ARTHUR D. LIM vs.

HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

FACTS: This case involves a petition for certiorari and prohibition as well as a petition-in-intervention, praying that respondents be restrained from proceeding with the so-called "Balikatan 02-1" and that after due notice and hearing, that judgment be rendered issuing a permanent writ of injunction and/or prohibition against the deployment of U.S. troops in Basilan and Mindanao for being illegal and in violation of the Constitution. Beginning January of this year 2002, personnel from the armed forces of the United States of America started arriving in Mindanao to take part, in conjunction with the Philippine military, in "Balikatan 02-1." These so-called "Balikatan" exercises are the largest combined training operations involving Filipino and American troops. In theory, they are a simulation of joint military maneuvers pursuant to the Mutual Defense Treaty, a bilateral defense agreement entered into by the Philippines and the United States in 1951. The entry of American troops into Philippine soil is proximately rooted in the international anti-terrorism campaign declared by President George W. Bush in reaction to the tragic events that occurred on September 11, 2001. On February 1, 2002, petitioners Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, attacking the constitutionality of the joint exercise. They were joined subsequently by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-Iist organizations, who filed a petition-in-intervention on February 11, 2002. Petitioners contend that the RP and the US signed the Mutual Defense Treaty to provide mutual military assistance in accordance with the constitutional processes of each country only in the case of an armed attack by an external aggressor, meaning a third country, against one of them. They further argued that it cannot be said that the Abu Sayyaf in Basilan constitutes an external aggressor to warrant US military assistance in accordance with MDT of 1951. Another contention was that the VFA of 1999 does not authorize American soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine territory. ISSUE: Whether or not the Balikatan 02-1 activities are covered by the VFA. HELD: Petition is dismissed. The VFA itself permits US personnel to engage on an impermanent basis, in activities, the exact meaning of which is left undefined. The sole encumbrance placed on its definition is couched in the negative, in that the US personnel must abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of this agreement, and in particular, from any political activity. Under these auspices, the VFA gives legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercises. It is only logical to assume that Balikat an 02-1 a mutual anti terrorism advising assisting and training exercise falls under the umbrella of sanctioned or allowable activities in the context of the agreement. Both the history and intent of the Mutual Defense Treaty and the VFA support the conclusion that combat-related activities as opposed to combat itself such as the one subject of the instant petition, are indeed authorized. The Court held that no doubt that the US forces are prohibited / from engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. Yet a nagging question remains: are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise? The Court cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, it does not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. It cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners' allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in "doublespeak" in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite the Court to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao. Wherefore, the petition and the petition-in-intervention were dismissed.

Shangri-La International Hotel Management Ltd. v Developers Group of Companies, Inc. FACTS: DGCI claimed ownership of the trade marks based on prior use on its restaurant business within the Philippines since 1982, and on that basis was granted a certificate of trade mark registration on May 31, 1983. SLIHM started using the mark in the Philippines only in 1987 when it put up two hotels, the EDSA Shangri-La Hotel and the Makati Shangri-La. However, use of the trademarks went back as far as 1962 when the Kuok family, owners of SLIHM, adopted the name Shangri-La in all of their hotels and hotel related establishments around the world. On June 21, 1988, the Shangri-La International Hotel Management, Ltd. and Kuok Philippine Properties, Inc., filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a petition praying for the cancellation of the registration of the Shangri-La mark

and S logo issued to the Developers Group of Companies Inc., on the ground that the same was illegally and fraudulently obt ained and appropriated for the latters restaurant business. In this regard, they point to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property as affording security and protection to SLIHMs exclusive right to said mark and logo. The Shangri-La Group alleged that it has been using the said mark and logo for its corporate affairs and business since March 1962 and caused the same to be specially designed for their international hotels in 1975, much earlier than the alleged first use by the Developers Group in 1982. DGCIs lone witness even admitted in court that he travelled a round Asia prior to 1962 and knew the Shangri-La Hotel in Hong Kong and even stayed in that hotel. The Developers Group instituted a complaint for infringement and damages with prayer for injunction. When the Shangri-La Group moved for the suspension of the proceedings, the trial court denied such. The Shangri-La Group filed a petition for certiorari before the CA but it was dismissed ruling that Kuok Group does not have proof of actual use in commerce in the Philippines in accordance with Section 2 of R.A. No. 166, it cannot claim ownership of the mark and logo. While the Paris Convention protects internationally known marks, R.A. No. 166 still requires use in commerce in the Philippines. Accordingly, and on the premise that international agreements, such as Paris Convention, must yield to a municipal law, the question on the exclusive right over the mark and logo would still depend on actual use in commerce in the Philippines. Respondent has a right to the mark and logo by virtue of its prior use in the Philippines and the issuance of Certificate of Registration. Hence, the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not international agreements, such as Paris Convention, must yield to a municipal law (RA No. 166). HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the CA and the Trial Court which found SLIHM guilty of trademark infringement. SCis in favor of SLIHM. The new Intellectual Property Code (IPC), Republic Act No. 8293, undoubtedly shows the firm resolve of the Philippines to observe and follow the Paris Convention by incorporating the relevant portions of the Convention such that persons who may question a mark (that is, oppose registration, petition for the cancellation thereof, sue for unfair competition) include persons whose internationally wellknown mark, whether or not registered, is identical with or confusingly similar to or constitutes a translation of a mark that is sought to be registered or is actually registered. However, while the Philippines was already a signatory to the Paris Convention, the IPC only took effect on January 1, 1988, and in the absence of a retroactivity clause, R.A. No. 166 still applies. The Paris Convention mandates that protection should be afforded to internationally known marks as signatory to the Paris Convention, without regard as to whether the foreign corporation is registered, licensed or doing business in the Philippines. It goes without saying that the same runs afoul to Republic Act No. 166, which requires the actual use in commerce in the Philippines of the subject mark or devise. Our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments Consequently, the petitioners cannot claim protection under the Paris Convention. Nevertheless, with the double infirmity of lack of twomonth prior use, as well as bad faith in the respondent's registration of the mark, it is evident that the petitioners cannot be guilty of infringement. It would be a great injustice to adjudge the petitioners guilty of infringing a mark when they are actually the originator and creator thereof. Under the former trademark law, R.A. No. 166, as amended, which was in effect up to December 31, 1997, hence, the law in force at the time of respondent's application for registration of trademark, the root of ownership of a trademark is actual use in commerce. Section 2 of said law requires that before a trademark can be registered, it must have been actually used in commerce and service for not less than two months in the Philippines prior to the filing of an application for its registration. Registration, without more, does not confer upon the registrant an absolute right to the registered mark. Evidence of prior and continuous use of the mark or trade name by another can overcome the presumptive ownership of the registrant and may very well entitle the former to be declared owner in an appropriate case. As between actual use of a mark without registration, and registration of the mark without actual use thereof, the former prevails over the latter. While the present law on trademarks has dispensed with the requirement of prior actual use at the time of registration, the law in force at the time of registration must be applied, and thereunder it was held that as a condition precedent to registration of trademark, trade name or service mark, the same must have been in actual use in the Philippines before the filing of the application for registration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City are hereby SET ASIDE. The complaint for infringement in Civil Case No. Q-91-8476 is ordered DISMISSED.

Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque FACTS: Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency. Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breast milk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breast milk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006. Part of the prohibitions contained in the IRR is the total ban on advertising and promotion of breast milk substitutes. Petitioner challenged said order and contends that the provisions of the IRR are unconstitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement. It also contends that respondent acted in grave abuse of discretion in issuing the said IRR. Respondents aver that the IIRR seeks not only to implement the Milk Code but also various international instruments which are deemed part of the law of the land.

ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is HELD: Yes. Under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads: Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules. Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of the domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as social legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of domestic law. Organization for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because not constitutional.

Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature.

PRISCILLA C. MIJARES vs. HON. SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA FACTS: Invoking the Alien Tort Act, petitioners Mijares, et al., all of whom suffered human rights violations during the Marcos era, obtained a Final Judgment in their favor against the Estate of the late Ferdinand Marcos amounting to roughly $1.9B in compensatory and exemplary damages for tortuous violations of international law in the US District Court of Hawaii. This Final Judgment was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals. As a consequence, Petitioners filed a Complaint with the RTC Makati for the enforcement of the Final Judgment, paying P410 as docket and filing fees based on Rule 141, 7(b) where the value of the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The Estate of Marcos however, filed a Motion to dismiss alleging the non-payment of the correct filing fees. RTC Makati dismissed the Complaint stating that the subject matter was capable of pecuniary estimation as it involved a judgment rendered by a foreign court ordering the payment of a definite sum of money allowing for the easy determination of the value of the foreign judgment. As such, the proper filing fee was P472M, which Petitioners had not paid. Petitioners submit that their action is incapable of pecuniary estimation as the subject matter of the suit is the enforcement of a foreign judgment, and not an action for the collection of a sum of money or recovery of damages. For the CHR, the Makati RTC erred in interpreting the action for the execution of a foreign judgment as a new case, in violation of the principle that once a case has been decided between the same parties in one country on the same issue with finality, it can no longer be litigated again in another country. The CHR likewise invokes the principle of comity and of vested rights. Petitioners complaint may have been lodged against an estate, but it is clearly based on a judgment, the Final Judgment of t he US District Court. The provision does not make any distinction between a local judgment and a foreign judgment, and where the law does not distinguish, we shall not distinguish. Thus, respondent judge was in clear and serious error. To resolve this question, a proper understanding is required on the nature and effects of a foreign judgment in this jurisdiction. ISSUE: Is the preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment a generally accepted principle of International Law. HELD: The conditions required by the Philippines for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment were originally contained in Section 311 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For an action in rem, the foreign judgment is deemed conclusive upon the title to the thing, while in an action in personam, the foreign judgment is presumptive, and not conclusive, of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title. However, in both cases, the foreign judgment is susceptible to impeachment in our local courts on the grounds of want of jurisdiction or notice to the party, collusion, fraud or clear mistake of law or fact. The complaint to enforce the US District Court judgment is one capable of pecuniary estimation. But at the same time, it is also an action based on judgment against an estate, thus placing it beyond the ambit of Section 7(a) of Rule 141. We find that it is covered by Section 7(b)(3), involving as it does, other actions not involving property. The viability of the public policy defense against the enforcement of a foreign judgment has been recognized in this jurisdiction. This defense allows for the application of local standards in reviewing the foreign judgment, especially when such judgment creates only a presumptive right, as it does in cases wherein the judgment is against a person. The public policy defense can safeguard against possible abuses to the easy resort to offshore litigation if it can be demonstrated that the original claim is noxious to our constitutional values. There is no obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.

While the definite conceptual parameters of the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have not been authoritatively established, the Court can assert with certainty that such an undertaking is among those generally accepted principles of international law.There is a widespread practice among states accepting in principle the need for such recognition and enforcement, albeit subject to limitations of varying degrees. The fact that there is no binding universal treaty governing the practice is not indicative of a widespread rejection of the principle, but only a disagreement as to the imposable specific rules governing the procedure for recognition and enforcement. Thus, relative to the enforcement of foreign judgments in the Philippines, it emerges that there is a general right recognized within our body of laws, and affirmed by the Constitution, to seek recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as a right to defend against such enforcement on the grounds of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The preclusion of an action for enforcement of a foreign judgment in this country merely due to an exorbitant assessment of docket fees is alien to generally accepted practices and principles in international law. In this particular circumstance, given that the complaint is lodged against an estate and is bas ed on the US District Courts Final Judgment, this foreign judgment may, for purposes of classification under the governing procedural rule, be deemed as subsumed under Section 7(b)(3) of Rule 141, i.e., within the class of all other actions not involving property. Thus, only the blanket filing fee of minimal amount is required.. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed orders are NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new order REINSTATING Civil Case No. 97-1052 is hereby issued. No costs. ALPACO