PEOPLE vs. WEBB G.R. No. 176389 G.R. No.

176864 December 14, 2010 APPELLEE: People of the Philippines APPELLANTS:Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Machael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong Abad, J.: CASE: On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela and Jennifer were brutally murdered in their home in Paraaque. In an intense investigation, a group of suspects were initially arrested by the police, but were eventually discharged due to suspicions of frame up. Later in 1995, The National Bureau of Investigation announced the resolution of the crime as they presented a star witness Jessica M. Alfaro who pointed at the accused (herein appellants) Webb et.al. as the main culprits. She also included police officer Gerardo Biong as an accessory to the crime. Relying on Alfaros testimony, information for rape with homicide was filed by the public prosecutors against appellants. Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City Branch 274 presided over by Judge Tolentino took over the case. With Alfaros detailed narration of the events of the crime, the court found her testimony credible, noting that her delivery are spontaneous and straightforward. On January 4, 2000, trial court rendered judgment finding accused (herein appellants) guilty as charged, imposing them the penalty of reclusion perpetua while Biong, as an accessory to the crime, was given an indeterminate prison term of eleven years, four months and one day to twelve years. Damages were also awarded to Lauro Vizconde. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision, with a modification on Biongs penalty to six years minimum and twelve years maximum, plus increased awards of damages to Lauro Vizconde. A motion for reconsideration on the same court was also denied, hence the present appeal on the Supreme Court. On April 20, 2010, the Court granted the request of Webb to submit the semen specimen taken from Carmelas cadaver on DNA analysis, believing it is under the safekeeping of the NBI. The NBI, however, denied that the specimen is under their custody and that it was turned over to the trial court. The trial court on the other hand, denied the claim that the specimen was under their care. This prompted Webb to file an urgent motion to acquit denying Webb of his right to due process. ISSUE/HELD: 1.) Whether or not Webb was indeed denied of due process on the premise that the semen specimen was lost under the care of the government and must immediately be acquitted? NO. 2.) WON Alfaros testimony is entitled to belief? NO. 3.) WON Webbs evidences are proven sufficient enough to rebut Alfaros testimony? NO. 4.) WON Biong acted to cover up the crime after its commission, thus making himself an accessory to the crime? NO.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SET ASIDE the Decision dated December 15, 2005 and Resolution dated January 26, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. 0336 and Acquits accused-appellants Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A. Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada and Gerardo Biong of the crimes of which they were charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guild beyond reasonable doubt. They are ordered immediately RELEASEDfrom detention unless they are confined for another lawful cause. 1.) Webb cited Brady v. Maryland, and claimed that he is entitled to outright acquittal on the ground of violation of his right to due process given the States failure to produce on order of the Court either by negligence or willfull suppression the semen specimen taken from Carmela. Webb is not entitled to acquittal for failure to produce the semen specimen at such stage. Brady v. Maryland was overtaken by the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. Youngblood which held that due process does not require the State to preserve the semen specimen although it might be useful to the accused unless the latter is able to show bad faith on the part of the prosecution or the police. Further, during the previous appeals made on CA, the appellants expressed lack of interest in having a DNA test done, and so the State cannot be deemed put on reasonable notice that it may be required to be produced some future time. 2.) Alfaros testimony, was found doubtful. Testified by Atty. Sacaguing, he claimed that Alfaro was an asset of the NBI since 1994. When the officers one day teased her about being dormant, she became piqued and suddenly claimed that she know someone who knows about the massacre. But when the said someone was not presented, she told Sacaguing that she might as well assume the role of her informant. Alfraro never refuted such testimony. It is possible for Alfaro to lie even with such intricate details, given that she practically lived in the NBI office. Moreover, the media is all over the case that everything is thoroughly reported. Generally, her story lacks sense or suffers from inherent inconsistencies. 3.) Among the accused, it was Webb who presented the strongest alibi. His travel preparations were confirmed by Rajah Tours and the Philippine immigration, confirming that he indeed left for San Francisco, California with his Aunt Gloria on March 9, 1991 on board United Airlines Flight 808. His passport was stamped and his name was listed on the United Airlines Flights Passenger Manifest. Upon reaching US, the US Immigration recorded his entry to the country. Moreover, details of his stay there, including his logs and paychecks when he worked, documents when he purchased a car and his license are presented as additional evidence, and he left for Philippines on October 26, 1992. Supreme Court accused the trial and court of appeals as having a mind that is made cynical by the rule drilled into his head that a defense of alibi is a hangmans noose in the faces of a witness sweaking I saw him do it. A judge, according to the SC, must keep an open mind, and must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion arising from a desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case. For positive identification to be credible, two criteria must be met; 1.) the positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness 2.) the witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived. For alibi to be credible and established on the other hand, it must be positive, clear, and documented. It must show that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime. Webb was able to establish his alibis credibility with his documents. It is impossible for Webb, despite his so called power and connections to fix a foreign airlines passenger manifest. Webbs departure and arrival were authenticated by the Office of the US Attorney General and the State Department. PEOPLE V. WEBB 17 Aug. 1999 Deposition Facts: A was accused of rape with homicide. During the course of the proceedings in the trial court, A filed a Motion to Take Testimony by Oral Deposition praying that he be allowed to take the testimonies of certain persons in the United States. The trial court denied the motion.

Issue: Whether As motion should have been granted Held: No. A deposition, in keeping with its nature as a mode of discovery, should be taken before and not during trial. In fact, rules on criminal practiceparticularly on the defense of alibi, which is As main defense in the criminal proceedings against himstates that when a person intends to rely on such defense, that person must move for the taking of the deposition of his witnesses within the time provided for filing a pre-trial motion. RADIOWEALTH FINANCE V. DEL ROSARIO (REMEDIAL) When a DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE granted by a trial court is reversed on appeal, the reviewing court cannot remand the case for further proceedings. Rather, it should render judgment on the basis of the evidence proffered by the plaintiff. Inasmuch as defendants in the present case admitted the due execution of the Promissory Note both in their answer and during the pretrial, the appellate court should have rendered judgment on the bases of that Note and on the other pieces of evidence adduced during the trial. In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on respondent's demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants. Applying Rule 33, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the CA should have rendered judgment on the basis of the evidence submitted by petitioner and not remand it. A remand is not only frowned upon by the Rules, it is also logically unnecessary on the basis of the facts on record.

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE COMPANY vs. DEL ROSARIO 335 SCRA 288 FACTS: Spouses Vicente & Maria Del Rosario jointly & severally executed, signed and delivered in favor of Radiowealth Finance Company a promissory note for P138,948. Thereafter, respondents defaulted on the monthly installments. Despite repeated demands, they failed to pay their obligation. Petitioner filed a complaint for the collection of sum of money before the RTC. Trial court dismissed the complaint for the evidence presented were merely hearsay. CA reversed & remanded the case for further proceedings. Petitioner claims that respondents are liable for the whole amount of their debt and the interest thereon, after they defaulted on the monthly installments. Respondents counter that the installments were not yet due and demandable. They theorize that the action for immediate enforcement of their obligation is premature because its fulfillment is dependent on the sole will of the debtor. Hence, they consider that the proper court should first fix a period for payment, pursuant to Articles 1180 and 1197 of the Civil Code. Issue: W/N the CA patently erred in ordering the remand of this case to the trial court instead of rendering judgment on the basis of petitioners evidence? Held: Yes. While the CA correctly reversed the trial court, it erred in remanding the case "for further proceedings."Consequences of a Reversal, on Appeal, of a Demurrer to Evidence The old Rule 35 of the Rules of Court was reworded under Rule 33 of the 1997 Rules, but the consequence on appeal of a demurrer to evidence was not changed. Defendants who present a demurrer to the plaintiffs evidence retain the right to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to

present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations. In the case at bar, the trial court, acting on defendants' demurrer to evidence, dismissed the Complaint on the ground that plaintiff had adduced mere hearsay evidence. However, on appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the disputed pieces of evidence had in fact been admitted by defendants. HUN HYUNG PARK v EUNG WON CHOI CARPIO-MORALES; February 12, 2007 FACTS - Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty.- After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied. - Park appealed the civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should not include its civil aspect. The RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove Chois criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted Parks appeal and ordered Choi to pay himP1,875,000 with legal interest.- Upon Chois motion for reconsideration, however ,the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Parks motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which dismissed his petition. ISSUE: WON the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case in view of his demurrer HELD YES Reasoning - In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.- On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.- In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand.- Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue.- Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the

suit.- As for petitioners attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the records the nature of Chois alleged oral objections to Parks motion for reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon; hence, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against it. Dispositive Petition is DENIED.

MARIO J. MENDEZONA ,et al,petitioners, versus JULIO H. OZAMIZ,et al, respondents February 6, 2002 Facts: A suit was instituted on September 25, 1991 by the petitioner spouses Mario J. Mendezona as initial plaintiff and in the amended complaint filed on October 7, 1991, herein co-petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona joined as co-plaintiff. In their compliant, the petitioners as plaintiff therein alleged that petitioner spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona and Maricar Mendezona own a parcel of land each in Lahug, Cebu city with similar areas covered and described in TCT. The petitioners ultimately traced their titles of ownership over their respective properties from a deed of Absolute Sale executed in their favor by Carmen Ozamiz and in consideration of P 1,040,000. It appears than on January 15, 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for guardianship with RTC Oroquieta, City alleging that Carmen Ozamiz had become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends and could no longer take care of her properties by reason pf weak mind and absentmindedness. As guardians Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed on August 6, 1991 with the guardianship court their Inventories and Accounts including the 10,369 square meters Lahug property. Said Lahug property covered by deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of petitioners. In their Answer, respondents opposed the claim of ownership of the Lahug property and alleged that the titles issued to the petitioners are defective and illegal and the ownership of said properties was acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration for the sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable. Respondents further alleged that on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession of her mental faculties; and that her properties having been placed in administration, she was in effect incapacitated to contract withpetitioners. On September 23, 1992, the Trial court rendered decision in favor of petitioners. On

appeal the Court of Appeal reversed its decision and ruled that the Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove that the consideration was actually paid.
Issue: whether to consider the testimony of Judge Durias as newly discovered evidence Held: A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is concurrence of the following requisites:

1. the evidence had been discovered after trial; 2. the evidence could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and 3. the evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative, or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted, would probably alter the result. All 3 requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the new trial. SC finds that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of the case, the name Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness for the defendants, herein respondents. That the respondent chose not to present his is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias' testimony in another case be considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias' which were existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial The testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him by questioning. Factual findings of the appellate court are generally conclusive on the SC which is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the SC to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. However, this rule is not without exception. If there is a showing that the appellate court's findings of facts complained of are totally devoid of support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, the SC must discard such erroneous findings of facts. SC finds that the exception applies in the case at bench. Simulation is defined as :the declaration of a fictitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for the purposes of deception, the appearances of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from that which was really executed. The requisites of simulation are: 1. an outward declaration of will different from the will of the parties;

2. the false appearance must have been intended by mutual agreement; and 3. the purpose is to deceive third persons. None of these were clearly shown to exist in the case at bar. Contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the appellate court, a simulated contract cannot be inferred from the mere non-production of the checks. It was not the burden of the petitioners to prove so. It is significant to note that the deed of absolute sale is a notarized document duly acknowledged before a notary public. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

SPOUSES MESINA V. MEER (REMEDIAL) FACTS: ISSUE: Whether or not the grounds relied by them are sufficient to give due course to the petition.
HELD: No. After careful examination of the case, we resolve to deny the petition. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT is an equitable remedy and is allowed only under exceptional circumstances and only if fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is present. Where the defendant has other available or adequate remedy such as a motion for new trial or appeal from the adverse decision, he cannot avail himself of this remedy. Under the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, the PETITION FOR RELIEF must be filed within 60 days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner's good and substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be. Most importantly, it must be filed with the same court which rendered the decision. As correctly pointed out by the CA, the petitioners' allegation of extrinsic fraud should have been brought at issue in the MTC. If they truly believe that the default of the spouses Mesina prejudices their rights, they should have questioned this from the very beginning. Yet, they chose to participate in the proceedings ans actively presented their defense. And their efforts were rewarded as the MTC rules in their favor. When the respondent appealed the case to the RTC, they never raised this issue. Even after the RTC reversed the finding of the MTC, and the CA sustained this reversal, petitioners made no effort to bring this issue for consideration. The SC will not allow petitioners, in guise of equity, to benefit from their own negligence.

PEOPLE V. LI KA KIM ALIAS ED (REMEDIAL)

The requisites of NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE in order to justify a new trial are that: 1. the evidence is discovered after trial; 2. such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and 3. the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative, or impeaching, and of such weight that if admitted, would likely change the judgment. NOT ONE OF THE REQUISITES MENTIONED IS ATTENDANT. Appellant's PASSPORT could have easily been presented during the trial. then, too, the presentation of appellant's passport would hardly be material to the outcome of the case. Appellant was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as being the perpetrator of the crime. There is merit, however, in appellant's contention that the court a quo erred in imposing the penalty of death. Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on Criminal Procedure requires the recitation in the information of aggravating or qualifying circumstances in order to be appreciated as such. The use of a motor vehicle considered by the trial court in decreeing death penalty is inappropriate, that aggravating circumstance not having been aptly alleged in the Information. The requirements are mandatory not only to afford the accused the right to object to the presentation of evidence showing such aggravating circumstances not so alleged but also to preclude the court from even taking such aggravating circumstances into account. Rule 39

FAJARDO V. QUITALIG (REMEDIAL)

As frontline officials of the justice system, sheriffs must always strive to maintain public trust in the performance of their duties. Hence, they must see to it that the final stage in the litigation process is completed without unnecessary delay. A review of the record of this case revels that respondent enforced the writ of execution dated 7 March 2000 only on 24 August 2000 as shown by his 25 August 2000 Report of Service. SECTION 14. RETURN OF WRIT OF EXECUTION - The writ of execution shall be returnable to

the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within 30 days after receipt of writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every 30 days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies hereof promptly furnished the parties. Evidently, respondent was not only remiss in his implementation of the writ, but likewise derelict in his submission of the returns thereof. We find respondent's explanation to be utterly wanting. He is guilty of dereliction of his duty as a sheriff, because he failed to: 1. execute the writ within 30 days from his receipt thereof; 2. submit his report or service within the same period; 3. make periodic reports to the MTCC until the judgment was fully satisfied; and 4. furnish the parties with copies of the reports. Clearly, the actuations of respondent constitute disrespect, if not outright defiance of the MTCC's authority. In the absence of instructions to the contrary, a sheriff has the duty to execute a writ with reasonable celerity and promptness in accordance with its mandate.

Santos v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 155618 March 26, 2003 Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS: Petitioner Edgar Santos and respondent Pedro Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor of the Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections. The Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the duly elected Mayor. Petitioner filed an election protest before the lower court. After trial and revision of the ballots, the trial court found that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes while respondent received only 2,105. Hence, it rendered judgment declaring and proclaiming petitioner as the duly elected Municipal Mayor, and setting aside as null and void the proclamation of respondent made by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Meanwhile, before the trial court could act on petitioners motion, respondent filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari, assailing the decision of the trial court. Likewise, respondent appealed the trial courts decision to the COMELEC. The COMELEC issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which effectively enjoined the trial court from acting on petitioners motion for execution pending appeal. Subsequently, the COMELEC dismissed petitioners petition for certiorari after finding that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed judgment. Moreover, the COMELEC held that the remedy from the decision of the court a quo

was to file a notice of appeal. Hence, it directed the trial court to dispose of all pending incidents in the election protest with dispatch. The trial court issued an Order approving the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal and installing petitioner as the duly elected Mayor. Meanwhile, respondent filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition in SPR No. 20-2002. After five days, or on August 26, 2002, he filed a supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002. Barely two days later, on August 28, 2002, and while his motion for reconsideration and supplemental petition in SPR No. 202002 were pending, respondent filed another petition with the COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002. The petition contained the same prayer as that in the supplemental petition filed in SPR 202002. Acting on respondents motion, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante and enjoining petitioner from assuming the functions of Mayor. ISSUE: whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in giving due course, instead of dismissing outright, the petition in SPR No. 37-2002 despite the clear showing that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping, and in setting aside the trial courts order granting execution pending appeal HELD: Yes. It is at once apparent from the records, as shown above, that respondent was guilty of forum-shopping when he instituted SPR No. 37-2002 with the COMELEC. Forumshopping is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also be the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. For it to exist, there should be (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. Considering that respondent was indubitably guilty of forum-shopping when he filed SPR No. 37-2002, his petition should have been dismissed outright by the COMELEC. Willful and deliberate forum-shopping is a ground for summary dismissal of the case, and constitutes direct contempt of court. COMELECs act of setting aside the trial courts order granting execution pending appeal is premised on the argument that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond are not good reasons. This is untenable. A valid exercise of the discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. The following constitute good reasons and a combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1) public interest involved or will of the electorate; (2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and (3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending. The decision of the trial court in election protest was rendered on April 2, 2002, or after almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the said decision to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the Mayor continued to run. The will of the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the election protest, had to be respected and given meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed the services of a mayor even while the election protest was pending, and it had to be the candidate judicially determined to have been chosen by the people.

BERNARDO V. CA (REMEDIAL)
In fine, under the new RULE ON DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, the accused has the right to file a demurrer after the prosecution has rested its case. If the accused obtained prior leave of court before filing his demurrer, he can still present evidence if his demurrer is denied. However, if he demurs without prior leave of court, or after his motion for leave is denied, he waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for decision on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution. This power to grant leave to the accused to file a demurrer is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The purpose is to determine whether the accused in filing his demurrer is merely stalling the proceedings. In the case at bar, petitioner admits that the trial court denied her motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. In such case, the only right petitioner has under Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court after having been denied leave to submit a demurrer is to adduce evidence in her defense. However, even without express leave of the trial court, nay, her motion for leave was denied, petitioner insisted on filing a demurrer instead of presenting evidence in her defense. Judicial action to grant prior leave of court to file demurrer to evidence is discretionary upon the trial court. But to allow the accused to present evidence after he was denied prior leave of court to file demurrer is not discretionary. Once prior leave is denied and the accused still files his demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss, the court no longer has discretion to allow the accused to present evidence. The only recourse left for the court is to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution. and unless there is grave abuse thereof amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is not present in the instant case, the trial court's denial of prior leave to file demurrer to evidence or motion to dismiss may not be disturbed. However, any judgment of conviction by a trial court may still be elevated by the accused to the appellate court.