Criminal Law Cases

1. G.R. No. 166401: October 30, 2006 [Formerly G.R. Nos . 158660-67] PEOPLE OFTHEPHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.
ALFREDO BON, Appellant. FACTS: Eight informations were filed against Bon, charging him with the rape of AAA and BBB, daughters of his older brother. All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years. AAAtestified that she was only 6 years old when she was first molested in 1994, while BBB testified that she was first by Bon in 1997 when she was 10 years old. The RTC convicted Bon on all 8 counts of rape. The penalty imposed composed of 8 death sentences. The CAagreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard to 6 of the 8 death sentences. The CA downgraded the convictions in 2 of the 8 criminal cases to attempted rape, finding no evidence beyond reasonable doubt in these 2 cases that Bon had accomplished the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make him liable for consummated rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 9346 which ended the imposition of death penalty. ISSUE: Whether Bon's penalty for attempted qualified rape which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than that of consummated rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua? HELD: The determination of Bon's penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, Section 2 of which mandates that in lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower courts, but must, if the guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when appropriate.
law" for attempted rape is the prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61and 71of the Revised Penal Code. Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for attempted rape. Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape, with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication. However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty, does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346? If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion temporal. The consummated felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony. There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
It is a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly construe d against the state and liberally in favor of the accused. If the language of the law Upon the other hand, Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of establishes that the penalty to be imposed upon the principals the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial, as a of an attempted felony must be a penalty lower by two means of effecting substantial justice. The law is tender in degrees than that prescribed by law for the consummated favor of the rights of an individual. It is this philosophy of felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW (First Batch 1 -50) Chi, Irish, Xty, Rej, James Page 1 caution before the State may deprive a person of life or liberty commit a felony. that animates one of the most fundamental principles in our The penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Thus, RA 9346 should be construed as having downgraded those penalties attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices. In the case of appellant Bon, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckonednot from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor. 2. [G.R. No. 135919 : May 9, 2003] PEOPLE OFTHEPHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. DANNY DELOS SANTOS YFERNANDEZ, Appellant. FACTS: The RTC found appellant Delos Santos guilty of the crime of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. De Leon, one of the prosecution witnesses, testified that around 8pm of November 6, 1997, he saw the victim Rod Flores drinking gin with a group of men. As De Leon was about to fetch water from a nearby faucet, he approached them and borrowed Flores' cart. While waiting for the cart, he stood across Flores. Suddenly Delos Santos emerged from the back of Flores and stabbed him with a knife. Delos Santos stabbed Flores many times and the former ceased stabbing the latter only after he saw him dead. For his defense, Delos Santos contended that there was no evidence that he has a motive to kill Flores. In fact there was no previous heated argument or altercation between them. He argued that since the prosecution witness testified that there was no altercation between him and Flores, it follows that no motive to killcan be attributed to him. ISSUE: WON motive to kill on the part of appellant Delos Santos needs to be provedin the case at bar. HELD: No. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is positively identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established. In People vs. Galano, we ruled that in the crime of murder,
motive is not an element of the offense, it becomes material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the accused had committed it. In this case, no such doubt exits as prosecution witnesses De Leon and Tablate positivelyidentified appellant Delos Santos as the one who committed the crime. 3. G.R. No. 166479 : February28, 2006 RODOLFO C. VELASCO, Petitioner, v . PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES, Responde nt. FACTS: Om April 19, 1988, at around 7am, private complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in front of his house when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Accused Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached Frederick and firedat him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. The shooting incident was reportedto the police sub-station by Brgy. Chairman Dacasin, describing the suspect as wearing a vest or "chaleco". Velasco thereafter was apprehended and brought to the police sub-station where he was identified by private complainant as the one who fired at him. Armando Maramaba, the driver of the tricycle in which the accused rode, testified that he was picked up by the accused who was wearing a "chaleco", upon reaching the parked jeep which was being washed by private complainant, the accused ordered him to stop. The accused alighted and firedseveral shots at the victim. Velasco denied having shot the victim. He alleged that the prosecution was not able to sufficiently establish the identity of the assailant because the Barangay Chairman, who reported the incident to the policemen, identified the assailant as one wearing a "chaleco," was not presented to corroborate the testimony of Maramba. He pointed out that the prosecution presented police officers who were not eyewitnesses. He added that he had no motive to harm, much less kill,the victim, the latter being a total stranger. He explained that since the identity of the assailant is in doubt, motive becomes important and his alibi gains weight and value. ISSUE: WON the prosecution was able to conclusivelyestablish the identity of the assailant. HELD: Y es. Private complainant Ferederick Maramba and Armando Maramba positivelyidentified accused Velasco as the assailant.
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW (First Batch 1 -50) Chi, Irish, Xty, Rej, James
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Private complainant saw Velasco alight from the tricycle of Aramando before he successively shot him. Aramando witnessed the shooting because he was the driver of the tricycle in which Velasco rode in going to the house of the private complainant and in leaving the crime scene. After the shooting incident, private complainant went to the City Jail and identified Velasco as the person who shot him. At the Dagupan City Police Station, Armando Maramba pointed to Velasco as the assailant not because he saw a man wearing a chaleco, but because it was he whom he saw shoot the private complainant. Velasco's defense of alibi shall fail. As against positive identification by prosecution witnesses, the accused's alibi is worthless. Having been identified by 2 credible witnesses, Velasco cannot escape liability. Velasco's asseveration that it is unthinkable for him to shoot private complainant because he has no motive to harm, much less kill the latter, he being a total stranger, deserves scant consideration. It must be stressed that motive is a state of (one's)mind which others cannot discern. It is not an element of the crime, and as such does not have to be proved. In fact, lack of motive for committing a crime does not preclude conviction. It is judicial knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no reason at all. Even in the absence of a known motive, the time-honored rule is that motive is not essential to convict when there is no doubt as to the identityof the culprit. Motive assumes significance only where there is no showing of who the perpetrator of the crime was. In the case at bar, since Velasco has been positively identified as the assailant, the lack of motive is no longer of consequence. 4.G.R. No. 152527 October 20, 2005 JOEYGUIYAB y DANAO, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS: While Joseph Madriaga and the victim Rafael Bacani were conversing in front of Community Center in Tumauini, a certain Juan Sanchez approached and kicked them. As they posed for a fight, petitioner Guiyab uttered, "Y ou try and you will see" while brandishing a knife. Madriaga picked up a stone, grabbed Sanchez by the hair and struck him in the head. It was then that Guiyab chased him. Failing to catch Madriaga, Guiyab turned to Bacani who was following them. Guiyab stabbed Bacani once on the right chest. Bacani ran a few meters before he fell and he was then brought to the hospital. Bacani eventually died.
Guiyab raised the defense of alibi. He testified that at the time the incident happened, he was not at Tumauini Cultural and Sports Center; that he was at Sitio Bayabo, Camasi farming until 5:00pm and slept in their house at around 9:00pm. The trial court found petitioner Guiyab guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. The decision was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this petition. Guiyab claimed that the real identity of the assailant was not fullyestablished by the prosecution since the lone eyewitness learned the name of the petitioner only after it was fed to him by Police Officer Armando Lugo. He contended that the identification of the petitioner was tainted with conjecture and speculation. ISSUE: WON petitioner Guiyab was adequately identified as the assailant. HELD: Y es. Records show that that prosecution witness Joseph Madriaga testified in a categorical and straightforward manner on the events leading to the death of Bacani. Madriaga's identification of Guiyab could not be doubted. Evenif Madriaga did not know the name of the petitioner prior to the incident, he was able to identify him in open court. Besides, Madriaga maintained that although he did not know the name of the petitioner, he knew him by his face. There is nothing in law or jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non , that, for a positive identification of a felon by a prosecution witnes s to be good, the witnes s must first know the former personally. The witnes s need not have to know the name of the accused for so long as he recognizes his face . The SC ruled that 'knowing the identity of an accused is different from knowing his name. Hence, the positive identification of the malefactor should not be disregarded just because his name was supplied to the eyewitness. The weight of the eyewitness account is premised on the fact that the said witness saw the accused commit the crime, and not because he knew his name.
5. G.R. No. 165842 November 29, 2005 EDUARDO P. MANUEL, Petitioner, versus PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS:
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Petitioner Eduardo Manuel was first married to Rubylus Gaa on July28, 1975. Sometime in 1996, Manuel met Tina Gandalera, whom he married in March of the same year. The relationship of Eduardo and Tina became rocky, causing the latter to inquire from the NSO the status of the former. Tina then learned that Eduardo had been previously married. Tina filed a criminal case of bigamy against Eduardo. For his part, Eduardo claimed that Tina was aware of his previous marriage to Rubylus; that he declared "single" in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid. He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina. Eduardo further claimed that Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years. The trial court found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy. Eduardo appealed before the CA alleging that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he married the Tina, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the time that he married the Tina, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted. The CA, nevertheless, affirmed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this instant petition. ISSUE: WON Eduardo is guilty of bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit). HELD: Y es. Article 3, paragraph 2 of the RPC provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional felony, it is deemed voluntary. Although the words "with malice" do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, such phrase is included in the word "voluntary". Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from which another suffers injury. When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional. For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evilintent. Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
In the present case, the prosecution proved that the Eduardo was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist. The prosecution also proved that the Eduardo married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivityof the Family Code. Eduardo is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married Tina. As a general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo; such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat. It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married Tina in 1996, he was of the well-grounded belief that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the he acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married Tina and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. Eduardo, however, failed to discharge his burden.
6.
G.R. No. 152133 : February 9, 2006 ROLLIE CALIMUTAN, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OFTHE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.
FACTS: Victim Cantre and witness Saano crossed paths with petitioner Calimutan and a certain Bulalacao. Cantre was harboring a grudge against Bulalacao, suspecting the latter as the culprit responsible for throwing stones at the Cantre's house on a previous night. Thus, upon seeingBulalacao, Cantre suddenly punched him. While Bulalacao ran away, Calimutan dashed towards the back of Cantre and Saano. Petitioner Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big as a man's fist, which he threw at victim Cantre, hitting him at the left side of his back. Calimutan and Cantre were eventually pacified. On his way home, Cantre complained of the pain in the left side of his back hit by the stone. Cantre complained also of stomachache
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and was unable to eat. By nighttime, he was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb. Calimutan died the following day. The exhumation and autopsy of the body of the victim Cantre was conducted by Dr. Mendez of the NBI who explained that the victim suffered from an internal hemorrhage and there was massive accumulation of blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen. The laceration of the spleen can be caused by any blunt instrument, such as a stone. Hence, Dr. Mendez confirmed the possibility that the victim was stoned to death by Calimutan. The RTC found Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. The CA sustained the decision of the trial court. ISSUE: WON petitioner Calimutan should be convicted of homicide. HELD: No. Article 3 of the RPC classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in particular: (1) intentional felonies, and (2) culpable felonies. These two types of felonies are distinguished from each other by the existence or absence of malicious intent of the offender. In intentional felonies, the act or omission of the offender is malicious. In the language of Art. 3, the act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice). The offender, in performing the act or in incurring the omission, has the intention to cause an injury to another. In culpable felonies, the act or omission of the offender is not malicious. The injury caused by the offender to another person is "unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice." As stated in Art. 3, the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. In this case, the SC did not, in good conscience, attribute to petitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, much less to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such intent, the SC did not sustain the conviction of petitioner Calimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as rendered by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead, the SC found petitioner Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felonyof reckless imprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code . The meeting of the victim Cantre and witness Saano, on the
one hand, and petitioner Calimutan and his helper Bulalacao, on the other, was a chance encounter as the two parties were on their way to different destinations. While the evidence on record suggests that a running grudge existed between Cantre and Bulalacao, it did not establish that there was likewise an existing animosity between Cantre and Calimutan. It was the victim Cantre who was the initial aggressor. Calimutan sought only to protect Bulalacao and to stop the assault of Cantre against the latter when he picked up a stone and threw it at Cantre. The prosecution did not establish that Calimutan threw the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intent of killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim. Petitioner Calimutan's intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point, the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao who was much younger and smaller in built than the victim Cantre. 7. [ G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005] MELBA QUINTO, petitioner, vs. DANTEANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO, respondents. FACTS: Edison Garcia, 11 years old, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about 11 years old, saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage culvert. Wilson assented but Garcia opted to remain outside the drainage culvert. Respondent Pacheco along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with water about a foot deep. After a while, respondent Pacheco, came out of the drainage system and left without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside, and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the scene. For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson's mother, and informed her that her son had died. The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and Pacheco. The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. It also held that it could not hold the respondents liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson's death.
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ISSUE: WON preponderant evidence exists respondents civillyliable for the death of Wilson..
to
hold
HELD: No. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. A person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. "Natural" refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. The prosecution has the burden to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things: first, the criminal act and second, defendant's agency in the commission of the act. Corpus delicti includes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. In the present case, the prosecution failed to adduce preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages. The SC agreed with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the deceased
sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as to how the deceased sustained the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped, fell hard and his head hit a hard object. That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the drainage culvert was dark. Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the abrasion on the left forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the abrasions on the face and left forearm of the victim were made ante mortem or post mortem. The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the respondents hit the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object or instrument that might have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased. It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at all. However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to prove that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the latter was invitedto join them in fishing. In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of action for damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information. 8.[G.R. No. 138645. January 16, 2001] PEOPLE OFTHEPHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. WILBERT CABAREO, appellant. FACTS: On the evening of the barangay fiesta of Jayobo, Lambunao, Iloilo while a disco was going on, a commotion involving Pablo Sanchez and Tayok Estiva occurred near a store a few arm's length away from the venue of said disco. Brgy. Captain Aurelio Catedrilla went to the place where the trouble was to pacify persons involved in the commotion. He was followedby Nerio Casaquite. When Aurelio Catedrilla reached the place, Wilbert Cabareo, alias Bebot, shot him at the back with a 10 inch long firearm. However, instead of the bullet hitting Aurelio Catedrilla, it hit the back of Nerio Casaquite. Wilbert Cabareo
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was about two arm's length away from them when he pulled the trigger. Nerio Casaquite was brought to the hospital. However, Nerio Casaquite later succumbed to the gunshot wound he sustained. For his defense, Wilbert Cabareo, argued that it was Estiva who shot the victim. He claimed that while Estiva and Brgy. Capt. Aurelio Catedrilla were grappling for the possession and control of a shot gun, the gun accidentally fired, hitting Nerio Casaquite at his back causing his death. The trial court rejected Wilbert Cabareo's claim that Estiva was the killer. It found Wilbert Cabareo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. ISSUE: WON finding of the RTC that Cabareo is guilty of murder is proper. HELD: No. Wilbert Cabareo should be convicted of homicide, not murder. "Art. 4. Criminal Liability. --- Criminal liability shall be incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended."
Moreover, it could not be said that the attack was without risk to himself, because the victim was then in the company of three other persons, all of whom were alert and one was even armed. Well-settled is the rule that a qualifying circumstance must be established as clearly as the elements of a crime. In this case, treachery was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Absent any other qualifying circumstance, appellant should therefore be convicted only of homicide, not murder. 9.[G.R. No. 121828. June 27, 2003] PEOPLE OFTHEPHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. EDMAR AGUILOS, ODILONLAGLIBA YABREGON and RENE GAYOT PILOLA, accused, RENE GAYOT PILOLA, appellant. FACTS: Joselito Capa and Julian Azul, Jr. were drinking beer together in a store when they were joined by Edmar Aguilos and Odilon Lagliba. In the course of their drinking, an altercation between Edmar and Julian ensued. Elisa, the storeowner, pacified the protagonists and advised them to go home. Edmar and Odilon left the store. Joselito and Julian were also about to leave, when Edmar and Odilon returned. Edmar and Julian traded fist blows. Odilon watched as Edmar and Julian swapped punches. Joselito tried to placate the protagonists to no avail. Because of Joselito's intervention, Odillon pulled out his knife and stabbed Joselito. Ronnie Diamante and appellant Rene Pilola, who were across the street, saw their gangmate Odilon stabbing the victim and decided to join the fray and stabbed Joselito. Julian saw Ronnie bashed Joselito's head with a hollow block and Ronnie also got a piece of broken bottle and struck Joselito once more. Joselito died on the spot. The RTC found appellant Rene Gayot Pilola guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The appellant assailed the decision of the trial court. The appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove that he conspired with Ronnie and Odilon in stabbing the victim to death. He asserted that evenif it were true that he was present at the situs criminis and that he stabbed the victim, it was Odilon who had already decided, and in fact fatally stabbed the victim. He argued that he is merely an accomplice and not a principal by direct participation. ISSUE: Whether the contention of the appellant is correct. HELD:
In the present case, appellant is responsible for the death of Nerio Casaquite, even if the former's intended target when he fired the gun was supposedly Catedrillo. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the actual victim be different from the one intended. As held in US v. Diana decided by the Court as early as 1915, "[ t]he same crime would have been committed if the injured man and the deceased had been Dionisio Legara, instead of the defendant's nephew, x x x; the crime of homicide would have been committed just the same and one man would have been deprived of his life by the criminal act of another." The trial court ruled that the killing was qualified by treachery. It failed to explain, however, the basis of said ruling. Indeed, the proven facts do not adequately establish the presence of this qualifying circumstance. In this case, the prosecution proved that appellant fired at the back of the victim. It was not able to show, however, that appellant had deliberately adopted the attack, considering that it was executed during a commotion and as a result of it.
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No. The appellant is not merelyan accomplice but is a principal by direct participation. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proved separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. There may be conspiracy even if an offender does not know the identities of the other offenders, and even though he is not aware of all the details of the plan of operation or was not in on the scheme from the beginning. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. The mere presence of an accused at the situs of the crime will not suffice; mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate on the part of the accused is not enough to make him a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Conspiracy to exist does not require an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. From the legal standpoint, conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. As a rule, the concurrence of wills, which is the essence of conspiracy, may be deduced from the evidence of facts and circumstances, which taken together, indicate that the parties cooperated and labored to the same end. Even if two or more offenders do not conspire to commit homicide or murder, they may be held criminally liable as principals by direct participation if they perform overt acts which mediately or immediately cause or accelerate the death of the victim, applying Article 4, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code: Art. 4. Criminal liability. - Criminal liability shall be
incurred: 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongfulact done be different from that which he intended. In such a case, it is not necessary that each of the separate injuries is fatal in itself. It is sufficient if the injuries cooperated in bringing about the victim's death. Both the offenders are criminallyliable for the same crime by reason of their individual and separate overt criminal acts. Absent conspiracy between two or more offenders, they may be guilty of homicide or murder for the death of the victim, one as a principal by direct participation, and the other as an accomplice, under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code: Art. 18. Accomplices. - Accomplices are the persons who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must concur: (a) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (b) the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission of the crime. Accomplices come to know about the criminal resolution of the principal by direct participation after the principal has reached the decision to commit the felony and only then does the accomplice agree to cooperate in its execution. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan of the principal by direct participation and cooperate in its accomplishment. However, where one cooperates in the commission of the crime by performing overt acts which by themselves are acts of execution, he is a principal by direct participation, and not merely an accomplice. In this case, Odilon all by himself initially decided to stab the victim. The appellant and Ronnie were on the side of the street. However, while Odilon was stabbing the victim, the appellant and Ronnie agreed to join in; they rushed to the scene and also stabbed the victim with their respective knives. The three men simultaneously stabbed the hapless victim. Odilon and the appellant fled from the scene together, while Ronnie went after Julian. When he failed to overtake and collar Julian, Ronnie returned to where Joselito felland hit him with a hollow block and a broken bottle. Ronnie then hurriedly left. All the overt acts of Odilon, Ronnie and the appellant before,
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during, and after the stabbing incident indubitably show that they conspired to killthe victim. The victim died because of multiple stab wounds inflicted by two or more persons. There is no evidence that before the arrival of Ronnie and the appellant at the situs criminis, the victim was already dead. It cannot thus be argued that by the time the appellant and Ronnie joined Odilon in stabbing the victim, the crime was already consummated. All things considered, the SC ruled that Ronnie and the appellant conspired with Odilon to kill the victim; hence, all of them are criminally liable for the latter's death. The appellant is not merely an accomplice but is a principal by direct participation. 10. G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943 THEPEOPLE OFTHEPHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendantsappellants.
carelessness. In the instant case, appellants, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed. The doctrine in the new Rules of Court states that "No unneces sary or unreasonable forces shall be used in making an arrest and the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention." And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest. It may be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, but the facts alone constitute no justification for killing him when he offers no resistance for he was asleep. The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the incident of another act performed without malice. And, as once held by the SC, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentiallyinconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence, and where such unlawful act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence to support a plea of mitigated liability. As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance of alevosia. 11. Bringas vs. People 125 SCRA687 - on proximate cause Facts: In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita Gesmundo. The two were bound for Lusacan in Tiaong, Quezon. They boarded the train of Manila Railroad Company at about 2pm. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag at 8pm, the train slowed down and the conductor, accused-appellant, Clemente Brinas, shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan!" The old woman walked towards the train exit carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When they were near the door, the train suddenly picked up speed. The old woman and the child stumbled from the train causing
Appellants, Chief of Police Antonio Oanis and Corporal Alberto Galanta were instructed by the Constabulary Provincial Inspector to arrest the escaped convict, Anselmo Balagtas, with bailarina named Irene, and if overpowered, to get him dead or alive. Upon arrival at the Irene's house, Oanis approached and asked Brigada Mallare where Irene's room was. Brigada indicated the room and said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene and upon seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door where they were, they simultaneously fired at him. It turned out later that the man shot and killed was not Balagtas but an innocent man named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. ISSUE: WON appellants Oanis and Galanta can be held responsible for Tecson's death. HELD: Y es. Under the circumstances of the case, the crime committed by appellants is murder though specially mitigated by circumstance. In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants relyon the case of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat , but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or
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them to fall down the tracks and were hit by an oncoming train, causing their instant death. A criminal information was filed against Victor Milan, the driver, Hermogenes Buencamino, the assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas for Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But the lower court acquitted Milan and Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent CAaffirmedthe decision. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling the accusedappellant was negligent? Held: There was no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the conclusion drawn from the findings. It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run before they are able to disembark; there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped. The appellant was negligent because his announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full 3 minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. The premature announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked and picked up speed. The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant.
gunfire. The RTC convicted Intod of attempted murder. Issue: WON he is liable for attempted murder? Held: No. Only impossible crime. In the Philippines, Article 4(2) provides and punishes an impossible crime-an act which, were it not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate would constitute a felony against person or family. Its purpose is to punish criminal tendencies. There must either be (1) legal responsibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intendedact in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts evenif completed, would not amount to a crime. Thus: Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where: (1) The motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) There is no intention to perform the physical act; (3) There is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) The consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to actor or beyond control prevent consummation of intendedcrime. Factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality, the crime was impossible of commission. Legal impossibility on the other hand is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an attempt. The factual situation in the case at bar presents a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
12. Intod vs. Court of Appeals 215 SCRA52 (1992) - On Impossible Crime
13. Ladonga vs. People Facts: Intod and company were tasked to kill Palang-pangan due to land dispute. At 10:00 p.m. of that same day, Intod and companions, all armed with firearms arrived at Palangpangan's house. Thereafter, petitioner fired at the said room. It turned out the Palangpangan was in another city and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired. No one was hit by the GR No. 141066, February 17, 2005 - BP 22 applies suppletorily Article 39, RPC Facts: In 1989, spouses Adronico and Evangeline Ladonga became Alfredo Oculam's regular customers in his pawnshop business. The Ladonga spouses obtained loans which were guaranted by checks. However, the three checks bounced
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upon presentment for the reason "CLOSEDACCOUNT"; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, Oculam filed a criminal complaint against them. The RTC rendered a joint decision finding the Ladonga spouses guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating B.P. Blg. 22. Adronico applied for probation which was granted.On the other hand, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC erred in finding her criminally liable for conspiring with her husband as the principle of conspiracy is inapplicable to B.P. Blg. 22 which is a special law; moreover, she is not a signatory of the checks and had no participation in the issuance thereof. Issue: Whether or not conspiracy is applicable in violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Ruling: Y es B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the recent case of Yu vs. People, the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22. The suppletory application of the principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in U.S. vs. Ponte . For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators are principals. All these notwithstanding, the conviction of the petitioner must be set aside. Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.] The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely
present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check subject of Criminal Case No. 7068. With respect to Criminal Case Nos. 7069-7070, Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioner's participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her coconspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. However, this inference cannot be stretched to mean concurrence with the criminal design. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a viewto the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
14. People vs. Bustinera GR No. 148233, June 8, 2004 FACTS: ESC Transport hired Luisito Bustinera as a taxi driver. It was agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m., after which he would return it to ESC Transport's garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of P780.00 per day. On December 25,1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on the same day as he was supposed to. The owner of ESC reported the taxi stolen. On January 9, 1997, Bustinera's wife went to ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been abandoned. ESC was able to recovered. The trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualifiedtheft. Issue: Whether or not the RTC is correct in convicting him of qualified theft. HELD: No Bustinera was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles, by Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING. "When statutes are in pari materia
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or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter, or have the same purpose or object, the rule dictates that they should be construed together. The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft is qualified whenany of the followingcircumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large catt le; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fish pond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No.6539, as amended defines "car napping" as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of car napping are thus: (1) the taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done with intent to gain. Car napping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, the concept of unlawful taking in theft, robbery and car napping being the same. From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-car napping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply
mauled Ruben with fist blows. And as he fell to the ground, Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block on the parietal area. Esmeraldo, Ismael and Edgardo fled to their house only when the policemen arrived. Ruben sustained injuries and was brought to the hospital. The doctor declared that the wounds were slight and superficial, though the victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened. The trial court found the accused guilty of the crime of frustrated murder. An appeal was made by the accused, but the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision with modification, changing the crime to attempted murder and imposed an indeterminate penalty of 2 years of prision correccional as minimum to 6 years and 1day of prision mayor as maximum. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not there was intent to kill. 2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in modifying the crime from frustrated to attempted murder. 3) Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of treachery was properlyapplied. 4) Whether or not the correct penalty was imposed. HELD: 1) Y es. The Court declared that evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist, inter alia, in the means used by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim, the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim, the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. In the present case, Esmeraldo and Ismael pummeled the victim with fist blows, while Edgardo hit him three times with a hollow block. Even though the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, intent to kill was presumed. 2) Y es. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Although the wounds sustained by the victim were merely superficial and could not have produced his death, it does not negate criminal liability of the accused for attempted murder. The intent to kill was already presumed based on the overt acts of the accused. In fact, victim could have been killed had the police not promptly intervened. 3) Y es. The essence of treachery is the suddenand unexpected attack, which gives no opportunity for the victim to repel it or defend himself. In the present case, the accused attacked the victim in a sudden and unexpected manner as he was walking
15. Rivera vs. People GR No. 166326, January 25, 2006 - overt or external acts FACTS: As the victim, Ruben Rodil, went to a nearby store to buy food, accused Edgardo Rivera mocked him for being jobless and dependent on his wife for support. Ruben resented the rebuke and thereafter, a heated exchange of words ensued. In the evening of the following day, when Ruben and his three-yearold daughter went to the store to buy food, Edgardo, together with his brother Esmeraldo Rivera and Ismael Rivera, emerged from their house and ganged up on him. Esmeraldo and Ismael
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with his three-year-old daughter, impervious of the imminent peril to his life. He was overwhelmed with the assault of the accused and had no chance to defend himself and retaliate. Thus, there was treachery. 4) No. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death. Since the accused were guilty only of attempted murder, the penalty should be reduced by two degrees, in accordance to Article 51of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, under Article 61(2), in relation to Article 71of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty should be prision mayor. In the absence of any modifying circumstance in the commission of the crime other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the medium period of prision mayor which has a range of from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. To determine the minimum of the indeterminate penalty, the penalty of prision mayor should be reduced by one degree, prision correccional, which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Hence, the accused were sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from two (2) years of prision correccional in its minimum period, as minimum, to nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
accused went back to the tricycle and ordered him to proceed to Calasiao. The accused alighted at the intersection of the De Venecia Highway and Malued Road and took another tricycle. RTC convicted him of attempted murder. Petitioner submits that if ever he committed a crime, he merely committed attempted homicide. He maintains there was no sudden firing because the victim testified he was observing the alleged gunman for a period of ten seconds before the latter finally drew his .45 caliber pistol and fired at him. After the first shot, the victim was able to run away. Issue: Whether or not the crime committed was attempted murder. Held: Y es.The lower court was correct in appreciating treachery in the commission of the crime. The lower court was correct in appreciating treachery in the commission of the crime. There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim. It was clearly established that private complainant, while washing his jeep, was suddenly fired upon by petitioner for no reason at all. The suddenness of the shooting and the fact that he was unarmed left private complainant with no option but to run for his life. It is likewise apparent that petitioner consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack making sure that private complainant will have no chance to defend himself by reason of the surprise attack. Petitioner's claim that the shooting was not sudden because private complainant was observing him from the time he alighted from the tricycle is belied by the fact that private complainant was not able to run when he was first fired upon. Though private complainant was looking at him, the former was not forewarned by any outward sign that an attack was forthcoming. It was only after the first shot that he felt his life was in danger. Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failing to perform all acts of execution as to produce the felony by reason of some cause other than his own desistance, petitioner committed an attempted felony. Petitioner already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill by shooting private complainant seven times, but failed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness of the latter. Private complainant sustained a wound on the left
16. Velasco vs. People GR No. 166479, February 28, 2006 - wound inflicted not sufficient to cause to death Facts: An Information charged petitioner with the crime of Attempted Murder. The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that on April 19, 1998, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, private complainant Frederick Maramba was cleaning and washing his owner type jeep in front of his house at Lasip Grande, Dagupan City when a motorized tricycle stopped near him. Accused Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of the tricycle, approached the complainant and fired at him several times with a .45 caliber pistol. The accused missed with his first shot but the second one hit the complainant at the upper arm, causing him to stumble on the ground. The complainant stood up and ran, while the accused continued firing at him but missed. Armando Maramba, the driver of the tricycle in which the accused rode, testified that he picked up the accused who was wearing a chaleco, at the intersection of Pogo-Lasip Road. Upon reaching the parked jeep which was being washed by the private complainant, the accused ordered him to stop. The accused alighted and firedseveral shots at the victim. Then the
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arm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death. 17. People vs. Valledor GR No. 129291, July 3, 2002 - does not perform all the acts of execution Facts: This case is about Enrico Valledor's appeal of his conviction for the crime of consummated, frustrated and attempted murder. Last 06 March 1991, the appellant attacked Roger Cabiguen (stabbed on the forearm), Elza Rodriguez (stabbed on the chest), Ricardo Maglalang (was inflicted w/ physical injuries on different parts of the body) There were two other people inside the room (they were not harmed by the appellant). Roger and Ricardo were both wounded, while Elza died from the stab wound. After his arrest, accusedappellant was intermittentlyconfined at the National Center for Mental Health. Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, the cases were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to withstand trial. This time, accusedappellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the exempting circumstance of insanity. Issue:
after stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing the victims. Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who was in a state of a complete absence of the power to discern. Judging from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware and in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other people were also inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had my revenge" after stabbing them. Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of the wrong he has done and the consequence thereof. 2. In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be held liable only for attempted murder and not frustrated murder. The wound sustained by Roger Cabiguen on his right forearm was not fatal. The settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have brought about death.
18. People vs. Dela Cruz 1. 2. Whether or not insanity was properlyproved. GR. Nos. 154348-50, June 8, 2004 - attempted murder only Whether or not accused should be liable of attempted murder for the crime commited against Roger Cabiguen. Facts: Felipe Pajunar testified that on December 15, 1995, at past 11:00 o'clock in the morning, he was at the public market of Sta. Catalina to buy biscuits and candies for his child's exchange gift. When he was about to leave the market, he was summonedby his cousin, Paulino Tabuay, to join his group for a round of local wine ("tuba"), to which Felipe acceded. The other men in the group were Victoriano Francisco, the victim in Criminal Case No. 12445, and Agaton Rubia. All three of them were seated outside the store of a certain Julie Calidquid. While the group was conversing, two unidentified men approached their table. One of the men, whom Felipe later identified as appellant Pablo dela Cruz, asked for a glass of "tuba" from Paulino. Paulino willingly obliged but appellant refused to accept the glass offered to him, saying it might contain poison. To show appellant that it did not, Paulino drank the glass of "tuba" he was offering and refilled it for
Held: 1. No. In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burdenof overcoming the presumption of sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably show that accused-appellant was not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was charged: 1) Simplicio Y ayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the latter chose to stab Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3) Simplicio Y ayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4) Accusedappellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa, utteredthe words, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa)
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appellant, who then drank without hesitation. Appellant joined the group and sat with Felipe on his right and Victoriano on his left. Suddenly, appellant placed his right arm around Felipe and, with his left hand, stabbed him, whispering, "Pinaskuhan nako nimo Brod." (This is my Christmas gift to you, Brod.) Felipe was wounded on his left chest and fell down. Immediately thereafter, appellant turned to Victoriano and stabbed him. Victoriano was rushed to the Bayawan District Hospital where he was declared dead on arrival. Felipe recalled that appellant used a hunting knife, more or less six inches long. He also recalled having seen victim William Tacaldo with Juan Florencio inside the public market stall typing some documents. Issue: Whether or not accused was correctly charged of frustrated murder. Held: No.For the injuries he inflicted on Felipe Pajunar, appellant should be charged only of Attempted Murder instead of Frustrated Murder. To be liable for the frustrated stage of a felony, the offender must perform all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The testimonies of the medical experts show that the wound inflicted was not of the kind which could have caused instantaneous death. According to the testimony of Dr. Calumpang, the only way by which Felipe's life would have been endangered was if the wound developed a major infection.[ In fact, Felipe was only confined at the NOPH for a few days after which he was allowed to go home and recuperate. 19. Perez vs. Court of Appeals GR No. 143838, May 9, 2002 - attempted rape Facts: Eufemia Tria, in her testimony, gave an account of the incident that took place in the morning of April 14, 1988. She was then washing clothes outside their house when she heard someone cry "Inay". She then peeped into their windowwhich was just a few meters from where she was and there saw her daughter Julita lying flat on a bamboo bed with her skirt raised. She saw accused Adelmo on top of Julita with her hands pinned down. As accused was kissing her daughter in the neck, his buttocks were moving in an up and down motion while her daughter was fighting back and struggling to break free. Eufemia then rushed straight to the room where she found accused hiding under the bamboo bed. The trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner guilty of attempted rape. Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly charged the accused of attempted rape.
Held: No. Petitioner's acts of lying on top of the complainant, embracing and kissing her, mashing her breasts, inserting his hand inside her panty and touching her sexual organ, while admittedly obscene and detestable acts, do not constitute attempted rape absent any showing that petitioner actually commenced to force his penis into the complainant's sexual organ. Rather, these acts constitute acts of lasciviousness. The elements of said crime are: (1) that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) that it is done (a) by using force and intimidation or (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and (3) that the offended party is another person of either sex. All these elements are present and have been sufficiently established in this case. Petitioner clearly committed lewd acts against the complainant. Moreover, petitioner employed force when he committed these acts on the complainant. In fact, as found by the trial court, there were bruises on complainant's neck and navel which belie petitioner's claim that the complainant consented to these acts. Although the information filed against petitioner was for attempted rape, he can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness because the crime of acts of lasciviousness is included in rape 20 .Baleros vs. People GR No. 138033, February 22, 2006 - not a case of attempted rape FACTS: At about 1:50 in the morning or sometime thereafter of 13 December 1991 in Manila, the accused, by forcefully covering the face of Martina Lourdes T. Albano with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical with dizzying effects, tried to rape the victim by lying on top of her with the intention to have carnal knowledge with her but was unable to perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance, said acts being committed against her willand consent to her damage and prejudice. RTC convicted him guilty of attempted rape. On appeal, the CA affirmedthe RTC's decision. Issue: Whether or not the act of the petitioner constitutes attempted rape. Held: No. Under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by a man who has carnal knowledge or intercourse with a woman under any of the following circumstances: (1) By using force or intimidation; (2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Under Article 6, in
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relation to the aforementioned article of the same code, rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the crime of rape by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. Expounding on the nature of an attempted felony, the Court, speaking thru Justice Claro M. Recto in People vs. Lamahang, stated that "the attempt which the Penal Code punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; that which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization and consummation." Absent the unavoidable connection, like the logical and natural relation of the cause and its effect, as where the purpose of the offender in performing an act is not certain, meaning the nature of the act in relation to its objective is ambiguous, then what obtains is an attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, which is not a juridical fact from the standpoint of the Penal Code. There is absolutely no dispute about the absence of sexual intercourse or carnal knowledge in the present case. The next question that thus comes to the fore is whether or not the act of the petitioner, i.e., the pressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while on top of Malou, constitutes an overt act of rape.1avvphil.net The information filed against petitioner contained an allegation that he forcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of cloth soaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou testified about the pressing against her face of the chemical-soaked cloth and having struggled after petitioner held her tightly and pinned her down. Verily, while the series of acts committed by the petitioner do not determine attempted rape, as earlier discussed, they constitute unjust vexation punishable as light coercion under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. In the context of the constitutional provision assuring an accused of a crime the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, it cannot be said that petitioner was kept in the dark of the inculpatory acts for which he was proceeded against. To be sure, the information against petitioner contains sufficient details to enable him to make his defense. As aptly observed by then Justice Ramon C. Aquino, there is no need to allege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information for unjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists even without the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason that this term is broad enough to include any human conduct which, although not productive of some physical or material harm, would unjustly
annoy or irritate an innocent person. The paramount question is whether the offender's act causes annoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it is directed.26 That Malou, after the incident in question, cried while relating to her classmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and the fact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyond cavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of petitioner. 21. People vs. Caballero (April 2, 2003) Facts: In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando (Baby), Robito (Bebot) and Marciano, Jr. (Jun), all surnamed Caballero, were having a drinking spree in the house of their brother Ricardo in the Mondragon Compound. At about 7:00 p.m. of said date, Eugene Tayactac and Arnold Barcuma arrived in the sari-sari store of Wilma Broce which was across the Mondragon Compound. Eugene had dinner in the store while Arnold proceeded to the house of Susana Broce. Momentarily, Armando arrived in the store and asked Eugene in an angry tone: "Gene mopalit ka?" (Gene, willyou buy?). Eugene replied: "What is this all about? We don't have any quarrel between us." Armando left the store but stood by the gate of the barbed-wired fence of the Mondragon Compound. His brothers Ricardo, Robito and Marciano, Jr. joined him. Ricardo and Robito were armed with knives. When Wilma told Eugene that she was closing the store already, he stood up and left the store on his way to Susana's house. At that time, Myrna Bawin, who was standing by the window of their house saw her brother Eugene going out of the store and proceeding to the house of Susana. She called out to him and advised him to go home. As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando suddenly grabbed Eugene towards the compound. Eugene resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined Armando and assaulted Eugene. Armando took the wooden pole supporting the clothesline and hit Eugene with it. The latter tried to parry the blows of the Caballero brothers, to no avail. In the process, Eugene was stabbed three times. As Eugene was being assaulted, Myrna returned to the window of her house and saw the Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene. She shouted for help for her hapless brother. Wilma, who witnessed the whole incident, was shocked to immobilityat the suddenturn of events. From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the commotion and rushed to the scene to pacify the protagonists. However, Ricardo accosted Arnoldand stabbed the latter on the left side of his body. Forthwith, Robito, Marciano, Jr. and Armando
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ganged up on Arnold. Two of them stabbed Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under the house of a neighbor. For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the commotion was. He was, however, met by Robito who stabbed him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo retreated and pleaded to his uncle Lucio Broce for help: "Tio, help me because I am hit." The commotion stopped only upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers. They all returned to the compound. On August 5, 1994, Armando, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito, were charged with Murder for the death of Leonilo Broce. They were also charged with the same crime for the death of Eugene Tayactac. Another Information was filed against the Caballero brothers for frustrated murder for the injuries of Arnold Barcuma. In convicting the accused, the trial court found that all of them conspired to kill Eugene and Leonilo and cause injuries to Arnold. While the trial court stated that it was only appellant Armando who stabbed Eugene, and only the accused Robito who stabbed Leonilo, however, it concluded that all of them were equally liable for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. Held: Issue on Conspiracy- The trial court correctly found that all the appellants conspired to kill Eugene and assault Arnold. There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and intent.1)[13] Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof beyond reasonable doubt.2) [14] However, direct proof is not required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.3) [16] Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same purpose and were united in their execution.4) [17] Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of them for in contemplation of the law,
the act of one is the act of all. Mere knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy absent intentional participation in the act with a view to act not the the
furtherance of the common objective and purpose.5) [20] Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act done outside the contemplation of the conspirators. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiring on how and what are the necessary and logic consequence of the intended crime. In this case, all the appellants by their simultaneous collective acts before and after the commission of the crimes were united in one common objective, to kill Eugene, and cause injuries to Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed. Hence, all the appellants are criminallyliable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the appellants stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of one is the act of the others. However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the appellants are not criminally liable. The prosecution failed to adduce evidence that the appellants and the accused Robito conspired to kill Leonilo. The appellants did not actually see Leonilo rushing out from his house to the situs criminis. They had no foreknowledge that the accused Robito would stab Leonilo. There was no evidence presentedby the prosecution to prove that all the appellants assisted the accused Robito in killing Leonilo. Issue on the crimes committed by the appellants In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 (death of Eugene), the appellants are guilty as co-principals by direct participation of murder, qualified by treachery. In order that treachery may be considered as a qualifying circumstance. In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no inkling that he would be waylaid as he sauntered on his way to his girlfriend Susana's house. On the other hand, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole while appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with knives. The attack on the hapless Eugene was swift and unannounced. Undeniably, the appellants killed Eugene with treachery.
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW (First Batch 1 -50) Chi, Irish, Xty, Rej, James 1)2)3) 4)5)
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Baguio City,for a snack. They ordered coffee and sandwiches. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219 (Arnold), the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code. A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase in the commission of the crime. The offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts of execution which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.. While they were waiting to be served, a woman passed by their table. While Cpl. Ugerio was talking to her, a man, later identified as Peter Andrada, herein petitioner, approached the former and scolded him.Sgt. Sumabong, identifying himself as a PC non-commissioned officer, advised petitioner to pay his bill and go home as he was apparently drunk. Petitioner heeded Sgt. Sumabong's advice for he paid his bill and left the restaurant with his companions. While Sgt. Sumabong was paying his bill, he heard Cpl. Ugerio, seated about a meter away, moaning in pain. When Sgt. Sumabong turned around, he saw Cpl. Ugerio sprawled on the floor. Petitioner was hacking him on the head with a bolo. Sgt. Sumabong approached them but petitioner ran away, followed by a companion. Sgt. Sumabong chased them but to no avail. Upon Sgt. Sumabong's instruction, Sgt. Gaces brought Cpl. Ugerio, the victim, to the St. Louis University Hospital. Then Sgt. Sumabong reported the incident to the police station at Camdas Road and thereafter proceeded to the hospital. When he returned to the police station, he learned that petitioner was arrested in a waiting shed at the corner of Camdas Road and Magsaysay Avenue. The arresting officers then brought petitioner back to the restaurant where they recovered the bolo used in hacking the victim. Witnesses to the incident were interviewed by the police and they pointed to petitioner as the culprit. Dr. Francisco Fernandez, a neuro-surgery consultant, testified that either wound, being fatal, would have caused the death of the victim had it not been for a timely medical treatment. Petitioner interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. After hearing, the trial court rendered its Decision finding the accused PETER ANDRADA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated murder. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority as he was only 17 years, 9 months and 20 days old at the time of the incident. Hence, it modified the trial court's decision. Issue: Whether or not the crime committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide?
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that the appellants had the intention to kill Arnold. The appellants performed all the acts of execution but the crime was not consummated because of the timely medical intervention. Treachery attended the stabbing of Arnold because he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift and sudden. He had no means and there was no time for him to defend himself. In sum, the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder. Decision: 1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217, the Court, finding the appellants not guilty of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, REVERSES the judgment of the trial court and ACQUITS them of the said charge. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code.
2.
3.
22. Andrada vs. People of the Phils GR No. 135222 Facts: T/ Sgt. Teodolfo Sumabong, Sgt. Gaces and Cpl. Arsenio Ugerio dropped by Morlow's Restaurant, Bokawkan Street,
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Held: Petitioner contends that assuming he is guilty, he should only be convicted of frustrated homicide, not frustrated murder. He insists that treachery was not present. His hacking the victim was a "spur-of-the-moment" act prompted by self-preservation. We are not persuaded. There is alevosia when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to himself from any defense which the offended party might make.[17] We agree with the lower courts that the petitioner planned to kill the victim with treachery in mind. At that time, the victim was seated, having just finished a meal at a late hour. His back was towards petitioner when the latter, without warning, hacked him twice on his head with a bolo. The attack was so sudden and unexpected that the victim had no opportunity either to avert the attack or to defend himself. Considering that petitioner had performed all the acts of execution which would have resulted in the death of the victim, had it not been for timely medical assistance, a cause not of the will of the petitioner, and considering further the presence of treachery, then, the crime committed is frustrated murder, not frustrated homicide.
of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. Presidential Decree No. 1866, [63] as amended by Republic Act No. 8294, [64] which is a special law which states that if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance - generic. Whereas, the used of unlicensed firearm that was alleged in the information and must be proven during trial is considered special aggravating circumstances and it cannot be offset by mitigating circumstance unlike generic that it may be offset. Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14, paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. Moreover, it can be offset by an ordinarymitigating circumstance. Temperate or moderate damages (P25,000) may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss was suffered but its amount cannot be provedwith certainty. gunshot wound sustained by Michael in his right shoulder was not fatal or mortal since the treatment period for his wound was short and he was discharged from the hospital on the same day he was admitted therein
23. PALAGANAS vs. PPL G.R. No. 165483 September 12, 2006 Facts: The petioner was sentenced by RTC and Affirmed by the CA for the guilty of crime of Homicide and two counts of Frustrated Homicide. A rumble, caused by the song "my way" at videoke bar resulted in the shooting by the petitioner, who answer the call of help of his brother who was involved in rumble incident. Petitioner invoked self-defense to justify his shooting. Issue: Whether or not self-defense is validly invoked. Held: For a valid self-defense, primarily unlawful aggression must be existed. In the case at bar no unlawfulaggression that comes from the victim since the throwing of stones to the accused does not puts in actual or imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the accused. The accused has other options other than shooting , either by running or taking cover or calling proper authorities. The justification of self-defense is not correctly be appreciated. As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must rely on the strength
24. PEOPLE VS PAGADOR GR No 14006-10, April20, 2001 Facts: Accused was found guilty of 2 counts of murder and 3 counts of frustrated murder. He killed the parents of his girlfriend and wounded the 3 other sisters. The subject of this appeal is the 3 counts of frustrated murder. 1s t count: Accused chased her, pulled her hair which caused her to stumble; then accused sat on her stomach and hacked her. She pretended to be dead to stop the assault. 2nd count: Found by her sisters to be lying on top of their dead mother holding her bleeding stomach 3rd count: Left index finger was cut when accused swung his bolo as she approached her mother. She ran and jumped out of the window. ISSUE: WON accused is guilty of three counts of frustrated murder HELD:
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1s t count: Y es. The accused had already performed all the acts of execution which tended to produce the death but failed to cause her death by reason independent of his own free will. Perpetrator stood up and left the crime scene on the belief that he had consummated his heinous act. 2nd count: No. Intent on the part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked is lacking. When such intent is lacking but wounds were merely inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only. 3rd count: No. Accused did not pursue her as she ran and jumped out of the window. Apparently, his purpose was merely to drive away the 4 sisters and dissuade them from attacking him. No intent to kill. Physical injuries only. 25. People vs. Almazan (Sept. 17, 2001) Facts: On 28 September 1996, at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Vicente Madriaga and a certain Allan played chess. Spectators were Vicente's son Noli, who was carrying his 2-year old daughter, Vicente's grandson Noel, and a neighbor named Angel Soliva. While the game was underway, Henry Almazan unexpectedly arrived and brandished a .38 caliber revolver in front of the group. Almazan's fighting cocks had just been stolen and he suspected Angel, one of the spectators, to be the culprit. He imed his gun at Angel and pulled the trigger. It did not fire. He triedagain, but again it failed. Vicente Madriaga stood up and tried to calm down Henry, but the latter refused to be pacified. His daughter, unscathed, held on to Noli, crying. Henry then turned on Noel and shot him on the left thigh. Noel managed to walk lamely ("paika-ika") but only to eventually fall to the ground. Thereafter, Vicente Madriaga called on his neighbors who brought Noli and Noel to the hospital. Noli however died before reaching the hospital, while Noel survivedhis injuries. Dr. Ma. Cristina Freyra of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service conducted an autopsy on the body of Noli which revealed that the cause of the victim's death was a gunshot at the trunk from a .38 caliber revolver. Dr. Misael Jonathan Ticman, attending physician of Noel, in turn declared that the gunshot wound on the left thigh of Noel was a minor injury that would heal in a week.i>[4] Noel was never admitted in the hospital as his doctor sent him home the same day.ii>[5] On crossexamination, Dr. Ticman testified that if not medically treated the wound might get infected or lead to the victim's death. The trial court declared accused-appellant Henry Almazan guilty of murder and frustrated murder; with shooting Noli S. Madriaga with a handgun, aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation, which caused the latter's death; and with shooting Noel Madriaga with the same handgun which
would have produced the latter's death if not for timely medical attendance. Issue: Whether or nor the trial court erred in holding him guilty of frustrated murder as the wound sustained by Noel Madriaga was not fatal that could have caused his death if not for timely medical assistance? Held: Nevertheless, we find that the accused-appellant should be held liable for attempted murder, not frustrated murder. For the charge of frustrated murder to flourish, the victim should sustain a fatal wound that could have caused his death were it not for timely medical assistance. This is not the case before us. The court a quo anchored its ruling on the statement of Dr. Ticman on cross-examination that the wound of Noel could catch infection or lead to his death if not timely and properly treated. However, in his direct testimony, Dr. Ticman declared that the wound was a mere minor injury for which Noel, after undergoing treatment, was immediately advised to go home.iii> [15] He even referred to the wound as a slight physical injury that would heal within a weekiv>[16] and for which the victim was in no danger of dying.v>[17] Clear as the statement is, coupled with the fact that Noel was indeed immediately advised to go home as he was not in any danger of death, we have no reason to doubt the meaning and implications of Dr. Ticman's statement. His statement that Noel could catch infection was based on pure speculation rather than on the actual nature of the wound which was a mere minor injury, hence, not fatal. According to jurisprudence, if the victim was wounded with an injury that was not fatal, and could not cause his death, the crime would only be attempted.vi>[18] The observation that the conviction should be for slight physical injuries only is likewise improper as the accused-appellant was motivated by the same impetus and intent, i.e., to exact vengeance and even kill, if necessary, when he shot Noel Madriaga. The fact that the wound was merely a minor injury which could heal in a week becomes inconsequential. 26. PEOPLE vs GONZALES Jr. GR Nos . 139542, June 21, 2001 On October 31, 1998 at about 2:30 p.m., the families of Noel Andres and herein accused-appellant were both on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. At the intersection point, the cars they were driving almost collided. Later on, when Andres found an opportunity, he cut Gonzalez off, disembarked from his car and went over to Gonzales'. Altercation then ensued. Meanwhile, Dino Gonzalez, son of Inocencio, entered the scene in defense of his father. Fearing that his son was in danger, Gonzalez took out the gun which
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was already in his car compartment. Upon seeing his father, Gonzalez's daughter, Trisha, hugged her father and in the process held his hand holding the gun. The appellant tried to free his hand and with Trisha's substantial body weight pushing against him the appellant lost his balance and the gun accidentally fired. Feliber Andres, Noel's wife, was shot to death while their son, Kenneth and nephew Kevin were wounded. The trial court found the accused guilty of the complex crime of murder and two counts of frustrated murder and accordingly sentenced him to death. Accused were also ordered to pay for civil liabilities to the heirs of Mrs. Andres, and the parents of KevinValdez. Hence, an automatic review or this case. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it found treachery was present in the commission of the crime. 2. Whether or not the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to appreciate voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong be considered as mitigating circumstances. RULINGS: 1. It has been consistently held by this court that chance encounters, impulse killing or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack. Thus, the sudden attack made by the accused due to his infuriation by reason of the victim's provocation was held to be without treachery. Sudden attacks made by the accused preceded by curses and insults by the victim or acts taunting the accused to retaliate or the rebellious or aggressive behavior of the victim were held to be without treachery as the victim was sufficiently forewarned of reprisal. For the rules on treachery to apply the sudden attack must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the victim and without provocation on the part of the latter. We affirm the recommendation of the Solicitor-General that the shooting was not attended by treachery and accordingly the crime committed for the death of Feliber Andres is homicide and not murder. 2. The mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender, passion and obfuscation, incomplete defense of a relative and lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, pleaded by the defense, were not convincingly proved and none can be
considered in the imposition of penalties. The testimony of prosecution witness contradicts the appellant's pretense of voluntary surrender. The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is also not obtaining. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Noel Andres towards the appellant and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at the complainant's vehicle. The plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of incomplete defense of a relative is also unmeritorious since the act of Andres in cursing and shouting at the appellant and his son do not amount to an unlawful aggression against them, Dino Gonzalez. Finally, the plea for the appreciation of the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is likewise devoid of merit. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury sustained by the victim. The appellant's use of a gun, although not deliberately sought nor employed in the shooting, should have reasonably placed the appellant on guard of the possible consequences of his act. The use of a gun is sufficient to produce the resulting crimes committed. 27. People vs. Aca-ac (Apr. 20, 2001) Facts: On the basis of criminal complaints 3 of the minor Fritzie Aca-ac, four informations4 for rape were filed against accusedappellant in the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. Dr. Amora testified that there was no laceration in the hymen of complainant. She said, however, that it was possible that there could be a penetration of a male organ up to the labia minora and the hymen would stillbe intact. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of frustrated rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that accused-appellant was guilty of consummated rape and accordingly sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.
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Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether or not there is frustrated rape? Held: First. In holding that the crime committed was frustrated rape, the trial court relied on the findings of Dr. Amora which showed that complainant did not have any lacerations in her hymen which in fact was intact. The trial court pointed out that there was no evidence of penetration into the vagina of complainant. This is error. As this Court explained in People v. Orita,22 rape is either attempted or consummated. There can be no frustrated rape. For that matter, the mere touching of the labia or pudendum by the male organ is enough to consummate the crime of rape. 25 It is enough that there is a penetration, however slight, of the external genitalia.26 Consequently, the fact that there was no laceration of complainant's private parts or that her hymen was intact, as testified to by Dr. Amora,27 does not preclude a finding of rape against accused-appellant. It bears emphasis that a broken hymen or laceration of any part of the female genital is not a pre-requisite for a conviction for rape.28 Accused-appellant's claim that it was impossible for him, then 57 years old, to commit the crime of rape because he could no longer have an erection is self-serving. Age is not the criterion in determining sexual interest and potency.
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, thus the Petition for Review was filedbefore the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of theft has a frustrated stage. HELD: No. Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present. In the crime of theft, the following elements should be present: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. The Court held that theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property by one with intent to gain. Thus, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose the property stolen since he has already committed all the acts of execution and the deprivation from the owner has already ensued from such acts. Therefore, theft cannot have a frustrated stage, and can only be attempted or consummated. 29. People vs. Pablo (Jan. 16, 2001)
28. Valenzuela vs. People G.R. No. 160188. June 21, 2007 FACTS: While a security guard was manning his post at the open parking area of a supermarket, he saw the accused, Aristotel Valenzuela, hauling a push cart loaded with cases of detergent and unloaded them where his co-accused, Jovy Calderon, was waiting. Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and later emerged with more cartons of detergent. Thereafter, Valenzuela hailed a taxi and started loading the cartons inside. As the taxi was about to leave, the security guard asked Valenzuela for the receipt of the merchandize. The accused reacted by fleeing on foot, but were subsequently apprehended at the scene. The trial court convicted both Valenzuela and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. Valenzuela appealed before the Court of Appeals, arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since he was not able to freely dispose of the articles stolen. The Court of
Facts: The prosecution established that on March 8, 1992, at around 7:45 in the evening, Lucita Loveres and her children, Jocelyn, Edgar, Alma and Robert, were eating supper in their house at No. 5 Tambis Street, Area 9, Pasong Tamo, Tandang Sora, Quezon City. The sister of Lucita, Aida Gertos, who was staying with them, was also there. Lucita's husband, Domingo Loveres, was then sleeping. Then they heard Renato "Panong" Danao call from outside, "Manang." Lucita Loveres went out accompanied by her children, Jocelyn and Edgar, while Aida Gertos stood outside the door of the house. Outside their gate, they saw Panong, appellant Danilo Pablo, appellant Nicolas Compra, one Rencio, appellant Edwin Trabuncon, Inggo Pablo, Jerry Trabuncon, one Redford and their other companions. Inggo Pablo held a bolo; Panong held a gun; Rencio and Jerry Trabuncon each held a knife; appellant Edwin Trabuncon held a piece of wood; appellant Danilo Pablo held a knife; and appellant Nicolas Compra held a bolo. Lucita stood by the gate of their house while Edgar and Jocelyn stood beside her. Panong asked Lucita to let the troublemaker come out ("Palabasin ang nanggugulo"). Lucita replied that there was nobody making trouble ("Walang nanggugulo dito"). Suddenly, Panong shot her with his gun hitting her in the neck. Edgar and Jocelyn who were just beside their mother witnessed the
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incident. Panong just stared at them. When Edgar lifted his mother, Inggo Pablo stabbed him, and Edwin Trabuncon hit him on his left forearm with a piece of wood. Appellant Danilo Pablo was an "alalay " or aide of Panong and was holding a knife, while appellant Nicolas Compra was holding a bolo. When Edgar Loveres was hit by appellant Edwin Trabuncon on the forearm, he ran towards their house, and stood by the window. In the meantime, Jocelyn embraced her mother, Lucita, and pulled her away from the gate to the front of their house where Lucita fell. Then Jocelyn saw her father, Domingo, awakened by the commotion, come out of the house. She ran towards him, but the group of Panong, Domingo Pablo, Rencio, appellant Edwin Trabuncon, appellant Danilo Pablo, appellant Nicolas Compra and other companions dragged her father towards the house of Inggo Pablo, which was five meters away from their house, separated only by a street. Robert Loveres, who followed his father, was likewise dragged by the same group. When they were in front of the house of Inggo Pablo, the group, including the appellants, helped one another stab, hack and kill Domingo and Robert Loveres. Appellant Nicolas Compra held Robert's right upper arm when he was stabbed by the brother of Renato Pablo, appellants Danilo Pablo and Edwin Trabuncon and was released after he was hacked at the neck. The incident was witnessed by Edgar Loveres who watched from their window, and Jocelyn Loveres, who followed her father and who was only an arm's length away from him and her brother when they were stabbed. There was a fluorescent light at the corner where the incident happened. vii>[8] After the incident, the group of assailants fled together with their families in a stainless jeepney. Edgar Loveres left through their back door and went to Fort Bonifacio where he sought the help of his uncle Godofredo Borja. He was brought to the Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he was treated. A medical certificate dated March 17, 1992viii> [ 9] showed the following findings: "Incised wound, distal third, distal phalanx, 2nd digit, right hand; Abrasion, medial aspect, F/ 3 post. forearm, left, sec. to stabbing." In the meantime, Aida Gertos, who also witnessed the incident, brought Lucita Loveres to the Philippine Heart Center where she died On March 9, 1992, Medico-legal Officer Dario Gajardo conducted an autopsy of the bodies of the victims, Domingo, Lucita and Robert Loveres, and prepared the corresponding medico-legal reports and certificates of death. The cause of death of Domingo Loveres was cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to stab and hacked wounds in the body. The death of Robert Loveres was caused by cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage
secondary to stab and hacked wounds in the neck and trunk. The death of Lucita Loveres was caused by cardio-respiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound in the trunk. The Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 107, Quezon City convicting accused-appellants Danilo Pablo, Nicolas Compra and Edwin Trabuncon of three (3) counts of murder and one count of attempted murder, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and prision mayor Hence, this appeal. Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED DANILO PABLO Y MALUNES, NICOLAS COMPRA Y FERNANDEZ AND EDWIN TRABUNCON CONSPIRED WITH PANONG (A.K.A. RENATO DANAO) IN KILLINGOR SHOOTING LUCITALOVERES?
Held: Appellants contend that the prosecution established that it was only Renato "Panong" Danao who shot Lucita Loveres, but the trial court convicted them of the crime of murder on the ground of conspiracy, which was not supported by evidence. It is a settled rule that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of prior agreement on the commission of the crime as the same can be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, showing that they acted in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design.ix>[62] An overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy may consist in actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, in lending moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or exerting moral ascendancy. The prosecution established that when Lucita came out of their house to talk to Panong (a.k.a Renato Danao) all the accused were already by their gate, standing, holding on to their weapons. When Panong shot Lucita, not one of the accused assisted or showed concern for her. They just stood there holding on to their weapons and proceeded to commit acts of violence against her remaining next of kin. When Edgar Loveres tried to help his mother; when he was stabbed; when he was hit with a piece of wood and chased with a knife by Edwin Trabuncon, all the accused were also
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there. No one assisted him nor showed concern for him. Not one of the accused tried to stop the assailants from hitting Edgar Loveres. All the others just stood there watching with their bladed weapons. When Domingo and Robert Loveres came out from their house, the three accused were all there waiting together with their companions and they dragged the two towards the house of Inggo where they repeatedly stabbed, hacked and killed both of them. Thereafter, all of them fledfrom the scene of the crime. It is evident from the above circumstances that all the accused acted collectively and individually with a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose. Not even one of the accused tried to stop the assault on all the victims (People vs. Carino, 233 SCRA687; People vs. Leonor Tamang, G.R. No. 99868, August 19, 1994). They were all x> "together in the execution of their criminal design." [64] We agree with the trial court that there was implied conspiracy among the appellants in the commission of all the crimes charged. When Panong called Lucita Loveres who went out of the house to respond to his call, appellants were among those with him armed with weapons. Danilo Pablo held a knife,Nicolas Compra helda bolo, Edwin Trabuncon held a piece of wood.xi>[65] When Panong shot Lucita, there was no evidence that appellants were surprised, nor did they protest or attempt to help the victim. Instead, they appeared unitedin the execution of a common criminal design. The presence of the appellants as a group, each of them armed, undeniably gave encouragement and sense of security and purpose among themselves.xii>[66] Where conspiracy is established, the act of one is the act of all.xiii>[67] All the conspirators are liable as co-principals.xiv>[68] Hence, the trial court correctly held appellants liable for the murder of Lucita Loveres. The act of Renato Danao in suddenly shooting Lucita Loveres while they were conversing qualified the crime with alevosia.xv>[ 69] However, there is no factual basis for the trial court's finding that the crime was committed with evident premeditation as the prosecution failed to prove the following requisites: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 30. PEOPLE vs. BULAN (GR 143404, June 8, 2005, 459
SCRA 550)
This case was certified by the Court of Appeals (CA) to this Court for review, in view of its finding in its Decision that appellants Jose Bulan and his son, Allan Bulan, are guilty of murder as principals by indispensable cooperation punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, and not merely as accomplices as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42. On the night of June 6, 1994, a dance was taking place at Brgy Datag. Alberto Mariano, a barangay tanod in said barangay was assigned the task of seeing to it that anybody who entered the gate to the dance hall at the plaza must have a ribbon. Appellant Allan Bulan came to the dance and entered the gate without the required ribbon. Alberto Mariano followed appellant Allan Bulan into the dance hall and asked him why he entered the gate without a ribbon. Instead of answering Alberto's question, Allan boxed him on the head. Accused Estemson Bulan, Allan's brother, who had entered the dance hall, likewise, boxed Alberto. Estemson then held Alberto, while Allan boxed the latter on the chest. Perlita Mariano, Alberto's sister, who was present at the dance, embraced her brother as Allan and Estemson unceasingly pummeled him. The other barangay tanods Ceferino Ceballo and Juan Boribor, and a barangay kagawad, Dante Ereso, stopped Allan and Estemson from further beating Alberto. After being pacified by the barangay officials, Allan and Estemson left the dance hall. Alberto, on the other hand, went back to where he originally stood to resume his duty. His sister Perlita stood beside him. One Edwin Solo, a policeman, suddenly came into the dance hall and dragged Alberto into the street just outside the entrance. Perlita embraced Alberto as he was dragged outside the barangay plaza. Appellants Jose Bulan and Allan Bulan were waiting for Alberto and immediately held the latter by his shoulders. Jose held Alberto's right shoulder while Allan held his left shoulder. Perlita was still embracing her brother but she was pulled away from. Accused Estemson Bulan suddenly appeared behind Alberto and stabbed him twice in the back with a small bolo. Perlita screamed for help. However, despite the fact that there were people at the entrance gate, nobody came to help Alberto and Perlita. After stabbing Alberto, Estemson immediately escaped, while Jose and Allan dragged the fatally wounded Alberto away from the barangay plaza to the store of Valentin Talion, which was forty meters away from the scene of the stabbing. They dropped Alberto face down on the ground in front of Valentin's store and then left, running towards the direction of [the] barangay plaza. Perlita, who followed Jose and Allan as they dragged her brother, kept on
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shouting for help but nobody came to help them. After Jose and Allan left, Perlita returned to the barangay plaza and sought help from her relatives who were at the dance. She, likewise, sought the help of the barangay officials present and informed them that Alberto was already dead. Minutes later, Nelson Rubio, a policeman, went to the place where Alberto lay. When the policeman tried to lift Alberto, the small bolo which was used in stabbing Alberto and which remained embeddedin his back, fell to the ground. ISSUE: Whether or not the appellants are guilty of the crime charged as principals by direct participation as ruled by the CA, or, as ruled by the RTC, mere accomplices to the crime of murder. RULING: Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide to commit it. Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy; it may be established by acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be logically inferred the existence of a common purpose to commit the same. The prosecution must prove conspiracy by the same quantum of evidence as the felonycharged itself. Indeed,proof of previous agreement among the malefactors to commit the crime is not essential to prove conspiracy. It is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim; what is primordial is that all the participants performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to bring out the victim's death. Once conspiracy is established, it is unnecessary to prove who among the conspirators inflicted the fatal injury. If conspiracy is proved, all the conspirators are criminally liable for the crime charged and proved. The act of one is the act of all. In this case, the appellants were waiting outside the dance hall near the gate when Edwin Solo brought the victim towards them, onto the street. Jose held the victim by the right shoulder, while Allan held him by the left. Estemson suddenly appeared from behind the victim and stabbed the latter at the back with a small bolo. The appellants continued holding the victim as Estemson stabbed him yet again. Even as Estemson fled, the appellants dragged the victim from the gate, towards the store, where they dropped the victim's body and fled from the scene. Allan then left Catanduanes and hid in Pasay City where he was arrested by the NBI on August 7, 1994. Considering the foregoing, the Court affirms the finding of the CA that the appellants are guilty as principals by direct participation in the killing of Alberto Mariano.
PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BERLY FABRO y AZUCENA, accused-appellant. FACTS: Appellant Fabro, together with her common-law husband Donald Pilay and Irene Martin, was charged with the crime of "Violation of Section 21(b) Art. IV, in relation to Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended of the RTC of Baguio City in an information that reads: That on or about the 7th day of April 1993, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and/ or deliver to PO2 ELLONITO APDUHAN, who acted as poseur-buyer, one (1) kilo of dried marijuana leaves, a prohibited drug without any authority of law, in violation of the aforementionedprovision of law. Two concerned individuals, Gloria and Emma Borce, reported to Chief Inspector Evasco of the 14th Narcotics Regional Field Office, that a couple living together as husband and wife was engaged in selling marijuana. Acting on the report, Chief Inspector Evasco organized two teams to conduct a buy-bust operation. SPO2 Apduhan was designated poseur-buyer in the operation. As Apduhan, Gloria and Emma drew near Pilay's residence, appellant met them. Her common-law husband who appeared drunk was inside the house by the main door. Gloria and Emma introduced Apduhan to appellant as a stranger in the place who wanted to buy marijuana. After Apduhan had ordered a kilo of the contraband, appellant told them to wait a while. She returned in the company of Irene Martin. Appellant was holding something that looked like a brick wrapped in newspaper and placed inside a transparent plastic bag. Appellant handed the stuff to Apduhan. Her companion, Irene Martin, demanded payment therefor. After ascertaining that it was a brick of marijuana, Apduhan made the pre-arranged signal of lighting his cigarette; the back-up team rushed towards their direction and arrested appellant and Pilay. Irene Martin was able to escape. The trial court rendered a decision finding appellant Fabro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. ISSUE: W/ N there is conspiracy in the commission of the crime. HELD: Yes. Appellant's contention that Irene Martin was the real culprit being the source of the contraband does not in any way absolve her of the crime of selling marijuana. While it is true that it was Irene Martin who took the money, appellant was
(31) [ G.R. No. 114261. February 10, 2000]
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the one who negotiated with the poseur-buyers; fetched her co-accused; carried and handed over the marijuana to Apduhan. The acts of Martin and appellant clearly show a unity of purpose in the consummation of the sale of marijuana. In other words, between Martin and appellant, conspiracy in the commission of the crime was indubitably proven by the prosecution. Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425 punishes the mere conspiracy to commit the offense of selling, delivering, distributing and transporting of dangerous drugs. Conspiracy herein refers to the mere agreement to commit the said acts and not the actual execution thereof. While the rule is that a mere conspiracy to commit a crime without doing any overt act is not punishable, the exception is when such is specifically penalized by law, as in the case of Section 21 of Republic Act 6425. Conspiracy as crime should be distinguished from conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability the latter being applicable to the case at bar.
* Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the commission of the offense shallbe imposed in case of any xxx conspiracy to commit the same in the following cases: xxx b) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous drugs.
informed the roomboy that they needed a room. The latter then ushered them to their room and then gave a stub to their telephone operator, Digna Siazon, where he indicated that two customers checked in at room no. 2. Accused Marife called up Digna and asked for an outside line and later on given a line. She then called up the Sunshine Moneychanger in Pasay City and talked with the officer-in-charge, Eduardo Rafael. Identifying herself as Joann Redillo, accused Marife misrepresented to Eduardo that she came from Japan and would like to convert her 40 pieces of yen to pesos. She requested that the currency conversion be made in her room inside the nearby Queensland Lodge. Eduardo agreed to the arrangement. Eduardo instructed his messenger ROLANDO ANDASAN to proceed to the lodge and give the lady occupant of room no. 2 the sum of P114,000.00 in exchange for her 40 pieces of yen. Rolando left the office and proceeded to the lodge. The appellants later on checked out from the lodge and subsequently, the roomboys discovered the lifeless body of Rolando inside the room, lying beside the bed and covered by blood-stained bedsheets. And while accused Marife admitted that she participated in the perpetration of the crime, albeit under duress, accused Eladio, Jr. raised the defenses of denial and alibi. Accused Marife admitted that she was present at every stage of the crime - from the time it was planned until its consummation. She alleged however that she joined the conspirators under duress as Danny threatened to kill her if she refused to cooperate. After trial, the court found the accused guilty as charged and imposed on them the maximum penalty of death as they were found to be part of an organized or syndicated crime group under Article 62 (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. ISSUE: (1) W/ N there exists a conspiracy in the commission of the crime. (2) Is direct proof of previous agreement to establish conspiracy essential? HELD: (1) Yes. (2) No. Conspiracy exists where the plotters agree, expressly or impliedly, to commit the crime and decide to pursue it. Conspiracy is predominantly a state of mind as it involves the meeting of the minds and intent of the malefactors.
(32) [ G.R. No. 124871. May 13, 2004] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARIFE BELLO y ROSCO @ " Joann Redillo," JOHN DOE @ "Eladio M. Consue lo, Jr." and " Boyet," PETER DOE @ "Danny Dineros," and RICHARD DOE @ " George" and/ or "Cayo," accused, MARIFE BELLO y ROSCO @ " Joann Redillo" and JOHN DOE @ " Eladio M. Consue lo, Jr." and "Boyet,"accused-appellants. FACTS: ROLANDO ANDASAN is a messenger/ collector at the Sunshine Moneychanger in Pasay City, earning a measly net income of P2,000.00 per month. On July 25, 1995, in the course of his employment, he was mercilessly stabbed 28 times and died. An Information for robbery with homicide was filed against 4 accused: Marife Bello alias "Joann Redillo," Eladio M. Consuelo, Jr. alias "Boyet," Danny Dineros and "Cayo" or "George." Only accused Marife and Eladio, Jr. were arrested. Accused Danny and Cayo remain at large. On July 25, 1995, a cab entered the Queensland Lodge in Pasay City, with accused Marife and Eladio, Jr. on board. They alighted in front of the private garage of room no.2 and
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Consequently, direct proof is not essential to establish it. The existence of the assent of minds of the co-conspirators may be inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken together, indicate that they are parts of the complete plan to commit the crime. In the case at bar, the records clearly reveal that appellant Marife was part of the plan to rob the moneychanger. This plan was mapped out in accused Danny's house in Cavite by appellants, together with accused Danny and Cayo. On the whole, the incriminating circumstantial evidence against the appellants sufficiently proves their complicity. Circumstantial evidence is that which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. Resort to circumstantial evidence is, in the nature of things, a necessity as crimes are usually committed clandestinely and under conditions where concealment is highly probable. To require direct testimony would, in many cases, result in freeing criminals and deny proper protection to society. Thus, the guilt of an accused may be established through circumstantial evidence provided that the requisites are present, viz: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the inferences must be based on proven facts; (3) the combination of all the circumstances produces a conviction beyond doubt as to the guilt of the accused. In the case at bar, while no witness testified to the actual stabbing and robbing of the victim, the circumstantial evidence adduced by the prosecution supports a judgment of conviction. In sum, the Court finds that the defenses raised by the appellants are clouded with improbability and uncertainty. As the conspiracy among the accused was sufficiently established by the prosecution, the appellants are equally guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide for in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Thus, although the original plan may have been to simply rob the victim and while appellant Marife may not have actually participated in the horrendous killing, the conspirators are equally liable as coprincipals for all the planned or unanticipat ed consequences of their criminal design. * Be that as it may, we find that the trial court erred in holding that
the appellants were part of a syndicated or organized crime group under Article 62 (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, which merits the imposition of the maximum penalty of death. While the appellants and their co-accused confederated and mutually helped one another for the purpose of gain, it was neither alleged nor proved that they formed part of a group organized for the general purpose
of committing crimes for gain which is the essence of a syndicated or organized crime group.
(33) [ G.R. No. 153559. June 8, 2004] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ANTONIO COMADRE, GEORGE COMADRE and DANILO LOZANO, appellants. FACTS: Appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano were charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated Murder. At around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert's father, Barangay Councilman Jaime Agbanlog. As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school. The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Agbanlog, Wabe, Bullanday, Camat and Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the San Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical treatment. However, Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital. ISSUE: W/ N conspiracy exists in the commission of the crime. HELD: No. Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.
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The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship with Antonio is insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the crime. Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act. The ratiocination of the trial court that "their presence provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio", is devoid of any factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a valid basis of a finding of conspiracy. Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. There being no conspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime. Under the Article 48 (complex crimes), when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances, including the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder)is death. The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the death penalty. Antonio Comadre is convicted of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. Appellants Gregorio Comadre and Danilo Lozano are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence to establish conspiracy, and they are hereby ordered immediately released from confinement unless they are lawfully held in custody for another cause.
of violation of B.P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as The Bouncing Checks Law. The RTC, convicted both Evangeline Ladonga and her spouse Adronico, both are regular customers in the pawnshop business of Mr. Oculam in Tagbilaran City, Bohol; sometime in May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a P9,075.55 loan from him, guaranteed by UnitedCoconut Planters Bank (UCPB) Check No. 284743, post dated to dated July 7, 1990 issued by Adronico; sometime in the last week of April 1990 and during the first week of May 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained an additional loan of P12,730.00, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 284744, post dated to dated July 26, 1990 issued by Adronico; between May and June 1990, the Ladonga spouses obtained a third loan in the amount of P8,496.55, guaranteed by UCPB Check No. 106136, post dated to July 22, 1990 issued by Adronico; the three checks bounced upon presentment for the reason "CLOSED ACCOUNT"; when the Ladonga spouses failed to redeem the check, despite repeated demands, he filed a criminal complaint against them. ISSUE: (1) W/ N conspiracy is applicable in violations of BP Blg. 22 by invoking the last sente nce of Article 10, RPC. (2)W/ N petitioner Ladonga is considered a conspirator in the commission of the offense charged. HELD: (1) Yes. Some provisions of the Revised Penal Code are applicable to special laws. It submits that B.P. Blg. 22 does not provide any prohibition regarding the applicability in a suppletory character of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code to it. Article 10 of the RPC reads as follows: ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. The article is composed of two clauses. The first provides that offenses which in the future are made punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of the RPC, while the second makes the RPC supplementary to such laws. The first clause should be understood to mean only that the special penal laws are controlling with regard to offenses therein specifically punished. The second clause contains the
(34) [G.R. No. 141066. February 17, 2005] EVANGELINE LADONGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. FACTS: The Petitioner Evangeline Ladonga seeks a review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3 of Bohol, convicting her
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soul of the article. The main idea and purpose of the article is embodied in the provision that the "code shall be supplementary" to special laws, unless the latter should specifically provide the contrary. B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. (2) No. Article 8 of the RPC provides that "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." To be held guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, the accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. The overt act or acts of the accused may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan. In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner performed any overt act in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy. As testified to by the lone prosecution witness, complainant Alfredo Oculam, petitioner was merely present when her husband, Adronico, signed the check. Oculam also did not describe the details of petitioner's participation. He did not specify the nature of petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime, either by a direct act of participation, a direct inducement of her co-conspirator, or cooperating in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have been accomplished. Apparently, the only semblance of overt act that may be attributed to petitioner is that she was present when the first check was issued. Conspiracy must be established, not by conjectures, but by positive and conclusive evidence. Conspiracy transcends mere companionship and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one as a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a viewto the furtherance of the common design and purpose. The instant petition is GRANTED. Petitioner is acquitted of the charges against her under BP Blg. 22.
(35) [G.R. No. 154182. December 17, 2004] EDGAR Y. TEVES and TERESITA Z. TEVES, petitioners, vs. THESANDIGANBAYAN, respondent. FACTS: Edgar Y . Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting them of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in Valencia. That on or about February 4, 1992, and sometime subsequent thereto, in Valencia, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Edgar Y . Teves, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, committing the crime-herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife, herein accused Teresita Teves, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminallycause the issuance of the appropriate business permit/ license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor of one Daniel Teves, said accused Edgar Y . Teves having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves. ISSUE: W/ N petitioner Teresita Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or caused, her husband (Edgar Teves) to commit the second mode of violation of Sec. 3 of the Anti-Graft Law. HELD: No. Conspiracy must be established separately from the crime itself and must meet the same degree of proof, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, the evidence must reasonably be strong enough to show community of criminal design. Certainly, there is no conspiracy in just being married to an erring spouse. For a spouse or any person to be a party to a conspiracy as to be liable for the acts of the others, it is essential that there be intentional participation in the
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transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design. Except when he is the mastermindin a conspiracy, it is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution in the execution of the crime planned to be committed. The overt act must consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or of moral assistance to his co-conspirators. Section 4(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, the provision which applies to private individuals, states: SEC. 4. Prohibitions on private individuals. - (b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof. We find no sufficient evidence that petitioner Teresita Teves conspired with, or knowingly induced or caused, her husband to commit the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. As early as 1983, Edgar Teves was already the owner of the Valencia Cockpit. Since then until 31 December 1991, possession by a local official of pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not yet prohibited. It was before the effectivity of the LGC of 1991, or on January 1990, that he transferred the management of the cockpit to his wife Teresita. In accordance therewith it was Teresita who thereafter applied for the renewal of the cockpit registration. The acts of petitioner Teresita Teves can hardly pass as acts in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the violation of the Anti -Graft Law that would render her equally liable as her husband. If ever she did those acts, it was because she herself was an owner of the cockpit. Not being a public official, she was not prohibited from holding an interest in cockpit. In criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of guilt. The burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that the accused is either responsible for its commission or has conspired with the malefactor. Since no conspiracy was proved, the acquittal of petitioner Teresita Teves is, therefore, in order.
GACO, accused. RUFINO TESTON and ROGELIO GACO, accused-appellants. FACTS: On July 12, 1995, Forca, Teston, Gaco and Osorio were charged with MURDER before the RTC of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City. Except for Forca who has remained at large, all the accused pleaded not guilty for conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of superior strength, with intent to kill and while armed with bladed weapons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stab and hack with their bladed weapons, one VLADINER DECENA, hitting him in the different vital parts of his body and inflicting upon him multiple stab and hack wounds which cause cardio-pulmonary arrest which were the direct and immediate cause of his death shortly thereafter. Bucol testified that he played basketball with Vladiner Decena. Forca, Teston, Gaco and Osorio were already there drinking at a nearby store. After they had finished playing, he and Vladiner watched the butchering of a shark; Vladiner was seated inside a cart, while Bucol stood about ten meters away from him. When Bucol turned to look at his friend, he saw Forca about to stab Vladiner with a bolo, prompting him to shout "Toto, sasaksakin ka," but nevertheless, Vladiner was stabbed. Forca stabbed the victim once, then Osorio held Vladiner's hair and Gaco his armpits, thus allowing Forca to stab Vladiner two more times. Osorio and Gaco then released Vladiner, and it was at this point that Teston came forward and hacked him 19 times. ISSUE: W/ N there is conspiracy in the commission of the crime. HELD: Yes. The court found that the accused acted in conspiracy. It held that, in the killing of Vladiner, each of the accused performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination so as to indicate a common purpose and design. In full agreement with the trial court, the OSG asserts that accused acted in conspiracy. Based on the testimony of Bucol, Forca stabbed Valdiner, after which Gaco held him by the armpits, while Osorio grabbed his hair. Thereupon, Teston hacked the victim several times with his bolo. Their various acts clearly show that they were animated by the same
(36) [G.R. No. 134938. June 8, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CARLOS FORCA (at large), RUFINO TESTON and ROGELIO
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purpose and impelled by a common design. The manner in which the accused attacked Vladiner also shows that they acted with abuse of superior strength since they clearly outnumbered the victim who was utterly defenseless. Thus, the trial court was correct in holding the accused liable for the crime of murder. As shown by their concerted acts, accused clearly harbored and were united in the execution of the same criminal purpose - to end the life of Vladiner Decena. Since conspiracy has been proven, it need not be determined who among the accused delivered the fatal blow. All of the accused are liable as principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation; for in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.
withdrew and fled with Canete following him. Merlinda rushed Jeremias to the Cebu City Medical Center but he succumbed to severe hemorrhage secondary to the stab wound on the left side of his chest. He died upon arrival at the hospital. ISSUE: W/ N there is conspiracy in the commission of the crime. HELD: Yes. Conspiracy is attendant in the commission of the crime. For conspiracy to exist, it is sufficient that at the time of the commission of the offense the accused had the same purpose and were united in its execution. Proof of an actual planning of the perpetuation of the crime is not a condition precedent. From the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, and as can be inferred from their acts, it is evident that Bagano and Caete were one in their intention to kill Jeremias Montecino. Hence, in accordance with the principle that in conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the fact that it was Bagano who delivered the fatal blow on Montecino and Caete's participation was limited to a mere embrace is immaterial. Conspiracy bestows upon them equal liability; hence, they shall suffer the same fate for their acts.
* Article 248 of The Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murde r. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in the commission of the crime, the lower penalty of reclusion perpetua shallbe imposed.
(37) [G.R. No. 139531. January 31, 2002] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REYNALDO BAGANO* alias Pugot a.k.a. REYNALDO FRIOLO, and PABLITO CAETE, accused-appellants.
FACTS: This is an appeal from the Decision of the RTC of Cebu City, finding Reynaldo Bagano alias Pugot and Pablito Caete guilty of murder. Bagano and Caete were charged with murder qualified by conspiracy and aggravated by treachery and evident premeditation in an Information dated 3 July 1995. On 1997 the trial court convicted both accused of murder for the killing of Jeremias Montecino and sentenced Bagano, a recidivist, to reclusion perpetua, and Caete to reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The court a quo rejected the defense of alibi and denial raised by accused Bagano and Caete on the basis of the following findings: About 3am, Jeremias Montecino and his wife Merlinda were sleeping in their home, when they were awakened by someone repeatedly calling Jeremias' name. The call came from outside. Jeremias went to the window to see who it was and thereafter left their room to go outside. Merlinda remained in their room, but peering through the window she saw Canete suddenly embrace Jeremias as the latter was opening the gate. Thereupon, Bagano with ice pick in hand stabbed Jeremias on the chest. Jeremias struggled to free himself from Caete's clasp and ran, but Reynaldo Bagano gave chase. Upon hearing Merlinda's screams for help Bagano
(38) G.R. No. 159280
May 18, 2004
AUGUSTO SIM, JR., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and The PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. and co-accused Elison Villaflor were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. Elison Villaflor and Augusto Sim,Jr., were formallycharged with the crime of Estafa in an Information which reads: the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud Jay Byron Ilagan in the
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following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations which they made to said Jay Byron Ilagan to the effect that they are selling one (1) colored green Nissan Pathfinder pick-up in the amount of P480,000.00 registered in the name of Henry Austria, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said Jay Byron Ilagan to give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P480,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent, as the said car is a stolen car and they are not the owner, and were made solely, to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of P480,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said Jay Byron Ilagan. ISSUE: W/ N there was conspiracy between petitioner Augusto Sim, Jr. and Elison Villaflor in defrauding private complainant Jay Byron Ilagan. HELD: Yes. Even in the absence of direct evidence of prior agreement to commit the crime, conspiracy may be deduced from the acts of the perpetrators before, during and after the commission of the crime, which are indicative of a common design, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments. Conspiracy is deemed implied when the malefactors have a common purpose and were united in its execution. Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility. Conspiracy, as a rule, has to be established with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself and shown as clearly as the commission of the crime. However, conspiracy need not be shown by direct evidence, but may take the form of circumstances which, if taken together, would conclusively show that the accused came to an agreement to commit a crime and decided to carry it out with their full cooperation and participation. ( Erquiaga v. Court of Appeals) As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, petitioner's actions in relation to the fraudulent sale of the Nissan Pathfinder to private complainant clearly established conspiracy as alleged in the information, which acts transcend mere knowledge or friendship with co-accused Elison.17 Notwithstanding the fact that it was only Elison who dealt with
or personally transacted with private complainant until the time the sale was consummated, by his own testimony petitioner admitted all the acts by which he actively cooperated and not merely acquiesced in perpetrating the fraud upon private complainant.18 That petitioner is a conspirator having joint criminal design with Elison is evident from the fact that as between them, both knew that petitioner was the person selling the vehicle under the false pretense that a certain Henry Austria was the registered owner.19 Petitioner, together with Elison, clearly deceived private complainant in order to defraud him in the amount of P480,000.00, to the latter's damage and prejudice. The totality of the evidence indicates a common or joint design, purpose and objective of the accused-appellants to defraud private complainant
(39) [G.R. No. 135204. April 14, 2004] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. NARCISO RAMOS y MATIAS, RAMON SAN ROQUE y DELA CRUZ, EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y DELA CRUZ alias LALING, WILLIAM RAMOS alias WILFREDO RAMOS, (provisionally dismiss ed), and three (3) other John Does , accused. EULALIA SAN ROQUE DE FRANCISCO y DELA CRUZ alias "LALING", appellant. FACTS: Eulalia San Roque alias Laling, appealed from the Decision of the RTC, Branch 122, Caloocan City, declaring her guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. The Information filed against appellant and her co-accused is quoted as follows: "That on or about the 11th day of February 1993 in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with deliberate intent to kill, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie up on a santol tree, stab, shoot and burn one WILLIAM LOMIDA, resulting to the death of the latter." Prosecution witness, Bernie Ambal, narrated that around 7pm of Feb. 11, 1993, he was standing outside his store when he saw
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Narciso Ramos, Ramon San Roque and three (3) others passed by. They proceeded to the house of William Lomida and appellant, who were then live-in partners. Narciso and Ramon stood by the door, while one of their companions, holding an armalite, positioned himself behind Narciso. Their other companion, armed with a pistol, stayed on the street, and the third one, also armed with a pistol, went to the backyard. Narciso pulled out his .45 caliber pistol and knocked at the door. Appellant then opened the door and Ramon went inside. Soon thereafter, William and appellant, accompanied by Narciso, Ramon, and three (3)others left the house. The group headed to Narciso's house, about kilometer away from Ambal's store. Unknown to them, Ambal trailed behind. Hiding himself behind a tree fifteen meters away, Ambal saw one of their companions poking his armalite at William. Then, they tied William to a santol tree. He was pleading to appellant, but she simply turned her back. Ramon stabbed William twice at the stomach with a 29" bladed knife. Then Narciso shot William five to seven times with his .45 caliber pistol. When William was already dead, Ramon and Wilfredo Ramos untied his body and brought it to a dumpsite (of used tires) twenty five meters away. There they placed William's body atop a pile of rubber tires. Ramon poured gasoline on his body and set it on fire. Appellant and the others were closely watching. After thirty minutes,appellant and the men left. ISSUE: W/ N appellant Eulalia San Roque conspired and confederated with her co-accused in perpetrating the crime of murder.
H ELD: Ye s.
one who opened the door and allowed the other accused to enter the house. She joined them in bringing the victim to the residence of Narciso Ramos, her brother-in-law. While her coaccused dragged the helpless victim, tied him to a santol tree, stabbed him twice by a bladed knife, and shot him 5 to 7 times, appellant merely watched intensely. She even "turned her back" as the lifeless body of the victim was being burned. And after attaining their purpose, she fled with the other accused. The above circumstances clearly show the common purpose and concerted efforts on the part of appellant and her coaccused. We agree with the trial court in concluding that their acts were indications of a criminal conspiracy to commit the crime of murder.
(40) [G.R. No. 158057. September 24, 2004] NOE TOLEDO y TAMBOONG, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondent. FACTS: This is a petition for review of the Decision of the CAaffirming on appeal the Decision of the RTC of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82, convicting the petitioner of homicide. The Information filedagainst petitioner is quoted as follows: "That on or about the 16th day of September 1995, at around 9:30 o'clock in the evening, in Barangay Libertad, municipality of Odiongan, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a bolo, one Ricky F. Guarte, which causes his untimely death. The evidence on record shows that on September 16, 1995, appellant went to a black-smith who made the design of his bolo. When he went home late in the afternoon, appellant saw the group of Lani Famero, Michael Fosana, Rex Cortez and Ricky Guarte drinking gin at the house of the Sps Manuel and Eliza Guarte, Ricky's parents. Appellant's house is about five (5) meters away from the house of Spouses Guarte. Appellant requested the group of Ricky to refrain from making any noise and they obliged. Later that evening, they heard stones being hurled at the roof of the house. The stoning was made three (3) times. Ricky rose from bed and peeped through a window. He saw appellant stoning their house. Ricky went out of the house and proceeded to appellant's house. Ricky asked
In determining the existence of conspiracy, it is not necessary to show that all the conspirators actually hit and killed the victim. The presence of conspiracy among the accused can be proven by their conduct before, during or after the commission of the crime showing that they acted in unison with each other, evincing a common purpose or design. There must be a showing that appellant cooperated in the commission of the offense, either morally, through advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. In such case, the act of one becomes the act of all, and each of the accused will therebybe deemed equally guiltyof the crime committed. The series of events in this case convincingly show that appellant and her co-accused acted in unison and cooperated with each other in killing William Lomida. Appellant was the
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appellant, his uncle, why he was stoning their house. Appellant did not answer but met Ricky at the doorstep of his (appellant's) house and, without any warning, stabbed Ricky on the abdomen with a bolo. Ricky was taken to the Romblon Provincial Hospital. Ricky had sustained one (1) stab wound but due to massive blood loss, he died while being operated. ISSUE: W/ N petitioner acted in complete self-defens e when he stabbed the victim. HELD: No. The OSG asserts that the petitioner failed to prove selfdefense with clear and convincing evidence. Hence, the decision of the CA affirming, on appeal, the decision of the RTC is correct. The petitioner testified that his bolo hit the victim accidentally. He asserted in the RTC and in the CA that he is exempt from criminal liability for the death of the victim under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
4. Any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of causing it.
victim in complete self-defense. The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories - (1) that he killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Self-defense, under Article 11, paragraph 1, and accident, under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, are affirmative defenses which the accused is burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence. The petitioner failed to prove that the victim was killed by accident, without fault or intention on his part to cause it. Thus, to prove self-defense, the petitioner was burdened to prove the essential elements thereof, namely: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the petitioner; (3) employment by him of reasonable means to prevent or repel the aggression. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstances of self-defense, whether complete or incomplete.[23] Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.[24] We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petitioner failed to prove self-defense, whether complete or incomplete: The evidence on record revealed that there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Ricky. While it was established that Ricky was stabbed at the doorstep of appellant's house which would give a semblance of verity to appellant's version of the incident, such view, however, is belied by the fact that Ricky arrived at appellant's house unarmed and had only one purpose in mind, that is, to ask appellant why he threw stones at his (Ricky's)house. With no weapon to attack appellant, or defend himself, no sign of hostility may be deduced from Ricky's arrival at appellant's doorstep. Ricky was not threatening to attack nor in any manner did he manifest any aggressive act that may have imperiled appellant's well-being. Ricky's want of any weapon when he arrived at appellant's doorstep is supported by the fact that only one weapon was presented in court, and that weapon was the bolo belonging to appellant which he used in stabbing Ricky. Thus, appellant's version of the events does not support a finding of unlawful aggression .
However, petitioner now alleges that he acted in self-defense when he stabbed the victim. As such, he contends, he is not criminally liable under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code which reads:
Art. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminalliability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it: Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
The petitioner avers that he was able to prove the essential elements of complete self-defense. The petitioner is proscribed from changing in this Court, his theory of defense which he adopted in the trial court and foisted in the CA - by claiming that he stabbed and killed the
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Appellant was not justified in stabbing Ricky. There was no imminent threat to appellant's life necessitating his assault on Ricky. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In the absence of such element, appellant's claim of self-defense must fail. Further, appellant's plea of self-defense is not corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.
and hacked him with a bolo. Conrado was able to parry the first bolo attack with his guitar. When Romeo continued to attack him, accused pulledhis bolo from his waist and they engaged in a duel. When Romeo felldown, Conrado run ( sic) away and went on foot to the Ziga Memorial Hospital where he was treated by Dr. Magayanes. While being treated in the hospital, the police arrived and he surrendered himself including his bolo. Felixberto Bo, a resident of Bonot, Tabaco, Albay, heard a shout for help at about 12:00 o'clock midnight on August 25, 1994 and being a Barangay Tanod he got down from his house and started to run towards the direction of the person shouting for help; that he met Conrado Casitas at the bridge and he asked Conrado what happened; that accused told him that Romeo Boringot waylaid him and that he left him (victim) on the ground; that Felixberto proceeded walking and saw Romeo Boringot by the roadside near a coconut tree and full of blood; that when he arrived, his compadre Reynaldo was already there; that Apolonio Bueza was also there; that Santos Bueza, a Kagawad member of the barrio and Benigno Boqueo also a member of the Barangay Councilwere also there including the wife of Romeo Boringot; that he was the one who took charge in having Romeo brought to the hospital (TSN, January 17, 1997, pp. 6-7; 11-13).[4 ]
41. CONRADO CASITAS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent . Upon reaching the pathway leading to the road and upon passing by a coconut tree, he was suddenly hacked at the back with a bolo which was more than one (1) foot long. He looked back at his assailant and he recognized him to be appellant Conrado Casitas whom he knew since the 1970's and whose face he clearly saw as light from the moon illuminated the place. Appellant hacked him on the back a second time. Romeo tried to scamper but he was blocked by appellant. In fact, appellant hacked him again, this time hitting him on his left forearm. The blow caused him to drop the flashlight he was holding. While in the prone position, appellant went on hacking him, hitting him on different parts of the body, including the ears and head. While hitting him, appellant was shouting invectives at him. Appellant also hit him with a guitar causing Romeo to sustain an injury on his forehead. All in all, he sustained eleven (11)wounds (TSN, March 12, 1996, pp. 25, 28-34; TSN, April 29, 1996, pp. 9, 12, 19-20; TSN, July 2, 1996, pp. 6-7). Romeo's wife, Aida, rushed to where he was. Upon seeinghis bloodied condition, Aida shouted for help. Some people came to their rescue. When somebody with a flashlight arrived, appellant fled (TSN, March 12, 1996, p. 32). The petitioner invoked self-defense. The CAsummarized the evidence of the petitioner in the RTC, thus: In the earlymorning of August 25, 1995 at around 12:30 o'clock, while Conrado Casitas was walking strumming his guitar and singing, Benhur Bonaobra pelted him with stones, hitting his chest twice. Romeo Boringot suddenly appeared
Rulingof the Court
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the numerous blows inflicted by appellant resulting to the eleven (11) wounds suffered by the victim on vital areas of the body were clear manifestations of a deliberate, determined assault, with intent to kill the victim, ruling out the claim of self-defense. If Conrado Casitas stabbed Romeo Boringot merely to defend himself, it certainly defies reason why he had to inflict eleven (11) wounds on the latter. It may be that, after the first few blows, one who acts in self-defens e might deal a few blows without changing the character of his defense , if this was done out of confusion or fear, but, after delivering several blows, to inflict a stab wound on the victim's throat as a coup de grace would negate any semblance of good faith and manifest a delibe rate and wanton intention to kill. Just as the presence and severity of a large number of wounds on the part of the victim disprove self-defense, so do they
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belie the claim of incomplete defense of a relative and indicate not the desire to defend one's relative but a determined effort to kill. The settled rule is that whether or not the accused acted in self-defens e, complete or incomplete, is a factual issue. And the legal aphorism is that factual findings of the trial court and its calibration of the testimonies of the witnes ses and its conclusions anchored on its findings are accorded by the appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, more so when affirmed by the CA. The exception is when it is established that the trial court ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case.[ 7 ] We have reviewed the records of the RTCand the CA and we find no justification to deviate from the trial court's findings and its conclusion. The petitioner was burdened to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, the confluence of the three essential requisites for complete self-defens e: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable means used by the person defending himself to repel or prevent the unlawful aggression; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. By invoking self-defens e, the petitioner thereby admitte d having delibe rately caused the victim's injuries. The burden of proof is shifted to him to prove with clear and convincing evidence all the requisites of his affirmative defense . He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution because even if the prosecution's evidence is weak, the same can no longer be disbelieved after the petitioner admitte d inflicting the mortal injuries on the victim.[ 8] In this case, the petitioner failed to prove his affirmative defense . First. The victim sustained 11 hacked wounds and lacerated wounds.[9] The number, nature and location of the victim's wounds belie the petitioner's claim that the said wounds on the victim were inflicted as they dueled with each other. The protagonists were face to face as they boloed each other. The petitioner failed to explain to the trial court how the victim sustained injuries on the proximal left posterior lateral left, at the back.[ 10] The use of a bolo to injure the victim as well as the number and location of the wounds inflicted on the victim are proof of the petitioner's intent to kill and not merely to defend himself.[ 11] In contrast, the petitioner merely sustained continuous hematoma and six linear abrasions.[ 12] At the time of the incident, the petitioner was intoxicated and disoriented. If, as he claimed, the victim hacked him with a bolo, it is incredible that he merely sustained abrasions and
contusions, while the victim sustained nine hacked wounds and lacerated wounds on different parts of the body. Second. Dr. Ray Magayanes, the witness for the petitioner, testified on re-direct examination that the wounds sustained by him could not have been caused by a bolo: q When you answered the question of the prosecutor that all these injuries could not have been caused by a bolo, you are referring to injuries other than the incised wound? All these injuries could not have been caused by a bolo.[13]
Third. The petitioner never surrendered voluntarily to the police authorities and admitted that he had injured the victim. This would have bolstered his claim that he boloed the victim to defendhimself.[ 14] The petitioner did not do so. Upon his discharge from the Ziga Memorial District Hospital a few hours after the treatment of his wounds, the petitioner left Tabaco, Albay, and hid in Manila. His address was unknown. It was only on October 5, 1995 that the policemen were able to arrest him on the basis of a warrant for his arrest used by the trial court.[ 15] By fleeing from his house and concealing his whereabouts for more than one year from the stabbing, the petitioner thereof implicably admitted his guilt.[ 16] The petitioner's claim that he was told by a policeman to flee to avoid aggravating the situation is flimsy. When asked about the identity of the policeman, the petitioner failed to identify the latter.[17 ] The Court cannot believe that a policeman would allow the petitioner, a suspect in a crime, to escape and thereby open himself to criminal and administrative charges. Fourth. The petitioner even failed to give a statement to the police authorities and lodge a complaint against the victim and Bonaobra for physical injuries or attempted homicide. If, as the petitioner, he was the hapless victim of unlawful aggression, he should have lodged the appropriate charges against Bonaobra and the victim. It was only when he testified before the trial court that he claimed for the first time that he acted in self-defense when he boloed the victim. On the petitioner's contention that he surrendered voluntarily to the police authorities, the Office of the Solicitor General disagreed,with the followingratiocinations: Appellant imputes error on the court a quo for not appreciating voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance in his favor (pp. 10-11, Appellant's Brief).
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The same does not persuade. It was incumbent upon appellant to prove his allegation that he indeed voluntarily surrendered to the authorities. This cannot prosper solelyon the basis of his self-serving statements, uncorroborated by any other unbiased and credible evidence. More importantly, this is debunked by the fact that he was arrested on October 5, 1995, which was a year after the incident (TSN, June 11, 1997, p. 18). The fact that he had to be arrested is clearly inconsistent with the claim that he voluntarily surrendered.[ 18] We agree with the Office of the Solicitor General. The petitioner even failed to identify the policeman to whom he surrendered voluntarily. The fact of the matter is that the petitioner fled from Tabaco and sought sanctuary in Manila.
their companions Gilbert de Guzman and Lenin Baldazo at the drinking session and holiday festivities then going on in the house of appellant's aunt Precy Baldoza. [14 ] The trouble that night allegedly began when appellant attempted to flirt with Balia by touching her hand when she passed the videoke microphone to him. According to appellant, what he did angered the victim, causing the latter to utter in a loud voice,"Putang ina mo, multo ka."[ 15] Immediately thereafter, Balia purportedly asked appellant to leave to avoid further problems. Thus, appellant claims to have gone, but that he was prompted to return to retrieve his mother, who had been left there in the course of their heated argument.[16 ] As he returned to fetch his mother, while situated about two (2) meters from his aunt's house, so appellant narrates, Nicolas suddenly appeared and pulled out a knife. Appellant approached Nicolas and asked, "Ano ba ang problema?" In the course of their argument, appellant allegedly attempted to wrestle the knife away from the victim. Consequently, in their struggle to gain possession of the knife, appellant and Nicolas fell on the ground, with the latter landing on top of appellant. According to appellant, he was surprised to see that the knife had pierced the stomach of Nicolas. Confused, as he was himself bloodied, appellant explains, he ran away and left the victim without helping him.[17 ] Appellant went straight to his home where he told his wife and father about what had transpired. His father then went to the police station and came back with two (2) police officers.[ 18] To counter the defense's account of the incident, the prosecution presented Balia who claimed to have witnessed the killing of the victim. Her testimony attested to the following facts: In the evening of 25 December 1997, appellant and Lopez joined a get-together at the house of Baldazo where, among others, Nicolas and Balia were present. Throughout the night, the group drank beer and sang in celebration of the holidays. Sometime during the drinking spree, however, Balia noticed that appellant had surreptitiously left in a hurry without explanat ion and thereafter disappeared for a considerable amount of time. Balia believes that at that point, appellant went home to get the murder weapon as his mother appeared at the venue of the festivities thereafter and inquired whether her son had a fight with anyone.[ 19]
42. PP VS CONCEPCIONPEREZ x---------------------------------------------------------------------------x Criminal Case No. 423-M-98 That on or about the 26th day of December 1997, in the municipality of Bustos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill one Rolando F. Nicolas, with treachery, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife said [sic] Rolando F. Nicolas, hitting him on his abdomen, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the said Rolando F. Nicolas.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. Subsequently, the defense manifested at pre-trial that while appellant indeed stabbed Nicolas in the stomach once, he did so however in self-defense. For this reason, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, ordered the conduct of reverse proceedings with the defense first to present its evidence on the alleged self-defense.[ 11]
[ 10]
. The defense's version of the incident runs, thus: At about 11o'clock in the evening of 25th of December 1997, appellant and his friend Lopez joined Nicolas, Balia, and
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At around 11:45 that evening, the festivities ended uneventfully. Appellant, who was first to leave the group, seated himself in the veranda outside the house. He was followed by his mother, Nicolas, Balia and the rest. As Balia and Nicolas were going out of the house and into the veranda, the latter paused and stooped slightly to light a cigarette.[20 ] Balia saw appellant suddenly stand up, rush toward Nicolas and stab him. Thereafter, appellant fled. Nicolas was stunned, managing to utter only the words, "Why, Joey?" before collapsing. He was rushed to a nearby hospital where he expired.[21] Appellant argues that all the essential elements of selfdefense were sufficiently established to exculpate him from liability. He contends that no evidence on record shows that he intended to kill the victim; if at all, the death of the victim was purely accidental and only triggered by the provocation committed by the victim when he attacked appellant with a knife.[ 29] Case law has established that in invoking selfdefense , whether complete or incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
[ 30 ]
the victim of an unlawful aggression in order to be entitled to his claim of self-defense.[ 34] This is so, because it is a fundamental principle that one who exculpates himself with an allegation of justification has the burden of fully showing the concurrence of all the elements constituting the defense invoked.[ 35] Unlawful aggression presupposes not merely a threatening or an intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, which imperils one's life or limb.[ 36] It is the first and primordial element of self-defense. Without it, the justifying circumstance cannot be invoked.[ 37] Hence, it is crucial to determine whether or not the victim Nicolas was indeed the unlawful aggressor. He was not. Aggression to be unlawful must be actual and imminent, such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that person is seeking to defend. As adequately established by the prosecution, there was no incident to speak of which would amount to aggression, much less unlawful aggression, on the part of the victim. Correspondingly, appellant failed to present any corroborative evidence to buttress his bare allegations, despite the presence of many persons during the incident who could have been called to testify. His lone testimony in support of his claim of self-defense under the circumstances is simply not enough to establish his defense. Appellant is not even sure of his real defense. He asserts that his acts were made in self-defense, but he suggests at the same time that the victim's death was accidental. The incongruent claims make his overall theory implausible. While appellant's slaying of Nicolas is a proven fact, the prosecution however failed to prove the presence of treachery to qualify the killing to murder. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [3 8] The barefaced fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery.[4 5] The prosecution has the burden to prove that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously
We find that appellant has miserably failed to demonstrate that the death of Nicolas had occurred on the occasion of a legitimate self-defense on his part. The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence since he admits the commission of the alleged criminal act. [ 31] One who admits the infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of proving selfdefense with sufficient and convincing evidence, for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing. [ 32] Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. If the accused's evidence is of doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must necessarily fail.[ 33] Accordingly, there can be no self-defense unless there was unlawful aggression on the accused. It thus follows that the accused has the burden of proof to show that he was
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and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack employed by him.[ 46] When the prosecution fails to prove treachery, as in this case, the accused may be held liable only for homicide not murder.[ 47] 43. CABUSLAYVS PP The prosecution presented evidence proving the following as facts: Paquito Umas-as, 34, was one of the four children of Generoso Umas-as of Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City. Still single, Paquito earned a living as a collector of payments for assorted articles such as jackets, mats, thermos and plates that he sold on credit. Paquito collected as much as P70,000.00 for a period of four months and the net profit of such collections was divided equally between him and his employer. [6 ] At around 8:30 in the morningof 5 August 1992, Leoncio Tagapulot Zaragosa, a refrigeration technician helper and resident of Roosevelt Street, Iligan City, was conversing with Felix Lauriana [10 ]near the school building in Lapayan, Libertad, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte when a Hammer (Hummer)truck parked in front of them.[ 11] Four policemen alighted, followed by a driver. The police thereafter halted the collector who was riding a motorcycle from Lapayan. The collector was wearing a blue denim jacket with foldedsleeves and blue denim pants.[ 12] The police asked the collector to show his identification card (ID). The collector took the ID out of his left pocket and when it reached the "front man," one of the policemen, who Zaragosa later verified as the petitioner, opened fire at the collector whose right hand was then raised. The four other policemen meanwhile had their firearms pointed at the collector. [ 13] Petitioner, who was four meters away from the collector, consumed the entire magazine of his M-16 armalite in firing at him. The collector fellto the ground and was still moving when the police placed him on board a vehicle and brought him to Kolambugan.[ 14] One of the policemen rode on the collector's motorcycle and likewise headed for Kolambugan.[ 15]
Director of the Philippine National Police (PNP), Lanao del Norte Command stated that he had received a reliable intelligence report of a plot to assassinate the Mayor and ViceMayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and Governor Abalos and his family. In response to the intelligence report, he dispatched a team of PNP personnel to conduct mobile checkpoints along the national highways in several municipalities and to check on people who would possibly carry out the plot. Jubail claims that the intelligence report was proven accurate after a few months because the Vice-Mayor of Kauswagan was killed in Samborong, Linamon and in December of the same year, Governor Abalos was assassinated in Iligan City.[ 21] The team headed by Senior Inspector Celso G. Regencia included SPO4 Rosello Canoy, SPO2 Jovito Cabuslay, C2C Nilo Montebon and C2C Gerry Cane. Their area of responsibility consisted of the twenty-two (22) municipalities of Lanao del Norte. In full military outfit, save for Canoy as he was assigned to the Intelligence Operatives Command, the men established a mobile checkpoint on 5 August 1992 at the national highway, Barangay Libertad, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the purpose of intercepting armed men who intend to carry out the assassination plot.[22 ] At about 8:30 in the morning, a man riding on a red Honda motorcycle [23 ] going to the direction of Pagadian City approached the mobile checkpoint. The motorcycle rider was allegedly wearing a black bonnet, sunglasses, sweatshirt and gloves that coveredthe half portion of his fingers.[ 24] Regencia testified that he signaled the motorcycle rider to stop at the right side of the road. He asked for the identification card of the motorcycle rider who pretended to reach for his wallet, but instead pulled out a gun. He heard a shot and his thigh went numb. As he rolled to the ground, he heard a volley of gunshots after which petitioner approached him. Regencia then approached the motorcyclist and removed his bonnet to be able to identify him. Regencia later found out that the motorcyle rider was shot by petitioner. [25 ] Regencia ordered his men to load the motorcycle rider to the truck. The victim later identified as Paquito Umas-as was still alive when he was loaded on the hummer vehicle to be brought to a hospital, but was pronounced dead on arrival by Dr. Caga, the attending physician. Regencia then asked that he be given first-aid treatment for the wounds he sustained. He thereafter turned over the rider's motorcycle, sunglasses and revolver to the police station at Kauswagan. And after bringing the victim's body to a funeral home in Kolambugan, he
The defense presented a different version of the commission of the crime. Petitioner presented as witnesses Julmunier Akbar Jubail, Celso Gomera Regencia and Jovito Luna Cabuslay. Police Superintendent Julmunier A. Jubail, Provincial
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proceeded to Baroy General Hospital where his wounds were treated by a certain Dr. Fabin.[ 26] To prove that he was wounded during the incident, Regencia showed to the court a quo the scars caused by the gunshot wounds. There were three scars, one of which was the entry of the bullet and the other two were splinter wounds. He said that the bullet used was the kind that splinters upon hitting an object. He presented a medical certificate under the signature of Dr. Demterio U. Opamen, Jr.[ 27] For his defense, petitioner confirmed Regencia's testimony that the latter had directed an approaching motorcyclist to stop at the right side of the highway. He heard Regencia ask the motorcycle rider in Visayan dialect to show his identification card. Cabuslay then saw Paquito Umas-as shoot Celso Regencia. This and his belief that he was the next target prompted him to shoot the motorcycle rider with his M16.[ 28] Police Superintendent Jubail was immediately informed of the incident and on the basis of Regencia's account, he sent out a "Spot Report"[29] to inform Recon 9 and 13. The report is couched as follows: "SPOT REPORT x x x CMM SPO2 JOVITO CABUSLAY CMM INSP REGENCIA'S BACK-UP OPEN FIRE (sic) HITTING AND FATTALY (sic) WOUNDING SAID UNIDENT(IFIED) PERSON WWITH (sic) MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS IN HIS BODY AND DIED ON THE SPOT PD RESPONDING PNP ELEMETS RECOVERED FROM THE VICTIM'S BODY ALFA CAL. 38 REVOLVER SMITH AND WESSON (HM) SN 236701 WITH ONE (1) EMPTYSHELLAND 5 UNSPENT AMMO x xx" Petitioner justified the shooting of Paquito Umas-as because he believed that he would be the next person to be shot at by the victim; and having acted in defense of his person and that of his superior officer, he asserted before the court a quo that he has no criminal liability because of the attendance of the following circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the victim; (c) lack of sufficient provocation on his part, and in the case of defense of his superior officer, he was not induced by revenge, resentment, or other evilmotives.
All of these requisites being present, petitioner claimed there was legal justification for shooting Paquito Umas-as.[3 2] The Sandiganbayan however grave credence to the version of the prosecution and rejected the version of petitioner. So, it found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide. It accorded full faith and credence to the testimony of Zaragosa as it was "categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and consistent." Moreover, it observed that no proof was adduced to show that Zaragosa was moved by some evil motive to falsely testify against the accused Cabuslay.[ 33] Hence, petitioner filed the instant petition before the Court, insisting that the Sandiganbayan erred in not crediting him the justifying circumstance of self-defense or defense of a stranger or the lawful exercise of a right or office.[38 ] We have minutely scrutinized the assailed Decision and find it amply supported by the evidence on record. Petitioner claims that he acted in self-defense and in defense of Regencia. One who invokes self-defense admits responsibility for the killing. Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts to the accused who must then prove the justifying circumstance. He must show by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in self-defense, or in defense of a relative or a stranger. With clear and convincing evidence, all the following elements of self-defense must be established: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.[ 47 ] Self-defense, like alibi, is a defense which can easily be concocted. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that once an accused has admitted that he inflicted the fatal injuries on the deceased, it is incumbent upon him in order to avoid criminal liability, to prove the justifying circumstance claimed by him with clear, satisfactoryand convincing evidence. He cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution but on the strength of his own evidence, "for even if the evidence of the prosecution were weak it could not be disbelieved after the accused himself had admitted the killing."[4 8] Thus, petitioner must establish with clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. In order that defense of a stranger may be appreciated, the following requisites must concur: (1) unlawful aggression
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by the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means to prevent or repel it; and (3) the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other evilmotive.[ 49 ] Unlawful aggression is the first and primordial element of self-defens e. Of the three requisites, it is the most important. Without it, the justifying circumstance cannot be invoked. If there is no unlawful aggression, there is nothing to prevent or repel.[ 5 0] Unlawful aggression refers to an attack or a threat to attack, positively showing the intent of the aggressor to cause injury. It presupposes not merely a threatening or an intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an imminent danger thereof, which imperils one's life or limb. Thus, when there is no peril, there is no unlawful aggression.[51] It is crucial to ask whether the victim Paquito was an unlawful aggressor. We answer this question in the negative. Aggression to be unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that person is seeking to defend. Petitioner asserts that he was the victim's next target, thus the need to shoot the victim in self-defense. His claim should be disbelieved. As he himself had explicitly testified before respondent court, the hummer jeep was behind him and was parked about three to four meters from the national highway.[52 ] He also stated that Paquito could not have seen the hummer jeep because it was obscured by Muslim houses. [ 53] It only follows that if from Paquito's perspective, he cannot see the hummer jeep which is a fairly large vehicle, then he could not have seen petitioner as well. If Paquito cannot see petitioner from where he was positioned, then Paquito could not have possibly aimed to shoot at petitioner. Petitioner's contention therefore that there was an imminent threat of bodily harm coming from Paquito upon his person is at best illusory. There was no peril, ergo, there was no unlawful aggression. It should also be recalled that at the time, Cane was on top of the hummer jeep manning the machine gun.[ 54] If Regencia had indeed been shot as the defense insists, then Cane was better situated to defend Regencia. It is implausible how an officer like him, in such a strategic position and trained in the operation of the said weapon could have omitted firing a shot in Regencia's defense. More to the point, it is beyond credulity that the outbursts of gunfire hardly elicited any
reaction from the other police officers who were only a few meters away from the crime scene and who continued conducting their search on the bus which was then about to pass the checkpoint. [5 5] Likewise noteworthy is the fact that after the second burst of fire on Paquito, knowing that Paquito was still alive[ 56] and in all probability was still holding a handgun,[57 ] petitioner chose to assist Regencia instead of making sure that Paquito had been immobilized and disarmed, basic to a policeman's training. In addition, the claim of the defense that Paquito shot Regencia on his right thigh is untenable. Petitioner would have the Court believe that Paquito dared challenge five policemen, four of them in full battlegear, at a checkpoint and armed with only a handgun. This is contrary to ordinary human experience, as well as the human instinct which is to flee for dear life and seek safety. If indeed Paquito was armed and had criminal designs in his mind, the natural tendency upon seeing a checkpoint ahead would be to abort one's plans and leave the premises immediately. Petitioner's story not only was contrary to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life, in all appearances it was also contrived.[ 58] Respondent court was correct in rejecting it. We also confirm that the medical certificate presentedby Rege Regencia to prove that he had been shot by the victim has no probative value. The physician who signed the same was never presented as witness for the defense. We also note that the physician who signed said medical certificate, a certain Dr. Demterio U. Opamen, Jr., is different from the doctor who according to Regencia had treated his wounds.[5 9] It is also worthy of note that the defense never presented in evidence the gun Paquito allegedly use to shoot Regencia. The gun was also not clearly identified. Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim must be positively proved and said gun would have been a vital evidence to establish this requisite. Petitioner, however, insists that he would have presented the gun had not respondent court pressured him to rest his case and submit it for decision. Such contention hardly inspires belief. Records reveal that petitioner never made it known to respondent court that the defense would be presenting the gun allegedly used by Paquito. What the defense did manifest was their intention to present one Major Bartolino to testify that he had received the gun allegedly used by Paquito and that he had brought it to the NBI on 30
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September 1992 for examination. It should be underscored that the defense was not even sure that there was an NBI report on said examination. The defense was well aware of the relevance of the NBI report to prove their allegations that the victim was carrying a gun and used the same on Regencia, especially since the victim was reported to be negative of nitrates on his hands. No cogent reason could be thought of for the failure to secure a copy of the report or even know of its existence. It should be noted that the examination was made as early as September 1992. A party's failure to produce evidence, which if favorable would naturally have been produced, is open to the inference that the facts were unfavorable to his case.[ 61] This Court can only conclude that said gun never existed, and this explains the failure of the defense to present it before respondent court. Thus, it is immaterial to delve on the issue raised by the petitioner on the discrepancy of the make of the gun as noted by respondent court in its Decision.
organs.[ 67] Petitioner testified that he pulled the trigger of his armalite twice.[6 8] He aimed at "the front of his body, at the chest, up to the stomach."[6 9] Had petitioner merely defended himself from the victim's unlawful aggression, one shot to immobilize him would have been enough. There was no reason for petitioner to shoot him seven more times, even aiming at his vital organs. It bears repeating that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove a plea for self-defense or defense of stranger because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defend oneself.[ 70] In the instant case, Paquito's wounds serve to tell us that petitioner was induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive and that he was set on killing the victim. Petitioner's avowal that his first shot was single but went automatic on the second shot is likewise unbelievable.[ 71] Petitioner's armalite has a selector that switches it from single shot to automatic. Since it was petitioner who was in possession of the firearm and he admitted that he fired the shots, we reasonably conclude that it was he who switched the firearm to automatic firing. All told, petitioner failed to satisfy the requirements of self-defens e and defense of a stranger to justify the shooting of Paquito. Next, petitioner contends that the killing of Paquito resulted from the lawful performance of his duty as police officer. However, such justifying circumstance may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that the accused acted in the performance of a duty, and the injury or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.[ 72] These two requisites are wanting in this case. The victim was not committing any offense at the time. Petitioner has not sufficiently proven that the victim had indeed firedat Regencia. Killing the victim under the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a valid performance of a lawful duty by a man who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to protect the lives of the people. As aptly held inPeople v. de la Cruz,[ 73] "Performance of duties does not include murder . Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim."
On the alleged inconsistencies in Zaragoza's testimony, it is relevant to state that a witness is not expected to remember an occurrence with perfect recollection of the minute details. Thus, even the most truthfulof witnesses may err and often give confusing statements. What is important is that Zaragosa unwaveringly, forthrightly and unequivocally declared that petitioner shot at the victim. Neither did he falter in identifying the gunman.[ 65] All in all, petitioner has failed to prove unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. Without this essential element, petitioner cannot successfully invoke self-defens e. Even assuming that he tried to defend a stranger, his defense would not prosper. In defense of a stranger, unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is also indispensable. In both self-defens e and defense of a stranger, unlawful aggression is a primordial element. Granting arguendo that there was unlawful aggression, we find that petitioner's contention that he employed reasonable means to repelthe aggression must fail. It is settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply material commensurability between the means of attack and defense. What the law requires is rational equivalence.[6 6] Also, the nature and number of wounds suffered by Paquito negate any claim of self-defense or defense of a stranger. The Court notes that the victim sustained eight gunshot wounds which were all fatal as they affected vital
44. PP VS ENFECTANA That on November 2, 1994, at about 11:00 o'clock in the morning, at the National Highway, Barangay Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the
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jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to killand with evident premeditation and treachery and without justifiable cause, did then and there wilfully,unlawfully and feloniously bumped Leo Boco and the complainant Adelaida Boco with the trycicle (sic) of the accused, when the victim has just alighted from a passenger jeepney, then attacked, assaulted, hacked, stabbed and wounded Leo Boco with the use of sharp bladed weapons, which the accused provided themselves for the purpose, therebyinflicting injuries upon Leo Boco, which injuries caused the instantaneous death of Leo Boco, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the victim, in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines and other related laws and caused injuries on the complainant, Adelaida Boco, when she was bumped by the trycicle (sic) named "Pepit" owned and operated by the herein accused and driven by coaccused Erwin Enfectana. Upon arraignment, appellants pleaded "not guilty"to the charge. Thereafter trial ensued. Appellant EUSEBIOENFECTANA testifiedthat on November 2, 1994, at around 11:00 A.M., while he was at home, someone arrived and informed him that his tricycle was involved in an accident. He went to the place and saw his tricycle turned upside down with its windshieldbroken. Suddenly, he saw Leo Boco running towards him with a "dipang" (a small bolo). He evaded the attacks of Leo Boco and managed to get hold of a piece of wood which he used to defendhimself. Still, Leo Boco persistedin attacking him until he was able to get hold of a bolo which he used in stabbing Leo. According to him, he was able to stab Leo in the right hand and chest. Aside from this he was also able to hack him in the neck. As Leo fell down from these counter-attacks, according to appellant, he took Leo's bolo and used this to stab him. He was then chased by the sons and the cousin of Leo Boco up to his house which they pelted with stones. After they stopped, Eusebio decided to call the authorities to surrender himself.xvi>[11] Appellant ERWINENFECTANA testifiedthat he is 24 years old, married, and a resident of Cabay, Balangkayan, Eastern Samar. According to him, at around 11:00 A.M. of November 2, 1994, while he was waiting for passengers in Bgy. Cabay, Balangkayan, he saw Leo Boco running toward him with a small bolo. In his effort to escape, he accidentally bumped his tricycle on a fence. He fell down because of the impact but he immediately stood up and ran away because Leo Boco was still chasing him with a bolo. In order to escape, he hid in the house of Osias Montes where he learned that his father,
Eusebio Enfectana, and Leo Boco had a quarrel.xvii>[12] IN NOT CONSIDERINGTHAT APPELLANT EUSEBIO ENFECTANAACTEDIN SELF-DEFENSE. In essence, the issues here are (1) whether the trial court properlygave credence to the version of the prosecution while disbelievingthat of the defense; (2) whether there is self defense on the part of Eusebio Enfectana; and, (3) whether the circumstance of treachery should be appreciated to qualify the offense to murder. Likewise, we must further inquire into the propriety of the civil indemnity and damages awarded by the trial court. Appellant Eusebio Enfectana admits that he killed Leo Boco. He, however, alleges that he acted in self-defens e . According to him, he was attacked first and he had no option but to kill the aggressor. On the other hand, appellant Erwin denies any participation in the killing and alleges that he was nowhere near the place where the incident transpired. Both appellants assail the finding of the trial court that they are liable for the death of Leo Boco. According to them, it was the victim, Leo Boco, who had the motive to commence the assault upon Eusebio Enfectana because of Boco's conviction resulting from a complaint lodged against him by the Enfectanas. They add that Boco also lost in a civilcase involving his house. As for the issue of self -defense , it is an established principle that once this justifying circumstance is raised, the burden of proving the elements of the claim shifts to him who invokes it. xviii>[24] The elements of self-defens e are: (1) that the victim has committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual or imminent threat to the life and limb of the person claiming self-defens e; (2) that there be reasonable necessity in the means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) that there be lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defens e or, at least, that any provocation executed by the person claiming self-defens e be not the proximate and immediate cause of the victim's aggression. xix>[ 25] The condition of unlawful aggression is a sine qua non ; otherwise stated, there can be no self-defens e, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the person defending himself. xx>[26] Given the fact that the relationship betweenthe parties had been marred by ill willand animosities, and pursuant to the rule on the burden of evidence imposed by law on the party invoking self-defense, the admission of appellant Eusebio
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Enfectana that he killed Leo Boco made it incumbent upon appellant to convincingly prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim which necessitated the use of deadlyforce by appellant. Unfortunately, appellant miserably failed to prove the existence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. As found by the trial court: The version of the accused [appellant] that it was Leo Boco who was the unlawful aggressor and that Leo Boco attacked and stabbed him while he was inspecting his tiltedtricycle on the highway cannot be given faith and credit it being an afterthought, self-serving and expert invention and/ or imagination sans truth.xxi>[27] Weighing the conflicting versions of the prosecution and the defense, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that the prosecution's version is more in accord with the natural course of things, hence more credible. Anent the thirdissue, we also agree with the trial court that treachery is present in this case. The victim and his wife were suddenly attacked as they were coming down from a jeepney. They had no idea that they were going to be assaulted. The manner by which the appellants commenced and perpetrated their assault, (1) by tryingto bump Leo and Adelaida Boco, making the former lose his balance and more susceptible to an attack, and (2) by simultaneously attacking Leo Boco, hence preventing him from putting up any semblance of defense, shows beyond any doubt that there was alevosia in this case. Settled is the rule that an unexpected and suddenattack under circumstances that render the victim unable and unprepared to defendhimself constitutes alevosia.xxii>[28] 45. MANABANVS CA The Facts The facts as narrated by the trial court are as follows On October 11, 1996, at around 1:25 o'clock in the morning, Joselito Bautista, a father and a member of the UP Police Force, took his daughter, Frinzi, who complained of difficulty in breathing, to the UP Health Center. There, the doctors prescribed certain medicines to be purchased. Needing money therefore, Joselito Bautista, who had taken alcoholic drinks earlier, proceeded to the BPI Kalayaan Branch to withdraw some money from its Automated Teller Machine (ATM). Upon arrival at the bank, Bautista proceeded to the ATM booth but because he could not effectively withdraw
money, he started kicking and pounding on the machine. For said reason, the bank security guard, Ramonito Manaban, approached and asked him what the problem was. Bautista complained that his ATM was retrieved by the machine and that no money came out of it. After Manaban had checked the receipt, he informed Bautista that the Personal Identification Number (PIN) entered was wrong and advised him to just return the next morning. This angered Bautista all the more and resumed pounding on the machine. Manaban then urged him to calm down and referred him to their customer service over the phone. Still not mollified, Bautista continued raging and striking the machine. When Manaban could no longer pacify him, he fired a warning shot. That diverted the attention of Bautista. Instead of venting his ire against the machine, he confronted Manaban. After some exchange of words, a shot rang out fatally hitting Bautista. [4] On 24 October 1996, Manaban was charged with the crime of murder. The Information states: That on or about the 11th day of October 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, armed with a gun, and with intent to kill, qualified by treachery, did then and there wilfully,unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one JOSELITO BAUTISTA, by then and there, shooting him at the back portion of his body, thereby inflicting upon said JOSELITO BAUTISTA mortal wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said JOSELITO BAUTISTA. [5] The Defense's Version Manaban, the accused, testified that he was employed by Eagle Star Security Agency as a security guard and was assigned at BPI Kalayaan. On 10 October 1996, he was on duty from 7:00 p.m. until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Manaban narrated that on 11 October 1996, about 1:40 a.m., Bautista tried to withdraw money from the ATM. Manaban then saw Bautista pounding and kicking the ATM. When Manaban asked Bautista what was the problem, Bautista replied that no money came out from the machine. According to Manaban, Bautista appeared to be intoxicated. Manaban looked at the receipt issued to Bautista and saw that the receipt indicated that a wrong PIN was entered. Manaban informed Bautista that the ATM captured Bautista's ATM card because he entered the wrong PIN. He then advised Bautista to return the followingday when the staff in charge of servicing the ATM would be around.
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Bautista replied that he needed the money very badly and then resumed pounding on the ATM. Manaban tried to stop Bautista and called by telephone the ATM service personnel to pacify Bautista. Bautista talked to the ATM service personnel and Manaban heard him shouting invectives and saw him pounding and kicking the ATM again. When Manaban failed to pacify Bautista, Manaban fired a warning shot in the air. Bautista then faced him and told him not to block his way because he needed the money very badly. Bautista allegedly raised his shirt and showed his gun which was tucked in his waist. Manaban stepped back and told Bautista not to draw his gun, otherwise he wouldshoot.
However, Bautista allegedly kept on moving toward Manaban, who again warned Bautista not to come near him or he would be forced to shoot him. Bautista suddenly turned his back and was allegedly about to draw his gun. Fearing that he would be shot first, Manaban pulled the trigger and shot Bautista. Manaban recounted that he then went inside the bank and called the police and his agency to report the incident. While he was inside the bank, a fellow security guard arrived and asked what happened. Manaban answered, "wala yan, lasing." Later, a mobile patrol car arrived. Manaban related the incident to the police officer and informed him that Bautista was still alive and had a gun. Manaban then surrendered his service firearm to the police officer. According to Manaban, he fired his gun twice - once in the air as a warning shot and the second time at Bautista who was about four meters from him. [19] On cross-examination, Manaban further explained that after he fired the warning shot, Bautista kept coming toward him. Manaban pointed his gun at Bautista and warned him not to come closer. When Bautista turned his back, Manaban thought Bautista was about to draw his gun when he placed his right hand on his waist. Fearing for his life, he pulled the trigger and shot Manaban. According to Manaban, "[n]oong makita ko siya na pabalikwas siya, na sadya bubunot ng baril, sa takot ko na baka maunahan niya ako at mapatay, doon ko na rin nakalabit yung gatilyo ng baril." Manaban declared that it did not occur to him to simply disable the victim for fear that Bautista wouldshoot him first. [20]
The trial court heldthat the defense failed to establish self-defense as a justifying circumstance. According to the trial court, unlawful aggression, which is the most essential element to support the theory of self-defense, was lacking in this case. The trial court found that, contrary to Manaban's claim, Bautista was not about to draw his gun to shoot Manaban. Evidence show that Bautista's gun was still tucked in his waist inside a locked holster. Furthermore, the trial court held that Bautista could not have surprised Manaban with a preemptive attack because Manaban himself testified that he already had his gun pointed at Bautista when they were facing each other. The trial court likewise rejected Manaban's claim of exemption from criminal liability because he acted under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. The trial court held that the requisites for the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear under paragraph 6, Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are not present in this case. However, the trial court creditedManaban with two mitigating circumstances: voluntary surrender and obfuscation. The Court of Appeals' Ruling On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals later reconsidered and modified its decision with respect only to the award of loss of earning capacity. Using the formula 2/ 3 [80 - age at the time of death] x [gross annual income - 80% gross annual income], the Court of Appeals recomputed the award for loss of earning capacity. In its Resolution dated 8 November 2001, the Court of Appeals reduced the award for the loss of the victim's earning capacity from P1,418,040 to P436,320. The Issues In his petition for review, Manaban submits that: 2. The Respondent Court gravely erred in ignoring petitioner's self-defense on the sole fact that the entrance of the deceased victim's wound was from the back. 3. The Respondent Court gravely erred in concluding that petitioner failed to establish unlawful aggression just because the holster of the victim was still in a lock position. 4. Granting arguendo that petitioner made a mistake in his appreciation that there was an attempt on the part of the deceased victim to draw his gun who executed "bumalikwas," such mistake of fact is deemed justified.
The Court's Ruling
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The petition is partly meritorious. Unlawful Aggression is an Indispensable Requisite of Self-Defense When the accused invokes self-defens e, he in effect admits killing the victim and the burden is shifted to him to prove that he killed the victim to save his life. [ 27] The accused must establish by clear and convincing evidence that all the requisites of self-defens e are present. [28] Under paragraph 1, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, the three requisites to prove self-defense as a justifying circumstance which may exempt an accused from criminal liability are: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused or the person defending himself. [29] Unlawful aggression is an indispensable requisite of selfdefense. [30] Self-defense is founded on the necessity on the part of the person being attacked to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. [31] Thus, without prior unlawful and unprovoked attack by the victim, there can be no complete or incomplete self-defense. [32] Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault or at least a threat to attack or inflict physical injury upon a person. [ 33] A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not considered unlawful aggression, [ 34] unless the threat is offensive and menacing, manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. [35] There must be an actual, sudden, unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, which puts the defendant's life in real peril. [36] In this case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. First, Bautista was shot at the back as evidenced by the point of entry of the bullet. Second, when Bautista was shot, his gun was still inside a locked holster and tucked in his right waist. Third, when Bautista turned his back at Manaban, Manaban was already pointing his service firearm at Bautista. These circumstances clearly belie Manaban's claim of unlawful aggression on Bautista's part. Manaban testified: The allegation of Manaban that Bautista was about to draw his gun when he turned his back at Manaban is mere speculation. Besides, Manaban was already aiming his loaded firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back. In that situation, it was Bautista whose life was in danger considering that Manaban, who had already fired a warning shot, was
pointing his firearm at Bautista. Bautista, who was a policeman, would have realized this danger to his life and would not have attempted to draw his gun which was still inside a locked holster tucked in his waist. Furthermore, if Manaban really feared that Bautista was about to draw his gun to shoot him, Manaban could have easily disabled Bautista by shooting his arm or leg considering that Manaban's firearm was already aimed at Bautista. Aggression presupposes that the person attacked must face a real threat to his life and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not imaginary. [38] Absent such actual or imminent peril to one's life or limb, there is nothing to repel and there is no justification for taking the life or inflicting injuries on another. [39] The trial court credited Manaban with two mitigating circumstances: voluntarysurrender and obfuscation. It is undisputed that Manaban called the police to report the shooting incident. When the police arrived, Manaban surrendered his service firearm and voluntarily went with the police to the police station for investigation. Thus, Manaban is entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On obfuscation, we find that the facts of the case do not entitle Manaban to such mitigating circumstance. Under paragraph 6, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is appreciated where the accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. The requisites of the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation are: (1) that there should be an act both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) that the act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity. [40] In his testimony, Manaban admitted shooting Bautista because Bautista turned around and was allegedly about to draw his gun to shoot Manaban. The act of Bautista in turning around is not unlawfuland sufficient cause for Manaban to lose his reason and shoot Bautista. That Manaban interpreted such act of Bautista as preparatory to drawing his gun to shoot Manaban does not make Bautista's act unlawful. The threat was only in the mind of Manaban and is mere speculation which is not sufficient to produce obfuscation which is mitigating. [41] Besides, the threat or danger was not grave or serious considering that Manaban had the advantage over
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Bautista because Manaban was already pointing his firearm at Bautista when the latter turned his back. The defense failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence the cause that allegedlyproduced obfuscation. 46. PP VS BELTRAN Murder is one of the instances when man descends to a level lower than that of the beast, for it is non-instinctive killing, a delibe rate destruction of a member of the same species for reasons other than survival.[1] On 3 November 1999, appellant was indicted in an Information[4] for Murder allegedlycommitted as follows: That on or about October 25, 1999 at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening at Velasquez Road, Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a bolo, a deadly weapon, with intent to killand with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and hack with the said bolo, suddenly and without warning one Norman Concepcion y Habla while the latter was unarmed and completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on the different parts of his body, which directly caused the victim's death. When arraigned on 9 November 1999, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty"to the charge therein.[5] Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. Ever D. Sales (Ever) was a resident of Velasquez Subdivision, Barangay Sta. Rita, Batangas City. He worked as a gasoline boy in CaltexGasoline Station at San Pascual, Batangas City. Ever testified that on 25 October 1999, at about 10:00 in the evening, he left his workplace and proceeded home using his bicycle. While traversing the Velasquez Road, he saw appellant holding a bolo and standing in front of his house situated at the side of Velasquez Road. On the opposite side of the same road, he saw Norman H. Concepcion (Norman) standing in front of an automobile repair shop. Exhausted by the travel, Ever decided to stop by and rest momentarily at a nipa hut near the same road. Minutes later, he saw appellant, from a distance of six meters, stalking Norman who was then walking near the automobile shop. Appellant approached Norman, and, without a warning, hacked him with a bolo. Norman tried to avoid the blow by moving backwards and shielding his face with his left arm. However, Norman's left hand was hit and wounded by the bolo. When Norman turned around and ran, appellant hacked him at the back causing him to fall down on a grassy area. Appellant repeatedlyhacked Norman with a bolo.
Fearing for his own safety, Ever immediately left the nipa hut and sought help in a nearby sari-sari store. Later, he went to the crime scene and found no trace of appellant. He also discovered the bloodied and lifeless body of Norman sprawled on the ground. Afterwards, he proceeded home and narrated to a relative named Renato Sales (Renato) what he just witnessed. Later, Renato informed a certain Carmina Baliwag of the incident, who in turn, relayed the same to Normita Concepcion (Normita), the sister of Norman. Ever also declared that he did not know of any reason why appellant hacked Norman to death.[6] On the other hand, the defense argued its case by presenting the testimony of the appellant himself and a certain Dr. Luisito Briones. Appellant admitted that he hacked Norman with a bolo but insisted that he did the same in self-defense. He narrated that on 25 October 1999, at about 10:00 in the evening, he and his mother were resting inside their house when suddenly, he heard Norman shouting and insulting him outside their house and challenging him to a fight. When he came out of the house, he noticed that Norman was accompanied by several unidentified persons. Thereafter, he tried to pacify Norman but the latter slapped the back of his head and pulled out an ice pick from his pocket. He retreated and looked for something to defend himself. He found a bolo near a tamarind tree in front of their house and took the same. When Norman was about to enter appellant's house, the latter hacked him with the bolo. Norman tried to avoid the blow but the same hit his left arm. Appellant lost grip of the bolo and the same fell on the ground. While appellant was reaching for the bolo, Norman grabbed his head and tried to stab him with the icepick. Appellant, however, eluded the counter-attack but he sustained a minor wound on the forehead. Upon gaining control of the scuffle, appellant took the bolo and hacked Norman four consecutive times, most of them landed on the head. When appellant noticed that Norman was no longer moving, he fled therein and went to his brother, Sherman Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, where he stayed that same night and hid therein the bolo. The next day, he went to his sister's house in Lipa City. Later that day, he went to the Granja Hospital, also in Lipa City, for treatment of his wound on the forehead. On 9 October 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision[15] finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. It reasoned that appellant's claim of self-defense cannot be sustained in view of the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In closing, the trial court ruled:
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I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF EVER SALES DESPITE OF ITS BEING UNBELIEVABL E AND BIASED, INSTEAD OF THE SELFDEFENSEINTERPOSED BYTHE APPELLANT. Anent the first issue, appellant argued that the testimony of prosecution witness, Ever, is biased, unbelievable and confusing; that the trial court shouldnot have considered them; that his acquittal is proper on the ground of self-defense; and that the elements of self-defense are present in the instant case. The contention is without merit. On another point, appellant contended that he merely acted in self-defense when he hacked Norman to death. We disagree. Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code provides for the elements and/ or requisites in order that a plea of selfdefense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal liability, viz: ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminalliability: Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur; First. Unlawfulaggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repelit; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. As an element of self-defens e, unlawful aggression refers to an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the defendant's life in actual peril.[32] It is an act positively strong showing the intent of the aggressor and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude.[ 33] It is also described as a sudden and unprovoke d attack of immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or rights of the person attacked.[ 34] There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in actual or imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-defense. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon.[35] In order to constitute unlawful aggression, the person attacked must be confronted
by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.[36] In the instant case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Norman that justified the act of appellant in hacking him to death. There was no actual or imminent danger on the life of appellant when he came face to face with Norman. As narrated by Ever, Norman was just walking on the road and was not provoking appellant into a fight. It was the appellant who approached and suddenly hacked Norman repeatedly even when the latter was already fallen on the ground. In short, appellant was the unlawful aggressor. Even if this Court were to adopt the version of facts of appellant, the result or conclusion wouldbe the same. Appellant alleged that he was resting inside his house when he heard Norman shouting invectives against him and challenging him to a fight. When he went outside the house to pacify Norman, the latter slapped the back of his head and brought out an ice-pick. Appellant retreated and when Norman tried to follow him inside the house, he took a bolo and repeatedly hacked Norman. The foregoing circumstances does not justify the act of appellant in hacking Norman . Obviously, mere shouting of invectives and challenging one to a fight does not put one's life in actual or imminent danger. In the same vein, mere slapping of one's head does not place a person's life in serious danger such that it compels him to use a bolo and hack the offender. As regards the brandishing of an ice-pick, appellant had several less harmful means of avoiding the same as he was not cornered or trapped . He could have run inside his house and locked the door, or, called the neighbors or authorities for help. Unfortunately, appellant did not avail himself of any of those options and instead chose to hack Norman. Quite conspicuously, no convincing evidence was presentedto show that Norman was, indeed, armed with an ice-pick at the time of the incident. In fact, no ice-pick was found in the crime scene nor in the body of Norman. There was also no proof adduced showing that Norman attempted to stab appellant or tried to barge into the latter's house.[37] The fact that appellant sustained an injury on his head, allegedly caused by Norman's ice-pick, does not signify that he was a victim of unlawful aggression or that he acted in self-defens e .[ 38] The physician who treated appellant testified that the latter was diagnosed on 26 October 1999, the day after the hacking incident; that appellant was discharged on the same day he was treated in the hospital since he was only an out-patient; and that at the time he
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examined the head injury of appellant, it was already on its healing stage.[39] It is clear from the foregoing that appellant's head injury was not serious or severe. The cause of the same is likewise doubtful. Thus, the superficiality of the injury sustained by appellant is no indication that his life and limb were in actual peril.[40] In stark contrast, Norman was almost decapitated and sustained fatal injuries on the head and neck. All in all, Norman sustained seven fatal wounds, most of them located at the head and neck. Based on the foregoing, it is difficult to believe that Norman was the unlawful aggressor. The gravity, location, and number of wounds sustained by Norman are eloquent physical evidence showing a determined effort on the part of appellant to killNorman, and not just to defend himself.[41] Time and again, we held that unlawful aggression is a sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of selfdefense .[42] It is an essential and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, there can be, in a jural sense, no complete or incomplete self-defens e .[43] Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be appreciated even if the other elements are present.[44] To our mind, unlawful aggression is clearly absent in the case at bar. The second element of self-defense requires that the means employedby the person defending himself must be reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression of the victim. The reasonableness of the means employed may take into account the weapons, the physical condition of the parties and other circumstances showing that there is a rational equivalence betweenthe means of attack and the defense.[45] The act of appellant in repeatedlyhacking Norman on his head and neck was not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the latter. As stated earlier, no convincing evidence was presented to show that Norman was armed with an ice-pick at the time of the incident. In fact, no ice-pick was found in the crime scene or in the body of the victim. There was also no proof showing that Norman attempted to stab appellant or tried to barge into the latter's house. Granting arguendo that Norman was armed with an ice-pick, the repeated hackings were not necessary since he can overpower or disable Norman by a single blow on non-vital portion/ s of his body. Again, as correctly obs erved by the OSG, had the appellant merely wanted to protect himself from what he perceived as an unlawful aggression of Norman, he could have just
disabled Norman .[46] When Norman fell on the ground, appellant should have ceased hacking the former since the alleged aggression or danger no longer exists. By appellant's own testimony, however, he hacked Norman with his bolo even when the latter was already lying on the ground. It appears, therefore, that the means used by appellant, which were simultaneous and repeated hackings, were adopted by him not only to repel the aggression of Norman but to ensure the latter's death. In sum, such act failed to pass the test of reasonableness of the means employed in preventing or repelling an unlawfulaggression. Like an alibi, self-defense is inherently weak for it is easy to fabricate.[47] Thus, this Court had consistently ruled that where an accused admits killing the victim but invokes selfdefense, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense.[48] As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all the elements of self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.[49] In the instant case, appellant failed to discharge such burden with clear and convincing evidence. Therefore, his plea of lawful self-defense must fall. With regard to the second issue, appellant contended that there was no treachery that qualified his act to murder in the absence of direct evidence showing that his attack on Norman was sudden; that Norman was not deprived of an opportunity to defend himself; and that appellant did not employ treachery to insure the execution of the crime. Appellant's contention is bereft of merit. Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under circumstances that render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack.[50] It is as an aggravating circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. Article 14, paragraph (16) of the Revised Penal Code states the concept and essential elements of treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus: ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are aggravating circumstances: 16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia). There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
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As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements / conditions are required in order that treachery may be appreciated: (1) The employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would insure the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended party, who has, thus no opportunity for selfdefense or retaliation; and (2) delibe rate or conscious choice of such means, methods or manner of execution. Further, it must always be alleged in the information and proved in trial in order that it may be validly considered.[51] In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the Information against appellant. Moreover, all the essential elements/ conditions of treachery were established and proven during the trial. Appellant, while holding a bolo, had waited for the dark to set in before making his move so that nobody, especially Norman, would notice his impending attack. When he saw Norman, alone and unarmed, casually walking near an auto repair shop, he followedhim surreptitiously. Later, appellant came out and approached the unsuspecting Norman, who, in turn, faced the former. Appellant took advantage of the stunned and hapless Norman by swiftly hacking him with a bolo. As the assault was sudden and unexpected, Norman was forced to move backwards and raise his left arm to shield his face but it was too late. Norman's left arm was immediately hit by the bolo. When Norman turned his back on appellant and tried desperately to run, appellant hacked him again at the back causing him to fall on the ground. As the bloodied and moaning Norman was lying on the ground, appellant unleashed his full wrath by repeatedly hacking him on the neck and head. Upon noticing that Norman was no longer moving and was, in fact, almost decapitated, he stopped the hacking and fled the scene. As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the appellant's attack rendered Norman defenseless, vulnerable and without means of escape. Appellant's use of nighttime and a deadly bolo, as well as the sudden attack and repeated hackings on the vital portions of Norman's body, were especially adopted by him to immediately cripple Norman and prevent him from retaliating or escaping. Appellant deliberately adopted them in order to overpower the much younger, taller, and larger Norman. Considering that Norman was alone and unarmed, there was absolutely no way for him to defend himself or escape. Further, the fact that Norman sustained several fatal wounds while appellant allegedly sustained a single superficial wound on his forehead shows that Norman was not able to retaliate
or defend himself. Given the foregoing, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant intended and was determined to kill Norman. Appellant, however, asseverated that there was no treachery since the attack was frontal or face to face, such that Norman had been forewarned of the attack and, thus, placed him in a position where he can defend himself. Appellant also claimed that there was a quarrelbetween him and Norman prior to the hacking incident which, in effect, negate treachery since it disproved the fact that the attack was suddenand unexpected. We are not persuaded. There is no dispute that Norman was facing appellant at the time of the first blow. Subsequently, however, Norman turned his back and tried to run but he was hacked at the back, and when he fell on the ground, he was hacked again repeatedly. It is settled that treachery is to be appreciated when the victim was initially attacked frontally, but was attacked again after being rendered helpless and had no means to defend himself or to retaliate.[52] As long as the attack was sudden and unexpected, and the unarmed victim was not in a position to repel the attack, there is treachery.[53] The quarrel between Norman and appellant prior to the hacking incident does not negate treachery. It is true that there is no treachery if the killing was preceded by an altercation or dispute. The same, however, does not apply in the instant case. The misunderstanding between the two occurred on 22 October 1999. This was settled before their barangay officials on the morning of 25 October 1999. Cooler heads then had already set in. In fact, the two shook hands before the same barangay officials. Thus, there was no reason for Norman to suspect that appellant still held a grudge against him and to prepare or anticipate appellant's retaliation. It must also be noted that no conversation or struggle occurred between them shortlybefore the hacking incident. Appellant argued that if his plea of self-defense cannot be considered, he is still entitled to the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on the part of the offendedparty and voluntary surrender under Article 13 paragraphs (4) and (7) of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. We reject these contentions. Article 13 paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person's criminal liability may be mitigated if there was a sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party which immediately preceded the crime. Before the same can be appreciated, the following elements must concur:
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(1) That the provocation or threat must be sufficient or proportionate to the crime committed and adequate to arouse one to its commission; (2) That the provocation or threat must originate from the offended party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate to the commission of the crime by the person provoked. Norman did not in any way provoke appellant into a fight on that fateful night. There was no argument or physical struggle that ensued between them shortly before appellant hacked Norman with a bolo. Norman was innocently walking along the road when, all of a sudden, appellant surfaced and hacked him in rapid succession. The alleged altercation between the two occurred much earlier (22 October 1999) as to reasonably and sufficiently incite the appellant to act the way he did. In the absence of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party, appellant's assertion of mitigating circumstance cannot be sustained. Moreover, and more importantly, this ordinary mitigating circumstance cannot offset the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery which is present in the instant case. Likewise, appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Article 13, paragraph (7) of the Revised Penal Code states that the offender's criminal liability may be mitigated if he voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority or his agents. Accordingly, the essential elements of voluntary surrender are: (1) that the offender had not been actually arrested or apprehended; (2) that the surrender was voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agent. Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the barangay officials of Lipa City just before he was turned over to the police by a certain Tomas Dimacuha.[54] Assuming that appellant had indeed surrendered to the authorities, the same was not made spontaneously.[55] Immediately after the hacking incident, appellant, instead of proceeding to the barangay or police, went to his brother, Sherman Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, and the next day, to his sister in Lipa City. It took him three long days to surrender to the police authorities.[56] Moreover, the flight of appellant and his act of hiding until he was apprehended by the barangay officials are circumstances highly inconsistent with the spontaneity that characterizes the mitigating circumstance of voluntarysurrender.[57] 47. PP VS RABANAL In the early dawn of August 11, 1996, a drunken and armed
Roberto Pascua was fatally shot by the security guard of a building in Dagupan City, Pangasinan. The prosecution asserts that Pascua was treacherously shot while the defense contends that it was an act of self-preservation. The prosecution's version of the incident: At 2:00 a.m. of August 11, 1996, Freddie Soriano, a security guard of the CSI building in Dagupan City, saw accusedappellant Bonnie Rabanal, a security guard of the McDonald's restaurant located in the same building, repeatedly shoot at close range the victim Rudy Pascua, the security coordinator of the building. After the victim fell down, accused-appellant firedanother shot and then took the victim's gun and fled.[3] Accused-appellant, on the other hand, asserts that the fatal shooting of Rudy Pascua was an act of self-defense. He alleges that on August 11, 1996, at 2:00 a.m., Pascua, who was armed and reeking of alcohol, approached him at his usual post in front of the McDonald's restaurant and suddenly kicked the podium, causing it to fall on him. When accused-appellant asked what was the matter, Pascua uttered, "Y ou're hardheaded security guards, I told you to give me P100.00 per head monthly but you refused to give, are you going to give me or not?" He then drew his firearm and said, "If that's the thing you want to happen, I better kill you."[5] Accused-appellant pleaded for his life while Pascua demanded that he surrender his firearm. While Pascua was reaching for accused-appellant's holster, the latter pushed him and grabbed his gun. Pascua lost his balance and staggered backwards. At that instant, accused-appellant drew his pistol and pulled the trigger four times. Pascua fell to the ground. Accusedappellant then took the gun from Pascua's hand and brought it to the security agency as proof that somebody attempted to kill him.[6] That same day, accused-appellant voluntarily surrendered himself and Pascua's firearm to Supt. Enrique Galang at Camp Crame. He did not surrender at Dagupan because of Pascua's influence as bodyguard of Belen Fernandez. He was brought to the Lingayen Police Station the followingday.[7] A. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF SELF-DEFENSE WERE NOT OBTAINING BASED ON CONJECTURAL, PREPOSTEROUS, AND ILLOGICAL REASONS. For self-defense to prosper, accused-appellant must prove by clear and convincing evidence the following elements: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employedto prevent or repelit; and (3)
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lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[10] Although all the three elements must concur, self-defense must rest firstly on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression has been proved, no self-defense may be successfully pleaded, whether complete or incomplete.[11] In other words in selfdefense, unlawful aggression is a primordial element. It presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person - not a mere threatening or intimidating attitude - at the time the defensive action was taken against the aggressor.[12] In the case at bar, even if we sustain the version of accused-appellant that the initial act of aggression came from the deceased, we cannot uphold his plea of selfdefense . While indeed, the drunken victim initially brandished his handgun and aimed it at accused-appellant, the evidence shows that he laid it down on the nearby concrete porch shortly before he was shot several times by accused-appellant.[13] When the deceased laid down his gun, unlawful aggression had already ceased and it was no longer necessary for accused-appellant to have fired successively the way he did at the victim.[14] Furthermore, we note that accused-appellant had shoved the intoxicated victim who staggered backwards. Hence, it was accused-appellant who became the aggressor when he, despite such prevailing conditions, not to mention the inebriated physical state of the deceased, proceeded to fire several shots at the victim. His act can no longer be interpreted as an act of self-preservation but a perverse desire to kill.[15]
one's life means that the danger must be present, that is, actually in existence, or imminent in that the danger is on the point of happening.[18] This cannot be said in this case because the victim was unarmed when he was shot by accused-appellant.[19] Indeed, the danger had already ceased when the victim laid his gun down on the pavement, thus enabling accused-appellant to push him away. Furthermore, even assuming that the victim was a gun club member armed with a more powerful handgun than that of accused-appellant, it must be pointed out that the deceased was at the time of the incident a middle-aged and drunken 46 year-old,[20] with impaired and slowed physical reflexes on account of his intoxication. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, was a youthful and sober 27 year-old security guard, in full possession of his physical faculties.[21] Accused-appellant stands 5'5"[22] while the victim's height was only 5'2".[23] Suffice it to state that under such conditions, it would have been easy for the bigger, sober accused-appellant to subdue the intoxicated and already unarmed victim. It must be remembered that the means employed by the person making a defense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.[24] What the law requires is a rational equivalence, in the consideration of which will enter as principal factors the emergency, the imminent danger to which the person attacked is exposed, and the instinct more than reason, that moves or impels the defense; and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but upon the imminent danger of such injury.[25] In other words, whether or not the means employed is reasonable will depend upon the nature and quality of the weapon used by the aggressor, his physical condition, character, size and other circumstances and those of the person defending himself as well as the place and occasion of the assault.[ 26] In the case at bar, assuming arguendo that the aggression was continuing, the means employed by accused-appellant in repelling the assault of the unarmed victim was not reasonable. It must be noted that the deceased sustained four (4) gunshot wounds fired at close range, all of them concentrated on the chest area and each of them fatal.[27] It bears repeating in this regard that the nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia which disprove the plea for self-defense because they demonstrate a determined effort to kill the victim and not just defendoneself.[28] All told, the Court finds no reason to reverse the ruling of the
Accused-appellant, however, insists that the unlawful aggression of the victim was a "continuing one whether or not he momentarily tripped, lost his balance or did similar acts of temporary character."[16] Thus, he argues that even if the deceased lowered his guard at some point, he was still the aggressor. He also cites the fact that the victim was "predisposed to using violence and intimidation while accusedappellant was simply a security guard doing his job;" and that the victim was armed with the more powerful and sophisticated .9mm Colt MK IV series 80, while accusedappellant merely had an inferior .38 caliber pistol.[17] These arguments fail to persuade. There is unlawful aggression when the peril to one's life, limb or right is either actual or imminent. Actual peril to
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court a quo insofar as accused-appellant's culpability is concerned. This brings us to the second issue, concerning the propriety of the imposition by the trial court of the death penalty on the ground that the killing was qualified by treachery and aggravated by cruelty. It must be borne in mind that qualifying and aggravating circumstances which are taken into consideration for the purpose of increasing the degree of the penalty imposed must be proven with equal certainty as the commission of the act charged as criminal offense.[29] Murder is the unlawful killing of any person when qualified by any of the circumstances listed under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.[30] Treachery or alevosia, which is alleged in the information, is one such qualifyingcircumstance. We do not agree with the trial court that the killing of Rudy Pascua was attended by alevosia. There is treacherywhen the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[31] In this case, the two elements of treachery are not present, i.e. (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself, and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him.[32] The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.[33] For treachery to be appreciated, it must be present and seen by the witnes s right at the inception of the attack.[ 34] Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, its perpetration with treachery cannot merely be supposed.[ 35] In the case at bar, there was neither a description of how the attack was commenced - whether it was sudden, unexpected and whether the victim was caught totally unaware - nor has there been a showing that the method of execution in the commission of the crime was conscious ly or delibe rately adopted by the malefactor. To reiterate, the existence of alevosia must be based on positive or conclusive proof, not mere suppositions or speculations,[36] and must be proved as clearly and as convincingly as the killing itself.[37] Any doubt as to the existence of treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.[38]
Likewise, the aggravating circumstance of cruelty cannot be appreciated in this case. There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act.[ 39] In other words, for cruelty to be appreciated, it must be shown that the accused, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused the victim to suffer slowly and painfully as he inflicted on him unnecessary physical and moral pain. The crime is aggravated because by deliberately increasing the suffering of the victim, the offender denotes sadism and, consequently, a marked degree of malice and perversity.[40] The test for determining the presence of cruelty is whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the victim's suffering.[41] Consequently, there must be proof that that the victim was made to agonize before he was killed.[42] In this case, the wounds sustained by the victim came from four (4) gunshots fired in quick succession. Furthermore, other than the number and location of the wounds, there is absolutely no evidence that would show accused-appellant's cruelty and sadism. The mere fact of inflicting several wounds successively upon a person to cause his death, with no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of said injuries to show that the malefactor wanted to prolong the suffering of the victim, is not sufficient to prove the existence of this aggravating circumstance.[43] The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated given the factual milieu of this case. For voluntary surrender to mitigate criminal liability, the following elements must concur: (1) the offender has not been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (3) the surrender was voluntary.[44] For the circumstances of voluntary surrender, it is sufficient that it be spontaneous and made in a manner clearly indicating the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally, either because he acknowledges his guilt or wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense which will necessarily be incurred in searching for and capturing him.[45] In the case at bar, accused-appellant fled after the commission of the crime, taking with him the victim's gun, although the Dagupan City Police Station was just a few meters away from the locus criminis. His supposed fear for the victim's influence in the community has no basis, and, if at all, even betrays his feelings of guilt at what transpired. As has been aptly ruled in People v. Herrera:[46] Flight strongly indicates a guilty mind and betrays the existence of a guilty conscience. Indeed, flight is an implied
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admission of guilt and accused-appellant's act of fleeing to Batangas after shooting the victims cannot but betray his guilt and his desire to evade responsibility therefor. Certainly, a righteous individual will not cower in fear and unabashedly admit the killing at the earliest possible opportunity if he were morally justified in doing so. If the accused-appellant honestly believed that his acts constituted self-defense against the unlawful aggression of the victim, he should have reportedthe incident to the police instead of escaping and avoiding the authorities. (Emphasis and italics supplied) The circumstances that accused-appellant neither resisted arrest nor did he struggle to free himself when he was taken into custody by the authorities do not amount to voluntary surrender.[47] Indeed, it was only later that he decided to turn himself in. Needless to state, his surrender can hardly be deemed spontaneous. In the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed is Homicide and not Murder.[48] The penalty therefor, under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, is Reclusion Temporal, to be imposed in its medium period considering that there is no modifying circumstance to aggravate or to mitigate criminal liability.[49] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant shall be entitled to a minimum term,to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, Prision Mayor. Thus, accused-appellant shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum. 48. PPVS ESCARL OS The Facts Version of the Prosecution "Around 9 o'clock in the evening of July 1, 2000, Antonio Balisacan went to the residence of Jaime Ulep in Domampot, Asingan, Pangasinan to attend a benefit dance which was near the place. In the benefit dance was his son Crisanto Balisacan, who attended the dance with his friends. Crisanto stood beside the emcee, Ceasario Escarlos, appellant's brother. While Ceasario was calling the victim, Antonio Balisacan, to come to the the stage as he was a kagawad, Crisanto heard the people at his back shout Ay!'. Five (5) to six (6) meters at his back, with the place [illuminated] by a 50 to 100 watts bulb, he saw appellant stab his father, Antonio, several times. Crisanto was momentarily shocked that he was not able to react. When appellant fled, Crisanto came to his senses and
ran to Antonio. Antonio was still alive so he brought him to Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital where he expired a few minutes after arrival. "Within the vicinity was Antonio's brother, Marcelo Balisacan. He was in the Asingan-Urdaneta road, which was about fifteen (15) meters outside Ulep's yard when he heard people shout and run from the benefit dance. Wanting to know what was happening, he went to the benefit dance and saw that Antonio was stabbed. He went near Antonio, hugged him, and asked who stabbed him. He replied, Tomy Escarlos.' Version of the Defense "On the night of July 1, 2000, accused TIMOTEO ESCARL OS together with Rexie Y abes, Fredo Ramos, Erwin Ramos, Rowena Alamigo and others were at the yard of Jaime Ulep, in Purok Inanama, Domanpot Asingan, Pangasinan watching a benefit dance sponsored by Mr. & Mrs. Organization. He was invitedto buy lechon during the benefit dance. "While thereat, Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk, passed in front of accused and told him, Y ou are here again to create trouble.' Accused was offended so he answered back saying Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any trouble here.' Antonio Balisacan told him, OKINNAM KETDI' (vulva of your Mother) and without warning boxed him. Timoteo was hit on the forehead, which left a scar on his forehead about an inch above the right eyebrow. He intended to box back but he noticed that the victim was pulling out a kitchen knife, so for fear of his life, he grabbed the weapon from Antonio Balisacan and used the knife in stabbing the latter who was hit at the side below the left armpit. He stabbed him twice and when the victim was about to fall down, he was able to hit him for the third time. "The weapon that Timoteo was able to get from Antonio was a kitchen knife about 10 to 12 inches. Antonio drew the knife from his left side. Timoteo was able to get hold of the handle of the knife when he grappled for the same from the victim, by taking hold of the knife with his right hand and stabbed Antonio who was intending to stab him. Antonio was one (1) inch taller than accused. "Timoteo's testimony was corroborated by an eyewitness, CESARIOESCARL OS, the brother of Timoteo and president of the Mr. & Mrs. Association which sponsored the benefit dance on July1, 2000. The Ruling of the Trial Court "The second element of self-defense is also lacking. The
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nature, location and the number of wounds inflicted on the victim belie and negate the accused[ s] claim of self-defense. The post mortem findings of the autopsy report showed that the victim sustained four stab wounds. "If there is any truth to the accused'[s] claim of self-defense, he would not have stabbed him several times. [Worse,] the location of the wounds suggested that the accused was at the back of the victim when the wounds were inflicted. It is therefore evident from the conduct of the accused that he was determined to kill the victim and did not just act to defend himself. In view of the foregoing, it is no longer necessary to discuss the third element."[9] Hence, this automatic review.[10] The Issues These issues boil down to four: (1) sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, (2) viability of self-defense, (3) appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, and (4) propriety of the penalty and the damages imposed by the trial court. The Court's Ruling The appeal is partly meritorious. First Issue: Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence Although appellant did not directly raise the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence as an issue, this Court nonetheless deliberated on it motu proprio, because an automatic appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case for review. Indeed, the strength of the prosecution's evidence must be passed upon, especially in cases in which the death penalty has been imposed by the trial court.[12] We have carefully examined the evidence for the prosecution and found that the fact of killing and the identity of the killer were duly established beyond reasonable doubt. Undoubtedly, the factual premises with regard to the killing and its commission by appellant are clear and undisputed. He did not at all deny the allegations against him and openly admitted that he had killed the victim. However, he interposes self-defense to seek his exoneration from criminal liability. Second Issue: Plea of Self-Defense In pleading self-defense, appellant asserts that it was the victim
who initially approached and assaulted him. Allegedly, the former had no choice but to defend himself under the circumstances. In his testimony before the trial court, he described the confrontation that had led to the fatal killing as follows: We stress that when the accused invokes self-defens e, the burden of proof is shifted from the prosecution to the defense . Thus, the latter assumes the responsibility of establishing this plea by clear and convincing evidence.[ 15] Upon its shoulders rests the duty of proving, to the satisfaction of the trial court, the justifying circumstance of self-defens e.[ 16] The implications of pleading self-defense insofar as the burden of proof is concerned was explained by the Court in Macalino v. People,[17] from which we quote: "In pleading self-defense, petitioner in effect admitted that he stabbed the victim. It was then incumbent upon him to prove that justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, relying on the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. The reason is that even if the prosecution evidence were weak, such could not be disbelieved after petitioner admitted the fact of stabbing the victim."[18] The accused who avers that the killing arose from an impulse of self-defense has the onus probandi of proving the elements thereof.[19] The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.[20] Verily, to invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.[21] Unlawful Aggressiononthe Part of the Victim In the present case, appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when the latter unceremoniously boxed him on the forehead in the heat of their argument . Appellant adds that he had initially thought of hitting back when he noticed that the victim was pulling out a kitchen knife. Hence, to save his life, the former grabbed the weapon and used it to stab the latter. Appellant insists that under the circumstances, he was legally justified in using the knife to ward off the unlawful aggression. For him to
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wait for the knife to be raised and to fall on him before acting to defendhimself wouldbe asking too much, he argues. The contentions of appellant are untenable. While the victim may be said to have initiated the confrontation, we do not subscribe to the view that the former was subjected to an unlawful aggression within the legal meaning of the phrase. The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a heated exchange of words between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Moreover, the alleged drawing of a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in imminent danger. The former might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter. Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger -- not merely threatening and intimidating action.[ 22] Uncertain, premature and speculative was the assertion of appellant that the victim was about to stab him, when the latter had merely drawn out his knife . There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat to one's life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not just speculative.[23] Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing incident and that some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant disarmed the victim by wresting the knife from the latter. Afte r the former had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill the latter. Hence, appellant became the unlawful aggressor when he stabbed the victim.[ 24] When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor.[25] To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal self-defense on the part of appellant.[26] Undoubtedly, the latter went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries on the latter, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased. Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to Prevent or Repel the Attack Appellant argues that in the heat of the encounter, he was not in a position to calculate or determine the effects of his blows,
and that it was nevertheless necessary for him to inflict them in order to save his own life. As correctly held by the trial court, the nature, the number and the location of the wounds inflicted upon the victim were important indicia disproving self-defense.[27] The claim of appellant that only two of the four stab wounds were fatal is of no moment, inasmuch as the means he employed was glaringly disproportionate to the perceived unlawful aggression. He admitted in his testimony that he had stabbed the victim for the third time, even when the latter was about to fall. The means employed by a person invoking self-defens e must be reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, as held by the Court in People v. Obordo:[28] "Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defens e contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense . Accusedappellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get something from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part of the victim's body was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him."[29] Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to selfdefense must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.[30] Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defens e.[ 31] Unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression against the other, there can be no self-defens e, complete or incomplete, on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of selfdefense will have no basis.[32] Third Issue: Appreciation of Qualifying Circumstances The essence of treacheryis the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thus depriving the latter of any real chance to put up a defense, and thereby ensuring the commission of the
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attack without risk to the aggressor.[33] Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of a means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and conscious adoption of the means of execution.[34] There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards the former.[ 35] In the instant case, the verbal and physical squabble prior to the attack proves that there was no treachery, and that the victim was aware of the imminent danger to his life.[36] Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish that appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack for the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat.[37] Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant could eventually turn into a violent physical clash. The existence of a struggle before the fatal blows were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was forewarned of the impending attack, and that he was afforded the opportunity to put up a defense.[38] Indeed, a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. Moreover, any doubt as to the existence of treacherymust be resolved in favor of the accused.[39] In People v. Cario,[40] we modified the trial court's decision and ruled that the crime committed was only homicide, because the qualifying circumstance of treachery had not been clearly established. Thus, the Court declared:
put up a fight before he was fatally stabbed. These circumstances negate the existence of treachery in the commission of the offense."[41] As in People v. Cario, the Office of the Solicitor General recommended in this case that appellant be convicted of homicide only, inasmuch as the qualifying circumstance of treachery had not been sufficiently established.[42] The trial court correctly ruled that the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was not present in the killing. Essentially, there is evident premeditation when the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out a criminal intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.[43] Obviously, the acts of appellant in the present case can hardly be described as a product of reflective thought or deliberate planning towards a decisive resolve to kill the victim. On the contrary, the confrontation that escalated to a violent brawl was quite spontaneous, casual and incidental. Verily, the brutal killing was not the result of a previous plot or sinister design to end the life of the victim. The elements of evident premeditation are as follows: (a) the time when the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to the determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of a period of time, between the determination and the subsequent execution of the crime, sufficient to allow the accused an opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of the act.[ 44] As found by the trial court, the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish any of the foregoing requisites. To be sure, when there is no showing how and when the plan to kill was decided or how much time had elapsed before the crime was carried out, there is no evident premeditation.[45] In a criminal prosecution -- especially in cases involving the extreme penalty of death -- nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged must be established.[46] 49. PP VS ARNANTE On 16 July 2000, Valentin Arnante, his son Domingo Arnante, and other relatives were celebrating the birth anniversary of Christopher Arnante, another son of Valentin and brother of Domingo, at their residence in Sto. Domingo, Iriga City. Shortlyafter lunch, the group started having drinks in the living room of the Arnante residence. At around six o'clock in the evening, Valentin and his son Domingo, by then already both
"However, we agree with the OSG's recommendation that appellant be held liable only for homicide, not murder. In this case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not conclusively established . For treachery to exist, the following requisites must be met: (1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or form of attack employed by him. The facts show that Edmundo was placed on guard concerning a possible assault by Pedro. First, there was a heated argument between them at the place of the wake. Second, Edmundo was not unaware that he and Rolando were followed outside by appellant, who did not adopt any means to conceal himself or hide his intention of confronting Edmundo. Third, the abrasions and contusions on Edmundo's face show that Edmundowas able to
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drunk, came to a heated argument. Domingo told his father to stop embarrassing him in front of guests but the latter still went on berating his son. Feeling ignored, Domingo stood up, proceeded to his room, followed by his brother Christopher, and took hold of a handgun. Domingo fired the gun towards the ground scaring the people in the house and prompting them to rush out through the front door. Domingo went out of the house through the kitchen door. His father Valentin followed until he was fired at and shot twice by Domingo. The victim was not able to make it to the hospital. Domingo Arnante admitted having shot his own father twice but sought to justify his misdeed. He said that during the celebration of his brother's birthday, his father, without any apparent reason, got mad at him and started scolding him. He told his father to stop humiliating him in front of all the guests but the victim persisted. He left the group and went to his room to get his gun. He fired the gun downwards to make his father stop censuring him. He then went out of the house through the kitchen door but his father still followed and threatened to hack him with a bolo. He was so embarrassed that he lost control of himself and shot his father twice. He promptly left the scene but soon thereafter surrendered to the police authorities. In its brief for appellant, the defense raised a lone assignment of error to the effect that the "the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant despite the fact that he (had) acted in legitimate self-defense."[3] The claim of self-defense is untenable. When an accused admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear and convincing evidence.[4] In order that the plea of self-defense can prevail, three basic conditions must concur, i.e., (1) unlawfulaggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[5] Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger on the life and limb of a person defending himself[6] and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. The aggression must be real and not just imaginary.[7] Nothing in the testimony would suggest the attendance of a kind of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim that can justify appellant's claim of self-defens e. A mere perception of an impending attack is not sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression, and neither is an intimidating or threatening attitude.[ 9]
The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Verily, appellant voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities shortly after the shooting incident. Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, prescribes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of parricide. The attendance of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender justifies the imposition of the lesser penalty.[10] 50. TANGAN VS CA1s t case At around 11:30 p.m. of December 1, 1984, Navy Captain Eladio C. Tangan was driving alone on Roxas Boulevard heading south. He had just come from Buendia Avenue on an intelligence operation. At the same time, Generoso Miranda, a 29-year old optometrist, was driving his car in the same direction along Roxas Boulevard with his uncle, Manuel Miranda, after coming from the Ramada Hotel. Generoso was moving ahead of Tangan. Suddenly, firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way, causing him to swerve to the right and cut Tangan's path. Tangan blew his horn several times. Generoso slowed down to let Tangan pass. Tangan accelerated and overtook Generoso, but when he got in front, Tangan reduced speed. Generoso tried four or five times to overtake on the right lane but Tangan kept blocking his lane. As he approached Airport Road, Tangan slowed down to make a U-turn. Generoso passed him, pulled over and got out of the car with his uncle. Tangan also stopped his car and got out. As the Mirandas got near Tangan's car, Generoso loudly retorted, "Putang ina mo, bakit mo ginigitgit ang sasakyan ko?" Generoso and Tangan then exchanged expletives. Tangan pointed his hand to Generoso and the latter slapped it, saying, "Huwag mo akong dinuduro! Sino ka ba, ano ba ang pinagmamalaki mo?" Tangan countered, "Ikaw, ano ang gusto mo?" With this, Tangan went to his car and got his .38 caliber handgun on the front seat. The subsequent events per account of the parties' respective witnesses were conflicting: According to the prosecution witnesses, particularly, Mary Ann Borromeo, Rosalia Cruz and Manuel Miranda, the accused pointed his gun at Generoso Miranda and when Manuel Miranda tried to intervene, the accused pointed his gun at Manuel Miranda, and after that the accused pointed again the gun to Generoso Miranda, the accused shot Generoso Miranda at a distance of about a meter but because the arm of the accused was extended, the muzzle of the gun reached to about more or less one foot away from the body of Generoso Miranda. The shot hit the stomach of Generoso Miranda causing the latter to fall and while still conscious, Generoso
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Miranda told Manuel Miranda, his uncle, to get the gun. Manuel Miranda grappled for the possession of the gun and during their grappling, Rosalia Cruz intervened and took hold of the gun and after Rosalia Cruz has taken hold of the gun, a man wearing a red T-shirt took the gun from her. The man in T-shirt was chased by Manuel Miranda who was able to get the gun where the man in redT-shirt placed it. On the other hand, the defense, particularly the accused and his witness by the name of Nelson Pante claimed that after the gun was taken by the accused from inside his car, the Mirandas started to grapple for possession of the gun and during the grappling, and while the two Mirandas were trying to wrest away the gun from the accused, they fell down at the back of the car of the accused. According to the accused, he lost the possession of the gun after falling at the back of his car and as soon as they hit the ground, the gun fell, and it exploded hitting GenerosoMiranda.[1] After the gun went off, Tangan ran away. Meanwhile, Generoso lay on the ground bloodied. His uncle, Manuel, looked for the gun and ran after Tangan, joining the mob that had already pursued him. Tangan found a policeman who allowed him to enter his patrol car. Manuel arrived and told the policeman that Tangan had just shot his nephew. Then he went back to where Generoso lay and there found two ladies, later identified as Mary Ann Borromeo and Rosalina Cruz, helping his nephew board a taxi. Manuel suggested that Generoso be brought to the hospital in his car. He was rushed to the Philippine General Hospital but he expired on the way. In the recent case of People v. Velasco and Galvez,[19] we held that the prosecution cannot avail of the remedies of special civil action on certiorari, petition for review on certiorari, or appeal in criminal cases. Previous to that, we categorically ruled that the writ of certiorari cannot be used by the State in a criminal case to correct a lower court's factual findings or evaluation of the evidence.[ 20] Rule 117, Section 7, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, is clear:
of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information. We now come to the petition for review filed by Tangan. It is noteworthy that during the trial, petitioner Tangan did not invoke self-defens e but claimed that Generoso was accidentally shot. As such, the burden of proving selfdefense ,[21] which normally would have belonged to Tangan, did not come into play. Although Tangan must prove his defense of accidental firing by clear and convincing evidence,[ 22] the burden of proving the commission of the crime remained in the prosecution. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals appreciated in favor of Tangan the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense under Article 13 (1), in relation to Article 11(1), of the Revised Penal Code, to wit: ARTICLE 11. Justifying circumstances. - The following do not incur any criminalliability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the followingcircumstances concur: First. Unlawfulaggression.
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it. Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. ARTICLE 13. Mitigating Circumstances. - The following are mitigating circumstances: 1. Those mentioned in the preceding Chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. Incomplete self-defense is not considered as a justifying act, but merely a mitigating circumstance; hence, the burden of proving the crime charged in the information is not shifted to the accused.[23] In order that it may be successfully appreciated, however, it is necessary that a majority of the requirements of self-defense be present, particularly the requisite of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.[24] Unlawful aggression by itself or in combination with either of the other two requisite suffices to establish incomplete selfdefense. Absent the unlawful aggression, there can never be self-defense, complete or incomplete,[25] because if there is
Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. - When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal
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nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of defense will have no basis.[26] There is no question that the bullet which hit the victim was fired from the caliber. 38, which was issued to Tangan by the Philippine Navy. The cause of death was severe hemorrhage secondary to gunshot wound of the abdomen, caused by the bullet fired from a gun of the said caliber. The prosecution claimed that Tangan shot the victim point-blank in the stomach at a distance of about one foot. On the other hand, Tangan alleged that when he grappled with Generoso and Manuel Miranda for possession of the gun, it fell to the ground and accidentally fired, hitting the victim.
first cocked and pressure was exerted on the trigger. If it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver.[36] Having established that the shooting was not accidental, the next issue to be resolved is whether Tangan acted in incomplete self-defens e. The element of unlawful aggression in self-defens e must not come from the person defending himself but from the victim. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not sufficient.[ 37] Likewise, the exchange of insulting words and invectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, no matter how objectionable, could not be considered as unlawful aggression, except when coupled with physical assault.[ 38] There being no lawful aggression on the part of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defens e falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of the gun, but the Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun from him. It may be said that the former had no intention of killing the victim but simply to retain possession of his gun. However, the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result of the gunshot wound, though the shooter may not have the intention to kill, does not absolve him from culpability. Having caused the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for all the consequences of his felonious act. He brought out the gun, wrestled with the Mirandas but anticipating that the gun may be taken from him, he fired and fled. The third requisite of lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself is not supported by evidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandas for almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one who provoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns, assuming it was done by Generoso, may be irritating to an impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered as creating so powerful an inducement as to incite provocation for the other party to act violently. The appreciation of the ordinary mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation and passion and obfuscation under Article 13, paragraphs 4 and 6,[39] have no factual basis. Sufficient provocation as a requisite of incomplete selfdefense is different from sufficient provocation as a mitigating circumstance . As an element of self-defense, it pertains to its absence on the part of the person defending himself; while as a mitigating circumstance, it pertains to its presence on the part of the offended party. Besides, only one mitigating circumstance can arise out of one and the same act.[ 40] Assuming for the sake of argument that the blowing of horns, cutting of lanes or overtaking can be considered as
The finding of the lower court that Generoso Miranda III was shot while the accused and the Mirandas were grappling for the possession of the gun immediately after the accused had taken his gun from inside his car and before the three allegedly fell to the ground behind the car of the accused is borne out by the record. The court also agrees with the court below that it was the accused-appellant who shot and killed Generoso Miranda III. If the accused-appellant did not shoot Generoso III during the scuffle, he would have claimed accidental killing by alleging that his gun exploded during the scuffle instead of falsely testifying that he and the Mirandas fell to the ground behind his car and the gun exploded in the possession of Manuel Miranda. The theory of the prosecution that the shooting took place while the three were grappling for the possession of the gun beside the car of appellant is completely in harmony with the findings and testimony of Dr. Ibarrola regarding the relative position of the three and the precarious nearness of the victim when accused-appellant pulled the trigger of his gun. Dr. Ibarrola explained that the gun was about two (2) inches from the entrance wound and that its position was almost perpendicular when it was fired. It was in fact the closeness of the Mirandas vis--vis appellant during the scuffle for the gun that the accused-appellant was compelled to pull the trigger in answer to the instinct of selfpreservation.[34] The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the target was about 2 inches but definitely not more than 3 inches. Based on the point of exit and the trajectory transit of the wound, the victim and the alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made and the position of the gun was almost perpendicular when fired.[35] These findings disprove Tangan's claim of accidental shooting. A revolver is not prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it was already
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acts of provocation, the same were not sufficient. The word "sufficient" means adequate to excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity.[41] Moreover, Generoso's act of asking for an explanation from Tangan was not sufficient provocation for him to claim that he was provoked to kill or injure Generoso .[42] For the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation to be appreciated, it is required that (1) there be an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) said act which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.[43] In the case at bar, Tangan could not have possibly acted upon an impulse for there was no sudden and unexpected occurrence which wuldhave created such condition in his mind to shoot the victim. Assuming that his path was suddenly blocked by Generoso Miranda due to the firecrackers, it can no longer be treated as a startling occurrence, precisely because he had already passed them and was already the one blocking their path. Tangan's acts were done in the spirit of revenge and lawlessness, for which no mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation can arise. TANGAN VS CA WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 103613 is DISMISSED. The appealed decision subject of G.R. No. 105830 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) Tangan is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, maximum, with all the accessory penalties. SOORDERED. It bears stressing that at no time during the trial of the case did petitioner raise self-defense. Nevertheless, the trial court and the Court of Appeals found the attendance of the mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense, sufficient provocation, and passion and obfuscation. When petitioner appealed the decision, he threw open the whole case for review. It became the duty of this Court to correct any error as may be found in the appealed judgment, whether it was made the subject of assignment of errors or not.[2]
Thus, this Court reviewed the records of the case and found that the evidence fails to support or substantiate the lower court's findings and conclusions. Clearly, therefore, this case falls within the recognized exceptions to the rule that an appellate court will generally not disturb the assessment of the trial court on factual matters considering that the latter, as a trier of fact, is in a better position to appreciate the same.[3] First of all, the physical evidence belies petitioner's version of the incident. As we clearly explained in our assailed Decision: The medical examiner testified that the distance between the muzzle of the gun and the target was about 2 inches but definitely not more than 3 inches. Based on the point of exit and trajectory transit of the wound, the victim and the alleged assailant were facing each other when the shot was made and the position of the gun was almost perpendicular when fired. These findings disprove Tangan's claim of accidental shooting. A revolver is not prone to accidental firing because of the nature of its mechanism, unless it were uncocked, then considerable pressure had to be applied on the trigger to fire the revolver.[ 4] Physical evidence is a mute but eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in the hierarchy of our trustworthy evidence.[5] For this reason, it is regarded as evidence of the highest order. It speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses.[6] The physical evidence is amply corroborated by the eyewitness accounts of Rosalia dela Cruz and Mary Ann Borromeo to the effect that petitioner took a gun from his car and suddenly firedit at the deceased.[7] Likewise, this Court found that the mitigating circumstances appreciated by the trial court are not present. Petitioner refutes this and insists on his version of the facts. However, the testimony of his witness, on which he heavily relies, suffers from material inconsistencies which render it unworthy of belief. All of these , and the incredibility of petitioner's account when compared with the physical evidence, belie selfdefense . From the established facts, it can be plainly gleaned that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased. What merely transpired before petitioner's gun went off was a heated exchange of words between the protagonists. This does not qualify as unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack, or imminent danger thereof. The person defending himself must have
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been attacked with actual physical force or with actual use of weapon.[11] Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. There can be no selfdefense, complete or incomplete, unless the victim has committed an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.[12] By the same token, the evidence does not show the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party. As stated, the provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit a wrong and must accordingly be proportionate to its gravity. In this case, all that the deceased did immediately before he was shot was shout expletives and slap petitioner's hand when the latter pointed it to his face. These acts, while offensive, were grossly disproportionate to petitioner's act of drawing and firing of a gun. Furthermore, there was no sudden and unexpected occurrence that could have naturally produced a powerful excitement in petitioner's mind causing him to lose his reason and self-control. As shown by the facts, no passion and obfuscation could have clouded his mind. On the whole, therefore, this Court correctly imposed on petitioner the proper penalty for Homicide, without the attendance of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, and sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, maximum. While his Motion for Reconsideration was pending, petitioner filed with the Court an "Omnibus Motion to Re-Raffle/ Transfer and/ or to Recuse." He alleged, among others, that the ponente of the assailed Decision is biased in favor of respondents and, therefore, must recuse herself from this case. Petitioner's accusation, however, is based on nothing more than this Court's own evaluation of the evidence and departure from the rule that findings of facts of lower court are not to be disturbed. Petitioner should bear in mind that the Decision, although penned by a member of the Court, is a decision of the whole Court. Hence, any attack on the integrity of the ponente, or any member of the Court for that matter, is an attack on the entire Court. More importantly, petitioner fails to establish with concrete proof his imputations of bias. Such irresponsible and unfounded statements will not be taken lightly by this
Court. Hence, petitioner and his counsel should be admonished for making such baseless and unsubstantiated accusations of bias against the Court. Moreover, the Omnibus Motion should be deniedfor lack of merit. Petitioner faults the Court for increasing the penalty five times such that, despite having served the penalty imposed by the trial court, he now faces the "intolerable specter of reincarceration."[13] It should be recalled that petitioner, by conscious ly and delibe rately firing his gun, snuffed the life out of a 29-year old optometrist. Suffice it to state that petitioner should bear the conseque nces of his felonious act.
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1. G.R. No. 166401: October 30, 2006 [Formerly G.R. Nos . 158660-67] PEOPLE OFTHEPHILIPPINES, Appellee, v.

(31) [ G.R. No. 114261. February 10, 2000]

(38) G.R. No. 159280

May 18, 2004

Rulingof the Court

The Court's Ruling

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