Action, Authority and Approach: Treatises on Zen/Chan, Radical Interpretation, and the Linji Lu

Michael Scott Carroll

Dedicated to: Joseph Garcia, -for showing me when to speakand Mark Carroll -for teaching me how to listen.-

Table of Contents

Abstract ......................................................................................................................................................... 5 A Descriptive Introduction, in Three Fibers .............................................................................................. 8 Treatise One: , Chan, and Zen: A Critical Inquiry Concerning the West......................................................... 13 From to Zen: D.T. Suzuki Stakes his Claim ............................................................................. 15 From Zen to Chan: Hu Shihs Revolt ............................................................................................ 18 A New Chan (Or No Chan at All?) ................................................................................................ 23 The Empire Strikes Back: Suzukis Response ....................................................................................... 26 Taking Sides in a Non-Polar Polarity .................................................................................................... 30 Political Preference and the Rules of Elimination ................................................................................ 33 Zen: Authority and Abuse in America ............................................................................................... 40 Continuity (or the lack thereof) and Chan ......................................................................................... 43 An Uneasy Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 47 Treatise Two: Radical Interpretation, Wittgenstein, and the Concept of Meaning: A Philosophical Approach ....... 50 The Identification Step, Depiction, and Meaning.................................................................................. 52 Wittgenstein, Forms of Life and Experiencing Meaning ...................................................................... 60 Some New Considerations on Radical Interpretation ........................................................................... 67 Continuity, Consistency and Chan/Zen: An Interpretive Attitude ........................................................ 71 Treatise Three: Hosting and Approaching: An Interpretive Investigation of the Linji Lu ............................................. 77 Between Lnj and Linji Lu: Person and Text, History and Myth ........................................................ 80 I ........................................................................................................................................................... 81 II ....................................................................................................................................................... 844 III ...................................................................................................................................................... 877 IV ...................................................................................................................................................... 899 Interpretation and Assumption: A Final Prelude .................................................................................. 90 Departing Home: Structure and Contexts ............................................................................................. 99 I - Structure ..................................................................................................................................... 100 II - Standpoint ................................................................................................................................. 108 III - History...................................................................................................................................... 112 Stripping Lnj Bare: Rn and Changing Y / ..................................................................... 118 Unaffected Presence: Wsh as an Ideal for Action ................................................................... 126 Jng and the Metaphysics of Person and Place .............................................................................. 136

A Confident Host: Actualization, Understanding, and Zh ........................................................... 145 Making the Whole Body Function : A Concluding Shove Into Rnperson : people .......................... 160 Conclusion : A Few Thoughts on Two Inescapable Labels......................................................................................... 170 Acknowledgments..................................................................................................................................... 180 Bibliography.............................................................................................................................................1180

Abstract of thesis entitled: Action, Authority and Approach: Treatises on Zen/Chan, Radical Interpretation, and the Linji Lu

Submitted by Michael Scott Carroll for the degree of Master of Philosophy (MPhil) at the University of Hong Kong in August, 2006.

This thesis is a collection of three treatises. The first, , Chan, and Zen: A Critical Inquiry Concerning the West, investigates the political roots of the names Chan and Zen and the consequences of these roots upon Western scholarship of a particular school of Chinese Buddhism. Treatise Two, Radical Interpretation, Wittgenstein, and the Concept of Meaning: A Philosophical Approach, presents a noncircular methodology (radical interpretation) for interpreting alien texts and languages that does not appeal to authority but, instead, employs a language-theoretical approach. The final treatise, Hosting and Approaching: An Interpretive Investigation of the Linji Lu, employs radical interpretation to present a new reading of the Linji Lu, a seminal text in Chan/Zen Buddhism. The purpose of the Linji Lu, this treatise concludes, is to bring readers to wshunaffected
presence

: the simultaneous understanding and

actualization of an action ideal which allows a person to take part in an ever-changing and turbulent objective world (jng ) while both a) not taking part in the creation of shmatters : social affairs and b) helping others actualize wshunaffected presence . Connecting these three seemingly disparate essays are three fibres of thought that emerge from each treatise. Treatises One and Three, for example, serve as very different case studies for applying the conclusions of Treatise Two. Treatises One and Two, conversely, may be viewed as preliminary work necessary to embark on the project of Treatise Three. Last, Treatise One may be viewed as a challenge to studies of Buddhism, with Treatise Two proposing a methodological answer to that challenge and Treatise Three putting it into application. The result are three treatises that mutually sustain one another as they cover larger themes of action, authority, and approach, raising, along the way, a few thoughts on names and the way we use them.

A Descriptive Introduction, in Three Fibers

[W]e extend our concept of [a word] as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. -Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations [67] Mutually acting as () master () and companions, they all emerge at the same timeone in three, three in one. -Lnj Yxun , Linji Lu [499a2-3]

Description becomes difficult when the object being described does not conform to the implications its labels. In such a respect, this introduction must shoulder a heavier burden than many of its counterparts in other MPhil theses for if, as is taught in thesis writing classes, typical theses a) introduce a problem, b) review relevant literature on the subject, c) propose a methodology for the solution and, last, d) outline results and a conclusion then, to put it simply, this introduction has much explaining to do. On the most superficial level, this thesis can be seen as a collection of extended treatises. Such collections, however, especially when they hope to pass as MPhil theses, usually group their contents around a single, obvious theme. Though this collection contains only three discourses, the task of making explicit a single theme which runs through and unifies all the contents has proven extremely difficult, if not entirely impossible. The reason for this difficultly is because these discourses (as a brief overview of each shows) all employ divergent approaches for tackling diverse issues:

Treatise One: , Chan, and Zen: A Critical Inquiry Concerning the West

This treatise explores the meanings of the terms Chan and Zen (which, supposedly, are identical because they refer to the same school of Buddhism) tracing the terms back to their earliest appearances in the English language. Drawing on the philosophy of Robert Brandom, I will argue that a difference in the elimination conditions (and, hence, meaning) of these two terms is due to (and proliferates) a political dispute, the reverberations of which have molded Western understanding, practice, and study of this school of Buddhism by defining the very meanings of the names by which we refer to it. Along these lines, this treatise will seek to show that Chan and Zen not only mean different thingsone has the implications of a historical-anthropological, Sino-centric, objective approach while the other implies a psychological, heavily Japanese, spiritual understanding of the same school of Buddhismbut that these names were created and are employed primarily as political tools used to further (and give legitimacy to) unjustifiable assumptions held by their tokeners. It is this political nature of Chan and Zen, rooted, as it is, in the very words themselves, that this treatise seeks (through the act of exposition) to defuse.

Treatise Two: Radical Interpretation, Wittgenstein, and the Concept of Meaning: A Philosophical Approach This treatise champions and outlines the fundamental aspects of the approach of radical interpretation by first drawing out that approaches greatest deficiencythe (lack of a) concept of meaning. This deficiency will be introduced by exploring the alwaysmade-but-rarely-discussed identification step in interpretation and then supplemented by a discussion of the concept of meaning in Wittgensteins later work. This discussion

should not only mend this shortcoming but also strengthen the overall approach of radical interpretation by recasting it in a new light. The chapter will conclude by bringing the whole investigation back to our particular concerns with East Asian Buddhism and explaining how radical interpretation (reconceived in this way) is relevant to the goal of making philosophical sense of the Chan/Zen school of Buddhism.

Treatise Three: Hosting and Approaching: An Interpretive Investigation of the Linji Lu The last treatise employs the principles of radical interpretation to investigate a seminal (Chan/Zen) Buddhist text: the Linji Lu . The purpose of this exposition is to provide an avenue for understanding the Linji Luone that, unlike most previous approaches to the work, follows a meaning theoretical approach rather than one centered on uncovering hidden or esoteric motivations. My task is to pull out the concepts that dominate and unify the work. Along those lines, I will show that the central goal of the Linji Lu is to bring students to actualize wshunaffected presence : an action ideal which allows a person (rn ) to be a part of (and involved in) an ever-changing and turbulent objective world (jng ) while both a) not taking part in the creation of shmatters : social affairs and b) helping others actualize wshunaffected presence as well. The philosophical method by which the Linji Lu seeks to achieve these ends lies in its exposition of the concept of zhhost : master a concept that represents not only a state of insight and understanding into the nature of the world and language but also a self-actualized embodiment of that understanding. Understanding and its self-actualization, I aim to show, are the central, unifying themes of the Linji Lu, ones so critical that the text even

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provides (in the form of stories and exchanges) a medium for de-conceptualizing them so that they wont become barriers to their own actualization.

Rather than categorize these three treatises under a single themerather than seeking the weak connection of a single fibre that runs through the whole length of the threeI propose, instead, a stronger, more complex composition for the unifying thread of this thesis. Taking hints from the two epigraphs, I suggest that this thesis may be read in three ways, as three fibres, each originating from one treatise and weaving its way through the other three. The first fibre, for example, unwinds from Treatise One. Seeing the analysis of Chan and Zen in Treatise One as presenting a challenge for scholars of that school of Buddhismthe challenge of how to prevent interpretations of the school from being colored by political motivations and agendasTreatise Two may then be understood as a proposal of methodology intended to answer that challenge, with Treatise Three being a case study intended to test the strength and effectiveness of that methodology towards achieving those ends. Another fibre, emerging from Treatise Two, takes a different, more scientific tack. Viewing Treatise Two as a theoretical discussion of radical interpretation and meaning, Treatises One and Three may then be seen as two very different applications (and tests) of this meaning-theoretical approach. In Treatise Three the approach handles an object of the kind that such approaches are usually put to work on: a difficult text from Classical China. In Treatise One, the meaning-theoretical methodology Ive developed reveals insights of a broader nature when applied far more narrowly to the words Zen and

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Chanshowing how the meanings of these names are far more complex and important than they appear. The last fibrethe Linji Lu fibreis the most straightforward. If we take as our goal a non-circular interpretation of the Linji Lu, then Treatises One and Two are the necessary preparatory work that must be done for that goal to be realized: in order to interpret the Linji Lu in a non-question-begging way one must first a) be cognizant of any political agendas s/he might have with regards to the text (Treatise One) and then b) develop a methodology for reading (and interpreting) the text without resorting to appeal to (political) authority when difficulties are encountered (or, even, without making an authoritative agenda the underpinnings of the entire interpretationTreatise Two). The result of twisting these three fibres into a thread is a work that is more contiguous and coherent than I often worried it would be, even if it is still lacks the appealing continuity possessed by more standard and (singly) focused theses. This shortcoming, I hope, can be overlooked if readers (like the author) are willing to look upon these three fibres (and the single thread they create) in the same way that Lnj understands attainment of the three most popular Chinese Bodhisattvas: they all emerge at the same timeone in three, three in one.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Treatise One , Chan, and Zen: A Critical Inquiry Concerning the West

"What's in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as sweet". -William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet

Sometimes the most nave questions turn out, on closer analysis, to cut to the heart of a significant, but overlooked, problem. In the study of Chan/Zen one such question might simply be: What is the difference between Zen and Chan? For those initiated into Zen/Chan studies, the answer may seem painfully obvious: Chan (also written Chan) is the Chinese pronunciation of the character , the same character from which the (Japanese) term Zen is transliterated. The two terms, then, are basically synonymousthough we typically identify Chan with historically Chinese aspects of the school and Zen with Japanese developments. This answer is correct, but deceptiveit evades a deeper point. An answer like this doesnt tell us why there are two names when just one could (and, in the past, did) suffice. It says nothing about how to address this school as a whole in English (i.e., address both its Japanese and Chinese parts together) and why different people address the whole school using different terms. In addition, this stock answer doesnt mention anything of the important origins of the terms Chan and Zen in Englishit doesnt bother to investigate how, when and why they were coined. In this treatise I will explore the implications of this nave question, tracing the terms Chan and Zen all the way back to the influential exchange of views between Hu Shih and D.T. Suzuki in 1953. This heated exchange, I will argue, was rooted 13

Carroll, Michael Scott primarily in a political dispute, the reverberations of which have molded Western understanding, practice, and study of this school of Buddhism by defining the very meanings of the names by which we refer to it. As (following the question of the epigraph) Shakespeares Romeo and Juliet teaches us that there is, in fact, very much in a name, so too will this treatise seek to show that its initiating question about names is in no way nave: that Chan and Zen not only mean different thingsone has the implications of a historical-anthropological, Sino-centric, objective approach and the other implies a psychological, heavily Japanese, spiritual understanding of the same school of Buddhismbut that these names were created and are employed primarily as political tools used to further (and give legitimacy to) unjustifiable assumptions held by their tokeners. It is this political nature of Chan and Zen, rooted, as it is, in the very words themselves, that this treatise seeks (by laying it bare 1 ) to defuse. One last introductory note: To avoid contributing to the very problem I investigate, I wish to state outright that I approach the question at hand with one restriction and one assumption. The restriction is to explore the nature and consequences of the political rift between Chan and Zen without endorsing it in any waynot to judge the claims of the authors mentioned, only to make explicit the motivations that appear to underlie such
1

I realize, of course, that, given the large amount of historical content in this paper, accusations may be leveled that my arguments fall prey to the genetic fallacythat I am using the history of Chan and Zen and the 1953 dispute to prove the truth of my claims about the Zen and Chan distinction. While investigations such as this one do walk a thin line that puts its dangerously close to falling prey to such fallacious reasoning, I wish to diffuse these claims by noting that this papers interest is not in drawing (necessary) conclusions from history but in looking to history to shed light on a current situation. Chan and Zen are not (currently) used synonymously and preferential use of one term over the other does abound. By looking to the history of both terms in the English language (and particularly at the point where there was a change from near-exclusive use of one term in the English language to wide-spread, but not synonymous, use of both terms) the underlying (hardly controversial) assumptions are that a) the meaning of words in a language can change and are tempered by their use over time and b) much can be learnt about a words meaning by investigating its history of use. In that sense my analysis of the Zen/Chan split is far from exhaustiveintended to highlight the major features of the (political) divide in meaning between the (supposedly synonymous) words by examining an event that went hand-in-hand with a major turning point in their use, not to be evidence for my entire claim.

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Carroll, Michael Scott claims. The assumption is that traditions like the one under question are more likely to be connected by some unifying principle than torn apart by discontinuities and that understanding of what unifies a movement is far more instructive than an exhaustive evaluation of discontinuity. These two guiding principles, however, will come into conflict. So far as that will occur, then, I will be guided by the restriction until the last sections, when I will give reasons in support of the assumption.

From to Zen: D.T. Suzuki Stakes his Claim

As with most names, Zen should be acknowledged as a rather arbitrary English label for the particular form of Buddhism it is supposed to denote. Why use the Japanese romaji (Romanization) Zen, after all? Why not the Mandarin Chinese pinyin term Chan, instead? The Korean Sn? Sanskrit Dhyna? Or why not translate (rather than transliterate) it into something like Meditation Buddhism, as was done with Pure Land Buddhism? We can probably assume that, at various points in history, Zen tried to enter the English language under all these different names (as well as some others not considered). The name that took root, however, ended up being Zen, the transliteral Japanese pronunciation of the character . Its easy to propose a few reasons why Zen won out over a wide range of other plausible name choices. To begin with, this school of Buddhism, under attack by NeoConfucianism, began a long, sustained declined in China and continental East Asia after the Song dynasty (960 1279 CE) whereas in Japan it remained vigorous with internal

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Carroll, Michael Scott reforms and imperial support all the way up until modern times.2 This made Japan a more likely place for the discovery and appropriation of Zen by the West to begin. Moreover, at a time of important cultural transmission between East and Westthe post-World War II periodan occupied Japan remained open and pervasive in seeking interaction and cultural exchange with the West while China, war-ravaged and recovering from a civil split into two governments was, in most practical ways, shut off to the rest of the world. Korea and Vietnam, likewise, struggled with their own internal conflicts at this time. The only East Asian country that could fully focus on rebuilding both itself and its relationships (including intellectual relationships) with the West, then, was Japan. Another major factor explaining why Zen took hold in English is the profound influence of Daisetz Teitaro (D.T.) Suzuki, a Japanese scholar and lay Zen practitioner. Fluent in the English language and Western culture, Suzuki not only published massively on Zen during his lifetime but had a knack for making friends and attracting followers: his picture of a mystical Zen not explainable by mere intellectual analysis appealing to a variety of influential Westerners, including Carl Jung, Gary Snyder, John Cage, Aldous Huxley, Thomas Merton, and J.D. Salinger (among others). It seems probable that, his understandable inclinations towards Japanese aside, Suzuki favored the use of Zen (over, say, the translation Meditation) because of the mystical flavor of the singlesyllable word in English. The term Zen, one of a limited numbers of words beginning with z, not only sounds mysterious but has proven to be very malleable in English, usable as a proper noun, a verb 3 and even as an adjective (a zen-like state).

Dhyna in India, which likely was never even a viable sect at all, more or less disappeared not long after transmission to China. 3 In computer lingo zenning a problem is to figure out the solution by a sudden insight or flash of enlightenment. (Howe 2005)

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Carroll, Michael Scott Even before the infamous 1953 debate with Hu Shih there is a strong push in Suzukis work to set parameters for understanding Zen in the way he wanted (and we typically understand it now). This definition of Zen, prior to the debate, was rather mixed: the general emphasis being on Zen as a psychological, religious, semi-mystical experience, one (vaguely) aimed at seeing into the nature of ones own being, and [pointing] the way from bondage to freedom. (Suzuki Essays 1949, 13) Suzuki further defined Zen as something living and beyond rational evaluation, characterizing it as the most irrational, inconceivable thing in the world not subject to logical analysis or to intellectual treatment. (ibid., 23)4 In this vein, Suzuki often talks about Zen as one might talk about a living religion, making Zen a living subject that authoritative statements can be made about: Zen proposes its solution, Zen abhors anything coming between the fact and ourselves, Zen liberates all the energies properly and naturally stored in each of us Additionally, Suzuki often, drawing inspiration from an intellectual idol, William James, uses this living depiction of Zen to relate it to psychology and psychological processesto emphasize Zens philosophy and thought concerning the mind and action. These usages of Zen, characterizing it as a religious, dynamic, even living entity, took such effective hold in Western culture that they still guide common thinking on (as well as the rules for the very use of) Zen today. Typical, everyday usages of Zen, just

Though, as we shall soon see with Hu Shih, Suzuki is often attacked on this point, I think it should be kept in mind that, prior to 1953, Suzukis interest in characterizing Zen in this way was not due so much to a rejection of scholasticism, historicity, or logical analysis in general but, rather, was centered on rejecting the (rather superficial) thinking at the time that the only true Buddhism was the logical Buddhism being reconstructed from Indian texts. Suzuki, having himself studied Indian Buddhism and familiar with this view, was keen to debunk the bias, seeking (in my opinion) more to carve a place for Mahayana Buddhism in the West than to reject scholarship on Zen outright.

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Carroll, Michael Scott like many current academic interests in Chan/Zen, owe their origins, in one way or another, to D.T. Suzuki.

From Zen to Chan: Hu Shihs Revolt

Considering Suzukis profound influence over Zen and, consequently, much of the understanding of Zen in the English language, it seems only to be expected that, at some point, challenges would be posed to Suzukis assertive definition of the term. Further, such challenges were likely to come from the academic realm, an area perhaps eager to delve into Zen but unable to under the academically unfriendly characterization given by Suzuki. The scholar who would end up posing this challenge would be Hu Shih, a Chinese philisopher who, armed with newly uncovered historical evidence taken from the Pelliot collection of the Dunhuang cache, challenged not only Suzukis understanding of Zen but countered his authority by championing a new term: Chan. A major turning point in the study of Zen is the 1953 article-and-response between Hu and Suzuki published in that years first issue of Philosophy East and West. The exchange begins with an article by Hu Shih, Chan (Zen) Buddhism in China: Its History and Method: an investigation of flaws in the traditional, received history of Zen Buddhism as revealed by discoveries from the recently uncovered cache of Buddhist documents in Dunhuang, China. Immediately following that article is a terse reply by Suzuki, Zen: A Reply to Hu Shih. This debate (which just about every Chan/Zen scholar has formed an opinion on) is most often cast as a conflict between

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Carroll, Michael Scott History and Religion: Hu acting as the historian and Suzuki as believer. Flaws and personal biases in both views have been picked out, discussed and reconciled extensively. What gets overlooked, however, are the political aspects of the dispute. The importance of Hu/Suzuki debate, I hope to show here, is more than the superficial conflict between dead history and living religion but is a political maneuver (and counter-maneuver) to dominate the origin and content of the transmission of Zen to the West. The consequences of this struggle exceeded the expectations of both sides. Hu, like Suzuki, was an East Asian scholar fluent in Western language and culture. A graduate student of John Deweys at Columbia and, later, an ambassador for the Kuomintang to the United States in 1938, Hu first encountered Suzukis early writings on Zen in the late 1920s, writings that inspired him to do further research on the subject with preserved texts taken from a (then) recently-uncovered ancient library in the Northwestern Chinese city of Dunhuang. A Confucian living during troubled times for China, Hu found inspiration in the Tang monk Shenhui (684 758 CE), whom he saw as a revolutionary spirit that took large political gambles and, against all odds, momentously changed the philosophical direction of his school (and, by rewriting the patriarchal lineage of the school, the very history of the school itself). If there was any scholar with the ability, knowledge, and reputation to challenge Suzuki, it was Hu Shih. Hus Philosophy East and West article, as he announces in the introduction, is a two-pronged attack on Suzuki that 1) rejects Zen is illogical, irrational, and, therefore, beyond our intellectual understanding before 2) claiming Chan can be properly understood only in its historical setting (Hu 1953, 3). The second prong of the attack, as Hu makes evident at the end of the article, walks hand-in-hand with the additional claim

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Carroll, Michael Scott that Chan phrases can (only) be understood rationally and that the school employs methodologies which are examinable and understandable. Hus article, from the mention of Suzuki at the beginning to his confident ending statement (That was Chinese Chan at the end of the eleventh century), is an open challenge to Suzukis undisputed authority over the subject matter. These attacks were, especially for the time, very bold. What is truly striking about the article, however, is not Hus explicit attacks but his subtler ones, in particular his move to usurp Suzukis Zen and replace it with Chan. There are only a handful of uses of Zen in Hus 1953 article, nearly all of them, with the exception of the few in parentheses (like the one in the title), directly associated with Suzuki and his illogical, irrational conception of Zen. When Hu moves on from his criticism of Suzuki to discuss history and method, however, he switches to using Chan disposing, by the second section of the paper, with Zen altogether. This is no accident. Hus use of Zen at the beginning of the paper is intended not to connect Zen to Chan but rather, to disconnect them and separate the two Zen is Suzukis (misguided) understanding of Chinese Chan. To show the importance and strength of this tactic, lets take a different tack. In the introduction to Chan Insights and Oversights Bernard Faure asks: Why use two namesChan and Zenwhen one would seem to suffice? As part of his rather brief answer he notes,

As it is well known, Zen is the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese character Chan (itself a transcription of the Sanskrit dhyna), and Japanese Zen developed out of the Chinese tradition known as Chan Buddhism. There is undeniably a continuity between Chan and Zen, and most scholars consider the two terms interchangeable. However, there are many historical, cultural, and doctrinal differences as well, and these differences are not merely superficial: they would surely

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Carroll, Michael Scott

affect the essence of Zen, if this term had any referent.True, Zen succeeded historically to Chan, but what did it actually inherit from it? (Faure 1993, 3)

For Faure, who is so detailed in his coverage of issues and so careful to identify biases elsewhere, this passage is rather superficial and self-confident. It is also very instructive: the biases Faure voices here are Chan biases all directly traceable back to the 1953 article. Most notably, Faure emphasizes Zen as coming after Chan, as though Chan were something single (like an original master) and unified and Zen was the successor that carried on the masters ideas but will always remain a distinct, separate entity (notice how Faure talks about the Chinese character Chan, choosing not only to capitalize Chan but to give a certain aura of primacy to China in implying that it has sole ownership of its script). Further, Faure takes the terms Chan and Zen themselves entirely for granted: he never asks why we dont simply use Chinese Zen instead of Chan or Japanese Chan instead of Zen. He also ignores that other terms are possible. These hidden landmines of bias are ones inherited from Hu and his Chan. It may not be immediately obvious why the use of Chan and not Chinese Zen betrays a bias, especially given that most simply accept Faures claim that Zen is the Japanese pronunciation of the Chinese character Chan and Japanese Zen developed out of the Chinese tradition known as Chan Buddhism. Chan, we take from this initial statement, is just the Chinese way of saying Zen (or, nearer to Faures argument, Zen is the Japanese way of saying Chan) therefore Chan is the appropriate name for the Chinese side of the school, just as Zen is proper for the Japanese side. Why must we use two different languages to refer to one school of Buddhism, though? We rarely do as much when discussing other religions or movements in English. If we want to talk about Catholicism in Mexico we talk about Mexican Catholicism, not Catolicismo. If Faure 21

Carroll, Michael Scott were to take this initial claim further, references to this historical school in the Cantonese-speaking areas of South China should properly be called neither Chan nor Zen but Sim. To use the native term Chan when the term Chinese Zen communicates the idea more clearly (Zen being widely understood, while Chan is mostly only known in academic circles) implies academic snobbery and/or unfamiliarity with Englishthat, or a cloaked political motive. Very revealing to this entire discussion is another article by Hu written twenty years prior to the one in Philosophy East and West. This 1932 article, The Development of Zen Buddhism in China, though less well known, is very similar to the 1953 article, also advocating the historical approach and using recovered Dunhuang texts. Entire passages in the 1953 article, as a matter of fact, are lifted almost verbatim from the 1932 one. What the 1932 article lacks, however, is an (outright) attack on Suzuki. It also lacks the term Chan. The term Chan does appear briefly at the beginning of the 1932 article (the school of Chan or Zen ()) but, this one use aside, never appears again. Instead, Hu uses the terms Zen, Zennism, Chinese Zen, and Dhyana (when referring to what he sees as the earlier, more Indian stages of Zen) to communicate his points and refer to the school. In 1932, before the second World War, Hus exile to Taiwan, and the greatest surges in Suzukis popularity, Hu talks Zen. Twenty years later Hu changes his talk to Chan. Hus basic ideas remain much the same, what changes are his motives and the political climate. This new Chan is not just an attack on Suzukis ideas in particular, but a move to recover many things for the school, including a central role for

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Carroll, Michael Scott China and Chinese texts. The new Chan isnt just a part of a vehement critique; it is the banner for Hus academic (and Chinese) revolution in the West.

A New Chan (Or No Chan at All?)

One thing that needs to be kept in mind in our discussion of the Hu/Suzuki debate is the players stakes. Hu and Suzuki were both gambling for the same thing: to be the primary channel by which Chan/Zen came west. Most specifically, they were both competing to be the dominant authority on Chan/Zen in the United States of America, a country in which both had spent significant time and had numerous ties. Both were wellversed in Americas language and culture. Suzuki, however, who first began proliferating his thinking on Zen not long after he attended the Worlds Parliament of Religions (1893) as assistant to Rinzai Zen abbot Shaku Sen, had the great advantage of time over Hu. Hu realized in 1932 that Zen was already the established term in English and, initially, sought to reform Zen from within. Twenty years later, he had a change of heart. For any number of reasons, Hu seems to have thought that more was needed than internal criticisms and reforms. What was needed was fundamental revision: a renewal of the sort that Shenhui effected when he overthrew the legacy of Shenxiu and the Northern School. Hus ultimate purpose in his 1953 article, then, is revealed in a romantic characterization of Shenhui: a revolutionary pronouncement of a new Chan which renounces chan itself and therefore is no chan at all. 5 (Hu 1953, 7)

Though Hu Shih is using the uncapitalized, italicized chan to represent the Sanskrit term dhyna (from which chan is translated) it is hard not to read this statement without some sense of irony, considering that Hu Shih was a Confucian and, hence, a descendent in a tradition that sought to eradicate Buddhism throughout Chinese history.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Hus 1953 article was revolutionary. In changing from using Zen to using Chan, Hu declared that he was no longer willing to play by the rules set down by Suzuki. Chan was the new rallying banner for the rejection of Suzukian thought. Much of the content of this Chan revolution was determined as being against Suzukis Zen but, as with all revolutions, it also possessed its own positive underpinnings. The positive principles that Hu gave (along with the general sense of rejection of Suzukian Zen) remain primary determinants for how Chan is understood and studied today (this is particularly true for those who use Chan as the general name for the entire school as well as for the Chinese part of it). The primary aspects of Chan that are most salient to understanding of the term are the ones that Chan wears on its face. Chan implies a dual relocation of the center of discourse 1) to China (away from Japan) and 2) to texts and history, as opposed to practice and tradition. Thus, for example, recovered Dunhuang documents seem to hold a prominent position in Chan research while traditional Japanese texts tend to take a peripheral role (or no role at all). 6 A third aspect of Chan studies that is derived from Hus nominal Chan revolution is a sense of the entire school as being mired in discontinuities. This aspect of
This preference of the Dunhuang texts over the traditional ones strikes me as odd. The Japanese texts, certainly, are likely to contain numerous errors and interpolations over generations of copying and interpretation but this, in itself, does not justify preferential treatment for the Dunhuang texts. One advantage that the Japanese texts have (that the Dunhuang ones lack) is (ironically) history: we know where the texts came from, who transmitted them and, to some extent, the biases and motives of the copiers and preservers of the texts. On the other hand, dont know anything about who gathered and preserved the Dunhuang texts (and, oddly, nobody asks). Moreover, the Japanese texts have a line of interpretation behind them (centuries of commentary and marginal notes) leading down to the first monks that brought them from China, interpretative additions that try to capture as much of the original text as possible, including the pronunciation of characters. The Dunhuang texts have no such lineage and, in some sense, our only option for understanding them is through radical translation. Though the notes (and even the text itself) in the Japanese traditions may be biased, these traditions give us the advantage of tracing many of those biases back to their origins. As much as the Dunhuang texts may add to scholarship, the simple fact of their age gives no reason to value them over their potentially apocryphal or biased Japanese counterparts, which, if we look carefully, still have much they can offer both Chan and Zen.
6

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Carroll, Michael Scott Chan originates, perhaps, from Hus discovery that the famed patriarchal lines of transmission (from Bodhidharma to Huineng, for example) were more political creations for gaining sectarian legitimacy than actual lines of transmission of the dharma (teaching). In recent Chan studies, this disconnectedness and internal chaos has become a dominant paradigm for researching the school. Having two names for one schoolor, rather, being the second namehelps Chan emphasize the discontinuous nature of its subject matter. 7 I dont wish for Hus role or intentions in his 1953 article to be over-exaggerated. Hu undoubtedly saw himself as leading a revolution against Suzuki but it does not necessarily follow that he meant to displace Suzuki (and Zen) completely, or that he was acting alone in his quest. In truth, much of the success of Hu Shihs Chan revolution, much of the solidification and formalization of the new elimination rules he posed for Chan, came from scholars who were attracted to the possibilities of Zen presented in Suzukis writings but whose sensibilitiesgeographical, methodological, or otherwisewere more akin to Hus. Chan scholars (not surprisingly, perhaps) typically hold many biographical details in common with Hu: they tend to be educated to PhD level (in history, philosophy, anthropology, or religious studies of some sort), employed in an academic position at a university, and (in their writing, at least) religiously unaffiliated. 8 It is these scholars who

An interesting question to ponder here: How much of the discontinuity implicit in Chan is due to the interest of scholars in investigating discontinuities and how much of Chan scholars interest in discontinuities simply comes from the fact that Chan (as a revolutionary alternative to Zen) is a discontinuous term (was first used to break an authoritarian continuity)? 8 The model example of a one such Chan scholar might well be Bernard Faure, who pays tribute to the pioneering contributions of Asian scholars such as Hu Shih and Yanagida Seizan whose use of newly discovered manuscripts permitted a drastic rewriting of early Chan history (Faure 1993, 4) but doesnt similarly recognize Suzuki, even though he examines and quotes Suzuki often elsewhere. Faures selective tribute not only emphasizes the Chan focus on history and Chinese textual reconstruction but also

25

Carroll, Michael Scott carried on the Hus revolt and kept Chan alive with their vigorous support of the term in the academic world. In fact, as most any common speaker of English knows (or, rather, doesnt know), the term Chan is pretty much only kept alive in academic circles, the English language in general preferring Zen. The Chan revolt, then, although the dominant paradigm the academic world, never got off the ground in popular English, where Suzukian Zen still holds a tacit monopoly. This might tempt some to say that both Hu and Suzuki won (to some extent) in their gamble against one another but, as I hope to bring out in the rest of this paper, that is not the caseeverybody, rather, has lost as a result of the Chan/Zen split.

The Empire Strikes Back: Suzukis Response

One reason why the Chan revolution, for all its success in the academic world, could never entirely topple the legacy of Suzukian Zen seems obvious: by relocating the center of study of the school from Japan to China and from modern, living practice to historical/textual reconstruction Chan set itself up in dialectical (political) opposition to Zenan opposition that weakened the Suzukian monopoly on meaning but also strengthened and focused Zen by giving it an opponent to clearly define itself against. In this way, Hus article backfired by giving Suzuki a new platform for rejecting any attempts to relocate Zen discourse as well as solidifying his own authority over Zen by identifying himself with the correct interpretation of it. In revolting against Suzukis authority over Zen, Hu not only had first to grant that Suzuki had authority
emphasizes its overarching anti-Suzukian Zen principle (Suzuki, after all, was also a pioneering Asian scholar on this school, the one who even introduced Hu to its thought). Faure not only shares Hus method and preferences, then, he holds true to the general Chan rejection of things related to Suzuki.

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Carroll, Michael Scott over the term but also had to declare himself as being the opposition to Suzuki and Zen. This made Hu a perfect target, one that Suzuki could, in his response, openly point out as an incorrect view. Suzuki, then, presents a comprehensive attack to Hus article in his response: he rejects any attempt to (re)locate Zen at all, eschews Hu Shihs focus on history ([Hu Shih] may know a great deal about history but nothing about the actor behind it [who] eludes the historians objective handling. (Suzuki 1953, 25)) and, in his only mention of Chan, brushes aside his opponents Sino-centrism by noting that while Zen may have come from the Chinese Chan, both originally derived from a Sanskrit term and that Hu must have noticedthat Zen has almost nothing to do with the Indian Buddhist practice of dhyna (ibid., 45). Suzuki even seems to have anticipated the appeal Hus Chan would have with academic circles, asserting that practice of Zen is a necessary first step before one can proceed to the study of its historical objectifications as Hu Shih does (ibid., 26) and even portraying the competition between Huineng and Shenxiu with Shenxiu (meant to represent Hu) going to the capital under imperial patronage [where] his teaching [was] more esteemed (ibid., 27) while (Suzukis idol) Huineng, an outsider and a common man, returns to the South and lives in obscurity, teaching the dharma to peasants. The message is that Shenxiu was supported by all the secular authorities but, in terms of practice and thinking, Huineng had it right. As Suzuki says (perhaps trying to turn the tables and make himself look like the embattled reformist) In the history of Zen, [Huineng] comes foremost his message was really revolutionary. (ibid., 27) 9

The further implication here is that the figure Hu Shih identifies with, Shenhui, is merely the (traditional) disciple of Huineng. Huineng (Suzuki) began the revolution, there would be no Shenhui (Hu) with no Huineng.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Reading Suzukis article now, with half a century of subsequent Chan/Zen development behind us, a number of things stand out. First, we have to question how much Suzuki realized was implied (and at stake) in Hus use of Chan. Suzuki certainly violently reacts against all the things that Hu wants to identify with Chan (historicism, methodology, etc.) but, for his part, Suzuki only once uses Chan in his response article: pointedly noting, in what seems to be an off-handed chastisement, that the term Zen or Chan is originally derived from the Sanskrit [dhyna] (Suzuki 1953, 45). Was Suzuki trying to make Chan go away by refusing to acknowledge it, or did he really not get Hus strategy at all? Its hard to sayall we know is that the rest of the article is filled, exclusively, with talk of Zen. Another thing that stands out is that Suzuki unnecessarily overplayed his hand. His assertions of authority over Zen are so extreme they seem to work against Suzuki and draw extra sympathy for Hu. If Hu played the role of the rebel, Suzukis responded by taking the role of the authoritarian establishment. Suzukis bold statements about Zen or Buddhism are often left entirely unsupported by argumentation or evidence (e.g., Buddhas enlightenment was no other than a sudden enlightenment.(ibid., 27)) and, as if this werent enough to isolate scholars who identify with methodological rigor of Hus Chan, Suzuki even begins his attack with a blanket prohibition against all but enlightened practitioners from saying anything about Zen:
vis--vis Zen, there are at least two types of mentality: the one which can understand Zen and, therefore, has the right to say something about it, and another which is utterly unable to grasp what Zen is. The difference between the two types is one of quality and is beyond the possibility of mutual reconciliation. Men of the first type know very well where this second type is entrenched, because they were there themselves prior to their attainment to Zen. (ibid., 25)

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Carroll, Michael Scott If youre not with Suzuki, youre against him (and, consequently, with Hu). If we cast Hu as the leader of the Chan rebellion then we can easily cast Suzuki as the mastermind behind a totalitarian (or perhaps, theocratic) repression that seeks to identify, isolate, and quash the rebels, with prejudice. 10 The result of Suzukis violent response is a sharper, more painful distinction between Chan and Zen than would have existed otherwise. It cemented the parameters for understanding Zen that Suzuki originally laid out in his early writings but it put exaggerated emphasis on the parameters that opposed Hu (Zen is practical and psychological, not historical, rooted in tradition and continuity, not texts and discontinuity, etc.). This partly explains why, despite numerous attempts to reconcile Hu and Suzuki, many of the sticking points of the debate remain bothersome today. The scholar who studies Chan history or philosophy cannot (at the beginning, at least) escape a sense of being unqualified to say anything about it until he has practiced (and been enlightened?) just as the practitioner who has simply accepted all the traditional accounts must feel some embarrassment when he learns that many important Zen figures were fictionalized, and that the lineage in which he studies is, in many ways, the creation of those seeking (or who sought) political advantage. Hu and Suzukis debate echoes still, shaping who and what is seen as Chan or as Zen.

Another impression we can take away from Suzukis article is that the Japanese scholar was a bit too eager to receive such a succinctly worded view like Hus that he could immediately respond to. Suzuki, after all, throws everything he can lay his hands on at Hu. On Hus translation of zhi (chih) as knowledge, for example, Suzuki spends eight pages explaining why his translation of praj-intuition is the only one acceptable. In all likelihood, the thinly-veiled glee in Suzukis attack on Hu can be attributed to the fact that Hu provided him with a target that he could use to sharpen his own stance and assert his authority against. As Faure notes, having already been anonymously attacked in a 1927 Times review of Essays in Zen Buddhism for his failure to take into account the Dunhuang documents Suzuki, who attributed the article to Hu [Faure 1993, 95], now, in 1953, had a concrete (no longer anonymous) figure which he could identify as espousing the wrong thinking on Zen and could, in addition to redressing the 1927 attack, use as a contrast for clarifying his own authority and correct attitude on Zen.

10

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Carroll, Michael Scott

Taking Sides in a Non-Polar Polarity

A significant consequence of the Hu/Suzuki debate is that it created exactly two categories and no middle, meaning that all Western discussion of this school had to be put on one side or the other. One group of people that gets pushed into the Zen category is that group of Suzuki adherents who touted and disseminated Zen widely in popular venues, but never gave Zen much treatment in more academic mediums. Faure, in yet another comment in his discussion of Why two names?, notes, The field of Chan and Zen studies has been particularly thriving in Japan since the war, and the area seems to be gaining some recognition in Western scholarship too, despite the lingering associations of Zen with the counter-culture pervasive during the 1960s. (Faure, 4) At first glance this statement seems an innocent enough account of the state of studies in the field. Examined closely, however, at least three important features appear that should alert us to the fact that the nature of the statement is not descriptive but, rather, very political: 1) Chan and Zen are not used interchangeably, 2) association with the counter-culture pervasive during the 1960s is considered detrimental to Western scholarship on Chan/Zen, and 3) negative associations of that same counter-culture are placed with Zen, not with Chan (or Chan and Zen). (Additionally, we might also flip back to the cover of the book and notice the title: Chan Insights and Oversights. Faure wishes to associate himself with Chan from the onset, not with Zen.)

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Carroll, Michael Scott Faures move to push the counter-culture pervasive during the 1960s into the Zen group is an example of how modifying the understanding/definition of one term can sometimes be facilitated by altering the understanding/definition of another term. Somewhere along the line, using Zen took on the consequence of implying things related to 60s counter-culture (lets just say it: hippie things). Certain people (mostly scholars) wished to avoid these associations and so they worked to impose on Chan the understanding that Chan didnt have anything to do with (or, even, rejected the thoughts of) that counter-culture. 11 This led to even closer (perhaps, necessary) association of the counter-culture group with Zen: the effect being the categorization of people who were never even involved in the Chan/Zen dispute onto the side of Zen. Just as the hapless hippies got pushed onto a side, whole works on the subject may be pulled from one classification to another, too. Noted translator Ruth Fuller Sasaki, for example, translated Dumoulins study Entwicklung des chinesischen ch'an nac Huinng im Litchte des Wu-mn-kuan into The development of Chinese Zen after the Sixth Patriarch : in the light of Mumonkan, systematically rendering every Chan into a Zen because [she had] come to hold the opinion that Japanese must be the language of Zen for those who undertake it as a practice and a disciplineand without such an approach that by reason of which Zen exists can never be grasped, or even understood. (Dumoulin 1953, xv) Sasaki wrote into Dumoulins work her support for Suzukis conception of Zen: giving geographical priority to Japan (and Japanese), preferring practitioners over scholars, and even replicating Suzukis style of making authoritative assertions on how Zen can be grasped or understood. Thus, a study of chinesischen
Of course doing this worked against the intentions of Chan users by ensuring a connection between Chan and 60s counter-culture. Pushing the counter-culture (and Zen) away, after all, only keeps the relationship of these two things to Chan closer to memory.
11

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Carroll, Michael Scott ch'an after Hui-nng using the Wu-mn-kuan became, for English readers, a book on Chinese Zen after the Sixth Patriarch in light of the Mumonkan (same text, but with the Japanese spelling instead of the Chinese one). 12 What is shared by those associated with Zen, whether the association be voluntary or not, is a certain common affinity (lineage?) with Suzuki. Much the same goes for Chan and Hu. These echoes from the 1953 debate have persisted over 50 years and have led the debate (and the Chan/Zen split itself) to most typically be portrayed as a dilemma or polarity, with Suzuki and Hu representing opposite views that (in a very Hegelian sense) cannot be reconciled but are mutually dependent upon one another. This portrayal is most pervasive, oddly enough, in the number of discussions that seek to dispel the notion that a dilemma exists. In A Belated Response to Hu Shih and D.T. Suzuki James Sellman concludes that neither Hus nor Suzukis position can be narrowly confined to only one side of a dualism (Sellman 1995, 104)a conclusion given in response to Arthur Waleys comment on the debate (If there were no Hus there would be no Suzukis. (Waley 1955, 78)) which Sellman simply misread as casting the two positions as necessary polarities. 13 Similarly, Faure asks of the debate Are we condemned to use the same dichotomies and to remain forever trapped in the same discursive hermeneutic dilemma between Suzukis metaphysics and Hu Shihs

An interesting question here is: Was Dumoulin ever aware of these changes to his study and did he think them significant? While I have not come across any sources that suggest an clean answer, it is notable that most of Dumoulins later writing (or at least the English version that I have consulted) rely more on Zen than Chan: a lasting influence of Sasaki, perhaps? 13 Waleys point is not that Hu and Suzuki are polar opposites. He does not, after all, give the (necessary) additional claim that without any Suzukis there would be no Hus. Waleys, instead, aims mostly at criticizing Suzukis contradictory denial and reliance upon history. To quote the passage more extensively than Sellman, Suzuki need not feel that he is a sinner (he actually uses this word) if he has sometimes dabbled in history, for apart from the mundane there is no transcendental. Still less need he ask Hu to join in his peccavi, for if there were no Hus there would be no Suzuki. (Waley 1955, 78)

12

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Carroll, Michael Scott historicism? (Faure 1993, 90) before proceeding (with a correct reading of Waleys quote) to debunk the existence of any such dilemma. Faure and Sellman both do good jobs in refuting the claim that a duality/dilemma exists between Hus and Suzukis position but never sufficiently discuss whose claim they are refuting. Faures targets, for example, are Hus and Suzukis successors who were only able to repeat, while refining them, the same arguments. (ibid., 87) The identities of these successors, however, are (strangely for Faure, who certainly doesnt take a minimalist approach to citation) not given. The truth is that it is difficult to find sources that portray the debate in the way that Faure and Sellman wish to refute. What we typically come across, instead, are commentators on the debate that reject that it is polar: claiming that Hus and Suzukis positions are reconcilable (or, at least, that one didnt understand the other). The important question to ask here, then, is not Can the dilemma/duality be resolved? or even Is there a polar opposition between the positions? but, rather, Why do Suzukis and Hus positions suggest a dilemma when nobody seems to hold the view that one exists? The answer deals not with the specifics of Hus or Suzukis arguments but with the opposing positions of Chan and Zen. This opposition, as I intend to show, is entirely political in nature.

Political Preference and the Rules of Elimination

Before continuing, a definition of politics seems in order. By politics I imply relations between people that involve authority or power. These relations can take place

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Carroll, Michael Scott between groups, individuals, or a combination of both. Additionally, I take political to imply both this understanding of politics and the understanding that, when something is recognized as having this implication it becomes a relationship that is open to discussion, evaluation, and criticism. On this understanding an antonym to a political distinction, then, might very well be a natural one. It is in both these ways that I wish to show the Chan/Zen split is political. From the beginning, Hus use of Chan was political. As mentioned earlier, both Hu and Suzuki had numerous ties to America and both were competing, as it were, in a recently established American journal to be the representative voices that would shape how a certain school of Buddhism would be interpreted and understood in the West (and in America specifically). Suzuki, having not only begun his work earlier but also having the benefit of continuing to do research over the war years (during which Hu, understandably, was preoccupied with other matters), had a great advantage: his work was (perhaps for lack of alternatives) widely considered as the definitive channel for Zen in the West. In 1932 Hu challenged Suzukis dominant interpretation of Zen and, for whatever reasons, was not satisfied with the results. In 1953 Hu challenged Suzuki again, this time tossing aside Zen and fighting, instead, under the banner Chan. Chan was a political gamble and, in many ways, was one that succeeded. Its important to stop here and stress that Chan/Zen could only be divided and used as political tools in a Western cultural setting like America. A primary reason for this is because, in the Asian countries in which this school traditionally flourished China, Vietnam, Korea, and Japanthe pronunciation of its name derives from the character . Even though these different nominal pronunciations are usually adaptations

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Carroll, Michael Scott of the original Chinese (or Sanskrit) term, there is every reason to believe, along with Chad Hansen, that these East Asian practitioners of Zen saw spoken language as generally parasitic upon written language: a written , to them, is the referent of a spoken chn, thi, sn, or zen. In Western culture and languages the opposite assumption permeates our thinking. Because of the phonetic aspect of Western writing systems, the printed word is seen as parasitic upon the spoken one. (c.f. Hansen 1992, 3539) Therefore zen and chn do not refer to a single written for Westerners but, instead, each utterance births a different attempt to Romanize the sound of the spoken word, allowing the creation of two written Western words for only one Chinese character. Another feature of Western languages that causes difficulties in translating East Asian languages is the use of capitalization to mark out proper nouns. A school of Buddhism falls, in English, into the category of names that must (as a rule) begin with a capital letter. Thus (when referring to a Buddhist school or sect) must be written as Zen or Chan not zen or chan. East Asian written languages, however, do not have a similar device for marking out a word as a proper noun in a language. This employment of capitals significantly narrows the roles Zen or Chan may play and the ways they may be understood in comparison to the more flexible , which can simultaneously mean a sect of Buddhism or meditation. In light of these considerations, we may wonder, though Hu Shih seemed conscious of the rebellion he was starting against Suzuki with Chan and though Suzuki may well have been aware of the nominal challenge posed, if the debaters, being native speakers of their respective East Asian languages, fully anticipated the divisive

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Carroll, Michael Scott implications that their conflict could have when taken up by Western scholars. Both of them they were, after all, fundamentally talking about the same . For Western scholars, too, Zen and Chan both refer to the same . Oddly enough, though, may not simultaneously refer to both Zen and Chan in Western languages. The two terms, after all, are not synonymous. This division, originating in the Hu/Suzuki debate, continues to hinder Western scholarship and study (as well as practice) of this school not just because it is rooted in a political dispute (and employed for political purposes) but because this political division has been largely overlooked or ignoredthe politics that separate Chan from Zen are dangerous precisely because they are not considered political and easily dismissed as being only a simple difference of language. To establish the significant problems and harms posed by overlooking the political nature of the Zen/Chan division, it is important to show why Chan and Zen cannot be used synonymously. To this end, Robert Brandoms discussion of introduction rules and elimination rules for terms and statements is useful. In Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, Brandom argues that the conceptual content of a statement or term is determined by two sets of rules: the introduction rules for which the terms use may be justified (the set of sufficient conditions for asserting it) and the elimination rules or set of necessary consequences of asserting [the term,] that is, what follows from doing so. (Brandom 2000, 63) In short, there are conditions that allow us to assert a term coherently and consequences of asserting that term. Both contribute to determining the terms conceptual content. For

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Carroll, Michael Scott most terms and statements the introduction and elimination rules match up. This is not always the case. For both Chan and Zen, the conditions and consequences dont match (after 1953). Both terms have the same simple and straightforward introduction ruleseach must either a) refer to the character or b) refer to the school of Buddhism denoted by that character (in some aspect)but they also have additional elimination rules that not only dont match up with the introduction rules, but conflict with the elimination rules of the other term (i.e., the elimination rules for Chan conflict with the elimination rules for Zen). In this way, the two terms are not synonymous because the consequences for using each term are different (even though they share the same conditions for use). This alignment between introduction rules (and misalignment between elimination rules) was a necessary feature for Hus nominal revolution. Hu could only bring Chan into his 1953 article if it had the same introduction rules as Zen and the introduction of Chan could also only be useful to him (for usurping Suzukis authority) if he could change the elimination rules to reflect the conceptual consequences he wanted the term to have. Hu made sure Chan and Zen had the same inputs (that they referred to the same thing) but changed the conceptual outputs that came from using Chan. This explains why the answer to the nave question at the beginning of the paper is evasive. By limiting explanation to the fact that Chan and Zen are different names for the same school of Buddhism or for the same character the answer addresses only half the meaning (conceptual content) of the termsthe introduction rules. What is ignored are the elimination rules and the consequences of use.

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Carroll, Michael Scott But even if we assume that, on some level at least, fluent English users of Chan and Zen are completely aware of both the introduction and elimination rules for the terms, we are left with the question of why the important differences in the elimination rules have gone unaddressed for so long. What motive would lead a respondent to our nave question to only mention the introduction rules for Chan and Zen and evade mentioning the important differences in the consequences of each of these terms? There are at least two reasons why a full investigation of the rules of elimination for Chan and Zen has been avoided for so long. The first reason why discussion of the consequences of Chan and Zen may be avoided is that users of the terms dont wish to reveal that their patterns of use are based primarily on political preferences. Suzuki wanted Zen to imply Japan, its culture, psychology, practice and pure religious experience. Hu wanted Chan to emphasize China, its history, philosophy, and academic (anti-authoritarian) ideals. Suzuki and Hu both had preferences for how to evaluate and understand their subject matter, but no meta-reason for why their own approach was superior to the others. Why ought we focus on current practice over history or why ought we prefer texts recovered in Dunhuang, China to those stored in Kyoto, Japan? Hu, especially, was well aware that his preferences for China, history and academic method were not ones that he could justify beyond the levels of bias and assumptionhaving already hit a wall when he tried to dodge the issue in his 1932 Zen article. Hus troubles in 1932, moreover, were increased by the realization that Suzuki didnt make unsupported preferences for Japan and psychology, Zen did. Hus (innovative) response was to forego trying to reform Zen and infuse his own preferences into Chan instead. After 1953, then, Suzuki, Hu,

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Carroll, Michael Scott and anybody else engaged in the debates over practice vs. text, China vs. Japan, authoritarian assertion vs. academic method no longer had to expose their normative preferences over the debate, they merely had to carefully use the right terms at the right times to support their views. This assertion of one term over the other alleviated the burden of justifying individual assumption/prejudices by funneling the conflict into an unacknowledged political battle between two words. 14 The other reason users of Chan and Zen may wish to avoid explicating the political consequences of using these terms is because they dont wish to announce their own lack of control over them. Speakers have much less control over the language they use than they tend to believe. We might even go so far as to say that, on the level of what terms/statements mean, we have virtually no control over (natural) language at all. No matter how innocuously a scholar may use Zen, no matter how sincerely and innocently a student may wish his use of Chan to refer only to the character , the consequences of these terms are always beyond the individual users immediate control. 15 Defining (setting the conceptual content for) a term is an effort that must always extend beyond an individual into a group and must, to take effect, penetrate into and be accepted by the culture and society of the language in which the term is used. The reason translators, scholars, and practitioners may wish to avoid discussion of the consequences of Chan and Zen, then, is that they wish to nurture the illusion that they can remain neutral in the Hu/Suzuki debatethey dont wish to acknowledge that,

Some less obvious consequences of the terms follow from the background of those who use them most. The prominently academic and religiously non-partisan backgrounds of Chan scholars, for example, give the peripheral elimination rules that Chan is an isolated, academic concern (not a popular one) and that talk of Chan can be about religion but ought not to be religious itself. 15 Just like the racial epithet chink always carries consequences of racism in its use, no matter what the intentions of the user may be.

14

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Carroll, Michael Scott just by using one of the only two terms for 16 , they accept the normative choices of a whole group and sacrifice their individual power to choose what they say. The consequences of Chan and Zen, working under the initial restraints set by Suzuki and Hu control what our statements mean when we talk about this school of Buddhism in English as much as we do ourselves. 17 Along these lines, we must remember, of course, that Hu and Suzuki only set the initial parameters how they wanted Zen and Chan to be understood in English, it was the social effort of the various writers, practitioners, scholars and commentators who came after them that fixed these parameters into consequences rooted in the English language. If these two terms are ever to be synonymous (and not so politically loaded) again, then, their unification must be a collective effort, too. Before such a coordinated, bi-partisan reunification movement can take place however, further justification for such a move may be required to impact my point. In the next section, Ill try to provide such justification by outlining the various harms being caused by the Chan/Zen rift.

Zen: Authority and Abuse in America

One area where Zen, with its emphasis on practice, critically needs closer affiliation with Chan is in preventing abuses that come from its political selfidentification with absolute authority. This can be demonstrated with examples in the
Even the composite terms Chan/Zen or Zen/Chan (which, at any rate, are infeasible as general terms to be used for all references to the school), not only solidify (with their employment of the slash /) that differences exist between the two terms but do state some preference one way or the other with the order they are given. 17 This, I think, explains the earlier mystery of why so many scholars feel compelled to de-polarize a polarity that nobody claims existswhat these scholars are trying to do is not to unravel a dilemma but, rather, are (futilely) trying to reassert their own individual power to determine the normative content of their views without having it superseded by Hus and Suzukis elimination rules for Chan and Zen.
16

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Carroll, Michael Scott Western practice of Zen that are described by Stuart Lachs in a series of articles posted on the internet. 18 Lachs summation of his general concern in Coming Down from the Zen Clouds is worthy of extensive quotation:
Beginning in 1975 and continuing to this day, a series of scandals has erupted at one Zen center after another revealing that many Zen teachers have exploited students sexually and financiallyThese scandals have been pervasive as well as persistent, affecting almost all major American Zen Centers. It should be emphasized that the source of the problem lies not in sexual activity per se, but in the teachers' abuse of authority and the deceptive (and exploitative) nature of these affairs Zen centers were torn into factions of those who deplored the teacher's behavior and those who denied or excused it. The apologists, when they did not flatly deny what had occurred, would explain it away as the teacher's "crazy wisdom" or more commonly, they would blame the victim or dismiss it by commenting that the teacher isn't perfect. Another explanation was that the student did not yet truly understand the teaching. Disciplining of Zen teachers in America has been rare. Usually, those who objected to the goings-on either left voluntarily or were pushed out of the center by those loyal to the teacher or by the teacher himself. Some of the students who left eventually resumed their practice while others were so disillusioned and embittered that they abandoned Buddhism altogether. (Lachs 1994)

The most prominent example of such abuse is Richard Baker, the first American Roshi and leader of the San Francisco Zen Center (SFZC) from 1971 to 1983. Baker, the sole American Dharma Heir of Shunryu Suzuki, the Japanese Soto monk who founded the SFZC, was able to abuse his power because he 1) had authoritarian control of the executive powers of the SFZC, 2) determined how students were to interpret and practice Zen and 3) was, due to unquestioning acceptance of transmission myths connecting him to the original Buddha, regarded as a saint or living Buddha by many subordinates.
18

Lachs articles are all available on both mandala.hr and www.thezensite.com at time of writing.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Baker abused his powers greatly, using SFZC money for a new BMW (while students who work-practiced ten to twelve hours daily in the Center-owned businesses got a $100 monthly stipend with no medical coverage), promoting only those who affirmed his authority, and using his position of power to (openly) conduct affairs with female students (one of which destroyed the marriage of a friend and Center supporter). Six years after Baker was forced to leave the Zen Center he sued to reclaim his position, arguing (with great historical inaccuracy) that by ousting him, the Center was denying 2,500 years of how Buddhism was developed and continued. (Lachs 2002, see also Downing 2001) There are many ways of interpreting the Baker scandal. In general, though, it must be acknowledged that the authoritarian environment of the SFZC, where the senior members blindly and unquestioningly bought into Zen's mythology and Baker's transmission being above and beyond question (ibid.) and where textual study was (until Baker was finally ousted) discouraged and considered unnecessary, such abusive use of Zen doctrine and hierarchy was probably inevitable. Bakers distortion of Zen was extreme, to say the least, but any sort of movement that stresses absolute transmitted authority and suppresses (or isolates itself from) dissenting elements will, without fail, become single-sided and doctrinaire. The abuses at places of Zen practice worldwide are due in part, to the fact that the elimination rules for Zen lead it to be conceived of it as independent of history and authoritarian. The most prominent elimination rulethe one that places the center of Zen in Japanexasperates these problems by preventing practitioners from looking elsewhere for guidance on how practice at temples should proceed: ignoring, with Lachs

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Carroll, Michael Scott example, that head monks at Korean temples are elected, they dont inherit the position from their father or get appointed to it for life. 19 An influx of the sort of methodology and dissenting attitude that pervades Chan could certainly have brought members of the SFZC to critically reevaluate Baker and his dharma earlier (they might, for example, have questioned it in light of the fact that, of the three people Suzuki Roshi gave Transmission to, one was Baker, one was his own son, and the third was a person unknown to him that he transmitted to as a favor for a friend (ibid.)). We might also speculate that, were it not for the elimination rules that so exclusively associated Zen with Suzuki and authoritarian transmission (and the omission of rival views), the conception of Zen that the SFZC students had would not have led them to put up with (and deify) Bakers authoritarianism for so long. So we might ask: If Hu had continued to work from the inside, questioning Zen myths and methodologies and posing his own alternatives from within (instead of from without, with Chan), would the general conception of Zen be different? If the (Suzukian) politics underlying the use of Zen had been discussed openly (particularly in contrast to the use of Chan) earlier, would Zen still be seen in such narrow, authoritarian terms? Would Zen practice be, if not improved in some way, more diverse? On all questions I find little evidence to reject an affirmative answer.

Continuity (or the lack thereof) and Chan

The prominent exit rule placing Zen in Japan is epitomized in Kaiten Nukariyas Religion of the Samurai the first book on Zen in English and one of the very few works on Zen to precede Suzuki. In the beginning of chapter one (History of Zen in China) Nukariya states outright: To-day Zen as a living faith can be found in its pure form only among Japanese Buddhist. You cannot find it in the so-called Gospel of the Buddha and more than you can find Unitarianism in the Pentateuch, nor can you find it in China and India any more than you can find life in fossils of bygone ages.

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Carroll, Michael Scott

If explicating the political nature of the exit rules for Zen (and, perhaps, rectifying them with the ones for Chan) may help dispel the aura of absolute authoritarianism around Zen, then doing the same for Chan may have the opposite effect of leading the academic world to question the increasingly common conviction that little, if any, continuity unites that Buddhist school. The earliest widespread use of Chan in English came not from Hu Shih but, rather, from Derk Bodde. Bodde, in his English translation of volume two of Fung Yu-lans A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, which appeared five years prior to the Hu/Suzuki debate, chose (in a very influential chapter on the school) to translate as Chan rather than as Zen. It is hard to say why Bodde made this particular choice in translation, but it is likely that it contributed to Hus decision to use Chan as a banner for revolt. 20 Whatever the connection may be, notable differences exist between the Fung/Bodde chapter on Chan and Hus article, the most important being that Fung gives a coherent philosophical analysis of (his understanding of) the basic ideas/tenets of the Chan school while Hu avoids undertaking such a task. Hu has many things to say about the method that should be used to evaluate Chan as well as about the rationality of Chan and various historical characteristics of Chan but does not give any sort of account of what might be holding the discourse of Chan together. Hus revolution was so concentrated on breaking authoritarian views on the constitution of Zen that it

Another likely contribution worth mentioning was Hus possible resentment towards Japan, Suzuki and the Zen religious establishment for their self-righteous justification of the invasion of China (and crimes against the Chinese people) during the war. Suzuki, often portrayed by his American students as a gentle sage, for example, wrote that religion should, first of all, seek to preserve the existence of the state, and that Chinese were unruly heathens whom Japan should punish in the name of religion. (quoted in Victoria 1997, x)

20

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Carroll, Michael Scott neglected a positive account of what constitutes Chan. This desire to side-step (or deny the existence of) a positive account of the constitution of Chan as a whole is still common today. Faure writes in Chan Insights and Oversights: Two basic assumptions of this book are that there is no such essence [of Zen] and that discontinuities are, when one focuses on them, at least as obvious as continuity. (Faure 1993, 3) This biased elimination rule, particularly because it has gone undiscussed, is a barrier to certain advancements in the study of Chan. Historical, anthropological, textual and other academic studies of Chan, which, by virtue of their respective methodologies seek to objectively approach their subject, stress discontinuities (such as, famously, that the famed patriarchal lines of transmission were often untruthful creations aimed at giving sectarian legitimacy than actual lines of transmission of the Dharma) while avoiding a complementary discussions of continuity (such as whether those lines of transmission are important or significant because they communicate some shared thought, philosophy or attitude) contributing to the growing sense that there is not much of a Chan discourse at allthat Hus Chan was, in a very real sense, a revolutionary pronouncement of a new Chan which renounces chan itself and therefore is no chan at all. (Hu 1953, 7) The problem is not that Chan eschews the notion that there is anything that constitutes Chan and holds it together, but that Hus Chan began without any such statement of the constitution of Chan and never, after Hu, developed one. The political opposition to the absolutist content of Suzukian Zen, moreover, makes it seem that if any account is given of what Chan is that that account, invariably, will be authoritarian, Zen, and not very academic or objective. This ingrained impression that, in all likelihood, there is no single element that holds Chan together at

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Carroll, Michael Scott all precludes viewing (and treating) Chan as a movement that may be studied and evaluated as a whole. Let me pause to reassert the assumption given (and put aside) at the beginning of the paper. It is my basic assumption that, despite obvious and deep discontinuities, there is something continuous that constitutes the school of Buddhism under question something the holds it all together. This continuous constitution need not be a text or a tenant, it could be something less tangible: like an attitude or a personal identity. Of course, if the continuous constitution of this school of Buddhism is something so intangible as an attitude, then there is much to say why Chan scholars would tend to approach their subject as discontinuous. The continuous vs. discontinuous debate, after all, is like the one over text vs. practice: we cannot justify one side or the other with a meta-reason. There are, however, reasons that I think suggest scholars/academics ought not allow the elimination rules of Chan to suggest discontinuity over continuity. To begin with, there is one single element that, were it not for the Chan/Zen split, would be extremely obvious as holding this school of Buddhism togetherits name. From its inception in China to its spread across East Asia this school of Buddhism has always gone by (or, at times, the longer version ). Though this may not be much, it is a unifying element and, as such, an important starting point. Inherent in individual terms, as I have tried to use Brandom to show, is a lot of implicit conceptual content that can be brought to light. With America and the West entrenched in a political Chan/Zen split, however, this one obvious element of continuity becomes muddled and lost in the confusion of cultural variables. This is especially true for the Chan

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Carroll, Michael Scott group, which tends to juggle the terms Chan and Zen more than the Zen group (which generally takes the strategy of ignoring the term Chan) does. As long as there are two referring English terms with mismatched elimination rules, then, it seem that the task of explicating the meaning of will never get out of the gate. Two additional reasons why I support reevaluating the elimination rules of Chan deal with the effect that not doing so has had on academic work in the field thus far. As long as both English terms for contain politically loaded elimination rules, after all, there will be no neutral ground for a scholar in the field to stand. In addition, psychological and practice-based explorations (as well as philosophical ones) will continue to be isolated from the academic world. Worst of all, the view of Chan as inherently self-destructive strikes one as pitiful and disgusting. This might explain why Chan/Zen studies are such a limited, specialized area to this day: it is hard to imagine a new student being attracted to a discipline that always seeks to dismantle itself. In other words Chan, since 1953, truly has become (in a very tragic, non-ironic sense) a Chan which renounces chan itself and therefore is no chan at all.

An Uneasy Conclusion

An easy conclusion to a paper like this would be to provide a few simple arguments for a single term that can be used to overcome the Chan/Zen split and reunify the (dangerously) fragmented Western discourse on this school of Buddhism. One could conceivably argue for reunifying behind the original term Zen, claiming that Zen was not only the first term to take root but is, still, the term by which this school is

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Carroll, Michael Scott known popularly, while Chan is somewhat limited to academic circles. Maybe, to appease Channists and to de-Westernize the term a bit, a lowercase zen could be used instead of a proper Zen. Or the assertion could be put forth that all problems would be solved if both sides unified behind a literal translation, like Meditation Buddhism. Good pluralists might wish to push Dzan or try Zaine. A radical person could even go so far here as to argue for letting people pronounce the name of school however they will (Chan, Zen, Son, anything) but that the name should be written using the character (even non-Chinese speakers could surely come to recognize the character with a little bit of practice, after all, and an immediate switch to would surely and quickly eliminate (in published materials, at least) all of the political and cultural problems that come with a written Zen or Chan). While it would be easy to conclude with a terse, coherent argument for unification behind a new, single term doing so would be to undermine the work done by this inquiry. By making explicit the conceptual content of Chan and Zen, it was not my goal to allow us to push aside these problems and start anew with a new term (starting anew does not guarantee we wont end up in the same place by a different route, after all) but to re-engage debate on fundamental issues by revealing the political natures of these terms and bringing concealed biases into the open where they may be discussed and critically evaluated. Merely doing this much, I believe, already goes a long way to free Western students, practitioners, and scholars of Chan and Zen from being held hostage by the biases and political maneuvering infused into these terms by others. Discussing the politics behind Zen and Chan takes us a long way towards more control of our discussion and use of , but is not sufficient in and of itself. Another way

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Carroll, Michael Scott in which this conclusion is an un-easy one is that it comes bound with the implication that, in pursuing in the West, we must not only continue to evaluate the way we understand our Western designations for the character (be it Chan, Zen, or something else entirely) beyond what has been done here but realize that evaluation and awareness of our Western renderings of these terms is a duty that can never be fulfilled. In our investigations we must always keep an eye on our own biases and political posturings as well as the biases and politics of those around us. Hopefully, though, such vigilance will not only help us get a peak at what , Chan, or Zen means but, too, learn a little something more about ourselves.

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Treatise Two Radical Interpretation, Wittgenstein, and the Concept of Meaning: A Philosophical Approach

An overt objective of the previous chapter was to open corridors for Western academic study and discussion of continuity (or, at least, the possibility of continuity) across the Zen/Chan tradition. A less obvious, but closely intermingled, goal was to make room for a philosophical evaluation of this school of Buddhism. Making room for philosophy in Chan/Zen, however, requires not only depoliticization of the authorityladen terms Chan and Zen (between the two of which there was very little room for philosophical work to be done) but also outlining what approach a philosophical evaluation to this school of Buddhism might take. The task of providing a philosophical framework and method for studying Chan/Zen is the focus of this chapter. Along such lines, the choice of philosophical approach made here is, perhaps, unusual. The most popular philosophical method for interpreting the text and tradition of Chan/Zen is obviously hermeneutics. Hermeneutics, rooted in biblical interpretation, is certainly a fine and well developed paradigm for interpretation but is undesirable for two reasons. First, hermeneutics is deeply entrenched in the language, thought, and history of European (Continental) philosophy. A thorough understanding of the theory of any one of the modern hermeneutic philosophers (Riceour or Gadamer, say) requires a certain fluency in the history and major figures of European philosophy that those writers draw

Carroll, Michael Scott upon (Heidegger being the most important name on a list that stretches at least as far back as Hegel)this requirement is, for most, overly burdensome. 21 Secondly, hermeneutics is undesirable because, broadly construed, it lacks a wellgrounded starting pointa broader justification for how interpretation is even possible when approaching one tradition from a distinctly different one. This problem is especially acute when viewed through the lenses of East Asian Buddhism and Zen/Chan: How can we interpret texts written in classical Chinese, which is no longer spoken? What initial steps may we take to interpreting such texts (or the wider traditions that they fall under) that dont involve appeal to authority? In a tradition that is often claimed to be illogical and beyond rational comprehension, is there any underlying basis for interpretation to take place? Radical interpretation, the philosophical approach explored in this chapter, holds promise as a theory that is less likely to be bogged down by such difficulties. Originating within the Analytic tradition of philosophy, which seeks to shrug off historical baggage and give primacy to logical approaches to philosophical questions, radical interpretation is (under Quine) originally concerned with how to interpret completely alien statements. In this way, radical interpretation starts where I take hermeneutics to stop short: it begins theorizing at the point where an interpreter first encounters an alien language and culture. The approach that radical interpretation takes from this starting point is fundamentally logical: interpretation should seek to maximize one of two principles for a
This required philosophical fluency, moreover, seems counter-productive to our purposes. Why must we first steep ourselves in a Western tradition of philosophy in order to take a philosophical approach to an East Asian one? The background requirement for hermeneutic theory seems to suggest that the only way to philosophically approach a text/tradition without just accepting the established interpretive authorities is to approach it from a European philosophical mindset. Casting the situation in this way, might not hermeneutics be seen as working against the project of the last chapter by re-establishing certain interpretive authority over our assumptions?
21

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Carroll, Michael Scott corpus of alien statementsit should seek either to maximize truth in that corpus (the principle of charity) or to maximize coherence/reasonableness (the principle of humanity). Guided by either of these two principles, a radical interpreter hopes to understand any possible statement within another language. In this treatise, I will champion and outline the fundamental aspects of the approach of radical interpretation by first drawing out that approaches greatest deficiencya (lack of a) concept of meaning. This deficiency will be introduced by exploring the always-made-but-rarely-discussed identification step in interpretation and then supplemented by a discussion of the concept of meaning in Wittgensteins later work. This discussion should not only mend this shortcoming but also strengthen the overall approach of radical interpretation by recasting it in a new light. The chapter will conclude by bringing the whole investigation back to our particular concerns with East Asian Buddhism and explaining how radical interpretation (reconceived in this way) is relevant to the goal of making philosophical sense of the Chan/Zen school of Buddhism.

The Identification Step, Depiction, and Meaning

At the beginning of the chapter Radical Interpretation in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation Donald Davidson writes,
Kurt utters the words Es regnet and under the right conditions we know that he has said that it is raining. Having identified his utterance as intentional and linguistic, we are able to go on to interpret his words: we can say what his words, on that occasion, meant. (Davidson 1984, 125)

The italics in the above quote have been added to draw attention to something both incredibly remarkable and mundanely commonplace. Kurt uttered Es regent and, when he did so, we were able to identify that utterance as both linguistic and intentional.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Kurt said something and, even though we didnt understand it (assuming we dont speak German), we were able to tell that he intended to say something and used language to do sohow did we accomplish these feats? It is hard to tell if Davidson has an answer to this question: he never addresses the issue. This is odd, especially in light of how central this feat of identification is to the paradigm cases of radical interpretation. In the original thought experiment W.V.O. Quine employed to introduce radical interpretation theory (Quine calls it radical translation), for example, we imagine a field linguist trying to translate the language of a hitherto untouched people.(Quine 1960, 28) The linguist, unaided by bilingual assistants or any connection with the native language, first makes headway when, observing his subjects, [a] rabbit scurries by, the native says Gavagai, and the linguist notes down the sentence Rabbit (or Lo, a rabbit)(ibid., 29). Rabbit, at that point, becomes a tentative translation [for Gavagai], subject to testing in further cases.(ibid.) But how does the linguist make this tentative step into translating the language in the first place? How does he know that Gavagai is a lingual expression at all? Why does he assume Gavagai is likely about the rabbit? It is likely that Quine and Davidson neglect to address this issue because they take it for granted. It seems basic to understanding any language, after all, that a speaker/listener can identify when language is being used. Radical interpretation, moreover, is interested not in how language is first learned but in how a person already initiated into one language may interpret statements in another. Knowing when a statement is intentional and linguistic, then, is an ability radical interpretation assumes a potential interpreter naturally possesses.

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Carroll, Michael Scott On first glance, it seems that the radical interpretation theorist has every right to take this ability for granted. It remains rather strange, however, that discussion on radical interpretation begins after the identification step (where one identifies the statement as intended and linguistic) and not with it. This step, after all, is not just preparatory to [going] on to interpret what [Kurts] words, on that occasion, meant, it makes the entire act of interpretation possible: it affirms not only that Kurt intentionally said something but that his words meant something, too. The introduction of the term meaning provides an initial clue as to why the identification step gets overlooked. Though proponents of radical interpretation often have volumes to say about meaning, a primary strength of the theorys logical approach (and a legacy it inherits from Quine) is its ability to circumvent the term and avoid entanglement in the quagmire of theory surrounding it. By stressing the maximization of either truth or coherence in the translation/interpretation of a corpus of statements, after all, one avoids direct engagements with the discussion of meaning by preferring sentences (propositions) to words and by setting useful guidelines for interpreters that allow them to measure the strength of an interpretation rather than rely on fuzzier judgments over how well it captures meaning (i.e., it allows interpreters to ask in straightforward terms: Is this the interpretation the gives us the most true/coherent sentences for this corpus? instead of How well does this translation capture the meaning of the original statements?). As much as avoiding discussion of meaning may strengthen radical interpretation, however, it also imposes limitations. To begin with, avoiding a discussion of meaning in radical interpretation theory tends to make the term taboo in practical applications of

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Carroll, Michael Scott radical interpretation. Though avoiding appeal to the term meaning may benefit interpretive work by forcing an interpreter to work harder and explain a word or phrase in terms of say, its use or role in a certain context, it tends to put the interpreter in the awkward position of feeling compelled to avoid interpreting any alien phrase as meaning 22 . An even more important shortcoming is that without a concept of meaning we cannot make sense of the identification step. In sidelining the discussion of meaning, then, radical interpretation theory not only fails to make sense of that first step but ignores itbeginning its project, instead, with another, less fundamental (and, perhaps, unnecessary) step: material stimulus. Before developing this point, some initial explanation of my construal of the term meaning seems necessary. Meaning as I use and explore it here, is less an established philosophical term or concept and more an everyday word, one used, for example, to ask What does this mean? or assert What that means is. My employment of meaning in this way models itself on Wittgensteins use of the term in his later work: a broad construal that allows Wittgenstein not only to investigate meaning but to turn his investigation back on itself and also inspect what role meaning plays in our language. Though I will not make full exegesis of Wittgensteins discussion of meaning my task here (a task which would further require exegesis of all of his later work) I will, for reasons that will be apparent later, follow Wittgensteins precedent of using (and taking) meaning as we do in ordinary language and avoiding theorizing on the term.
22

Though, admittedly, this problem is not a particularly large or insurmountable one for the radical interpreter I think it is worth noting here because, in the context of the Chan/Zen tradition, we find (in texts translated to English) a wide variety of Chinese/Japanese terms tend to be translated into the English term meaning. At the very least, then, it seems important that, in interpreting this school, the entire possibility of interpreting a character/phrase into the term meaning should be openit would seem to be a sign of poor interpretive work if the freedom to use the term meaning in interpretation was hampered just because it is convenient for to avoid the philosophical quagmire the surrounds meaning in English.

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Carroll, Michael Scott With this in mind, there is one distinction I wish to make here concerning meaninga distinction that will clarify why the concept is so important to making sense of the identification step. The distinction I have in mind here is the one between meaning and just depicting: I will explicate this distinction by way of example. Consider two things: drawings on a cave wall done by primitive peoples and Egyptian hieroglyphic. Both can perform a number of common tasks. Both can, for example, tell a story, denote a certain person, place, or time, express feeling or emotion (e.g., the word cry versus a crying face), even provide simple numerical accounts of daily living 23 . Moreover, understanding the pictures of either the cave drawings or the hieroglyphs is neither necessarily dependent upon nor necessarily related to the oral communication of the people who made them. A reader does not need to know Middle Egyptian or be familiar with primitive cave grunting to be able to understand the hieroglyphs or the drawings. 24 There are many similarities between cave drawings and hieroglyphs but we hardly consider them similar. Hieroglyphs, after all, constitute a language, cave drawings do not. But how (as with Kurt and Es regnet) do we know this? Both the hieroglyphics and the cave drawing are pictures that we can interpret. How do we know that the hieroglyphs mouth and basket form a word (rek, or time) and that eat from the basket,
The drawings of the primitive cave dwellers, for example, could have one full moon with numerous drawings of individual deer beneath it, one made each time a deer was hunted in a lunar month. (Or, even simpler than a full moon, twenty-eight parallel scratchesone to count each day.) 24 In the case of Egyptian Hieroglyphic, Egyptologists have never been (nor ever will be) able to speak Middle Egyptian. The oral language is long lost and pronunciations used to make sense of the phonetics today are adaptations taken from Greek or Coptic and are used as tools of convenience. One could, of course, argue that, lacking oral understanding of the language, Egyptologists still might not fully understand Egyptian Hieroglyphic. In such a case I would direct attention to classical Chinese writing. Also based in pictures classical Chinese writing could be used for communication between two learned Chinese who, speaking different dialects, could not communicate orally. This view goes in line with the arguments that classical Chinese may never have been a spoken language at all but, rather, just a written language for communication between scholars and other members of the elite.
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Carroll, Michael Scott mouth-shaped basket or say basket doesnt capture what these two hieroglyphs mean? (Or, to put it differently, that their meaning isnt necessarily worn on their face?) This problem is serious one but, oddly enough, not one that plagues usan entire academic discipline has never been built around interpreting cave drawings, after all. The reason is because, as language users, we can easily distinguish between signs/pictures that merely depict and those that mean, even when the pictures that mean also depict or have their origin in depiction. (The ability to make this distinction, I suspect, is something within the grasp of even illiterate language users.) Cave drawings just depict, Egyptian hieroglyphics have meaning. 25 It may just be grammatical happenstance that leads us to characterize words as possessing meaning, but it does correctly convey that the ability to notice meaning (as well as the use of the word meaning) is bound up with the ability to know when somebody is using language and intending to express something. In this way, the distinction between mere depictions and meanings is one that can be made with spoken language as well. A distressed, prelinguistic caveman may grunt !help! (an involuntary expression of pain that happens to match the English word) but any language speaker (not just one that knows English) would know him to be just depicting his distress, not meaning the English sentence Help!. Returning to our earlier discussion, the primary consequence of this distinction is that it shows radical interpretation cannot take the identification step for granted. How
For those who remain unconvinced by the comparison of cave drawings and hieroglyphic, consider Egyptian Hieroglyphic by itself, as it appears inscribed on obelisks or pyramid walls. The Hieroglyphic inscriptions often go with pictures of people and events and, yet, Egyptologists (even before Champollions breakthrough with the Rosetta stone) never tried to translate/interpret the pictures, only the hieroglyphs. Just looking at a photograph of such inscriptions, we (like Egpytologists) can easily pick out hieroglyphs that mean from pictures that just depict. The ability to make this distinction is fundamental not only to language use but, too, to the word meaning.
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Carroll, Michael Scott one makes that first step and distinguishes between mere depiction and meaning, after all, not only grounds the entire project of radical interpretation but also is crucial to understanding all the steps that follow. Radical interpretation theory, for its part, seems to have weakened its own position on this countthe theory is grounded, instead, in the less stable (and more problematic) material stimulus step. In both of the test cases for radical interpretation given at the beginning of this section, Quine and Davidson rely on the modulus of stimulation (stimulating material occurrences happening in present time) to make their first step in radical interpretation i.e. they rely on a rabbit hopping by when the native says Gavagai or on rain falling when Kurt says Es regent. For both philosophers, radical interpretation can only begin when we have the ideal conditions of a) material stimulus and b) a linguistic, intentional utterance related to it. This step is problematic for two reasons. First, the requirement of external stimulus for radically interpreting alien statements seems counterintuitive and excessively burdensome. This is especially true if we take Davidsons statementAll understanding of the speech of another involves radical interpretation.(Davidson 1984, 125)at face value. How, under this requirement, may we begin to interpret nonstimulated statements, like written language? Non-stimulated written languagesuch as the ancient writings of extinct civilizations and classics written in dead (and lost) tongues (such as the classical Chinese of many Zen/Chan texts, which is neither a currently spoken nor written language)intuitively seems like it should be subject to radical interpretation in some way: while we often accept that we can never fully recover or understand such languages, we (like early Egyptologists) are rarely accept the claim that lost languages are beyond the ken of our understanding. Given, then, that studies

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Carroll, Michael Scott dealing with dead languages would likely benefit greatly from radical interpretation theory, it seems an important task to re-evaluate the modulus of stimulation step and see if there arent alternatives to it that will broaden the scope of radical interpretation. Second, and most important, taking material stimulus (or stimulus meaning) as the first step for radical interpretation is problematic because the step itself lacks grounding. Even though a rabbit hops by when the native says Gavagai, and even if the native points to the rabbit as he says it, beginning with this step alone we have no background for knowing that Gavagai is about the rabbit. We lack any basis for knowing that the native means the rabbit that is stimulating our senses at the moment when he utters his statement. Such a bedrock of understanding is necessary not only to make sense of how this step is possible but also to give a potential interpreter assurance that the method of radical interpretation can hold waterthat its steps are founded on some solid ground. 26 An account of meaning is needed for radical interpretation because, without one, there is no foundation for making that critical first identification step. Our ability to know that Kurts Es regnet is intentional and linguistic or that Gavagai is a statement in a language and not just a grunt of distress is critical to all that follows in the theory. If we are to radically interpret statements in a language at all, we need to begin with an understanding of what grounds the possibility of radical interpretation (i.e., identifying linguistic meaning), otherwise we very much risk the possibility of falling

Quine, admittedly, does address this issue in his discussion of the example. He never resolves it, however, appealing to natural expectations held by the field linguist about the natives and stopping his considerations there. Quine may feel justified for doing so in the context of his discussion in Word and Object but it is a primary interest of this paper to investigate these natural expectations (for reasons outlined above) and push Quines discussion even further.

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Carroll, Michael Scott prey to the claim that, with enough creativity, one could radically interpret the beats of a butterflys wings into a coherent or generally truthful language.

Wittgenstein, Forms of Life and Experiencing Meaning

Ludwig Wittgensteins Philosophical Investigations is a useful text for guiding an investigation of meaning in relation to radical interpretation not only because it extensively explores issues surrounding logic, meaning, and language, but because it is one of the few works to probe into the identification step discussed above. This investigation of how we understand a statement to have meaning (as opposed to just depicting) appears in Part II, Section VI of Investigations: the discussion of noticing an aspect (also called aspect-seeing). What is noticing an aspect and what does it have to do with the initial step for radical interpretation? Wittgenstein begins his inquiry with a simple case:
I contemplate a face, and then suddenly notice its likeness to another. I see that it has not changed; and yet I see it differently. I call this experience noticing an aspect. (193e) 27

This, as Wittgenstein shows, is hardly an unfamiliar phenomenon. We see a strange picture of a duck one moment and then, later, see it as a rabbit. An outline of a cube seems to have its right side forward one moment but its left side forward at another. What we see seems different and yet the picture itself remains unchanged. Whatever it is that occurs in noticing of aspect, once it happens we can never think of (or feel about) the picture in the same way again. Wittgenstein seems to capture the general sense of it when
27

All references from Philosophical Investigations are given in the main body of the text with citations from Part I cited by section () number and references from Part II given by page number. See appendix for bibliographical details.

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Carroll, Michael Scott he writes the flashing of an aspect on us seems half visual experience, half thought. (197e) This initial characterization of the experience of noticing an aspect, however, is unsatisfying as a conclusion for Wittgenstein. Other questions and problems arise: [Is] this a special sort of seeing? Is it a case of both seeing and thinking? or an amalgam of the two, as I should almost like to say?... why does one want to say this? (197e) The concept of a representation of what is seen, like that of a copy, is very elastic, and so together with it is the concept of what is seen. The two are intimately connected. (Which is not to say that they are alike.) (198e) These loose threads lead Wittgenstein to push the discussion further. He extends the scope of his investigation of aspect-seeing from pictures to symbols (such as the black/white cross) and shapes and, from there, on to words and poetrybringing Wittgenstein to ponder the very same curiosity that we find in our identification step: how do we notice the aspect of meaning in a word? An initial point to take from this discussion is that, while lingual statements do possess meaning, our ability (as language speakers) to notice that meaning is neither certain nor guaranteed (contrary to what radical interpretation theorys taking the identification step for granted implies). Just as someone may look and see a duck but no rabbit, an assistant to an archaeologist may look at the hieroglyphs and only see only scratches on stone or depictions of everyday items. At the same time, however, we recognize that the missed aspect or meaning is immanent: we expect that the aspect/meaning will eventually be seen through either an epiphany (Aha, now I see it!) or guidance (This is the mouth and that isnt a bill but two rabbit ears).

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Carroll, Michael Scott This is an interesting point about our relationship to language and meaning, and Wittgenstein probes its implications further by making a unique (but characteristic) turnhe asks us to imagine a person who is entirely unable to notice an aspect. This is the aspect-blind person, who has an altogether different relationship to pictures from ours. (214e) Wittgenstein draws the picture of the aspect-blind person by challenging his readers with innocuously difficult questions and scenarios, like
What would you be missing if you did not experience the meaning of a word? What would you be missing, for instance, if you did not understand the request to pronounce the word till and to mean it as a verb,or if you did not feel that a word lost its meaning and became a mere sound if repeated ten times over? (214e) Suppose I had agreed on a code with someone; tower means bank. I tell him Now go to the towerhe understands me and acts accordingly, but he feels the word tower to be strange in this use, it has not yet taken on the meaning. (214e)

As Wittgenstein remarks himself here, the importance of this concept [aspectblindness] lies in the connexion between the concepts of seeing an aspect and experiencing the meaning of a word. (214e) Seeing an aspect doesnt just relate to noticing meaning, it relates to experiencing meaning. But what is experiencing meaning? To answer this question, we need to approach it from another direction. Returning to a pervasive question in this paper, we may ask of Wittgenstein what basis makes seeing aspects possible and, from this, how can we understand (and experience) meaning? What grounds our ability to perform these feats? Wittgensteins response is to direct us away from seeking a meta-explanation or an a priori account of this grounding and to direct us, instead, to acknowledge that our ability to make the identification step relies on the fact that we all accept a certain behavioral basis: What has to be accepted, the given, isso one could sayforms of life. (226e) A form of life, as we learn elsewhere in the Investigations (see 19, 23, 241), is groundwork that must be accepted with language for language to be possible (to 62

Carroll, Michael Scott imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. (19)). In this sense a form of life may seem more basic than language (forms of life, indeed, arent limited to linguistic humans) but to assert as much is to confuse the issuea language is part of the activity that is a form of life, conceiving a language entails conceiving all those other actions that come with itexpressing, indicating (pointing), representing, playing games. This is an important point: the basis for radical interpretation (for making the identification step) is bedrock which turns our spade (217)it is the form of life that grounds communication. Exploring the activities that make up our form of life, then, is exploring what is shared between all language users (which they all must accept as given). Therefore, when the interpreter hears the jungle native say Gavagai or ponders over the indecipherable writings on the wall, she is able to identify meaning because she and the native share a form of life and the natives linguistic activities are fundamental to both (and all) languages. Though the structures and shapes may differ greatly, both languages are founded on the same bedrock. A shared form of life not only allows the radical interpreter to identify a foreign statement as possessing meaning but also provides the basic groundwork for going about interpreting meaning. A concept that Wittgenstein introduces in Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics that is useful here is that of a technique. As Meredith Williams draws out in the essay The Philosophical Significance of Leaning in the Later Wittgenstein, mastery of techniques is important to Wittgenstein because they are both the content and the result of the learning circlethe method of teaching which initiates students into their first language. The learning circle, writes Williams, moves from the experimental activity of testing in which the pupils reactions are shaped creating the

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Carroll, Michael Scott sense of the obvious, to the activity of testing in which the result is seen as necessary. (Williams 1999, 210) Mastery of techniques, thus, is a fundamental feature of the form of life of language users and, as such, also plays a crucial role in understanding meaning in languagewe dont just use techniques to initiate a student into the practice of language but we also hone and practice them to evaluate language and understand what is said. This partly explains Wittgensteins interest in exploring the nature, impact, and possibilities of a wide range of basic lingual techniques including (to cite a few examples) definition (as in 30), comparison (66 - 67), explanation (69, 87), and investigating rules of grammar (90). Mastery of techniques, moreover, comes not just from ostensive training (to use Williams term) but also from close investigation of each of the techniques and how they work. Because of this, we all may have different levels of technique mastery and vary in our abilities to evaluate meaning in this way. One such technique that is unique to (and much discussed in) Wittgenstein is examining word use. This well-known discussion is closely linked with the considerations on rule followingconsiderations which, in turn, are intricately bound up with Wittgensteins interest in logic. 28 Logic pulls out the rules we follow in the grammar of a language (the ones that determine or are determined by the use of a word) and helps us use those rules better evaluate meaning in language. The starting point from which logical enterprises followthe tautologies and necessary truths

Though Saul Kripkes skeptical argument (see Kripke 1982) tends to dominate discussions of rule following, I think that Warren Goldfarbs point that Kripkes reading of the argument isolates the sections on rule following from the rest of Investigations and gives too narrow impact to the discussion should be kept in mind (see Goldfarb 1985). Though I will not attempt a full discussion of rule following here, I believe this exploration of meaning, learning, and form of life provides some support for accepting Goldfarbs points and keeping the skeptical argument from coloring our understanding of those sections too much.

28

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Carroll, Michael Scott or falsehoods of logicare, like the activity of rule following, rooted in our form of life, giving a certain shared basis for evaluating meaning between all languages:
Disputes do not break out (among mathematicians, say) over the question of whether a rule has been obeyed or not That is part of the framework on which the working of our language is based (for example, in giving descriptions). So you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?It is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not agreement in opinions but in form of life. (240 - 241)

Mastering logic is honing of our ability to understand (and employ) meaning by becoming proficient in a process of language that is grounded in language users form of life. A process such as this should not be mistaken for meaning, however, as no process could have the consequences of meaning. (218e) (In the same vein, use isnt meaning either, as some interpret Wittgenstein to claimWittgenstein twice stresses in Part II Let the use teach you the meaning.(212e, 220e)) It is only a component for learning and understanding meaning and may only grasp meaning insofar as it works in conjunction with a counterpartexperiencing meaning. Returning to aspect-blindness, a key element of that discussion, as Wittgenstein leads us through it, is that the aspect-blind person is one that has mastered all the techniques needed to evaluate meaning but lacks a capacity for experiencing meaning. The aspect blind person can perform any required feats and pass any tests associated with language, but he lacks experience when it comes to the meaning of wordshe can see the schematic cube as a representation of a cube but cannot see it jump from one aspect to another (213e)he does not get a certain feeling from it. Experiencing meaning is a primary concern in Part II of the Investigations that includes, by family resemblances, a group of concepts such as the experience of a word (214e - 215e), our inclinations to use words (216e), and the feeling of words (218e

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Carroll, Michael Scott 219e). Wittgenstein, again, is careful to warn readers not to mistake this experience with meaning (Meaning is as little an experience as intending. (217e) 29 ) but emphasizes that this queer experience or inclination plays an important part in how we choose and value words in language, particularly in cases where we search for the right word or the word that hits it off (see 215e and 218e). If asked to say if Wednesday is fat or Tuesday lean or vice versa, we have inclinations one way or the other. These inclinations are not inherent in the (logical) use of the word (or even in a factual account of it (214e)) but they are not exclusively private, eitherthey are judgments that can be openly discussed and, often, affirmed or negated (as, for example, poets in a poetry workshop discuss the feeling of a word in a poem and how appropriate a specific employment of the word is based off of its feeling). This discussion of experiencing meaning is hard to wrap ones hands around if we forget the broad sense in which Wittgenstein takes meaning and try, instead, to define or conceptualize it. This is not to say that Wittgenstein rejects meaning as a conceptrather the opposite seems true, the discussion of meaning seems important to Wittgenstein because it is a concept that we act under. By examining the ways we talk about and act under meaning Wittgenstein is not trying to theorize but to relieve us of the burden of grammatical difficulties surrounding the word meaning that lead us to theorize on meaning and misapprehend the concept by limiting and over-clarifying it. This is a mistake, and we should remember where the strength and utility of such concepts comes from when we recall Wittgensteins remark from 67: [W]e extend our concept of number as in spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does
29

The continuation of this thought is worth noting as an aside: [What] distinguishes [meaning and intention] from experience?They have no experience-content. For the contents (images for instance) which accompany and illustrate them are not the meaning or intending.

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Carroll, Michael Scott not reside in the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres. 30 The concept of meaning is bound up both with the mastery of techniques and with experiencing meaning. Each informs how we act on (how we use or understand) a word and, as such, constitutes an important aspect in any investigation of meaning. Moreover, intricately connected as the two are, technique and experience are not independent of each otherthe two, rather, complement and mutually develop one another. These ideas, I think, all bear upon one last passage from Part II of the Investigations: a passage that, I think, will help lead us back into our discussion of radical interpretation:
It is possibleand this is importantto say a great deal about a fine aesthetic difference.The first thing you say may, of course, be just: This word fits, that doesntor something of the kind. But then you can discuss all the extensive ramifications of the tie-up effected by each of the words. That first judgment is not the end of the matter, for it is the field of force of a word that is decisive. (219e)

Some New Considerations on Radical Interpretation

The first impact of Wittgensteins discussion of meaning upon radical interpretation was already addressed in the preceding section: our ability to make the identification step is grounded in a shared form of life. The field linguist, the native, Kurt, and ourselves are all language using human beings and, as such, share the fundamental groundwork of activities that makes language possible. It is this groundwork,

This metaphor is even better appreciated if read against the background of the discussion of family resemblances. Such resemblances do not connect like a web or a net, they obtain their strength, rather, from overlapping to form a single length. A hundred foot thread consists of numerous overlapping fibers of varying lengths. A fiber on one end of the thread, however, need not touch a fiber on the other end. This is not a weakness of the thread but, rather, a crucial source of the threads (and a concepts) strength.

30

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Carroll, Michael Scott moreover, that makes the entire feat of radical interpretation possibleit provides bedrock from which to launch any interpretation of intentional and linguistic activity. It is from this bedrock that radical interpretation draws its logical approach. Part of what is learned when one is taught a first language (part of the form of life an initiate learner must grasp) is the mastery of techniquestechniques that, for evaluative purposes, may be honed, refined, and formalized. Logic, the result of such honing and refining, is the most essential tool of the radical interpreter: it is the key used to unlock an alien language. Before the radical interpreter may use this key, however, he must first find a keyhole. Traditionally, the keyhole that radical interpretation seeks out is that of present material-stimulus, of having rain fall when Kurt utters Es regent. Modulus of stimulation, however, is a very limiting and narrow keyhole, one that requires a certain set of circumstances that arent available in many cases where radical interpretation would be useful, such as the interpretation of written texts. As I suggested at the beginning of the paper, these limitations stem from radical interpretation theorys tendency to avoid discussion of meaning. Though this tendency may initially appear to help radical interpretation by allowing it to dodge a potentially impassible philosophical quagmire, it also creates significant shortcomings because it forces radical interpretation theory to avoid discussing its most fundamental stepthe identification step. This step, where the interpreter is able to identify a sign or utterance as meaning instead of just depicting, is essential to radical interpretation because the identification of meaning is, essentially, the identification of a form of lifethe identification of shared

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Carroll, Michael Scott activities from which the entire project of radical interpretation may be launched. This leads us to suspect that meaning, in fact, is a central concept to the radical interpreters enterprise. This, in turn, led to an investigation of meaning inspired by Part II, section XI of Wittgensteins Investigations, the results of which will be outlined now. One impact of our Wittgensteinian investigation is the revelation that the concept of meaning is composed of many different fibers, among which is radical interpretation theorys focus: the mastery of techniques (logic). Mastery of techniques alone does not capture the concept of meaning, however, and we find elsewhere another concept equally important to the project of radical interpretationone so fundamental that it often gets overlooked: aspect-seeing. Noticing an aspect, or seeing as, is part of a group of concepts that twist together to form another fiber in the concept of meaning: experiencing meaning. Though this fiber is equally integral to the concept of meaning it cannot be formalized, as the mastery of techniques can. We experience meaning by seeing a picture now as a mouth beside a basket, now as the word time, by seeing the word March here as month or there as an order, even by just feeling that the vowel e is yellow and not blue (216e). These experiences may seem insignificant at first, but they are important because they determine how we act under a conceptthey bear upon how we choose and value words by contributing to the decisive field of force of a word (218e and 219e). This broad conception of meaning, I wish to suggest, provides not only grounding for the enterprise of radical interpretation, it allows us to see that material stimulation does not necessarily have to be the next step (and is not necessarily the best step to make) in radically interpreting statements. The importance of the modulus of stimulation after

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Carroll, Michael Scott all, is not to draw a connection between rabbit and gavagai (as say, we would draw a line between a word and its translation) but to initiate the interpreter into the language by giving him all the fundamental components he needs to begin learning what the natives mean. In the Gavagai case, then, the field linguist finds space to apply his mastery of techniques when he notes the natives use of the word and, in the same vein, gains an initial experience of Gavagai when the rabbit hops by. The linguist of course, may be mistaken in his evaluation of the word or get confused experiences (perhaps by other, competing stimulus) but the point is that he can now begin interpreting the language because he possesses the basic materials needed to create a concept of meaning for the language. Such a concept, even in its shakiest, most skeletal form, gives the linguist room to continue not only because it allows him to evaluate the natives actions with respect to that concept but also because it commences his education in the language. With a concept of meaning the linguist can enter a learning circle that is similar to that of the language initiate: one where he evaluates techniques in the language (using logic), experiences meaning from (and through) those evaluations, makes tentative interpretations and then judges those interpretations against the standard of either of the two principles (charity or humanity)judgments which lead him back to (re)evaluating techniques. An additional consequence here is that the discussion of meaning breaks the monopoly of material stimulus as the only open keyhole for commencing the process of radical interpretation. We can imagine now many other possibilities for interpretation by setting out (and testing) how the conditions of a concept of meaning may be met in different scenarios. The pictures that accompany hieroglyphs (on pyramid walls), for example, may provide what we need to experience meaning (in relation to the

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Carroll, Michael Scott hieroglyphs above or below the picture). We cannot tell for certain beforehand how well such a scenario will fulfill our requirements but the point is that, with a concept of meaning, we now not only know how to look for such scenarios but can begin to guess how well they will help us interpret the language or texthow well they will allow us to enter the learning circle.

Continuity, Consistency and Chan/Zen: An Interpretive Attitude

How does all this discussion of radical interpretation and meaning bear upon our stated project of philosophically approaching Zen/Chan Buddhism? The effect is to create both positive possibilities and negative restrictions. The possibilities that radical interpretation offers for the study of Zen/Chan Buddhism are, in one way or another, implied above. Among these, the most important and least surprising is simply: it is possible for students from other cultures to interpret the Chan/Zen school of Buddhism without appealing to authority. Initially, this first positive possibility may not appear nearly as important as it is. The theory within my presentation of radical interpretation that grounds this claimthe discussion of certain characteristics that must be shared between the forms of life of any people who have languageseems intuitive and uncontroversial. Language use within a culture, after all, hardly seems possible if (to take a basic example) using gestures to indicate an object is not a part of the language users form of life. The importance of this simple possibility sharply increases, however, when framed and focused by the common prohibitionist stance on Zen: a stance which, in its mildest form, claims (like Suzuki

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Carroll, Michael Scott in his 1953 response to Hu Shih) that a person cannot understand, and therefore is not licensed to make claims about, Zen until she has experienced enlightenment or satori 31 , usually under the guidance of a monk or master. 32 The prohibitionist view, still potent today, suffers significant deflation when inquiry begins with language and the conclusion is drawn that there is a real basis by which any use of language may be (with a lot of careful analysis and experience) interpreted by any single language user (whatever language s/he may use). Coherent interpretationinterpretation that is reasonable and consistentfurthermore, implies (a reasonably high degree of) understanding. Approaching Chan/Zen Buddhism with language as our starting point, then, we may say that so long as the texts and monks of the tradition use language to communicate ideas the only absolute requirement necessary for one to have the potential to understand 33 those ideas is language ability, not enlightenment or satori. 34 There is another significant consequence of the discussion of language and forms of life: it provides for the possibility of continuity across the Zen/Chan tradition. If
Though both terms are common translations for the character w , I distinguish between enlightenment and satori here partly out of agreement with Chang Chen-Chis analysis of the difference between the two translations (Chang 1957) and partly to put some emphasis (by distinction) on Suzukis rather liberal use of satori. By employing the term satori in place of enlightenment, Suzuki allows for satori to be used less to express a certain fundamental attainment and more to draw a line between those who Suzuki may want to say understand Zen and those who he wants to say do not (i.e. a line between those who are and are not licensed to say anything about Zen). (see Suzuki 261) 32 In a severer form, the prohibitionist stance might be characterized by Thomas Mertons assertion in the introduction to Wus The Golden Age of Zen that few westerners will ever actually come to a real understanding of Zen. (Wu 1967, 23) 33 In order to stave off foreseeable objections to this conclusion, I will grudgingly allow for Chang ChenChis distinction between to understand and to realize to be made here, should readers require it (see Chang 1957). I hold reservations about this distinction, however, because this distinction, rather than drawing connections between understanding and realization, creates an unbridged gap between the two. Such a gap, I fear, allows for abuses as it puts no standards on what it means to realize Zen/Chan: creating the possibility for those with prohibitionist (authoritarian) inclinations to recklessly use this term to draw a line between who is licensed to make claims about Chan/Zen and who is not (also see footnote 11). 34 Another simpler way to make this point is just to ask: Why would (enlightened) masters use language if their language can not be understood by the unenlightened? Or, also: How does one obtain enlightenment/understanding of Zen/Chan if not through language? Are the masters all just blowing air?
31

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Carroll, Michael Scott monks used language to communicate with one another, studying under various masters and reading sutras, then it is distinctly possible that they passed on some sort of continuous understanding of chan:zen that held the entire tradition together, even across such gaping cultural divides as the one between China and Japan (or Japan and America). This point is important not only because it opens up room for fruitful discussion of what might hold the whole tradition together but because it widens the range of philosophical stances that might be taken in study of this schoolfreeing us, in a way, from being limited to adopting only a skeptical stance. Although the theory supporting radical interpretation provides these positive possibilities, the approach of radical interpretation is best characterized as one of negative restriction. In the specific context of Chan/Zen Buddhism, there are three major restrictions implicit in the approach of radical interpretation especially worth noting: 1) Interpretations cannot be logically inconsistent. This would be a basic principle any radical interpreter needs to hold to, whether he is more inclined to uphold the principle of charity or the principle of humanity (both mentioned in the introduction to this chapter) as his standard for interpretation. Rather than going into detail and engaging in the debate of which standard is superior, let it simply be noted that the aim of both principles is to achieve logical consistency in interpretation. The disagreement is on how to go about that goal: the principle of charity instructs the interpreter to make the interpretation consistent with the external world (by maximizing truth) while humanity mandates that an interpretation be internally consistent (by maximizing coherence/ reasonableness). So far as the project of logic is understood as uncovering a part of the form of life of language users (as I characterized it in my discussion of Wittgenstein,

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Carroll, Michael Scott above) then there should be nothing controversial about requiring interpretations to be consistent with logic (as opposed to being consistent only with our views or opinions which, themselves, may not be either internally or externally consistent) despite, or even particularly because of, views that Chan/Zen Buddhism (and the language it employs) is illogical. 2) Special attention must be given to both grammar and the meanings of individual terms in the language being interpreted. These two areas for focus, grammar and meaning, are not only very closely related to one another but are also intimate with the importance of logic. Taking cues from the above discussion of Wittgenstein, we can consider a good understanding of the grammar of a language an important technique mastery that will help us better apprehend meanings. Conversely, we must emphasize evaluation of the meanings of individual terms in light of, among other things, the grammatical role they play in particular sentences. These meanings may not be ones that can be set in stone or interpreted with unwavering consistency, but they should be held together by a certain traceable internal tension, as the individual fibers are held together to make the strength of a thread (see above). These points are especially important to keep in mind when working with texts written in classical Chinese. 35
35

Interpreters of Chinese texts, especially of texts written in Classical Chinese or wnynwn , have been particularly prone to sideline both of these points. The Chinese language is often viewed as being ungrammatical (or having very few grammar rules). This view, most likely a lingering relic of the old (but mostly discredited) understanding of written Chinese as being an ideographic language (with each character representing an idea or a thing), doesnt stand in the face of modern research. A result of this poorlyconstructed theory of Chinese writing is that interpreters of Chinese tend to take either one of two approaches when realization their interpretations of individual Chinese characters into translation: a) interpret the character completely consistently by translating it with only one English word, no matter how much that strategy may mangle a translation (or the meaning of the character itself) or b) finagling the interpretation of the character (re-translate it to make it fit) in the interests of privileging creating grammatical English sentences (at which point, in translation, the potential importance of the character a philosophical term is lost/obscured). In light of the problems of both these approaches, I will from this point forward adopt Hansens format of giving the pronunciation, character, and string of dominant translations (e.g. yidea:attitude ) when translating a particular character. This format, though aesthetically

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Carroll, Michael Scott 3) Community and experience must be consulted. This last major restriction imposed by my Wittgensteinian re-imagining of radical interpretation is a subtle one. Drawing on the earlier discussion of experiencing meaning, this restriction imposes on the interpreter the burden of both a) trying to get as much experience of the meaning of a term as possible by learning the language and consulting how that term is used in (and discussed) in a variety of textual sources and b) discussing the meaning of a term with other scholars close to the language community it comes out ofdiscussing, for example, the subtleties of how the term feels. These burdens are intended to help an interpreter experience meaning as much as possible, even though it is a task that he can never complete. The restriction that we should consult experience before making an interpretation is also a perennial weakness in interpreting texts from ages long gone because, simply put, an interpreter can never be a full part ofnever obtain experience fromthe community in which the text was written. As much as it is a rule for producing strong interpretations, then, this last restriction also serves the purpose of being a constant reminder of how interpretations (radical or otherwise) of ancient texts will never be able to lay claim to being authoritive as there will never be any way to assure that they are entirely correct (or, even, the best possible interpretation). This last restriction, and the recoil that comes with it, efficiently and concisely communicates what the project of radical interpretation is all about. Radical interpretation is not only an approach to interpretation that is taken in the absence of authority (whether that absence should come from an actual vacuum of authority or a decision not to resort to authority) but is also an approach that never allows authority to be granted to either an

bulky, helps give readers a good feeling of the range of meaning of a Chinese term while also preserving the sense of continuity and unity of the meaning of the term.

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Carroll, Michael Scott interpreter or an interpretation. In other words, while never denying the possibility of a correct or best interpretation of a text, the theory and approach of radical interpretation makes it apparent that no interpretation (or interpreter) can ever meet the conditions that would justify such a claim to having an authoritative interpretation. Radical interpretation, then, may best be viewed as an attitude. A radical interpreter holds himself to certain restrictions and grants himself license to give credence to a particular interpretation only under certain rules. He doesnt reject interpretations that are authoritarian (in fact, he eagerly consults them for experience) nor does he reject authority outright, but he does acknowledge and keep constantly in mind that authority can only be given, never justified. This is the work of the radical interpreter: he must not only always be engaging the text or tradition that he wishes to understand but also always be engaging his own assumptions and preferencesas much as he is vigilant of what he studies, he is also vigilant of himself.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Treatise Three Hosting and Approaching: An Interpretive Investigation of the Linji Lu

The project of this penultimate chapter is to give an account of the key philosophical methods and concepts central to understanding the Linji Lu or Records of Linji (J: Rinzai Roku, K: Imje Rok). My reasons for undertaking this evaluation of the Linji Lu are threefold: First, the Linji Lu exerts profound influence on the Zen/Chan tradition and East Asian philosophy in general. Most of the modern Chan/Zen sects in China, Korea, and Japan take the Linji Lu as an archetype of the true spirit of their teachings, with the highly influential Rinzai sect of Japanese Zen Buddhism tracing its lineage to (and taking its name from) Lnj Yxun (J: Rinzai Gigen, K: Imje ihyn) (? - 866 36 ), the Chinese Tang dynasty monk of whose actions, teachings, and history the Linji Lu portrays. 37 Moreover, the Linji Lu has long been a text with great influence over Western perceptions of Buddhism (and Daoism) in East Asia. The (highly original) anecdotes found at the beginning and end of the are familiar to nearly all East Asian studies students in the West and the text as a whole also often serves as an example of the languageskeptical (or insufficiency of language) position many attribute to Chan/Zen. With translations of the Linji Lu becoming increasingly available and accessible in the last thirty years, then, a philosophical evaluation of the core concepts and methodology of the
Though the date for Lnj Yxuns death is traditionally given as C.E. 867, Yanagida gives sufficient evidence to suggest that C.E. 866 is more likely. (see Yanagida 1972a) 37 Interestingly, Lnj isnt the only character depicted in the Linji Lu upon whom a Japanese Chan/Zen sect is based. Phu (J: Fuke), another idiosyncratic monk appearing in the text and virtually unknown elsewhere in the Chan/Zen literature of the time, is the supposed founder of Fuke Zen ( or ) a sect made up of music-playing itinerants that was outlawed in Japan during the Meiji Restoration.
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Carroll, Michael Scott text promises to provide an important paradigm for better understanding not only Chan/Zen Buddhism but also Western perceptions of East Asian thought. Complementing this first consideration, the second reason for choosing to evaluate this work stems from its suitability as a testing ground for the projects of the previous two chapters. Discussions of the Linji Lu (as will be shown in the following section) are as easily distorted by political agendas motivating use of Chan or Zen as other texts in the tradition. This provides a convenient opportunity to gainfully employ my analysis of the Zen/Chan distinction in Treatise One and see how much of the discussion surrounding the Linji Lu is political and how our understanding of that discussion (along with what avenues are available for understanding the text) changes when we require agendas to be justified. This fresh look at the Linji Lu will open up space for approaching the text from new directionsapproaches I intend to launch from the framework of radical interpretation (set out in Treatise Two). These new approaches to the text will not only draw on Treatise Two but will also go a long way toward rounding out the ideas outlined therefor, as the enduring and rich discussion over Quines Gavagai example might suggest, radical interpretation techniques gain momentum (and mature) when put to practical use. In such respects, the treatment of the Linji Lu in this chapter might be seen as providing us with the resources to formulate a new method of interpretation that adjudicates the meaning of language used without circularity. 38 Finally, I chose the Linji Lu as my final subject for evaluation here because it is a work that is exciting, provocative, funny and intricate but has, in the materials available

In other words, a method of interpretation that doesnt rely on or presuppose special access to the semantic or interpretive content claims of now inaccessible unseen mental states, purposes, etc.

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Carroll, Michael Scott to Western readers, been treated mostly in piecemeal. Popular segments taken from beginning and end of the Linji Lu are often quoted and discussed but a treatment of the book as a whole is, notably, unavailable. 39 This strange 40 omission not only leaves those who are unable to study the text in its original Chinese even more susceptible to the interpretative paradigms of translators but is, quite simply, a shame. Ultimately, then, my last reason for investigating the Linji Lu here is to open up new windows on this literary and philosophical masterpiece. I hope that, by doing so, others will not only find this text more accessible but, too, will be struck by some of the philosophical awe and literary beauty contained in this very original work. 41 The purpose of this exposition is to provide an avenue for understanding the Linji Luone that, unlike most previous approaches to the work, follows a meaning theoretical approach rather than one centered on uncovering hidden or esoteric motivations. My task is to pull out the concepts that dominate and unify the work. Along those lines, I will show that central goal of the Linji Lu is to bring students to actualize wshunaffected presence : an action ideal which allows a person (rn ) to be a part of (and involved in) an ever-changing and turbulent objective world (jng ) while both a) not taking part in the creation of shmatters : social affairs and b) helping others actualize wshunaffected presence as well. The philosophical method by which the Linji Lu seeks

Particularly neglected in this regard is a thick segment of lectures the middle of the text (labeled in the Watson/Akizuki division of the text as shzhnginstructing the group) which, besides taking up more than fifty percent of the text, present all of the key concepts most important to interpreting the work as a whole. 40 Strange because of the generally strong interest in the work by scholars typically cited as pioneers in the field. Bernard Faure notes, For some obscure reason, Linji who had been so well studied (and translated) by Yanagida and Demiville, has not yet been the object of any in-depth study in English. (Faure 2003) 41 Modern Japanese philosopher Nishisa Kitar once wrote: If there should come a time when books were to disappear from the earth, or I was banished to some bookless land, it would be enough for me if I had only Shinrans Tannish and the Records of Rinzai [Linji Lu]. (Quoted in Sasaki 1975, viii)

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Carroll, Michael Scott to achieve these ends lies in its exposition of the concept of zhhost : master a concept that represents not only a state of insight and understanding into the nature of the world and language but also a self-actualized embodiment of that understanding. Understanding and its self-actualization, I aim to show, are the central, unifying themes of the Linji Lu, ones so critical that text even provides (in the form of stories and exchanges) a medium for de-conceptualizing them so that they wont become barriers to their own actualization.

Between Lnj and Linji Lu: Person and Text, History and Myth

A study of the Linji Lu cannot get off the ground without addressing a potent issue that figured at the center of the 1953 Hu/Suzuki discussion and the Chan/Zen splithistory versus actor. Central to this discussion were two opposing arguments: 1) Hus claim that the Chan tradition can be understood historically and rationally and 2) Suzukis dual assertions that the actor or the creator or the man who is behind history eludes the historians objective handling and that only one type of mentality can understand Zen 42 (Suzuki 1953, 25). This tension, one of the core political issues at stake in the Chan/Zen divide, needs to be examined before this investigation of the Linji Lu can proceed because, if passed over in silence, we (as interpreters) stand to find ourselves unable to appreciate the circularity of the implicit appeals to authority in these two approaches and the possibility of non-question-begging alternatives.

42

For a more detailed discussion of these viewpoints, please refer back to Treatise One pages 26 - 29.

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Carroll, Michael Scott I Tension between history and actor is not unique to the Zen/Chan discussion. Concerns over what evidence may entitle a historian to make a claim about a place, person, or event are the old domain of historiographya subfield of both history and philosophy. 43 In Chan/Zen and the Linji Lu, however, a number of outstanding characteristics of the tradition make this tension especially acuteand potentially problematicfor conducting textual study. In the 1953 debate, Suzuki advocated a prohibitionist view against Hus use of history to understand Zen/Chan. This prohibitionist argument has long been a point on which the Japanese scholar has been attacked as (more or less) contradicting himself. 44 These claims of contradiction are often so forceful as to distract attention from a central point. Though his prohibitionist position on this issue does seem, by most accounts, untenable for Suzuki, the attacks against it usually do the Zen proponent injustice by inadequately addressing Suzukis central aim: recreation of the psychological mind-set of the actor behind the history (i.e., reclaiming the mental state of historical persons). This slight seems especially unfair because Suzukis view, however nave modern scholars may label it, is a paradigm not only shared by many other adherents of Zen but one that is strongly rooted in certain modern characteristics of the tradition. Even if Suzukis standpoint is outrageously untenable, its profound influence on modern understanding of Zen does seem to merit it being examined with a certain amount of attention.

In truth, this particular question of history versus actor rarely gets addressed in modern historiography. The reason is likely due to the fact that this debate is developed most in the academic discipline of Historyalready engaged in doing history and far from inclined to accept Suzukis prohibitionist view. 44 See, particularly, the attacks on Suzuki in Ames 1954, Waley 1955 and Chang 1957.

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Carroll, Michael Scott With its emphasis on the actions and personalities of Lnj and a few other important monks that he was in contact with, the Linji Lu is paradigmatic of a distinguishing trend in the Zen/Chan textual tradition. Unlike the other Chinese Buddhist sects contemporary with it, such as Huayan (J: Kegon, K: Hwam) and Tiantai (J: Tendai, K: Ch'nt'ae), which often afforded less importance to the actions and character of the major figures than it did to those figures writings and lectures, descriptions of the personalities and activities of prominent Chan/Zen monks are given side-by-side with records of those monks teachingsnot merely relegated to oral tradition or separate hagiographical works (such as the Gaoseng Zhuan , or Stories of Eminent Monks) but sharing equal billing with the lectures in the text. This special (and, in some ways, defining) characteristic of the school seems to first take shape in the Liuzu Tan Jing or Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch (which is, largely, a description of the early life and enlightenment of Hu Nng (J: En, K: Hyenng) (var: ) (638? - 713), the sixth patriarch of the title) and later develop into the unique ylsayings and records (J: goroku) 45 style of literature, of which the Linji Lu may be considered a genre model. The ylsayings and records genre, as will be discussed in greater detail below, places records of monks teachings alongside records of their travels, actions, and backgroundsit is obvious in ylsayings and records works that trying to capture and portray the personality of the monk is just as important to the compilers as recording his words 46 .
45 46

Oral records is another very plausible translation of yl . The result being that personalities of the principle actors of the Linji Lu are particularly vivid and memorable. Alan Watts, for example, describes Lnj as a character of immense vitality and originality that is ruthlessly iconoclastic (Watts 1957, 100-101) and Yanagida Seizan names the braying, kicking Phu (J: Fuke, K: Pohwa) (n.d.) as one of the fascinating eccentrics of Chinese Chan history.

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Carroll, Michael Scott In addition to this literary characteristic (and, in many ways, because of it), a dominant interpretation of the Chan/Zen tradition is that it is skeptical of language (or, sometimes anti-language), a characterization most famously made by the catchphrase(s) blwnz jiowibichun , not (to) stand on writing and letters, separate transmission outside of teachings 47 . This catchphrase, moreover, has its own formulation in the Linji Lu: The form(s) of winnings from success in qiseeking:entreating (the buddhas and patriarchs) are all writing and letters (), in the end it is does not get hold of the yidea:attitude
48

of (the) living patriarch(s). 49 (497b9-10) 50 Standard

interpretations of lines like these help to further explain why Suzuki and others (especially practitioners of Zen) would focus on the actors who transmit the teachings rather than on the recorded teachings themselves. Here, a students enlightenment is characterized less by his/her mastery of written teachings and more by whether or not s/he captures the enlightened state, the yidea:attitude, of a masterwhether s/he receives a transmission that inducts him or her to a lineage that stretches back to Sakyamuni (C: Sjimun ) or the historical Buddha, standing, as it were, eyebrow to eyebrow with the master and the patriarchs and viewing the same thing (i.e., seeing the true nature of the world).

(Yanagida 1972a, 81) These particularly strong characterizations of the actors of the Linji Lu (which brings them to life and makes them seem so vividly real) may further help us to understand Suzukis obsession with capturing the actor behind history. 47 Or, perhaps, separate transmission outside of Buddhism with Buddhism being taken mostly in the sense of Buddhist teachings. 48 This character is most commonly translated as meaning. My criticism of this translation, as well as my justification for my own alternatives, is provided in a later section of this chapter. 49 All translations of the Linji Lu in this paper are my own, though I have received invaluable assistance by consulting translations of the text made by of Burton Watson, Ruth Fuller Sasaki, and Irmgard Schloegl. 50 References to the Linji Lu are given in the format presented in Concordance to the Record of Linji edited by App in 1993: with the page number(s) of the Taish canon edition followed by the line number(s).

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Carroll, Michael Scott These are the core motivations behind Suzukis emphasis on the actor and rejection of historiography. They are also, we may plausibly suppose, the political biases that largely color his approach to the text, which Abe Masao () summarizes:
Suzuki was more concerned with Lin-chi [Lnj] and Chao-chou as Zen personalities than he was with the Lin-chi Lu [Linji Lu] and the Chao-chou Lu as collections of Zen saying and anecdotes [W]hat concerned him was the genuine and vivid Zen which manifests itself in Zen texts or in and through Zen figures and should manifest itself in every one of us. Throughout his extensive writings Suzuki used Zen texts only to show what genuine and vital Zen is. It was simply because he believed genuine Zen was well expressed in these two texts that he appreciated the Lin-chi Lu and especially the Chao-chou Lu. (Abe 1985, 70)

An interesting point to note about the article in which this characterization of Suzukis approach appears, True Person and CompassionD.T. Suzukis Appreciation of Lin-chi and Chao-chou, is that, even after such an insightful summary of Suzukis approach to the Linji Lu, Abe doesnt once question whether this particular methodology might have influenced the conclusion Suzuki drew on the Linji Lu that the idea of Person is the key to the entire work and the nucleus of genuine Zen spirit (ibid., 69) and that, with this Person, the route to enlightenment comes from Seeing (instead of, say, Listening) into ones into ones Self-nature (ibid., 71).

II Exerting force on the other side of the tension is an approach to the Linji Lu that, while not irreconcilably (polarly?) opposed to Suzukis approach, is certainly an approach that comes into conflict with it. This approach, which I typify as the Chan approach in Treatise One, takes a different tack: rather than pitting text against person, it

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Carroll, Michael Scott opposes history against myth (argues for a revision of traditionally accepted historical account). In an informed and detailed essay entitled The Textual History of the Linji lu (Record of Linji): The Earliest Recorded Fragments, Albert Welter examines the history of the Linji Lu up to its development into the text that is, in modern times, taken to be the standard one (the Taish canon copy). Welter is careful to distinguish in the beginning of his study between the historical figure of Linji and the text that bears his name and further notes that some 250 years separate Linjis life (d. 866) and the compilation of the Linji lu in its standard form (1120). 51 (Welter 2002) This observation, taken together with Yanagidas supposition that ylsayings
and records

texts are put together by certain

monks [who] started making anthologies of the teachers words and actions based on what they heard from other students in addition to their own experience (Yanagida 1983, 187) leads Welter to conclude early in his paper that The story of the Linji lu is not the story of one man, Linji Yixuan. It is the story of a movement. Welter continues from this conclusion,
The success of this movement contains the story of the success of Chan. In brief, my research on the Linji lu will not be set against the background of Linji the man and the style of Zen he represented, but will look at the Linji lu in light of the success of Chan, particularly the Linji faction, in Song China. A look at the various fragments will tell us how the image of Linji was shaped through various records, and how the words and teachings attributed to him evolved through the filter of memory and imagination... What these teachings represent are not so much the words of one man, which are in any case irretrievable, as the combined aspirations of the movement as a whole, projected on the person of Linji as founder. (Welter 2002) It is interesting here to note that, in some ways, Welters Chan approach is more personalist than Suzukis. For, while Suzuki focuses on the persona (represented in the text) Welters more extreme authorial intent view ignores the texts portrayal in favor of other historical access to the author. I am indebted to Chad Hansen for pointing out this often unnoticed point.
51

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Carroll, Michael Scott Welter, by examining the changes in records, sayings, and events attributed to Lnj from texts that chronologically preceded the now standard Song Dynasty/Taish canon version of the text (dated CE 1120), notes that, in early fragments taken from texts like the Zutang Ji (Patriarchs Hall Anthology) (CE 952), Zongjing Lu (Records of the Source Mirror) (CE 961), and Jingde Chuandeng Lu (Jingde Transmission of the Lamp Records) (CE 1004), the image of Lnj not only changed to become more powerfully iconoclastic but some of the very details of the monks life were finagled for the purposes of strengthening the (political) legitimacy of some lines of transmission at the expense of others. 52 The primary reason for these changes, Welter contends, was the rising influence of the Linji faction at the Song court,an assertion that further leads Welter to contend that The work of documenting the teachings of these masters [Lnj and his three predecessors in the Sijia Yulu (Recorded Sayings of the Four House) 53 ] is connected directly to Linji faction aims to substantiate and validate their legitimacy as representatives of true Chan at the Song court. (ibid.) Welters claims about the development of the Linji Lu are very representative of the history/myth oppositiona division traceable, most notably, to Hu Shihs early exposition (using documents uncovered from the Dunhuang cache) of how the traditional patriarchal lines of transmission were grounded more in myth than historical fact. It is obvious how the conclusions drawn from the Welter/Chan approach to the Linji Lu should create a tension with those drawn from the Suzuki/Zen approach.
Details of the story of Lnjs enlightenment, for example, were changed in an attempt to affiliate him more closely with Hungb and distance him from the (more obscure) figure of Dy . (Welter 2002) 53 The Sijia Yulu is no longer extent but its contents are allegedly reflected in the later Tiansheng Guangdeng Lu (Tiansheng Supplementary Lamp Records). The three predecessors Welter is referring to are Mz Day (709 788), Bizhng Huihi (750 813) and Hungb Xyn (? ca.850).
52

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Carroll, Michael Scott Suzuki views the Linji Lu as a tool for recovering the true Lnj and pure spirit of Zen that he possessed, Welter not only regards the text as a case study in mythmaking and a prominent [example] of the patriarch-making process that Chan was engaged in but denies that either Lnj or the Linji Lu are unique, seemingly having singled out the text for analysis primarily because Linji is invoked as the archetype of true Zen. (ibid.)

III As stated at the outset of this section, the tension between these two interpretations of the Linji Lu is neither irreconcilable nor rooted in a dilemma or polarity. The interpretations are, certainly, couched in different approaches to the text but these approaches, put side-by-side, do not in themselves constitute the necessary opposition of a dilemmathey merely give conclusions that conflict on a number of points. The overall ideas in these conclusions, in turn, are not, despite their conflicts, necessarily irreconcilable. There is much, actually, that the two positions hold in common. Most notably, both devalue the inherent worth of the text itselfSuzuki/Abe see the text only as a tool for trying to communicate what genuine and vital Zen is (Abe 1985, 70) to the unenlightened, Welter regards the Linji Lu merely as a part of a case study in Chan politics and mythmaking during the Song Dynasty. My purpose in investigating these two approaches to the Linji Lu is to show that this tension between them which often (especially when left unaddressed) greatly influences our understanding and distorts our reading the text is, for the greater part, political. This political aspect is a continuation of the Zen/Chan power struggle to determine which approach will dominate interpretation of the Buddhist sect in the West.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Just as Abe-reading-Suzuki exclusively privileges the term Zen and (in addition to using a lot of Suzukis Zen conventions, such as talking about Zen as if it were a living thing) goes out of his way to conclude with a tribute to Suzukis interpretive research of the school ([Suzuki] will serve timelessly as a stone bridge, spanning East and West, for all his fellow beings (ibid.., 80)), so too does Welter follow Hu Shihs example of only using the term Zen in the opening section of the work (thereafter exclusively privileging the term Chan) and including a paragraph distancing Chan from Zen by implicitly criticizing certain aspects of Zen scholarship. 54 The problem with these heavy political influences is the way they distort scholarship and research by privileging the set of assumptions of one approach over those of another while also seeking to obscure (and limit discussion on) the assumptions of both approaches by infusing those assumptions into the elimination conditions of the key terms of the debate. When these assumptions are considered, however, it becomes apparent that no overarching meta-reason to privilege one set of assumptions 55 (and the approach that stems from them) over another can exist. From a completely objective standpoint (if one is possible) there is no reason why the Abe/Suzuki approach to the Linji Lu is any better than Welters approach (or vice-versa).
54

This paragraph (after which Welter uses the term Zen only once more) appears early in the first section of his paper. Notice the shift between the use of Chan and Zen to just Zen: More recently, scholarship in the area of Chan and Zen studies has shifted from the Tang to the Song period. Rejecting the golden age hypothesis as an ideological construct of the later Chan and Zen school, scholars in the West, while continually indebted to the advances made by Japanese scholars, have begun to challenge some of their leading assumptions. Particularly singled out was the notion of a pure Zen, a leading concept in Zen studies until recently that privileged enlightenment as a pure, unadulterated and unmediated experience of reality, uncompromising in its provocative assertion of truth that condemned all vestiges of formalism. As Bernard Faure has pointed out, even scholars like Yanagida, the father of modern Zen studies, have not been immune to such ideological presuppositions. (Welter 2002) 55 Or, to be more specific, one set of authority-granting assumptions. We can look at these assumptions as taking the classic Zhuangzi form: When we have a dispute, Ill choose someone who agrees with me to judge.

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Carroll, Michael Scott This, as I discussed in chapter 2, is one of the dominant motivations for scholars to mask their Chan or Zen biases by overlooking the political nature of these two terms. In the specific context of the Linji Lu this oversight allows both Abe/Suzuki and Welter to proceed without having to justify (or fully reveal) their basic assumptions about the text (and Chan/Zen). Revealing these biases, however, does (as I argued in the conclusion to chapter 2) much to discharge the potency of the politics that attend them, clearing up room to approach the Linji Lu from a new direction.

IV Despite my exposition of and attack on the political nature of the Welter and Abe/Suzuki interpretations of the Linji Lu in the last sub-section, I want to dispel immediately any conclusions that there is not a kind of understanding available from these other kinds of (authoritative) approachesjust that it is not an understanding of the meaning of the text or the content/doctrine in it. Both approaches may be useful in stimulating a reader to follow a prescribed regimen found by the two authors to be of value. The claim, however, that these two authors are studying the meaning of the text is, in both cases, only true in a metaphorical sensenot in the sense of semantic meaning or correct interpretation. Suzuki approaches the text with a focus on the actor and discovers (with Abe) that the key to the text is the concept of Person, the presence of which may be said to have essentially contributed to the historical success of the Linchi school. (Abe 1985, 71) Welter, too, starts his interpretation from a distinction between the historical Lnj and the text that bears his name and a criticism of the golden age/true Zen ideological constructs and finds considerable evidence to suggest

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Carroll, Michael Scott that the standard edition of the Linji Lu represent[s] the combined aspirations of the [Linji Chan] movement as a whole, projected on the person of Linji as founder. (Welter 2002) One (rather platitudinous) lesson here is that all approaches to the Linji Lu have purposes and methods. Not all methods, however, are equal. What is problematic about both the Abe/Suzukis and Welters authority-assumption method is that these methods are circularthey make conclusions out of assumptions (or conclusions that collaborate and support assumptions) when seeking to present the meaning of the text. There is a better method for investigating and discussing meaning in the text, one that seeks to justify the purposes informing the method as well as the method itself. This method radical interpretationsets as a fundamental requirement that assumptions must (as much as possible) be exposed, listed, and explained.

Interpretation and Assumption: A Final Prelude

The conclusion of Treatise Two enumerated a few negative restrictions that radical interpretation imposes on interpreters. That short list, though intended to be a broad summary of what should be learned from the discussions of radical interpretation and meaning that preceded it, was not meant to be a complete description of the principles of radical interpretation. Such a comprehensive list, though likely useful for reference, seems as unnecessary to compose as it would be exhausting. What holds the theory and methodology of radical interpretation together, after all, is neither its principles nor its rules: it is the spirit of radical interpretationan attitude that

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Carroll, Michael Scott challenges all forms of interpretive authority and shows that there is no way to justify or legitimate such authority. Apprehending radical interpretation by means of this attitude provides the benefit of elucidating further negative rules and restrictions of the approach that might be less immediately obvious when ones seeks simply to deduce all such principles from the theory of radical interpretation. One such illumination, inferable from the discussion in the preceding section, is that a radical interpreters assumptions need to be a) kept visible and b) acknowledged as assumptions (acknowledged as beingat the outset at least unjustified or, even, potentially unjustifiable). Assumptions, though not inherently authoritarian, are often a motivating factor for trying to establish interpretive authority. Suzuki sought definitive authority over Zen because he wished to give extra (political) weight to assumptions that Zen is psychological, alogical, and best studied in the context of Japan. Hu revolted with Chan in order to authorize historical, rational, Sinocentric assumptions (as well as, interestingly, anti-authoritarian ones). The motivation behind the actions of both these scholars (as well as the vast majority of those that have come after them) is a desire to proceed from a starting point that is unjustified or unjustifiable. Rather than explore and lay them out from the outset, however, these assumptions (in the interest of making them authoritative paradigms) are buried: remaining mostly or fully concealed until they emerge as (interpretive) conclusions. So far as they contribute to the construction of an initial paradigm, assumptions are necessary for beginning any project of interpretation. Attempting interpretation without first adopting a minimal set of assumptions is analogous to trying to give

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Carroll, Michael Scott judgments on an issue by taking the infamous view from nowhereit denies the interpreter a frame of reference and thus leaves him with no place to begin his project because it makes the project inconceivable. Even if an assumptionless interpreter should use the methodology of radical interpretation (grounded as it is not in assumptions but in rather observations about language) he will still be unable to begin interpretation. Assumptions are necessary to give that first sorting of information that makes interpretation possible. An interpreters first sorting of information, however, usually should not closely resemble his last one. Though it is indeed possible that an interpreters assumptions about a project should turn out, in the end, be entirely correct, there is enough that is coincidental about such occurrences to necessitate always approaching such interpretations with a high (but healthy) degree of suspicion. The very project of interpretation, after all, seems cradled within the idea framework that what is being interpreted should have the greatest influence on the result, not the interpreters assumptions. A good interpreter lets the object of interpretation determine the validity of assumptions; he doesnt let assumptions determine the validity of interpretation. It is hard to be a good interpreter in this way, however, if assumptions are not acknowledged and kept visible throughout interpretation (so they can constantly be measured and questioned). In light of this, it seems appropriate to provisionally adopt the exposure of assumptions as an additional negative restriction mandated by radical interpretation. If assumptions are made (and kept) visible then may be are discharged as motivations for establishing interpretive authoritythe interpreter will be unable to hide them either from himself or the readers. Declared assumptions require especially

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Carroll, Michael Scott rigid and careful processes for justification precisely because of their visibility as assumptions. This visibility not only does a great deal to keep an interpretation free from the distorting effects of authority but, it can be hoped, will also increase the overall quality of interpretations by making the standards for justifying conclusions even more rigorous. (Further explanation is needed of this point but, for the sake of flow and structure Ill relegate it to the footnote below. 56 ) Within the project of interpretation there seem to be two kinds of assumptions: 1) assumptions that are potentially justifiable through interpretation (of the object of interpretation that the interpreter is assuming things about) and 2) those that are not potentially justifiable in this way. Of the latter kind of assumption, we may distinguish, broadly, two categories. In the spirit of killing two birds with one stone I wish to explicate these two kinds (and two sub-categories) of assumptions here by making examples of my own assumptions about the Linji Lu. Ill start with the second kind of assumptions first. The first category of assumptions that are not justifiable through interpretation is filled with assumptions that cannot be factually justified from available materials (materials external to the object of interpretation). This sort of assumption is (necessarily?) present in nearly every interpretation, but seems especially obvious when the object of interpretation is shrouded in the mists of historywhen a) some
The thinking here is that an interpreters assumptions (when visible) require especially careful and methodical work to justify as conclusionssuch work being necessary to overcome the likely view of readers that the conclusions the interpreter drew that resemble assumptions are drawn merely because, well, they resemble the interpreters assumptions (i.e., because of interpretive bias). If an interpreter must put in extra work (pay extra attention to details) to draw a conclusion from an assumption (because the assumptions are visible), then, might not such work/attention become a standard against which the interpreter will seek to justify every conclusion drawn? Might not that extra work and extra attention become merely the standard levels of work and attention required to draw interpretive conclusions? This analysis is, admittedly, very optimistic but it, I believe, something definitely worth hoping for in the field of interpretation.
56

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Carroll, Michael Scott noticeable amount of time (a generation, say) has lapsed between the creation of the object of interpretation and the time when it is interpreted or b) when the object of interpretation is, itself, a product that has been developed over a long stretch of time. The Linji Lu is, in both of these senses, an object of interpretation obscured by time: not only does a span of nearly 900 years stretch between the composition of the Taish canon version (1120 C.E.) and this interpretation (circa 2006) but another significant span of 254 years separates that compilation from the date of the death of Lnj Yxun (866 C.E.). In light of these facts, then, and in the absence of proof that would resolve the issue one way or another, I find the following set of assumptions is plausible: [I] The Linji Lu is likely not very faithful to the actual personage of Lnj Yxun, who may never have existed at all (which would make faithful recording his words and actions impossible). Even if Lnj did exist, however, it seems certain (from the words of the text itself) that he was not involved in the writing or compilation of any edition of the Linji Lu. Misquotations, factual errors, insertion of popular myth, interpolations (from earlier editions that might have existed) and political influence (passages aimed at strengthening the authority of a person or idea) are all, especially given the time period between Lnjs supposed death and the compilation of the Taish edition, likely to be present in the text. Assumption [I] belongs to the first category of assumptions not justifiable from interpretation (alone) because factual evidence could imaginably be presented to dispute any member of the set. A time-traveling video camera, for instance, could prove that the Linji Lu is rather faithful in recording the words and actions of the historical Lnj Yxun by recording his entire life (not a likely scenario, of course, but imaginable).

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Carroll, Michael Scott More probable, amazing textual discoveries could strongly suggest that the historical Lnj Yxun not only existed but even wrote the Linji Lu (or a version of the Linji Lu that is very similar to the Taish version). Given the extreme unlikelihood of any such occurrences, however, I feel that [I] is a rather safe set of assumptions to make. [II] Interpretation of the Linji Lu must proceed by trying to make sense of the text, not by trying to recover the mind of the writer(s) of the text. [III] Following from [II], the best approach for analyzing the Linji Lu is a lingual and historical one. Both assumption [II] and assumption [III] fall into a different category of assumptions not justifiable from interpretation because the realm of justification for these assumptions is the realm of meta-theory, not that of empiricism (i.e., not a realm where justification can be made through factual truth or falsity). The reason for the difference is that both assumptions are also normative claims and normative claims are justified neither through empirical argument nor conclusions drawn from interpretation (of the Linji Lu). Normative claims require metatheoretical justification and, so far as meta-theory is concerned, there seems to be no basis for justifying (or rejecting) either of these two normative claimsleaving them to stand as assumptions. 57

57

There is, however, a very strong epistemological justification for making the assumption [II] and following it with [III]. This justification is rooted in what I take to be the incoherence of the (only?) alternative to the approach of [II], viz., recovering the mind of the author(s) of the text. I find this approach incoherent because there seems to exist no standards by which an interpreter may judge when the approach has succeeded (or, at least, when he has done a good job of capturing the authors mind). The problems with justification run like this: What is being captured/recovered when one seeks to recover the mind of the author? A mental state? An emotion? An attitude? A whole personality and life history? Even if one tries to evade these problematic questions by resorting to a claim to want to capture an ambiguous, vaguely defined abstraction like a mental state (another question: is it even possible for one person to hold the mental state of another?) a whole other slew of questions pop up: Is the interpreter capturing the mental state of the author as it stood when she began the work or as it stood when she finished it (surely in the space of time between first putting pen to paper and sending it off to the publisher her mental state changed, even if only slightly)? How, moreover, can one make sense of this project when a text (or

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Carroll, Michael Scott Assumptions [II] and [III] have additional significance. Both assumptions are ones that are inherent in the approach (but not necessary in the theory) of radical interpretation. Radical interpretation, as a methodology, requires interpreters to assume a historical (as opposed to agent-centered) approach to their object of interpretation and to privilege language 58 as the best means of making sense of that object. So long as a radical interpreter keeps these assumptions visible, though, they shouldnt become motivations for authority and create easy conclusions: they shouldnt, for example, lead the interpreter to find (in the spirit of the Abe-reading-Suzuki interpretation of the Linji Lu) that language is the key idea under discussion in every text/tradition. (Interestingly, the most popular conclusion about the Linji Luone even more common than the two discussed in the first section of this papertakes the text as being primarily about language. This view of the text will be probed at the end of this treatise.) These two categories of assumption put aside, all other interpretive assumptions are ones that can possibly be resolved by the object of interpretation (i.e., possibly justified or rejected by the results of the interpretation). My remaining assumptions (although they build upon the earlier assumptions) are of this type: [IV] The Linji Lu is a sophisticated text organized in a coherent way. This assumption essentially rejects the contra-textual attitude shared by Welter and Suzuki. Rather than devalue the text of the Linji Lu as nothing more a distortion of the ideas of Lnj Yxun (the actor behind it) or deride it as a political tool for mythmaking and historical revision, I take the text as being the carefully constructed magnum opus of a group of like-minded individuals.
tradition) has multiple authors or is heavily edited (both of which are commonly the case in classical Chinese philosophy)? Answers to the questions seem far from forthcoming, if they are answerable at all. 58 Or, rather, forms of life and their parts.

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Carroll, Michael Scott My reasoning behind making this assumption is centered on a reading of the historical facts surrounding the creation of the Taish version of the Linji Lu that differs significantly from Welters. Rather than take the evidence that the text was written by someone other than Lnj and that the Taish version emerged more than 250 years after Lnjs death as suggesting that the Linji Lu is (little more than) a political tool and anthropological relic testifying to the story of the Linji faction I take them to imply that the Linji Lu is a sophisticated, centered work of philosophy. Why must we assume that time and non-centralized editorship would result in Welters assumption/conclusion, after all? May we not also say that, in that span of over 250 years, disciples of Lnj (and the line(s) of disciples stretching on from them) sought not only to collect and compile records of the famous monk but to carefully edit and center those records in the way that (they thought) best communicates the spirit/philosophy of his teaching? What seems particularly objectionable about Welters conclusions is the implication that the only thing that held the members of Linji school together in the Song Dynasty (C.E. 960 - 1279) were their ties to Lnj Yxun and the political power they derived from that mythical lineage at court (power they used the Linji Lu to preserve). This implication is shallow. If the Linji Lu was mostly a political tool, after all, why does it continue to be studied and why havent schools continued to edit it for their purposes? Why does the text contain (more than stories and anecdotes about Lnj, which are what Welter focuses on) long philosophical lectures? Welters assumption/conclusion does not seem to be able to plausibly answer these questions. Another reason I reject Welters assumption/conclusion is that it conflicts with my initial attitude towards the Linji Lu. This attitude is expressed in my final assumption:

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Carroll, Michael Scott [V] Some (philosophical) continuity unifies the Linji Lu. Careful readers will notice that [V] is a narrowed reformulation of an assumption given at the beginning of Treatise One. One reason this assumption is so pervasive throughout this thesis is, I suppose, practical: philosophy, as a discipline, focuses more on continuity and unifying principles than on discontinuous (chaotic?) service to details. Simply put, then, this treatise is a part of a philosophy thesis being written by a philosophy student: one who is inclined both by temperament and self-interest (in obtaining a degree) to make this assumption. This is the practical motivation for this assumption. The practical motivation reveals only half the story, however. The assumption of continuity within the Linji Lu is also strongly based in the enduring influence of that work. The Linji Lu has been read, commented on, lectured on, translated, and quoted almost innumerable times in the past nine centuries. Acknowledging that not everyone (or, even, anyone) who interpreted the Linji Lu in that time may have understood it (or seen it as being sustained by a central, continuous thread) might we still not say that what drew people to the text is the lure of some central ideas in the work, immediately present and sensed even as they are not fully seen or understood? Welter, as I noted earlier, apparently chose Lnj and the Linji Lu for his historical/sociological analysis because they are widely acclaimed in Zen circles and invoked as the archetype of true Zen or pure Zen. Rather than taking this to just suggest an ideological construct, however, why not take it to suggest that a powerful central message sustains interest in the text? 59

In the section of his paper entitled Content Analysis, Welter compares the same True Man anecdote () within two different editions and notes that Both versions contain more colorful language than was found in the [earlier dated] Zutang ji. The impure thing (bujing zhi wu) becomes Linijs famous dried shit stick (ganshi jue). The body-field of the five skandhas (wuyin shentian) becomes the vividly

59

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Carroll, Michael Scott Surely the high status of the text may also be an ideological construct (and parts of the text itself may also have been edited for political purposes) but doesnt it seem intuitive that that the Linji Lu wouldnt have been such an effective and enduring a political tool if it werent for some powerful central philosophy holding it together? These questions are, of course, unanswerable here. An important result of the following interpretation, however, will be to show how much evidence there is in the text to justify each assumption as well as areas that might show the assumptions to be flawed. The interpretation, we shall also see, will also show to what extent these assumptions cannot be justified through the text: what extent assumptions of the kind of [IV] and [V] belong to within the categories of assumptions as [I] [III]. These conclusions, however, should not be drawn here but should be placed where they belong: in the end, after interpretation has unraveled them for us.

Departing Home: Structure and Contexts

Let us begin interpretation of the Linji Lu with a description of its structure and contexts. This first pass over the text will, hopefully, give a sufficient enough account
expressed lump of red flesh (chirou tuanshang) prosaic terms are substituted with lively imagery intended to stimulate the imagination. (Welter 2002) These comments are very useful observations on the edits and revisions which the Linji Lu underwent as it approached the Taish version. I take issue with Welters conclusion from these points, however:
This process of substitution and elaboration is not accidental, but is part of a larger design to transform Linji into a new kind of dynamic patriarch. It is closely connected with the creation of Linjis persona as a vigorous spirit, an innovative patriarch championing a revolutionary understanding of Buddhism. (ibid.)

What bothers me about this conclusion is not so much what it includes as what it omits. Why doesnt Welter note that these changes might also be part of a project (or different projects) to revise the written stories of Lnj so that those stories more closely approximate what the editors making the changes understood to be the spirit of the masters teaching/life? (Or to come closer to the oral versions of the same stories about Lnj that the editors took to be more accurate?) This other possible conclusion seems just as likely and obvious as the one Welter gives but remains noticeably absent from his paper. This is very unfortunate, especially considering that it is perfectly possible for both conclusions to be simultaneously accurate about the text.

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Carroll, Michael Scott of the whole structure of argument that the text should be placed in so that, when the interpretation delves into the specifics of the Linji Lu (such as the meanings of individual terms), the reader (and the interpreter) will always have a frame of reference to return to when s/he feels lost.

I - Structure One does not even need to see the original Chinese text of the Linji Lu to guess that the structure of the work is a source of some interpretive difficulty. Among the seven most well-known modern translations of the Linji Lu, each divides up and interpolates the chapters so differently that, as App notes, the famous story of Rinzai [Lnj] planting pine trees forms chapter 49 of Watson [1993] and Akizuki [1972], chapter 67a in Schoegl (1975), chapter 2 in Sasaki (1975) and Iriya (1989), chapter 67 in Demiville (1972), [and] chapter 39 section 1 in Yanagida. (App 1994, 426) The reason for these large interpretive disparities is the shortage of section divisions and utter lack of enumerated chapters in the Linji Lu: the first two-thirds of the text are composed of dense, intimidating blocks of characters with no section headings that dont significantly shorten in length until the reader reaches the first of (only) two titled sections. These two titled sections knbintest(ing) and xnglrecord
of activity distinguish(ing)

and

seem to be, with the preface at the beginning, the only textual

divisions that interpreters can agree on, though, in light of the sheer length of the (nonsection-titled) text that precedes them, even this general agreement is only a part of

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Carroll, Michael Scott another interpretive splitwith interpreters disagreeing as to whether these sections should be the last two of three or the last two of four. 60 These disagreements of chapter and section division in the Linji Lu are further instructive because they show how effectively division and spacing may influence an interpretation of a text. Modern readers want contexts for passages, stories, or even lectures to help make sense of them and, by deciding where a section begins or ends (as well as, with paragraph divisions, where an idea begins or ends), translators can contextualize works like the Linji Lu to accord with their interpretations. Bracketing off contexts with empty space and (chapter/section) numberings is a powerful tool for translationbut also one easily abused. We should be careful of the modern chaptering and sectioning of the Linji Lu, then, not only because translators divisions are based off interpretative paradigms (and agendas) which are usually not made entirely visible but because the tools of contextualization that we use in modern written languages are very different from the contextual tools of Tang and Song China. Whereas, for example, it is common in modern written language to put spaces between paragraphs and chapters (to mark off thoughts, contexts, times, places, etc.), this tool, though not absent in Tang/Song literature seems to be (probably due to practical constraints of the cost and availability of writing materials) something of luxury in the literature of the time and used sparingly. The same principle applies for modern punctuation (such as commas): though such punctuation is often added to (Chinese) text to facilitate reading, punctuating is, like translation, primarily an act of interpretationdifferent punctuation schemes, the reader of classical Chinese texts
60

Watson (1993), following Akizuki (1972), divides the first third of the text into two further sections which they label, respectively: shngtngascending the platform and shzhnginstructing the group .

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Carroll, Michael Scott quickly finds, can provide for radically divergent readings of the same line(s). Rather than relying on spacing and punctuation for contextually interpreting the Linji Lu, then, we should instead focus on the contextual tools the text itself providesaction and language. Contexts are always marked off in the Linji Lu with actions. Lectures, for example, begin with (Lnj) ascending the [lecture] hall (shngtng ), are organized into topics by questions posed (wn ) by those present and interjections where Lnj will readdress the audience (by, for example, calling them dd [those of] great virtueor doli [those who] flow daoway(s)), and end with Lnj either a) dismissing the audience (zhnzhng : Treasure [this]./Take care.) or b) acting in some conclusive way (typically binxi zu : [Lnj] leaves his seat.). This emphasis on action as a tool for contextualization (rather than, say, narration) provides some clues as to the larger context that the Linji Lu positions its readers in: the standpoint of the novice or student. By contextualizing with Lnjs actions, the philosophical expositions that take up two-thirds of text, for example, read less like careful discourses and more like dictated (but well-edited) lecture notes, where the only actions that are recorded are the ones that have some direct bearing upon the content of the lecture itself ([The master] Enters the hall [Somebody] asks [the master] says [the master] leaves.) and where the talks themselves, like impromptu teaching sessions, dont comprehensively explore one idea or theme in a single lecture but, rather, drop and re-engage themes over many lectures as Lnj moves along. Moreover, the stories of Lnj that fill the rest of the Linji Lu seem far less fragmented and takes on much more life when contextualized as anecdotes shared between classmatesverbal exchanges and 102

Carroll, Michael Scott occurrences that students wish to make sense of, find humorous, use to emphasize some profound aspect of the background or ability of their instructor or relate to explicate a particular teaching of their master (or show their master actualizing his teachings). There are even (particularly in his encounters with Phu ) stories where Lnj seems to be the butt of a jokestories told, perhaps, by (low-achieving?) students wishing to poke fun at their master by pairing him with a personality he seems unable to handle:
One day, Phu was outside the monks hall, munching on fresh lettuce. When he saw this, the master [Lnj] said Just like a donkey! Phu began braying like an ass. The master said This thief! Phu repeated Thief! Thief! and left. [503b17-19] 61

This action-oriented method of partitioning and contextualizing in the Linji Lu goes hand-in-hand with another structural aspect of the Linji Lu that puts the reader in the standpoint of the student: the colloquial style of language. This innovative literary tool is a distinctive feature of the text that has long earned it special distinction as a milestone (and breakthrough) in Chinese literature: the Linji Lu employs the vernacular, grammatical fluidity, and popular profanity of oral Chinese during the late Tang Dynasty. The employment of colloquial Tang-era Chinese rather than the stiffer written style of Classical Chinese (wnynwn ) is often emphasized in literary discussions of the Linji Lu because of the way it signals a radical break in the tradition of Chinese writing. To over-emphasize this revolutionary aspect of the writing style, however, is to risk failing to appreciate its particular role within in the text itself. The employment of colloquial language allows for a smoothness of transition and expression in the Linji Lu that isnt possible with wnynwn. It allows details and other specifics
Other stories about Phu (who is discussed in greater detail on pages 163 -166) seem to convey this same spirit of poking fun at Lnj. See particularly the stories grouped around the one given above: [503b39],[503b10-16], and [503b20-24].
61

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Carroll, Michael Scott (such as citations and full names 62 ) to be skipped over with relatively little awkwardness and emphasizes action (and actions) by making the tales of Lnj feel less like pointed anecdotes (carefully shaped and crafted around a particular lesson or moral) and more like reports of real life (with all its attendant confusions and incomprehensibilities) related from memory. The colloquial language of the Linji Lu is a remarkable contextualizing device. It helps to emphasize the presence of Lnj as a person (perhaps explaining why no scholars seem to adopt the view that no such person ever lived) by bringing his voice to life in lectures and conversations. Moreover, it brings to life the voice(s) of the unseen storyteller(s): the students voice which, so far as it wishes to keep its speaker concealed or unobtrusive in the background, is less forthright and vibrant than Lnjs voice (and the voices of the other characters who appear in the Linji Lu) but still noticeable with its potent mixes of self-deprecation, playfulness, irony, mystery and (strongest of all) awe for a beloved teacher. Nowhere does this voice seem stronger than in the penultimate passage (which may also have been, prior to interpolation, the conclusion to the textsee footnote 62), where Snshng Hurn (n.d.), the

62

There is one place in the Linji Lu where we are provided with many specifics on Lnjhis surname, hometown, what temples he stayed at and how he came to preside at them, his posthumous namethe very last lines of the text [506c8-25]. The Guzunsu Yulu , however, which contains an exact copy of those lines, labels that passage as a copy of the inscription on Lnjs memorial tower. Although Yanagida (1972a) has argued against the plausibility that this inscription was not made by immediate disciples of Lnj (as the dates and places within it conflict with other records), it seems reasonable to suggest that this concluding fragment, so out of place given the context of the rest of the Linji Lu, was included under the belief that it was copied from Lnjs memorial tower and, therefore, a fitting way to conclude the text. (Alternatively, the inscription might have been added to the Linji Lu by somebody not involved in the compilation of the rest of the text (it might be interpolated at a later date, as Dumoulin argues (Dumoulin 1988 180-181)). This is also plausible given that the preceding passage [506c3-7] seems to conclude the Linji Lu in a way that better matches the spirit and style of the rest of the work.)

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Carroll, Michael Scott disciple who credited with compiling the Linji Lu at the very beginning of the work 63 , has a discussion with Lnj about the preservation of his teachings just before Lnj dies:
When the master left the world (transformed: ) he sat down and said, After I am extinguished (mi), dont similarly destroy (miqu ) my teachings 64 . Snshng spoke out: Why dare to destroy (miqu ) a monks teachings? 65 The master asked After this, people will question you: in which direction will you doguide : direct them? Snshng hhumphed : shouted . The master said Who knew my teachings would be destroyed (miqu ) at the hands of this dumbass? Done speaking, the master remained upright, expressing only silence (shj). [506c3-7]

In this last story from the text, the one in which the compiler(s)/storyteller(s) behind the rest of the work reveal themselves (in the character of Snshng), a deep sense of irony is communicated. Lnj wants to know how his teaching will be passed on and Snshng responds with a hshout 66 a response that Lnj often used himself and might have similarly employed if the roles were reversed. The irony is that as Lnj is being extinguished (mi ) at the conclusion, his character is simultaneously implying that his students (represented in Snshng) will extinguish (miqu ) or distort his teachingsthat they wont pass them on as Lnj would wish them to be passed. The
See line [496b10]: Compiled by fmethod : Dharma : reality heir Hurn from Snshng Literally: my true dharma eye and collection/treasure (). This term is rather technical and, as Yanagida points out, seems to have an additional connotation of awakened nirvana (see further Yanagidas introduction to Hisamatsu 2002, xlvii footnote 5) 65 The text can be interpreted multiple ways. Another possible translation, one that I think would keep with the spirit of playfulness (but also take it too far) might be: Snshng 65 spoke out [I] dare to destroy/extinguish the monks true dharma eye and collection. 66 H is a deep, guttural ejaculation which doesnt seem to have an English equivalent. The sound of the character (h) is, supposedly, also the sound of the ejaculation itself (the Japanese, however, transliterate it kat[su]considering that the Cantonese pronunciation hoit contains, like the Japanese, an abrupt stop at the end, we may plausibly guess a similar stop) though Lnj also develops h as possessing its own philosophical meaning in the text (see page 125). I will generally refer to h in this interpretation as shouting though, too, it often seems to better capture its flavor when translated as a dismissive/grumpy humph.
64 63

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Carroll, Michael Scott compiler(s) of the text are acknowledging their own deficiencies in being able to communicate Lnjs teachings here even as they are seeking to surpass those limitations. The message is that, in the way they contextualize the entire work, the compilers are only students and that, as they are speaking and relating what they believe are the teachings of Lnj through a character of the same name, their master is, so to speak, expressing only stillness/silence (shj). The ironic tone of this last story sets off something else unique about the context and language of the text that the compiler(s) wish to make known: room is being left open for interpretation. There is a sense of playfulness in that last story that should lead us to believe that things are far from conclusively decided. Might we not re-read Lnjs last words to Snshng (Who knew my teachings would be destroyed at the hands of this dumbass?) as an affectionate final joke directed at a star student (one suggesting that Snshng really does understand what Lnj wants and/or approving Snshngs ability to pass on his teachings) rather than strictly as a lament? The closure of this story is far from determinative and invites interpretive dispute. Interpretive dispute, in this way, seems be contextually encouraged for certain parts of the Linji Lu. In the two labeled sections knbintest(ing) and distinguish(ing) and xnglrecord of activitythe commentaries of two uninvolved monks (ones that are not present in the story itself but discussing it afterward), Wishn and Yngshn , are included. These commentaries, given in the form of a conversation between the commentators, often broach the question of what a particular story is aboutalways ending with further questions and no definite answers. Moreover, the commentaries, in being a form of interpretation of the stories, add another layer of uncertainty to the text

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Carroll, Michael Scott that requires interpretation. Whether one reads these Wi-Yng commentaries as (poor) interpolations or not 67 , they elucidate the obvious contextual point that the stories in these two sections were meant (at least in some way or aspect) to be interpreted by the readers. There is another way in which the context of the Linji Lu encourages interpretation: the implication of transcription. The standpoint of the student implies that all the conversations and lectures in the text are transcribed, leaving wide open the question of (among other things) the (mis)transcription of homophones. A studenttranscriber, when confronted with two homophones (two words that have the same pronunciation but differ in spelling, meaning and/or origin) must choose between one or the other, even though that choice means that the intended meaning of the speaker might be altered. In this way, the context of the Linji Lu is designed to leave us open to doubt some of the individual characters in the text itself. 68 These particular contextual tools, then, give further guidance as to how the standpoint of the student is meant to contextualize the Linji Lu for readers. The standpoint is intended to create certain confidence that Lnj Yxun actually existed and sought to communicate his understanding and knowledge to his students while also marking off the places in the text where the reader, knowing that students may not have been able to transcribe a homophone (or pun) correctly or that the stories of Lnj, in themselves, do not necessarily contain a point by which to guide their interpretation,
The commentaries, along with a passage [505b15-26] that (surreptitiously?) appears in the xnglrecord of section of the text, do seem generally aimed at clarifying Lnjs place with the Chan/Zen lineage which would make the later interpolation of these Wi-Yng passages into the text at some date after the first compilation a definite possibility. 68 Of course it should be noted that this last opening for interpretive dispute has large potential for interpretive abuse. The tool of homophone interpolation/exchange can also be a meaning changing vehicle that might be put to use by an approach to the text that also has a strong political agenda. For the sake of interpretive rigor, then, it seems best to regard the text as only allowing for the interpretive dispute of homophones in cases that seem grammatically plausible and are heavily supported by the text, like puns (examples of which is explored on pages 118 125 and pages 129 135).
activity 67

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Carroll, Michael Scott needs to do his/her own interpretative work. In this way, the standpoint of the student provides a certain sense of self-doubt within the textself-doubt that, I shall show at the conclusion of this interpretation, plays a critical role in pushing readers to actualize the teachings of the text, not just understand them.

II - Standpoint If the standpoint of the student is the over-arching context that the compiler(s) of the Linji Lu wish the text to be set in, then what does this standpoint entail? What, after all, are the concerns, situations, and motivations that would dominate the life of a student in Lnjs time? To put it in another way, how should we contextualize the context of the student? The text of the Linji Lu offers a numerous tidbits of information on this account, information that should lead an interpreter to suppose not only that he is right to take the student as the proper context for approaching the work but, further, that the compiler(s) of the Linji Lu wished to emphasize certain particular aspects of the students standpoint for readers. It is generally understood throughout the Linji Lu that Lnjs students (as well as most of the audience members at his lectures) are monks. Lnj is not preaching to ordinary laypeople and, though the first person to ask a question of Lnj at the beginning of the text is a provincial governor known as Attendant Wng , laypeople like Wng are not, as we can gather from the content of Lnjs lectures, the sort of people that Lnj expects to address when he ascends the hall (shngtng ). Lnjs lectures are, instead, directed towards a clergy of monks, all of whom have basic knowledge of Buddhism. This educational background can be inferred not only

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Carroll, Michael Scott from Lnjs frequent discussion of the problems students (xuzhe ) face in understanding fmethod : Dharma : realitybut from his constant references to masterpieces of Buddhism and Chinese literature as well. Lnjs lectures assume listeners have a broad background in Mahayana Buddhism, indicating that those listeners have the free time and resources to either a) study the works that Lnj often refers to (such as the Lotus Sutra or Vimalakrti Nidea Sutra ) or b) listen to lectures on Buddhismtime and resources that would likely be available to monks and nuns living in a monastery like Lnjs (and, perhaps, certain members of the elite). 69 More than the basic background knowledge the lectures presuppose, however, the very act of attending lectures and question-answer periods with the master (known in modern times by the Japanese term mond (C: wnd )) implies that Lnjs students are both very devoted to understanding (Lnjs philosophy of) Buddhism and that they possess exceptionally large amounts of time for study (farmers, merchants and even government officials, after all, dont usually have adequate free time to travel to Lnjs temple to attend lectures). These easily deduced facts all imply (and are implied by) a term that Lnj puts particular emphasis on in the text: chjileaving home . Chji, literally part [from] home, also carries the meaning of becoming a monk or nundescribing the important moment in a students life when s/he departs family, home, and occupation (the concerns of lay life) for a new existence of monastic devotion. Monks and nuns must leave the homes where they lived and the families that raised them to study Buddhism, a fact that not only demonstrates they likely possess a

Given the plentitude of references in the lectures, I think that this basic educational background can be assumed even though Lnj occasionally asserts that students do not study sutras at his monastery [503c27].

69

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Carroll, Michael Scott basic understanding of Buddhism but that their dedication to learning Buddhism is strong enough to that they would be willing to shirk their important Confucian filial duties (xio ) as sons and daughters (who should maintain their ancestors graves and have children to maintain their own graves) to pursue an understanding Buddhism and life of monastic discipline. Chjileaving home, we learn in the text, is important not only because it becomes the event by which Lnj (and Chinese society in general) defines the monks and nuns existence but because it is an enormous sacrifice for Lnjs students, one which they measure their own successes and attainments against (see [500c3], [501c20]). A number of expected alterations to a students lifestyle come with Chjileaving
home

. In a monastery, students do manual labor such as gardening [505a5-13, 505a16-23,

and 505b7-14] but also spend time in other religious learning activities such as meditating [505a29-505b6], listening to lectures, and having personal interviews with the temples head monk (i.e. Lnj). In addition to these somewhat regimented rituals of everyday living, travel plays an important role in monks monastic life. The majority of scenarios in the section xnglrecord of activity (also translatable as record of travels) find Lnj traveling to various places, sometimes on important errands (such as delivering a letter for his master, Hungb [505b15]) and, sometimes, merely to visit other monasteries and call on renowned monks (or even lay householders [503b3]). Discussion of travel is not just limited to Lnjs wanderings in xnglrecord of
activity

, though. Students (and accomplished monks) also make trips to call on Lnj.

Traveling is such an important and frequent activity that the language of travel permeates the entire text of the Linji Lu. Lnj often begins by asking of new monks Where do you come from? [503a29] and monks ask (famously) of Lnj What is the

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Carroll, Michael Scott patriarch coming from the Wests yidea(s):attitude(s) ? [504b3]. The lectures of the text, moreover, often employ terms implying travel and place at key pointsterms such as renter : join , chleave : part , zuseat : place and jng 70 . It is relevant to note that one of the most important event in Lnjs life portrayed by the textLnjs coming to understand and actualize Hungbs fmethod : Dharma : reality (portrayed at the very beginning of thexnglrecord of activity)is, itself, a travel story: After three years of sitting ( ) in Hungbs monastery and after thrice asking Hungb about the great yidea : attitude of the Buddhas fmethod : Dharma : reality and being struck with the fly whisk each time in response, Lnj decides to leave Hungbs monastery, at which point Hungb instructs him to visit the hermitage of the monk Dy . Lnj arrives at Dys residence and, through his conversation with the monk, has a great winsight 71 (), realizing that Hungbs fmethod : Dharma : realitydoes not have much in it. After this, Lnj returns to Hungbs monastery. [504b28-505a4]

A detailed discussion of jng , which has the implications of both place and environment, is found in a later section of the chapter. 71 Though I chose the simple and straightforward translation insight here, w is most often translated as enlightenment. Another familiar translation is the Japanese term satorifirst popularized by D.T. Suzuki when he put it at the center of his whole interpretation of Zen, labeling it both the remaking of life itself (Suzuki 1949, 231) and the raison dtre of Zen without which Zen is no Zen. (ibid, 261) Without repeating my brief criticism of these two loaded translations of the term (see footnote 31 in Treatise Two), I want to question here the assumption that w is both the center and the goal of this school of Buddhism. It seems to me that, precisely because the centrality of w is generally accepted/assumed by interpreters, then some critical investigation of the legitimacy of this claim is necessary to make sure the assumption isnt motivated by (or motivating) an interpretive agenda. Along these line, the Linji Lu may well serve as an ideal starting point for taking such a critical view. Though Lnjs attainment of dw (great w) is obviously an event of importance in the text, it is revealing to note that the actual term w appears in the text only three times. Another Chinese term commonly translated as enlightenment ju is similarly scarce and appears only four times in the text (not including its employment in the name of the monk Dju ). These textual statistics, of course, do not prove that w and ju are not, in some way, a central goal or concept of the Linji Lu but they do suggest that the terms (and their concepts) are not the primary concern of the compiler(s). (This seems especially true when these statistics are compared with the number of instances of these terms in the Essentials of Transmitting Mind or Chuanxin Fayao , where w appears 18 times and ju 21 times. The Essentials, which is

70

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Carroll, Michael Scott These features, all of which are connected, in one way or another, to the concept of chjileave home , dominate and define the lives of Lnjs students. The students, however, as different as their lives may be from ordinary lay people in Lnjs time, still lived and existed as a part of a place and time period. Before concluding this discussion of contexts, then, one last change of perspective seems necessarya final examination of the Linji Lu in its historical context.

III - History The time period in which the Linji Lu is set is one of immense significancethe setting of the text is contemporaneous with the harshest and most effective persecution of Buddhism in Chinese history. Buddhism as an institution was, for a number of years at least, essentially wiped out. Both because a) this period undoubtedly influenced and affected the compiler(s) of the text and b) because it can be expected that those compiler(s) anticipated (and likely meant that) readers would read about Lnj with the background of that time period in mind, then it seems necessary to examine and pull out the important features of this historical setting here, even if the scene should be painted (as this one is) only in very broad strokes. In a nutshell, two major trends of the late Tang Dynasty led to the decline of Chinese Buddhism. The first trend was increased national conflictboth in wars with neighboring powers and in internal struggles between the imperial family and powerful generals. These conflicts, besides putting the empire into a state of near-constant
attributed to Lnjs master Hungb and considered a product of the late Tang, is less than half the length of the Linji Lu.) Healthy skepticism of the common assumption that enlightenment or satori is the central goal and key for understanding all Zen/Chan Buddhism, then, should be kept with us as we proceed with our investigation of the text (and, perhaps, should be applied to evaluations of this school of Buddhism more generally).

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Carroll, Michael Scott upheaval, also drained imperial coffers and put the empire in perpetual financial crisis. The second trend was an increase of Daoist and Confucian scholars in positions of influence at court (combined with a decline of Buddhist influence). Both of these trends came to a head under the reign of Emperor Tng Wzng , whose reign lasted a short, but significant, six years (CE 840 846). Emperor Wzng, a fervent Daoist, made use of Confucian and Daoist criticisms of the economic strain (institutional) Buddhism put upon the empire to order the seizure of nearly all Buddhist-owned monasteries, lands and assets: a move which would have rendered tens of thousands of monks and nuns homeless had not Wzng simultaneously ordered them all (forcibly) returned to lay life. Wzngs persecution of the institution of Buddhism put the Buddhist philosophy/religion/tradition in a position diametrical to the one it held at the beginning of the Tang. In the early Tang dynasty, Buddhism reached one of its most notable (historical, cultural and philosophical) peaks due to the lavish patronage of the imperial court (the period of greatest patronage being the court of Empress W Ztin (r. 690 - 705)). By the end of the Tang, however, that same court-focused institutionalism contributed to the destruction of Buddhism in China. Even after Wzngs persecution ended and many Buddhists were able to return to monastic life and reclaim some temples and lands, imperial support was never the same. The Tang Dynasty, weak and hobbled by financial woes, collapsed in CE 907throwing China into a period of instability and disunity (the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period) that lasted until the founding of the Song Dynasty in CE 960. After Wzngs persecution, then, over one hundred years passed before any stable central power capable of supporting institutional (traditional) Buddhist practice emerged in China.

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Carroll, Michael Scott These particular facts give the Linji Lu special importance for readers contemporary to the period in which the text was compiled, readers that would have been more immediately aware of the events surrounding the time period in which Lnj taught and who would also have likely seen the text as shedding some light on how Buddhism can be (and was) reformed to survive periods of persecution and little central support. 72 Approached in both these ways, the Linji Lu goes far to fulfill expectations. Though the date of Lnjs birth and his age are unknown, his death falls, by the reckoning of the last, memorial inscription, passage of the text, in CE 867 a year which, if we guess he lived to be at least forty but no older than seventy, would put the persecuting reign of Emperor Wzng (CE 840 846) in what would likely have been the early-to-middle years of Lnjs monastic life. 73 In this respect, there are a number of features in the language, lectures and settings of the Linji Lu that suggest not only the influence of the time period, but that the text itself made dealing with such turbulent times a central concern. In his opening words, for example, Lnj declares:
Today [I] the Mountain Monk, [who does] not refuse shmatter(s) : social affair(s) , must obey the bend of the feelings and the situations of people () and take the [lecture] zuseat : place . Under the gate of the patriarchs (), I would not open my mouth about the great shmatter : social affair you would have no place (ch ) to stand. Today [however] I have been invited by the Attendant () so theres no need to hide the gngkey link : guiding principle 74 of the sect. If there is

Notable in this regard is that most of the other religions/philosophies in China that were also subjected to Wzngs persecution (such as Nestorian Christianity)as well as other schools of Chinese Buddhism never recovered and reestablished themselves in China after the persecution as Chan/Zen Buddhism was able to. 73 Yanagida guesses, plausibly, that Lnj was born between CE 810 and 815, making Lnj about 50 years old at his death and in his late twenties to early thirties at the time of the persecution. (see Yanagida 1972a) 74 Gng , literally, is the headrope of a fishing netthe one that the fisherman pulls on to draw the net and gather all the fish together.

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anyone who wishes to be a general, deploying troops and raising banners, let him or her rise to meet the audience. [496b11-15]

These first words undertake a lot more work than their typical characterization by commentators (as Lnj simply absolving himself for [complying] with the rules the discursive game while also employing a strategic denial of language 75 ) conveys. The important point in this passage is that Lnj is inviting questions about Buddhism not from under the gate of the patriarchs ( )the approach of the received sectarian lineagebut at the invitation of the prefectural governor, Attendant Wng . Lnj is recognizing his position as a guest of the Attendant (who is, literally, the zhhost :
master

of the prefecture) and responding accordingly. Lnjs position as a guest of the Attendant has more implications than we might

initially be aware of. The battle terminology at the end of the passage suggests struggle (the late Tang and the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period were times of constant war and strife) and displacement (no place to stand), the implication being that Lnj is making this statement around the time of the persecution (or, at least, in a time of general hardship and war). Given such a context we can see the importance of Attendant Wng, who appears (from his name and title and historical context) to be more than just the head
75

These quotes are from Faures Chan Insights and Oversights (Faure 1993, 199). I find Faures (and similar anti-language) assertions here to be textually ungrounded. Though Lnj mentions not opening his mouth and though, along with his use of shouting and beating to answer students, he occasionally criticizes language, I fail to see why these textual features should imply language was recognized as a necessary evil and granted a provisional valueas a signpost or a skillful means (upya). [ibid.] Why should Lnjs inability to open his mouth under the gate of the patriarchs lead us to conclude that, for either Lnj of the Zen/Chan school, language is looked down upon and used only as a skillful means? I do not wish to investigate the matter in detail here but do wish to note that, even though the extent of Lnjs non-linguistic behavior and his occasional criticism of language and discussions of skillful means does give some textual basis for the anti-language reading of the Linji Lu, this reading doesnt seem, either in the context of this first passage in particular or in light of the work as a whole, to be a central, unifying idea. Faures brief claims hereas well as longer claims, like that of Sellman and Schneider (in Schneider 2003)are too piecemeal in textual support and limited in scope to serve as a plausible interpretation of the Linji Lu as a whole (or, even, a general characterization of it).

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Carroll, Michael Scott of a prefecture but one of the Regional Commanders of the outer provinces.76 These large outer provinces, along with the Regional Commanders (and their powerful armies) that controlled them, enjoyed a great deal of autonomy from the imperial throne during the late Tang: the result being not only that they were able to rather comfortably weather the turbulence of the era but that Buddhism within these provinces was not subjected to the harsh persecution of Wzngs reign. Buddhist monks like Lnj in the outer provinces could remain protected under the patronage of the Regional Commanders at the outer reaches of the empire even as their counterparts in heart of the empire were being defrocked and dispossessed. Attendant Wng, and the implications of military protection and isolation from the imperial court (usually considered the center of a dynastys scholarship and culture) that come with him, is therefore an important character in the Linji Luone who both places the text in its historical context and expresses something about how Lnjs teachings fit (were adapted?) to that context. We should not overemphasize the Attendants role in these respects, though. Lnj is very careful to note in his opening speech not only the Attendants invitation but, too, the feelings and situation of the people () and the great shmatter : social affair of the times. Though we may not be certain what either the feelings and situation of the people or the great shmatter : social
affair

is exactly, Lnjs (careful) noting of them communicates one further important

point: Lnj was, with his teaching, no longer focusing primarily on (seeking patronage from) the imperial court but, rather, centering his concern on larger shmatters : social affairs
See further Yanagida 1972a. Yanagida supposes the Attendant Wng is a member of the Wng family which controlled the position of Regional Commander of Chngd Province () at the time of Lnjs teaching. Lnjs place of teaching, Zhnzhu is one of four prefectures in Chngd Province (modern day Hebei ).
76

116

Carroll, Michael Scott and on persons/people . This is a significant shift for both Tang Buddhism in general and Lnjs lineage in particularone so important that the compiler(s) of the Linji Lu are careful to signal this important change of conceptual focus at the beginning of the text. Lnj must obey the bend ( ) of the feelings and situation of the people () 77 , showing that rnperson : people (and shmatters : affairs : things ) have a particular importance, one that the text wishes to give priority to. Once we are alerted to the importance of rnperson : people and shmatters : social affairs, however, and notice that those concepts are ones that run through and constantly re-emerge in the entirety of Linji Lu, we are left with the question of what role these key concepts play in text. To make sense of rnperson : people and shmatters : social affairs and the relationship of these two concepts to one another (as well as to the text as whole), though, we need to take our interpretation to a new stage: we need to move out from a primarily contextual exploration and into a philosophical investigation.

Stripping Lnj Bare: Rn and Changing Y /

These two characters can be read two ways. Instead of feelings and situation of the people, we might take to mean [the] rnperson : people feeling(s)/situation(s). This second possible interpretation, though a bit bulkier on Western eyes, seems to fit just as well (and, perhaps, even better) within the larger context of this passage and the text as a whole.

77

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Carroll, Michael Scott The philosophical importance of the concept rnperson : people 78 to the Linji Lu has not gone unnoticed. As noted in the first section, Suzuki (and, apparently, Abe) took this concept as the key to understanding the entire text. They were not alone in making this assessment: two other influential interpreters of the traditionHeinrich Dumoulin (author of the influential Zen Buddhism: A History) and Paul Demiville, renowned French Sinologist and the first Western language translator of the Linji Lushared this interpretation. Rnperson : people lies at the heart of the Linji Lu. A great deal of evidence supports the view that rnperson
: people

is a central

philosophical concept in the Linji Lu. There is textual-statistical evidenceDumoulin notes that a synopsis of all Chinese characters shows that of the total 1336 characters in the text, the graph for human being [rn ] appears 196 times. Prescinding from characters that are used frequently without any special significance on their own, there are only two other graphsboth of them expressing negationthat are used more frequently than this. (Dumoulin 1988, 189)and there is literary evidencethe Linji Lu often puts its focus on people and persons and their actions: even the long lectures themselves are carefully bracketed into the context of being spoken by Lnj (and then further bracketed into the standpoint of the student). Although rnperson : people is obviously a significant concept within the Linji Lu, interpretations of the text should be careful not to simply grab hold it and then run with it in their own directions (identifying, for example, Lnj with the Western concept of humanism as Demiville does (Faure 1993, 243 and 261)) but, rather, keep
The character rn , in addition to the singular person or the plural people can sometimes take on the meaning of others. As I am (in the particular context of the Linji Lu) wary of the implications of distance and separation that are implied by the term others (as well as the regrettably technical Continental flavor of the word), I have chosen to keep mention of it limited to this footnote rather than including it in the main body of the text.
78

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Carroll, Michael Scott philosophical exegesis of the concept close to the text, letting development of the concept be guided by the compiler(s) of the Linji Lu, not by our own agendas or intuitions. In the Linji Lu, rnperson : people is never isolated from a contextthe concept-term is never discussed (presented) alone but is always a part of a pair. However, one term that rnperson
: people

gets paired with in the textydependency

: compliance

seems to go a

particularly long way to isolate, and help us better understand, the sense and importance of rnperson : people to the Linji Lu. The meaning of the concept y stretches over a broad range of English translations, bridging depend (or dependency) with comply/yield to (or compliance). In addition, y can imply a sentimental attachment to a person, place or thing. If this three-fold (but, in my opinion, sensible) stretch of meaning is initially surprising to Western readers, another twist awaits: ydependency : compliance is homophonic with another important character in the Linji Luyclothes : robes . These two characterterms, more than being just being pronounced the same way, also look very similar (one could easily be miscopied in place of the other) the only difference being a rnperson : people radical on the left side of ydependency : compliance . These are coincidences the Linji Lu takes philosophical advantage of. The standpoint of the student, implying as it does, a certain amount of textual insufficiency in cases such as these, quickly leads us to wonder if (particularly when Lnj is lecturing), the right character was copied down. Might not a student have transcribed ydependency :
compliance

when Lnj meant yclothes : robes ? There are many places where such a mis-

transcription is entirely possiblethe grammatical coherence of the text being preserved with either character (even as the reading of the lines changes). More likely than mis119

Carroll, Michael Scott transcription, however, it seems that the homophones are meant to a be pun that Lnj employsLnj means both terms and uses them in a way (when he speaks) that is intended to keep us guessing between the two. There is more. Like all well-crafted jokes, Lnjs pun works on two levels. More than just a simple play on homophones, Lnjs playfulness brings across a point that he makes in numerous places in his lectures: names and words arent shreality : stuff (they lack any xngessence : nature ) and, as such, shouldnt be relied upon. This claimwhich is also the central point of his recurrent discussions of languageconnects beautifully with the discussion of ydependency : compliance in [499c15 - 19]:
Students (), dont be mistaken: the fmethod : Dharma : reality of this world and other worlds are without self [inherent] xngessence : nature , they dont create xngessence : nature . Theyre only have empty names ()the written forms of those names are also empty (). How can you idly attribute shreality : stuff to names?A big mistake. Even if they have it [shreality : stuff], everything is [a] jng [of] changing y : there is Bodhi y , nirvana y , emancipation y , Trikaya () y , knowledge of jng y , Boddhisattva y , Buddha y . You seek the center of the kingdom of changing y what wthing : object are you looking for?

Lnjs playful pun on the homophones ydependency : compliance and yclothes : robes , we can see here, has a serious side. The pun is its own point: neither ydependency : compliance and yclothes : robes is the correct transcription of Lnjs lectureneither of these terms (or his spoken words) have inherent shreality : stuff . There is nothing real in language so students should not attribute reality to itthey should not think that it captures (or will lead them to) some stable, physical object (w ).

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Carroll, Michael Scott There is, of course, nothing too philosophically groundbreaking (in either the Western or Chinese traditions) in this point about language. Lnj, however, takes it a step further with an epistemological claim: even if we posit that there is shreality : stuff in words and names, we cannot know what that shreality : stuff isall words, phrases and fmethod : Dharma : reality are jng [of] changing y . There are a lot of points open to confusion in this last statement. Most notably, a definition of jng 79 has yet to be given and changing y needs to be clarified. Though the first confusion seems more critical, I will avoid it momentarily to focus on the clarification of what is meant by changing y . This clarification is best made with the help of [501b29-501c10] from the texta sister passage that mimics and complements the lines quoted above:
People come qiseeking
: entreating

of me and I go out for the measuring up. [They] dont

measure me up rightly so I begin dressing in various yclothes : robes . The student () begins to divide (distinguish) () and enters into the words I speak. A pity: this bald, blind, eyeless ass takes my yclothes : robes and notes if theyre blue (), yellow, red, [or] white. I toss it all off and take up a clean and pure jng . The student () takes one look and begins to feel joy and yearning. I toss that off too and the student () losses xnheart : mind () and runs about like a madman, shouting that I have no yclothes : robes . I then give him a measure of doguidance :
direction

: Do you know my rnperson beneath the yclothes : robes or not? In the moment you

turn your head, you get an understanding of me.

79

I wish to forego defining the term jng for the time being here. My reasons for doing so, as well as an (extensive) definition of the term, is laid out below in pages 136 145 .

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Carroll, Michael Scott

Students (), dont identify yclothes : robes . Yclothes : robes cant move themselves, rnpeople wear yclothes : robes : there is clean and pure y (), without birth 80 y (), Bodhi y , nirvana y , patriarch/ancestor y (), Buddha y . Students (), there are only sounds, names, writings, and phrases ()in the end all are changing y . They spew forth from the ocean of breath () behind your navel, crash against the teeth and become phrases and ideas ( )its common knowledge theyre all phantasms and illusions ().

Lnjs unique style of oral philosophy is apparent in these passages. A number of disparate ideas are presented, each of which flow effortlessly into one another but none of which ever undergoes a detailed exposition of its own. The words, ideas and concepts of the lectures are all as elusive as Lnjs changing y / as soon as the student/reader begins to grab hold of one concept, Lnj turns that concept into another (seemingly different) one. The student tries to grab hold (identify) this new concept and, once again, Lnjs meaning changes. This is where the seemingly innocuous pun played on ydependency : compliance and yclothes : robes really makes an impact. Both terms are names and phrases () and, as such, have no inherent naturetheres no concrete shreality : stuff within or behind them, they are phantasms and illusions. This can be seen in the way that the text can smoothly change y /. A passage that appears to be talking about dependency on and compliance with Bodhi, nirvana, Buddha, etc. is replicated with a slight change and becomes a passage about putting on the clothes or external appearance of Bodhi, nirvana, Buddha. This brings supports the hypothesis that the two terms can and are

80

Wshng also implies more technical Buddhist concepts like non-(dependent) origination.

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Carroll, Michael Scott meant to be used interchangeably throughout the text: our dependencies and compliances are all clothes that may be changed and, conversely, the clothes we wear (the ideas we cling to and adopt) are all things we become dependent on and comply with. The ultimate point of changing y / is to reveal the wide variety of thingsideas, names, clothes, concepts, etc.that catch students. Students (mis)take these things as shreality because that shreality
: stuff : stuff

and find an insurmountable difficulty in their studies

always eludes them, it always brings them short of any

conclusion or realization. Students become stuck, so to speak, trying to get to the shreality : stuff of Buddha. Lnj, as we can tell from his description of himself, wishes the opposite of his students. Lnj wants students to be able to navigate dependence and appearances (all these y /, including the without y /) effortlessly, to master them but not be reliant on them. This is why Lnj avoids terms for enlightenment, like w and ju 81 , and instead employs the term huto understand : to be able to when implying what should be his students goal. The insight and understanding his students seek isnt purely intellectual: it is part and parcel with a certain capability. This brings us back to the underlying concept: rnperson : people . It is rnperson :
people

that changes y / and rnperson : people that acts. This is a point that the reader is

reminded of both contextually (Lnj is always in the background talking in the lectures, just as rnperson : people are always acting in the stories) and textuallya term that Lnj employs for student (xurn ) contains the character for study followed by that

81

See footnote 71 in this treatise.

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Carroll, Michael Scott of person and meaning both a person who studies and studies rnperson : people. 82 Rnperson : people is the only solid constant in the text, it is the only thing equivalent to want students want with shreality : stuff. Rnperson : people in this sense, is the focus of the Linji Lu. Lnj wants, like [those of] first virtue in the ancient times to mark off road(s) for drawing out rnperson : people [497b3]he wants to reveal ways by which students may be disabused of changing y / and bring out the rnperson : people underneath, the real rnperson : people that they have allowed to be obscured. This focus on rnperson : people, along with the discussion of changing y /, is aimed at bringing students to shift focus from the projects that have been causing difficulty in their life and their study of Buddhismtrying to understand/grasp the shreality
: stuff

and, in so doing, obtain some constancy in life. There are two crippling

setbacks to this project, though: first, there is no shreality : stuff for students to grab onto (or, at least, no way of obtaining it) and second, shreality : stuff has no inherent nature of its ownwords, names and phrases (which are commonly attributed as denoting, or being stimulated by, shreality : stuff) are only a facet of rnperson : people, who wears them [501c67]: they only appear to move and have nature so much as it is rnperson : people that makes them appears to do so. This explains the focus on rnperson : people in the Linji Lu. Lnjs concern is that students are running in circles by seeking understanding through words when, in fact, those words are just a tool of their own employment. They are ydepending : complying with

This doesnt seem to be merely a late Tang colloquialism as Lnj also employs the more specific xuzhe to refer to students in the text. The choice of xurn in contexts like [501b29-501c10] is a deliberate one.

82

124

Carroll, Michael Scott words even while words are just yclothes : robes that they wear and make move (give them appearance of having constancy/shreality : stuff) themselves. Only rnperson : people, then, can act and bring a student to huunderstand
: be capable

if a student ever wants to

understand Lnjs teachings, then, that first thing s/he needs to do is forget seeking by changing y / and, instead, draw out rnperson : people. There are a few positive proscriptions that Lnj gives for achieving this drawing out. Of those, the one he repeats with the greatest frequency is that students need to trust in themselves, [It is] because your xnconfidence : trust falls short that today everything is in knots [Lnj] hhumphed : shouted and said: With [such] little trust in/upon rnperson :
people

, the day will never come when you understand. [496b26-496c2] If the students

have no confidence in themselves, the fundamental project of drawing out rnperson : people can never get off the ground. There are, of course, other, non-lingual ways that Lnj employs to draw out rnperson : people. These are, famously, the hhumphs : shouts and beatings that he will give as responses to students questions and actions (or lack thereof). These shouts and beatings have, among other uses, the purpose of finding and drawing out rnperson : people, as is shown in the section popularly known as Lnjs Four Shouts. In that section [504a26-29] we find that (at least) one of the four kinds of shoutsthe shout that is a searching pole in the shadow () grass (a pole, according to commentators, to find fish beneath foliage growing on the surface of a pond)is meant to seek out, and catch, rnperson : people. Rnperson : people both is and is not the most basic concept of the Linji Lu. It is the baseline of the text in the sense that nothing can happen before rnperson : people is drawn out, 125

Carroll, Michael Scott without (an) acting rnperson : people no change or understanding can take place. However, it is also not the baseline in the sense that rnperson : people does not (can not) stand alone. Rnperson : people exist in a world and it is in this world they act. Drawing out rnperson :
people

, then, means, at the same time, to draw out (and actualize) an understanding of how

rnperson : people should act and exist in that world. The ideal for this action leads us to the next critical concept in the Linji Lu: wsh .

Unaffected Presence: Wsh as an Ideal for Action

In the three lines immediately preceding the passage on changing y (quoted above) Lnj, in a description of himself, reveals the ideal of how rnperson : people acts when it is drawn out into the world:
Today the way the Mountain Monk makes use of chplace : handling (affairs) is to: truthfully rectify by building (completing: ) and destroying, playfully employ expressions (features) and changings, enter every jng , follow through chplaces : handlings (of affairs) with wshunaffected presence jng are unable change and replace. [501b27-29] 83

This passage is a description of both Lnjs method of instructing students and his own way of acting, one where Lnj compares the way he uses places and handles [affairs] with the way other monks use them (and the flaws in those monks approaches). As will become more apparent later, however, what Lnj is describing here is more than a method of instruction, it is also an ideal for action. With Lnj pedagogy and instruction

This is a difficult and nuanced couple of lines, the Chinese is worth quoting in full. Ive added a colon and breaks (/) so that the verse-like rhythm passage will be more obvious: : / / / /

83

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Carroll, Michael Scott collapse and are inseparable from everyday action: when drawn out rnperson : people not only exemplifies the ideal of action but also guides others. There are some parts of Lnjs above model for action that have already been discussed in the previous section. Truthfully rectify by building and destroying and playfully employ expressions (features) and changings, for example, respectively relate to changing y / and drawing out rnperson : people : the former refers to the organic, constantly shifting flow of Lnjs lectures while the latter implies his idiosyncratic mannerisms (his punning as well as his beating and shouting). One part of the model that remains unexplained, however, is the relationship between chplaces : handlings
(of affairs)

and the term wshunaffected presence . The term wsh is a compound of two concepts. The first, w , is a

common negation in Chinese (without, lacking) with roots that run deeply into Daoism (particularly into the Zhuangzi and Wng Bs (CE 226 -249) reading of the Daode Jing ). The second concept, sh , was touched upon earlier: sh are matters, affairs and events that are related to, and created by, people (rn ). In this way, sh may be contrasted with w , which are (physical, objective) things and objects. The most literal translation for wsh, then, would be lacking matters or without social affairs. On the level of what wsh is meant to achieveof why Lnj holds it as an idealthis translation helps capture a lot. Lnj, like other Buddhists, wants to end the output of karmaactions that cause suffering and the endless cycle of birth and rebirth (). Karma, typically written in Chinese using the broad characterterm ycause : enterprise seems to be refined, in Lnjs lectures, to the narrower (but still

127

Carroll, Michael Scott broad) character-term shmatter : social affair. This refining of concepts, though unusual at first, seems in closer step with Lnj analysis of rnperson : people as being the center (i.e., that which moves and wears all words, phrases, ideas, etc.) of all action. Other than rnperson : people, only shmatters : social affairs are caused and (because they are caused by acting rnperson : people) can cause (i.e. have effects that cause other things). The production of shmatters : social affairs, therefore, is synonymous with the production of karma and, as such, Lnj holds as ideal only action(s) that dont create shmatters : social affairs. To limit our investigation of the concepts of wsh to this simple translation and discussion of ideal outcome, however, is insufficient. To begin with, this initial translation doesnt very effectively capture all the various grammatical employments of wsh in text, where wsh isnt merely an external description (i.e., this man is without affairs) but describes of a basic internal state[to be] wsh is to be (a) noble rnperson : people () [497c27]. Further, wsh is often discussed in the text in conjunction with ch : a term which normally gets used in the sense of handling or disposing of affairs (sh ) but which also means place or location (ch ). Wsh , we find in these associations, is a method (f ) of chhandling affairs:
The Master instructed the group, saying: Students (), Buddha fmethod : Dharma : reality [works] without using skillful ch handling of affairs , [it is] only ordinary wsh . [498a16-17]

In its being opposed to skillful ch handling of affairs and being described as ordinary, wsh seems, actually, to be a sort of passive non-ch handling
of affairs

it

seems to be a handling of affairs that doesnt handle affairs. This view of wsh seems supported by another, often quoted, passage from the text:

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Carroll, Michael Scott

With regards to this Mountain Monks insight into ch handling of affairs there are not a great number of kinds [of ch handling of affairs ], just ordinariness: wear clothes (y ), eat rice, pass time wsh (). [500c10-11]

This and similar statements in the text (see also [498a16 - 18]) that instruct students to act ordinarily have led many commentators to describe the Linji Lu as being permeated with heavy strains of Daoism. The term wsh does indeed, we noted above, have Daoist implications. The pattern of creating a new action-oriented concept by negating another action concept with w smacks heavily of the Daode Jing , where a central (and widely discussed) concept is that of wwinon-action : non-deeming . Like wsh, a literal translation of wwi renders something like without action and without deeming. This is done by simply negating the concept wi , which covers the broad range of possible translations between to (purposefully) do to to deem/to name something (so as to guide action). The concept wwi, however, is developed in the Daode Jing far beyond this narrow rendering. As Chad Hansen notes in A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought,
Laozis prescriptive paradox involves the whole complex role of wei. We should avoid any action based on artificially induced or learned purposes or desiresthose that result from deeming things to be such and such. Its conceptual role in this slogan is continuous with the theory of a guiding conceptual perspective and Laozis attitude that being guided in this way is an unnatural artifice Getting rid of wei is freeing us from societys purposes, socially induced desires, social distinctions or meaning structures. We are to free ourselves from social, artificial, unnatural guidance, guidance by a system of distinction and name pairs. That, notoriously, leaves us able to act naturally. (Hansen 1992, 214) 84

A.C. Graham, who thinks that wwi is primarily an ideal for governing people, gives a simpler, more traditional interpretation/translation of the termdoing nothing. (See Graham 1989, 232 234)

84

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Carroll, Michael Scott In light of the connections to Daoism and the Daode Jing that are implied by patterning the structure (and usage) of wsh on wwi , then, I offer one further, very important, interpretation for wshunaffected presence. Unaffected presence more fully captures scope of wsh as an action ideal by highlighting three implications of the term. First, unaffected implies the Daoist reading of wwi , above: the wsh person () acts naturally and casually, his or her actions are neither socially induced nor forced and awkward as they are not motivated or guided by words and phrases. The wsh person eats, clear his or her bowels, sleeps, works in the fields, travels, etc. and does so effortlessly (without coming into discord with the world around him/her and creating more shmatters : social affairs). S/he is so natural and ordinary (fn ) that s/he seems sagely (shng )this is one reason why the text constantly collapses together the concepts of common and sagely (fn and shng ) (see, for example, the encounter between Lnj and Phu in [503b10-16]). This aspect of unaffected presence goes closely together with another aspect, one which plays slightly on the English meaning of unaffectedthe wsh person not only acts naturally but does not create (affect) shmatter : social affair. S/he is wsh in the sense that s/he does not output (cause) shmatters
: social affairs

or contribute to their

escalation or further development. This state of wsh is expressed in a quote from the Bodhisattva Manjushri 85 which Lnj employs to describe the Buddha, Buddha is always in the world but never pollutes or acquires () the world fmethod : Dharma : reality. [502b67]

85

See Watson 1993, page 73 footnote 3.

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Carroll, Michael Scott The last, but most important aspect of unaffected presence is expressed in presence. The wsh person, like the Buddha, is always in the world and achieves the ideal of action while surrounded by the shmatters : social affairs of the world. This is expressed at the very beginning of the Linji Lu, where Lnj recognizes not only the feelings and situation of the people () but that there are larger shmatters : social affairs of the times that need to be addressed. 86 Even though the wars and religious persecutions of the late Tang are never mentioned explicitly in the Linji Lu they are not only present in the background of the work but, too, recognized as being a motivating reason (and context) for Lnjs teaching. Lnj is integrally involved in the world that he teaches in and travels through. This emphasis on presence brings the ideal for action back around to the texts conceptual focus on rnperson : people. It is always (a drawn out) rnperson : people that is wshunaffectedly
present

. There is an important way, however, in which presence

: people

(particularly as it implies rnperson

) brings wsh to deviate from its Daoist

implications. This departure is evident in a passage from the Linji Lu that seems to be most often quoted of all passages from the textthe True Man without Rank:
[The Master] ascended the [lecture] hall () and said: Upon this red flesh-ball is a wwiwithout
position

zhnrntrue person constantly crawling in and out from the various gates in the face 87

of your rnperson . Those who want evidencetake a look. At this time a monk asked out: Whats the wwiwithout position zhnrntrue person like? The Master came down from the meditation seat, grabbed hold [of the monk] and said Doguide :
direct

! Doguide : direct !

86 87

This passage was quoted on pages 114 155. This termthe gates of the faceis flavored by the technical language of Buddhism and refers to the sense organs (ears/hearing, eyes/sight, nose/smell, flesh/touch, and mouth/taste).

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Carroll, Michael Scott

The monk prepared to give an idea. The Master let go of him, saying: Wwiwithout position zhnrntrue person what a shit-wiping stick. [The Master] returned to his quarters. [496c10-14]

The Daoist terminology in this passage should be noted carefully. Not only does the well-known Zhuangzi concept of zhnrntrue person crop up with what seems to be a pun on the term wwinon-action : non-deeming but Lnj even shouts out Doguide : direct ! Doguide :
direct

!the name and key character-concept of the Daoist school of

: direct

thought. It is notable that, except for doguide elsewhere in main body of the text.88

none of these concepts appear

A criticism of Daoism is obviously at work here, but what is being criticized? Interestingly, the text is criticizing Daoist thought and philosophy by paying homage to (quintessentially Daoist) works like the Zhuangzi and Daode Jingit is showing the Daoist influences it is indebted to and, more importantly, explicating where it breaks away from those influences and how it overcomes weaknesses in the concepts borrowed. Wwiwithout positionzhnrntrue person is often presented by interpreters and translators of the Linji Lu as a single concept. Four-character concepts, however, are not only rare elsewhere in the text (and in the Chinese of the time period) but zhnrntrue person is obviously a stand-alone concept borrowed from the Zhuangzi. Wwiwithout
position

moreover, appears to be a homophonic pun on the concept of wwinon-action : non-deeming89 .

The only exception is M Fngs poetic summation of the text in the preface. It is, of course, impossible to tell if these two characters were homophones in the time that the text was compiled, as the Chinese language has undergone many changes since then. The suggestion seems plausible, though, given that the characters (/) are homophones in (modern) Mandarin Chinese (with a change in tones between the two) and in Cantonese (also with a tone change). Even without determinative evidence of the pronunciation of these two characters, however, the famous Daode Jing
89

88

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Carroll, Michael Scott What the Linji Lu seems to be presenting in this passage, then, is the Daoist concepts of wwinon-action : non-deeming and zhnrntrue person, to which the concept of the wsh person owes its roots. Indeed, reading the description of the zhnrntrue person in Chapter 6 ( ) of the Zhuangzi we find familiar echoes with the concept of wwinon-action : nondeeming

and the wsh person:

The True Men () of old did not mind belonging to the few, did not grow up with more cock than hen in them, did not plan out their actions. Such men as that did not regret it when they missed the mark, were not complacent when they hit plumb on. Such men as that climbed heights without trembling, entered water without wetting, entered fire without burning. Such is the knowledge which is able to rise out of the world on the course of the Way (). (Graham 1981, 84)

If the concept shares such affinities with the wsh person, though, why does Lnj call the (wwiwithout position/wwinon-action : non-deeming) zhnrntrue person a shit-wiping stick? The answer lies in situation that immediately precedes the insult: Lnj asks the wwi zhnrn (the student/monk) to doguide : direct and the monk prepares to give his ideato speak. Lnjs insult is directed at two distinct facets of this situation. First, Lnj doesnt want a description of the wwi zhnrn (which the monk seems about to give). Not only do Lnjs proscriptions against trying to find shreality : stuff in language seem relevant here, but it is obvious that what he wants is active guidance and direction, not passive description. This explains the noteworthy use of the term do herea term which translations of the text blandly (and misleadingly) translate as speak, but which is better

structure for concept conjunction (negation) + concept Ais obviously being employed here for referential reasons.

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Carroll, Michael Scott translated as guide or direct 90 Lnj wants the wwi zhnrn to give guidance, to direct, but the monk seems only able to offer up more words (which are more likely to set students astray rather than guide them). Lnjs second, related dissatisfaction with wwi zhnrn is a Mahayanist one. Mahayana (C: ) Buddhism, the tradition of Buddhism from which Lnj (along with Chan/Zen and every other major Buddhist school in China) descends, most prominently distinguishes itself (theoretically) from its rival, Theravada or Hinayana (C: ) Buddhism, with its emphasis on universal liberation from samsara (the wheel of life and suffering in which beings are endlessly reborn) which it sets against (what it claims to be) Theravadas narrowly elitist and individualistic method of liberation. Mahayana philosophy illustrates the philosophical difference by playing on the Buddhas metaphor of the raft. The Dharma (C: fmethod : Dharma : reality ) is a raft which takes a person from one side of the river (samsara) to the other (nirvana, or freedom from samsara). Mahayana (literally translated as Great Vehicle) characterizes Theravada (which Mahayanists deridingly call Hinayana or Small Vehicle) as providing only singleperson rafts: rafts that take only one person across the river at a time and are disposed of after use (left on the other shore so that the others are left to cross the river themselves). Mahayana, by contrast, provides a great raft, one which brings everybody across the river at once. According to Mahayana, then, the distinction between the Dharma of the two schools is both a) ethicallike the Buddha, the foremost concern of those who are enlightened is to enlighten othersand b) practicalMahayana Buddhism claims that
The text employs many other verbs that approximate the English to speak (such as yn , yn and shu ) but only in rare instances uses do as a verb in a similar context. Considering dos related philosophical meanings in Chinese then, such as path and guidance, we can expect that dos employment here is meant to be taken more specifically as to guide or to direct than just to speak.
90

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Carroll, Michael Scott nirvana is an all-or-none attainment: either everybody enters nirvana at once or nobody enters it at all. Lnjs Mahayanist background suggests reasons why he would find the Daoist concept of zhnrntrue person to be limited: the concept (at least on its face) is essentially individualisticthe zhnrntrue person does not guide or direct others but focuses, instead, on itselfit is a single, isolated person acting apart from the difficulties of the social and natural spheres, not a teacher liberating others within the world. As a Mahayanist, Lnj finds this unacceptable. Related and integral to this dissatisfaction is the critical pun on wwi . By punning on wwinon-action
: non-deeming

and transcribing, instead, wwiwithout

position

Lnj implies that the wwinon-acting : non-deeming person is a person who stands nowhere wi , in Chinese, has much the same scope as the term position does in English, its meaning encompassing both physical location and social standing/rank. Lnjs dissatisfaction with wwiwithout position, then, stems partly from the fact that the wwinonacting : non-deeming

person is (or, at least, seeks to be) removed from the social worldthat

they deny social position and rank (a denial which makes them, in effect, hermits). There is an even more intriguing and cutting criticism in Lnjs pun. The ideal of wwinon-action : non-deeming doesnt just fall short for Lnj because it isolates rnperson : people from society but because it lacks physical positionit denies a person presence because it denies him a place to be present in. For Lnj, the Daoist concept of wwinonaction : non-deeming

denies the realities of the external world (the world of sensory input) and,

as such, becomes unintelligible as a method that relates to drawing out rnperson : people.

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Carroll, Michael Scott This last point of criticism needs further development. In order to develop it, though, discussion needs to focus not only on the idea of position (which, in its various forms, is by far the single most permeating concept in the text) but on the one concept that seems to underlie and unify this idea in the Linji Lu: jng . The long overdue investigation of jng, moreover, will set the stage for fitting in the last remaining piece of this interpretation of the textit will allow us to finally give an explanation of how rnperson : people emerges, acts, and guides (liberates) others in the world (i.e., how rnperson :
people

, upon being drawn out actualizes the action ideal of wshunaffected presence).

Jng and the Metaphysics of Person and Place

Throughout this paper, jng has been intentionally given without a translation. The reasoning behind this decision was to both a) bring readers to take notice of the frequency, importance, and diverse employments of the term and b) encourage readers to make some initial forays into interpreting the term themselves. Jng is a rich, multifaceted concept and the Linji Lu makes full use of the subtleties and texture of the term in its employments of it throughout the whole of the text. If a requirement were to be put in place that only one English concept were allowable for translating/interpreting jng, environment, the translation dominantly preferred by the English translations of the text 91 , would by and far be the best fit. Environment, with its connotations of both place and sensory stimulation hacks a good middle-ground between, one the one hand, the traditional Chinese understanding of
Of the three complete translations, Schloegl and Watson tend to use environment. Sasaki differs (but only slightly) with her choice of surroundings.
91

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Carroll, Michael Scott the term and the more technical philosophical Buddhist development of the concept on the other. This translation is rough, however, and, in seeking a single English term for jng that captures common Chinese understanding as well as its philosophical Buddhist developments, translators compromise, to a large extent, the flavor and depth available within both these sources of meaning. Chinese etymology of the term jng describes it as a character whose meaning can be understood from its graphical elements (), with the right-hand element jng (end, conclusion, unexpectedly)representing the sound and the left-hand elementt (soil, ground, territory, domain)indicating the meaning. The influence these two sources 92 have upon the meaning of jng is obvious from the diverse meanings attributed to the character in Chinese dictionaries: boundary, place, condition and circumstances. In this way, the (ordinary) Chinese understanding of jng links together location (and the boundaries that define a place or location) with situationthough common usages of jng may not imply both these understandings, the character-concept itself stretches to include and imply both of them. 93 Buddhist philosophy draws on this ordinary Chinese meaning of jng and develops it in a related, but different direction. This development is most evident in philosophy the Yogacara or Faxiang 94 (J: Hoss) School of Buddhism, which reached its height China during the early part of the Tang Dynasty. Within the school of Faxiang Buddhism, the paradigm for technical and philosophical employment of jng
Some sources claim that, more than being just a phonetic component, jng was originally written jng , indicating a possible relation in meaning between the two. 93 I am indebted to Hansens learned exposition of the concept qng as a model for exploring (and making philosophical sense of) complex concepts like jng (Hansen 2006). 94 Also sometimes known as the Yuishiki or Vijanavada school. Some scholars even employ (more) literal English translations of the name of the school, such as Mind-Only School.
92

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Carroll, Michael Scott seems to have been established by the translations (from Sanskrit) made by the famous monk/translator Xunzng (596-664). Under Xunzngs careful (but highly creative) brushstrokes jng becomes a translation for the Sanskrit term visaya (var: viSaya, vishhaya), which (like the Chinese) implies location (kingdom, territory, abode) but also means sense object and the reach of the senses (of the ears, eyes, mind, etc.). It is along these lines of object and sensation (sensory input) that Faxiang philosophically develops the meaning of jng. From this technical-philosophical employment by the Faxiang school 95 , the character-concept jng richly exploded in the context of Buddhist philosophyin modern Chinese Buddhism at least five major interpretations of the term may be enumerated 96 : (1) Object, phenomena, things, affairswhat is apprehended by the mind and five sense-organs (the six organs, corresponding to the six jng that defile the mind). (2) Objects of cognition/value judgments (synonymous with suq ). (3) Mental state or condition; sphere, viewpoint. (4) World, realm. Objective realm. (5) Boundary, limit, frontier, environment, conditions, circumstances. Though, with five definitions, this philosophical exegesis of jng may seem overly exhaustive it is necessary to pull out the rich texture and meaning of the concept philosophically employed by the Linji Lu to the fullest extent possible. This is obvious in

For a good overview of how Faxiang employs jng for its philosophical purposes, see Takakusu 1947 (p 89-90). 96 A great debt of gratitude is owed to the Venerable Dr. Jing Yin of the Buddhist Studies Centre at the University of Hong Kong for his correspondence with me on jng . The eight interpretations (from which I shorten and refine the list to five) are derived from that correspondence.

95

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Carroll, Michael Scott a key passage from the text [497a22-29] commonly known as the Four Distinguishments :
At an evening lecture 97 the Master instructed the group, saying: There are times rnperson : people is seized but not jng , times jng is seized but not rnperson : people , times rnperson : people and jng are both seized, times neither rnperson : people nor jng are seized. Some monk asked: What is rnperson : people is seized but not jng ? The master said: The spring sun unfolds jn [silk] 98 across the earth / childrens hair hang down, white as silken strands. [The] monk asked: What is jng is seized but not rnperson : people ? The master said: A kings decrees reach all corners ( ) / generals outside the border go without the smoke and dust () [of battle] 99 . [The] monk asked: What is rnperson : people and jng are both seized? The master said: No word(s) () from Bng or Fn 100 / chplaces : handlings (of affairs) are isolated in one spot. [The] monk asked: What is neither rnperson : people nor jng are seized? The master said: The king ascends the treasured throne () 101 / commoners burst into song.

If Sasaki is correct, this emphasis on the lecture being in the evening, unique to the text, is meant to imply that the gathering for this lecture was less formal. (Sasaki 1975, 70 note 43) This might also indicate that the audience was composed only of the ablest of students. Though it is hard to verify Sasakis supposition here, the idea of this lecture being an exclusive, private talk is an interesting one, and not without merits. 98 Jn is a kind of expensive, valued silk embroidered with multi-colored flower patterns. 99 The images of smoke () and dust () convey (as most interpreters are quick to pick up) the impression of fighting and battle. Both terms however are also important Buddhist concepts, ones that educated Buddhist students are not likely to have missed. These are the sensory inputs that mislead (by leading one to believe that they have shreality : stuff like smoke) or defile the mind (the Buddhist dusts). 100 Bng and Fn semi-autonomous, outlying provinces in the empire (controlled by military governors much like Attendant Wng ). They roughly occupy, respectively, what are now the provinces of Shanxi and Henan . 101 Din has a double meaning: it refers both to a kind of palace () and to the alcove in which a statue of the Buddha is placed. Accordingly, the first part of this passage can be read both as The king [ruler] ascends the treasure throne. and The king [Buddha] is placed in his jeweled alcove.

97

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Carroll, Michael Scott This passage of the Linji Lu, like many other important sections of the text, can be read in two ways: as a) a practical investigation of rnperson metaphysical examination of these concepts. In its practical reading, Lnj is talking about the larger shmatters : social affairs of the time and describes their causes in terms of rnperson : people and jng . Everything, Lnj is seeking to show us, can be understood through the relationship of these two concepts. When the concept jng is all that is focused on (and rnperson : people disappears) then everything appears to be entirely uniform and peaceful, even if, Lnj seems to be hinting, this is far from the case. 102 When rnperson : people receives sole focus, however, law and order prevail even as the practical context within which those matters are to be understood, (the smoke and dustsee footnote 64) is overlooked. When neither of the two concepts is considered, nothing changes or gets accomplishedthe outlying warlords dont talk with the king, chplaces : handlings (of affairs) get isolated and shoved aside. When both rnperson
: people : people

and jng or b) a

and jng are considered at once, however, the entire

kingdom comes together: the king takes his throne and common people contentedly sing songs. The metaphysical (or meta-practical) side of this passage is more complex. Looking at the passage as a set of metaphysical/theoretical statements, it not only argues against the comprehensibility of a theory or metaphysic that doesnt take into account both rnperson
: people

and jng but also describes (in the first three explanations) what

erroneous views of the world emerge when the two are not understood as existing
102

This is a best guess as the practical references in this line are, as far as I can tell, mostly lost. One thing worth noticing, though, is the natural language of Daoism. Could this also be another critique of what Lnj interprets as Daoisms focus environment or person at the expense of understanding how the two relate to one another? Another thing worth noting is the unnatural imagery of a white-haired child rnperson : people with the markings of old age even as it is in its youthful prime.

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Carroll, Michael Scott together. With jng but no rnperson : people there is no change (as the references to jn and silk strands () which are both used to make yclothes : robes is meant to make us realize) nothing is comprehensible because everything (the entire earth down from the spring sun) all looks exactly the same. 103 (This first view seems, once again, to be knock on both (Lnjs view of) Daoism as well as against any system that puts heaven/nature () at its center and eliminates consideration of rnpeople.) Conversely, with rnperson : people but no jng, rnperson : people has complete control of itself but only at the expense of completely being cut off from the external world around it. The generals on the frontier are at peace but, at the same time, the barbarian hordes (always a pressing threat in Chinese history) are amassing and organizing, unknown and unseen. This is a non-sustainable state. This second situation is a criticism of Faxiang Buddhism (smoke () and dust () as well as jng are terms with heavy Faxiang influences), which states that mind alone exists and that all else is nothing but a creations of mind. Lnj implies here that, while Faxiang is strong for its ability to comprehend all the aspects and areas of the human mind, it is mistaken in allowing rnperson
: people

to hold a privileged and exclusive position over jnga person who

deludedly denies jng cannot endure for long. The third metaphysical construction, where rnperson : people and jng are both seized, seems directed at the Madhyamika or Sanlun (J: Sanron) school, which expounds the doctrine of the emptiness of all things. Sanlun thought, especially as it

103

This is an argument on how the objective world (jng ) looksor, rather, doesnt look, as it cannot be made sense ofwithout a perceiver. A Western parallel might be come from Kantian metaphysics: jng without rnperson : people paralleling with the inconceivability of the objective world without the (a priori) intuitions of space and time.

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Carroll, Michael Scott exposes the emptiness ( ) of words, is very influential upon Lnjs lectures and philosophy. What he seems to be denying here, however, is the situation of not taking both rnperson
: people

and jngthe situation where the two are rejected and removed

because they are empty. The result that Lnj pictures is a world where everything is isolated and disconnected, where no word(s) come from the (often rebellious) outlying provinces and chplaces : handlings (of affairs) are left alone and not taken care of. This state, we shall see shortly, Lnj rejects because it is one that make actualization impossible even though Lnj accepts the Sanlun analysis that all words (including rnperson : people and jng) are empty he does not simultaneously conclude that neither rnperson : people nor jng existdenying as much, he shows here, is erroneous because, without both rnperson : people and jng no understanding and actualization can take place. Nothing is chhandled under this metaphysical construction, a problem for Lnj because, as we might remember from the discussion of wshunaffected presence the key is not to try to prevent the creation of karma by removing oneself (this doesnt work, but only creates more karma but leaving shmatters :
social affairs affairs

unhandled) but to act (handle) in a way that doesnt create karma/shmatters : social

(and, even brings others to wshunaffected presence as well). The last constructionthe view that Lnj is claiming is the only correct and

sensible onehas both rnperson : people (the commoners) and jng (the palace/alcove). With both these concepts present together everything is peaceful and ordinarythe Buddha is placed where he belongs and common people sing contentedly. Compared with the other three, this world is the only one that is reasonable and sensible. These initially cryptic metaphysical constructions are, as I have shown above, all criticisms of the different philosophical system of metaphysics which underpin Lnjs

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Carroll, Michael Scott own philosophical system. Daoism (in so far as institutional Daoism during the Tang was couched in nature/heaven ( ) worship), from which Lnj draws his action ideal of wshunaffected presence, gets attacked first. Faxiang, whose advanced discussion of sensation the Linji Lu draws upon and credits with its particular use of terms such as jng and xnheart : mind , is criticized second. Thirdly, and closest home to the philosophy of the Linji Lu, is the Sanlun metaphysics of language and emptinessa philosophy that Lnj often espouses and accepts in his lectures so far as it applies to language (language is empty (), words and phrases are not shreality : stuff ) but ultimately rejects so far as it similarly implies that rnperson : people and jng are empty and lack inherent existence. 104 Lnjs refutations of the metaphysical systems that influence his thinking are, in all honesty, rather sparse and incomplete. What is most interesting about this passage, however, is not the content of his refutations but rather the way he ultimately undoes metaphysics by collapsing it with practice and practical concerns. Metaphysical views, Lnj asserts, are what emerge from an erroneous removal of one (or both) of the key concepts of rnperson : people and jng from a picture of the world. No metaphysical system can make sense when isolated from (or negating) the realities of person and place and, as such, there is, ultimately, no need of metaphysicseverything can (and should) be understood in terms of rnperson : people and jng so why talk about something beyond (meta) them? The practical reading of the passage, which addresses the larger shmatters : social affairs of the day, emphasizes this point. Metaphysical discussion and discussion of larger shmatters : social affairs are discussed together, as one, and refuted
Unfortunately, there it is not within the scope of this thesis (which seeks to just explicate the key concepts of the Linji Lu) to go into a detailed account of these three metaphysical schemes and how Lnjs lectures and philosophy draws upon them. Hopefully, such an exposition will not be neglected by future works on the text.
104

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Carroll, Michael Scott not their own grounds but only on the grounds of rnperson : people and jngwhich Lnj presents as giving a comprehensive and cutting insight into the issues. For Lnj everything that is comprehensible and changeable is such only through the relationship between rnperson : people and jngwithout these two concepts at its core no philosophical system or metaphysic can hold water. This is the heart of Lnjs (non)metaphysics of person and place. Wshunaffected
presence

is more than just the action ideal for Lnj, it is the ultimate goal all of Lnjs

philosophizing: it is both the realization that there is no metaphysics 105 that nothing is important beyond rnperson
: people

and jngand also the actualization of this

understandingonce this point is understood then (with the ghosts of language and metaphysics exorcised and no longer a concern) the understanding must be actualizedit must become a part of the action of rnperson : people. Understanding and actualization come together as part and parcelthe student that truly understands is, at the same time, already wshunaffectedly present. Returning to Lnjs criticism of the wwiwithout position zhnrntrue person in the last section momentarily, we may see here why Lnj is opposed to the idea of rnperson : people that is wwiwithout position and why the concept of rnperson : people is always discussed against the context of another concept. When position is taken awaywhen environment, stimulus, conditions, situation, etc. are theoretically removed and rnperson
: people

is left alone (or, even, taken away too)then the possibility of

actualization disappears as well. Without rnperson : people and jng there is no way to discuss shmatters : social affairsall that may be discussed or reverted to are empty words.
105

Here, again, seems to be a point on which Lnj draws from the philosophy of the Sanlun school which, famously, asserts that samsara and nirvana are, in truth, one and the same.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Significantly, understanding cannot be reached because its necessary accompaniment actualizationcannot take place. This explains the careful choice of so many key concept-characters in the text that (like chplaces
: handling (affairs)

) have place

implications as well as the strong emphasis on setting and action (from the standpoint of the student): the Linji Lu wants to always keep person and place in front of readers so that they wont be tempted to do metaphysics with the text but, rather, will be more able to break free and actualize their understanding. With the (non)metaphysical structure of the Linji Lu in place, however, one glaring question remains: how, with words declared empty and metaphysics collapsed into practical concerns, is a student to draw out rnperson : people? What, in other words, does the text proscribe to make a student actualize wshunaffected presence ? The answers to these questions lie with the last major character-concept pair that I will discuss within the Linji Luthe interplay between zhhost : master and bnguest .

A Confident Host: Actualization, Understanding, and Zh

The recurrence of place and person terminology in the Linji Lu is connected with another critical thematic and conceptual thread in the text: travel. The language of travel, as noted earlier, is pervasive throughout the entirety of the Linji Lunot only do Lnjs lectures employ a great deal of travel terminology (dopath : way , renter , lroad , etc.) but many stories from the text begin, develop, or end with either Lnj traveling to pay somebody a visit or another monk traveling to call on Lnj.

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Carroll, Michael Scott As now seems to be a commonplace with themes from the text, the language of travel is significant on two levelsthe practical and the metaphysical. Practically, travel is important to the text because (as discussed on pages 110 - 112) it a fundamental feature in the lives of Lnjs students (and, therefore, a fundamental feature of the standpoint/context of the work). After chjileaving home , students in Lnjs time experience a life of unceasing travel: not only are they expected to leave the monastery to accompany their master on trips or to run errands but, as we see in the text both in Hungbs instructions to Lnj and Lnjs instructions to a non-comprehending student ([504a8-9]), students are encouraged (especially when they encounter learning difficulties they cannot surpass) to travel and study with different masters at different monasteries until they have understood/actualized fmethod : Dharma : reality . On a metaphysical reading, however, the language of travel takes on another level of importanceit represents the fundamental relationship between rnperson : people and jng . Since jng always change and re-present themselves in new forms, rnperson : people is pictured as traveling through jng . Life, for all rnpeople, is envisioned as moving through an endless succession of objective environmentsrnperson
: people

having to

navigate (as best he or she can) the new jng that s/he constantly encounters. There is another aspect to the metaphysical reading of the language of travel, howeverone directed more closely at metaphysics (in the sense of language) as it relates to students. For, while all rnperson : people are traveling in the sense that they are constantly navigating new jng , not all rnperson : people have chjileft home. Chjileaving
home

, in the metaphysical sense, comes when one begins to bindistinguish when one

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Carroll, Michael Scott sees that not all fmethod

: Dharma : reality

for navigating jng are the same and,

understanding this, begins to bindistinguish those that navigate it better from those that navigate it poorly (or, even, bindistinguish that what one wants is to stop producing karma and enter nirvana). In this way, Lnj has the following to say about chjileaving home:
In recent times, students generally dont know fmethod : Dharma : realitylike sheep with probing noses, any thing ( ) they hit up against they place in their mouths. 106 Servants arent bindistinguished from [their] masters, bnguest is not discriminated from the zhhost : master . If they continue like thisevil xnhearts : minds entering dopath(s) : way(s) , rushing into any crowded (popular) chplaces : handlings (affairs) they wont get the name true chjileft home rnperson ( ): they are only householders (). Those who chjileave home have bindistinguished with the usual true and correct insights: bindistinguished buddha [and] demon, bindistinguished true (), bindistinguished fake 107 (), bindistinguished common (fn ), bindistinguished sage (shng ) . 108 If theyve distinguished these, they may be called [those who have] truly chjileft home but if buddha [and] demon are not bindistinguished , this is just leaving one home to enter another. [498a21-26]

The difference between a student who has chjileft home and an ordinary person who is still very much a householder () is that the student has made a number of (loose) bindistinctions between different doways : guidance . The student knows which doways : guidance is generally desirable (Buddha) and which is to be avoided (demon). These are bindistinctions made by labeling doways : guidance in a true () rather than a false or artificial () manner (which is, interestingly, another bindistinction the student
106

This line, besides being an insulting comparison for sheep, is also a criticism of how students use words and mimic others (including how they mimic and (mis)use the concepts that Lnj discusses in his lectures) and dont bindistinguish between what words they use. 107 Or artifice. 108 Common fn and sage[ly] shng are terms that are typically paired (as a contrast). Shng can also be translated as holy or sacred.

147

Carroll, Michael Scott must be able to make)by attaching descriptive labels to the doways : guidance on which they generally belong. These lingual bindistinctions are the necessary first step a student must achieve if s/he wants to actualize wshunaffected presence. Oddly, given Lnjs description of all words and names as empty ( ) the second step is not, as we might have expected, to undo these bindistinctions but to make another one: to bindistinguish servants from masters or bnguest from zhhost : master . This additional bindistinction, it is easy to pick up on, is also a distinction of student from teacher: a distinction between those who have made the first step and wish to understand the fmethod : Dharma : reality that will help them in their navigation of jng and those who have actualized that fmethod pedagogical roots of the zhhost
: master : Dharma : reality

. Before digging further into the

/bnguest distinction, however, a brief look at the

(unlikely 109 ) philosophical roots of the character-concept pairConfucianismis helpful. Zhhost : master and bnguest are concepts pervasive through all (classical) Confucian texts, but seem most developed in the Mencius () where zhhost : master proves to be an especially malleable concept, working not only as a noun (host or master) but also standing as a verb (put in charge, make most important and, sometimes, advocate). Mencius, as we might expect from a Confucian text, develops both character-concepts

Of the schools of Chinese philosophy which Chan/Zen is said to have drawn upon, Confucianism rarely, if ever makes the list. In the particular context of the Linji Lu, however, this is strange not only because zhhost : master and bnguest (as shown below) are so obviously Confucian but because the central concept of the textrnperson : people seems to be Confucian-inspired as well. Rnperson : people, we should notice, is homophonic with rn , a central concept in all classical Confucian literature (commonly translated as benevolence). Though a relationship between the two seems very likely, we should remember, however, that, as with everything else, Lnj is careful to distinguish where he breaks away from the philosophies and concepts that he draws upon. Just as, then, Lnjs rnperson : people seems to have Confucian roots notice that, unlike rn , which combines a rnperson : people with an rtwo (implying the relationship between two people), Lnjs rnperson : people stands alonernperson : people , and rnperson : people alone, is central to the Linji Lu.

109

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Carroll, Michael Scott deeply along the lines of ritual () and position ( or ): zhhost : master and bnguest are a relationship of titles that accords to particular situations, with the bnguest being a traveler who should be remembered and respected (Mencius 12.7 110 ) by the zhhost : master , who receives him, with deference, into his home. The bnguest , we should note here, is more important than the zhhost : master , as is shown in Mencius 9.8:
Wan Chang asked, According to some, when he was in Wei Confucius host [] was Yung Ch, and in Chi the royal attendant Chi Huan. Is this true? No, said Mencius. In Wei, Confucius host [] was Yen Chou-yu Mi Tzu said to Tzu-lu, If Confucius will let me play host [] to him, the office of Minister in Wei is his for the asking. Tzu-lu reported this to Confucius who said, There is the Decree. Confucius went forward in accordance with rites and withdrew in accordance with what was right, and in matters of success or failure said, There is the Decree. If, in spite of this, he accepted Yung Ch and the royal attendant Chi Huan as hosts [], then he would be ignoring both what is right and the Decree. When Confucius met with disfavour in Lu and Wei, there was the incident of Huan Ssu-ma of Song who was about to waylay and kill him, and he had to travel through Sung in disguise [ ]. At that time Confucius was in trouble, and he had as host Ssu-cheng Chen-tzu I have heard that one judges courtiers who are natives of the state by the people to whom they act as host [or deem (themselves) host: ], and those who have come to court from abroad by the hosts [] they choose. If Confucius had chosen Yung Ch and the royal attendant Chi Huan as hosts [], he would not have been Confucius. (Lau 2003, 213)

There are a number of items in this passage that should send up red flags for one familiar with the Linji Lu. We find, for instance, both the themes of killing (or trying to kill) legendary figures (see, [500b21-25], below), and putting on clothes (he had to

110

The format being used here is: (standard) chapter number and (.) section number from the Chinese text. This chapter is translated on pages 274-275 of the Lau translation (Lau, 2003).

149

Carroll, Michael Scott travel through Sung in disguise). Even more interesting, however, is the point that it makes about the legendary figure of Confucius . In his travels, Confucius is only able to survive because he took the proper people as zhhost
: master

he correctly

bindistinguished who he should deem zhhost : master (). This distinction, more than preventing Confucius murder, is important because it is a defining distinction: one important factor that made Confucius Confucius (i.e. made him a great person) was that he adeptly deemed zhhost : master. The connections with the Linji Lu here are easy to see. What makes an able student an able student is not his or her understanding/actualization (if they understood/actualized, after all, they wouldnt be a student) but his or her ability to pick the right teacher(s)to adeptly deem zhhost : master. Being able to do so, as a matter of fact, is not only the next step to a students actualization of fmethod : Dharma : reality but also the actualization of it. In a section of the Linji Lu popularly known as the Four Guests and Hosts ( 111 ), Lnj describes for us the ideal meeting of teacher and student:
[A] student (), [upon meeting the teacher] replies with a clean and pure jng as he comes before the teacher ( : one of great wisdom and knowledge). The teacher bindistinguishes that it is a jng , takes it and throws it in a pit. The student () says: A good teacher! [The teacher] responds: Whatdont [you] know good from evil? The student ( ) bows. This is zhhost : master sees zhhost : master . [501a10-13]

In this passage Lnj uses kguest instead of bnguest . It is hard to understand why he makes the switch suddenly as the two terms generally appear to be synonyms. To make a guess at the reason for the change in this particular context, however, kguest seems to imply more an outsider (who may be uninvited) while bnguest , a somewhat more formal term, might imply an honored and invited guest. This, however, is only a guess.

111

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Carroll, Michael Scott By recognizing the teacher (through his methods) as zhhost begins actualizing himself as zhhost : master as well. 112 An important deviation in the way the Linji Lu philosophically employs zhhost :
master : master

the student

from the way the Mencius develops it is that, in his lectures, Lnj inverts the
: master

traditional (Confucian) relationship between zhhost

and bnguest . In the

Mencius, bnguest is the more prominent concept: not only do we find Confucius playing (and defining himself in) the role of bnguest but we also find the concept given special prominence in the character-concept pair: when the two appear as a pair in the Mencius (chapters 10.3 and 14.24) bnguest always precedes zhhost : master (). Lnj inverts the Confucian pairing. He not only gives zhhost : master prominence by placing it before bnguest () but encourages students, who, after chjileaving home, live perpetually as bnguests as they constantly travel in their search of guidance, to make themselves zhhost : master. This inversion also rejects a relationship that puts passivity and servitude in a place of importance and emphasizes one that highlights action and selfactualization. Instead of letting other zhhosts : masters make him or her bnguest, the student should self-actualize and make himself or herself zhhost : master. Rather than define himself or herself as the bnguest of another, the student instead should become zhhost : master and define what are bnguests. If Confucius was Confucius because he deemed zhhost : master

This situation, zhhost : master sees zhhost : master is presented with a set of three other situations in that section: bnguest sees zhhost : master , zhhost : master sees bnguest , and bnguest sees bnguest .

112

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Carroll, Michael Scott ( ) then we might say that the wsh person is wshunaffectedly deems bnguest (by deeming himself/herself zhhost : master). 113 The astute reader might already sense that another collapse occurs here. With the language of travel we distinguished between the practical and metaphysical significance of that languagebetween the practical aspect of the student chjileaving home and traveling the world and the metaphysical aspect of the student not only encountering many different jng but also being able to bindistinguish in language between different fmethods : Dharmas : realities for navigating those jng . These two distinctions, however, are, like Lnjs (non)metaphysics of person and place inseparably collapsed into one anotherthe language of travel makes practice and metaphysics one and the same. 114 This collapse entails another: the collapse of understanding and actualization. To make himself or herself zhhost : master a student must both understand what this means and actualize it. Understanding and actualization are, like practice and metaphysics or rnperson : people and jng , inseparablethey emerge together and cannot be separated, they are, in a sense, the same thing. This collapse of understanding and self-actualization in making oneself zhhost :
master present

because s/he

is most easily discussed in the context of language. As noted earlier, the initial step
home

that must be taken to first become a student is to chjileave

113

to bindistinguish (by

This is what Lnjs himself does in the story of his great winsight ( ), where he finally understands Hungbs fmethod : Dharma : reality ([504b28-505a4]very briefly sketched on pages 111 112). At the beginning of the story, Lnj is bnguest to Hungb, asking Hungb questions about Buddhism and, each time, getting beaten in response. After an sudden realization under Dy, however, Lnj returns to Hungbs monastery and no longer acts the part of the submissive studentgoing so far as to even hit Hungb himself when Hungb asks him what Dy taught him. 114 This can be seen in the title of the last section of the text xnglwhich can be translated as record of practice and record of travels [on foot] as well as record of activity.

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Carroll, Michael Scott correct naming) between fmethod : Dharma : reality (or doways : guidance) that are desirable and those that are undesirable. Bindistinguishing in this way initiates a students studies but also creates a problem: it brings a student (as discussed earlier) to try to grasp or obtain those fmethod : Dharma : reality through the names they bearit leads students to believe that a shreality : stuff or wthing : object exists in (or, at least, lies behind) the name, which they then try to obtain. Such names, however, are not shreality : stuff or wthings : objects but are empty ()they do not move themselves but are, instead, moved (worn) by rnpeople. The student makes himself/herself zhhost : master by changing y /. Instead of being ydependent yclothes
: robes : compliant

on (or with) words and names, words and names become

for the student to wear. Like Lnj, the student makes himself/herself

zhhost : master and words and names bnguestsdependents to be commanded and employed as the zhhost : master sees fit. This is exactly why the language of the Linji Lu is so fluid and layered in meaningLnj (and the compiler(s) of the text) does not rely upon words and names to guide and make points but, rather, commands words and names (adeptly wears them) as tools for teaching. (This explains, too, the incredible difficulty one encounters when trying to translate the text and the aesthetically unpleasing necessity of providing Chinese pronunciations and multiple translations in this interpretation.) This is where understanding and actualizing collapse into one another with respect to language. One who truly understands the (empty) nature of words and names is also one who wears them with wshunaffected presence (i.e. in a way that instructs others and doesnt create karma). Without understanding of the nature of words and names one

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Carroll, Michael Scott cannot control them, without control over words and names one cannot understand them. Understanding and actualization are one and the same. 115 This point about understanding and actualizing zhhost
: master

with respect to

language is apparent in the passage where Lnj instructs students to kill:

Students (), if what you want to acquire is discriminating insight (or understanding: ) into fmethod : Dharma : reality, dont just accept the human thoughts and feelings aroused by what you see and hear ( ). Inside or outsideslaughter what you encounter. [If] you encounter Buddha(s)
116

kill Buddha(s), encounter patriarch(s)kill patriarch(s), encounter

arhat(s)kill arhat(s), encounter father [and] motherkill father [and] mother, encounter relative(s)kill relative(s): to begin taking up freedom, dont create wthing(s) : object(s) that restrict [you]. Students from all over come [to me], there is yet to come one who doesnt ydepend on :
comply with

wthings : objects . [500b21-25]

Once again we see why action (and actualization) must accompany understanding: students have reified the names and words theyve bindistinguished (made them into wthings : objects they ydependend on : comply with ) and, as such, can only free themselves of them by killing them. Understanding that they are empty and acting to destroy the shreality : stuff that one has given to names and words are the very same thing. Not everything can be killed, however, and a more difficult situation presents itself when students must make themselves zhhost
: master

with something that is not

inherently empty (and, indeed the very thing that they first set out to make themselves
One cannot, either, just understand that words are empty and refuse to speak. This is obvious in passages of the text where students, rather than answer a question from Lnj (when they seem to know they will get it wrong) choose to hhumph : shout , make some action or remain silent, instead (and are summarily hit by the Master) (see, for example, [506a10-13]). Expressing nothing (and seeking nothing), after all, can create shmatters : social affairs /karma just as surely as using words that one depends on. Avoiding language is no solution, a student must make himself/herself zhhost : master of words and names and employ them only to lead others to understand/actualize (while not creating shmatters : social affairs). 116 The scare quotes are added here to show that this passage can be read both as kill Buddha (the term) and as kill Buddha the living being.
115

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Carroll, Michael Scott zhhost

: master

of): jng . Jng , we will remember from the discussion of Lnjs

(non)metaphysical philosophy, cannot be removed (seized) and always confronts rnperson : people. To exacerbate the situation, jng are constantly changing and mutating, changes that rnperson : people naturally responds to and reflects back: Jng [can] assume 10,000 different kinds [and] rnperson
: people

[will] assume them too. Therefore in

response to wthings : objects [rna person : people] manifests imageslike the moon in the water. [499a16-18] Jng , from the appearance of things at least, cannot be worn. The problem with the close interaction between rnperson : people and jng is that rnperson
: people

, which cannot be extricated from the constant stimulus of change

presented by jng , gets thrown into a constant state of flux. It is this state of unending flux (a state of karma) that is precisely the reason that students join monastic life in the first placethey wish to end suffering by cutting off the seemingly unstoppable march of change (which Buddhists call the chain of cause and effect). This, Lnj concludes, is what leads students to try to grasp wthings : objects (or reify words into wthings : objects). Wthings : objects, unlike people, do not reflect (are not at the mercy of) the changes in their environmenteven as jng change wthings : objects appear to remain the same. 117

117

This claim may seem obviously false on the face of it, given that the translations for w are only things and objects. Things and objects, English speakers know, change all the timeas I blow my nose on the roll of tissue the roll shrinks (until is disappears) and the tissue becomes soiled and is disposed in the trash can. In the Buddhist way that Lnj employs the term w , however, w are not just things and objects but the essence of things and objectsi.e. what lies behind things and objects so that each one may always be (correctly) identified as a that thing or this object. To bring Western philosophical concepts in to aid us here we may equate w with Platonic Formsthe w of the Buddha is the Form of the Buddha. This better explains the epistemological argument that Lnj makes against the possibility of obtaining w behind names and words (see pages 120 121)Lnj, it turns out, would not be likely to agree with Plato.

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Carroll, Michael Scott As we remember from earlier in the interpretation, this is problematic. Lnj not only denies the existence of wthings : objects but, too, asserts that, even if they did exist, they could not be apprehended. Understanding and actualization only come together, as one, and, as such, rnperson : people cannot be guided by wthings : objects because rnperson : people can neither understand nor become them. Though the water may reflect the moon it would be a mistake to say that the (mass of) water doing the reflecting is the moon or that the water contains the moon. Having motivated the problem in this way, Lnj next hints at its solution:
Students(), if you want to acquire fmethod : Dharma : reality, you have to begin by being excellent men. The weak and quick to follow wont get ita cracked qvessel : ability is not fit to hold ghee. 118 If [you] want to be a great qvessel : ability , never accept the human thoughts and feelings aroused by what is seen and heard (). [Instead,] in every chplace : handling (of affairs) make [yourself] zhhost : master [then] every chplace : handling (of affairs) you occupy will be true. But if something comes, always remember not to accept it. When you have one doubt [the] demon enters your xnheart : mind . Even if a Bodhisattva has one doubt s/he accepts the demon of birth and death ( ). Put your thoughts to rest, dont qiseek
: entreat

outside [yourself]. When

wthings : objects come, illuminate them. If you have xnconfidence : trust in your functioning () at this very moment, then not even one shmatter : social affair will remain (). Your xnheart :
mind

in one moment of thought creates the three-fold world () immediately followed by

causes from a jng divided and deemed to be ( ) six dusts ( ) 119 . What you lack is responding by using chplace : handling (of affairs) right now. In a moment you can enter clean or defiled, enter the halls of Maitreya, enter the country of three eyes, freely travel every chplace :
handling (of affairs)

seeing everything as empty names. [499a18-27]

118

I follow mostly Watsons commentary and interpretation here: Ghee, the finest clarified butter, is used in Buddhist literature to symbolize the highest level of the teachings. (Watson 1993, 42 note 2) 119 In other words, the six senses (including mind).

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Carroll, Michael Scott The key concept in this long passage is xnconfidence : trust . Xnconfidence : trust deals with ever-changing jng by, simply, revealing rnperson : people as constant, unchanging fmethod : Dharma : reality. If, as Lnjs (non)metaphysics of person and place reveals, the only two things that actually exist are rnperson
: people

and jng then rnperson

: people

must

handle the ever-changing nature of jng not by grasping something constant (found outside rnperson : people) but by grasping rnperson : peopleby reaffirming (actualizing) his or her own self. This is where xnconfidence : trust comes in. In order to viably handle ever-changing jng rnperson : people must be impermeable to influence and externalities that might lead it astray (i.e. must be self-confident, must have absolute faith in the qvessel : ability of rnperson : people and never qiseek : entreat outside) and be strong enough to make itself zhhost
: master

in all situationsit must always zhhost

: master

rnperson

: people

and bnguest

everything else. Xnconfidence : trust brings rnperson : people to be capable of encountering all jng but to never need to reflect or try to reify jng when it does soit uses only rnperson : people to make rnperson : people into precisely what students have been seeking for so desperately in external names and jng an unchangeable, reliable constant. Lnj sums up what such a rnperson is like in [500a12-19]:
Students (), the true Buddha is without forms and images (), the true fmethod : Dharma : reality is without characteristics () If a man is like a true student () [he] never grasps at the Buddha, never grasps at the bodhisattvas or arhats, never grasps at the victories of the threefold world. Changing and responding ( ) without isolating or casting off ( ), not creating wthings : objects that restrict [him]. The earth could be turned upside downI wouldnt doubt [him]. Buddhas from ten directions appear in front [of him] and for one instant [his] mind

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would be joyful, the three realms of hell could open in the ground [before him] and for not one instant would [his] mind be alarmed. Why is [it] like this? [Because] I see that fmethod : Dharma : reality is empty characteristics. Changing yuhas : exists , not changing wis without : lacks : is nothing .

This passage is, perhaps, a descriptive summary of the fruits of all that Lnj has to teach. In the passage we find rnperson : peopleat once drawn out and xnconfident (not ydependent
: compliant

upon anything)navigating through jng confidently and

smoothly, changing and responding () but not isolating. This, we see, is wshunaffected
presence

. As beautiful as this passage is, it presents an extremely frustrating wall that

interpreters must run up against at the end. If changing yuhas : exists , not changing wis
without : lacks : is nothing

then which is the drawn out rnperson : people? Is s/he changing

adapting to every change of jng with every change of jng , as the phrase changing and responding implies ( )or is s/he unchangingwalking through jng with undisturbable confidence, as the part about the earth being turned upside down implies? Is, we need to know, rnperson : people wwithout : lacking : nothing or yuhaving : existing ? The answer to this question is one of the most essential, fundament underpinnings of the Linji Luone on which the entire work turns. If rnperson : people is wwithout : lacking :
nothing

, then it means not only that rnperson : people doesnt exist (and, we can deduce, that

jng dont exist either) but that nothing actually needs to be done to achieve wshunaffected presenceall that needs to be done is nothing. If rnperson : people is yuhaving :
existing

then the opposite is true: rnperson : people does exist and, as such a practical (step-by-

step) description of how to achieve wshunaffected presence can be givenall that is needed is for Lnj to lay out the rest of the steps. This answer is the necessary last key readers of

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Carroll, Michael Scott the Linji Lu need to unlocking the final step to understanding/actualizing wshunaffected
presence

. Frustratingly, this key is never given. The utter neglect that readers of the Linji Lu receive from the text on this crucial

point is not simply an oversight (or cruel joke) on the part of the compiler(s). The truth is that the answer readers seek is one that the text cannot givethe nature of rnperson : people cannot be expounded upon both a) because even if rnperson : people has xngnature , the names and words that would be employed to expound upon it are, themselves, empty () and, as such, unable to capture it and b) because rnperson : people cannot be understood from explanation alonernperson : people, like zhhost : master, must be both understood and actualized at the same timethe moment rnperson : people is understood is also the moment rnperson : people is drawn out (and wshunaffectedly present). The interpreter has, then, hit the unfortunate and frustrating (frustrating both for what it leaves unsaid and for the fact that it must leave it unsaid) wall at the end of Lnjs lectures. At this point, with a key answer missing and understanding of how to achieve Lnjs action ideal seemingly impossible, the interpreter feels that Lnj and the text (or, perhaps, his own interpretive limitations) have failed him. Interpretation, thankfully, does not end here, though. There is, in the text, a subtle but potent way around the impasse. This saving grace, however, is found not in Lnjs lecturesthe part of the text that this interpretation has heavily relied on up till nowbut, instead, in the anecdotes and stories at the beginning and end of the Linji Lu: the part of the text that seems to confound and defy interpretation. It is this defiance and unruliness, I will show in the conclusion to this treatise, that makes understanding and actualization of wshunaffected
presence

finally possible.

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Making the Whole Body Function : A Concluding Shove Into Rnperson : people

Perhaps because they love their objects of interpretation too much, interpreters often forego naming favorite passages. My own from the Linji Luthe one that I feel exerts the most vigor and independent lifeis the short anecdote in [496c23-497a1]:
[The Master] ascended the hall (). A monk asked: What is the great yidea : attitude of Buddha fmethod : Dharma : reality ? The Master raised his fly whisk. 120 The monk hshouted out . The Master struck him. Yet another monk asked: What is the great yidea : attitude of Buddha fmethod : Dharma : reality ? The Master raised his fly whisk again. The monk hshouted . The Master hshouted , too. The monk faltered (as he was about to say something). The Master struck him. The Master said: Everybody: for fmethod : Dharma : reality , dont shrink away from losing body or life (: fate). Twenty years I was at Hungbs chplace three times [I] asked about the great yidea : attitude of Buddha fmethod : Dharma : reality , three times he was nice enough to beat me with his stick. But it (the beatings) was all as though Id been patted on the back with a (fragrant) sprig of mugwort. I wish I could taste another dose of that stick. Which rnperson : people will give it to me? At that time a monk stood forward and said: Ill give it to you.

120

Used to swat flies but, in later times at least, also a symbol of authority.

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Carroll, Michael Scott

The Master picked up his stick and offered it to him. The monk moved to take it. The Master struck him.

Why did Lnj strike these students? Scenarios like thesewhich populate the very beginning and end of the Linji Luare an early source of inspiration for kan (C: gngn ) collections and, as such, often removed from the rest of the text to be discussed in isolation. Looking at them (as our interpretation does) comprehensively, as a part of the text as a whole, however, we find clues that can help us to penetrate these confusing, humorous and seemingly incomprehensible parts of the text. Towards the particular task of making sense of the above passage, for example, we might take the following bit from Lnjs lectures as a big interpretive clue:
Students () from all over come and, in this Mountain Monks place, I make them into three types according to their basic qvessel : ability . If the basic qvessel : ability is less than average, I seize jng but dont remove fmethod : Dharma : reality . If the basic qvessel : ability is above average, I seize both jng and fmethod : Dharma : reality . If the basic qvessel : ability is truly superb, I seize neither jng nor fmethod : Dharma : reality nor rnperson : people . But if one of insight beyond classification comes to this Mountain Monks place, I make my whole tbody : style : essence ynguse :
function

, and overstep the basic qvessel : ability . [501b3-8]

This description of Lnjs classification of studentsand the pedagogical style he employs with each classcan be used as a guide for interpreting the passage quoted above it. Even though it is difficult to ascertain which class each of the monks in the first passage fit into (whether the first monks basic qvessel : ability , for example, is less than average or above average) we can still get a basic picture of what is going on herewe can form a basic picture of what Lnj and the passage are aiming at.

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Carroll, Michael Scott The key to understanding these passages is the term qvessel : ability . Notice that q has two connotations: it refers, on the one hand, to some sort of vessel as well as, on the other hand, to ability. In this way, we see in [499a18-27] (see page 162) that qvessel :
ability

(as a concept-term) implies the dual components of understanding and

actualization: ones qvessel : ability not only holds understanding but, too, prevents the human thoughts and feelings aroused by what is seen and heard ( ) from penetrating and disturbing that understanding. Qvessel
: ability

is confidence and self-

actualization even as it is the ability to contain or hold fmethod : Dharma : reality . The beatings that Lnj administers to his students (as well as the ones he so fondly recalls having received from his own master) may be understood in this way: they are admonitions directed at students with weak qvessel : ability as well as, too, pedagogical methods designed to bring students to strengthen their own qvessel : ability. Qvessel : ability we discover in the lectures, is not something that Lnj can strengthen for his students, it is only something that they can strengthen (actualize) for themselves. This seems to explain, in part at least, how the anecdotal sections of the text connect with the lectures in the Linji Lu. In the lectures, Lnj lays out the basics of his approach: to bring students to draw out rnperson : people (and, with it wshunaffected presence) the only source which one may turn to for guidance in navigating the ever-changing jng s/he encounters every moment (that are, to put it another way, an inseparable part of existence). Drawing out rnperson : people, however, requires students not only to understand the true situation of rnperson
: people

but also to actualize itto have unwavering

confidence in the guidance of rnperson : people.

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Carroll, Michael Scott The question that arises herethe wall that was hit at the conclusion of the last sectionis that of what understanding qvessel
: ability

contains: what exactly is the

guidance that rnperson : people provides? Here Lnj becomes necessarily silent: lectures of instruction (their words being empty) are no longer the proper pedagogical vehicle for drawing out rnperson : peoplethe text here undertakes a different approach. The approach of the anecdotal sections of the textwhich are, for the most part, concentrated at the end of the Linji Luis, I will argue by way of conclusion here, to give students a shove past this intellectual (language-based) obstacle. Having been taken as far as Lnjs words of instruction can possibly take him or her, the anecdotes are intended to push readers beyond the intellectual wall theyve hit by providing a number of portraits of rnperson : people and wshunaffected presence. As we can see from the quote above, the point is to overstep the basic qvessel : ability and, like Lnj, make [our] whole tbody :
style : essence

ynguse : function . This is done, interestingly enough, with a number of

stories of rnperson : people interactingstories where the readers are directed to look at other rnpersons : people making [their] whole tbody : style : essence ynguse : function . Interestingly, some of the best anecdotes and stories in the Linji Lu that achieve this effect are ones where Lnj is portrayed in an unflattering light:
One day the Master [Lnj] and Phu went to a vegetarian banquet zhhosted by a lay family. The Master asked: One hair swallows the sea, one mustard seed holds Mount Sumeru.Is this to be wideemed wonderful ynguse : function of supernatural ability naturally proceeding from the tbody : style : essence ? Phu upturned the dinner table. The Master said: Too coarse! Phu said: What place do you think this istalking about coarse and fine?

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The next day the Master went again to a vegetarian banquet with Phu and asked: I wonder how todays food (supply) will compare to yesterdays? 121 Phu, like before (), upturned the dinner table. The Master said: [Hes] got it, but its too coarse! Phu said: Blind fool!When does the Buddha fmethod : Dharma : reality talk about coarse or fine? The Master stuck out his tongue. 122 [503b3-9]

In this anecdotethe penultimate quote I will present from the texta number of interesting events occur. At the outset, Lnj panders to his hosts with a quote from the Vimalkirti Sutra (a complement linking them to another noted lay patron of Buddhism) asking if the supernatural occurrences mentioned are to be attributed to ynguse : function or to tbody : style : essence . The distinction here between tbody : style : essence and ynguse :
function

is one that Lnj takes from the Huayan school of Buddhism. 123 Huayan, in a

nutshell, distinguishes between the tbody : style : essence and ynguse : function of physical objects, noting that tbody : style : essence and ynguse : function are inseparablethey fully interpenetrate every single thing and each other. We can guess here that, for all its emphasis on physicality (and presence), Lnj appreciates the tbody : style : essence/ynguse : function distinction. as one that seems to blur both the metaphysical and the practical. Here, then, Lnj is simply asking: If everything is rnperson : people and jng , are amazing occurrences to be understood as a ynguse : function of tbody : essence?

121

Lnj, asking if there will be enough food to eat today, is criticizing Phu for kicking over the table and spoiling all the food yesterday. There is an implication here that he is wondering if Phu will repeat his actions and kick over the table again. 122 Sasaki interprets this as a sign of fear or surprise (Sasaki 1975, 82 note 179). 123 The t /yng (essence/function) distinction is a conceptual pair traceable back to the writing of Neo-Daoist Wng B . It is also a distinction put to gainful philosophical employment in the Huayan school of Buddhism and, later, by Neo-Confucianism.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Phus response is instructive. When Lnj poses a philosophical difficulty Phu kicks over the dinner table, scolding Lnj for talking about coarse and fine. Phu here literally makes [his] whole tbody : style : essence ynguse : function : he criticizes Lnjs metaphysical question (which, it seems, was leading to another collapsing of the metaphysical and the practical) by actualizing the very subject Lnj is discussing. More is at work in this passage. Notice that Lnj and Phu are both bnguest to a lay zhhost : master in the story. Lnj is continuing as he might in a lecture hall quoting sutras and posing difficult (likely rhetorical) questionsand Phu criticizes this. Whereas Lnj may recommend making [yourself] zhhost : master in every chplace :
handling (of affairs)

, Phus question (What place do you think this istalking about coarse

and fine?) draws out the point that Lnj is still a guest in the home of a lay person (someone who hasnt chjileft home), not lecturing a group of students. Inversions like these are common in the stories and anecdotes of the Linji Lu. Though all these scenarios include and (usually) focus on Lnj, Lnj is not always portrayed in the best light, sometimes even, as in the passage above, appearing to have gotten it wrong. Phu scolds Lnj for being a poor guest, Hungb berates him for leaving in the middle of the summer session [505b27-506a6], even Attendant Wng chastises him for his focus on teaching his students to become Buddha(s) and make patriarchs by avoiding reading the sutras and meditation study [503c26-504a2]. The point of all this seems to be captured in Phus metaphorical upturning of the dinner table. As the reader studies and immerses himself or herself in the Linji Lu seeking to digest every word and make it his or her owns/he finds that the feast of the text upturns itself: that the food is not food at all but, rather, the first steps of a

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Carroll, Michael Scott lesson to teach one to feed himself. Thus Lnj beats monks who imitate his words or actions when they have not even actualized them themselves (such as in [503a29 503b2], [504a5-7] and [504b1-2]), makes himself guest to other zhhost : master (such as Attendant Wng) and, words lost, sticks out his tongue when Phu outdoes him with his own teaching and philosophy. This upturning of the feast of the Linji Lu is the texts last, most important pedagogical method. While they do not appear to undo Lnjs philosophizing in his lectures, these scenarios do have the important feature of taking that philosophizing out of the basic realm of theory and into the world of action. The reader/student cannot continue to understand Lnjs philosophizing in terms of words alone but must, rather, understand it in terms of actualizationactualization that, in many ways, appears to contradict the words of the philosophy even as it furthers the spirit of it. Lnjs philosophy, to put it differently, is removed from Lnj (hence why Lnj does not always appear in the best light and, in the end, remains silent) and put into the place where it is intended to be understoodthe world of rnperson : people and jng . This replacement of Lnjs philosophy, I suggest, is intended more for pedagogical reasons than merely demonstrative ones. When it is pushed out of the realm of mere instruction and repositioned in situations, actions, and utterances, the reader is forced to approach the Linji Lu from a new anglean angle that relies less on words and phrases and more on making [the] whole tbody : style : essence ynguse : function . The wall that is hit in trying to understand the lectures cannot be overcome with more (or less) words of philosophy but rather, by an overturning of all those words and phrasesby turning everything on its head by ridiculing it. The point is to show that the characters in

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Carroll, Michael Scott those sections who are overturning, ridiculing and brushing aside Lnjs philosophy not only understand fmethod : Dharma : reality but have actualized it, toothey are doing what they do to draw out (and destroy) the confidence students/readers have in the Linji Lu so that they may place it, instead, in themselves. Only when students have full and complete xnconfidence : trust in rnperson : people, after all, can they finally push past (and understand) the text and actualize wshunaffected presence. This last point about the Linji Lu provides, in a round-about (and incomplete) way, an answer to the wall that lingered at the end of the last section. Rnperson : people is neither yuhaving : existing nor wwithout : lacking : nothing . To say that rnperson : people is either yuhaving : existing or wwithout : lacking : nothing (or both/neither of these two) is to take rnperson :
people

as an abstraction or, as we have been doing, a mere character-concept, not as a

reality. Taking rnperson : people as an abstraction, moreover, is problematic not only because it makes actualization of rnperson : people (and, with it, wshunaffected presence) more difficult but because it is, itself, the very problem that the Linji Lu is trying to undo: Lnj works to draw rnperson : people out of the realm of abstraction, to actualize rnperson : people, not to obscure and bury rnperson : people further. The Linji Lu lectures and theorizes on rnperson : people only so far as is necessary to bring the reader to a point where s/he knows the importance of and is prepared to actualize rnperson : people (to draw it out) and then, upturning itself (and the student) pushes its reader to have xnconfidence : trust in that very rnperson : people and make the final step to actualize rnperson : people for himself/herself. In this way, this interpretation of the Linji Lu may conclude by interpreting the text as Lnj himself does:

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The Mountain Monk is without () one fmethod : Dharma : reality for rnperson : people all [I have] is cure for disease(s), an undoing of bonds. [500b28-29]

This brief interpretation has sought to provide a number of keys for re-opening the Linji Lu to modern reading and to academic study, East and West. It has, I believe, given adequate evidence to support and justify the assumptions laid out in the beginning: that ([IV]) the Linji Lu is a sophisticated text organized in a coherent way and ([V]) some (philosophical) continuity unifies the Linji Lu. These assumptions, however, are justified only so far as they carry with them a few footnotes and caveats. For, while the Linji Lu is a sophisticated, coherent text, it must be understood that it is so only so far as that sophistication and coherence follows a central philosophical stringonly so far as coherence and sophistication serves the central purpose of the text: to bring readers to both understand and actualize wshunaffected presence : an action ideal which allows a person (rn ) to be a part of (and involved in) an ever-changing and turbulent objective world (jng ) while both a) not taking part in the creation of shmatters : social affairs and b) helping others actualize wshunaffected presence as well. As a final thought, it is worth pointing out that one assumption we set out with concern to the textthe one that values and gives central importance to the text of Linji Luhas turned out, upon interpretation, to be a complex value. For, while the authors Linji Lu certainly must value the text as a means of achieving a certain goal (their authorial intent) that goal, interpretation reveals, is one that requires the readers not to overvalue the textit requires readers to understand that the empty words () of

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Carroll, Michael Scott the text lack inherent shreality : stuff : that the text will not lead them to capture some single stable theory or understanding (something like a w ). With this new interpretation of the Linji Lu (and the conclusions it draws about the text) I hope that further, in-depth, scholarship will be possible on both the text itself and the study of the Chan/Zen school of Buddhism in general.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Conclusion A Few Thoughts on Two Inescapable Labels

If it was the job of the introduction to present a general description and summation of this thesis, I take it as the duty of the conclusion to reckon with two descriptions that will inevitably be hoisted upon it: comparative and philosophical. By presenting a few short observations on these topics (and their conjunction: comparative philosophy) I hope to show not only what impact this thesis may potentially have upon such larger topics but, too, to exorcise a maligned ghost that has haunted this work from inception to completion: the ghost of prejudice that comes from unfriendly descriptions. Three events motivate this short discussion. The first, occurring before research for this thesis had even begun (and before I had even decided what I wanted to research), was discovering in my acceptance letter to the MPhil program at the University of Hong Kong that my area of specialization within philosophy for my study would be Comparative Philosophy. Though my interest was, undoubtedly, in Chinese thought, this label struck an odd note: still ringing in my ears at that time was Roger Ames description of comparative philosophy as a form of institutionalized racism. (Ames October 18, 2002) Ames comment on the term comparative philosophy is not an isolated thought. It is entirely common in contemporary publications by Westerners on non-Western subjects to begin with mention of the term comparativenearly always with the

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Carroll, Michael Scott purpose of distancing the work from that label. 124 Comparative philosophy, in fact, is such an unpopular term that many works and scholars have sought to create alternatives to it, alternatives that bear such interesting titles, but significantly different, titles as fusion philosophy, cross-cultural philosophy or studies in comparative thought. This increasingly common trend of disparaging or shedding (as much as possible) the label of comparative philosophy lends some justification to my (and, apparently, Ames) initial uneasiness with the two-term conjunction. What was once conceived as an exciting new field of study that should reinvigorate philosophy in general is, now, a misnomercomparative philosophy, to put it bluntly, has become an academic expletive. Few philosophers now want their work associated with that label and (on the often neglected, but eminently important economic level) few career possibilities are open to those whose work is primarily described as comparative. 125 The second event motivating this discussion, memorable for its occurrence at the very beginning of my research, was reading Bernard Faures plea for less philosophical (and more anthropological) work on the field of Chan (Faure, 2003). That plea/admonitionmore than just disappointing (as I was a student in a philosophy department whose personal and practical interests were in philosophical investigations of Zen/Chan)was surprising: Faures major works on the topic (Chan Insights and
Take for example, the introduction to the recent (2003) book Linguistic Strategies in Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism by Youru Wang. 125 I dont wish to extend this concluding discussion further than necessary by investigating the events and trends that led to the term comparative receiving so many negative connotations within the modern academic study of philosophy. For those who remain unconvinced, though, I will note, in passing, that one way we may judge how the academic discipline of philosophy judges comparative philosophy is economically. Of the graduate programs listed by the Philosophical Gourmet Report (www.philosophicalgourment.com) as being the top ten in the United States from 2004-2006, not one employs a full-time faculty member who lists comparative philosophy (or any form of non-Western philosophy) as an area of competence of specialization. Comparative philosophy it seems, is not unpopular, but not a wise area of specialization for an academic that wishes to be hired by (and do research in) the top academic institutions of philosophical study.
124

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Carroll, Michael Scott Oversights, The Rhetoric of Immediacy) are, by my estimation, some of the most philosophical contemporary scholarship on the subject of Chan/Zenwhy, then, should Faure wish to admonish against philosophical studies of the subject? The answer might be found in the equally surprising emergence of this same theme in the writing of another scholar whose work (though only discovered towards the conclusion of my research and writing) I also consider to be some of the best and most philosophical on the subject of Zen/ChanDale Wright. Wright, whose book on Hungb Xyn (Lnjs teacher in the Zen/Chan lineage and an important character in the Linji Lu) and John Blofeld (a noted interpreter and translator of Chan/Zen texts) is, notably, titled Philosophical Meditations on Zen Buddhism writes, rather unexpectedly, in the conclusion to that work that Zen Buddhism is not primarily a philosophical movement. (Wright 1998, 207) The surprise here is twofold. First, why should Wright, who describes his own book of meditations as philosophical, draws heavily on philosophers (such as, in particular, Paul Ricoeur, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Alistair MacIntyre) for guidance and inspiration, and even (in the conclusion quoted from above) presents an extended and convincing argument for how meditation in the Chan/Zen tradition is closely related to philosophy, make such a strange turn as to conclude that the subject of his meditations is not primarily a philosophical movement? The second surprise is that Wrightthough he doesnt come out and say so explicitlyimplies in that same conclusion that, though Zen Buddhism is not primarily a philosophical movement, it is primarily a religious one. The term

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Carroll, Michael Scott religious gets rather conspicuously paired with the term practice 126 in the conclusion and Wright subtly (but notably) translates the typical Chan/Zen character pair fn and shng as ordinary and spiritual (Wright 1998, 212) preferring a translation for shng that smacks of Christianity rather than the more usual translations of sage[ly], holy or sacred (see further footnote 4). Even without these cues, though, most readers would be quick to pick up on what Wright is implying Zen Buddhism primarily is when he denies it is a philosophical movementone of the oldest and most enduring questions about Buddhism (and Chan/Zen Buddhism, in particular) is, after all, Is Buddhism a religion or a philosophy? This all too (recently) common implication that Zen/Chan should be interpreted primarily as a religious movement and not as a philosophical one is particularly surprising from the pens of Wright and Faure because both of these scholars are especially careful in their work to point out and disarm the powerful influence that the European Enlightenment (and the Romantic reaction against it) has had on the way we interpret the Chan/Zen tradition. No feature of the Enlightenment, after all, seems to have been more central to its development than the separation of philosophy from religionwhile the work of the early modern philosophers (Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, etc.) all closely intertwine religious arguments, motivations and discussion with philosophical ones, Kant (who, following Wright, we may take as an exemplar of Enlightenment thought) is most notable for his utterly thorough removal of God and religion not only from metaphysics and epistemology but from ethics as well. If Faure

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In the Zen tradition, the purpose of saying that everything is religious practice is to bring daily life to awareness, to point out the patterns of daily activity to the one living them. (Wright 1998, 211) Emphasis added.

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Carroll, Michael Scott and Wright are critical of the effects Enlightenment thinking have had on the interpretation of Chan/Zen, we may then wonder, why do they both go out of their way to make a distinction about the school that, besides being unnecessary to their other arguments, lies at the core of Enlightenment thinking? 127 I do not intend to delve into either of the questions presented by these first two motivating events. My purpose of raising these queries, rather, is to show the unfortunate (and surprising ironic) position that this thesis was destined to occupy even before it was written: just as it will be little valued in the academic world of philosophy for its comparative approach, so too will it find itself generally unwanted in the field of Zen/Chan studies (even likely by those one would expect to be sympathetic to it). This work, I have been all too aware from the beginning of research to the end of writing, is one that very, very few people would care to see written. Though this bleak, overhanging sense of no-belonging has hung with this thesis throughout research and writing, a third event, occurring after the first two treatises were fully written and writing on the third was well underway, brought me to re-evaluate the unfriendly environment that this work will be born into. This last event was the

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It is notable here, too, that Wrights translation of shng as spiritual is odd not only unusual because it is uncommon but unusual because, while Wright is so acutely aware of altering influence Romanticism has had upon Blofelds interpretation of Buddhism, he does not seem to similarly recognize the effect it is exerting in this particular interpretation here. For, while Chinese folk theory and philosophy does have concepts of afterlife, rebirth, and heart/mind ( ), none of these concepts seems to either accommodate or approximate the Western concept of spirit/spiritual. This Western concept, rather, seems deeply rooted in Hegels philosophy of Geist (Spirit), which takes Spirit as (together) being God, history, philosophy, and individual peoplehence the general Western understanding of something spiritual as something both within (and personal to) an individual person and something beyond them (and individuals), something like Blofelds the Ultimate. If Kant may be taken as a central (philosophical) representative of the Enlightenment, then Hegel certainly seems to be the most influential philosophical spokesperson for the Romantic reaction to Enlightenment thoughtit is significant, then, that much Hegelian-influenced terminology crops up both in the works of Wright and Faure (and other Chan/Zen commentators).

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Carroll, Michael Scott presentation of the first treatise (on Chan and Zen) at the Crosscurrents philosophy conference at the University of Hawaii in March 2006. It was no small surprise (due, of course, to my then-enduring unease with the label comparative philosophy) to find, before the conference, that the panel my presentation of the first treatise had been grouped in was one titled The Nature of Comparative Philosophy. Even more surprising, however, was realizing that my understanding of comparative philosophy differed greatly from that of the other participants. There existed, I found, incredible discrepancies between my picture of the nature and purpose of comparative philosophy and the way it is described and discussed by others. Much current discussion on comparative philosophy tends to focus on conceptual schemes, or processes of (reflective) thinking. The comparative philosopher takes his or her own (nearly always Western) conceptual scheme and compares it (in some way) to another scheme (such as a Chinese one). The crux of discussion here revolves around three question types: 1) What is a conceptual scheme like? (or: Is there even such a thing as a conceptual scheme?) 2) How can we compare such schemes? (as well as: What is the best way to compare schemes? and: Is comparison of schemes even possible?) and 3) What does comparison of schemes reveal? Though not necessarily insurmountable, the difficulties posed by this approach to comparative philosophy are intimidating. To even talk about conceptual schemes an entire theory of mind (or language) needs to be built to support their possibility and give a picture of what they might be like. Additionally, this theory must explain what creates differences in conceptual schemes, how these schemes can change and interact (with the

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Carroll, Michael Scott outside world or other schemes), and (most importantly, perhaps) why we should want to compare schemes at all. On this way of understanding comparative philosophy, then, the project of comparative philosophy cannot even be understood until a huge theoretical background (one initially developed, paradoxically, with the purpose of making comparative philosophy possible) is put in place. 128 This way of understanding comparative philosophy seems to be motivated by emphasis on the word comparative. When stress is put on comparative, however, a simple question arises: Arent all academic projects comparative in some way? Even if a work does not compare one thought or school to another, then, at the least, a good reader should compare his or her thought to that presented in what is being read? In this way, isnt all philosophy (and reflective thought processes) comparative? Comparison, in one form or another, is inherent to philosophical thinking. Rather than focus on comparative, then, I propose an understanding of comparative philosophy that centers discourse on the word philosophy. In this way, we might envision comparative philosophy as the redefinition of both a word and the field that it namescomparative philosophy, rather than being seen as philosophy that is comparative may, instead, be understood as redefining philosophy by comparing the roles it may play in different contexts. This way of understanding comparative philosophy, I believe, is superior from the outset because it makes no move to disguise the Western standpoint from which the
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It is worth mentioning as an aside that this required background project explains (and, I think does much to legitimate) Ames comment. Conceptual schemes are, by far and large, a philosophical product unique to the modern Western philosophical tradition. To understand comparative philosophy, then, in terms of conceptual schemes is to give primacy to the tradition of Western philosophy over other traditions. The implication here seems to be that, though members of every philosophy tradition may do comparative philosophy, only the Western philosophical tradition is advanced enough to be able to explain what is being done.

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Carroll, Michael Scott project launches itself. The word philosophy (and its equivalents in other Western languages) is derived from the Greek root philosophiaor love of wisdom. This Greek root suggests, very appropriately, a historically European orientation for Western philosophyphilosophy, in the West, is traditionally defined by languages with roots in Greek (and Latinthe Romantic languages) and as such, is oriented almost exclusively towards (heavily) Greek-influenced cultures, cultures whose definition of philosophy stretches back to the same key texts of the Greek tradition. Exposure of the West to the highly developed (and radically different) cultures of India and East Asia, of course, invited some to re-evaluate the Greco-Roman definition of philosophy. These scholarsthe first comparative philosophersredefined

philosophy by using it as a label for works not rooted in the Greco-Roman tradition. The first acts of comparative philosophy, then, were (whether the acts were done with the specific project of redefining in mind or not) little more than the selection of certain non-Western authors and books to label as philosophy. The simple act of describing the Analects as philosophy or labeling the Buddha as a philosopher was (and is), in this sense, the creation of a new definition of philosophy that (by virtue of the fact that both definitions are given for the same word) must be compared and contrasted with the Western definition of philosophy. In this way, comparative philosophy is not a study of conceptual schemes but the specific practice of philosophy that handles the important task of critical self-reflectioncomparative philosophy, in other words, is the area of philosophy that provides the material and motivation for questioning the way that philosophy defines itself (or allows itself to be defined).

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Carroll, Michael Scott This different way of understanding comparative philosophy exposes an entirely new set of difficult questions: 1) Does philosophy have some definitive essence (something in the understanding of the wordhowever smallthat unifies it across time and culture) or is our definition of philosophy entirely arbitrary? 2) How much of comparative philosophy is, along these lines, a broadening of the definition of philosophy and how much of it is (to what might well become our horror) a distortion and limitation of non-Western works and authors with the purpose of making them fit into the (stringently narrow and rigid?) Western definition of philosophy? 3) What is the relationship between philosophy as a word and philosophy as a practice and how does this relationship bear upon comparative philosophy as a discipline? An answer to these difficult queries is certainly what the reader expects in this conclusionbut not what this conclusion will provide. The blank openness of these unanswered questions is, rather, the entire point of this concluding chapter. Instead of seeking to tie up these huge, over-arching loose ends (a job which would likely have required a fourth treatise) I hope that their provocative indeterminacy will extend into the thought of those readers that have journeyed this far through the pages of this work, inspiring (or confirming) a standpoint towards the thesis that is as self-critically aware of its own limitations as it is of the limitations engendered by this works particular approaches. In the end, then, I seek neither to distance myself from nor to outright reject the labels that (whether I wish it or not) will attach to this thesis. Quite to the contrary, I embrace descriptions of this work as comparative and philosophicalthis thesis wears them, so to speak, as different colored robes. So far as it wears those descriptions,

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Carroll, Michael Scott however, I hope that the reader will not be fooled into taking the descriptions for the thesis, or, even, the thesis for the descriptions. I hope, in short, that no words, names, or descriptions will deprive the reader of doing his or her own thinkingfor if, in the end, this work doesnt bring the reader to an original thought of his or her own then it truly deserves the negative reception it has long appeared destined to encounterthen it is really a work of that nobody wishes had been written.

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Carroll, Michael Scott Acknowledgments

Lists of acknowledgments have a way of growing quickly. This is particularly true with extended works like this one, where the influences, encouragements, and generosities that made fruition and completion possible reveal themselves fully only in retrospect, when everything has been digested and allowed to rest in the mind. Because of this, then, I make the unconventional choice of giving my acknowledgements at the end, rather than at the beginning. Doing so, I hope, will make appreciation of these outside contributions to this thesis all the deeper and more fulfilling. In terms of the influences that helped craft the treatises that make up the thesis (as well as the fibres that run through them) a great debt of gratitude goes to my advisor, Chad Hansen. Even more important than the intellectual gifts he has given me (such as an understanding of radical interpretation and classical Chinese grammar) I find that, over two years of weekly meetings, a number of the dispositions and attitudes that guided the flow and direction of these treatises are ones that, in one way or another, originated from his guiding influence during those discussions. Thanks, Chad, for a sense of Daoist philosophical deviousness. A wider acknowledgement of thanks is owed to the many lectures, classes, and private discussions that (in one way or another) were arranged by the Department of Philosophy at Hong Kong University. Every discussion engaged in there has, in one way or another, shaped the end result of this thesis and I wish to thank all the attendees, even if I cannot list them all by name. Particularly influential were Dr. Jiwei Cis lectures on Marxismlectures that, interestingly enough, were important in helping me formulate

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Carroll, Michael Scott Treatise One more solidly and concretely than it would have been otherwise. Thanks are also owed to the professors that kindly bought rounds of beers for attendees after departmental seminars: little seems to lubricate philosophical discussion as well as alcohol. Next, thanks are owed to the organizers of the CrossCurrents conference at the University of Hawaii and the conference participants. The conference not only gave me further opportunities for discussing and refining Treatise One, but also forged some valuable friendships and discussions that influenced the other two treatises (which were not yet fully formulated at that time). Some important sources of support need to be acknowledged as well. Hong Kong University and the Department of Philosophy provided not only research materials and academic guidance during my two year tenure of study but also generous financial support, including covering travel and lodging expenses so that I may present the first treatise at a conference in Hawaii. I am grateful to Vivian, Jovita, and Loletta in the Department of Philosophy for help with all the technical issues with my thesis and MPhil candidature at HKU, without them, the last two years wouldnt have been nearly as pleasant. On another level, Sally Garcia, Diane Carroll, Judy Wu and Mulan Gan all supported, encouraged, and generally sought to facilitate my writing and research at all stages. Ivy Wu kept me from watching too many independent films, always encouraged me to enjoy the writing I did and, on more than one occasion, unsuccessfully battled sleep to try to read a few pages of the work.

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Carroll, Michael Scott There are some special debts that should be acknowledged. Philippe Brunozzi and Xinyan Jiang read much of the thesis and provided invaluable commentary. Venerable Dr. Jing Yin of the HKU Centre for Buddhist Studies graciously provided very detailed answers to a few critical questions. The three examinersJiwei Ci, Joe Lau, and Dale Wrightvolunteered their time to examine the quality of this work are also owed a debt of gratitude: I hope this thesis provides, in one way or another, some compensation for their time. Special thanks are also due to Ka Ho Lamif not for his generous friendship this MPhil thesis simply would never have been submitted on time. Last, thanks are owed to all those who contributed to this work in some way, but who have gone unnamed here. Even if my memory is too deficient to properly acknowledge you here, I hope that, however small the contribution made, you will find the preceding work to have been worthy of it.

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