as straight syntax is from " ? In current ." But what is " straightsyntax phonology linguistic theorywe have " " two levelsof representation : PFandLF. Accordingly , if straightsyntax means two levelof representation . If PFis partof straight , it mustreferto these anything then , ? Likewise, is there syntax why is straightsyntaxdistinctfrom phonology -beggingway to arguethat LF (which any non-question alreadyencodes scope distinctions andat leastasmuchlexicalstructure asis necessary to projectphrase structure the informationthat Jackendoff attributesto conceptual ) cannotencode ? I can' t imaginewhat suchan argument structure would look like. 's So muchfor Jackendoff . The arguments arguments catalogued by Pinker . Let me considerthosearguments , p. 78ff.) fare no better in turn before ( 1994 offering criticism. First, Pinkernotesthat thoughtsare ambiguous , and arguesthat linguistic forms supposedly arenot. He givesseveral headlines amusing (e.g., newspaper ' StudTiresOut' as of this phenomenon ) examples , but other sortsof examples from written text arecertainlylegion. .Second that naturallanguage lack " logical , Pinkersuggests representations " that intuitively makesense , meaningthat certaininferences to us explicitness do not follow on the basisof naturallanguage form: " Englishsentences do not needs to carry out commonsense ." embodythe informationthat a processor Third, Pinkerargues that naturallanguage is unableto accountfor corefer " ence . Wemight introducea subjectin our discourse as the tall blond manwith " but oneblack shoe refer to the individual as " him." How do we subsequently know that we aretalking aboutthe sameindividual? Allegedly, nothing in the tells us. Englishlanguage

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Fourth that naturallanguage is unableto handleconversation , Pinkerargues 'I ' ' ' ' here ' and ' now' sincetheir words such as , , , , specific you meanings vary from contextto context . Supposedly these cases do not posea problemfor a distinct of thought . language Fifth andfinally, Pinkerargues thatnaturallanguages of , unlikethelanguage fail to account for . Thus cannot account for , , thought synonymy they allegedly ' ' the wall with paint' and ' Johnsprayed why Johnsprayed paint onto the wall meanthe samething. Pinker' s conclusionis that " peopledo not think in English or Chineseor of thought ." If EnglishandChinese andApache ; theythink in a language Apache are construed asE-languages I do not the conclusion , (thoughI doubt dispute thesearguments , if we taketalk of ). On the otherhand supportthat conclusion3 theselanguages to be standingin for talk of variouspossibleI -language states , the arguments fail miserably . We havealreadyseenthat I -language arerichly structured . representations The structureof LF representations relevant when seems we consider particularly Pinker' s line of reasoning . Considerthe argumentfrom ambiguity . The ' hastwo distinct LF ' man loves some woman inscription Every representations . But of course therelevant other , which intuitively encode scope ambiguity kinds of ambiguitiesare structurally encodedtoo - a famousexamplebeing ' ' ' ' Chomskys Visiting relativescan be boring . Is the expression visiting rela' ? Clearly that makesall the difference . tives gerundive or a nounphrase Thereis no barrier to our sayingthat LF representations alsoreflect lexical . If I say ' Johnwentto the bank' , theremaybe several possibleinterpretations ambiguity ' ' of what I say , depending upon which lexical entry for bank is inserted . I assume thatin the I language thereis a fact aboutwhich representation . lexical entry hasbeeninserted Likewise, Pinker' s example' StudTires Out' reflectsa combinationof lexical as( 1), or as(2)? andstructural . Is theLF representation structured ambiguity ( 1) Studtires] [(are ) out] [NP (2) Stud [NP ][tires out] to two distinct LF representations that thesetwo meanings correspond Again, I assume . . of LF representations Similarconsiderations applyto thelogicalexplicitness in an AI than offered LF are no less anything explicit Typical representations

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inference , andthereis certainlyno barrierto defining logical inference engine rulesdirectly for LF representations .4 WouldLF representations fail to account for pronominalcoreference ?Again it is hardto seewhy. Indeed , much of the most interestingwork indiscourse has assumed representation someform of the LF hypothesis theory andhasdefined the relevantanaphoric relationsfor LF representations . Likewise for the contextdependency of indexicalsandlike expressions . Finally , it is far from clear why two structurally diverse syntactic forms can' t havethe samemeaning . Henceit is unclearwhy synonymypresents an argumentagainstthe identification of I -language(or evenE-language with ) the language of thought . It is entirelypossiblethat thereshouldbe two distinct ' t therebe LOT representations with thesame , sowhy shouldn interpretation distinct I -language with representations the same ? Now, it may well interpretation be that Pinkerdoesnot intendthesearguments to cut againstthe candidacy of I -languages for the language of thought . Onething is clear however . If so intended , fail miserablys , the arguments

Appendix P2 Language / World } Isomorphism ?

In chapter4 I arguedfor a strong connection betweensemanticsand , metaphysics but I also hinted that there might be the possibility of an even stronger relation one that takes the structure of language and the structure of the world to be iso' morphic to each other. Let s call this thesis the language/world isomorphism ( LWI) hypothesis. The LWI label is a little bit crude, since the key idea is that there is an iso morphism holding between logical forms and the world . The basic idea is not restricted to the analytic tradition in philosophy . It has been at the root of the " semantic tradition " (in the senseof Coffa 1991) from Kant , through Bolzano and the early Wittgenstein , up to the present. As early asKant we find some suggestion that there is an isomorphism between a representation and the thing represented: [Representation of the spirit (Bestimmung ] is that determination der Seele ) thatrefersto other things. What I call referring (Beziehen ) is when its featuresconfonn to thoseof the externalthings ! [ The out of its component representation ] is composed in thesame concepts wayin which theentirerepresented out of its parts . Justas thing is composed , for example , onecansay that the notesof a musicalpiecearea representation of the hannonicconnection of the notes eachnoteis similar to eachtonebut because , not because the notesareconnected to eachotherjust asthe tonesthemselves .3 The most celebrated version of this general idea is surely the picture theory of meaning advanced by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus. On the view articulated there, just as " what a picture must have in common with reality , in order to be " able to depict it- correctly or incorrectly - in the way it does, is its pictoral form 1961 b 2.17 a , ( ), proposition must be isomorphic in structure to a state of affairs in order to represent or be about that state of affairs.

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" fonn" of a proposition (whatever Of course , we arenottalkingaboutthe surface " "under the about . We are be that might ) analysis- in proposition talking , only if other words, we are talking about its logical fonn. For Wittgenstein of propositionwould it reflectthe onewereto getdownto thecomplete analysis structureof the world.4
' Chomsky s Arguments against LWI

' s recent to show In Chomsky designed writings containa numberof arguments we of kind the semantics referential a to that if we were adopt ontology would of thingswe are kinds the about to track our intuitions predictdoesnot appear . Suchtheoriesallegedlycommitus to thingsthat we would really talking about . Theyalsoallegedlycommitusto typesof things asexisting neveracknowledge we are the from which aredifferent typesof thingsthat we ordinarily suppose theories for such too . And thethingswe talk aboutareallegedly unruly talking about . To havelabels for all thesepossibilities, let us call them the to handle " " " " , and commitments from , the type-mismatch argument implausible argument ' " " -objectargument . I will reviewall threeof Chomskys arguments the misbehaving beforeoffering what I taketo be the mostnaturalreply to them.
The Argument from Implausible Commitments Chomsky ( 1981, p . 324) draws attention to the fact that a referential semantics (apparently in conjunction with the LWI hypothesis) commits us to some apparently implausible entities (flaws for example) and suggests that we really ' t take can seriously a theory that commits us to such entities: ' s attention" I am not John , is obvious , but it escaped If I say"the flaw in the argument of them in one flaws world are the in , that view absurd the committedto amongthings in all Inent behaves . Nevertheless in question , the NP the flaw in the ar2U the argument .... thecoatin thecloset of thetmly referential in themanner relevant expression respects Pursuing a similar line of attack, Hornstein ( 1984, p . 58) has drawn attention to constructions like ( 1) .

( 1) . hisweight about manis concerned Theaverage

that " no onewishesto arguethat thereareobjectsthat are Hornsteincontends ." menin anymeaningfulsense average ' ' The generalconcernintroducedby exampleslike flaw in the argument ' man is that the doctrinethat theremustbe a tight connection and ' the average

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between semantics andontologyis suspect , for it commitsus to apparently absurd views. This argumentneedsto be fixed up a bit beforeit is fully functional. As it stands makesthe assumption , the argument that the logical form of theseconstructions ' the flaw ' is transparent - e .g., that the expression really is nothing morethana simpleNP containinga determiner anda noun . This is not suchan innocentassumption . After all, theLWI hypothesis doesnot hold thatthereis an between surface form and the world, butratherthatthere isomorphism linguistic is an isomorphismbetweensome ultimate logical form and the world. As ( 1985 Higginbotham ) hasargued , beforeadmittinga commitment to objectslike flaws andaverage men we would haveto look moreclosely at the underlying . logical form of theseconstructions ' flaw in the ' ' ' that Higginbotham suggests argumentis parallelto badsinger . ' ' The semantics of bad singer is not suchthat we saysomeone is a bad singer iff he is badandis a singer . Rather that someone , we understand is a singerand that his singing is bad. Likewise, we shouldnot say that ' that is a flaw in the ' . Rather argumentis true iff thatis a flaw andthat is in the argument , we should is true iff something is anargument andit is flawed. Despite saythatthe phrase ' ' , flaw may not be a nominal; it may be a modifier like 'bad' . appearances ' . First offersa similaranalysis for thecase of 'theaverage Higginbotham man , he notesthat the expression is actuallyambiguous between the caseof an individual who hastypical properties andthe sense in which we saythat the average . It is presumably the lattersense that is problematic family has2.3 children ' here . In this latter case that ' average , Higginbothamsuggests , despiteappearing to be an adjective , is functioningasa kind of adverbial . The construction is like (2), discussed parallelto examples ). by HaiK( 1983 (2) Let' s havea quick cup of coffee . thattherearecupsof coffeethatarein some , in (2) we arenot suggesting Clearly ' ' sense , quick is behavingas an adverbial quick. Rather , modifying the activity . Higginbothamproposes that in a constructionlike (3) the analysiswill be ' something alongthe linesof (3 ). (3) The average . family has2.3 children ' (3 ) On average . , a family has2.3 children

174

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more hereis Consider thesomewhat of ways Chomsky mightreplyin a number 4 . sentence ( ) complex (4) .6 thatit has2.3 children it clear ontheaverage Yourreport familyfailsto make out canbeworked if suitable Even , of , theywill technical spellouts glosses of their own . But the difficulties these course , and glosses mayintroduce spellouts communication innocent . As Chomsky arenotnecessarily themselves (personal like (5)? for examples with thestrategy , areweto continue ) asks (5) Doe . John is fallingbothers Thathisincome ' which man for ' anaverage John Doetobestanding is, are wetotake That , proxy ' ' ? kind of adverbial as a with in (5) is to befurther operating unpacked average about thesis counterintuitive averystrong and Thisbegins toconstitute possibly . constructions thelogicalformof these ' there to Higgin arelikewise In thecase of 'flawin theargument , responses how asks communication . Forexample available botham , ) , Chomsky (personal like (6)? in anexample couldonetreat' flaw' asakindof predicate (6) . ourefforts resisted of theflawsyoufoundbuttherestof them Wefixedthree it is the asin (6'), where answer is to saythat(6) canbeglossed Onepossible flawed . that are in the intuitively argument steps ' (6 ) our resisted of theflawed Wefixedthree youfoundbuttherestof them steps efforts . have to bejustifiedat some of this nature , andthereis a point Againglosses structure hidden of thisproposed thattheintroduction to show burden heavy form about the we know of what with the rest well syntactic of these comports rulesareavailable shown that it has to be more . Still , constructions , general here course theHigginbotham topursue fixes .Anyattempt notonlycase by case . will notbea trivialexercise
The Type-Mismatch Argument Even if we are comfortablewith potentially counterintuitiveentities suchas the mismatchbetween flaws, Chomsky( 1995a ) notesthat thereis an apparent and the have substances and that individuation type intuitively objects type

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individuationthata referentialsemantics will provide. To getclearon the issue , a tenninologicaldistinction will be helpful. Suppose we distinguishan I -substance from a P-substance , wherea P-substance (if thereis sucha thing) is the sort of stuff that would playa role in physicaltheory (H2O , for example ) and an I -substance if there is such is the stuff that we areintuitively talking about ( ) ' ' whenwe uselanguage (the intuitive referentof water ). To put the point in a moretheory neutralway, theI substance is whatit appears we aretalking about based our use of . The is that P-substances upon and language allegedproblem ' t match I -substances don . just up right ' ' If , followingPutnam ( 1975 ), water refersto ~ O, thena referential semantics ' . But the will assigna P substance valueof ' water (H2O ) asthe semantic problem 'is thatthestuffwe areactuallytalkingaboutwhenwe usetheterm ' water - is somethingelse altogether the I -substance . To seethis, considerthe fact that what we find in the HudsonRiver is called ' water' thoughit could hardly be considered . Also problematicis the fact that thereare substances H2O (e.g., icedtea O much more ) thatchemically than Hudson River approximate ~ closely ' waterdoes , yet we don t call them ' water' . According to Chomsky , the situation is evenmoreproblematic thanthis. If someone at the watercompany were to pour tealeaves into the system , so that what cameout of the tap waschemically identicalto Lipton Iced Tea , we would still call it ' water' - a I thoughwe about its . might complain impurity Thus, what we are talking about when we use the term ' water' - the 1substance - dependsupon the social settingin which we find that substance . But accordingto referentialsemantics , the meaningof the term is supposed to referredto - it is supposed depend uponthe chemicalcompositionof the substance to be a P-substance . Conclusion : Referentialsemantics the (if respecting LWI hypothesis . ) will not track the intuitive notion of meaning Onemight think it possible to getoff thehookby appealing to socialtheories of external(referential content in the sense of ) ( ). RatherthanP-substances Burge 1979 we : substances , that areindividuatedaccording might posit S substances to community norms . Thus of watermightnot accord , while my concept with , it might still accordwith a certainsociallydetennined that has the H2O object of water when it comes from the faucet but not whenit is served property being at a restaurant . Theproblemhereis thatthereareplentyof examples wheresuch S-substances (if therecouldbe suchthings ) would not trackour intuitionsabout - Burge' s own examplesabouttharthritis and brisket the extensionof terms are casesin point. That is, there is a mismatchbetweenI -substances and Ssubstances . We will comebackto this point a bit later .

176

P2 Appendix

The Misbehaving - Object Argument There are a number of interesting features to the water/tea story, one of which can be broken out as a separateobjection to referential semantics. ' We have already seenin the type- mismatch argument that I - substancesdon t track P- substances , but there is another problem . The water/tea story also seems ' ' to show that the I - substancewe are talking about when we use the term water . Something may ceaseto be water even is a most ill -behaved sort of substance if no internal physical changeshave taken place. For example, the same chemical compound is water when it comes from the tap but ceasesto be water when it is served at a restaurant. If that is the intuitive character of I - substances , then " " there is really little hope that referential semantics can give the reference of ' ' ' ' what we talk about when we talk about water and tea , since referential semantics is supposedly going to say that the content of these terms is ~ O in the first case and ~ O plus certain other elements in the latter. That is , I - substances are so unruly that it is wildly implausible to suppose that they could have any counterparts in the physical world . Hence, they have no counterparts that a referential semantics could utilize as their referents. Chomsky ( 1975, p. 203) makesa related if somewhatmore generalpoint when notes that the very notion of whether we are talking about a single object or a collection of objects turns on any number of social and institutional factors: We do not regarda herdof cattleasa physicalobject , though , but ratherasa collection there would be no logical incoherencein the notion of a scatteredobject, as Quine, Goodman , and othershavemadeclear. But even spatiotemporal contiguity doesnot is anobject . Onewing of anairplane condition sufficeasa general , but its left half, though entitiescan be takento be single Diore , scattered , is not. . . . Further equallycontinuous a picketfencewith breaks : consider , or a Calder physicalobjectsundersomeconditions a collection of leaveson a tree is not. The reason mobile. The latter is a "thing ," whereas , , is that the mobile is createdby an act of humanwill . If this is correct , apparently thenbeliefs abouthumanwill and actionand intentionplaya crucial role indetermining . of concepts eventhe mostsimpleandelementary Moving that discussion into the current debate, we might say that it is implausible for even such simple semantic concepts as object and collection to correspond . in any interesting sensewith P- substances Analysis of the Arguments : Some Replies

like the aboveis that anyreferential The conclusionthat we candraw from examples is going to misfire the LWI hypothesis semantics purportingto respect ' which P substances as referents to utilize is bound since it , just don t track badly . of naturallanguage the intuitive meanings expressions

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Onereply for the semanticist is to simply reject the LWI hypothesis . That is, onecould say: Yes is , a semantic concerned about the connection theory between and the world (aspart of a four-placerelation also involving language andcontext speaker ), butthis says nothingabouttherebeinganisomorphic map ping betweenprimitive linguistic expressions and (underanalysis or ) things ( kinds of things ) in the world. If thereis a singlelexical entry corresponding to ' water ' it , doesnot maponto any singlesubstance ; rather , it mapsonto various on circumstances , depending things , discourse , etc. Suchtheories participants areno lessreferentialthanthosethat respect LWI. After all, they arestill in the business of articulating language /world relations , albeit througha very complicated and the fact , that these story relationsare often dynamicone despite to-manyrelations . Is thereanotherway out? ? That is, why not bite the metaphysical Why not give up the P- and S-substances bulletandacknowledge thattherereallyareI -substances - thatis, things like flaws. They are clearly not logically absurdentities, and it neednot be conceded thattheyareparticularlyoddentities . In thecase of flaws, at least , one common in thearguments mightsaythattheyarealtogether onerunsacross , and onemight wonderwhy they shouldbe considered anylessreal than, say , tables andchairs . Likewise, coatshangingin the closetneednot haveany particular ontological priority over average families andflaws. But is this a metaphysical bullet that we canbite? Can our ontology admit suchthings? Here (finally) we cometo the issueof " aspects of the world" and the kinds of thingsthat we canbe realistsabout .
Aspect ~ of theWorld ' Operating throughout all three of Chomsky s arguments cited above is the assumption ( shared with Putnam and others) that P- substancesare the kinds of substancesthat a referential semantics is going to favor. For example, Chomsky ( 1993) remarks: To be an Intentional Realist , it would seem , is aboutas plausibleas being a Desk- or -of-Language - or Cat- or Matter-Realist Sound ; not thatthereareno suchthingsasdesks , etc., but that in the domainwherequestions of realismarisein a serious way, in the context of the searchfor laws of nature , objectsare not conceivedfrom the peculiar perspectives of commonsense . providedby the concepts But why should we make the assumption that " the domain where questions of realism arise in a serious way " is " in the context of the searchfor laws of nature "? One possible answer would be that physical theory gets to say what is real, and that hence if we are to have a genuine referential semantics in which

178

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are" real" existingentitiesthenwe arestuckwith the kinds of entities the referents makes a strong . But this answer andsubstances positedby physicaltheory to is controversial that an realism scientific about assumption assumption in view. false most and , my likely saythe least 1980 of science in thephilosophy ) A greatdealof literature (e.g., vanFraassen asmidsize do not existin the samesense holdsthat the entitiespositedby science earthbound objectslike tablesandchairs. Pursuingthis line of thinking, scientifictheories that we might say , despitetheir greatinterestandutility , are not the arbitersof what is real. on our ontology If we setasidethe exclusiveclaim of the physicalsciences then we may well values semantic as our P substances if we dismiss i .e. ), ( , of a semantic referents for the candidates are I substances find that entirely plausible ' ' water of value the semantic . For example just is , it may be that theory . that movesthroughpipesinto our homes I substance water the complicated mustbe If we takethat route , then it is far from clearthat the LWI hypothesis : surrendered it is entirelyparasitic or perhaps is a cheatiS to I -substances theappeal But perhaps if not . What is an I substance on the notion of I language representations " ? Seen " whatever I a to representation language corresponds particular simply ' ? At best vacuous , isn t it a misleading in this light, isn' t the talk of I -substance ? way of talking aboutI -language turnoutthatI -language . Evenif it should off a confusion to head Herewe need arein somesense logically prior (perhaps prior to I substances representations as our that not follow it does or metaphysically path empiricalinvestigators prior), The . will beginwith the linguistic representations ideais that the linguistic intuitions , but that because will indeedunderwriteour metaphysical representations intuitions to shedsomelight on of this we canexpectour metaphysical ' The lexicalentryfor ' water , when : . A concrete of I -language thenature example , if it (at least representation fully fleshedout, is boundto be a very complicated knowledge . Our ) is to interactin complexwayswith otherI language representations of thelexicon; rather , it of this fact doesnot comefrom directinvestigation evinces thatChomsky intuitionsaboutwaterlike those is guidedby metaphysical informationabout rich contextual in his articles- intuitionsthattakeinto account it is being whether whetherthe materialin questionis comingfrom a faucetor . in a restaurant served ' s waterintuitionsarenot thatChomsky It will not do to argue metaphysical " " , or aboutthe phenomenology that they areonly abouthis I -concept of water or beyondthe phenome . If thereis no world beyondtheseconcepts of water nology, then oncewe havemadethe stepfrom talking aboutlinguistic repre

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sentations to talk of concepts , or phenomena , or sense data , we havebasically into the world- or asfar into it aswe areevergoing to get.9 stepped Of course , this picture is as Kantianasit canbe. We havemetaphysical intuitions and we want to know what underwrites , thoseintuitions. The first departure " but - not "the categories from Kant lies in the answergiven of reason ratherthe structure of I language . The second lies in the fact that our departure neednot be entirely transcendental approach . We do havesubstantial independent of the language knowledge to gain faculty, andwe canusethatknowledge insight into the natureof reality.

Tl Appendix -A Basic Quantiticational Fragment

In this particularcasewe havea binary branchingstructure , but thereis an empirical questionas to whetherother forms are possiblein natural language .2 The tenninalnodes of sucha structure will bethelexical items , andthebranching nodes will belabelsfor grammatical S categories (clause ), NP (nounphrase ), VP (verbphrase ), PP(prepositional ), andsoon. Of particularinterestto phrase us are the geometricrelationsthat hold betweenthe nodesof suchstructures ,

A " " " " " ' " ' " " ' ~ " BE " " / " ' / / , " / " " , C "" D F G ~ " / ' / / / / ""I H

" is in fact an that a " sentence Following Chomsky( 1995b ), suppose ordered pair of representations (PF, LF) , wherePF representations interfacewith the " -articulatory" componentand LF perceptual interface with representations " " -intensional the conceptual system(or, as I would prefer to put it , LF is the level of representation that is visible to the semantic ). theory Sinceour principal interestwill be with LF representations , a few wordsare in orderabouttheir nature(for present we can skip over their derivation purposes ). I will assume , following work datingbackfour decades now, thattheform of a linguistic representation canbe characterized asa branching treestructure like the following.'

182

AppendixTl

the andtherole thatthoserelationsplay in allowingus to formally characterize ! notion of scopein naturallanguage Recall , first, that in formal logics suchasthe propositionalcalculuswe can ' ' . For example as scopemarkers utilize parentheses , in - (AvB )& (CvD ) we ' ' that the negationis to havescopeover the first conjunct ( A v B ) understand havedespaired . Many philosophers ) but not the second (andsomehaverejoiced . In fact, however not sotidy in naturallanguage , very areapparently thatmatters utilized tight definitionsof scopearepossiblefor the kinds of representations . in linguistic theory B iff thereis a path moving uniformly Let us saythat a nodeA dominates , A dominates downthe treefrom A to B. So, for example , in thediagramabove Reinhart D. and ), we ( 1976 all othernodes , andB dominates Following only C Y iff neither asfollows: Xc commands can also define a relation of c command the other andeverybranchingnodedominatingX of X andY dominates to this definition, B will c-command Y. For example alsodominates , according I ), the first branchingnodedominatingB , that is A , alsodominates I (because relation is a relativelysimplegeometrical I . C command but C will not c command -structurerepresentations on phrase , but it is alsoa very goodcandidate for . That is, we can assume for specifyingscoperelationsin naturallanguage 4 . is of this book that c command just SCOpe purposes ) and Wecanfurtherassume , following work datingbackto Chomsky( 1976 are generated (in part) by movementof ), that LF representations May ( 1977 form" shown with the " surface sentence a For . , quantifiedexpressions example ' ' shownin (2), where e is a co-indexed in ( 1) will havethe ( LF) representation traceof movement (later we will seehow thesetracescanbe treatedasbound S variables ).

1 ( ) loves J ohn everyo " ' / " , VP NP / " ' / " , / NP John V loves
everyone

A BasicQuantificational Fragment

" Wecanalso" linearize like (2) asin (3). representations

(3) John s [NP ] j s [NP everyone ][vp[y loves ][NP eJ]]] It is often supposed that certainambiguitiesin naturallanguage reflect multiple LF representations for a givenutterance . Thus, an utterance of (4) will have two differentpossible LF representations , reflectingtwo possible relations scope that might hold between the nounphrases . (4) Every manlovessomewoman

s " " ~ " " ' NP S " / / ' / " NP ( ) e vp j very A Joh V NP lov ej
183

s "" " " " "" " " """ " " " " " " " -..-VP .. NP //A 6 / """, V every NP ~ 6 loves some wo ~

184 ' (4 )

Tl Appendix

S -----""" " """ "' """'-"""" -......... ........S NP / "" " / ' / / " " " / 6 S NP every ~ "" / "" / 6 VP NP Worn some ~ . e I A V loves NP I ej

(4")

S ~ """ ....... ....-..--, , , -....--, , !s NP ' -" / / " ' / " " / / 6 S NP Worn some ~ /' 6 every ~ / NP . e I """" VP A V NP

loves ej between the distinction 2.2incorporated insection introduced predicates The fragment Ludlow and Larson . Here ) (1993 and , following expressions referring -order first basic that and Larson and byadding fragment ),we (1995 expand Segal . noun formore resources basic as some well phrases complex , as quantification

A BasicQuantificational Fragment

185

of Ll Syntax
8 - + 8 I and / or 82 8 - + it is not the case that 8 8 - + NPVP VP - + V2 NP VP - + VI VI - + ~ ,~ V2 - + ~ , ~ NP - + eve~ N NP - + ~ N NP - + Smith , ~ N - + mDn, woman , ~ , dQ& In addition to these simple phrase- structure rules, we can assume(following our discussion above) that there is a rule that maps the product of these rules onto

otherphrase markers (whichwill becalledLF representations ). Thisrule - which, " " , 1985 ) andMay ( 1977 following Chomsky( 1976 ), we cancall QR , for quantifier - statesthat a quantifiednounphrasecan be -adjoined raising Chomsky to S, leavingbehinda co-indexed trace . TheresultingLF representation is analogous to a restricted , QR quantifierform of first-orderlogic. As wasnotedabove will alsoprovide a way of representing certainscopeambiguities . (Recall the ' ' ' " LF representations givenfor Every manlovessomewoman in (4 ) and(4 ).) But how do these two representations , giveriseto two distinctinterpretations andprecisely whatis therelationbetween thequantified nounphrases andtheirco indexed ? Forthatmatter traces howcanc-command functionasscope ? , precisely The shortanswerto thesequestions is that the valuationpredicate Val is defined in sucha way that the co-indexedtracesaretreatedasboundvariables in the sense familiar from first-order logic, andthe compositionalaxiomsof the T-theoryensure thatc-command relationswill reflectscope relations . Thebasic ideais to incorporate Tarski' s idea of sequences into the axiomsof our T-theory . Specifically Val(A , B, 0 ) to be readas"A , we can introducethe predicate is the valueof B with respectto assignment 0 ," where0 is an assignment of valuesto all the variables of the language . If we think of thevariables asbeingof theform Xi ' wherei is a numericalsubscript then a 0 will an to , sequence assign object eachvariable Xi. This idea will bereflected in our basicaxiomfor theinterpretation of traceasin (5), where o (i ) is the ith positionof the sequence .

(5) Val (x, ~, 0) iff x = o(i ) for i ~ 1.

186

Tl Appendix

The crucial axiomsfor the interpretationof the quantifiersare as shownin " =j 0 ' indicates that the sequence 0 " differs from 0 ' at mostin the ith (6), where0 . position (6) a. Val( T N ], 51 ], 0 ' ) iff for every0 " =j 0 ' suchthatVal(O " (i ), N , 0 ' ), , [s [NPI ~ Val( T ") , 51, 0 b. Val( T " =j 0 ' suchthatVal(O " (i ), N , 0 ' ), , [s [NPI .sQme . N ], 51 ], s) iff for some0 Val( T ") , 51, 0 c. Val( T " =j 0 ' suchthatVal(O " (i ), NP, 0 ' ), Val(t , 51, 0 ") , [sNPj 51 ], 0 ) iff for 0 With the axiomsandrulesintroducedthusfar, the theoremderivedfor ' Every ' dog barks would be asshownin (7). (7) Val( T eve " =j 0 ' such , [s [NP ~ [NdQi ] 1 [s [NP eJ [vp[VIhmJU ]) iff for every0 that O " (i ) is a dog, O " (i ) barks It is alsopossibleto incorporate generalized quantifiertheoryinto this framework , for currentpurposes (seechapter8 of Larsonand5egal I995); however ' and' some '. we canmakedo with thetwo standard first-orderquantifiers' every We arenow readyto seehow the c-command relationcashes out the notion of scope . No stipulationis necessary as Larson and ibid. ; , p. 252ff .) note , 5egal( the situationis exactlyparallel to the way scopeandquantifier /variablebinding arerelatedin the standard calculus . predicate As an illustration, considerthe sort of structurethat would arisein the multiply ' ' quantified sentence every man loves somewoman . Abstracting from will be asfollows: detail, the structure

S / ' / / " " , * NP S ' / " " , Nt det

Given the way the axioms are defined for this structure , the interpretation of S* will be relativized to the sequenceintroduced in the resolution of the S node.

A BasicQuantificational Fragment

187

Thus andSegal offer thefollowingcontrasting , Larson theorems , reflecting thedifferent of the two LFs : interpretations 8 ( ) Val ' [NP (T, ~ [NP [N [s ~ ~ [Nwoman ] ] k [NP mBnJ1 [V2 ~ ] [NP ] eJ [vp ej 0 " =j 0 ' such thatO " (i ) is a man 0 ' " =j 0 ll ]) iff for every " such that , for some O "' (j ) is a woman "' (i ) loves O "' (j ) ,O (9) Val eve , [s[NP ' [NP (T ~ [Nwomanllj [s m Bn ] ] [So [NP ~ [N [V21 ~ [NP ] eJ [vp ej = iff for some 0 " 0 ' such that i O " ll ]) 0 ' " =j 0 " such that ( ) is a woman , for every j O "' (j) is a man "' (i) loves O "' (j ) ,O " In thewords of Larson and (ibid., p. 253 ): Thecorrelation Segal [between scope and c-command outcome of thewayin which thesemantics uses the ] is asimple -language to construct theT sentence object , Corn syntax position ally building ' of thelatterusing the' skeleton ." parts provided by theformer
Semantics of Ll

-place I nowintroduce a three Valpredicate Val as"A is the (A, B, C), to beread
value of B with respect to assignment

TerminalNodes

Val , 0) iff x = Smith (x, Smith Val (x, ~ , 0) iff x = Jones Val (x, ~, 0) iff x = o(i ) for i ~ 1 b. Val , 0) iff x is a dog (x, dQg Val (x, ~ , 0) iff x is a cat Val (x, ~ , 0) iff x is a man Val , 0) iff x is a woman (x, woman c. Val (x, bm , 0) iff x barks Val , 0) iff x walks (x, ~ d. Val x,y), ~ , 0) iff x sees y Val x,y),,~ , 0) iff x likesy

188 Nontenuinal Nodes

AppendixTl

a. Val( T , sNP VP], a ) iff for somex, Val(x , NP , a ) andVal(x , VP, a ) b. Val(x, [vp V NP], a ) iff for somey, Val((x,y), V, a ) andVal(y, NP, a ) c. Val(x, ra~], a ) iffVal (x, ~, a ) (wherea ranges overcategories , and ~ ranges overcategories andlexical items ) (3) a. Val( T thatVal( T , sSI ~ S2 , SI , a ) andVal( T , S2, a ) ], a ) iff it is both the case b. Val( T , [sSI QI S2 ], a ) iff eitherVal( T , SI , a ) orVal(T, S2, a ) c. Val( T , [sit is not the casethat SI ], a ) iff it is not the casethatVal(T, SI , a ) (4) a. ' ' Val( T , [s [NPi evea N], SI ], a ) iff for everya =j a suchthatVal(a (i ), N , a ), ' Val( T , SI , a ) b. Val( T , s [NPi ~ N ] , SI ], s) iff ' for somea ' =j a suchthatVal(a '(i ), N, a ), Val( T , SI , a ) c. Val( T, sNPj SI ], a ) iff for a ' =j a suchthatVal(a '(i ), NP, a ), Val(T, SI , a ') Definitions I. For any sequence a , a (i ) is the ith elementofa . ii . For any sequences a anda ', a ' =j a iff a ' differs from a at moston a '(i ) . iii . Val(T, S) iffVal (T, S, a ) for all sequences 0 '. Finally, let us againmakeuseof two derivationrulesthat wereintroducedwith L. the language

A BasicQuantificational Fragment

189

Derivation Rules E) (So

...a ...

aiff (i
therefore

. . . p. . .
< I>iff for some x , x = a and . . . x . . .

(Soi )
therefore cI >iff . . . a . . . Recallthat thesearenot logical rules, andthat the stepsin eachderivationare muchmoretightly constrained thanthey would be if the full resources of logic wereat our disposal . Theseare simply rulesfor derivingT-theorems . This fragment is significantlymoreinvolvedthanthelanguage L introduced earlier and it be useful to work a , might through derivationin orderto more fully ' atplay. Consider a derivationfor the sentence graspthemechanisms Everydog ' barks . Recallthat the truth definition will apply to a structuraldescriptionof a sentence will applyto theLF of thesentence : rs[NP , andin thiscase [N ~ dQ & ]1 . The derivation will as [S[NP ej] [vp[VIbmJ ]]] proceed follows:

' and Val (x, [vp [VI hm] ], 0 ) [from( 1), by (2a ), SoB ] (3) for every 0 " =j 0 ' such thatVa1 " (i), dQi, 0 ' ), for some x, Va1 " ) and (O ,0 (x, ej Val ") (x, bm , 0 E] [from(2), by (2c ), So (4) for every 0 " =j 0 ' such thatO " (i) is a dog x, x = O " (i ) andx barks , for some from 3 1 a 1 b 1 c E So [ ( ), by ( ), ( ), ( ), ] (5) for every 0 " =j 0 ' such thatO " (i ) is a dog " (i) barks ,O from 4 [ ( ) by Soi )

[s[NP [VI ~ [N bmJ ])] is trueiff .dQ & ]l s[NP eJ[vp (1 ) forevery a ' =j 0 ' such that Val " (i), [N ' ),Val ') (O ,0 , fs[NP (T b~ ]]], a [VI dQgl eJ[vp of (4a [instance )] (2) forevery 0 " =j 0 ' such that Val " (i), [N ' ), forsome x, Val ") (O ,0 (x, [NP dQ & }, 0 eJ

Appendix T2 A Quantificational Fragment with Events (from Larson and Sega11995 )

Following a proposaldue to Davidson( 1967b ), we can hold that there is an like 'Johnbuttered implicit quantificationover eventsin English action sentences ' the toastslowly . Subsequent that the writing in this vein hassuggested form is evenmorecomplexthan this, perhaps that it is alongthe lines logical of ' There is an evente, suchthat e is a buttering, John is the agentof e, the ' toastis thepatientof e, e is past , ande is slow .2 The standard is that the Davidsonian eventanalysiswill require assumption us to introducean explicit reference eventquantificationinto the syntaxitself. Wecanprobablydo this, but, asLarsonandSegal( 1995 ) haveshown , it is unnecessary . that we havea simple extensionto the language discussed in appendix Suppose Tl , so that we haveadverbs andprepositions introducedasfollows.

VP-+V ADV VP-+VPP P-+PNP

ADV - + slowly, quickly P - + in, with V - + swims , kicks NP - + the lake Then the task is to showhow the resultingstructures canbe interpretedas involving a kind of quantification overevents . As with the simplerfragmentin appendix TI , the axioms for the adverbsand prepositionswill essentially be . Theaxiomsfor theverbswill likewisebedisquotational with the disquotational twist thattheyaretakento bepredicates of events . Axioms , ratherthanindividuals for NPswill be asin the quantificational TI . fragmentintroducedin appendix The crucial stepfor introducingthe eventstructurewill comein the rule for the interpretationof S and the rule for the interpretationof the VP. The first

192

T2 Appendix

introducesthe theme(or the agencythematicrole, the second rule introduces role a other relevant thematic some , depending ).3The upon numberof factors will be straightforward . rulesfor theADV andPPcategories
Syntax

ofL2

Add the following to the syntax of L I :

VP -+V ADV VP-+VPP P-+PNP

ADV - + slowly, quickly P - + in , with V - + swims , kicks

NP-+ thelake for L24 Semantics TerminalSymbols ( 1)

a. ofe ' s kind) ' ) iffe is slow (for something Val(e, lQ ,0 . wlx of e'skind Val(e, guickl~, 0 ) iffe is quick (for ~ ) omething b. Vale ,x), in, 0 ) iffe is in x

c. Val , 0) iff e is a (event of) swllnlnlng (e, swims iffe is a Val e 0 , , ~ ( ) kicking Val (e, ~ , 0) iff e is a barking Val , 0) iff e is a walking (e, ~ Val (e, ~ , 0) iff e is a seeing Val (e, ~ , 0) iff e is a liking d. Val , 0) iff x = Smith (x, Smith Val (x, ~ , 0) iff x = Jones Val , 0) iff x = thelake (x, thelake x iff Val 0 ( , ~, ) x = o(i) for i ~ 1

A Quantificational withEvents Fragment e. Va1 (x , dQi, 0 ) iff x is a dog Va1 (x, ~ , 0 ) iff x is a man Va1 , 0 ) iff x is a woman (x, woman

193

Nonterminal Nodes (2) a. Va1 e, Va1 , [sNPVP x, x is dIe (T ], 0) iff , for some , 0) and (e, VP , for some of e andVa1 , 0) agent (x, NP b. Va1 (e, [ypVNP ofe and ], 0) iffVa1 (e, V, 0) and , for some y, y is dIedteme Va1 NP 0 (y, , ) c. Va1 V ADV], 0) iffVa1 Va1 (e, [yp (e, V, 0) and , 0) (e, ADV d. Va1 V PP (e, [yp ], 0) iffVa1 (e, V, 0) andVa1 , 0) (e, PP e. Va1 P NP z, Va1e,z), P (e, [pp ], 0) iff , for some , 0) andVa1 , 0) (z, NP f. Val ' ) iffVal(x, 13 ' ) (where a ranges overcategories (x, fa13 ], 0 ,0 , and13 ranges overcategories andlexicalitems ) (3) a.

Va1 the case that Va1 , [s51~ 52 Va1 (T ], 0) iff it isboth , 51 , 0) and (T , 52 , 0) (T b. Va1 Va1 , [s51Q [ 52 (T ], 0) iff either , 0) orVa1 (T, 51 , 52 , 0) (T c. Va1 that 51 that Va1 (T, [sitisnotthecase ], 0) iff it isnotthecase , 0) (T, 51
(4 ) a.

Va1 , [5[NPi (T ~ Va1 ") , SI, 0 (T b. Va1 , [5[NPi ~ (T Va1 ") (T, SI, 0

N ], S1 ], 0 ' ) iff for every 0 " ~i 0 ' such thatVa1 " (i ), N, 0 ' ), (O N], SI], 0 ' ) iff , for some 0 " ~i 0 ' such thatVa1 " (i ), N, 0 ' ), (O

194

'2 Appendix1

c. ' ' ' Va1 , SI , a ) ( T, sNPj SI ], a ) iff , for a =ja suchthatVa1 (a (i ), NP, a ), Va1 (T (5) derivationrules(repeated from Ll ) E) (So . . .a . ... a . iff ~ therefore . . . ~ . . . (Soi) . and . . . x . . . cj ) iff for somex , x = a

therefore < I iff . . . a . . . definitions 1 . of 0 Foranysequence 0 ',O ' (i) is theith element '. ii. onO Foranysequences 0 ', 0 ", 0 " =j 0 ' iff 0 " differsfrom0 ' atmost " (i). iii . Val ' ) for all sequences 0 '. , S) iffVal(T , S, 0 (T axioms a couple of Tobetter understand howthese , consider maybedeployed of thetruthconditions for the derivations . First thederivation , consider sample
' sentence ' Smith swims slowly .

Val .smi1h ~~ [ADVS ~ W)]) iff . . . , ~ [NP ] [vp [Vis (T (1 ) forsome x, x isthe there isane, Val(e, [vp .si .Q ::wW ~ im] [ADV )], 0), and [V Val x of e and 0 , Smitb J ) ( , [N agent , P of (2a )] [instance (2) x, Val(e, [ADV there is ane, Val(e, [v.s .si .Q ::wW , 0), and , forsome ~~ , 0) and
Va1 x is theagent ore, and (x, [NPSmi ! h] , 0) ), SoB ] [from( 1 ) by (2c (3) x, x is andVa1 ' ), and there is ane, e is a swimming ,0 , for some . } QwW (e, [ADV

of e, and Val theagent (x, [NPSmi !h] , 0) ] [from(2) by(lc), SoB

A Quantificational with Events Fragment

195

(4) there is ane, e is a swimming ande is slow x, x is theagent of , and , for some e, and Va1 0 (x, [N Smid1 J, ) P E] [from(3) by ( la), So (5) there is ane, e is a swimming ande is slow x, x is theagent of , and , for some e, andx = Smith E] [from(4) by ( ld ), So
(6) thereis an e, e is a swimmingande is slow, andSmith is the agentof e [from (5) by Soi] In this fragment functionbasicallylike adverbs , prepositional , although phrases the derivations for sentences PPs are more . To see containing slightly complex ' this, consider thederivation of thetruthconditions for thesentence Smithswims

'. in thelake

Val lake , [8[NPSmi (T :th] [vp [v. ~~ [pp [pin ] [NPthe ]]]]), iff . . . (I ) there is ane, Val lake x, x is (e, [vpk. ~~ [pp [pin ] [NPthe , for some ]]], 0), and theagent ofe, and Val x 0 , ( [N Smith J, ) P of (2a [instance )] (2) there is ane, Val Val thelake ~im ] , 0 ) and (e, k ..s (e, [pp [pin ] [NP ]], 0) andfor some x, x is theagent of e, and Val x ( , [NPSmi :th], 0) E] [from( I ) by (2d ), So (3) there is ane, Val z, Vale ,z), [pin Val (e, k . ~~ , 0) and , for some ] , 0) and (z, thelake x, x is theagent of e, and Val [NP ]], 0), andfor some (x, [NPSmi :th], 0) E] [from(2) by (2e ), So (4) there is ane, Val z, e is in z andVal ~im ] , 0) and (e, k .s , for some ~ (z, [NP x, x is theagent of e, andVal 0 lm ] ], 0), andfor some , (x, [N Smid1 J ) P E] [from(3) by ( Ib), So (5) there is ane, e is a swimming andfor some z, e is in z andVal thelake (z, [NP ]], 0), andfor some x, x is theagent of e, and Val . smi1hJ , 0) (x, [NP E] [from(4) by ( Ic), So

196

T2 Appendix

(6) there is ane, e is a swimming andfor some z, e is in z andz = thelake , and x, x is theagent for some of e, andx = Smith [from(5) by ( 1d), SoB ] (7) there is ane, e is a swimming ande is in thelake of e , andSmithis theagent [from(6) by Soi ]

Appendix

T3

A Fragment with I LFs for PropositionalAttitudes (from LarsonandLudlow 1993 )

of L3 Syntax
~Amp ; as LI , with addition

of thefollowing :

VP-+Vin 'S

Vinl - + believes , claims , thinks

Semantics of L3 Ten Dina ) Nodes

a. Va1 ' ) iff x = Smith ,0 (x, Smith Va1 ' ) iff x = Jones (x, ~ , 0 Va1 x 0 ' iff ' (i ) for i ~ 1 ( , ~, ) x = O b. Va1 ' ) iff x is a dog (x, g , 0 Va1 ' ) iff x is a cat (x, w, 0 Va1 ' ) iff x is a man (x, mIn, 0 Va1 x woman ' ) iff x is a woman ,0 ( , c. Va1 ' ) iff x barks .@ .rb ,0 (x, .b Va1 x 0 ' ) iff x walks , ~~ , ( d. Va1 ' ) iff x sees ({x,y}, ~ , 0 y Va1 ' ) iff x likesy ({x,y},~ , 0 Va1 ' ) iff x believes ,0 ({x,y}, believes y Va1 x 0 ' ~ , ) iff x thinks ({ ,y}, tbiDk y

198

AppendixT3

Va1 . 0) iff x claims ({x,y), claims y

Nonterminal Nodes (2) a. Val x, Val Val , [sNPVP], a) iff , for some (T , a) and (x, NP , a) (x, VP b. Val V NP (x, [vp ], a) iff , for some , a) (y, NP y, Val x,y), V, a) andVal c. Val < Xranges overcategories (x, [a ri ], a) iffVal(x, ri, a) (where , andri ranges overcategories andlexicalitems ) d. Val VintS (x, [vp ] , a) iff , for some ' a) andy = [] S[] w.rit. a y, Val x,y), Vint (3) a. Val S2 thatVal Val , [sSI .a .1ld (T ], a) iff it is boththecase , SI, a) and (T , S2 , a) (T b. Val [ S2 , SI, a) orVal(T, S2 (T, [sSI Q ], a) iffeitherVal , a) (T c. Val thatSI], a) iff it is notthecase thatVal (T, [sit is notthecase , SI, a) (T (4)

a. Val a' =j a such that Val ' (i), N, a), Val , ~ [NPI (T N ] , SI ], a) iff , for every , ~ (a (T ' 51 ,a) b. Val a ' =j a such that Val ' (i), N, a),Val , ~ [NPI ~ N (T ] , 51 ], a) iff, forsome , (a (T ' 51 , a) c. Val 51 that Val (T, [8NPj ], a) iff, fora' =ja such , a), Val , 51 , a') (a'(i), NP (T
Deftniti ODS (repeated from Ll ) I. Foranysequence 0 ',O ' (i ) is theith element of 0 '. 11 . Foranysequences 0 ',0 ",0 " =j 0 ' iff 0 " differsfrom0 ' atmost onO " (i ). iii . Va1 ' ) for all sequences 0 '. , S) iffVa1 , S, 0 (T (T

A Fragment withn ..Fs forPropositional Attitudes

199

Definition : Let a bea phrase marker with rootS, let 0 ' bea sequence , andfor each node of a let x be the semantic value to p, assuming Val , , a, P (T assigned 0). Then : 1. =< If Pis atenninal node andVal ' ), thenDPD (x, p, 0 ) Pix 2. If Pis [y8. 82. . . 80 ' ), then ] for n ~ 1andVal (x, [y8 ], 0 . 82. . . 80 = . . . DPD [(y .x ) 08.0 0820 D80rn
3. If the semantic value assigned to (3 , assuming Val ( T, a, 0 ), is not defined , and

= [('J is [15152 . . . 50 . . . D50rn (b ) 13 ] forn~ I , then 0130 0520 )D51D use twoderivation rules weused in LI and L2. , weshall Finally (5)
DerivationRules E) (So ...a ... aiffp derive . . . p . . .

node , then[]6D (a) . 6 is a tenninal --. -- = (6) -. -

forsome x, x = a and . . .x . . . derive . ..a . . . '. Consider asample derivation for'Smith believes Jones walks Val (T, S [N Smid1 ] [vp [vbelieves ]S [NPJ ~ [vp [~ S ~ ]]], 0) iff P (I ) forsome x,Val Val , 0) and (x, [NPSmi :thJ (x, [vp [~ believes ]S [NPJ ~ [vp [v ~~ ]]], 0) of(2a [instance )] (2) forsome x, Val forsome Smith ], 0) and (x, [N ({x,y}, kbelieves ], 0) and y, Val P Jones ][vp [~ ~~ ]][] w.rit. 0 y = [][s[N P E] [from (I ) by(2d ), So

(Soi )

200

AppendixT3

.fit. 0 ~~ ]][] W E] [from (3) by(ld), So

.fit. 0 :Blk [NPJ ~ [vp [v:w ~ ]][] W from 2 la SoB [ ( ) by ( ), ] (4) for some x, x = Smithandfor some Jones ] [vp [y y, x believes y, andy = [][ s[NP

(3) forsome x, x = Smith and forsome believes 1 , 0) andy = [][s ((x,y), [Vim y, Va1

(5) Smithbelieves[] s[N Jones ] [vp[v~ Wb ] ]] [] w.rit. 0 P [from (4) by Soi] Construction of the ll...F proceeds asfollows: First, the truth definition mustbe to the embedded clause to determine the semantic valuesof eachnode applied of theembedded . Recallthattheembedded isjust p- marker p- markerin this case the following.

s / """ NP VP I V I Jones I
~

We canget the semantic valueof eachnodefrom the following (partial ) derivation . VaI , [s [NPJ~ [vp V:wI1U (T ] )], 0) iff . . . ( 1) for some x, Val J~ , 0) andVaI (x, [ NP (x, [vp V~DJg ] ], 0) instance of 2a [ ( )] (2) x, Val for some (x, ~ , 0) andVaI (x, ~~ , 0) 1 from 2c SoB [ ( ) by ( ), ] (3) for some x, x = Jones andx walks from 2 Ia Ic [ ( ), by ( ), ( ), SoB ]

A Fragment with ll ..Fsfor Propositional Attitudes

201

Given the calculation of these semantic values, we can construct the ILF fol -

the definition introduced above . lowing Jones [][S [N ] [vp [v~~ ]]D P =[( [NPJ ~~ ]]D] ~ DD 5 [yp [y ,ThIe )D [by (3ii )]

In a more familiar tree representation, we have the following .

~ ~ , Jones } then derived thefollowingtheorem : , , wehave Finally Smith believes Jones walksis trueiff Smith believes

S True , ( ) " / / / " " , N P Jones Jones , V p ( ) ( ) I I Jones Jones ~ , , a )( V I) 8 True , ( ) " / / " " " N Jones P Jones , , ( ) ( V P ) I I V Jones Jones ~ , , ~ )( ) I
lb, Jones ~ .@ )

= [(So ~ [] ][(V True Jones IIe S )[< NP ;Jones ~ )[]J )[< V ;JO )[] ~alb [] ill [by(3ii)] = [(s J~ , Jones )]] [(V IIe S )]]] ,Tnae Jones )[< NP ;JO )< ~ )[< v ;Jones )~ ~ , Jones 3i [by( )]

204 Semantics

T4 Appendix

for LB

TerminalSymbols ( 1) a. Va1 , S, R, E) iffR is thedaybeforeS (e, ~esterday Va1 (e, ~ , S, R, E) iff R is thesame dayasS Va1 , R, E) iff R is thedayafterS (e, tomorrowS b. Va1 ({e,x), in, S, R, E) iffe is in x Val , S, R, E) iff e is a swimming (e, swims Val , S, R, E) iff e is a walking (e, ~ d. Val , S, R, E) iff x = Smith (x, Smith Val (x, ~ , S, R, E) iff x = Jones Val , S, R, E) iff x = TheLake (x, TheLake

Va1 than RIB ,S , R, E) iffS islater (e, PAST Va1 E temporally ,S , R, E) iff S , R, and (e, PRES overlap Va1 than RIB ,S , R, E) iff Sisearlier (e, FUT Va1 PERFECTS than SIR , RE ) iffE isearlier (e, PRES Va1 PERFECTS Rand than Risearlier than S , RE ) iffE isearlier (e, PAST Va1 E, E isearlier than than R , RE ) iff Sisearlier (e, FUTPERFECTS Va1 than S than R , RE ) iff E isearlier , Sisearlier (e, FUTPERFECTS Va1 e FUT PER E iff E and F Ecr S S is earlier than R , ,R , ) (, temporally overlapS Va1 than S than E ,S , R, E) iffR isearlier , Risearlier (e, FUTIN PAST f. -at Va1 ,S , R, E) iff in-progress (e, PROG (e, E) Va1 e S R E iff culminates at e ( ,~ , , , ) ( , E)
g. Val({x,y}, ~ fQm , S, R , E) iff x is earlierthany Val({x,y}, ~ , S, R, E) iff x is later thany Val({x,y}, ~ with y , S, R, E) iff x temporallyoverlaps

A B-TheoryTechnical Fragment

205

Axioms for NonterminA ISymbols (2) a.

Val NP1 ' ], S x, e, Val ', S at ,R , E) iff, forsome , R, E) and , (e, 1 (T, [IP (e, E) and Val forsome x, x istheagent of eand , S, R , E) (x, NP b. Val Val , R, E) and ], S, R, E) iffVal(e, I, S (eVP, S, R, E) (e, [r I VP c. Val , R, E) iffVal(e, V, S , R, E) (e, [vp V ] ,S V V PP R E iffVal e Val Val e S ,S , , , , , R, E) ) ( , S, R, E) and (y, PP ( [vp ], V e V ADV S R E iffVal e S R E and Val e ADV Val ,S , R, E) (, ( , [vp ], , , ) (, , , , )
Val Val d . Val ( e , [ pp P NP ] , S , R , E ) iff , for some z , Vale , z ) , P , S , R , E ) and Val ( z , NP , S , ( e , [ vpV ( e , ADV PPADV , S , R , E ) ] , S , R , E ) iffVal ( e , V , S , R , E ) and Val ( e , PP , S , R , E ) and

R , E ) e . Val f . Val R2 g . Val over (x , S , R , E ) iff a P ] , and lexical Val ( x , P ) where items . a ranges over categories and p ranges ( T , [ IP IPI , E2 ) and CON Val EI IP2 ] , S , R , E ) iffVal , S , R, E ) ( T , IPI , S , RI , EI ) and Val ( T , IP2 , S , ( eL TNS ASP ] , S , R , E ) iffVal ( e , TNS , S , R , E ) and Val ( e , ASP , S , R, E )

, E2 ) , CON

categories Rules

Production

( So E ) . . . a aiffp . . .

therefore

. . . p

. . .

( Soi

) . iff for some x , x = a and . . . x . . .

therefore

iff

. . . a

. . . ' ' Smith swam yesterday in this fragment

To

illustrate as

, the shown

derivation in ( 1) .

for

would

proceed

206

T4 Appendix

Val PAST CUL , [IP (T [NP Smith ] [r r[TNS ] [ASP ~g [ADV ))[vp [v.s ~esterda ~)))), S, R, E) iff . . . (1 ) forsome x,e, Val CUL (e, [r r[TNS .s PAST ] [ASP ~g [ADV ))[vpV , ~esterda ~))], S R, E) and At(e,E) and x istheagent of eand Val x , R, E) ( , [NP Smith ],S of (2a [instance )] iff (2) forsome x,e, Va1 CUL Va1 (e, [I[TNS PAST ] [ASP ]], S, R, E) and (e, [vpk S R E and At E e and x is the .s ~ s ofe and Va1 ][ADV , , , , ) ~esterda ( ) ~]] (x, agent S R E [NP Smi .d1 ], , , ) [from(1 ), by(2b ), SoB ] iff (3) forsome x,e, Va1 Va1 CUL (e, [TNS , R, E) and PAST ] ,S (e, [ASP ], S, R, E) and Va1 S R E and At e E and x istheagent ofe (e, [vpk.sM ~ [ADV , , ]], , ) ~esterday ( )

and Va1 , R, E) (x, [NP Smidl ], S from 2 2e So E [ ( ), by( ), ]

iff (4) for some x,e, Val PAST Val CUL], S, R, E) and (e, [TNS ], S, R, E) and (e, [ASP Val Val S (e, k swims ] , S, R, E) and , (e, [ADV ], ~esterday R, E) andAt(e,E) and x is theagent of e and Val x S ( , [NP Smith ] , , R, E) from 3 2c SoB [ ( ), by ( ), ] iff (5) for some x,e, Val Val , S, R, E) and (e, PAST (e, CUL, S, R, E) andVal (e, Val of .s ~ ,S , R, E) and , S, R, E) andAt(e,E) andx is theagent (e, ~esterday

e and Val ,S , R, E) (x, Smith from 4 SoB [ ( ), by(2g ), ] iff

(6) for some x, e, Val Val , S, R, E) and (e, PAST (e, CUL, S, R, E) andVal (e, At(e,E) andx is theagent of e ~ , S, R, E) andR is thedaybeforeS , and

and Va1 , Smith , S, R, E) (X from 5 1 a [ ( ), by( ), SoB ]

A B-Theory Technical Fragment iff

207

(7) x,e, Va1 for some Va1 , S, R, E) and (e, PAST (e, CUL, S, R, E) ande is a swim and R is the beforeS and At e E and x is the of e and x Va1 , , (, ) ( , ming day agent Smith , S, R, E) E] [from(6), by ( Ic), So iff (8) for some x,e, Va1 , S, R, E) andVa1 (e, PAST (e, CUL, S, R, E) ande is a swim = and R is the beforeS and At e E and x is the of e and x , , (, ) ming day agent Smith E] [from(7), by ( Id), So iff (9) x,eS is laterthanRIB Va1 for some , and (e, CUL, S, R, E) ande is a swim of e andx = At(e,E) andx is theagent , and , andR is thedaybeforeS ming Smith ] [from(8), by ( Ie), SoB iff ( 10 ) -at(e, E) ande is a swimming x,eS is laterthanR / E, andculminates for some , = x and At e E and x is the of e and Smith andR is thedaybeforeS , (, ) agent [from(9), by (It), SoB ] iff ( 11 ) -at(e, E) ande is a swimming eS is laterthanR / E, andculminates for some At(e,E) andSmith is theagent of e , and , andR is thedaybeforeS by Smith from 10 Soi [ ( ), by ]

Appendix

TS Fragment

A Basic A - Theory

This appendix , which borrowsfrom the ILF fragmentof Larson and Ludlow -basedanalysisof aspect 1993 combines an ILF theorywith an event , . To keep matterssimpleandto keepthe crucial axiomsat centerstage , basicquantifiers arenot introduced here(although theycouldbeintroduced alongthelinesof appendix Tl without difficulty). Propositional attitudeverbsarealsoomittedhere . Syntax of LA Terminal Symbols

As in LB (appendix T4). Nonterminal Symbols S ~ IP when / before /afterIP IP ~ TNSIP (ADV) IP~ NPI' I' ~ IVP VP -+V (PP ) PP-+PNP I -+ASP
Semantics of LA

TerminalNodes ( 1) a. Va1 < {x,y), ~ iff x sees y Va1 < {x,y), bib) iff x hit y

210 b. Vale ,x), in) iffe is in x. c. Val (e, ~ ) iffe is a swimming Val e ( , ~~ iff e is a walking d. Val (x, Smith ) iff x = Smith Val x ( , ~ V iff x = Jones Val (x, thelake ) iff x = thelake e. Val (x, PAST ) iff x wastrue x Val PUT ( , ) iff x will betrue x Val PRES ( , ) iff x is true f. Val (e, CUL) iff e culminates Val (e, PROG ) iff e is in progress . g Va1 (x, ~esterda ~) iff x washueyesterday Va1 ) iff x will behuetomorrow (x, tomorrow Va1 x iff ( , ~ ) x is huetoday Va1 (x, ~ iff x is huenow Nonterminal Nodes

TS Appendix

(2) a. Va1 Va1 1P2 , IPI ) when , 1P2 ]) iffVa1 (T (T ) (T, SIPI ~ IPI 1P2 Va1 T IPI 1P2 iffVa1 before Va1 , , ]) (T ) (T ) ( , [s ~ ~ Va1 Va1 , IPI ) after , 1P2 ] ) iffVa1 (T (T ) (T, [sIPI ~ 1P2 b. x, Va1 Va1 IPI ]) iff , for some , [IPTNS (x, TNS ), andx = [] IPI [] (T c. x, Va1 Va1 TNSIPI ADV]) iff , for some , [IP (x, TNS ), Va1 (x, ADV), and (T = x []IPI [] d. e, Va1 ' ) andfor some x, x is theagent of e and NP1 ' ]) iff for some Va1 (e, 1 (T, [IP x NP Va1 ( , )

A Basic A-Theory Fragment

211

e. Val Val (e, [1 (eVP ) ' 1VP]) iffVal(e, I ) and f. Val V PP Val (e, [vp ]) iffVal(e, V) and (e, PP ) . g Val P NP z, Vale ,z}, P) andVal (e, [pp ]) iff for some (z, NP ) i. Val(x, [uP ]) iff Val(x, P) wherea ranges overcategories andp ranges over lexicalitems . Definition Let a bea phrase marker with rootS andfor each node Ii of a, let x bethesemantic value to Val a . Then : , ) assigned p, assuming ( T

=< If Ii isaterminal node and Val (x, Ii),then OliO Ii,x) 2. If Iiis[ySI =[( ' . . So Val ' . . So ] for~ 1and (x, [.,SI ]), then S2 S2 OliO .x )OSlO y . . . ] OS20 OSoO
3. If thesemantic value to p, assuming Val , a), is notdefined assigned (T , and = (P node (a) p is a tenninal , thenDPD ) . . . So (b) Pis [1S. S2 ] for n ~ 1, then[] P[] = [(y [] . . . [] Sa [] ] ) []S.[] []S2
Derivation Rules

(SoB ) . ..a .. . aiffp ...p... (Soi ) ~x , x = a and . . . x . . . . iff for some cj ) iff . . . a . . .

212 ) ( RR Reduction Redundancy /will betrue / will betrue. . . , andx is/was < I- iff x is/was

AppendixT5

/will betrue. . . . iff x is/was '. with a sample derivation for ' Smithswam Thiscanbeillustrated yesterday Here weassume asyntax in whichthere is animplicittemporal . We conjunction assume further that the adverb modifies this to the , , (analogous conjunct way in whichadverbs ontheReichenbach ). modifytheR event proposal Val CUL Smi .d1 ] [rL[ASP ]][vp [y swimsl ]]]] ~ (T, [IP [IPI [TNS PAST ] [\P2 [NP . . iff . [1P3 [TNS PAST ] [1P4 ][ADV ]]]) ~esterday

(1 ) Va1 Va1 CUL swims , [IPI , [TNS PAST ] [1P2 [NP Smi :tbJ [rL [As ]][vpk ]]]]]) when (T (T P . . . [1P3 [TNS PAST ] [1P4 ][ADV ]) ):esterdayl of(2a [instance )] iff (2) x = [] [IP2 CUL forsome x, yVal [NP Smid1 ] [rL [As ]][vP [v (x, [1NS PAST ] ) and P = 000 Val and swimsl PAST ]),Val ) [] [ ]]] [] when (y, [1NS (y, [AD esterdayl y \' ~ 1P4] [] from 1 2b 2c SoB [ ( ), by( ), ( ), ] iff (3) x = [] [1P2 CUL forsome x, yVal S [NP .mid1 ][rL [ASP ]][vp [v ] ) and (x, PAST 000 Val swims ] [] (y, PAST ),Val (y, ~esterday ) and ]]]] [] when y = [] [1P4 ] [from (2), by(2i), SoB
iff (4) CUL for some x, y, x wastrueandx = (] [1P2 [A ]][vp [vswimsl [NP SmidlJ l[rL ~ p = . . . true and , y was yesterday y [] [1P4 ] [] [] when y wastrue E] [from(3), by ( Ia), ( Ie), ( Ig), So iff

A Basic A-Theory Fragment

213

(5) for some x, y, x was trueandx = (] [1P2 CUL)][vpkswims [N Smit Il ][rL[As P ])]] [] P = when was true and . . .] [] y yesterday y [] [1P4 [from(4), by RR ] iff (6) CUL]] Vp [] [1P2 ... [] was [N ] [rL[ASP [v swims ]]]] [] wastruewhen[] [1P4 PSmid1 trueyesterday [from(5), by Soi ] Thetreatment of theI LFsproceeds asin appendix T3.

otes N

Introduction 1. Seechapter3 of Sorabji 1983for discussion . Kretzman( 1976 that the issue ) argues is alsotakenup by Aristotle, althoughthis claim is somewhat morecontroversial . ' 2. In anycase that is the received view of Einstein , s position . But see p. 287of Shimony 1993for dissension on this point. It is worth noting that direct evidenceof Einstein' s for his Bpositionon the matteris hardto comeby; oneof the bestpiecesof evidence is a letter of condolence written to the family of a friend (Einstein theory sympathies 1955 ). 3. This pagereference is to the versionin Yourgrau1990 . 4. This in factechoes a pointmade several decades earlierby Reichenbach , p. xiii ) : ( 1956 " If the orientedphilosophyof our time deniesto contemporary science its speculatively , if it calls contributionssuchas the theory of relativity or the philosophicalcharacter andbelongingin the specialsciences theoryof setsunphilosophical , thisjudgementexpresses only the inability to perceivethe philosophical contentof modem scientific ." thought 5. See . Thefollowing passage , e.g., Smith 1993andCraig 1990 from Craig(p.339 ) illustrates ' this point of view nicely: " I find it surprisingthat anyone readingEinsteins 1905 that absolute papercanthink that Einsteindemonstrated simultaneitydoesnot exist and that time is thereforerelativeto a reference frame. For the entire theory depends upon of Einstein' s arbitrary (and, indeed acceptance , highly counterintuitive ) definition of , coupledwith a philosophicalpositivism of Machianprovenance according simultaneity to whichabsolute is meaningless if it is empiricallyundetectable . . . . One simultaneity ' who is not a positivistandwho therefore rejectsEinsteins definitionswouldregardthese asdeceived dueto the natureof their measurements relativelymovingobservers , which 's fail to detecttruetime. In a real sense , he would not regardEinstein theoryasa theory abouttime and spaceat all , but, as Frank put it , ' as a systemof hypotheses aboutthe behaviorof light rays , rigid bodies , andmechanisms , from which newresultsaboutthis behaviorcan be derived .'" But seeShimony1993for further discussion (andcriticism) of this view of relativity theory . 6. This view alsoappears to havebeenheld by Godel. See . Yourgrau1991

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can' t do philosophy . The point is that the questions can' t 7. I don' t meanthat physicists in isolationof philosophical carriedoutby persons in phibeanswered inquiry- whether or in physicsdepartments . losophydepartments . of this generalapproach 8. Strawson1959is a classicexample here . Someso called Prioreantenselogics are not genuine 9. A caveatis necessary . As van Benthem their semantics Prioreantheories , because import B-seriesresources " theoriesthe semantics ' ' ' ' " Priorean for ' past 1982 notes on , many , present, and fu( ) ' ture are often given in termsof the relationsbeforeand after. For example , it is typically ' iff x is earlierthan where is the utterance time. It asserted that x satisfies' past y, y for a Prioreantenselogic is quite out seems to me that this way of giving the semantics to eschew futureandpastevents of the spirit of Prior' s general , which happens program aswell asthe B-series time line. truth-conditionalsemantics 10. Of courseneitherKaplannor Perryadvocates , but the we chooseto work with. of the semantical framework here is key point independent -Perryview of indexicalswithin the truth-conditional This way of thinking aboutthe Kaplan frameworkis dueto LarsonandSegal( 1995 ). rather 11. Althoughtheobjectionturnson a theoryin whichtheoperators applyto events . The ideawould be to propositions thanto propositions , the objectionis readily adapted . that a givenpropositionis future, thenpresent , andthenpast Chapterl I . Portionsof this sectionaredrawnfrom Ludlow (forthcoming ). " " that the properties is individualistic 2. Chomskywould addthat I language , meaning the on the individual in isolationratherthanon relationsbetween of the systemdepend here . I don' t needto makethat assumption individual andthe externalenvironment , and . I ' ll rejectthe thesisfor psychologyin generala bit later ' " " more 3. The hedgeabout co opting ( , exaptation ) is to cover Chomskys accurately . For view that the language faculty may not havebeenthe productof gradualevolution moreon this, seesection1.2. . SeeLewis 1969for a 4. SeeLewis 1975afor an articulationof this view of language . of the natureof convention discussion andE-language 5. Strictly speaking , the differencebetweenI -language may not even ' andthenthere view there is I -language on s actual distinction since countasan , Chomsky is a collection of poorly defined if not incoherentviews which might be lumped together theories ." as" E-language . In a similar conclusion 6. Davidson( 1986 , thoughby a muchdifferent route ) reaches are in accord and would admit it Davidson neither a funny sense , , although Chomsky asan E-language on onepoint: that thereis no suchthing asa language ). (construed of Katz asabstract would be to regardlanguages 7. An alternative objectsin the sense . that I will set aside 1983 . For reasons outlinedby Higginbotham 1981 ( ), possibilityhere . of this issue discussion 8. For a general , seeBeakley1991

Notesto pp. 21- 39

217

9. SeeGould andLewontin 1979 . For someof Gnuld' ~popularwritings on this theme,

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13. This concession is controversial . For a sampleof the literatureon whethermental . imagesarefundamentally , seeBeakleyandLudlow 1992 pictorial or discursive Chapter2 1. For an example of someone whosealarmhasgoneoff , seeDevitt 1993 . 2. An interesting arises if one wants to hold to this extemalist of know1 puzzle conception of the meanings of the expressions . edgeandto the ideathat onehasa priori knowledge Some have d1at a priori self-knowledge andexternalism of thischaracter areincompatible argued . However are very subtle . This is not the placeto , it is fair to saythat the issues take up thesequestions . For a surveyof the.currentliteratureon the topic, seeLudlow andMartin 1998 . 3. See . , e.g., Chomsky1986 4. For discussions of this possibility . , seep. 209 of Montague1974 5. Durnrnett thatmodel theoretic semantics cannot ( 1991 ) hasstressed providesuchconnections is usefulfor characterizing entailment , but that it nonetheless relationsbetween -theoretic . Whether model semantics canevenaccount for entailment relations expressions -theoretictreatments also turns out to be controversial . For skepticismaboutmodel of 1990andField 1991 . , seeEtchemendy logicalentailment 6. Having an interpretiveT-theory without knowing that it is interpretive , or without knowingto what useit may be put, is like havinga mapwithout knowing whetherit is to scale of this concern , or without knowing what it is a mapof. For a discussion , see Foster1976 . 7. Therewould be no harmin writing a fragmentthat utilized the semantical notionsof ' ' ' satisfaction andreference instead . In thatcase , x = Sally might give way to Sally refers to x ' , and ' x walks' might give way to ' x satisfies' walks" . " canbe avoidedif we wish. I 8. Reificationof "the True usethe notion here'merelyfor convenience andnot out of Fregean intuitions that thereis sucha thing asThe True. 9. Werethis constraint to be relaxed like " ' Snowis , we would endup provingtheorems ' " white is trueiff snowis white andthe number7 is prime. For a discussion of this issue , seeDavies1981a . 10. For some criticismof this line of investigation FodorandLepore1997andFodor , see andLepore1998 . This criticism appears to be drivenby the assumption that lexical decomposition andthe like drive us into holism. I fail to seewhy this musthappen .

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's 11. For further discussion of Evans , seeWright 1986 ; Davies 1981b , 1987 ; argument Peacocke 1986 . 12. See . , e.g., McDowell 1980 ; Evans1982 ; Bilgrami 1987 ; LeporeandLoewer 1987 Theseauthorsareinfluencedby remarksin Dummett 1973andDummett1975 . 13. I' m not sureif LeporeandLoewersawthis. 14. SeeLudlow 1993 . . Onemightsuppose 15 aretreated that , within a broadlyDavidsonian program , T-theories " in a " deflationary so that do not refer to states of affairs , , etc. Lepore way, they objects " andLoewer( 1987 , p. 103 ) argueasfollows: If onethinks. . . that a truth theoryassigns of affairs or factsto indicativesentences then we can seewhy [certain possiblestates ] ' Cicerois bald' and truth theoriesassignthe sametruth conditionsto the two sentences ' ' to think of truth theories in this way. Davidsonrejects Tully is bald . But it is not necessary the reificationof truth conditions . . . ." Contraryto this line of thinking, I fail to see how we can stipulateT-theoriesto be deflationary . The fundamentalproblem is that, because oneis using(e.g.) Englishon the right-handsideof a T-sentence , whatis stated on the right-handsidecannotbe moreor lessthanwhatis stated by that Englishexpression . Oneway to get a handleon this issueis to think of the axiomsandtheorems in a T. Onemaynot wantto reify talk aboutplanets theoryasakinto thelawsin anyotherscience andquasars , but it is hard to seehow, short of generalscientific antirealism, one can commitment to them. The problemis not uniqueto certainkinds ofT -theoriesin escape which it is stipulatedthat the right-handsideof the T-sentences refersto a stateof affairs . Rather is usedto statethe , the problemstemsfrom the fact that naturallanguage " " truth conditions , andthusthat theT-theorycan state no moreor lessthanwhat is said usedto give the truth conditions . by the naturallanguage expression 16. This reference wasfirst broughtto my attentionby RichardLarson .

Chapter3 1. See 1985 ; Hintikka1962 , e.g., Cresswell , 1990 , 1969a , 1975 ; Lewis1972 ; Stalnaker 1984 . 2. See . 1990 1986 1987 , e.g., Richard ; Salmon ; Soames 3. See T3 for technical details . appendix 4. Thephilosophers Buridan include ); the (1966 ), Montague (1960 ), andQuine (1960 Karttunen and Ross . include 1974 1976 1976 ( ), ( ), ( ) linguists McCawley den Dikken Ludlow1996 and Larson Dikken 5. Forattempts , and , see , Larson , and , den . Ludlow1997 I depart fromHigginbotham 6. Here (1986a ). apparently andLudlow1993 . 7. Thefollowing fewparagraphs aredrawn fromLarson to ILF theories at precisely this point that 8. Reiber , p. 289 , arguing ( 1997 ) objects advanced andLudlow - still facethe such theories - particularly theversion by Larson " " "content is thatnomatter howsuccessful [Larson problem: The pointI wishto make in it will leave the central unanswered . andLudlow be this , ] may project objection candifferin content butreport thesame attitude (i ) howtwobeliefreports Explaining

Notesto pp. 57- 65

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think theyhavethe maybe a first stepin explaining(ii ) why ordinarythinkersmistakenly ' ' same content , but explaining (i ) doesnot sufficefor explaining (ii ). A pragmaticexplanation of (ii ) would haveto go beyondLarsonandLudlow' s; it would needto be an ' error ' abutcontentaremistaken ." This objectionfails theory thattells us why ourjudgements because it assumes thatwehaveintuitionsaboutcontents (apartfrom thoseintuitionswe are taughtto havein philosophygraduate seminars ) . Clearly we haveintuitions about whentwo sentences that we saythe same thing, but it is quite anothermatterto suppose havenaturalintuitionsaboutcontents . The situationis somewhat relatedto thatin syntax , whereChomskyhasargued that we haveintuitionsaboutthe acceptability of a sentence but not aboutits grammaticality . The latter notion is a theoreticalconstruct(just like, I submit, the notion of content . ) Accordingly, no error theory is necessary ; we haveno naturalcontentintuitions aboutwhich to be in error. 9. For what it ' s worth, I find this a plausiblereconstruction of what Fregewastrying to . It is certainlya reasonable say way of taking remarkslike the following (quotedearlier " in this chapter must be different ) : Although the thoughtis the same , the verbalexpression so that the sense be affectedby the differing timesof utterance , which would otherwise ." In other words, the verbal expressionmust change with , is readjusted circumstances in orderto express the samesense . 10. Doesit follow thattheremustbean independently , or is talk of sense existingsense just a handyway of talking aboutour ability to keeptrack of when two indexical expressions or attitudeattributions thatthelatter saythe same thing? I aminclinedto suppose is thecase of course it wouldbepossible to saythatsuchabilitiesunderwrite , although construedas abstractobjects . Sucha any epistemicrelation we might haveto senses in moredetail (if obliquely) in chapter 4. possibility will be discussed 11. In recentyearstherehasbeena greatdealof work on thesesortsof simulationtheories . For surveysof this literature and Smith 1986 , seeCarruthers ; Daviesand Stone 1995a ,b. 12. For a proposalin this vein, seeNolan 1970 . 13. Divide yes but not wall off. Thus we have a in thenatural , proliferationof disciplines sciences (molecularbiology , primateecology , etc.) which ignoretraditionaldisciplinary boundaries andwhich suppose that the varioussciences areconnected at somelevel and thatpostulating theories which rely on these connections is entirelyappropriate . Chapter4 " 1. Consider , for example , the following fragmentfrom Parmenides ( 1984 ): It mustbe " that what is therefor speakingof and thinking of is; for it is thereto be. The idea is 's alsoclearlyarticulated in Plato a s1l ' anger (237DE ), where Sophist pointsoutto Theatetus ' ' that if we fail to refer whenwe usethe expression somethingwe havefailed to express a determinate : proposition ' ' SIr: Surelywe canseethatthisexpression somethingis alwaysusedof a thing thatexists . Wecannotuseit just by itself in nakedisolationfrom everything thatexists , canwe? Theatetus : No. ' is to SIr: Is your assent dueto thereflectionthatto speak of ' something of ' some speak onething' ?

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11reatetus : Yes . ' ' ' ' SIr: Because you will admit that something standsfor one thing, as somethings stands for two or more . : Certainly 11reatetus . ' is to : Soit seems SIT to follow necessarily thatto speak of whatis not ' something speak of no thing at all. 11reatetus : Necessarily . SIr: Must we not even ' refuseto allow that in such a casea personis saying something , though he may be speakingof nothing? Must we not assertthat he is not even ' ' sayinganythingwhenhe setsaboututteringthe sounds a thing that is not ? Aristotle broke with Platoon a numberof metaphysical issues , but not on the connection between andmetaphysics . In chapter1 of Book Z of the Metaphysics , for language esthe questionof whetherpredicates must refer to independent , Aristotle address example '' forms: "And so onemight evenraisethe questionwhetherthe words ' to walk , to ' ' ' be healthy , to sit, imply that eachof thesethings is existent , and similarly in other casesof this sort; for noneof them is either self- subsistent or capableof being separated from substance , but rather , if anything , it is that which walks or sits or is healthy that is an existentthing. Now theseareseento be morereal because thereis something definite which underliesthem (i .e., the substance of individual) which is implied in ' ' ' ' " sucha predicate ; for we neverusethe word good of sitting without implying this. with Platoon thequestion HereAristotle disagrees of whether theremustbe independent forms, but crucially baseshis argumenton the linguistic fact that predicatescannot . (Seep. 2 of Alston 1964for a brief discussion of this passage .) standalone 2. The ideathat the domainshouldbe stipulated in advance in certain maybe grounded aboutthe desirabilityof formal rigor in semantic assumptions theory (andthe sciences in Ludlow 1992 reflectsa misunderstanding , asis argued , sucha desideratum ); however generally aboutthe role of formal rigor in science . generally for certain psycholinguisticreasons 3. It may well be that either (2) or ( 3) is inadequate . , but this would be a questionfor investigation 4. For a discussion of a fragmentof this kind, seesubsection 4.3.2 of LarsonandSegal . 1995 asan argument 5. A similar argument hasbeenraisedagainstusing singulareventanaphora of events . for the existence view, seeBealer 1982 6. For a lesspessimistic , and many , ChierchiaandThrner 1988 of the essays in ChierchiaandThrner 1989 . the apparent commitmentto 7. Somephilosophers havesuggested that we can escape . Thefirst assumption like Pegasus if we makea coupleof basicassumptions , standard objects holds, so that in free logics, is that we neednot assume existentialgeneralization from (i ), for example , we neednot infer (ii ). (i ) = Pegasus Pegasus (ii ) . for somex, x = Pegasus

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We cangrantthis point, sinceour concernis whetherreferringexpressions themselves raiseontological commitments of the involvement (quite independently .of quantification ). The questionis whetheran axiom like ( 17 ) by itself mustcommit us to an object like Pegasus . The issueis complicatedby the fact that (i ) appears to be contentfulin a way that (iii ) doesnot. (iii ) Val(x, Egret) iff x refersto Egref. Oneway of distinguishingaxiomslike ( 17 that ) from axiomslike (iii ) is by supposing . So, for example we havea conceptof , ( 17 they invokeconcepts ) is contentfulbecause we haveno conceptcorresponding , but (iii ) is not because to Egref. The prima Pegasus facie problemwith this solutionis that axiomslike ( 17) do not appear to be aboutconcepts . So, for example , but ratheraboutobjects who believedin the existence , a philosopher of Pegasus from his beliefsabout might well distinguishhis beliefsaboutPegasus the conceptof Pegasus . In sucha , and in turn may distinguish the two in his speech ' s utterances case for this philosopher , ( 17 ) mayplaya role in giving the semantics about aboutthe conceptof Pegasus . That would requirea second , but not his utterances Pegasus axiom referring specificallyto the concept . In any case , following considerations raisedin section1.3, I am highly skepticalof any analysisof concepts asbeingdistinct from their I -language . manifestations 8. See . , e.g., Kripke 1980 9. There is probably also room to wonder about the relevanceof rigidity intuitions here . Thoughit maybeconceded to Kripke thatnames in a way thatdescriptions rigidly designate do not, Stanley( 1997a that rigidity ) hasarguedthat Kripke merelyassumes is relevantto the theory of meaning . Pointing to Kripke ' s ( 1980 , p. 14) remarksthat " we havea direct intuition of the of , exhibitedin our understanding rigidity of names " thetruth conditions of particularsentences holdsthatKripke begsthequestion . , Stanley The intuitions aboutrigidity , if thereare suchthings, may haveno bearingon our understanding of truth conditions . 10. Note the parallelbetween this andmy discussion ofindexicals in section3.2. 11. I am indebtedto Ernie Leporefor discussion of this point. 12. For a statement of the concerns . For criticism, seeKripke 1976 . , seeWallace1972 13. SeeDreyfus 1982for just a sample . 14. In this sectionI havefocusedexclusivelyon the questionof whethersubstitutional . Thereare also numerous quantificationin fact freesus from ontological commitment technicaldifficulties that arisefor substitutional quantificationasa thesisaboutnatural - for example , someof which bearmentioning , the questionof whethersubstitutional language can be extended to quantifierslike ' most' and ' few' (Davies quantification 1981a ; Ludlow 1985 , section4.B ; Lewis 1985 ). For example , if the truth conditionsof ' Most ' spiesarebored aregivenasin the following example , the truth conditionscome out wrong, sincespieswill go by manynames , andit is possiblethat onespyin particular , Jones of names (say ) maybetheonly boredspy , but by virtueof his havingthousands , the following will be true: ' is true. For mosttermst , suchthat t- ' is a spy' is true andt- ' is bored

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technical difficulties areinteresting it must , I havesetthemasidebecause Althoughthese first bedemonstrated that substitutional frees us from all onto quantification logical commitments . I will returnto this problem(underanotherguise ) in chapter8.

ChapterS I. Thisisbasically theapproach totense in very efforts withinMontague Grammar early in particular of Montague . It has alsobeen 1974 in truth , in thePTQfragment adopted conditional semantics andLudwig1998 . ; see Lepore 2. Variations onthistheme arepossible . See Vickner for anexample . 1985 3. A more T theory canbefound in appendix T4. comprehensive 4. See Vickner 1985 andchapters 2 and3 of Hornstein 1990 for proposals onderiving tenses fromsimpler ones in theReichenbachian . framework complex have thataquantificational 5. Others observed treatment of these connectives is in order . See Bonomi 1997 forone such and for asurvey of some of therelevant literature . proposal of temporal 6. Thistreatment connectives relies asyncategormatic treatment of the upon . Thatis, theyareassigned connectives no specific andareimmediate category daughters of S. If wemake thenatural that should beassigned acategory CONJ , assumption they thena setof axioms thelinesof (7') couldbeemployed . along ' (7 ) a. Val Val ' ) iffVal( T, SIS , R ' ) and ') , s, R , E, 0 ,E ,0 , S, R ,E ,0 ( T, ~ SI CONJ1 ( T, CONJP b. Val is a y, sit. Val x,y), CONI CONIS2 , S, R, E, s) and (x, [CONI ], S, R, E, s) iff there Val R E s S S , , , , , (y ) c. ' Val x,y), [CONIa], S, R, E, 0 ' ) iffVal x,y), a ' ) (where a is 'before ., S, R, E, 0 , ' , or ' when ' ' after ) d. Val x,y), 'beforeS , R, E, 0 ' ) iff x is earlier thany
e. Va1 x,y}, ' after' , S, R, E, 0 ' ) iff x is later thany f. ' SR E 0 Val x,y}, ' when , , , , ' ) iff x temporallyoverlapswith y. . 7. Seeappendix T4 for detailsof the derivation ' ' for verbalinflection. 8. Here Infl stands 9. SeeHigginbotham 1989for further motivation for the introduction of eventpositions into nouns . . 10. The label is from Abusch1997 ' 11. Abusch( 1997 that it doesnot work , but I don t find her ; seeespeciallyp. 4) argues . on the crucial datapersuasive judgements . 12. SeeGiorgi andPianesi1998for discussion for the reductionof times to setsof eventsor propositionsarecommon 13. Proposals . literatureon time. See in the philosophical , e.g., Quine 1960

- 93 Notesto pp. 87 Chapter 6 1. The discussion that follows owesmuchto Smith ( 1993 ). 2. It alsoappears to be the coursetakenby Mellor ( 1981 . , aswe will seein a ) However anotherway out. bit, Mellor proposes ' s andSmart 's 3. Smith ( 1993 that thereis a differencebetween ) suggests Reichenbach in that, whereas Reichenbach makes use of the notion of strategies the time ultimately or eventof this very utterance with talk of timesor events , Smartdispenses . 4. HereI am ignoring anotherserious : Preciselywhat does difficulty for the B-theorist it meanto give detensed truth conditions ? If the truth conditionsareto be expressed in the metalanguage is English , and the metalanguage of English are , andall expressions tensed , by virtue of whatpowerarewe supposed to strip the metalanguage of its tensed ? And if we can strip the metalanguage of suchvocabulary vocabulary , is the remaining one that we actuallyunderstand ? In addition language , quite apartfrom our interestin , thereis the very real questionwhethera tenseless giving a truth-conditionalsemantics is evenpossible . (SeeTeichmann 1998for a discussion .) language 5. Smith( 1993 rather than a ) putsthis asanepistemological point logical one; heclaims we canseea priori that (9) is false , but not so with (8) . 6. SeeDavidson1967b field 1985for variousversions , Evans1985a , andButter of this idea . 7. I am gratefulto RichardLarsonandErnie Leporehere . An alternative story(Ludlow 1997b thatwethink of (8) ascontaining a strictbiconditional ) suggests - or , if oneprefers , asbeingin the scopeof a modaloperator , asin (i ) . (i ) ' is true iff there o (An utterance at time t of 'Thereis no spokenlanguage is no spoken at t) language if we suppose thatthetheorems themselves areextensional ( Even , asin Davidson1967a andin LarsonandSegal1995 , we might want to allow suchoperators , sincewe takethe theorems to be derivedfrom whatwe know to be a trueT-theoryfor thelanguage . In that case is something like "we know it is a theorem , the hiddenoperator of trueT-theoryfor ' , we needto be on alert for scopeambiguities . Intuitively, Englishthat. . .. ) . Accordingly what is amisshereis that we want the actualtokeningto simply fix the reference time, but we don' t want to be committedto the absurdview that necessarily thereis an utterance of the tokenin questionat the time that thereis no spoken . If we want to language capturethis intuition we needto makesurethat the eventquantificationhasscopeover -event the modaloperatorin (i ). Payingattentionto the relative scopeof the utterance , we get the following truth conditionsfor (8) : quantificationandthe modaloperator (ii ) ' An utterance u at time t of ' Thereis no spoken languageis suchthat o (u is true iff there is no spoken at t) language As above this fixes the evaluation to the time of utterance , of the token , but it keepsthe outside thescope of themodaloperator . Therestof thereasoning quantification proceeds asabove . 8. It does for how we think aboutthe T-theoryintroduced , however , entail someconsequences in chapter 5. Now it is no longersentences thatareto beevaluable bututterances ,

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in questionwill not be on the LHS of the andthe structuraldescriptionof the sentence ! Consider axiom (i ) : biconditionalbut will be outsidethebiconditionalaltogether (i ) ' , S, R, E, 0 Val( T, LpNP 1 ' ], S, R, E, 0 ' ) iff for somex , e, Val(e, 1 ' ) andx is the agentof e andVal(x, NP, S, R, E, 0 ') We will haveto rewrite this asthe conditionalized axiom in (ii ) if we areto incorporate -reflexives . from our discussion of token the lessons learned (ii ) ' , S, at S, of [IP NP 1 ' ], thenVal( Tu , S, R, E, 0 ' ) iff for somex,e, Val(e, 1 If u is utterance ' ). R, E, 0 ' ) andx is the agentof e andVal(x, NP , S, R , E, 0 9. The proposalin Higginbotham1995 , after all, is for tensed thoughtsandnot merely utterances . tensed . . SeealsoHigginbotham1986b 10 B-theorists to psychology arecommon 11 . I realizethatappeals (andhave enough among . seldom hand Constructive Russell1915 been since ), but such beyond waving proposals get it becomes clearthattheyface arefew andfar between , but whentheyaremade proposals that difficulties in their ownright. Atkins ( 1986 , p. 98), for example , suggests conceptual of entropy : " We havelookedthrough is simply our experience our time consciousness Law, andhaveseenthe nakedpurthe window on to the world providedby the Second . The deepstructureof changeis decay of nature ; the spring of changein poselessness asit spreads of thequalityof energy all its formsis thecorruption , irreversibly , chaotically ' in time. All change andpurposelessly , and time s arrow , point in the direction of corruption es in our . The experience of time is the gearingof the electrochemical process ." drift into chaosas we sink into equilibrium and the grave brainsto this purposeless ' more detail. to be out in rather spelled Obviously the core of Atkins s position needs ? How does leave anelectrochemical of entropy Justhowis it thatwe areconscious entropy to consciousness of time, and in ? How does of this rise on our brains any give imprint ?Needless to say tensed of time asbeingfundamentally , these particularto theexperience questionsare profoundly difficult , andAtkins has not provided any suggestionas to else . . Nor, frankly, hasanyone how they may be answered Chapter7 . on this matter for discussion 1. 1 am indebtedto Ed Keenan 2. Nor would this simply imply that 1am glad that a certainpropositionwasno longer . A better of a certainabstract true. My stateof relief is not aboutthe character proposition " the contentof the stateis that way of glossingthis is as I am in a stateof relief, and ." )][] is past [][(3e )(e is the eventof my havinga root canal . llitimately onewouldwant connectives 3. Here1treatthetemporal syncategonnatically for expositorypurposes . 1amtakingthefonner approach treatment a categonnatic only. that syntacticstructuremustbe binary runsafoul of assumptions 4. Of coursethis strategy out in binary branchingstructures , but the samegeneralideacanbe cashed branching that thereareboth not thebestway) is to suppose . Oneway of doing this (perhaps like [TP structures adverbphrases ( TPs ) and to hypothesize (AdvPs ) and tensephrases : like the to write axioms Adv S and Tense[Adv ]], following P

- 124 Notesto pp. 103 Val( T Tense AdvP]) iff thereis an x, suchthatVal(x , Tense , [TP ) andVal(x, AdvP) Val(x, [Adv Adv S iff there is an x such that Val x Adv and x=[] S[] ]]) , P ( , ) 5. For a clearstatement of this objection . , seeComrie 1985 6. Obviously , if ' is an eternal(e.g. mathematical ) propositionthenit may well be both future andpast . Herewe areconcerned with bounded events . 7. Although the objection turns on a theory in which the operatorsapply to events rather than to propositions , the objection is readily adaptedto propositions . The idea would be that a givenpropositionis future, thenpresent . , andthenpast 8. That is, from the rejectionof the idea that thereare only two possibletruth values . Truth-valuegapsarealsopossible . ChapterS 1. For discussion seePrior 1971 ; Evans1982 . ; Neale1990 ; Ludlow andNeale 1991 2. For example and Donellan 1966 . , by Strawson( 1950 For criticism of the view ) ( ) , seeKripke 1976andNeale 1990 . 3. Of courseRussell( 1905 ) wasthe first to introducethe possibility of namesas descriptions in disguise . Numerous othershaveadvocated sucha view. SeeKripke 1980 for criticism. 4. Of course like ( 15b , thoughthey often areinfelicitous, examples ), ( 16b ), ( 17b ), and be perfectlynatural . In fact, in the computerscience ( 18b ) canon occasion community thetaskis oftennot to explaintheinfelicity of suchexamples but ratherto find techniques ' " " . For a by which the subsequent pronouns intendedspecification canbe detennined discussion of this point seep. 317 of Sidner 1983 . 5. The proposal of Evans( 1977 do ) differs from the othersin that , while suchpronouns not standproxy for descriptions fixed (rigidly ) by description , theyhavetheir referents . 6. Amongthe varioustheories of descriptive there are a number of , pronouns proposals as to how descriptivecontent is to be recovered . In somecasesit is to be recovered ; in othersit is to be recovered . pragmatically by a generalsyntacticalgorithm 7. Axioms canalsobe written for binary branchingstructures like the following:

8. Oneideawould beto introducenumericalsubscripts into theseoperators (e.g., to indicate "N " . daysago ) andto developthe semantics accordingly

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Notesto pp. 128 - 139

for discussion of the material 9. I am grateful to GregRay and Murali Ramachandran in this section . of temporaldonkeyanaphora ? Partee that (i ) 10. Are therealsocases ) suggests ( 1984 . below would be an exampleof E-temporaldonkeyanaphora (i ) on a Friday . Whenever , Samwasasleep Mary telephoned It seems to me that this is mistaken . The problemis that the tensevariablein ' [Samwas ' to bestraightforwardly boundby ' whenever on a Friday' , ] seems Mary telephoned asleep ' ' not by someembedded temporalquantifier (i.e., not by a Friday ) . The differenceis that donkey anaphorahasthe pattern shownin (ii ) below, where bracesindicate the . donkeyanaphor

(ii) [All x: R(x, [some ])]R'(x, {y}) y: Py 's the of (iii). ButPartee follows example pattern iii ( ) '])]R'(y, {t}) t': Pt [All t: R(x, y, [some
in (iii ) is anaphoric on t ratherthan The problemof courseis that the temporalanaphor . I haveyet to discovera convincing e. It is simply a caseof bound variableanaphora . caseof temporaldonkeyanaphora -clause(" during -alonesentences 11. Notice that in (61), aswith stand , thereis a when " in the relativeclause . the Iranianrevolution ) too muchhereby callingtheneeded structure 12 . I amprobably abstract , since conceding - beginning thanthe sort of structure we posit everyday I doubtthat it is any moreabstract arenot pronounced . Strictly speaking with sentence andwordboundaries , thoseboundaries should either . It remainsa mysteryto me why the positing of suchstructures to abstract a is while the liberal positingof reference in certainquarters meetresistance - asthoughreference camefor free! allowedto passwithout complaint 13. Thesewerethe solutionsinitially exploredby Smith ( 1975 ), and ), Ladusaw( 1977 ). Dowty ( 1982 andwhich will haveto bemetat some whichI takeseriously 14 . This is achallenge point. Furthermore , arguingfor the plausibility of thesestructureswithin current linguistic . As an illustrationof the kind of effort that is necessary , theoryis not a trivial enterprise in Larsonet at. 1997 . The arguments clauses of implicit complement seethe treatment -clauses will be no lesssubtleandno less andimplicit relativeclauses for implicit when . intertwinedwith the principlesof currentlinguistic theory found in den clauses of the for 15. Here I am thinking argument implicit complement . Dikken et at. 1996andin Larsonet at. 1997 Chapter9 ' and ' after' 7, it is possible to treat ' before I . Not necessarily , since , aswe sawin chapter ' and ' after' ' before that the A theories is . The critical for simply thing disquotationally relation holding betweeneventson aBseries not be cashedout in terms of a precedence time line.

- 147 Notesto pp. 139

227

2. For example research hasbeendevoted to the question , a greatdealof psychological ' or ' after' is of whether ' before acquiredfirst. This research may initially appearunlikely to shed a greatdealof light on whether theB-theoryor theA -theoryis correct ; however ' . Forexample , this appearance to argue thatif ' before , it is possible maybedeceptive ' ' and after essentially thesame relation(as to the , for example , theydo according express B-theory ), thenthe acquisitionof thesetwo termsshouldoccur at the sametime. If so, thenthe questionof whetheronemight be moreeasilylearned thanthe othermight become . It might suggest thatthebefore /afterrelationis not a primitive afterall, significant and that the meaningsof ' before' and ' after' have rather different fine structure . . Early studies EveClark ( 1970 , theresultshereareinconclusive Unfortunately , 1971 ) by ' ' ' that childrenlearned' before suggested prior to learningthe meaningof after . Clarke further hypothesized that this could be accounted for if one supposed that thesepredicates weredecomposible into moreprimitive semantic features(including, on her theory 's and+/- prior). ThoughClarke , +/- simultaneous findingshavebeenconfinned by somestudies(e.g. We'll and Stenning 1978 ; Munro and Wales 1982 ), a great deal of research (Amidon and Carey 1972 ; Kelier-Cohen 1974 subsequent , 1987 ; Frenchand Brown 1977 ; Coker 1978 order ; Goodz 1982 ; Trosborg1982 ) hasshownno consistent of acquisition . Thesestudiesshowedthat otherfactorsmay be involvedin the order of - for example , whetherthe clausesare arbitrarily or logically ordered acquisition , or the orderof mentionof the events described . , or somecombinationof thesefactors 3. Subsequent research (seee.g. French1986 ) hasreportedotherresults , althoughcaution is necessary in interpretingthe results . Crucially, in the experiments reportedby French , childrenshowed facility with suchtermswhenreportingcausalor logical connections between . But this is not the sameassuggesting events that childrenhavefacility ' and ' after' which is of course with thetemporal uses of ' before whatis at issuehere ( ). 4. Presumably the psychologists the ability to decenteras a certain form of regarded achievement that it really , thoughone can imaginephilosophicalcritiques suggesting amounts to our adoptinga certainalienperspective on the world. s. Among other matters of separating out causalusesof , thereis the thorny ' when' asin " whenI touchthestoveI bum problem ' ( ) found, the myself ) . As Kelier-Cohen( 1974 causalandtemporalusesarenot well differentiated in early child language . -Pontywasdrawn 6. I owethis section to BrianBeakley . Thematerialon Merleau heading to my attentionby at leasthalf a dozencolleagues andstudents at StonyBrook. Chapter 10 1. Eachof thesequestionswould requirea book-length treatment . On the philosophy of space thattheargument from indexicalityemployed , for example , it shouldbeapparent ' ' ' ' in chapter 6 applies , just aswell to spatialindexicalslike here and there . Accordingly onemight anticipatethe collapseof space into a point, or perhaps one might find support for a Leibnizianpictureof space . The issues arevery subtle , however , anddemand . Parenthetically , Mellor ( 1981 very careful study ) hasarguedthat the fact that no one hasadvocated tells againsttheir applicationin the caseof spatialindexical predicates ' s tu time. Calling this the B-theorist , Craig ( 1996b ) hasarguedthat quoqueargument andtime arefundamentally different in this respect . That is certainly a plausible space , but it seemsto me that it would at least be an interesting exerciseto treat response

228

- 149 Notesto pp. 147

-like manner(that is, building spatialco-ordinates in an A -theory out of indexical space ' here ' ' there ' etc. . The obvious like is that where we all sharethe , , ) predicates problem sametemporalperspective (modulorelativisticeffectsit is currentlynow for all of us), ' ' there ' etc. ' we do not sharethe samespatialposition, so ' here , allegedlycan t be real features of physicalspace . The challenge for anA -theoryof space is thereforeto carry out the projectwithout collapsinginto a kind of extremesolipsism . 2. I am indebtedto Michael Potterfor discussion of this matter . 3. It appears that the A -theorist cannotappealto the sametruth-value links without to be quantificationovertimes. This , sinceall theselinks employwhat appears changes , however , sincetheA -theoristcould reinterpretthe quanti problemis only superficial fiershereassubstitutional over calendar dates . The result be quantifiers might something like the following (wherethe substituends of t aredates ): AI 't2)[Past :S is true when [ . . .a ] iff (3tl )(S wastrue when [ . . .tl ])] ('v ' B 'tl )[ Fut :S is true when [ . . . tl ] iff (3a )(S will be true when [ .. . a ])] ('v C' 't2)[S is true when [ . . . a ] iff ('v 'tl )( Fut :S wastrue when [ . .. II ])] ('v D' 'tl )[S is true when [ .. . tl ] iff ('v :s will be true when [ . . . a ])] ('v ' a )( past andso on. 4. Canall records ? Couldn' t onearguethat it is physicallyimpossible of aneventbe erased to erase all recordsof a crime? Imagine . , for example , an explosionin deepspace What would it taketo eraseall recordsof suchan event ? The criminalscould certainly eliminateall witness esneargroundzero - erasing , andthe criminalscould takememory -eliminationprogramaswell asthe original of the witness pills to striketheir memories . But of coursethe problemis that informationaboutthe explosionis departing explosion the scene at the speed of light. The criminalscan' t catchup to that signal , soin principle the informationis out there . Now it might be objectedthat while the criminalscan' t catchup to the information , whoreflectstheinformationbackto usneithercanwe, sothe barringhelpfrom someone evidence is in principle out of our grasp . That might be a problemfor the thoroughgoing idealist , but we might try to arguethat we areonly committedto antirealism about . Unlesswe moveto somesort of the future and the past . The presentis anothermatter it shouldbe enoughto say that the information is therein the verificationistsemantics , (hereI am overlookingrelativistictroublesinvolving the notion of simultaneity present burdens this might placeon our semantic aswell asthe epistemological ). theory that take What holdsfor events in deepspace could thenbe argued to hold for events -up roomsaswell. The criminalsmight soundproof the room andfind placein zippered of physics a way of blocking electromagnetic emissions , but thereis a genuine question " the informationof what took in aboutwhethertheycanthereby" erase place that room. in the It is arguable that the walls of the room cannotannihilatethe informationpresent . Reconstructing the it asa statechange or bury it in noise room. At bestthey canabsorb to be possiblein principle. information would no doubt be a tall order, but it appears

Notesto pp. 149 - 161

229

And if the room is later destroyed , well thenthe infonnation is still not annihilated , but now released into the environment albeit with yet morenoise . I am not sureabouthow plausiblethis line of argument is with respectto physical . At some the whole universe into a giant black hole. Do we theory point may collapse eventhen? If we extend really want to say that the evidenceof the crime is preserved the questionto quantumphysicsthen the preservation of all information seems even lesslikely, sincemeasurements takenbetween the time of the crime andthe time of our the crime will introducean elementof indeterminacy . attemptto reconstruct Moreover until theendof , evenif it couldbe shownthat all informationis preserved thephysicaluniverse conceivable thatthereshouldbepossible worlds , it certainlyseems wherethis is not the case . But thenour conceptof logical inferenceseems far too brittle . It shouldsurvivein worldswith differentphysicalproperties , shouldit not? Of course we aretalking aboutextremely sothematteris far from clear . general physicalproperties As I haveno ideahow to tackle thesequestions I passover them here . However , they arenodoubtwell worthpursuing . (I amindebted to EmilianoTrizio andEmilianoBoccardi for discussion of thesematters .) 5. Thereis a question led to accept( E) . , however , asto whethertheA -theoristis compel Onesupposes thattheanswer is yes to entailgiving up thegeneral , sincegiving it up appears thesisthat currentfactsdetermine truth. The issueis subtle , however , and perhaps there are ways for the A -theorist to block (E) . Until we have somejustification for on the assumption that the truth-valuelinks , we needto proceed blocking ( E), however A will drive the A theorist to contradiction in situations whereall evidence of an ( ) ( D) actioncanbe erased . -Nielsen 1988 6. For defenses of the standard view, seeWekker1976andDavidsen . 7. For a very interesting discussion of the origin of futuretensein Romance , languages seeFleischman . 1982 8. This is the only casewherethe identity breaksdown, althoughnot by much . Notice that onedifferencehereis that the intervocalic" b" hasdroppedout- a familiar process in the history of Romance . languages 9. Examples includeSicilian andSouthern Italian dialectsandspoken . Portuguese 10. For discussions Jenkins1972(p. 73ft '.); Huddleston '.); Coates 1983 , see 1976(p. 69ft (p. 177ff.) . Thereis alsoa brief reviewof this literaturein Palmer1990(p. 163ff.) . 11. For the record the conditionalmorphemes and the perfect , in Romance languages comefrom the sameLatin forms, and in many casesthe common ) morphemes (preterite . Considerthe following paradigmfrom Italian: origin is obvious remoto passato cred ei -esti -e (-ette ) -emmo -esteer -erono 12. SeeChafeandNichols 1986 . ; Palmer1986 ; Willett 1988 condizionale cred -er-ei -er-esti -er-ebbe -er-emmo -este -er-ebbero

230

Notesto pp. 163 - 174

. Theindexicalcharacter 13 of evidentials shouldbeobvious . In theroot case , something -handevidence that is first-handevidence for you might be second for me. Likewise, I evidence for something in the beginning , but archivalevidence might haveperceptual at another time. A similar storycanbetold for modaldispositions in the world. Eachtime we return to the Wicked Witch ' s hourglass , it has a different dispositional property. visits andtimesto illustrate , sinceI am usingsequential Obviouslytheseremarksareloose the indexicalcharacter of evidentialsand dispositions . Strictly speaking , evidentiality and modaldispositions will be the fundamental notionsthat underwriteour talk of timesandtemporalsequence . Appendix PI 1. Still , therearedifferences in the parametric of differentI -languages , and , although settings we shouldnot exaggerate these differences that , I think it is flatly falseto suppose of sense and shadeof , if preservation everythingis in principle translatable- at least ' meaningare importantto us. On this scoreJackendoffs claimsare completelyat odds with whatprofessional translators know . For a historicaldiscussion of translation , theory seeVenuti 1995 . 2. In point of fact, asis argued in Ludlow 1985 , I think the storyis false. For the sakeof otherwise . , however , let us suppose argument 3. In fact, thesearguments are at bestarguments againsta thesisthat would deny any structure to a sentence . apartfrom that visible in the written form of the sentence 4. Indeed . , doingjust that is a pet projectof mine. SeeLudlow 1998 5. I havealreadyhinted that I doubt they tell againstthe thesisthat E-language could be the language of thought . The ideais that onecanquite readily hold that E-language sentences haveLF representations with all the structure that I -language representations aresupposed to have . Indeed a number of individuals hold . , preciselythis thesis

P2 Appendix 1. Thematerial in thissection is drawn fromLudlow(forthcoming ). 2. Kant1910 - 1983 volume 15 . 76-77 translation from Coffa 1991 , , pp ; ). (p. 31 3. Kant1910 - 1983 15 fromCoffa1991 , volume , p. 78; translation ). (p. 31 " 4. Wittgenstein the matter as follows in his 1915 notebooks , p. 46): It (1961a explains thattheconstituents is clear of ourstatements canandshould beanalyzed of by means definitions to therealstructure of thestatement , andmustbe , if we wantto approximate . . . .Theanalyzed mentions morethantheunanalyzed . Theanalysis proposition makes theproposition more thanit was andmust notmake it , butit cannot complicated more that its reference was from the first. When the is as complicated proposition just asits reference ." , theit is completely complex analyzed I amindebted 5. In thefollowing discussion topersonal communication withChomsky . ' 6. Onepossible for Higginbotham here is to render thelinesof (4 ). (4) along response ' 4 ( ) Yourreport failsto make it clear thatonaverage a familyhas 2.3 children .

topp Notes . 174 - 182

231

' Thereare . For starters , however , potentialpitfalls in the (4 ) gambit , thereportdescribed in (4') neednot be aboutthe average at family all ; it could very well be a reporton milk in urbanareas . Is (4") a possibility? consumption " (4 ) Your reporton the average a family has2.3 family fails to makeit clearthat on average . children Obviouslynot, sincethis bringsus backto the apparent quantificationover the average the upstairs NP canbe analyzed family. But perhaps , alongthe awayin anotherfashion linesof (4"' ) . " (41) Yourreporton what , on average , the stateof familiesis, fails to makeit clearthat on average a family has2.3 children . But this might not do either , since(4) doesnot saythat the reportis on the generalstate of families. 7. Somemight claim to seea paradoxemerging . I am claiming that science here hasno does . The apparent , yet I -language specialclaim on ontology paradoxis that the nature of I -languageis supposed to be the product of scientific investigation . I am not sure thereis anythingmoreto the tensionherethanoneexpects to find in naturalization projects - whether it is epistemologythat we are naturalizing or the philosophy of language andmetaphysics . ( Forsurveys of some issues in naturalizing , seeQuine philosophy 1969 .) 1993 ; Komblith 1994 ; ShimonyandNails 1987 ; Papineau 8. Both PaulHorwich andNoamChomskyhavesuggested asmuchto me. 9. Nor doesit help to arguethat the concepts mediatebetween andthe world. language In that case /world relation. If conceptual , the sameconsiderations apply to the concept structureunderwritesour metaphysicalintuitions about I -substances , then our intuitions aboutI -substances will provideinsightsinto our conceptual structure , andour conceptual structurewill provideinsightsinto the structureof I -language . For the record ,I " middleman " here consider structure to be a dispensable . conceptual Appendix Tl 1. Here I ignore issuesaboutthe proper formalism for representing linguistic phrase . Among efforts to address markers this issue . , seeLasnik andKupin 1977 2. SeeKayne 1984for a defense of the thesisthat only binary branchingstructures are . SeeKayne 1994for a defense of the view that they must possiblein naturallanguage be rightwardbranching . 3. SeeNealeandLudlow (forthcoming of this point. ) for further discussion 4. Thereis an empiricalquestionasto whetherit is the optimal way of characterizing c-command in naturallanguage . Othercandidate theories areofferedby Aoun , Hornstein , andSportiche between theseproposals will ( 1981 ) andby May ( 1985 ) . The differences not be consequential to anyclaimsmadein tJiisbook. " 5. These area bit retrofrom theperspective of the" minimalistprogram representations of L F in theminimalistprogram (Chomsky1995b ) . For a gooddiscussion , seeHornstein . 1995

232

- 192 Notesto pp. 191

T2 Appendix I . Thenotation andthespecific execution of theevent here arefromthe(EC ) analysis of Larson andSegal 1995 . fragment 2. See 1989 1985 1991 . , e.g., Higginbotham , Parsons , andParsons 3. Clearlythisis anoversimplification . In particular is not , anNP in subject position theagent (at leastnotin English , however ). Ourgoal , is notto givea full account always of English to introduce thebasic mechanisms of theevent calculus , butmerely , to if see be useful in the semantics of tense . ultimately theymay 4. Following the(EC of Larson andSegal . 1995 ) fragment

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Index

Names , L., 78 Aqvist Bach , E., 65 , 131 , S., 39 Bergier , G., 25 Berkeley ., 21 Bloom ,P ., 153 ,P , 154 Boghossian , B., 39 Boguraev Bolzano , B., 171 , F. H., 46 Bradley Brennan , S., 56 Brentano , F., 22 Briscoe , T., 39 Broad , C. D., 106 , 153 , 175 , T., 96, 152 Burge Ca111lthers ., 45 ,P , 46 Casteiiada , H.-N., 91 Chamberlain , A., 141 Chamberlain , I., 141 Chierchia , G., 37 , 130 - 23 , Chomsky , N., 13 , 14 , 17 , 38 , 166 , 168

Einstein , A., 1 ,2 En , 130 ~, M., 82 Evans , G., 13 ; 14 , 40, 44, 60 , 61 , 114 , 113 , 116 , 129 , 138 Fodor , J. A., 26 , 28 - 61 , G., 44, 58 Frege Gale , R., 2, 77 ., 116 Geach ,P , A., 78, 8 Giorgi , H., 140 Goodglass Gould . S. J.. . 21 Gottlieb , D., 74 Grimshaw , J., 39 , J., 130 Groenendijk Guenthner , F., 78

- 182 172 , 185 Clark , E., 139 Clark , H., 56 Coffa , J. A., 171 Comrie , B., 81 , 131 , R., 116 Cooper . L., 92 ,W Craig ., 140 Cromer , R. F , 141

Hai 'k , I., 173 Hale , K., 39 Hall , H., 75 Helm .I... lIS. . 116 . 83 . , 39 , 49. 59. 82 , J., 13 , 30 Higginbotham 94 , 131 , 174 , 120 , 173 Hinrichs , E., 78 , 102 , 130 Hintikka , J., 72 Hofmann ., 154 ,F Hornstein , N., 78 , 82 , 172 Husserl , E., 75
Iamblichus ,1 Iabidou , S., 161 , G., 74 Ioup Isard , S., 161 Izvorski , R., 162

Davidson , 191 , 31 , 38 , 73 , 75 , 152 , Do Davies , Mo , 116 Descartes , Ro , 25 , 152 Dieks , Do ,3 , 103 , D., 82 , 84 , 102 Dowty Dummett , 39 , 44 , 71 , 76 , 99 , 109 , , 3, 5, 38 140 , 148 , 151

- 167 Jackendoff , 165 , R., 23 , 28 -Laird ., 26 Johnson ,P , 125 , 130 , H., 81 Kamp

248
Kant , I., 4, 171 , 179 -60 Kaplan , D., 7, 8, 13 . 14 ,57 .64 .93 - 30 Katz , J., 28 -Cohen Kelier , D., 141 , S. J., 39 Keyser Kneale ., 89 ,W , S., 71 , 72 Kripke Ladusaw ., 82 ,W , 84 Larson -58 , R., 32 , 33 , 42 , 49 , 51 , 54 , 61 ,62 , 69 , 70 , 93 , 184 , 186 , 187 , 191 , 197 , 203 , 209 Lasnik , H., 21 - 31 , E., 29 , 36 , 43 Lepore Lewis , D., 29 , 115 , 116 Loewer , B., 36 , 43 Ludlow ., 49 -56 ,P , 51 , 54 , 61 , 62 , 64 , 113 , - 155 128 , 130 , 153 , 184 , 197 , 209 , R., 182 , 185 May -Ginet McConnell ., 37 .S McDowell , J., 149 McNeill , D., 140 . 14 . 15 . 105 . , J. M. E., 1 , 2, 8, 9, 12 McTaggart 108 - 135 , 133 , A., 71 Meinong Mellor , H., 1 . 134 . 163 , 95 , 96 , 107 , 108 , 133 -Ponty - 144 Merleau , M., 142 , R., 102 Montague Neale ., 113 ,S , 116 ., 39 Nirenberg ,S Pannenides , 65 Parsons , C.. 75 , 76 Parsons , T., 71 , 81 , 85 , 116 , 120 , 121 . 123 Partee , B., 9, 103 , 104 , 112 , 129 , J., 7, 8, 13 . 57 , 58 , 60 Perry Pianesi ., 78 ,F , 82 - 169 Pinker .. 21 -25 ,S , 23 . 165 Plato , 46 Postal ., 28 ,P - 109 Prior , A. N., 4, 5, 15 , 78 . 100 , 107 . 133 , 135
, J., 39 Pustejovsky Putnam , H., 2, 3, 152 , 175 , 177 , W. V. 0 ., 66 , 75 , 117 Quine

Index

Schein , B., 120 , G., 32 , 33 , 42 , 49 , 54 , 57 , 58 , 69 , 70 Segal , 93 , 184 , 186 , 187 , 191 , 203 Sellars ., 74 ,W Semenza , C., 42 , R., 25 Shepard Sklar , L., 3 Smart , J. J. C., 89 Smith , C., 82 , 84 Smith . D. W ., 72 Smith Q., 92 Stein , H., 3 Stokhof , M., 130 Stowell , T., 82 Strawson . F., 112 ,P Tarski , A., 185 van Fraassen , B., 178 Weist , R. M., 139 , 140 Wettstein , H., 64 Whorf , B. L., 65 WilliamsD . C., 106 , 142 Williams , E., 166 -46 , L., 44 , 171 , 172 Wittgenstein , C., 68 , 148 , 150 , 151 , 155 Wright
., 90 ,P Yourgrau Zalta , E., 71 Zettin , M., 42 Subjects Adverbs andattachment , 53 ambiguity in disguise , 173 , 174 , 125 locating aspredicates , 125 - 129 , 97 , 98, 102 , 103 , 124 , 156 , temporal 157 Aktionsarten , 123 , 84 , 168 , 173 , 183 , 184 Ambiguity Anaphora E-type - 12 - 117 , 10 , 114 , 131 andmemory , 153 , 69 , 114 plural - 117 , 10 , 11 , 68 , 69 , Ill , 114 pronominal - 124 - 135 , 8- 15 , 101 , 102 , 111 , 129 , temporal 138 , 140 , 141 , 157 , 162 Antirealism , 109 , 148 , 150 - 15 A-series ,1 , 40, 77 , 95 , 96, 141 , 144 , - 149 147 , 152 , 162 , 163 - 123 , 80 , 81 , 85 , 86 , 120 , 161 Aspect tense to, 157 reducing

Raskin , V., 39 Reichenbach . H.. 1 .4. 14 .78 -80 .89 . 139 . 140 Reinhart , T., 182 , U., 81 , 125 , 130 Reyle , L., 26 Rips Rout , R., 71 Iey Russell , B., I , 11 , 25 , 112 , 113 , 217

Index Behavior of , 56 , explanation Belief -sense common of, 55 , 56 theory of, 56 models inferring semantics of, 95 -switching andslow , 154 of, 156 stability nature tensed of, 95 Beliefatbibution - 57 , 54 , 61 , 43, 49-51 -grained fine models of, 56 of, 55 , 62 logistics referential of, 55 component of, 55 , 56 , 61 syntactic component - 57 tacittheory of, 55 , 61, 62 Beliefs abilities for, 57 , tracking , 62 - 8, 12 B-series ,1 , 15 , 40 , 77 , 141 , 147 , 163 B-series relations , 2, 77 , 81 , 126 , 139 ' - 96 B-theorist s dilemma , 87 , 93 Evolution - 22 , 14 , 20 - 156 Externalism , 152 , 175 - 160 Future of, 157 , elimination Generative grammar , 166

249

Gradualism . 21

I-concepts , 166 , 178 Idealism also Antirealism , 75, 76. See ILFs . See Fonns Interpreted Logical , 85 , 86 , 123 Imperfective paradox - 133 , II , 12 , 53 , 131 Implicitclauses Indexicality - 96, 137 andsemantics , 8, 87 anddescriptive content , 58 - 102 Indexical , 47, 90 , 97 , 138 predicates Indexicals , 7, 13 , 14 , 20 , 47 , 168 character of, 7, 20 - 60 , 57 andcommunication , 2, 106 , 107 , 59 Change context of, 57 , 58 , 64, 71 , 169 Cognitive significance sensitivity of scholars andcounterfactuals , 164 , 59 , 60 Community - 187 - 102 of, 14 , 185 , 97 disquotational analysis Compositionality -Intensional andmodality , 23, 181 , 8, 14 , 59 , 60 system Conceptual Content senses of, 57 - 61, 97 , 98 - 102 , 6- 8, 13 , 14 , 15 , 47, 80 , 87 , , 58 , 81 descriptive temporal 22 137 , 155 , 156 , 138 , 57 , 131 , 152 propositional -reflexive - 96 -referring token of, 87 Co tenns , 48, 167 , 169 analysis abilities for, 14 - 64 Counterfactuals , 59 , 60, 161 , 61 tracking - 152 Inference , 69, 73, 147 , 164 DAR Intended model , 84 , 31 - 54 Davidsonian Intensional transitive verbs , 75 , 52 program Dedicto Intentions /deredistinction , 117 , 121 , 20 , 22 research Demonstratives alsoIndexicals Interdisciplinary , 58 , 59 , 90. See , 164 - 57 Fonns , 47 , 62 , 10 , 11 , 60, 71, 113 , 61 Interpreted Logical Descriptions asarguments of tense - 102 Diachronic , 51 , 100 , 151 , 152 disagreement construction of, 200 Dialects , 17 , 18 , 159 fonnaldefinition of, 199 boundaries , 64 Disciplinary - 201 with 197 Discourse fonnalfragment , 129 , 130 Theory Representation intoA-theory formal , , 160 fragment incorporated Dispositions - 213 Double access 209 , 84 readings - 179 DRT I-substance , 129 , 130 , 175 Entailment . 27 , 29 Knowledge of. 27 Cartesian Entrainment , 56 conception of. 151 Environmentalism . See Externalism growth - 156 Environments . 153 preserved by memory second -order . 45. 152 . 156 , 47 hyperintensional -. 152 - 156 self intensional . 164 , 53 - 29 - 45 semantic . 27 . 31 . 38 . 43 . 66 . 70 . 71. , 47, 48 opaque 88 , 144 , 164 , 144 , 2, 72 , 99, 100 , 138 , ISO Epistemology - 123 shared Events , 61, 131 , 73, 74 , Ill , 120 , 166 - 57 - 207 tacit in B-series - 86, 203 , 27 , 28 , 44, 45, 55 , 2, 77 - 201 fonnalfragment for, 197 future andpast - 86 , 99 , 100 , 3, 4, 84 Language - 163 Evidentials , 139 , 140 , 161 acquireddeficits in, 41, 42, 138

250
(cont.) Language - 141 , 41, 42, 99, 138 , 144 acquisitionof , 15 - 22, communicative function of, 8, 13 , 14 , 17

Index -like, 50 , 100 , 156 proposition social , 18 , 67 , 70 , 71 , 74, 75 , 172 , 173 Ontology , mythof, 106 , 107 Passage Past of, 160 - 163 , elimination -articulatory , 23, 181 Perceptual system states , 96 Perceptual PF , 23 , 167 , 181 - 144 , 15 , 137 , 141 , 178 Phenomenology

, 171 analytic ofmind , 2, 164 of age of giants in, 164 passing of religion , 2, 147 of science , 2, 178 of space , 147 Western , 157 , 167 Phonology , 2- 4, 177 , 178 Physics Possible utterances , 92 Markerese ,' 28 Possible , 29 worlds , 60, 94 sparadox , 8- 12 calculus , 105 108 , 133 135 Predicate McTaggart , 186 Predication Meaning , 45, 46 externalist of, 152 Prediction conception intuitive notion of, 175 of behavior , 55 of, 139 of future , 160 knowledge and Presentation , 165 , 166 language , 50 of, 171 Presentism picture , 100 , 109 theory , 143 , 148 semantics and Pronouns , 64 T-theory and , 43 , 10 , II , 116 descriptive - 156 andreference , 15 , 143 , 144 to properties , 152 , 164 Memory , 68 , 69 - 144 intuitions calculus , 40, 71, 141 , 172 , Propositional Metaphysical , 182 - 70 175 , 178 , 179 , 45 , 46, 49, 67 Property theory - 57, 62 -6 ,1 attitudes Metaphysics , 10 , 14 , 20 , 47 Propositional and semantics -76 , 4, 5, 15 , 65 , 95 , 96 , 141 , 163 Propositions , 108 -up bottom of, 50 , 4, 5 eternality Mebical , 21 , 10 , 112 theory general Mind / brain asInterpreted , 54 Fonns , 50 Logical Modal discards , 94 , 10 , 112 singular modals surface fonD of, 172 , 8, 10 , 14 , 71 , 121 - 179 anddispositions P-substance , 160 , 175 - 160 - 141 future tense to, 157 , 163 reducing , 137 Psycholinguistics reference of, 160 Psychology andbeliefattribution , 56 , 62 Names andsemantic , 39 , 54 competence calendar andtheexperience of time , 125 ,2 and andsemantics , 71 , 72 rigidity , 64

59 , 63 ascomputational , 17 , 19 system - 19 E-, 17 , 169 for, 179 faculty -, 14 - 26 - 171 1 , 17 , 159 , 165 , 178 andidiolect , 19 asnatural , 19 object - 26 nature of, 8, 13 , 14 , 17 , 63 - 22 aspartof biological endowment , 17 associal , 18 object - 28 - 169 of thought , 14 , 21 , 54 , 95, 165 andworld - 32 , 22 , 28 , 46 - 179 I World , 171 Language Isomorphism Lexicon , 39 , 71 , 72 , 166 , 167 , 177 , 178 , 181 - 184 - 163 , 156 , 173 , 174 , 181 Linguistics - 173 LF , 73 , 119 , 126 , 171 , 191 . See Inference Logic - 173 fonn , 73 , 119 , 126 , 171 , 191 Logical

, 145 Philosophy ofaction . 147

-72 , 70 proper

Objects , 123 incomplete , 172 , 176 misbehaving natural , 19 nonexistent , 71

Quantification - 189 basicT-theoryfragmentwith, 181 andconditionalized T-theorems , 93 , 186 generalized quantifiertheory

, 74, 85 implicit , 66 metalinguistic

Index
overevents , 73, 74, 77, 84- 86, 121 overproperties , 69 oversemantic values , 66, 76 overtimes , 77, 78, 84- 86, 100 substitutional , 74- 76, 127 , 128 - 184 Quantifierraising(QR), 182

251
- 59 Senses - 46 , 42 , 57 , 61 , 97, 98 , 185 Sequences Simulation , 63 theory -switching - 156 Slow , 153 S-substance , 175 , 177 Stoffen , 75 , 76 , 168 , 169 Synonymy - 185 , 166 , 167 , 169 , 181 , 191 , 192 , Syntax 197 , 203 , 209

Realism , 149 , 177 , 75 , 150 scientific , 178 Reason of, 4, 179 , categories Reference vs. denotation , 113 , 112 to future andpast events - 86, 99, 104 , 15 , 77 ,

to properties , 46 - 106 , 103 , III , 130 temporal and adverbs , 124 , 125 temporal to times , 113 , 140 , 144 , 156 to utterances -93 , 89 , 47 Referring expressions ,3 Relativity Theory , 171 , 172 Representation , 71 , 72 Rigidity Russellian , 49 propositions , 167 Scope asc-command , 182 , 186 , 187 of descriptions andmodals , 60 , 71 , 72 - 184 of quantified , 115 , 117 , 182 expressions of tense , 101 , 104 , 121 morphemes -referential Self , 89 expressions markers Semantic , 28 , 29 - 64 Semantics , 13 , 20 , 27 - 38 absolute , 14 , 28 , 31 , 57 , 65, 82 - 141 A-theory -213 , 144 , 209 , 15 , 97 in, 54 austerity - 96 B-theory , 99, 132 , 138 , , 6- 8, 15 , 77 , 137 - 207 203 and , 72 , 99, 100 epistemology , 58 , 59 Fregean - 31 and /world connections -38 , 27 , 36 , language - 173 171 andmetaphysics , 64-76, 95 , 84 , 85 , , 4, 5, 14 95 , 96 , 99 , 100 , 141 , 163 , 171 -theoretic model , 28 , 30 , 31 -world , 50 possible andpsycholinguistics - 42 , 39 - 179 referential , 14 , 172 - 31 structural , 28 - 135 of Tense , 4, 47, 77 -conditional - 52 truth - 46, 50 , 14 , 28 , 31 , 57 , 64 - 76 - 36 values -52, 66 - 71 Semantic , 48 , , 32 , 45 , 46 74

113 , 156 ,9 implicit ofmodals , 160

-22 . 20 Teleological Explanation - 7. 77 .1 . 106 Temporal becoming - 12 Temporal conjunctions . 11 . 80 . 81 . 101 . III . .

- 141 118 - 135 , 139 , 156 - 91 discourse , 6, 87 , 97, 98 , 137 Temporal , 140 Temporal egocenbism , 96 Temporal perception Tense (s) absolute , 117 , 118 , 120 of, 15 - 141 , 138 acquisition asaspect , I57, 162 - 124 -80, 101 , 9, 78 , 104 , 111 , 156 complex asconstituent of language , 166 elimination of, 15 - 163 , 95 , 96, 156 - 84 embedded , 102 , 103 , 126 (nested ), 82 - 163 asevidentiality , 161 - 160 asmodality , 157 -likeobjects aspredicate of proposition , 50 , 100 , 156 - 84 - 133 of, 82 , 131 sequence Tensed nature of world , 96 Tensed Nominals , 82 , 130 , 131 , 4, 166 Thought in animals , 24 , 54 , 25 , 26 imagistic - 28 - 169 of, 14 , 54, 95 , 165 , 21 language andmental models , 26 - 169 , 25 , 26 , 166 nonlinguistic andsense , 58 , 59 tensed nature of, 95 , 96 Time A-series A-series of. See conception B-series B-series of. See conception of, 96 consciousness - 144 of, 141 experience - 144 flowof, 106 - 109 , 142 future andpast , 151 - 144 of, 15 , 141 , 137 phenomenology asphysical , 2- 4 property tensed of, 2 conception untensed of, 1 , 2, 77 , (tenseless ) conception 78 , 144 , 163 -reflexives -conditions Truth Token . See Translation , 165 -worldIdentity Trans , 72

252
Truth indexical of, 152 conception timelessness of, 151 , 155 - 96 Truthconditions - 46, 58, 59 , 7, 27 , 77 , 104 , 129 tenseless , 77 , 78 , 91 -reflexive token -96 , 89 , 137 -value - 152 Truth links , 147 , 155 , 156 T-schema , 32 - 213 T-theories - 46 , 7, 14 , 31 , 63 , 64 , 181 of, 38 compositionality conditionalized , 57 , 58 , 64 derivation rules for, 34 , 35 nature of, 36 , 37 , 62, 124 disquotational - 213 of, 181 fragments , 32 , 41 interpretive -world - 76 connections of, 36 - 38 , 65 language , 84 - 86 modest vs. robust , 38 , 39 , 54 , 62 , 71 , 98, 99 - 141 evidence for, 39 - 42 , 137 , psycholinguistic 144 -reflexives andtoken -93 , 89 -mismatch - 176 , 172 lYpe argument
, 84 Vagueness When -clauses . See Temporalconjunctions

Index