The Marx of Anti-Oedipus

Aidan Tynan
Abstract

Cardiff University

The meeting of Deleuze and Guattari in 1969 is generally used to explain how the formers thought became politicised under the inuence of the latter. This narrative, however useful it might be in explaining Deleuzes move away from the domain of academic philosophy following the upheavals of May 1968, has had the effect of de-emphasising the conceptual development which occurred between Difference and Repetition and Anti-Oedipus. Worst of all, it has had the effect of reducing the role of Marxs philosophy to the supercial level of political alibi, impoverishing our understanding of its importance with respect to the conceptual assemblage of Anti-Oedipus. This paper attempts to restore Marxs relevance to Deleuze and Guattaris project by understanding Anti-Oedipus through the Marxian categories of production, distribution, surplus-value and consumption, and argues for a conception of schizoanalysis which does not relegate the name of Marx to the garbage heap of poststructuralist intellectual strategy. Keywords: Marx, Anti-Oedipus, distribution, consumption, ideology capital, production, surplus,

The story of the meeting of Deleuze and Guattari in the summer of 69 has attained something of a mythological status. The reason for this is clear: Anti-Oedipus is one of the most important and controversial intellectual responses to the political tumult of May 68. The accepted version of the origin myth suggests that Deleuze, the respectable professor, needed the sense of political urgency which Guattari offered, while Guattari, the lifelong activist, needed the theoretical grounding which Deleuze provided (Holland 1999: vii). While this characterisation is based on the authors own statements, and is obviously in some respects accurate, it has led to a certain picture, most luridly painted in recent times by Slavoj iek, of the radicalism of Anti-Oedipus as a purely strategic interjection whereby, in the climate of political

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reaction which followed May 68, Deleuze cynically acquired a political alibi (iek 2004: 201). Such a strategic explanation of Deleuze and Guattaris joint enterprise, moreover, has been used by Deleuzians partly as a way of explaining the change in tone between Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense on the one hand, and Anti-Oedipus on the other, and partly as a means to perceive Deleuze and Guattaris relationship to Marxist theory as extrinsic.1 While the strategic explanation is no doubt a useful shorthand in accounting for Deleuze and Guattaris fulminating style, it tends to impoverish our understanding, emphasising a paradigm shift in Deleuzes thought at the cost of a sense of logical development and continuity. Whats more, Deleuzes apparent shift from the history of philosophy to political theory has been interpreted by some critics as little more than a supercial retooling of an ultimately apolitical philosophy of difference.2 What I wish to argue here is that the transition from Difference and Repetition to Anti-Oedipus represents neither a dramatic change of terrain nor a post-conceptual politicisation. We should instead regard Anti-Oedipus as the necessary and logical development of concepts already active in Deleuzes thought prior to his meeting with Guattari.3 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze writes that the name of Marx is enough to save his philosophy of difference, and particularly his rejection of Hegel, from being merely the discourse of beautiful souls (Deleuze 1994: 207). What are we to make of this, especially when Marx appears only in passing in the pages of Difference and Repetition and only once, briey, in Logic of Sense? I wish not only to argue that the critique of the philosophy of difference which Deleuze performs in these books is logically consistent with the Marxian theory of desiring-production presented in Anti-Oedipus but that this logical consistency needs to be grasped in order to understand fully the Marxism of the latter book. In the place of Hegels concepts of contradiction, opposition and alienation, Deleuze puts his processual theory of different/ciation which in Anti-Oedipus is termed desiringproduction. The concept of a surface upon which actualisation and counter-actualisation take place, and the objective illusion which attends this process, functions in Anti-Oedipus to account for the historical development of capital, the ideological image of the real relations of production, the law of the tendency to a falling rate of prot and the displacement of capitals immanent limit which secures the counteraction of this tendency. In short, the philosophy of difference and repetition, of actualisation and counter-actualisation, of surface and

30 Aidan Tynan
depth, are given an explicitly Marxian expression in the pages of AntiOedipus and this in no way entails a crude politicisation of Deleuzes thought. The commitment to Marx which Anti-Oedipus displays is at least as much a theoretical as a strategic commitment.

I. Productive Dissymmetry
In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari use Marxs concepts to give an account of the immanentisation of capital, the means by which capitals interior limits become its principle of expansion. If a reconstruction of this account in Marxs own terms is rarely done, this is due to the conviction that Marx is largely external to Deleuzes thought. But such a reconstruction is vital in dispelling the pervasive misunderstanding that the theory of desire put forth in Anti-Oedipus is complicit with the postmodern stage of capital.4 If Marxs chief contribution was to disengage capital from its concrete manifestations in order to perceive its laws, then desire, like capital, must be understood not in any sense as a thing but as a process which goes through different phases in order to reproduce itself. If Deleuze and Guattari emphasise desiring-production, rather than a desiring subject or a desired object, it is because they want us to grasp this processual aspect as primary. Marxs critique showed how bourgeois political economy begins at the level of exchange, distribution or consumption, whereas these are always secondary with respect to production. If political economy tends to uphold and justify capitalist exploitation, Marx argued, it is because it begins with the phenomenal or ideological form of capital as concrete rather than with production as the rational abstraction capable of explaining how the concrete became what it is (Marx 1973: 1001). Similarly, as Deleuze and Guattari argue, psychoanalysis, beginning as it does with a concept of desire already installed in the subjectobject form (desire as sexuality), tends to naturalise the repressive social structure constitutive of this form. Desiring-production, then, is Deleuze and Guattaris rational abstraction and the desiring-machine the form of desires autoproduction.5 For Marx, the economic categories of exchange, distribution and consumption must be considered moments of the process of production even when these categories appear to exert a determining inuence on that process. We might suppose for example that need is primary with regard to the products which satisfy it. Anyone with any experience of consumer culture, however, will quickly deny this, as the market clearly creates the needs for whatever objects it believes consumers

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will be willing to purchase. This essentially cynical, consumerist insight corresponds to the economic principle of Says law which states that the supply of goods in the market creates the demand for them. At rst glance, this appears to be in accord with Marxs emphasis on the determining role of production. The production of ever more consumer goods appears necessary for the capitalist system to maintain stability and fend off crises caused by wars, shortages of raw materials and so on. All that is required for the market to regain stability is to create more commodities and stimulate more demand. Hence, although we might admit the primacy of production in the creation of commodities, it is consumption which has the true determining inuence since it is the latter which governs the reproductive process. To assert the priority of production in the midst of mass consumerism and articial needs might then seem hopelessly nave.6 Marx was quite vociferous in his condemnation of Says law and its adherents (Marx 1973: 94; Harvey 1982: 76). The reason for this is simple: to say that supply creates its own demand in other words that, given the right conditions, they cancel one another out is to suppose that the market is essentially equilibrating and that disequilibrium always has some external source. Marx, however, argued that the crises which afict capital are generated by capital itself, and this for the simple reason that capitalist production is founded on the unequal, antagonistic relationship between the worker, who owns nothing but his labour-power, and the capitalist, who owns the means of production. This fundamental inequality is what allows the capitalist to extort surplus-value and realise it as prot through a system based on the general equivalent of money (the market). Exchange, distribution and consumption explain nothing in themselves because there is a necessary disjunction between the worker as producer and the worker as consumer (Hardt and Negri 2000: 222). In order to furnish the capitalist with prot, the worker must produce more than he consumes. The laws of equivalence which condition the wage-system (an honest days work for an honest days pay) and the market (you get what you pay for) are derived and secondary with respect to this productive dissymmetry (Deleuze 1994: 20). This last point is key to understanding the theory of desire put forth in Anti-Oedipus. For desire to produce, it requires machines (a form of autoproduction) and, to the extent that this link is the fundamental connective principle which governs all life, every machine is a desiringmachine. But this does not mean that every machine functions according to the same laws, or uses, by which it has been produced (Deleuze and

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Guattari 2004: 31416).7 The primary and direct link between desire and the machine should not lead us to believe that every desiringmachine is equally legitimate, or that production and machine are cognate terms. It is quite possible, for example, to desire fascism, but this does not mean that desire is essentially fascistic. Similarly, we are not revolutionaries simply because we desire. To say that a society consumes as much as it produces is to say ultimately that it produces only in order to consume. But Marxs claim is that capitals ultimate goal is to reproduce itself in ever greater magnitudes and to displace the limits, internal to it, which reproduction imposes. This, as many have pointed out, is the only way of accounting for the global dominance capitalism has attained. It is only on the surface of capitalist society, that is, in ideological phenomena and the movements of the market, that production and consumption appear to cancel one another out. This illusion is maintained by commodity fetishism. In the rst volume of Capital Marx examines this phenomenon closely. The free worker, owning nothing but his labour-power, stands in an unequal relation to the capitalist the relationship between worker and capitalist is only productive to the extent that it is unequal and relative.8 The capitalist can exchange the commodity thus produced for the equivalent of its value. Hence, Marx speaks of two entirely different forms of value: the relative form and the equivalent form are two intimately connected, mutually dependent and inseparable elements of the expression of value; but, at the same time, are mutually exclusive, antagonistic extremes i.e. poles of the same expression (Marx 1954: 55). In Marxs expressive theory of value a commodity (a roll of linen or a coat) can be said to express x amount of another commodity. A coat can be expressed in x rolls of linen, a roll of linen in x number of coats, and so on. But changes in the conditions of production (increasing exploitation, technological development, etc.) cause this equation to uctuate continually. Hence the disjunction between value, measured by production, and exchange value, measured by money. What this means is that value exists only in its expression as production and cannot be said to pre-exist it. We might be tempted here to object that labour-power is the form value takes prior to its realisation in commodities, however, Marx insists that labour-power is not value but what creates value (Marx 1954: 57). Productive capacity is the source of all value but is not itself a value. If the commodity fetish has a mystifying function, it is that it gives an equivalent expression to an unequal relationship. In this sense, the distinction between production and capital appears quantitative and

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calculable: the worker exchanges an amount of his labour for a set wage, the more he works, the more he earns. But underlying this is a qualitative distinction between labour-power as value-creating activity and the general equivalent through which value is expressed. The difference between production and capital is both quantitative and qualitative, which is what allows labour to be turned into a commodity and sold, and why Marx continually speaks in both equivalent/absolute and relative terms. Marxs solution to the problem of the genesis of value was only possible by separating human labour-power in the abstract from its embodiment in both commodities and concrete forms of labour. The concept of simple abstract labour was derived by Marx from Smith and Ricardo, who posited the existence of a form of wealth on the side of the subject, prior to its embodiment in objects (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 2801). The liberation of labour-power from traditional social forms means that, unlike the serf, the slave or the bondsman, the free worker has to sell his labour-power in order to become a factor of production. As a consequence of this, the worker himself is produced as an adjacent part, peripheral to the production process which his labour constitutes in concert with the means of production. This is what Marx means when he says the worker is literally devalued by capital. But how was the free worker separated from the means of production in the rst place and how is he continued to be separated from them? This brings us to the problem of primitive accumulation and the disjunctive synthesis.9

II. Separation, Distribution and Disjunction

Deleuzes jettisoning of Hegelian categories appears to place his philosophy in a compromised position with respect to the bloody contradictions out of which history is inevitably made. If difference is not given in terms of contradiction then the difference which Deleuze emphasises might seem to be somehow indifferent to materiality, austere and otherworldly. Supposing, as is generally done, that the inequality between production and capital is made known only through contradiction and opposition, does this not put Deleuze in league with the mystications of capital itself? As Marx points out, the specic illusion to be dispelled is that capital rather than labour is productive: [Capital] becomes a very mystic being since all of labours social productive forces appear to be due to capital, rather than labour as such, and seem to issue from the womb of capital itself, while the market becomes an enchanted, perverted, topsy-turvy world, in which Monsieur le Capital and Madam la Terre do their ghost-walking (Marx 1972: 82730).

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In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari stress that desire composes the material infrastructure as much as the cultural and ideological superstructure. In other words, desire is immediately constitutive of reality. If this is so, how can we account for a specically political domain dened by desire, the transition from formal to real subsumption in the labour process, the increasing dominance of technical machines in social reproduction, and most importantly the mystication of the relations of production in social life?10 This relates to a larger debate within Marxism relating to the problem of political consciousness and the opposition of theory and practice. Marx invokes historical examples (chiey the British land enclosures of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries) to explain the origins of primitive accumulation, the process by which the worker was separated from the means of production in order to render him free, the bearer of labour in its abstract form (Marx 1954: 66970). But Marx de-emphasises historical subjectivity in order to lay bare the very laws of capital, which do not appear directly in experience and over which no one has direct control. This ambiguity in Marxs thought concerning the merits of history and practice on the one hand and theory on the other has led to much intramural debate (as, for example, between E. P. Thompson and Perry Anderson in the 1970s). But for Deleuze and Guattari, primitive accumulation is neither solely historical (materialist) nor continuous (ideological), and, while they dispense with ideology as crude false consciousness, they do in fact give a very powerful account of the mystication of desire, its capture in social reproduction.11 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze states that every phenomenon refers to an inequality by which it is conditioned (Deleuze 1994: 222). We can take this as one of the essential statements of Deleuzes critique of the philosophy of difference. If empirical phenomena can be constituted as a set of differential relations between terms (Peter is taller than Paul, Paul is taller than John) then this has given rise to philosophies of difference (Aristotle, Leibniz and Hegel are Deleuzes main examples) which emphasise negation over positive terms and derive difference from identity. Deleuzes critique, however, not only charges that the primacy given to negation and identity stems from an illusion, but, and this is the crucial point, that the illusion is internal to difference itself (Deleuze 1994: 240). Difference generates its own illusory appearance it generates, through its embodiment in concrete particulars, its own inverted image or self-negation precisely because through its distribution in these particulars it is cancelled in them. The concepts of opposition and contradiction are not the causes but only the effects of cancellation. The phenomenal world is doubled by an

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intensive, noumenal one, but this double is asymmetrical with respect to the extensive particulars whose production it conditions. We might suppose from this that Deleuzes philosophy is crudely dualistic (as some readings tend to argue12 ) but the dissymmetry pertaining between intensive and extensive is reducible to neither domain. To do justice to Deleuzes philosophy, then, we must speak of three distinct elements: 1) a eld of pure differentiation/intensity which qualies the phenomenal eld; 2) the phenomenal, differenciated eld itself, where the laws of quantitative and qualitative determinations (contradiction, opposition, etc.) come into being and intensity is cancelled; 3) something which allows a communication, interaction and reciprocal determination between the two but is reducible to neither one. In other words, between intensity and extensity there is the all important factor of distribution. Distribution here plays for Deleuze the role of what, for other philosophers, would be epistemology. We can only know difference in its cancellation in empirical things but, and precisely because of this fact, we can think difference as that which conditions phenomena. Similarly, the distribution of difference in phenomena causes the empirical to be mistaken for what conditions it. The cancellation of difference in phenomena [measures] the time of an equalisation, and in this way the principle of physical causality nds . . . its categorical physical determination (Deleuze 1994: 223). The cancellation of difference appears at one with irreversible physical causality, so that we take the cancellation of difference for difference itself. If the cancellation of difference in the empirical experience of quantity and quality takes on the character of irreversible physical causality (an apparent objective movement as Deleuze and Guattari call it), then intensity allows us to grasp this movement from the perspective of difference in itself: intensity denes an objective sense for a series of irreversible states which pass, like an arrow of time, from more to less differenciated, from a productive to a reduced difference, and ultimately to a cancelled difference (Deleuze 1994: 223, emphasis mine). The apparent objective movement by which the producer is steadily impoverished through distribution of the product has an objective sense dened by the intensive states which qualify this distribution. If we are to nd a concept of ideology in Deleuze, we should seek it here in the concepts of sense and distribution:
Good sense is the partial truth in so far as this is joined to the feeling of the absolute. . . . But how is the feeling of the absolute attached to the partial truth? Good sense essentially distributes or repartitions: on the one hand and

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on the other hand are the characteristic formulae of its false profundity or platitude. . . . Good sense is the ideology of the middle classes who recognise themselves in equality as an abstract product. . . . [F]or example, the good sense of eighteenth century political economy which saw in the commercial classes the natural compensation for extremes, and in the prosperity of commerce the mechanical process of the equalisation of portions. (Deleuze 1994: 2245)

The distribution which good sense effects repartitions (separates) and equalises in a compensatory manner according to the logic of the part and the whole, the part which belongs to the whole and the whole which lacks the part. In opposition to this, however,
there is a completely other distribution which must be called nomadic, a nomad nomos, without property, enclosure or measure. Here, there is no longer a division of that which is distributed but rather a division among those who distribute themselves in an open space a space which is unlimited, or at least without precise limits. Nothing pertains or belongs to any person, but all persons are arrayed here and there in such a manner as to cover the largest possible space. (Deleuze 1994: 36)

The discourse of Anti-Oedipus is organised around these two distinct forms of distribution. The molar corresponds to mass phenomena and the laws of large numbers while the molecular is described as micropsychic and micrological (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 31116). What needs to be remembered is that these are types of distribution and not differences in scale. We must avoid at all costs interpreting Deleuze and Guattaris position here as a sort of cult of the small. The crux of the matter is that, while all production corresponds to molecular laws, which are schematised as the three syntheses of desire, when it comes to reproduction these syntheses can become subject to illegitimate uses corresponding to the molar distribution. This is how Deleuze and Guattari account for the apparent objective movement which allows a fetishistic, perverted, bewitched world to come into being as a requirement of social reproduction (Deleuze and Guattari: 2004: 12). We must also note that this process through which the real source of production (labour) is mistaken for something dependent on it (capital, the earth, the despot) is, for Deleuze and Guattari, a characteristic of all societies to the extent that all societies reproduce themselves. Desire, then, in its revolutionary mode, produces without reproducing, and so is antithetical to any kind of social organisation, whatever its character.

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Anti-Oedipus is concerned with understanding the role of capital with respect to this tension between production and reproduction, and specically how capital, unlike other modes of production, draws on desire directly in order to secure its reproduction. Capital releases a form of desire, described by psychoanalysis as libido, freed from any social or organic ties, an eminently exible form of energy which can be channelled into any imaginable activity. This is how we should account for the bizarre array of desiring-machines in the opening passages of Anti-Oedipus. But free desire, like free labour, is something of a misnomer: in order to function, it needs some kind of surface on which its effects are registered, recorded, stored-up, that is, distributed. This is why Deleuze and Guattari need the concept of the body without organs. The latter is what orchestrates desire, it is a surface on which the desiring-machines can become productive. Capital, then, forms the body without organs of capitalist society. But what really interests Deleuze and Guattari is the discovery of different kinds of bodies without organs in the pathological states of schizophrenia, in which the functioning and distribution of the machines follow the laws of production, not the laws of the reproduction of capital. While these pathological states are in no way desirable in themselves, they provide a heuristic for the revolutionary imagination. If a society which reproduces in the same way it produces is literally impossible according to the criteria of the syntheses of desire this is suggested by the fact that, at the heart of desire, there is an antiproductive element which tends to resist the desiring-machines. The body without organs emerges not only as something which allows the machines to operate but also as a means to resist them (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 9). Every investment of desire in an organ or a machine is a source of pain and anxiety, much in the same way that the investment of money in a large piece of constant capital, such as a manufacturing plant, is a cause of great concern for the capitalist. An organ, like a factory, is not in itself productive but only becomes so through investments of desire. This is why the body without organs forms a disjunctive surface which attracts the desiring-machines but also repulses them. Without this attractionrepulsion, no machine would ever work: The genesis of the machine lies precisely here: in the opposition of the process of production of the desiring-machines and the nonproductive stasis of the body without organs (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 10). It is only by being constituted in opposition to any sort of organisation of desire, social or organic, that the body without organs is capable, in a seeming paradox, of performing a regulating or distributive role with respect to the machines.

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When the machines and the body without organs become opposed in this way (a functional opposition) the latter
falls back on (se rabat sur) desiring-production, attracts it, and appropriates it for its own. The organ-machines now cling to the body without organs . . . An attraction-machine now takes the place, or may take the place, of a repulsionmachine . . . The body without organs, the unproductive, the unconsumable, serves as a surface for the recording of the entire process of production of desire, so that desiring-machines seem to emanate from it in the apparent objective movement that establishes a relationship between the machines and the body without organs. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 12)

This whole process, in which the desiring-machines are attracted and repelled, explains the phenomenon of primitive accumulation, the separation of desire from its productive organs, and the transition to the properly ideological stage when desire labours under the repression which both keeps it apart from its nal satisfaction and constantly stimulates it into new investments and counter-investments. Capital, and the relations between money and commodities that it establishes in its opposition to production, draws on desire directly in order to meet the needs of capitalist reproduction. If Deleuze and Guattari condemn the discourse of Freud it is because psychoanalysis never (with rare exceptions such as Wilhelm Reich) points up this complicity. In the Oedipus complex, the molecular (or pre-personal) way in which desire is produced (the id) is related to the molar (or personal) object forms: the father and the mother. By insisting on this molar distribution in the processes of psychic repression which constitute Oedipal sexuality, psychoanalysis argues that the desiring subject is produced as a function of these objects, as what is missing to and what is lacking them, whence the triangle of daddy-mummy-me. The paternal law separates the child from the body of the mother, through its prohibition, then grants access under certain conditions (the molar distribution) which re-constitute desire as a function of the law. Whence the topsy-turvy, perverted and bewitched world. It is vital to note here that desire is never duped into its complicity with authority, it simply continues to desire under conditions alien to its laws of production. Desire cannot be deceived because it is immediately constitutive and so has nothing to be deceived about. But this does not rule out something which performs the ideological function of capturing desire. This is why Deleuze and Guattari insist that the essential thing is the establishment of an enchanted recording or inscribing surface that arrogates to itself all the productive forces and all the organs

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of production, and that acts as a quasi cause by communicating the apparent movement (the fetish) to them (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 13). The body without organs, then, plays the role of an ideological surface, what Marx calls the surface of society. The laws which determine the production of desire are not the same as the laws which determine the distribution of desire on this surface: when the productive connections pass from machines to the body without organs (as from labor to capital), it would seem that they then come under another law that expresses a distribution in relation to the nonproductive element as a natural or divine presupposition (the disjunctions of capital) (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 13). The real cause refers to the inter-molecular modications of the desiring-machines, while the distribution of the machines on the surface presents a ctive quasi-cause whereby the real cause is displaced in the apparent movement of separation/disjunction (Deleuze 2004: 1089). This double causality is the only thing capable of constituting the social world of desire and its capture. It is in the space opened by the two causalities that we nd the domain of sense, the distribution and inscription of effects, or the ideological domain as such.13 Primitive accumulation, in which production is shorn from its products, is never accomplished once and for all but persists as a necessary part of the process; it is a necessary double movement which at once transforms the social means of production into capital and the producers into wage-labourers. The historical development of capital is dependent on this double movement which brings into being a disjunction between abstract production in general shorn from the means of production, but also a conjunction, in which the two meet again but this time under conditions set by the capital relation. Once formulated in this way, we can understand Deleuze and Guattaris conception of the dynamic of accumulation constitutive of the specic power of the capitalist axiomatic as a disciplinary force.

III. Surplus-Value of Code, Surplus-Value of Flux

In chapter four of Theories of Surplus-Value, Marx writes:
Productive labour, in its meaning for capitalist production, is wage-labour which, exchanged against the variable part of capital (the part of the capital that is spent on wages), reproduces not only this part of the capital (or the value of its own labour-power), but in addition produces surplus-value for the capitalist. It is only thereby that commodity or money is transformed into capital, is produced as capital. Only that wage-labour is productive which produces capital. (This is the same as saying that it reproduces on an enlarged

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scale the sum of value expended on it, or that it gives in return more labour than it receives in the form of wages. Consequently, only that labour-power is productive which produces a value greater than its own.) (www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theories-surplus-value/ ch04.htm)

Capital, in order to reproduce, must reproduce at an expanded rate because it only produces to the extent that it produces a surplus. Conversely, the way the worker produces is not the same as how he reproduces, or consumes in order to reproduce his labour-power, because the disjunctive surface of capital excludes the greater part of his product. Here we have the fundamental Marxist proposition regarding surplus-value, prior to its breakdown into prot, interest, rent, costs of circulation and so on. Under capitalism, products are not produced for their immediate use-value, they are kept in a reserve in order to be sold at a later date. For this reason, Marx saw clearly that the sphere of exchange, of values, is constituted as a function of a superabundance on the side of products, which itself presupposes the appropriation of labour above and beyond that required for the production of immediate use-values (Marx 1973: 4569). Although Marx insists that surplusvalue is unique to the capitalist mode of production, he does suggest that a form of accumulation in the capitalist manner is a naturally occurring and universal phenomenon:
No production [is] possible without an instrument of production, even if this instrument is only the hand. No production without stored-up, past labour, even if it is only the facility gathered together and concentrated in the hand of the savage by repeated practice. Capital is, among other things, also an instrument of production, also objectied, past labour. Therefore capital is a general, eternal relation of nature. (Marx 1973: 86)

What Deleuze and Guattari call surplus value of code is the means by which primitive economies regulate society through direct inscriptions (scarications) on the body which block any movement towards decoding. The emergence of capital, on the contrary, marks the transition to a society regulated by a surplus-value of ux, the latter being a conjunction of two kinds of decoded ows: a ow of workers without any ties and a form of general equivalent capable of buying and selling anything at all, including labour-power (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 290). The regulative principle of capitalist society, then, corresponds not to coding but to this interior limit between the mutually exclusive decoded/ing ows. This limit is regulative precisely because it both attracts and repels the organs of capital.

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Capital is constantly deterritorialising, nding new, exotic markets and innovative practices of decoding at its periphery, but as part of the same movement it must reterritorialise, rediscovering within its centre zones of archaism and lack which check this expansion. Without subjects ready and willing to occupy, to live, this interior limit, capitalism itself would not be possible since it would be unable to legitimate its periods of crisis. Capitalism, then, must constitute a subjectivity based on hostility towards codes, but it must also produce subjects unwilling to follow decoding all the way beyond the social relations which condition the production of the decoded ows themselves. The psychoanalytic subject discovers desire in the abstract, a free oating desire (libido) which, however, is only free to the extent that it is tied to a social order that denies it satisfaction (prohibition of incest). Capitalist society constitutes the limit between production in general (desire) and production for the sake of capital (work) as its own interior, uncrossable limit (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 333). The libidinal objects of the parental fantasy are discovered only to the extent that they are rediscovered outside the family as symbolic substitutes (the cop, the priest, the nation). Deleuze and Guattari characterise the disciplinary power of capital entirely within the terms of this double movement, or axiomatic, the conjunction/disjunction of the two mutually exclusive ows:
In Das Capital Marx analyzes the true reason for the double movement: on the one hand, capitalism can proceed only by continually developing the subjective essence of abstract wealth or production for the sake of production, that is, production as an end in itself, the absolute development of the social productivity of labor; but on the other hand and at the same time, it can do so only in the framework of its own limited purpose, as a determinate mode of production, production of capital, the self-expansion of existing capital. Under the rst aspect capitalism is continually surpassing its own limits, always deterritorializing further, displaying a cosmopolitan, universal energy which overthrows every restriction and bond; but under the second, strictly complementary, aspect, capitalism is continually confronting limits and barriers that are interior and immanent to itself, and that, precisely because they are immanent, let themselves be overcome only provided they are reproduced on a wider scale (always more reterritorialization local, world-wide, planetary). (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 281)

The necessarily expanded reproduction of capital cannot be separated from a form of subjectivity which seeks to surpass its immanent limits (the unconscious) only by displacing them, redrawing them at a further remove hence the psychoanalytic drama of Oedipus, in which the

42 Aidan Tynan
subject overcomes the familial gures only by rediscovering them in the social and political domains. The Marxian theory of money, then, is of particular interest to Deleuze and Guattari because it relates specically to the production of axiomatised subjects (Thoburn 2003: 97). The two decoded ows, the ow of workers and the ow of money capable of buying their labour-power are characterised as a differential (a difference between two differences). Money as a result appears in two forms, a ow of wages which goes into the pockets of the workers (what Marx called variable capital), and a ow of prots which the capitalist takes and reinvests in the means of production in order to extract more surplus-value from his workers (what Marx called constant capital). In establishing a common measure money effects the cancellation of the intensive difference, which qualies the two ows:
Let us return to the dualism of money, to the two boards, the two inscriptions, the one going into the account of the wage earner, the other into the balance sheet of the enterprise. Measuring the two orders of magnitude in terms of the same analytical unit is a pure ction, a cosmic swindle, as if one were to measure intergalactic or intra-atomic distances in meters and centimeters. There is no common measure between the value of the enterprises and that of the labor capacity of wage earners. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 250)

Capital is not dened by a homogeneous ow, but by two mutually exclusive ows which act as checks on one another: a ow of payment and a ow of nancing, a ow of tangible assets and a ow of credit, a market ow and a ow of technological innovation (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 407). For this reason, Marxs theory of money is conceived on the one hand as a measure, or store, of value, and on the other as a medium of exchange, facilitating the circulation of capital (Harvey 1982: 251). The great cosmic swindle which the social authority of capital performs is to conate these two aspects of money, to displace the limit which separates them, and to mystify this in commodity-fetishism and exchange (Marx 1970: 879). Deleuze and Guattari are insistent on a Marxian theory of money which gives adequate importance not only to the general equivalent but to banking practice, to nancial operations, and to the specic circulation of credit money since it is in the opposition of the two kinds of money (payment and nance) that difference is cancelled and surplusvalue realised (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 250). This explains why they are hostile to Freuds account which emphasises the role of the general equivalent in psychic life. According to Freud, the libidinal structure

The Marx of Anti-Oedipus

43

which accounts for the signicance of money is primarily anal-erotic rather than phallic. Hence, the famous equation money = shit which Deleuze and Guattari so vehemently deride (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 31). The phallus, being the standard or the unit of measure (gold), refers to excrement as the medium of exchange value, the general equivalent (credit-money). As Jean-Joseph Goux writes:
Supplementary (superuous) elements are what govern the circulation of substitutes. The surplus is excluded to act as measure of the replacements. In general, whatever the register, the universal exchange value is linked to excess. In the election of gold as in that of the phallus, the surplus is charged with measuring the decit in transactions involving value whether in a positive form (as surplus of wealth in gold or surplus of vitality in the phallus) or in a negative, archaic form (as excrement, matter that is excluded and expelled). (Goux 1990: 31, my emphasis)

Surplus brings into being a lack or exclusion (something withheld in a reserve) which functions as a principle of calculation (or cancellation)14 and allows a separate ow to be set up as the medium of exchange. A detatched complete object is excluded or excepted, only to return as the totality which the parts lack; the parts lack what is in excess of them. The function of the State is to establish an innite debt capable of appropriating and absorbing everything and this, precisely, is what establishes money as the general equivalent (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 21415). The despotic or Asiatic formation does not eradicate the primitive codes and their nite debts; it overcodes them by relating them all to a single, transcendent higher unity, rather than each other. The despotic mode of production brings into being two ows, a ow of credit (debt) and a ow of payment (tribute), crucial to the development of capital. In this sense, capitalism does not replace feudalism. Rather, feudalism becomes capitalism by being monarchised, democratised, etc., over a long historical period (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 242). Capitalism lacks a body of its own on which it could inscribe its codes precisely because it is hostile to coding and this is why it nds an archaic body on which to reterritorialise. Capitalism does not replace feudalism, but rather maintains elements of feudal authority, exercised no longer from a point of transcendence but immanently, through capital itself. The limit between attraction and repulsion is the regulatory principle of all desire. This limit is universal, not only to all societies but to nature. In phenomena of co-evolution, such as the orchid and the wasp, two elements double and are thus in excess of one another, but also attract one another as what each lacks. In primitive society, similarly, the

44 Aidan Tynan
limits which regulate behaviours such as incest are coded and thus the limit remains purely virtual (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 270). Capitalist society is distinct from every other because its limits are constantly being brought into reality as something lived, and, indeed, this occupation of the social limit is precisely how capitalist society can dispense with codes. The limit which constitutes capital is experienced in different realms as the limit between payment and credit, production and capital, variable and constant capital, but also as that between desire and work. Money, in so far as it functions as a means of social regulation, concretises this limit, makes it a lived reality. The zones of lack and archaism which capital hollows out in the midst of abundance and innovation serve as graphic examples of this.

IV. Realisation, Consumption and Counter-actualisation

The realisation of the surplus-value immanent in commodities is necessary for the maintenance of social authority since realisation, and not production, is what governs the distribution of desiring-machines: Furnishing or realizing surplus value is what establishes recording rights (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 12). Social authority is dependent on the ability to realise surplus-value and thus crises of realisation are part and parcel of capitalist reproduction. If capital cannot accommodate itself to the expansion of products and markets which its reproduction necessitates, it will enter a period of crisis; surplus-value will be produced but will not be realised as prot. All crises are crises of realisation in this sense. The entire mass of commodities . . . must be sold. If this is not done, or done only in part, or only at prices below the prices of production, the labourer has been indeed exploited, but his exploitation is not realised as such for the capitalist (Marx 1972: 244). The barriers to realisation were known to the political economy of Marxs day but were explained, for example by Ricardos theory of rent, by factors external to capital. It was Marx who discovered that the barriers to realisation arose out of the antagonism, internal to capital, between the conditions under which surplus-value is extracted and those under which it is realised as prot. Similarly, we can say that Deleuze and Guattari were the rst to discover the disjunction between the productive conditions of desire and the ideological conditions of its consumption. What David Harvey calls the structural problems of realization can be read, then, following Anti-Oedipus, as the problem of how capital manages to displace its interior limits, encountering them as something external but constantly redrawn at a further remove (Harvey 1982: 87).

The Marx of Anti-Oedipus

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Deleuze and Guattaris analysis proposes that capital fabricates a psychic interiority which places these limits inside the subject itself, forcing the subject to occupy them libidinally as psychic repression, as the trauma of the family romance, as dream and fantasy, as psychotherapy and hospitalisation (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 338). The fundamental argument of Anti-Oedipus is that capitals limit, while being perfectly real and concrete, produced as it is by desire, is populated with the fantasy gures of an archaic authority, mommy and daddy, as a condition of desires realisation. For this reason, we need to think in terms of three elements in the ideological process: the repressing representation which performs the repression; the repressed representative, on which the repression actually comes to bear; the displaced represented, which gives a falsied apparent image that is meant to trap desire (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 125). Desiringproduction, as distinct from social (re)production, always occurs at the limit of society, but the synthesis of conjunction is deemed illegitimate when it derives what lies beyond the limit from the limit itself. In the Oedipal drama, the subjects desire is constituted as a function of the paternal proscription from which the desired object, the mother, is derived. The social limit is thereby lived, but only as dream, fantasy and the representations of the subject. This is precisely how unconscious material is fabricated through the synthesis of conjunction (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 345). The problem from the point of view of the capitalist is precisely that the consumption powers of the worker are constantly being undermined by capital itself through the impoverishment of workers. The capitalist deprives the worker of the greater part of his product, not in order to consume directly but to sell at a prot. But the proletariat, precisely because of their exploitation, are incapable of buying all the commodities they produce, and so capital must constantly nd new means of disposing of its reserve, discovering new markets (whence imperialism, but also the psychoanalysts consulting room) for realisation. Capitalism, then, brings into being models of realisation which do not necessarily involve consumption, and which may be explicitly ascetic. As Deleuze and Guattari write:
Marx has clearly demonstrated the importance of the problem: the ever widening circle of capitalism is completed, while reproducing its immanent limits on an ever larger scale, only if the surplus value is not merely produced or extorted, but absorbed or realized. If the capitalist is not dened in terms of enjoyment, the reason is not merely that his aim is the production for productions sake that generates surplus value, it also includes the realization

46 Aidan Tynan
of this surplus value: an unrealized surplus value of ux is as if not produced, and becomes embodied in unemployment and stagnation. (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 255)

As a result, capital includes as part of its vast productive process a moment of antiproduction, something which prevents immediate consumption. Indeed, capital can be dened as the unity of production and antiproduction, since what intervenes in order to separate the producers from the product (the State, its police and its army) likewise function to prevent consumptions, even on the part of capitalists, which do not serve the interests of capital. There must be something to prevent unfettered technological advancement, a ow of stupidity to counter the ow of knowledge; there must be an asceticism to counter the ow of excess, and an archaism to counter the tendency towards absolute deterritorialisation. Capital produces far more than it can accommodate, and so must bring its vast resources of repression to bear on whatever escapes realisation. This conceptualisation represents a recurring theme in the history of Marxism. Rosa Luxemburg in her Accumulation of Capital famously proposed that militarism and imperialism provide the vital markets in which surplus-value is absorbed or realised. Sweezy and Baran, in their landmark book Monopoly Capitalism, suggest that the problem of absorption becomes ever more pressing when capital enters its late, or monopoly, phase where price xing and centralisation become the norm. The problem, however, must be related back to what Marx, in volume three of Capital, considered the central law of capitalist accumulation, the so-called law of the tendency to a falling rate of prot. As Marx explains:
proceeding from the nature of the capitalist mode of production, it is . . . a logical necessity that in its development the general average rate of surplusvalue must express itself in a falling general rate of prot. Since the mass of the employed living labour is continually on the decline as compared to the mass of materialised labour set in motion by it, i.e., to the productively consumed means of production, it follows that the portion of living labour, unpaid and congealed in surplus-value, must also be continually on the decrease compared to the amount of value represented by the invested total capital. Since the ratio of the mass of surplus-value to the value of the invested total capital forms the rate of prot, this rate must constantly fall. (Marx 1972: 213)

What this means is that even if the rate of surplus-value grows, this can only be expressed in an ever decreasing rate of prot. Marx schematises

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this as follows: if a capitalist employs 100 workers for one week and pays out 100 in wages (variable capital) in order to produce 200 worth of total product, then the rate of surplus-value is 100%. But if we suppose that the same capitalist spends 50 on constant capital (machinery, raw materials) the rate of prot will be expressed as 66 2/3%, if he spends 100 on constant capital it will be 50%, and so on (Marx 1972: 211). Increasing technological development entails a relative decrease in the amount of labour and an increase in productivity, leading to a general glut of products and an increasingly impoverished proletariat incapable of purchasing them. As a result, even if the absolute rate of prot goes up, the rate of prot relative to total capital (constant and variable) decreases (Marx 1972: 220). A number of inuences counteracting the falling tendency have been noted by Marx and others writing after him. All of these inuences, whether they involve the depression of wages or the channelling of money into bureaucracies such as civil government and social welfare, into military spending and public works, are ways of devaluing, depreciating or destroying capital.15 Deleuze and Guattari reinterpret this from the unique perspective afforded by schizoanalysis. The schizophrenic is produced in the same way as any other commodity but with the vital difference that the schizo is not saleable; the desire of the schizophrenic is produced by capitalism but is unrealisable in it, whence the repressive forces of psychiatry, anti-psychotic drugs and the asylum, all of which are means capital nds to counteract the unprecedented liberation of desire it precipitated (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 266). The neurotic, on the other hand, is perfectly realisable, and neurotic illness has provided capital with a whole new set of markets (therapy, anti-depressants, and so on). It is for this reason that Deleuze and Guattari condemn the practice of psychoanalysis as a gigantic enterprise of absorption of surplus value (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 260). Psychoanalysis, in other words, contributes to the diffusion of antiproduction, that bourgeois asceticism on which realisation depends, in that consumption in the realm of fantasy is no consumption at all. Realisation, then, is opposed both to production and consumption proper. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze distinguishes the virtual from the possible, arguing that while the possible is realised, the virtual is actualised: The possible is opposed to the real; the process undergone by the possible is therefore a realisation. By contrast, the virtual is not opposed to the real; it possesses a full reality by itself. The process it undergoes is that of actualisation (Deleuze 1994: 211). The social limit, which the schizo occupies, is in no way realisable (its realisation is its

48 Aidan Tynan
displacement) but is actualisable. To the extent, then, that actualisation is opposed to realisation, we can argue that every actualisation is already a counter-actualisation to the extent that the latter de-realises a corresponding realisation. This, in fact, is in accordance with Marxs own conception of the inuences which counteract the falling rate of prot, since these inuences are literally destructive of capital. Counteractualisation, then, must be seen as part of capitals self-destruction, since it signies the production of something unrealisable in the heart of capital itself. As long as the falling tendency and its counteraction are regulatory, this secures the immanentisation of capital. Legitimate consumption, on the other hand, would be a deregulating counteractualisation, a displacement of the limit common to both desiring and social production, not the displacement of one into the other. If realisation involves the calculation, or cancellation, of difference, then legitimate consumption always involves something incalculable and unrealised, a remainder: the conjunctive synthesis . . . implies a veritable migration of the remainder or residue (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 359). The schizo then, like the worker, receives a share of the product, of what is left after each division (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 17). But, unlike wages, which serve to reproduce labour-power, this share remains unrealised. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze describes the process as follows: God makes the world by calculating, but his calculations never work out exactly [juste], and this inexactitude or injustice in the result, this irreducible inequality, forms the condition of the world. . . . [I]f the calculation were exact, there would be no world. The world can be regarded as a remainder (Deleuze 1994: 222, emphasis mine). These remainders can be found migrating everywhere on the body without organs of capital as what capital cannot consume, and from these remainders we make our own bodies without organs.16

V. Conclusion
Anti-Oedipus gives us a coherent and compelling account of how capital constitutes a whole eld of immanence that is reproduced on an always larger scale, that is continually multiplying its axioms to suit its needs, that is lled with images and with images of images, through which desire is determined to desire its own repression (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 407). Deleuze and Guattari exhort us to think this process of immanentisation in terms of three different planes of the body without organs of capital. First, there is the plane of the unequal productive relationship between worker and capitalist, or desire and machine. This

The Marx of Anti-Oedipus

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is the differential in the unequal relationship between the owner of labour capacity and the owner of the means of production constitutive of surplus-value. Second, there is the plane of disjunction or recording on which the two incommensurable forms of money, the ow of wages and purchasing power on the one hand, and the ow of nance and credit on other, come into being to constitute the interior limit of capital. This is the limit that capital is constantly displacing through the cancellation of the difference constitutive of the productive relationship. Third, there is the unity of production and antiproduction which capital needs as a condition of realisation. The great forces of repression (the State, its police and its army) are joined to the permissiveness of the market. The permissive structure is the repressive structure (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 291). Whence, the dualism of capital, which on the one hand produces for the sake of production, but on the other produces strictly for the sake of the capitalist social formation. The ideological function which psychoanalysis performs is the displacement of the absolute limit, which is the exterior limit of all societies, into the relative limit (capitalist reproduction) through a repressing false image of this externality derived from the interior limit of capital and fabricated in the unconscious to be invested and consumed.

Notes
1. The question of their relation to marxism is one that is only posed from outside the theoretical work of Foucault and Deleuze; within it, the question of marxism does not arise. At the level of intellectual strategy, it is the positivity of this approach that must be underscored. These authors deploy elements of marxist theory in the process of elaborating something else, a different form of intelligibility of social reality (Patton 1988: 126). In a similar vein, Isabelle Garo argues that the appeal to Marx was a convenient way of opposing the wave of reactionary sentiment which followed May 68 but was never internal to Deleuzes thought (Garo 2008: 657). Manuel DeLanda, meanwhile, avers that the Marxist tradition was like [Deleuze and Guattaris] Oedipus, the little territory they did not dare to challenge (Delanda 2008: 174). Patton, Garo and Delandas comments, although divergent in tone, amount to the same thing: that Marx gures in Deleuzes thought as a sign of bad conscience. 2. See for example Hallward (2006: 162). 3. It is not at all my intention here to write Guattaris inuence out of the story, but rather to emphasise that his inuence must not be taken to be a crude politicisation of Deleuze. This much is a prerequisite to understanding Guattaris true inuence which, however, is a matter that lies beyond the scope of this paper. 4. Boltanski and Chiapello associate the triumph of neo-liberalism in the 1980s and 1990s with Deleuzes critique: Much better in effect, from the standpoint of unlimited accumulation, that the question be suppressed, that people convince themselves that everything can no longer be anything but a simulacrum, that

50 Aidan Tynan
true authenticity is henceforth excluded from the world, or that the aspiration to the authentic is only an illusion (quoted in Callinicos 2003: 11). Like Marx, contra Hegel, [Deleuze and Guattari] attempt to set things right by making a new beginning, a new type of beginning in fact, one which, as in Marx, starts with a rational abstraction, namely production in general (as process). Desire as process, as production, is as much of a corrective as Marxs general production is (Buchanan 2000: 21). On the importance of distinguishing between desiring-production and desiring-machine, see Buchanan (2008: 4950). This is the criticism of Anti-Oedipus Baudrillard makes in The Mirror of Production. Deleuze and Guattari employ the terms laws and uses interchangeably. Whether illegitimate or legitimate uses are at stake, these refer to the same syntheses (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 127). In Theories of Surplus Value Marx writes: Productivity in the capitalist sense is based on relative productivity that the worker not only replaces an old value, but creates a new one; that he materialises more labourtime in his product than is materialised in the product that keeps him in existence as a worker (www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1863/theoriessurplus-value/ch04.htm). The history of the debate over the meaning of primitive accumulation goes back to Lenins The Development of Capitalism in Russia, which argued that primitive accumulation was a one-off historical occurrence characterising the transition from the corve to capitalism. Rosa Luxemburgs famous argument in The Accumulation of Capital was that capital necessarily expands into a world system in order to nd pre-capitalist markets, and hence primitive accumulation is a continuous and necessary feature of capitalist reproduction. The latter thesis has been instrumental in the conception of postmodern capital as imperialist by Hardt and Negri and Samir Amin, among others. This is Badious critique of Deleuzes political theory, see Thoburn (2003: 5). Thoburn argues that, since capital is amoral, Deleuze does not need a concept of ideology. Thoburn, however, understands ideology purely as belief system and not, as Marx does, as part of a system of distribution (Thoburn 2003: 94). For a recent example of this type of dualistic reading, see Reynolds (2007). As Brian Massumi writes, The power of the quasi-cause is essentially distributive, www.anu.edu.au/HRC/rst_ and_ last/works/realer.htm). For the Marx and Engels of The German Ideology, the role of distribution is central to the historical development of the division of labour and the ideology of the State:
With the division of labour . . . is given simultaneously the distribution, and indeed the unequal distribution, both quantitative and qualitative, of labour and its products, hence property: the nucleus, the rst form, of which lies in the family, where wife and children are the slaves of the husband. . . . This xation of social activity, this consolidation of what we ourselves produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control, thwarting our expectations, bringing to naught our calculations, is one of the chief factors in historical development up till now.

5.

6. 7. 8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

This objective power above us is precisely what gives rise to the State, which re-constitutes an illusory communal life from real ties (Marx 2000: 1845). 14. Surplus-value only becomes calculable through its realisation as prot. Realisation of surplus-value and cancellation of difference then are to be understood as cognate terms in the discourse of Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 251). 15. See Harvey (1982: 845) for a discussion of these terms.

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16. Finance, for example, while representing a ow which facilitates realisation through banking power (credit money constitutes purchasing power), cannot itself be realised (Deleuze and Guattari 2004: 249; see also Deleuze 2006: 12).

References
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52 Aidan Tynan
Patton, Paul (1988) Marxism and Beyond: Strategies of Reterritorialization, in Carly Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, pp. 12337. Reynolds, Jack (2007) Wounds and Scars: Deleuze on the Time and Ethics of the Event, Deleuze Studies, 1:2, pp. 14466. Thoburn, Nicholas (2003) Deleuze, Marx and Politics, London and New York: Routledge. iek, Slavoj (2004) Organs Without Bodies: On Deleuze and Consequences, New York and London: Routledge.

DOI: 10.3366/E1750224109000701