Neutral Is Not Impartial Donald

Neutral Is Not Impartial: The Confusing Legacy of Traditional Peace Operations Thinking
DOMINICKDONALD
mpartiality has been fundamental to peacekeeping thinking since the activity's creation. It is one of the three cardinal principles of traditional peacekeeping, together with (the parties') consent and the (peacekeepers') minimum/non-use of force. Recently it has been consistently identified as the most significant single element' of that traditional trinity.^ It might therefore be thought that the term had a precise definitionor at least (pace peacekeeping itself) a generally accepted one'and that its application was based on a proper analysis of its implications in peace operations. Yet neither is the case. The explicit assumption that operated at the ad hoc formation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in 1956that impartiality meant simply the absence of partialityhas been allowed to survive unexamined for four decades.'' At the same time, for over forty years, practitioners and theorists alike have seen impartiality and neutrality as synonymous, without understanding the subtle distinctions between them. In fact, they are not true synonyms.' This confusion was of little importance until the postCold War boom in intrastate Peace Support Operations (PSOs) carved it in stone. Those who deny the existence of a "Grey Area" between traditional peacekeeping and Desert Storm-slyle enforcementor would keep troops out of ithave used the need to preserve the perception of impartiality as the bedrock of their arguments,^ but the bedrock is
DOMINICK DONALD is completing a doctoral thesis on Peace Operations Thinking in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. He has served in the British Army, written leaders for The Times of London, been a Contributing Editor at Red Herring Magazine, and worked as a Programme Officer for the UN in New York. He writes on a wide range of contemporary and historical security issues for British broadsheets. Address for correspondence: 30 Treadgold St, London W U 4BP, UK. E-mail: donmail@aol. com Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 29, No. 3, Spring 2003, pp. 415-448.
416
Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003
mislabelled. The nay-sayers have been defending neutrality, not impartiality; and it is the latter quality that is crucial to any understanding of, or freedom in, peace operations. T h e rest of the traditional trinity has already been substantially reexamined. The report on the setting-up of U N E F II and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force ( U N D O F ) in 1973 strengthened the basis for a wider use of force a quarter of a century ago, while recent research has shown the fallacy of " W i d e r P e a c e k e e p i n g ' s " reemphasis of absolute consent.' Those who have given impartiality a cursory examination have failed to place it in the wider context of the reality of peace support operations: that there are three categories, not two.* T h e result is that two of the trinitarian stool's three legs have been lengthened; impartiality must be dissected to restore its balance. Dissection must show a coherent understanding of the fundamental differences between neutrality and impartialitysomething which has so far been lacking. The first section of this article examines definitions of impartiality and neutrality and identifies independent activity based on j u d g m e n t as the significant distinguishing factor. T h e failure to examine impartiality's original application to peacekeeping operations has allowed a flawed interpretation to stand; the second section details the birth of traditional impartiality, its links with neutrality, the early perception that the two terms were synonymous and mutually dependent, and the way in which the passivity of one was allowed to infuse the meaning of the other. T h e third section shows how the gradual formalization of these beliefs harmed observers' ability to appreciate the distinctions between the two terms when post-Cold War P S O s brought those distinctions into relief. It also d e m o n s t r a t e s how traditional impartiality was, in effect, neutrality, when applied to the Grey Area. T h e fourth section explores the flawed attempts to reinterpret impartiality, and reveals how confusion about the t e r m s ' application to P S O s persists at the highest levels. T h e conclusion outlines the implications of this confusion and briefly suggests how practitioners might take it on board.
The Fallacy of Impartial Neutrality

Any comparison of British and American definitions of "impartiality" and "neutrality" immediately reveals self-evident similarities between the two terms.' According to the Oxford English Dictionary, impartiality is "[t]he quality or character of being impartial; freedom from prejudice or bias; fairness."'" "Impartial" is itself defined as "[n]ot
Donald
417
partial; not favoring one party or side more than another; unprejudiced, unbiased, fair, just, equitable. (Of persons, their conduct, etc.)"; "Impartially" as "without favoring one more than another; without prejudice or bias; fairly, equitably."" Explicitly political definitions of "neutral" stipulate that when applied to rulers or states it means "[n]ot assisting, or actively taking the side of, either party in the case of a war or disagreement between other states; remaining inactive in relation to the belligerent powers." It can also apply to entities "[b]elonging to a power which remains inactive during hostilities; exempted or excluded from the sphere of warlike operations."'^ "Neutrality" is an "attitude between contending parties or powers; abstention from taking any part in a war between other states...; [t]he state or condition of being on neither side or inclined neither way; [an] absence of decided views, feeling or expression; indifference."'' Thus, "neutral" and "impartial" both suggest offering no assistance, or attachment, to any party in a conflict. While the absence of assistance implicit in each term is very similar, there are clear and important differences in the nature of the respective detachment from all belligerents. A neutral party is far more passive than an impartial one. It abstains from taking any part, is indifferent, while neutrality is an "absence of decided views." Remaining "inactive in relation to the belligerent[s]," a neutral's ability to act apart from them is hampered by its being "exempted or excluded" from the sphere of operations; the limits to its conduct are thus determined by the parties to the conflictas, by implication, is the survival of its neutral status. An impartial actor, on the other hand, is "fair, j u s t . " Implicit in both of these adjectives is the notion of j u d g m e n t . W h e n this is coupled with the recurring notions of the absence of favoritism, prejudice, and bias, and the emphasis on fairness, it is clear that an impartial actor takes a position unattached to either party. That position is affected by the belligerents only to the extent that it is "equitable"though who defines that equality is unclear. The extent of an impartial agent's ability to act is also debatable, but what is certain is that it adopts a more concrete position than its neutral counterpart. Broader nonpolitical definitions also shed light on the terms' political manifestations. Neutrality is "[an] intermediate state or condition, not clearly one thing or another."'"* A neutral entity fits "neither of two specified or implied categories; [it] occup[ies] a middle position with regard to two extremes." It has "no strongly marked characteristics or features; [it is] undefined, indefinite, vague."'^ When contrasted with an apparently rare application of impartiality"[n]ot partial or frag-
418
mentary; entire, complete"'*these definitions highlight the fact that the difference between the two terms is in reality fundamental. They are thus in no way s y n o n y m o u s . A true s y n o n y m is "one of two or more words in the English language which have the same or very nearly the same essential m e a n i n g " ; synonyms are "such words as may be defined wholly, or almost wholly, in the same t e r m s . " " T h e MerriamWebster dictionary of synonyms clearly differentiates between "impartial" and "neutral." T h e latter, "in one of [its] earliest and still c o m m o n u s e s " applies to those w h o refuse to take sides. " T h e term need not imply an attitude of impartiality, but it usually implies either indecision or a refraining from positive action." S y n o n y m s include "indifferent" "elicit[ing] no decision as to whether they [the protagonists] are good or b a d " a n d (when applied to colors, terms, and character) "vagueness, indefiniteness, indecisiveness, ineffectualness." As with the definitions, there are links between the two terms; impartial's synonyms are given as "fair, equitable, unbiased, objective, just, dispassionate, uncolored," while "disinterested, detached, aloof, indifferent" are all suggested as analogous.'^ Yet while "disinterested" and "indifferent" are synonymous with "neutral" and analogous to "impartial," the fact remains that they are not themselves s y n o n y m o u s . There is an area of ground c o m m o n to the two terms in which each bleeds into the other. This c o m m o n ground does not stretch to include their respective essences. The negative synonyms for "neutral" and the j u d g m e n t implicit in " i m p a r t i a l i t y ' s " synonyms emphasize the fundamental difference between the two terms. Neutrality is a passive policy, without a core principle other than the avoidance of trouble, and with its limits defined by the belligerents. But impartialitywhether defined by the parties to the conflict or the actor himselfis a coherent position predicated on a j u d g m e n t of the protagonists. Activity independent of the belligerents is central to impartiality, for without that capability how can an impartial entity j u d g e , be fair, or demonstrate an absence of prejudice, favoritism, and bias? At its simplest, neutrality is an absence, impartiality a presence. A cursory examination of the development of political neutrality defined in one survey as "the non-involvement in the struggle for life and d o m i n a n c e " " a p p e a r s to contradict this. T h e laws of neutrality evolved to allow states wishing to remain aloof from conflicts the freedom to carry out their policies and their nationals the freedom to trade.^" Switzerland's compact with the signatories of the Congress of Vienna in 1815, which conveyed duties in peace as well as war, including the abstention from alliances, introduced the notion of legal
Donald
419
permanent neutrality.^' The Hague Conventions V (land) and XIII (sea warfare), signed in 1907, codified the rights and obligations of neutral powers (both de facto and legally permanent) in wartime. Both documents tend to specify the limits to the belligerents' expectations of the neutral, rather than provide an expansive platform for the neutral's independent activity. Yet they also stipulate that certain obligations on the part of the neutral "must be impartially applied by it to both sides."^^ So the origins of legal neutrality lay in the desire to retain the ability to act, while its formalization enshrined the notion of neutrality as principled, independent, active abstention. In theory, legal neutrality is neither passive nor an absence. But the reality of both legal and de facto permanent neutrality has been different. Though neutrality is the refuge and protection of the weak, it is decided by the strong. This is reflected in its gradual codification, which in turn reflected a struggle between two different legal perspectives. Broadly, the Athenian-Aristotelian (or positivist) perspective holds that law is determined case by case, and by the legislator best able to enforce its decisions. The Ciceronians (or naturalists), on the other hand, argue that there is a natural, inherently universal, and eternal "justice"; legislation is the process (through "right reason") of deciding which interpretation is closest to the overarching ideal. Thus, to the positivists, neutrality is to be observed only when it is acceptable to the legislator of the system in which it is asserted, and has legal status during hostilities only within the bounds determined by that same legislator. The naturalists, meanwhile, maintain that neutrality is a matter of each state claiming the best insight into the implicit rules of the community." The difficulty in establishing legal neutrality was that no broadly applicable naturalist interpretation could be arrived at, and the need for individual judgments in specific cases meant that the legal foundations were built on expedient, positivist arguments. By the time of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713, the positivists had won the legal debate.^" The Hague Conventions formalized a two-hundred-year-old process in which the search for a basis for neutrality simply focused on the dominant interest's ideas. Having been decided by the dominant force, these principles could be set aside or redefined by that same force. Given that the current international legal order is "tribal council-like," with no single state or body having overall legislative authority, and given that the positivist perspective necessitates constant redefinition, it is little wonder that "neutrality" fails to provide the powerless with room to maneuver among the powerful. The laws of neutrality, as much as the observance of the fact of it, have been decided by the strong."
420
Attempts to observe neutrality also reflect the strong man as arbiter. A country fighting for its survival is unlikely to pay much heed to a weaker p o w e r ' s self-declared neutral status. Even the success of legal permanent neutralitythe strongest form availabledepends on all interested p o w e r s ' readiness to respect the neutral's status.^* World W a r II provides the strongest evidence of the impossibility of genuinely impartial, principled neutrality. Of the twenty-two European nations of any size that were neutral in September 1939, only five stayed out of the conflict.^' Eleven had their neutrality trampled by invasion, while another six set aside their status more or less of their own free will, all but one becoming violators of some of the eleven.^^ T h e fate of the eleven demonstrated that the ultimate arbiters of neutrality were, as always, the belligerents; the policies of the five states which maintained their status revealed the impossibility of impartial neutrality. A neutral can only act i n d e p e n d e n t l y of the parties (i.e., be impartial) if there is a balance of power. If that balance shifts, especially in the neutral's vicinity, that state may be forced to m a k e concessions contrary to neutrality to save the essence of its status-thus losing its impartiality. This may both strengthen the stronger side and lessen its respect for (and likely observance of) that state's neutrality; annexation may be the next step.^' T o avoid this, each of E u r o p e ' s five successful W W I I neutrals avoided observing their H a g u e obligations to the letter.^" Their survival as neutrals d e p e n d e d on a c o m b i n a t i o n of factors (geographical location, timing, strong defenses, trading links, poverty^') that had little to do with impartial fulfilment of legal obligations. In effect, all five states had to persuade G e r m a n y (the danger posed by other belligerents was small) that the preservation of their status was more useful than its revocation. "As long as each [neutral] remained amenable to the varying degrees of pressure Berlin applied, G e r m a n y chose not to occupy them."'^ The hollowness of legal and de facto neutrality was thus emphasized by the fact that it was a default political position. Each of the five successful neutrals had sympathies with one or another of the belligerents and felt it was in no position to back with f o r c e . " Even legally neutral Switzerland had assumed its status (admittedly in the early sixteenth century, formalized in 1815) after having tried, and failed, at power politics.''' This status-by-default underlines the impossibility of impartial neutrality. Strict impartial neutrality assumes that belligerents will tolerate the inconvenience of the neutral's even-handedness because each will lose equally should its status be compromised. But the history of political neutrality shows that this is rarely s o . ' ' They may respect the
Donald
421
Status of a well-defended state too small to be worth more than a secondary effort, as long as it compromises that status to keep them happy^*successful wartime neutrality is the preserve of states too weak to be other than partial to the ascendant powerbut they will press a neutral strong enough to be genuinely even-handed until it has to set that status aside. Finally, to be viable, impartial neutrality needs a static balance of power. But in conflict, the balance of power is constantly shifting; stasis is only possible in a time of peace. If impartial neutrality is therefore possible only in peacetime, and is untenable in the circumstances for which it was designed, then it has the illusory substance of the emperor's new clothes. It is thus-by (empirical and dictionary, rather than legal) definition-passive and hollow. Thus the crucial distinction between "neutral" and "impartial" is independent activity based on judgment. An entity cannot be both impartial and neutral, for neutral bodies can only remain above a conflict by unprincipled passivity. The laws of neutrality imply a degree of action, and thus impartiality, but as we have seen, once impartial neutrality's essential preconditiona balance of poweris disturbed, a neutral must compromise its impartiality to survive. Not only is the legal basis of neutrality determined by the stronger party, the legal obligation on a neutral state to be even-handed in its neutrality is impossible to fulfill in time of conflictthe situation for which those laws were devised. "Impartial" and "neutral" are thus neither synonymous, nor even analogous. They are two entirely different concepts. Although there is some definitional common ground, this serves simply to obscure the terms' essential incompatibility. And the legacy of the terms' traditional trinitarian interpretation has further eroded this distinction. Suez 1956: The Birth of Traditional Trinitarian Impartiality The origins of traditional trinitarian impartiality, and the rest of the trinity, lie in the 1956 Good Faith Agreement between President Nasser of Egypt and Secretary-General (SG) Hammarskjold of the UN, which formalized the status of the UN's first peacekeeping force, UNEF. The Security Council's schism over Suez meant that both men thought of "impartiality" primarily in terms of a given country's position on the crisis. Nasser saw the principle as a prerequisite for allowing UN troops on Egyptian soil. Insisting on the last word when it came to the force's composition, he wanted it to be recruited from nations he saw as impartialideally, nonaligned and tending to support the Arab side in
422
Anned Forces & Society/Spring 2003
the broader Arab-Israeli conflict." He vetoed a substantial Canadian contingent, apparently because of Ottawa's membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)(making her an ally of France and the UK) and the Commonwealth. However, UNEF's Canadian commander, who conducted most of the negotiations, felt that the objections stemmed from the fear that Ottawa's so far pro-Egyptian policy "might later veer to the 'Western' if not the British stance over the issue of control of the Canal."^* In fact, Nasser wanted a nonpartial (at worst) or pro-Egyptian (at best) force. Her broader relations with their governmentshow far they supported her policies in the United Nations determined Egypt's attitude towards proposed contingents. The advice of distinctly partial consultants was also influential; the frequent input of the Soviet ambassador to Cairo was reflected in a veto on states "entangled in military pacts with the aggressors" thought to have "a strong Russian smell about it."'' Thus, Nasser's notion of "impartiality" was nothing of the kind. The least he would settle for was that a contributor be opposed to the aggressors. Hammarskjold, however, was thinking in more absolute terms. On 10 November, he insisted that an Egyptian veto on troop contributors would imply authorization of Egyptian infringement of his authority. Nasser was assured that the force would be "purely international in character," i.e., free of ties and thus impartial, and was threatened with UNEF's collapse if he continued to "introduce considerations extraneous to the aims of the UN." When continued Egyptian obstinacy brought Hammarskjold to Cairo on 16 November, he was determined that the final decisions about UNEF's composition and functions should lie with the UN, either in the authority of the Secretary-General or the authorizing body (the General Assembly [GA]). Above all, he wanted to make sure that UNEF could only be withdrawn when the UN deemed its task completed, and not whenever Egypt demanded it.*" This position reflected his strong ideas about his broader role. Hammarskjold had been adamant on the independence of the SecretaryGeneral from the moment of his appointment; the head of an organization with members of differing ideologies could only function by "be[ing] faithful to truth as he understands it.'"" The Suez Crisis reinforced his stance. On 31 October he publicly rebuked two member governments (Britain and France) for the first time, arguing that the principles of the Charter required he take action based on judgment i.e., be (in dictionary terms) impartial. "As a servant of the Organization the Secretary-General has the duty to maintain his usefulness by avoiding public stands on conflicts between member nations unless and
Donald
423
until such an action might help to resolve the conflict. However, the discretion and impartiality thus imposed on the Secretary-General... may not degenerate into a policy of expediency. He must also be a servant of the principles of the Charter, and its aims must ultimately determine what for him is right or wrong. For this he must stand." Later, he insisted that "[i]t is not by suppressing his views, but by forming his views on an independent basis and by consistently maintaining them that a Secretary-General can gain and maintain the confidence on which he is d e p e n d e n t . . . [ H ] e may antagonize one group today and another tomorrow...[but Member governments] will come to realize they have much to gain and little to lose through such independence....'"*^ H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s perception that he was an explicitly active, j u d g mental agent of the principles of the U N Charter thus informed his negotiations with Nasser. Yet the Good Faith Agreement (GFA) was a neutral rather than impartial document, an impressive fudge which pleased neither party. It still represented the most that could be obtained. Hammarskjold asserted his right as S G to determine the force c o m p o sition, while agreeing to sendas a practical measureonly contingents that Cairo approved. The exercise of E g y p t ' s sovereign rights regarding U N E F would "be guided, in good faith" by G A Resolution 1000; U N E F ' s activities would in turn "be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the Force...[T]he UN, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness to maintain UNEF until its task is completed.'"*^ This appeared to allow the Egyptians the right to ask U N E F to go, and the Force the right to insist that if its task was incomplete it be allowed to stay. But the " w i l l i n g n e s s " to stay was clearly linked to E g y p t i a n g o v e r n m e n t consent. Effectively, the U N was ready to " m a i n t a i n " U N E F to finish its j o b until Cairo decided otherwise. Any such Egyptian request was supposed to be referred to the U N E F Advisory C o m m i t t e e , which would either act on the request immediately or pass it to the General Assembly for consideration. But the A g r e e m e n t ' s second and third m e m o r a n d a (kept secret at Franco-British request) specified that Egypt had a veto over troop contributors; and it was those vetted troop contributors w h o m a d e up the Advisory Committee."" As far as the outside world was concerned, the G F A established a force dependent on a strong SG for its authority. The reality was that though the principle of impartiality had been established, the fact of neutrality had taken precedence. T h e first mention of impartiality in relation to U N E F reflected this shift. H a m m a r s k j o l d ' s 24 January 1957 report on the Force stated that it " m u s t . . . b e impartial, in the sense that it does not serve as a means to
424
force settlement, in the interest of one party, of political conflicts or legal issues regarded as controversial.""' For the first time, impartiality was explicitly linked to consent ("[t]he use of military force by the UN other than that under Chapter VII...requires the consent of the states in which the force has to operate'"**). More importantly, the SG's perception that impartiality necessitated the avoidance of controversy represented a considerable shift from his position in late October, when the term included the embracing of the inexpedient. This clear though passive definition was muddied (and the passivity emphasized) by the explicit linkage of consent and impartiality with two paragraphs in Hammarskjold's 6 November Report. '^ The latter had stipulated that "there is no intent in the establishment of the Force to influence the military...and thereby the political balance," and that UNEF had no military functions beyond those needed "to secure peaceful conditions" on the assumption that the belligerents would fully comply with the General Assembly's recommendations."* The assumption of full compliance meant that only a passive Force was needed, which could convince the parties that it had no desire to influence the military/ political balance. Hammarskjold's limited delineation of impartiality was by both definition and coupling a far more passive quality than that he had entertained at the outset of the Crisis. Neutrality had taken precedence out of simple necessity. The GFA was being negotiated as UNEF deployed, and while the ceasefire lines themselves were quiet, some principles had to be agreed upon as quickly as possible. At the same time, UNEF was an operational fact which neither party wanted to jeopardize. Nasser only signed up after thrice being threatened with the force's withdrawal. Hammarskjold felt that the Agreement's woolier, more inconsistent aspects (particularly those relating to withdrawal) could be revisited later, and was in fact planning to do so shortly before his death."' Furthermore, the UNEF Advisory Committee had demonstrated that it did not share the SecretaryGeneral's ideas about the independence of the Force as early as 14 November, when it indicated the primacy of Egyptian consent; acutely aware of the limitations of his own authority, Hammarskjold was unlikely to lead where his contributors refused to follow.''' And Nasser's misgivings about the loose definition of UNEF's task were outweighed by the knowledge that the Advisory Committee was unlikely to rock his boat. Ultimately, however, the two perceptions of impartiality had been incompatible; and though the GFA attempted to reconcile them, the reality was that the lowest common denominator was Nasser's consent. But Hammarskjold may also have been unclear about the distinc-
Donald
425
tions between neutrality and impartiality. In his writings he frequently confused the two. U N officials could take controversial stands, "but on an international basis and, thus, without departing from the basic concept of neutrality..."; any demand that "neutral" UN officials should not take a stand "is in conflict with the Charter itself."^' In assuming that a neutral entity can j u d g e and/or act independently, he was clearly confusing the two terms. He also claimed that the Secretariat was "a neutral instrument for the Organization" (surely an oxymoron) whose strength lay in trust in its impartiality; yet a m e m b e r of the Secretariat could be neutral "in relation to interests" without being neutral about the Charter or facts.'^ In effect, he was assuming that one could both act neutrally and be impartially inactive. His confusion is greatest in a 1960 statement to the Security Council. The principles of the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) "were that the Organization...should maintain a position of strict neutrality in relation to all the domestic problems of a political nature....This meant that neither the UN force, nor the civilian operation, could be used by any person or faction in pursuit of his or their political a i m s . . . . " " O N U C ' s independence of the parties was surely a manifestation of impartiality, not neutrality, while the Eorce's intrusive mandate meant that it could never be neutral. It would hardly be surprising if Hammarskjold were confused; legal usage had long combined the two terms. Even the Red C r o s s t h e only long-running successful e x a m p l e of third-party i n t e r p o s i t i o n w a s confused. Its four principles, set out fifty years after the organisation was created, included impartiality and universality. Universality was unattainable without neutrality (the refusal to "take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or doctrinal nature"), which the International C o m m i t t e e of the Red Cross (ICRC) had always practised by jealously guarding the confidentiality of what it knew, heard, or saw. Thus, though neutrality was only adopted as a core principle in 1965, it had long been a tacit operational requirement.''' In fact, the Red Cross could only act if it did not j u d g e ; and if it could n o t j u d g e , could it be genuinely impartial? The reality was that the Red Cross, like any neutral, could only do whatever, and go wherever, the belligerents permitted. For sixty years its principles said it was impartial, when it could not be. There may have been little need to define or isolate the terms given that the I C R C had functioned perfectly well. It is also entirely possible that, like "meet and right," "impartial and neutral" had b e c o m e a near-tautological double act, with a sloppy understanding of the differences between the two. T h i s confusion w o u l d not h a v e m a t t e r e d , but for one thing:
426
Hammarskjold had wanted an impartial force and settled for a neutral one, yet the force was understood to be impartial. Inasmuch as either he or Nasser understood the term, both saw impartiality primarily in the terms of the political position of the contributor state, a perception formalized in the stipulation in the GA resolution establishing UNEF that the force be recruited from member states other than the Permanent 5.'' This was reflected in the wider international community, which understood the Force to be recruited from countries "not partial" in the conflict. Yet the secret memoranda in the GFA ensured that UNEF could not be genuinely impartial, even if that was what everyone understood it to be. This was not immediately evident. After all, during periods of calm the neutral, essentially passive, appears to retain the impartial agent's principled independence of action; like a neutral state in a time of peace, UNEF could maintain the fiction of its principled independence as long as that coincided with the parties' essential interests. But once those interests overrode respect for UNEF, then the fiction of impartial neutrality was revealed. The moment UNEF's status was tested in the summer of 1967, impartiality vanished into the ether. Thus an original definitional and historical confusion was compounded by the GFA and Hammarskjold's confusion. Traditional peacekeeping was born neutral, yet the world understood it to be impartial. The terminological waters had been muddied. The stage had been set for the defence of neutrality, not impartiality. The Development of Traditional Trinitarian Impartiality Though peacekeeping achieved a gradually more formal basis during the 1950s and 1960s, the absence from the relevant documents of any operating principleparticularly any notion that impartiality might be that principleis striking. But UNEF did not need the freedom of action impartiality could provide. It had the consent of all parties and a fairly simple mission (particularly during Phase 4 [1957-67]), while its military effectiveness had nothing to do with the exercise of military force. Instead it was "a political counter... its moves and acts dictated by a delicate balance of political pressures, whose resultant force it registered."'* The peacekeepers' simple tasks (patrolling, manning observation posts) also demanded little conceptualization. But it is more likely that these lacunae reflected limited and confused thinking. For instance, peacekeeping's default basis until the greater formalization of the 1970s was the UNEF "Summary Study," which set out the principles and conclusions "emerg[ing] from a study
Donald
427
of the operation as a w h o l e . " Yet "impartiality" is not mentioned at all, while "neutrality" appears only once; and that (the clear-cut mandate "enabled it [UNEE] to maintain its neutrality in relation to international political issues") seems confusingly redolent of the 24 January 1957 delineation of "impartiality" (no intention to shift the military/political b a l a n c e ) . " The much-cited conceptual basis for early peacekeeping is in fact largely administrative in tone. Its occasional touching on principles stipulates that it would be dangerous to extrapolate from the unique U N E E experience, whose unusual political circumstances "justify the assumption that...[a future force] would be determined by the particular needs of...[each new conflict] situation." ^* Yet this thoroughly sensible assessment was discarded within a month, when Hammarskjold outlined his willingness to dispatch any other operations with the U N E E principles. T h e Study also emphasised the need for consent, strengthening the passive link.^' On the ground, U N E E interpreted "impartial" as even-handed, or fair, and "neutral" as uncommitted to either side;*"" impartiality was the default operational principle which allowed neutral troops to carry out their j o b s . The problem this created was that the two terms were now seen as complementary; a threat to one was automatically a threat to the other.*"' T h e violent confusion of the C o n g o quickly showed that the neutral/ impartial tandem was fundamentally unsuitable for peacekeepers needing to act. Congolese "had noted that whenever they attacked the U N force [ O N U C ] it withdrew, and in their eyes such a body could not be deserving of respect. They had now virtually neutralized the force....The changed situation...made it necessary for the force to...use military means under certain permissible circumstances."*^ So, by early 1961, O N U C had to abandon its passivity to survive. Later, it could only fulfill its accumulated mandates by having troop contributors rendered far from "inclined neither w a y " and thus neutral by their bitter Congolese e x p e r i e n c e , " taking actions that one of the belligerents (Moise T s h o m b e ' s Katanga) and much of the U N itself saw as utterly partial. O N U C ' s critics reflected the continuing terminological confusion by arguing that the U N had abandoned impartiality in acting against Katanga. But the operation was fully in line with the force's mandates; in fact, O N U C had abandoned neutrality, as it had to to survive in a chaotic operational environment. Such was the poverty of analysis that the notion of separating neutrality from impartiality was not even entertained. In fact, the criticism itself was wrong-headed; those who argued that O N U C had abandoned impartiality were, like Hammarskjold,
428
probably applying the meaning of neutrality.^ In reality, the Security Council was utterly divided over the Congo, and any decisive action by ONUC would be seen as partial by large powers with a considerable interest in the outcome, yet no presence in the field.^' Instead of using the ONUC experience as a springboard for a proper examination of impartiality, the UN chose to use it to reinforce the double-act interpretation. This was partly because everyone was aware that ONUC had taken the organization to the edge of the abyss.* But it was also because ONUC was a Grey Area operation thirty years before the term was invented; no one understood that the complications the force faced were more the manifestations of a different operational environment where new well-founded principles were required than of Congo's political chaos. Even if this had been realised, the chances of any analysis following were small. ONUC had convinced the UN to stick to buffer zones." The result was that by the summer of 1967, "impartiality" was part of a passive conceptual package. Hammarskjold's original strong conception of the termas manifested in his 31 October 1956 speech*^ had been undermined by its association with neutrality in the GFA and its explicit linkage with consent in the 24 January Report. The SG's Final Report on UNEF I, written after its humiliating withdrawal, formalized this emasculation. The operation had forged "[s]ome fundamental principles clearly applicable to any UN peace force"; the "full consent" of the host countries and other parties "is the indispensable precondition." Once cooperation was withheld from a force "it cannot hope to continue to perform any useful function." And in an early echo of the debates of the 1990s; " p e a c e - k e e p i n g and enforcement action...cannot be mixed."*' This passive package was bound even tighter by the principles for the creation of UNEF II and UNDOF in 1973-74. The broader and more forceful definition of self-defense might have encouraged impartiality's separation from neutrality; but closer examination shows that the redefinition of self-defense was by no means as strong as has been represented. Though this was to "include resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council," the force "would proceed on the assumption that the parties to the conflict would take all the necessary steps for compliance with the decisions of the Security Council." Three essential conditions for an effective force were also identified: the full confidence and backing of the Security Council, the ability to function as an integrated and efficient military unit, and "the full cooperation of
Donald
429
the parties concerned." But peacekeepers were unlikely to interpret the right to self-defense as widely as they might if they had to assume that a) whenever the belligerents misbehaved they didn't mean it, so could be ignored, and b) that their continued cooperation was not to be compromised. The enduring emphasis on consent and impartiality/ neutrality ensured that the traditional trinity remained passive; where the broadened right to self-defense clashed with the other two principles, it was not applied." This passive traditional trinity was so tightly bound that appreciation of its deep unsuitability for the new operational environment of post-Cold War peacekeeping was slow to come.^^ Second-generation holistic peacekeepers were despatched with an utterly passive conceptual kitbagone dominant doctrinal approach held that fear of the loss of impartiality should not stop neutral peacekeepers from "promptly and honestly reporting violations" by the belligerents." So when recalcitrant parties in Namibia, Angola, and C a m b o d i a broke agreements freely entered into, any use of force was thought to j e o p a r d i z e perceived impartiality, and thus consent, in consensual processes. The result was seen in "the bamboo pole incident," where a substantial United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) convoy (including the Head of Mission and Force Commander) turned back when confronted by a handful of youthful guerrillas and a single pole barricade, for fear of being seen to be partial.^'' Neutrality had become the default position. The debacle of the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) seemed to emphasize the consequences of the loss of perceived impartiality. By crossing the "Mogadishu Line," peacekeepers had been perceived as partial and thus become belligerents. Though the loss of impartiality was identified as the determining factor, the principle's passive harness meant that the subsequent reexamination focused on the idea which had been lead animal from the beginning: consent.'^ Even suggestions of a more robust approach to impartiality failed to cut the traces. An early UNPROFOR commander proposed that in a Complex Emergency deployment, "impartiality of the UN mission must never be compromised....This is not to suggest that in pursuance of this principle, UN peacekeepers should allow themselves to be threatened, bullied, or targeted, without responding appropriately." Yet he also stipulated that such a force be deployed only if the consensus or consent of the warring factions had been obtained.^* The operational consequences of this combination were seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1994-1995. Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose took over
430
as U N P R O F O R c o m m a n d e r there in January 1994, determined to stop the force's collapse and restore its credibility "by adopting a more robust approach in our dealings with the local w a r l o r d s . . . . " ' " T h e W i d e r Peacekeeping emphasis on absolute consent seemed to provide the relevant conceptual platform; as long as operational and strategic-level consent was maintained, his troops would be seen to be impartial. This meant that his use of force had to be seen to be even-handed.''^ But any use of force was seen as partial, usually by at least the targeted party and the protagonist rejoicing most in his punishment. Other factors, such as R o s e ' s belief that "the U N mission could not succeed without their [the S e r b s ' ] consent,"'" contributor countries' individual political agendas,*" their reluctance to risk casualties,^' and contradictory mandates, c o m bined to make Rose more robust in word than deed. T h e lack of a liberating tactical-level operational principle magnified these obstructions. Without any basis for impartiality in peace operations, or indeed a definition for the term, Rose could only interpret the loss of perceived impartiality as the loss of impartiality itself, rather than a sign of a problem with his understanding of the concept. Trinitarian impartiality's development had simply formalized the long-standing emphasis on passivity as the safe, l o w e s t - c o m m o n - d e n o m i n a t o r operational principle, and ensured that its product in the new environment was i m p o tence and inactivityneutrality. Squaring the Circle: The Flawed Attempts to Redefine Impartiality
Though the self-evident inapplicability of the traditional trinity to the new operational environment has led many of the more imaginative thinkers to readdress impartiality, none has found a way out of the morass. Doctrine writers' early attempts were particularly unhelpful. The W i d e r Peacekeeping/FM 100-23 perspective linked impartiality and neutrality, and echoed the Nordic line that a force should call attention to belligerents' violations without forcing compliance.*^ The French doctrinal concept of "active impartiality" also showed confusion. Its unhelpful application to all armed Chapter VI operations apart, it appeared to offer coherence in that impartiality was defined by the peacekeepers and the need for action was determined by the degree of the parties' compliance with the mandate. Peacekeepers had to d e m o n strate "a total impartiality" towards the parties, without being "totally neutral, which would have an effect on the force's c r e d i b i l i t y . " " But this implied total impartiality could be combined with a very high degree of neutrality (it cannot), while the later observation that the use of force to
Donald
431
ensure compliance might j e o p a r d i z e neutrality assumes that force is compatible with neutrality (another instance of swapped meanings).*" These assumptions made active impartiality at best a flawed basis for action.**' T w o of the most recent d o c t r i n e s N A T O and Britishalso combine clarity with confusion. N A T O Doctrine is striking for not mentioning neutrality at all, instead identifying impartiality as the core principle for all P S O s . Impartiality is poorly d e f i n e d " w i t h o u t favour or prejudice to any party and in accordance with the mandate"^*though the term also covers a helpful measure of j u d g m e n t : "actions of the parties will be j u d g e d in accordance with the mandate and International Humanitarian Law."*^ But N A T O also identifies consent as the principle distinguishing Peacekeeping (PK) from Peace Enforcement (PE) operations, and believes that a traditional P K force is impartial, when it will in reality be neutral.** And no guiding principle is identified for P E operations alone. T h e British doctrine is much better. There is an excellent, almost dictionary definition of impartiality as it applies to P S O . P S O are "neither in support of, nor against a particular party but are designed to restore peace and ensure compliance, in an impartial and even-handed manner..."; if force is used it "will only be because of what that party is doing or not doing, in relation to the m a n d a t e . . . . " * ' Impartiality "should not be confused with neutrality. To do s o . . .promotes passivity....Impartiality, perhaps better described as principled impartiality, requires a degree of j u d g m e n t against a set of principles, or the mandate, or both, which the notion of neutrality does not...."'" Yet this broadly accurate exposition also contains contradictions. "Principled impartiality" is linked with "even-handed"; in reality the two will often be incompatible. And the pragmatic statement about shifting the balance of power directly contradicts other assertions.*' Crucially, "[t]he conduct of P S O will be impartial to the parties but never neutral in the execution of the mission"; yet the broad P S O category includes traditional p e a c e k e e p i n g operations w h o s e reliance on consent and its c o n s e q u e n t passivity will require neutrality instead. A b o v e all, it appears that impartiality and neutrality are compatible: "principled impartiality...contrasts strongly with that of a neutral stance."'^ Even the doctrine with the closest understanding of true impartiality therefore maintains the passive link. Academic advocates of the Grey Area have tried to square the impartiality circle by distinguishing between "blind" and " s y m b i o t i c " variants of the concept. Symbiotic impartiality is the avoidance of prejudicing the interests of the parties to ensure their continued consent.
432
Blind impartiality is impartiality towards a mandate; peacekeepers' unprejudiced execution of the mandate may thus have prejudicial results.'-' Traditional peacekeeping's emphasis on consent has meant that though its practitioners might want to practice both variants, they have instead been forced to choose between emphasizing symbiotic impartiality or withdrawal.''' The result has been confusion, though with a discernible shift in favor of the blind option.'^ Daniel & Hayes suggest clearing the conceptual decks by having symbiotic impartiality as the preserve of traditional peacekeeping, and basing "coercive inducement" (their middle ground proposal) on the blind variant.'* But this analysis is also flawed. Symbiotic impartiality is clearly neutrality. And while the peacekeepers of the mid-1990s may not have known that their impotence was symbiotic impartiality, the perpetuation of the notion that one can be both passive and impartial can only continue to hobble what should be a robust principle. At the same time, the sensible insistence on blind impartiality as a principle for the middle ground is hampered by the complete absence of neutrality from a conceptual menu in which it still has a place; while the continued linkage (through the blind/symbiotic distinction) of the operating principles for two distinct operational areas diminishes the likelihood of coherent conduct in either.'' Only conceptual separation can introduce operational clarity. The increasing humanitarian dimension to post-Cold Wa^PSOs has meant that another, avowedly apolitical sector has entered the debate. The new environment has inflated the number and political importance of humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and International Organizations (IOs) and caused them to rethink (or often create) conceptual frameworks. The ICRC has been central to this process, through a study of its own likely future obligations and by leading the drafting and promotion of a code of conduct for humanitarian NGOs and IOs.'* But the end product has been a confusion as pervasive as that confronting the soldiers. Eor over a century the concepts of neutrality and impartiality have been central to humanitarian action in war, and served as the foundation of its international legal protection." Humanitarian neutrality is a principle of abstention (from aiding any belligerent [the ICRC definition] or from hindering one by acting outside obligations in general international law [so contravening the laws of war]). Humanitarian impartiality, on the other hand, is a principle of action; any humanitarian assistance must be rendered on the basis of objective criteria of need (which does not mean that all sides must receive the same amount).'"" According to humanitarian organizations, only political neutrality
Donald
433
could create the confidence for impartial delivery of assistance and only impartial action could preserve political neutrality. Of course, assistance can be delivered only with the consent of the belligerents. But this passive link was in theory broken by the parties' obligationin certain circumstancesto give consent, and their inability to base any withholding of consent on legal grounds."" T h e I C R C also retains the custom-based right of humanitarian initiative if it feels its special character might resolve a given situation.'"^ Taken together, all of these appeared to give humanitarian organizations considerable independence of action, and thus genuine impartiality. Yet the new operational environment revealed the fallacy of the humanitarians' impartial neutrality. Assistance to the victims meant obstruction of the belligerents; impartial aid jeopardized neutrality and hence security. Aid agencies' independence of action was hamstrung by factions linking permission for aid to political, military, or humanitarian issues outside the agencies' controlacceptance of which would, like the wartime neutral, further c o m p r o m i s e their statusand refusing to recognize humanitarian neutrality and impartiality. Informing the parties of their obligations under international law changed little."*^ The principles' relevance, and how humanitarian actors were to act when consent was qualified or absent, were thus called into question.'""* Most agencies adjusted by hardening their interpretations of impartiality (i.e., being more outspoken); those unhappy with the reserve imposed by neutrality tended to m o v e away from it, embracing impartiality instead.'"' The I C R C ' s broadly-accepted Code of Conduct seems to have embraced a more active present by replacing neutral with independent.""" Yet this is undermined by the d o c u m e n t ' s continuing emphasis on the neutrality-dependent I C R C principle of "universality.""" The reality is that the sanctity of the original two principles is everywhere reconfirmed. The neutrality/impartiality link survives; impartiality is still seen as one (of three) elements of humanitarian neutrality'"* while even an excellent recent reexamination of the humanitarian concepts suggests that they "should be regarded as partially overlapping principles, rather than as s y n o n y m s . " ' " ' U n a b l e to square impartiality, neutrality, and the absolute precondition of humanitarian assistance consentthe humanitarian c o m m u n i t y has (like the "Grey A r e a " deniers of the mid-1990s) tweaked and reconfirmed the old to avoid acknowledging the new. Humanitarian aid organizations can maintain the fiction of impartial neutrality; but once they try to move beyond the limits set by the parties their impartialitylike that of the traditional peacekeeper or the wartime neutraldisappears. They can have consent and be
434
neutral, yet never be more than nonpartial; genuine impartiality is beyond their capabilities. And in the meantime, ignorance about the distinction between neutrality and impartiality persists at the UN's highest levels. The experience of Bosnia and Somalia should have indicated that the neutrality/impartiality double act was clearly inapplicable to a Chapter VII environment. Yet Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's 1995 Supplement to An Agenda for Peace stated that the need to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief had led to a "new kind" of UN operation, in which the Force had Chapter VII authorization yet was without a mandate to stop aggression or hostilities; the Force (confusingly) remained "neutral and impartial" between the belligerents."" A speech by SG Kofi Annan in January 1999 seemed to show UN awareness that the two terms were no longer inextricably linked. "Impartiality does notand must notmean neutrality in the face of evil. It means strict and unbiased adherence to the principles of the Charternothing more, nothing less."'" But the speech outlined Annan's perception of his role in the light of criticism of the UN's dealings with Iraq, rather than an analysis of UN peacekeeping. It is also uncannily redolent of Dag Hammarskjold's speech to the Security Council on 31 October 1956 a ringing assertion of genuine impartiality that was swiftly followed by operational neutrality."^ The reality is that confusion persists. The Security Council has even deepened it by appearing to reinforce the neutral/impartial double act. The first joint mention of neutrality and impartiality in a Security Council Resolution was in SCR 929 of 22 June 1994, which "stress[ed that Operation Turquoise, the French Chapter VII intervention in Rwanda]...shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion....""' This was also the first resolution to assume that a "neutral" force could operate under a Chapter VII mandate. Three years later, SCR 1101 (28 March 1997) followed 929's precedent by authorizing the "neutral and impartial" Italian-led multinational operation in Albania, Operation Alba. It too suggested that a "neutral" force could operate under Chapter VII."'' It might be thought that the mention of both principles at last reflected a sense in the Security Council that neutrality and impartiality were separate concepts. But the inclusion of the Chapter VII references shows that this is not the case. Both resolutions were drawn up in haste to authorize actions Paris and Rome had already indicated they would take, regardless; the terms were included to assuage considerable Security Council concerns. Many members doubted Turquoise's avowed humanitarian intent, yet given the inability to man the United Nations
Donald
435
Assistance Mission in R w a n d a ( U N A M I R ) II they could not decline even a tainted offer of assistance to protect the targets of the genocide."^ And SCR 1101 escaped close scrutiny because though none of the Permanent 5 was convinced of the need for a force in Albania, neither did they think one would c o m e to any harm; the terms were included as a last-minute sop to the Chinese, ever-sensitive to issues of sovereignty. As for the combination of neutrality and Chapter VII, in both cases the press of t i m e a n d in l l O l ' s the feeling that Alba was irrelevantcombined to ensure that their obvious incompatibility was not addressed."^ N o r are these resolutions unique. A string of 1997-98 resolutions on the Central African Republic repeated the peculiar Chapter Vll/neutral and impartial c o m b i n a t i o n . " ^ Neutrality is i n c o m p a t i b l e with true impartiality; it is doubly incompatible with Chapter VII. M o r e recently, a resolution authorizing the E c o n o m i c C o m m u n i t y of West African States' Military Observer G r o u p ( E C O M O G ) force for Guinea Bissau has repeated the "neutral and i m p a r t i a l " c o m b i n a t i o n without the Chapter VII linkage, though one paragraph seems to provide justification for a very robust approach to the use of force."* T h e fact that this explicit linkage has only been applied to UN-authorized forces rather than "blue helmet" operations suggests that the U N believes the latter need no such guarantee. Implicitly, therefore, all U N operations are "neutral and impartial." At best, this linkage is confusing. At worst, it suggests an appalling lack of grip of p e a c e k e e p i n g ' s conceptual underpinningsa lack made more terrifying by the fact that it follows nearly a decade of intellectual revision. The impartiality/neutrality double act survives.
Conclusion
The lesson of Somalia and Bosnia is simple; that it is impossible to use force and be always perceived to be impartial. Yet this is still either not accepted, or used as grounds not to use force. To a considerable extent, this is the product of the traditional trinitarian view of impartiality, particularly its explicit and implicit linkage with neutrality. Where pure trinitarian impartiality has been applied to Grey Area operations, the UN has fallen back on neutrality. Where attempts have been made to stretch the trinity, the tactical-level product has also been neutrality. This is above all because the basic perspective of impartiality in the widening circle of PSO practitioners and thinkers is that it must be defined by the parties to the conflict. And as recent Grey Area operations have shown, that way lie impotence and inactivity.
436
Traditional trinitarian impartiality is in fact in no way genuine impartiality. Genuine impartiality is active, independent, and based on a judgment of the merits of the case. Traditional trinitarian impartiality is none of these; nor is it a stand-alone principle. Though active at its conception, it was born passive, a product of misunderstanding and compromise, and hitched early to the passive yoke of consent. Whenever operational crises suggested the need for reexamination, analysts simply returned to the Good Faith Agreement misinterpretation of the term. The Grey Area naysayers of the 1990s have based their resistance to reality on the defense of traditional impartiality. But they have been fightingprobably unknowinglyunder a false flag. By association and (imprecise) definition, traditional impartiality is in fact neutrality. This does not mean that the double act should be dispensed with. Confusion aside, it survives in part because it is useful. Without it Operations Turquoise and Alba might never have been launched; it may well be drafted in once more as lexical oil to smooth other potentially useful operations' paths through the Security Council. Yet as we have seen, it has damaging consequences in the field. How can one keep the baby while draining the bathwater? The key lies in distinguishing between political use of the terms and their application in the field. At the political levelin capitals or the Security Councila degree of confusion may be necessary. Mandate drafters can therefore apply the double act to authorize a force they intend to operate impartially (but needing neutrality's innocuous camouflage), neutrally (though benefiting from impartiality's air of robustness), or in a manner as yet undecided. But peace operations personnel cannot afford confusion. They must understand whether they are joining a neutral force (operating within limits set by the belligerents, whose consent is in the end absolute) or an impartial one (acting independently of the parties, based on judgment of the situation), and conduct themselves accordingly. Doctrine should acknowledge the fallacy of impartial neutrality and recognize that impartiality is the guiding principle when employing a force and neutrality the principle if one intends only to deploy it.'" The weaker principle is therefore best reserved for operations where troops' Rules of Engagement allow them only to return fire in protection of themselves and their posts; impartiality is appropriate for the rest of the wide range of peace operations, up to but not including Gulf-War-style enforcement. In reality, of course, troops in the field intending to act impartially will often find themselves in situations where they cannot. Yet it is also true that the more inchoate the parties and the more limited their
Donald
437
support, the greater the p e a c e k e e p e r s ' ability to act against their wishes. Only when the p e a c e k e e p e r s ' policy is widely seen to lack legitimacy, and/or a likely opponent is cohesive, highly motivated, and militarily as c o m p e t e n t as the interveners, does impartiality require escalation dominance. Impartiality is thus a principle ideally suited to the choppy waters of the Grey Area, where the belligerents' constant testing of peacekeepers means the latter must act or sink, and where third parties increasingly intervene on behalf of the civilian population rather than between the warlords who claim their allegiance. Neutrality is suitable for UNEE-style buffer zone or weak Second Generation-type endeavors, where peacekeepers are militarily irrelevant. This conceptual clarity will not in itself offer a solution to the problem of Grey Area peace operations. But if practitioners and thinkers alike can recognize the fundamental differences between the two terms, break impartiality's passive linkseven if only tacitlyand use it in a truer form as the basis for more robust action in situations where passivity leads to failure, then we may better address some of the early twenty-first c e n t u r y ' s more intractable conflicts.
Notes
1. For example, Shashi Tharoor has written "Impartiality is the oxygen of peacekeeping; the only way peacekeepers can work is by being trusted by both sides....The moment they lose this trust, the moment they are seen by one side as 'the enemy', they become part of the problem they were sent to solve." "Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?" Survival 37:4, Winter 1995-1996: 58. I refer to these three principles as the "traditional trinity" to distinguish them from Clausewitz's trinity of state, society, and military. The term "peacekeeping" was long left undefined, in part for fear of shackling what was seen to be an empirical activity with "an immutable terminology," but by the early 1970s the principal contributor countries accepted the International Peace Academy's definition. "The Army Field Manual V, Part 1, Peacekeeping Operations 1988," 1/5. See the Peacekeeper's Handbook (Pergamon, Oxford, 1984), 22, for the definition. For instance, UN Document A/3289 (the First Report of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international UN Force [UNEF]) emphasised that "as a matter of principle, troops should not be drawn from countries which are Permanent members of the Security Council [and therefore partial]." Secondary sources routinely refer to the impartiality element of the traditional trinity as "impartiality/ neutrality." See, for instance, Tharoor, "Should UN Peacekeeping Go 'Back to Basics'?"
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
438
7.
SG Waldheim extended the definition of self-defense to include "resistance to attempts by forceful means to prevent it [the force] from discharging its duties under the mandate of the Security Council." UN Document S/11052/Rev.l, 27th Oct. 1973, Paragraph 4. For an excellent critique of the reemphasis of consent, see James Gow and Christopher Dandeker, "Peace Support Operations; The Problem of Legitimation," The World Today, August-September 1995. For instance, Steven Ratner neatly isolates some of the problems of applying traditional impartiality to holistic operations, but bases his analysis on a bipolar, consentas-determinant perspective. Steven Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping (Macmillan, London, 1995), 51-54. The Oxford English Dictionary and Webster's are generally cited as the principal dictionaries for British and American usage respectively. Accordingly, I have cited the 2nd edition of the former (published 1989, and only marginally revised since [with no changes to the relevant definitions]), and the 1961 edition of the latter (also with no changes since to the relevant definitions). Similar differences exist between each dictionary's respective definitions of "neutral," "impartial," and their associated terms. To avoid the argument bogging down in endless definitions, I will confine citations from Webster's to endnotes.
8.
9.
10. The Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed. (OED) (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989), 700. According to Webster's, "impartiality" is "the quality or state of being impartial; freedom from bias or favouritism; DISINTERESTEDNESS, FAIRNESS." Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language (Merriam-Webster, Springfield Massachusetts, 1961), 1131. The italics and capitals are from Webster. 11. OED, 700. Webster's, 1131: "impartial" is "not partial; especially not favoring one more than another; treating all alike;" "impartially," "in an impartial manner; without bias or special favor." 12. OED, 356-357. Webster's, 1521: a "neutral" is "a person, party, ship or nation that takes or belongs to one who takes no part in a contest between others." When used as an adjective, it describes being "not engaged on either side; not siding with or assisting either of two or more contending parties...; lending no active assistance to either or any belligerent...; not involved in hostilities." 13. OED, 357-358. Webster's 1522; "a combination of neutral powers or states..." or a condition "...of being uninvolved...or of refraining from taking part on either side...: of a state or government that refrains from taking part directly or indirectly in a war between other powers:..of immunity from invasion or use by belligerents...sometimes guaranteed by treaty." 14. OED, 357-358. Webster's, 1522; "the quality or state of being intermediate, falling between extremes, or belonging to neither one nor the other of two well-defined categories or classes...: the quality or state of being neuter." 15. OED, 356-357. Webster's, 1521; "being neither one thing nor the other; belonging to neither of two usually opposed or contrasted classes; not decided or pronounced as to characteristics; MIDDLING, INDIFFERENT." 16. OED, 700.
Donald
439
17. Merriam-Webster's Dictionary of Synonyms (Merriam-Webster, Springfield Massachusetts, 1984), 24a; 25a. 18. Ibid., 561; 418. 19. Alfred P. Rubin, "The Concept of Neutrality in International Law," in Neutrality: Changing Concepts and Practices, Alan T. Leonhard, ed. (University Press of America, Lanham, Maryland, 1988), 9. 20. The gradual harmonization of individual Prize Courts, which judged the legality of wartime ship seizures, drove these developments. Early seventeenth century English Admiralty Court precedents were widely adopted by post-Westphalia polities, and codified in the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713. Neutrals undertook not to allow belligerents' prizes or prize goods to be sold in their ports, and not to trade in contraband goods (which excluded "all Provisions which serve for the Nourishment of Mankind and the Sustenance of Life"). In return they were to be allowed to trade freely. Rubin, "The Concept of Neutrality," 15-18. 21. In fact, Switzerland had maintained de facto permanent neutrality for three centuries prior to 1815; the violation of this status in the Napoleonic Wars (Napoleon famously told Swiss representative Hans Reinhard in 1809 that he found "neutrality" a meaningless word) led Berne to accept legal permanent status at the Congress of Vienna. Hanspeter Neuhold, "The Neutral States of Europe; Similarities and Differences," in Leonhard, Neutrality, 100-104. 22. 1907 Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land, Article 9. Article 9 of Convention XIII specifies that "[a] neutral power must apply impartially to the two belligerents the conditions, restrictions, or prohibitions made by it" in relation to belligerent warships. In both cases it must be assumed that "impartially" means "even-handedly."
23. Rubin, "The Concept of Neutrality," 9-10, 13. 24. Ibid., 9. The best of these arguments were Alberico Gentili's contradictory, positivist arguments for Madrid in assessments of the legality of English seizures of Spanish vessels by the Royal Council sitting in Admiralty, 1605-1608. 25. Rubin, "The Concept of Neutrality," 12-13, 25-29. 26. Peter Lyon, War and Peace in South-East Asia (OUP/RIIA, Oxford, 1969), 170. The earliest substantial record of an assertion of neutrality is Thucydides' account of the Melian Dialogue. Shunning its Spartan links, Melos asserted its neutrality in the Peloponnesian War, arguing that its strict noninvolvement denied Athens the right to attack. Athens, pursuing its own interests and setting aside the substantial debate, invaded, killing all the men of military age, enslaving the women and children, and colonizing the island. See Thucydides, The Pelopponesian War, trans. Jowett (Penguin, London, 1972), Book V Paragraphs 84-114, 116, 400-408. Other early assertions of neutrality also foundered at the hands of the strongest party; Britain broke up the Armed Neutralities of 1780 and 1800 and caused the USA to set aside its 1794 Neutrality Act in 1812. (Neither Armed Neutrality would qualify as "neutral" todayalliances are forbiddenand were not seen as particularly neutral at the time.)
440
27.

Those twenty-two were: Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Greece, Holland, Eire, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, Rumania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, USSR, and Yugoslavia. Eire, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland maintained their neutrality. (Albania, Austria, and Czechoslovakia had lost their ability to declare any policy to Italian occupation, unification with Germany, and German partition and subsumation respectively.) I have not included the irrelevant microstates of Andorra, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino, and the Vatican. Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Holland, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Norway, Yugoslavia. Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Rumania, Turkey, and the USSR all became combatants; only Turkey did not violate the neutrality of another nonbelligerent. Neuhold, "The Neutral States of Europe," 104-106. Of the eleven neutrals subjected to unprovoked invasions, only Finland had not already compromised its neutrality (as per Hague Conventions V and XIII) in favor of the belligerent that eventually attacked it. For de Valera's neutrality policy, see Tim Pat Coogan, De Valera: Long Fellow, Long Shadow (Hutchinson, London, 1993), 518-612. "Nonbelligerent" Spain despatched a division of volunteers to fight against the USSR and allowed the use of interned German vessels as supply ships for U-boats and its territory as the base for small Axis operations against Gibraltar; after October 1943, it claimed to be neutral in the war between Germany and the Allies, pro-German in the latter's war against the USSR, and pro-UN in the war in the Far East. (Jerrold M. Packard, Neither Friend nor Foe: The European Neutrals in World War II [Scribner's, New York, 1992], 338-340.) Portugal leased the Azores to, and so avoided their likely occupation by, the Allies; many felt this contravened Articles 1-3 of Convention V, and Articles 1-3, 5, 12-20 of Convention XIII. Sweden's violations of Convention V included permitting a fully-formed German division to cross its territory from Norway to Finland in 1941 (Article 2). Allied pressure forced Stockholm to impose a unilateral trade embargo on German-occupied Europe in 1944 and permit Danish and Norwegian forces to be trained on its territory; by early 1945 she had become a "pro-Allied non-belligerent state." Packard, Neither Friend nor Foe, 312; Henrik S. Nissen, ed. Scandinavia during the Second World War (U. of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1983), 188-190. Switzerland allowed limited Axis troops and materiel to travel through its passes, in violation of Convention V, Articles 2, 5, and 14. Of the five successful neutrals, four were on Europe's periphery. Swiss and Swedish defenses dissuaded German invasion when the latter could not afford to undertake yet more, almost certainly protracted, military commitments (mid-1941, mid-1943, mid-1944). Portuguese and Spanish poverty meant Germany saw both states as likely drains on its resources, while Spanish and Swedish tungsten (obtainable until mid-1944), and Switzerland's usefulness as a bolt-hole for senior Nazis' assets, ensured that each country was more useful as a willing near-partner than an unwilling ally or open enemy. Packard, op.cit., 358. This is equally true of more recent assertions of neutrality. Laos' legal permanent neutrality was never observed by one of its guarantors (North Vietnam), only patch-
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
Donald
441
ily so by another (the United States), and so never got off the ground; it and Cambodia {de facto neutral in the Vietnam War) had to tolerate the presence of substantial numbers of North Vietnamese regular troops and the maintenance of Hanoi's principal supply route to South Vietnam in eastern areas of their countries, as well as sustained air and limited ground offensives by the United States. Lyon, War and Peace in South-East Asia, 161-180; Michael Maclear, Vietnam: The Ten Thousand Day War (Eyre Methuen, London, 1981), 240-242, 400-402. See also JP Cross, First In Last Out: An Unconventional British Officer in Indo-China (Brassey's, London, 1992), for Laos. 33. Portugal, Eire, and Sweden (particularly after the invasion of Norway and Denmark) were broadly pro-British, Spain and Switzerland pro-German. Salazar was aware that any Portuguese declaration of war against the Axis would probably pit Lisbon against Madrid. Franco was still consolidating his revolution, De Valera felt (for reasons of nationalism and economy) that Eire could not afford to fight alongside Britain, and both Sweden and Switzerland felt strongly that only noninvolvement could ensure their survival. See Packard. 34. Neuhold, "The Neutral States of Europe," 103. 35. Ibid., 42-43. 36. Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small Powers (Routledge, London, 1988), 64. 37. Interview with F. R. Stockwell, Political Adviser to Lt. Gen. Sir Hugh Stockwell (Land Force Commander), 22 December 1997; Keith Kyle, Suez (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1991), 482-483; Urquhart, A Life in Peace and War, (WW Norton, NY, NY, 1987), 132-133. 38. Urquhart, A Life, 132-135; Kyle, Suez, 482. Cairo stressed the likelihood of Egyptians seeing any Canadian peacekeepers as interchangeable with the similarly dressed British, but Hammarskjold was adamant that as Canadian Foreign Minister Lester B. Pearson had suggested the creation of UNEF, and Canadian Gen. Bums had already been appointed its commander, a Canadian command and logistic presence was nonnegotiable. Mona Ghali, UNEF I, in William J. Durch (ed.) The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping (Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C., 1993), 116. Lt Gen ELM Bums, Between Arab and Israeli (Harrap, London, 1962), 200. Nasser's scepticism about Canadian motives may have been well-founded; Pearson had first mooted the creation of a joint UN-Anglo-French force, with the objectives of legitimizing the invasion, getting London and Paris off the hook, and avoiding permanent splits to NATO and the Commonwealth. Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (Harper & Row, New York, 1984), 178-179. 39. Bums, Between Arab and Israeli, 235 and 203-204. See Kyle, Suez, 72-75 for Egypt's improving relations with the Soviet bloc before Suez. 40. Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (Harper & Row, NY NY, 1984), 185-187 and 188191. 41. Speech delivered at the commencement ceremony, Johns Hopkins University, 14 June 1955; quoted in Wilder Foote, ed. The Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjold (Bodley Head, London, 1962), 82.
442
See Hammarskjold, 52-53 for his assertion of his independence of the two superpowers on his appointment. 42. Secretary-General's speech to the Security Council, 31 October 1956, quoted in Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 174, 258. 43. Ibid., 190; UN Document A/3375 Report of the Secretary-General on basic points for the presence and functioning in Egypt of UNEF, 20 November 1956, Paras 1-2 (the italics are mine); Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 190-192. 44. Ibid., 188-189, 193-194. The knowledge that Nasser could veto contingents would shatter the convenient Franco-British fiction that UNEF was an obstacle to Egyptian control of the canal. Stockwell interview. 45. UN Document A/3512 Report of the Secretary-General in pursuance of General Assembly Resolution 1123 (XI), 24 January 1957, Part 2 A, Para 5 b). 46. Ibid. This appears only three lines before the reference to impartiality, so the link is clear. 47. "[T]he consent and impartiality elements of 5 b) are refiected in A/3302 paragraph 8 and paragraph 12..." A/3512 Part 2 A, para 7. 48. UN Document A/3302, 2nd and final report of the Secretary-General 6 November 1956, paras 8 and 12. 49. Kyle, Suez, 500-502; Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 192-194, 248.
50. Bums, Between Arab and Israeli, 188-190; Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 190. 51. Lecture at Oxford University, 30 May 1961; quoted in Foote, ed. The Servant of Peace, 337-338. 52. These quotations (all in Foote) are from the Introduction to the Annual Report to the UN, 17 August 1961 (p. 367); a speech to the UN staff at Geneva, 4 December 1953 (p. 32); and the Press Conference on the Oxford speech in New York, 1 June 1961 (pp. 351-352). 53. SG's statement to the Security Council on the Congo, 7 December 1960, quoted in Foote, 324-325 54. Caroline Moorehead, Dunant's Dream: War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross (HarperCollins, London, 1998), 561-562. 55. GA Resolution 1000 (ES-I). The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peacekeeping 3rd Ed. (UN, NY, 1996), 37. 56. Bums, op. cit., 208. 57. UN Document A/3943 Summary Study of the Experience derived from the establishment and operation of the Force; Report of the Secretary-General, 9 Oct 1958, para 149. 58. Ibid., para 151. See paras 148-150 for the administrative tone. 59. Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 229-230.
Donald
60. Stockwell interview.
443
61. For instance, the deployment of U.S. troops in Lebanon in 1958 jeopardised the position of an avowedly neutral, already deployed UN observer mission (United Nations Observer Group in Lebanon, UNOGIL). UNOGIL "had to resume the difficult task of gaining the confidence of the inhabitants of those areas in the impartiality and independence of the observers." UN Document S/4085 3rd Report of UNOGIL 14 August 1958, para. 3 62. Indar Jit Rikhye, Military Adviser to the Secretary-General (Hurst, London, 1993), 221. 63. William Durch, "The UN Operation in the keeping, ed. Durch, 319-326. The Indian considerable political capital in vociferous ued passivity in the Congo would be an Military Adviser, 282, 312. Congo," in The Evolution of UN Peacegovernment in particular had invested support for ONUC, and felt that continaffront to its national dignity. Rikhye,
64. Particularly in the SG's statement to the UN Security Council on the Congo (see note 53). In fact ONUC's broad intrusive mandate (including military and police retraining and the assumption of many of the new state's basic executive functions) meant neutrality was never an option. 65. For instance, in January 1963 the U.S., UK, and Belgium (the former colonial power)all with substantial commercial and political interests in Katanga and its survivalpersuaded Secretary-General U Thant to order ONUC's advance on Jadotville to halt. The order was ignored. Rikhye, Military Adviser, 307. 66. Indar Jit Rikhye, The Theory and Practice of Peacekeeping (Hurst, London, 1984), 88-90. 67. The only non-buffer-zone force of the immediate post-ONUC era was the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), launched while ONUC was under way, which inherited posts sited by the British interpositional force that had intervened in December 1963; yet many of these posts were mini buffer zones dividing villages or streets. See Frank Kitson, Bunch of Eive (Faber & Faber, London, 1997), 216-277. 68. See note 42 above. 69. UN Document A/6672 Secretary-General's Final Report on UNEF, 12th July 1967, paras 23 and 22. 70. UN Document S/11052/Rev.l, Report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of SC Resolution 340, para. 1 d). 71. The purpose behind the redefinition was not to establish a binding wider principle but to ensure that UNEFII would not manifest UNEF I's impotence in the face of withdrawal of Egyptian consent. See Ensio Siilasvuo's In the Service of Peace (Hurst, London, 1992), 146-149 for the need to avoid another humiliation. 72. For two excellent surveys of the inapplicability of traditional principles to post-Cold War environments, see John Mackinlay, "Peace Support Operations Doctrine," in British Army Review 113, August 1996, particularly 10-12, and Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping, 51-54.
444
73.

The Nordic UN Tactical Manual emphasizes that peacekeepers are "neutral observers" in that "they do not take sides regarding the issues in conflict and the merit of each side's position.. .The fear of loss of impartiality, however, should not paralyze the peacekeepers from promptly and honestly reporting violations by the belligerent parties" (Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters [NORDSAMFN], Nordic UN Tactical Manual, Vol. 1, 25-6). Ratner, The New UN Peacekeeping, 170. The Deputy Force Commander, Gen Michel Loridon, was dismissed for his opposition to UNTAC's passive attitude to this and other confrontations. The engine for this reemphasis on consent was the British Army's "Wider Peacekeeping" doctrine, largely written by Charles Dobbie. It is noteworthy that many of the most telling examples of the consequences of the loss of impartiality in his article in Survival (A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping, Survival 6, 3, Autumn 1994) are drawn from the Somalia experience. See particularly 122 and 125-128. Lt. Gen. Satish Nambiar, "UN Peacekeeping Operations; A Perspective," in The Journal of the United Services Institute of India (Jul.-Sept. 1995), 315. This shows that Nambiar too was confused about the difference between neutrality and impartiality. He appears to be suggesting that impartiality is, ordinarily, incompatible with "responding appropriately" to threats or bullies. It is not; neutrality is. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, Fighting for Peace (Harvill, London, 1998), 12. Ibid., 185. Ibid., "Since the Serbs still controlled much of the territory...through which the aid convoys had to pass, it was clear the UN mission could not succeed without their consent," 185. "Every troop-contributing nation...had its own political agenda..." Ibid., 23. "The plea most frequently made to me [by visiting contributor country VIPs]...was not that the UN should use more force, but that it should use less. They were conscious of their responsibility to get their young volunteer peacekeepers home alive." Ibid., 242. Stephen John Stedman, "Consent, Neutrality and Impartiality in the Tower of Babel and on the Frontlines; United Nations Peacekeeping in the 1990s," in Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues (UNIDIR, Geneva, 1996), 50. In his article in Survival Charles Dobbie deals with neutrality always in tandem with impartiality and in a section headed "Impartiality," while FM 100-23 only refers to impartiality in terms of its perception. Dobbie, "A Concept," 133-5; FM 100-23, 12-14. For the Nordic approach see note 73 above. French Ministry of Defence, "Principles for the Employment of the Armed Forces Under UN Auspices," mimeo (March 1995) presented at UNIDIR conference on Differing National Perspectives on UN Peace Operations, Section 3; 2, quoted in Stedman, op.cit. Stedman, "Consent, Neutrality and Impartiality," 49-50.
74.
75.
76.
77. 78. 79.
80. 81.
82.
83.
84.
Donald
445
85. This contrasted with the conceptual pragmatism of the same doctrine's "Peace Restoration" category of operations undertaken before a conflict has ended, intended to restore peace or moderate violence; see LIN Document A/50/869 or S/1996/71, 26 February 1996, Letter dated 18 January 1996 from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, 3. French doctrine has since fallen into line with British and Nato doctrine, so the latter's confusions apply. 86. Bi-MNC Directive for Nato Doctrine for Peace Support Operations, Final Draft, 27 July 1998, Para. 3-6 (d)(l), 23. 87. Ibid., para. 3-6 (d)(2), 23. This subparagraph is in bold type. 88. PSO "are multi-functional operations conducted impartially in support of a UN/ OSCE mandate...They include peacekeeping (PK) and peace enforcement (PE)....(Ibid., PSO definition, 9). PK includes "the interposition of an impartial force between the parties..." (para. 2-2(b)); "impartiality and the minimum use of force should guide PK operations." (para. 2-4 (c)). 89. Army Field Manual Peace Support Operations Ratification Draft, 3-1 (para. 0303), 4-3/4 (para. 0411). "Principled impartiality" is explicitly identified with the French "active impartiality." 90. Ibid., 4-4 (para 0414). 91. For instance, the doctrine implies that no shift in the correlation of forces is intended in PSO. "A PSO mandate will not designate an enemy, neither will it relate to military victory, whereas a military enforcement operation [i.e., the Gulf and Korea] will attempt to change the correlation of local forces and impose a solution by force." Ibid. 3-1 (para 0303). This in itself suggests a degree of confusion. "Defeat" rather than "change the correlation of local forces"perhaps a phrase better linked with PE would seem a more appropriate term to combine with "impose a solution by force." 92. Ibid., 4-4, paras 0414 & 0411 93. Donald C. F. Daniel, "Is There a Middle Option in Peace Support Operations? Implications for Crisis Containment and Disarmament," in Managing Arms in Peace Processes, 61. 94. Donald C. F. Daniel and Bradd C. Hayes with Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement and the Containment of International Crises (USIP Press, Washington, 1999), 27-28. 95. See, for instance; Jarat Chopra, Age Eknes, and Toralu Nordbu, Fighting for Hope in Somalia, Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations, No. 6, Oslo; Norwegian Institute for International Affairs, 1995, 93; and Adam Roberts, The Crisis in UN Peacekeeping, Survival 36;3 (Autumn 1994), 115. 96. Daniel and Hayes with de Jonge Oudraat, Coercive Inducement, 37, Table 2-1. Daniel & Hayes' insistence on 'blind' impartiality for their Grey Area option "Coercive Inducement"only materializes in the table, not the text. 97. Daniel and Hayes do not examine neutrality nor properly define impartiality other than "to act without bias" ("prejudice or bias" in Daniel's otherwise very similar "Is There a Middle Option?"). (Daniel & Hayes with de Jonge Oudraat, 25; Daniel, 61.)
446
This lack of real analysis gives their tour d'horizon of peacekeeping principles the tenor of assessment rather than genuine enquiry. 98. See The ICRC's "Avenir project": Challenges, Mission and Strategy (Geneva, December 1997) for the purposes of the Avenir study. The Code of Conduct outlines ten principles, including the primacy of the humanitarian imperative; aid to be delivered according to need alone; aid not to further a political or religious standpoint; and the signatories to avoid acting as instruments of govemment foreign policy. (The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief [Geneva 1995]). The Code outlines the obligations of othersparticularly host govemmentstowards the signatories, yet the latter incur no obligations themselves. See Jon Bennett, "Coordination, Control and Competition: NGOs on the Front Line," in After Rwanda: The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance, eds. Jim Whitman & David Pocock (Macmillan, London, 1996), 138-141. According to Adam Roberts {Humanitarian Action in War, Adelphi Paper No. 305 [IISS, London, 1996] 60-61), the major flaw in the Code is its failure to address the issues of protecting vulnerable populations and aid activities, or reconciling impartial relief work with human rights advocacy or coercive measures. 99. Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, 51. 100. Hans Haug, "Neutrality as a Fundamental Principle of the Red Cross," International Review of the Red Cross 3 1 5 ( 1 November 1996), 627-30; Marc Weller, "The Relativity of Humanitarian Neutrality and Impartiality," Journal of Humanitarian Assistance; www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a528.htm posted on 10 February 1998, 4. 101. Weller, "Relativity," 5-6. In the Nicaragua case (1986 ICJ 124) the Intemational Court of Justice ruled that "there can be no doubt that the provision of strictly humanitarian aid to persons or forces in another country, whatever their political affiliations or objective, cannot be regarded as unlawful intervention, or as in any other way contrary to intemational law." 102. Marion Harroff-Tavel, "Action Taken by the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross in Situations of Intemal Violence," Intemational Review of the Red Cross 294 (May 1993), 6-7. According to Article 5, para. 3, of the Statutes, "the Intemational Committee may take any humanitarian initiative which comes within its role as a specifically neutral and independent institution and intermediary, and may consider any question requiring examination by such an institution." 103. "Respect for and Protection of the Personnel of Humanitarian Organizations." Preparatory document drafted by the Intemational Committee of the Red Cross for the first periodical meeting on intemational humanitarian law, Geneva, 19-23 January 1998, 6-7; Cedric Thomberry, "Peacekeepers, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Conflicts," in After Rwanda, 240-243. 104. Ibid., 231-232; Weller, 1-3. Matters are further complicated by the fact that many humanitarian relief NGOs now receive a significant proportion of their income from govemments/intemational organizations anxious to show political commitment to a given issue; political pressure or association with a donor can jeopardize neutrality and impartiality. Roberts, Humanitarian Action in War, 52.
Donald
447
Another thomy issue was that of the aid workers' status vis-d-vis PSO troops on whom they usually depended for security and who might have to use force while espousing the principles of the aid organisations. (Hugo Slim has pointed out that in the same place and time, and in all honesty, a soldier may describe air strikes, and a Red Cross nurse the provision of medical support, as "impartial." Slim, "Positioning Humanitarianism in War: Principles of Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity." Presentation at "Aspects of Peacekeeping" Conference, RMA Sandhurst, 23 January 1997.) The ICRC in part addresses this issue by suggesting that it can answer the need for a neutral intermediary between multinational troops and their victims. Human Rights and the ICRC; International Humanitarian Law (ICRC, Geneva, 1993), 14-15 and 22. 105. Hugo Slim, "Intemational Humanitarianism's Engagement in Civil War in the 1990s; A Glance at Evolving Practice and Theory," Journal of Humanitarian Assistance; http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.Uk/a/a.565.htm posted on 1st March 1998, 13; Slim, "Positioning Humanitarianism." 106. This is particularly the case in the Annexes. For instance, the first clause of all three enjoins host and donor govemments, as well as intergovemmental organizations (UN agencies, regional organisations, coalitions etc.) to "recognize and respect... the independence and impartiality of NGHAs" (Non-Govemmental Humanitarian Agencies). Code of Conduct Annexes 1,2 and 3, paragraph 1. Much of the debate over the Code of Conduct reflected the simultaneous doctrine disputes, as more interventionist organizations (such as MSF) argued that the new environment obliged them to speak outeffectively, to judge (be impartial) rather than be silent and thus complicit (neutral). See Hugo Slim, "Relief Agencies & Moral Standing in War; Principles of Humanitarianism, Neutrality, Impartiality and Solidarity," Development in Practice 1, 4 (Nov. 1997). 107. "The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims." Ibid., 2nd principle. 108. Slim, "Positioning Humanitarianism." The other two crucial pillars are abstention and prevention (from being used as a pawn of the belligerents). 109. Weller, op. cit., 3. 110. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (UN, NY, 1995), 10. 111. UN Document SG/SM/6865, Press Release: "Secretary-General Reflects on Promise, Realities of his Role in World Affairs, in Address to Council on Foreign Relations," 19 Jan. 1999, 4. 112. See note 42 above. 113. S/RES/929, preamble and paragraph 2. 114. "The Security Council... Authorizes the Member States participating in the multinational protection force to conduct the operation in a neutral and impartial way to achieve the objectives set out in paragraph 2 above and, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, further authorizes these Member States to ensure
448
the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of the said multinational protection force..." UN Document S/RES/1101 (1997), 28 March 1997, para. 4. 115. Conversation with retired senior French Army officer, 30 May 2001; Interview with 1st Secretary, UK Mission to the UN, 28 June 1997; L.R. Melvern, A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide (Zed Books, London, 2001), 210-211. 116. UK 1st Secretary interview. The two terms were also included in the SC's renewing resolutions, in Alba's reports to the Council, and in the debate over the withdrawal of the force. 117. These are: S/RES/1125 (6 August 1997), 1136 (6 November 1997), 1155 (16 March 1998) and 1159 (27 March 1998). The wording is very similar in all four. 1125 states that the Security Council "Approves the continued conduct by Member States participating in MISAB [the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreement] of the operation in a neutral and impartial way...; Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter..., authorizes the Member States participating in MISAB...to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel... (S/RES/1125, 6 August 1997, paras. 2 and 3). Security Council Resolutions have only used "neutral and impartial" in relation to non-UN forces. (Both the Multi-National Peace Force [MNPF] and MISAB were authorized under Chapter VIII of the Charter.) It is particularly striking that S/RES/ 1159, which set up the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), only mentioned "neutral and impartial" in the context of MISAB, which operated alongside the UN force. 118. SCR 1216 (21 December 1998) "[a]pproves the implementation by the ECOMOG interposition force of its mandate...in a neutral and impartial way and in conformity with United Nations peacekeeping standards..." (para. 4). Paragraph 6 "[a]ffinns that the ECOMOG interposition force may be required to take action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel in the discharge of its mandate." This clearly provides the basis for the initiation of the use of force; its wording is also almost identical to paragraph 3 of SCR 1125, which provides for the use of force by the Chapter Vll-based MISAB. 119. Gen. Sir Rupert Smith has recently suggested that the distinction between different categories of peace operation should be those that employ and those that deploy force; the former need a proper staff, the latter do not.

Neutral Is Not Impartial Donald

Transféré par

Informations du document

Titre original

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Neutral Is Not Impartial Donald

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Neutral Is Not Impartial: The Confusing Legacy of Traditional Peace Operations Thinking

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

The Fallacy of Impartial Neutrality

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Anned Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Anned Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Anned Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

77. 78. 79.

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Armed Forces & Society/Spring 2003

Vous aimerez peut-être aussi