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JOHN P. S PRI NGGA TE, ES Q.
NevadaBar #13 50
2 03 S outh A rlington A venue
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: 775.3 2 3 .8881
A ttorney for Plaintiff
IN THE FAMILY DIVISION
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
* * * * *
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A S HWI N
144
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Plaintiff, CA S E NO.:
vs. DEPT. NO.:
BHA RTI JOS HI ,
&A t
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Defendant.
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2 1
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COMPLAINT FOR DIVORCE
COM ES NOW the Plaintiff above- named, and for acause of action against the
Defendant above- named, complains and alleges as follows:
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That for more than six weeks immediately preceding the commencement of this
action, Plaintiff has been, and now is abonafide resident of and domiciled in the S tate of Nevada
and has been for said period of time actually, physically and corporeally present in said state.
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LA W OFFI CES OF
JOHN P S PRI NGGA TE
2 03 S A RLI NGTON A VENUE
RENO, NEVA DA 8950)
(775) 3 2 3
-
5551
1
That Plaintiff and Defendant intermarried on or about the 11th day of M ay, 1987,
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in Bombay, I ndia, and ever since that time have been and now are husband and wife.
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in
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That there are 2 children born the issue of this marriage, both ofwhich are majority
6 in age.
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I V
That there is community property and debts belonging tothe parties which must
be allocated and distributed by the Court.
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V
That Plaintiff has found it necessary toretain the services of an attorney to
prosecute this action, and he is entitled toareasonable attorney's fee therefore, plus costs of suit.
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VI
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That the parties are incompatible in marriage and there is nochance for
reconciliation,
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment as follows:
1. That the contract of marriage now existing between the parties be dissolved, and
that Plaintiff be granted an absolute decree of divorce, and the parties heretobe restored tothe
status of single persons.
2 . That this Court determine that there is community property/debt of the parties,
and distribute the same.
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/I I
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LA W OFFI CES OF
JOHN E S PRI NGGA TE
2 03 S . A RLI NGTON A VENUE
RENO. NEVA DA 89501
(775) 3 2 3 - 0881
- 2 -
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3 . That the Defendant be ordered topay Plaintiff areasonable sum as and for
his attorney's fees and costs, plus all other fees paid toother professionals retained by him as a
result of this litigation.
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.
DA TED this ?.- ,1 day of June, 2 008.
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LA W OFFI CES OF
JOHN P S PRI NGGA TE
2 03 5. A RLI NGTON A VENUE
RENO, NEVA DA 8950
(775) 3 2 3 - 8001
- 3 -
NOTA RY P LI G
VERIFICATION
S TA TE OF NEVA DA
) ss:
COUNTY OF WA S HOE )
A S HWI N JOS HI , under penalties of perjury, being first duly sworn, deposes and
says:
That he is the Plaintiff in the above- entitled action; that he has read the foregoing
COM PLA I NT FOR DI VORCE and knows the contents thereof; that the same is true of his own
knowledge, except for those matters therein contained stated upon information and belief, and as
tothose matters, he believes them tobe true.
A S HWI N JCI S HI
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S UBS CRI BED aml S WORN to
befoe me thisVr- day of
, 2 008
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LAW OFFICES OF
JOHN R SPRINGGATE
203 S. ARLINCTON AVENUE
RENO, NEVADA 89501
(775) 323-8881
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA
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AFFIRMATION
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
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The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, COMPLAINT
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FOR DIVORCE filed in case number: TO BE DETERMINED
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ocument does not contain the social security number of any person
- OR-
El Document contains the social security number of aperson as required by:
K A specificstate of federal law, towit:
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2 0
2 1
(S tate specificstate or federal law)
- or-
O For the administration of apublicprogram
- or-
0 For an application for afederal or state grant
- or-
0 Confidential Family Court I nformation S heet
(NRS 12 5.13 0, NRS 12 5.2 3 0 and NRS 1 .05
2 2
2 3
Date: June
1
/1 , 2 008
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(S
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John P. S pringate, Esq.
(Print Name)
Plaintiff
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(A ttorney for)
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LA W OFFI CES OF
(OLI N F. S TI RI NGGA TE
2 03 S . A RLI NGTON A VENUE
RENO. NEVA DA 89501
17751 3 2 3 '
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Submitted by:
j2ignatu

CODE: 1740
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ.
Nevada Bar #13 50
203 South Arlington Avenue
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: (775) 3 23 .8881
OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA
ASHWIN JOSHI.
Plaintiff, Case No.:
Dept. No.:
08
6
011
,
9,
BHARTI JOSH1
Defendant.
SHORT FORM FINANCIAL DECLARATION
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STATE OF NEVADA )
16 ) ss.
COUNTY OF WASHOE
1, 05).10)
0
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6514
) , being duly sworn and under the penalties of perjury, depose
and state as follows:
I have read the contents of this Financial Declaration and am competent to testify as to the
contents, and the contents are true of my own knowledge except for those matters stated on information
and beli
+ UBSCRIBED ANp SWORN to
ef r - me thisc day of
4110
, 200e .
rafimirteihad_,
NOTARY PUBLIC
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T h
(Signa e 8f Declarant)
as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
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LAW OFFICE S OF
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE
2035. ARLINGTON AVE NUE
RE NO. NE VADA 89501
(775) 323
-
8881
llllllllllll I444444
444444444444444! l l l l l . 1 1
1 1 1 1 . ! . . P. 1 1 ,04l l l l l l l OP
MFIRIGirl iuM41 41 1 1 . 4
Lf NDA A. KNOWLDE N
Notary Publio - State of Nevada
Ap p oin h en t fiecorded in 4Vas h oe Courtly
No: 00.c5 f i3-2 - E x g res Jan uary 24, 2010I
MONTHLY INCOME
If you are presently unemployed, questions 1-2 and then go on to the rest
of the questions. If you are employed, print "not applicable" in questions
1-2 and go on to the rest of the questions.
1. N/A I am presently unemployed and have been unemployed since
(date of your last employment)
2. My last employer was , and I earned
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per hour / week / month (circle one),
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Answer all of the following questions. If the question is not applicable in
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your particular circumstances, print "N/A" in the spaces.
Monthly Money Earned and Received
3 . I am employed and the earn the following wages:
I am paid by the hour and my hourly wage is: $ 17.00
I work hours per week.
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I am paid (circle one) every week: every 2 weeks;
lx a month; 2x a month, and without anything being
deducted from it, each check is for (attached last
3 paystubs): $ 671.00
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I work overtime approximately hours per
month at the rate of $ per hour for
an average monthly overtime earning of: $1,000.00 (VARIES/APPROX.)
I receive commissions each month in the amount of: SN/A
(averaged over a year)
I receive tips each month in the amount of: SN/A
I receive bonuses each month in the amount of: $N/A
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Based upon the above information,
My total average monthly income from employment is: $3 ,600.00
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LAW OFFICE S OF
JOHN IS SPRINGGATE
203 S. ARLINGTON AVE NUE
RE NO, NE VADA 89501
(7751323
-
8881
-2-
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Income Other Than Wage Earnings
I receive child support each month from the other party in
the amount of (amount of court order $
):
$N/A
I receive child support each month from someone else in the
amount of (amount of court order $
):
$N/A
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4
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I receive alimony/spousal support each month from the
other party in the amount of
(amount of court order $ ): $N/A
I receive alimony/spousal support each month from
someone else in the amount of
(amount of court order $ ): $N/A
I receive the following government assistance.
I receive Social Security Benefits each month in the amount of: $N/A
I receive Non Social Security Benefits each month in the
amount of SN/A
I receive State or County assistance (welfare, T.ANF,
SIIS, etc.) each month in the amount of: $N/A
I receive unemployment month in the amount of: $N/A
I receive retirement benefits each month in the amount of: $N/A
10. I receive investment income each month in the amount of: $N/A
1 I receive income from rental properties (excluding
depreciation) each month in the amount of: $N/A
2 I live with someone (friend, relative, significant other) who
contributes to the living expenses each month in the amount of $N/A
3 I am receiving educational or school benefits in the amount of: $N/A
5.
6.
8.
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I am receiving money from friends, relatives, or others each
month in the amount of $N/A
I am receiving other sources of income, including but not
limited to, monthly distributions from a trust or will in
the amount of: (PART-TIME WORK/RUTHERFORD) $ 100.00
Y TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME FROM ALL SOURCES IF: $3 ,700.00
(this amount is your "gross income")
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LAW ()micas OF
J OHN P. $PR1NGGATE
203 5. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO, NEVADA 89501
(775) 323-8881
-3 -
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HOW MUCH IS BEING WITHHELD FROM YOUR INCOME EACH MONTH?
Federal income taxes $ 682.00
Social Security $ 223 .00
Medicare taxes $ 52.00
Child support for children with the other party $N/A
Child support for children with someone else $N/A
Alimony/spousal support paid to the other party $N/A
Alimony/spousal support paid to someone else $N/A
Retirement, 401K, etc. SN/A
Health insurance total: SN/A
Of this amount, $ is the
amount paid for your and the other
party's children.
Any other garnishments or withholdings, please list:
NONE
OTAL WITHHOLDING FROM PAYCHECK:
$N/A
$ 957.00
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YOUR TOTAL EXPENSES EACH MONTH
(REPORT ONLY THE AMOUNT YOU ACTUALLY PAY)
Each month I pay rent or mortgage or I contribute to the
rent or mortgage where I live in the amount of:
For food each month, I spend or contribute to the family with
whom I am living the amount of:
For house/apartment utilities (gas, power, water, garbage,
sewer) I pay or contribute to my household the amount of
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$ 500.00
$ 400.00
$ 50.00
Life Insurance $N/A
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/1
//
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LAW OFFICES OF
JOHN P. SPRJNGGATE
203 S. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO. NEVADA 8950
(75) 3 23
-
8881
-4-
5. I have a vehicle and pay the following each month:
Vehicle payment each month in the amount of: $ 3 90.00
Fuel for the vehicle in the amount of: $ 450.00
Insurance for the vehicle (if paid over a period of
six months or a year, average the payment out) $ 125.00
Repairs and maintenance (averaged over a year) $ 55.00
6. I do not own a vehicle, but my monthly transportation costs
(bus, taxi, etc.) are: $N/A
7. I have medical bill that I pay on each month in the amount of: $ 3 00.00 (+ /-)
8. I have medical prescriptions each month in the amount of: $N/A
9. I pay health insurance (not deducted from my check) in the
amount of: $N/A
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10. I am paying child support each month that is not deducted
directly from my paycheck in the amount of
(amount of court order $
11. I am also legally responsible for the support of others, namely:
each month in the amount of (amount of court order
$ )
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$N/A
$N/A
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SN/A 12. Each month I pay child care in the amount of:
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13 . I have credit card/charge account payments each month and pay
those charges as follows:
Name of Credit Card or Charge Account
Bank of America in the amount of: $ 100.00
Best Buy in the amount of: $ 100.00
Discover in the amount of: $ 100.00
WAMU in the amount of: $ 100.00
U.S. Bank in the amount of: $ 150.00
Household in the amount of: $ 100.00
Wells Fargo in the amount of: $ 200.00
14. Clothing, cleaning, laundry, etc. each month: $ 50.00
15. I have school or educational expenses each month of: $N/A
16. My recreational expenses each month are: $ 100.00
17. My charitable expenses each month are:
$ 20.00
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LAW OFFICE S OF
JOHN P. SFRINGGATE
203 S. ARLINGTON AVE NUE
(7751 323-8881
-5-
1
18. Other expenses not listed above, please list:
Personal Products
TOTAL MONTHLY EXPENSES:
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1. House/Mobile Home (circle one) Separate/Community/Joint (circle one)
Who has possession? (circle one) me/the other party.
a. How much is it worth. $N/A
b. How much you owe on it: $N/A
2. Checking Accounts:
Write the Account's Location, Separate/Community/Joint Property, and Who Has Possession
Wells Fargo/Separate/Joshi $ 200.00
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3 . Savings Accounts:
Write the Account's Location, Separate/Community/Joint Property, and Who Has Possession
Wells Fargo/Separate/Joshi $ 275.00
$N/a
Cash you have on hand: $ 475.00
Retirement Accounts (indicate in whose name accounts are held)
NONE
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$ 50.00
$3 ,270.00
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NET INCOME (DEFICIT) EACH MONTH
(TOTAL MONTHLY INCOME MINUS TOTAL
WITHHOLDING MINUS TOTAL MONTHLY
EXPENSES:)
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$ 500.00
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ASSETS AND DEBTS
In the following section, list ALL assets and debts you have, either
separately or jointly with the other party.
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23 5.
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I/I
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LAW oPF10E S OF
JOE -IN P. SPRiNGGATE
203 5. ARLINGTON AVE NUE
(775) 323
-
8881
-6-

6. Vehicles: (list ALL vehicles owned by you and/or the other
party, even if your name is not on the registration and include
such things as motorcycles, boats and recreational vehicles)
a. Made and model: Chevy/Trailblazer
What you owe on the vehicle: $17,450.00
What the vehicle is worth: $11,000.00
b. Make and model: Dodge/Grand Caravan
What you owe on the vehicle: $ 7,500.00
What the vehicle is worth: $ 4,000.00
c. Make and model: Honda Civic
What you owe on the vehicle: $N/A
What the vehicle is worth: $ 2,000.00
7. Stocks and bonds: $N/A
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8. Credit Cards and Store Charge Accounts:
Name of Account
NONE
Balance Minimum Monthly Payment
$N/A
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On the lines below, please list any other assets worth more than $500.00
or debts you have that have not been previously listed. Assets such as
furniture, jewelry, boats, assets held in your child's name or joint
tenancy with any other person, and personal loans owed to you. Debts
such as medical bills and personal loans owed to others.
Asset Value of Asset
Computer System $ 1,400.00
Flat Screen TV $ 1,700.00
Jewelry (Wells Fargo Safe Deposit Box and
India Locker safe deposit) $1.Inknovv
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n
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LAW OFFICES OF
.101
-
SN P. SPRINGGATE
RENO, NEVADA 89501
(775) 3 23 8881
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$ 5,670.00
$ 5,000.00
$ 2,3 95.47
$ 1,726.65
$ 5,067.81
$ 1,107.3 6
$3 ,000.00
$ 664.00
$6,420.00
3
Meena Fowler (Sister)
Ashik Nanabhai
Bank of America
Best Buy
Discover
WAMU
U.S. Bank
Household
Wells Fargo
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7
9 ATTORNEY FEE ARRANGEMENT
10 have paid my attorney $3 ,000.00, including costs and expert fees, since this case began. Ipaid this amount
rom (source of funds used) personal credit card. I currently owe my attorney $0.00 in addition to the
mount paid above. My fee arrangement is as follows:
12
Attorney's fees at $225.00 per hour against retainer; paralegal rate at $60.00 per hour
Balanced Owed on Debt
1
Debt
2
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LAW orr[cEs or
JOHN P. SPPJNGGATE
RENO. NEVADA 89501
(775) 3 23 -8881
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SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF WASHOE, STATE OF NEVADA
AFFIRMATION
Pursuant to NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document, SHORT FORM
FINANCIAL DECLARATION filed in case number: TO BE DETERMINED
ocument does not contain the social security number of any person
-OR-
0 Document contains the social security number of a person as required by:
0 A specific state of federal law, to wit:
Date: June
(State specific state or federal law)
-or-
El For the administration of a public program
-or-
0 For an application for a federal or state grant
-or-
0 Confidential Family Court Information Sheet
(NRS 125.13 0, NRS 125.23 0 and NRS 12 tz .05
2008 11114 pAamair
W
rI igna.
hn P. Spring gate Esq.
(Print Name)
Plaintiff
(Attorney for)
LAW OFFICE S OF
JOHN 7 SPRINGGATE
RENO. NEVADA 89501
(775) 3 23
-
8881
-9-
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2(136 JUL 18 PM to 21
HO WA
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D . C O N
BY
DEP UTY
C ode: 1 1 37
ZAC HARY C O UGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
WASHO E LEGAL SERVIC ES
650 Tahoe Street
Reno, NV 8950 9
Telephone: (775)32 9-2 72 7
Facsimile: (775)32 4-550 9
Attorneys for Defendant/C ounterclaimant
ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant/Counterclaimant.
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
COMES NOW the Defendant, Bharti Joshi, by and through her counsel of record,
Zachary B. C oughlin, Esq. , of Washoe Legal Services, and hereby answers Plaintiff Ashwin
Joshi's C omplaint for Divorce as follows:
I.
As to Paragraphs I, II, III, and VI of the Plaintiff's C omplaint, Defendant admits each
and every allegation contained therein.
II.
As to Paragraph V of the Plaintiff's C omplaint, Defendant denies each and every
allegation contained therein.
WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that this action be dismissed, with Plaintiff to take
nothing by way of his C omplaint.
/ / /
/ / /
Case No.: DV08-01168
Dept. No.: 5
1

C O UNTERC LAIM
C O MES NO W, Bharti Joshi, Defendant/C ounterclaimant, by and through her counsel,
Zachary B. C oughlin, Esq. of Washoe Legal Services, and for a cause of action complains and
alleges as follows:
I.
The Defendant/C ounterclaimant, Bharti Joshi (hereinafter "Bharti")is a resident of the
State of Nevada and for a period of more than six weeks preceding the filing of this action has
resided and been physically present and domiciled in the State of Nevada, and now resides and
is domiciled therein, and during all of said period of time Bharti has had and still has the intent
to make said State of Nevada her home, residence, and domicile for an indefinite period of
time.
IL
The parties entered into a good faith marriage on or about the 1 2
th
day of May, 1 987, in
Mumbai, India, and ever since said date have been and now are, Husband and Wife.
III.
That there are no minor children born the issue of the marriage. There are however,
two children over the age of eighteen for which Defendant requests the C ourt to instruct
Plaintiff to assist Defendant in providing financial help for their education. Bharti is not
pregnant at this time.
IV.
That there is community property to be equitably divided, which includes but is not
limited to, Defendant's "woman's wealth" given by Defendant's parents for Plaintiff to hold
when they were married, the vehicles in each party and the children's possession, and the
money the Defendant earned while working for Legendary Luxury C amping Safari in
Houston, Texas, which was automatically deposited in Plaintiff's account every month for two
and one half years, which Plaintiff told Defendant he would give to her.
V.
That there are community property debts and obligations for this C ourt to divide in a
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fair and equitable manner, including but not limited to, medical bills incurred by Plaintiff that
should be deemed his sole and separate debt, and payments on the vehicles in each parties'
possession.
VI.
That Bharti should be awarded a reasonable sum as and for alimony, until her death or
remarriage, whichever occurs first.
VII.
That Bharti wishes to return to her former name, to wit: BHARTI R. DAVE.
VIII.
That Bharti has been required to retain the services of an attorney and requests the
C ourt set reasonable attorney's fees and costs to be paid to WASHO E LEGAL SERVIC ES.
IX.
That Plaintiff/C ounterdefendant and Defendant/C ounterclaimant are incompatible in
marriage.
X.
That neither party is an infant, incompetent, or in the military service.
WHEREFORE, Defendant/C ounterclaimant, Bharti Joshi, prays judgment as follows:
1 . That the bonds of matrimony now and heretofore existing between the
Plaintiff/C ounterdefendant and Defendant/C ounterclaimant be dissolved, the
Defendant/C ounterclaimant be granted an absolute decree of divorce and each of the parties
hereto be restored to the status of a single, unmarried person.
2 . That the community assets be equitably divided.
3. That the community property debts and obligations be equitably divided.
4. That the Defendant/C ounterclaimant be awarded a reasonable sum as and for
alimony until her death or remarriage, whichever occurs first.
5. That the Defendant/C ounterclaimant return to her former name, to wit: Bharti
R. Dave.
6.
That WASHO E LEGAL SERVIC ES be awarded reasonable attorneys fees.
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ZA 'ARY B. C O UGHLIN,
i
7. That the parties are incompatible in marriage and reconciliation of the partieS is
impossible.
8. For such other and further relief as to the C ourt may deem just and proper.
DATED this ?)day of , 2 0 0 8.
WASHO E LEGAL SERVIC ES
At rney for Defendant/Counterclaimant
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VERIFICATION
STATE O F NEVADA
)s. s.
C O UNTY O F WASHO E
I, Bharti Joshi, being first duly sworn, depose and say as follows:
That I am the Defendant/C ounterclaimant in the above-entitled action; that I have read
the foregoing "Verified Answer and C ounterclaim" and know the contents thereof; that the
same is true of my knowledge except for those matters therein contained stated upon
information and belief, as to those matters, I believe them to be true.
DATED thisij
-
day of July, 2 0 0 8.
BHARTI JO SHI
.......11
,
11.114i i i i i i i i i i i i Ii i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 111011111.i i i i i i i i i i i i i 1.11.11111111i i i i i i i i i i
NO TARY PUBLIC
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Subscribed and Sworn to before me
this1 7 day of July, 2 0 0 8-.
DEBORAH J. PRINGLE
Notary Public - State of Nevada
Appointment Recorded in Washoe County
No: 01-66S1 8-2-Expires November 4, 2008
5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL
Pursuant to NRC P 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Washoe Legal
Services, and that I served on this day the foregoing:
VERIFIED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM
by depositing for mailing, a true and correct copy of the within document with the United
States Postal Service, at Reno, Nevada, addressed to:
Law O ffices of
John P. Springgate, Esq.
2 0 3 South Arlington Avenue
Reno, NV 8950 1
DATED this el day of , 2 0 0 8.
Deborah Pringle
An employee of Washoe Legal Services
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F I L E D
Electronically
07-22-2008:10:21:52 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
Transaction # 291976
sEP 1 7 AN 837
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Code: 1137
ZACHARY COUGHL IN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
WASHOE L EGAL SERVICES
650 Tahoe Street
Reno, NV 89509
Telephone: (775) 329-2727
Facsimile: (775) 324-5509
Attorneys for Defendant/Counterclaimant
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
PLAINTIFF'S CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
COMES NOW, Defendant/Counterclaimant, Bharti Joshi, by and through her
counsel, Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq. , of Washoe L egal Services, and hereby submits her Case
Management Conference Statement.
The parties were married on or about May 11, 1987, in Mumbai, India, and ever since
said date have been and now are Husband and Wife.
There are two children the issue of Plaintiff and Defendant, who are majority in age.
The Plaintiff is not pregnant at this time.
That there are remaining community property to be equitably divided by the Court.
That community debts and obligations to be equitably divided by the Court.
That Bharti should be awarded spousal support.
That Washoe L egal Services be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B.030
The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the
Dept. No.: 5
B. Coughlin, Esq. Zac
At ney for Defendant/Counterclaimant
social security number of any person.
DATED this r cl
--
ay of September, 2008.
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2

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Washoe L egal
Services, and that on the day of September, 2008, I served the foregoing:
PL AINTIFF'S CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
by depositing for mailing with the United States Postal Service, at Reno, Nevada, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the within document addressed to:
L aw Offices of
Reno, NV 89501
_ I /
(171,e.A.,
DAOrah Pringle
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Code: 1637
ZACHARY COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Nevada Bar No. 9473
WASHOE LEGAL SERVICES
650 Tahoe Street
Reno, NV 89509
Telephone: (775) 329-2727
Facsimile: (775) 324-5509
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
AMENDED DEFENDANT'S CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
COMES NOW, Defendant/Counterclaimant, Bharti Joshi, by and through her
counsel, Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq., of Washoe Legal Services, and hereby submits her Case
Management Conference Statement.
The parties were married on or about May 11, 1987, in Mumbai, India, and ever since
said date have been and now are Husband and Wife.
There are two children the issue of Plaintiff and Defendant, who are majority in age.
The Defendant/Counterclaimant is not pregnant at this time.
That there are remaining community property to be equitably divided by the Court.
That community debts and obligations to be equitably divided by the Court.
That Bharti should be awarded spousal support.
That Washoe Legal Services be awarded reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
2003 SEP 18 PN 14:35
Dept. No.: 5

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DATED this p day of September, 2008.
chary B. Coughlin, sq.
ttorney for Defendant/Counterclaimant
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2
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certify that I am an employee of Washoe Legal
Services, and that on the / day of September, 2008, I served the foregoing:
AMENDED DEFENDANT'S CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT
by depositing for mailing with the United States Postal Service, at Reno, Nevada, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the within document addressed to:
Law Offices of
Reno, NV 89501
Deborah Pringle
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F I L E D
Electronically
10-02-2008:04:00:34 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
CASE NO. DV08-01168 ASHWIN JOSHI VS. BHARTI JOSHI
J T-10/3/2008

DATE, JUDGE
OFFICERS OF
COURT PRESENT APPEARANCES-HEARING
10/3/08
HONORABLE
SENIOR JUDGE
SCOTT T.
JORDAN
DEPT. NO. 5
J. Taylor
(Clerk)
CD

CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE

Present in Court were Plaintiff Ashwin J oshi, represented by counsel J ohn
Springgate, Esq.; and Defendant Bharti J oshi, represented by counsel
Zachary Coughlin, Esq.
This matter was scheduled as a Case Management Conference, and the
parties have agreed to put the following issues before the Court:
Mr. Springgate informed the Court that the parties have two children that
are no longer minors; therefore custody will not be at issue. Plaintiff has a
family debt of approximately $5,000.00 incurred in bringing the family over
from Tanzania. He agrees to keep that debt. The parties have consumer
debt of approximately $20,000.00 that the parties shall be divided equally.
Plaintiff also has a $48,000.00 medical bill. Although it is a community
debt, he will continue to pay and accept liability for it. Mr. Springgate has
explained to Plaintiff that should he be sued for that medical debt he could
file bankruptcy. Although Plaintiff is not pondering bankruptcy at this
point, should it become necessary, it will be a great deal of family debt
Plaintiff will no longer be responsible for. For that reason they agree to
the Court keeping jurisdiction on alimony for five years at $1.00 per year to
protect Defendant should a bankruptcy be filed.
There are two significant items of personal property in dispute, a television
and a computer. Plaintiff requests his personal papers located at the
residence in order to apply for citizenship.
In regard to the automobiles, Plaintiff shall keep the Trailblazer and
maintain, and Defendant shall keep the Caravan and maintain payments
on that vehicle. All other vehicles belong to the children.
Defendant has a claim about her womans wealth brought into the
marriage, and gifts. Plaintiff testifies that he does not have it, and does
not know where it is. He believes it may be with his sister in Tanzania.
Since he doesnt have it, he cannot agree to give it to her. He does,
however agree that it belongs to Defendant and is not community
property. Plaintiff agrees to notify his family that it should be delivered to
Defendant and will attempt to expedite that delivery.
Mr. Coughlin states that Defendant has considered the offer and is not at
a point to agree to it. Defendant is troubled by the lack of effort on
Plaintiffs part to obtain the womans wealth. Defendant strongly fees
some alimony award is in order.
Plaintiff verified that he works at a catering company and has no other
employment.
The Court indicates that its goal is to attempt to settle this matter.
In regard to the marital wealth, both parties agree it should be awarded to
Defendant. It is important Plaintiff cooperate in returning those items to
F I L E D
Electronically
10-10-2008:09:32:54 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
CASE NO. DV08-01168 ASHWIN J OSHI VS. BHARTI J OSHI
Page 2 of 2
J T-10/3/2008

Defendant. The Court has no other power to order their return other than
awarding them to Defendant.
The medical debt is being treated as a community debt, and Plaintiff
agrees to pay in full. The Court wants to make sure the parties
understand that should Plaintiff be sued for non-payment of the medical
debt the doctors have the right to pursue Defendant for payment. Her
recourse would be to sue Plaintiff.
The Court states that in regard to alimony, under Nevada rules alimony is
awarded when there is an imbalance between earnings of the parties.
Based upon the information, both parties earn the same amount so there
is no basis for alimony. Since Plaintiff is taking more than the debt, this
should offset any claim for alimony.
In regard to the issue of personal property, each party is to keep what they
currently have in their possession. Plaintiff does not want the television
but requests the financial information from the hard drive of the computer.
The Court states it has no power to order custody or visitation but
encourages the parties to have a meaningful relationship for the benefit of
the children.
The parties agreed to recess and attempt a settlement.
The Court was informed that the parties could not settle, therefore it did
not reconvene.

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IMMI

3696
FILED
FEB 2 5 2009
HOWARDX. CL70CL
.Li
ERK
B y :
DEPU CLERK
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs. CASE NO. DV08-01168
BHARTI JOSH', DEPT. NO. 14
ORDER RE PRETRIAL PROCEDURE
This matter is set for trial on March 12, 2009 at 1:30p.m.
Good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that, if a party intends to offer more than ten trial
exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and indexed. Plaintiff's exhibits will be
marked in alphabetical sequence and Defendant's exhibits will be marked in numerical sequence.
Each party shall submit two copies of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the
opposing counsel.
Counsel shall contact Martha Casique-Andrews at 775-325-6779 to schedule a
time with the Clerk to organize and mark exhibits. For trials set for one full day or more,
IDA ER
DISTRICT JUDGE

counsel shall meet with the Court Clerk no later than 3:00p.m. on the Friday prior to trial to
mark the trial exhibits. For trials which are scheduled for less than one full day, exhibits shall be
marked immediately prior to the convening for trial, and counsel shall arrive at least 15 minutes
before the scheduled time of trial.
Prior to meeting with the Court Clerk, counsel shall meet and discuss the
admissibility of proposed exhibits. At the time of marking the exhibits with the Clerk, the Clerk
shall be told which Exhibits may be admitted without objection.
At the opening of trial, counsel shall inform the Court which exhibits are being
admitted without objection.
Each party must file with the Court a trial statement, financial declaration and
UCCJA declaration. Courtesy copies of the trial statement shall be hand-delivered to opposing
counsel and Judge Gardner's chambers by no later than 5:00p.m. five (5) days prior to trial.
Failure to timely deliver these documents may result in sanctions against the offending party as
set forth in NRCP 37.
If the financial circumstances of a party have changed substantially since the
filing of the most recent financial declaration, that party is to file an updated financial declaration
at the same time as filing the trial statement.
Dated this
v
day ay of February, 2009.
-2-
CER IFICATE OF MAIL ING
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), T certify that I am an employee of the Second Judicial District
Court, and that on this date I deposited by county mail, at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
attached, addressed to:
ZACHARY B COUGHL IN ESQ
299 SOUTH ARL INGTON AVENUE
RENO NV 89501
JOHN P SPRINGGATE ESQ
203 SOUTH ARL INGTON AVENUE
RENO NV 89501
Dated this D5 day of February, 2009.
Adminis ative Assistant
-3-
1
2

CODE: 4220
Zachary B. Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 9473

ORIGtNAL
ILED
2019 MAR 5 AM 9: 26
=: ,>299 South Arlington Avenue
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Reno, NV 89501
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IN TH SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
--iL
=
6:,ASHWIN JOSHI,
IV
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Defendant/Counterdefendant,
vs. Case No.: DV08-01l68
BHARTI JOSHI, Dept. No.: 14
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL STATEMENT
COMES NOW, Defendant, BHARTI JOSHI, by and through her counsel of record, Zachary
B. Coughlin, Esq. of Washoe Legal Services, and pursuant to WDCR 5, submits her trial statement
for the trial presently scheduled for March 12,2009.
I. INTRODUCTION - RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant, BHARTI JOSHI (hereinafer "BHARTI"), and Plaintiff, ASHWIN JOSHI
(hereinafer "ASHWIN"), intermarried on or about May II, 1987.
A Complaint for Divorce was fled on July 1, 2008. Defendant filed an Answer and
Counterclaim to the Complaint on July 22, 2008. A Case Management Conference was held on
October 3, 2008.
26
II. ADMITTEDIUNDlSPUTED ISSUES
27
1. That there are no remaining minor children of the parties, and BHARTI is not pregnant.
28
2. That BHARTI is entitled to her "Woman's Wealth," and ASHWIN will notify his family that it

1 should be delivered to BHARTI and will expedite that delivery.

2 3. That ASHWIN shall keep the Trailblazer and maintain payments on the vehicle. That
3 BHARTI shall keep the Caravan and maintain payments on the vehicle.
4 4. That each party will keep the community property assets in their possession. ASHWIN does
5 request the financial information from the computer. The television and computer are to remain in
6 BHARTI'S possession.
7 5. ASHWIN has agreed to pay the medical debt in full. ASHWIN will also pay the family debt of
8 $5,000.00 incurred when he brought the family to the United States fom Tanzania.
9 6. That the parties are incompatible in marriage.
10 III. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES IN DISPUTE
11 B. ALIMONY
12
BHARTI should be awarded alimony/spousal support in an amount determined by the Court.
13 ASHWIN'S current income is $ 1,000.00 per month more than BHARTI'S.
14 NRS 125.150 provides that the Court may award such alimony as appears just and equitable. In
15
the seminal case, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209 (1974), the Court laid out a series of factors to
16
guide the Court in determining if an alimony award is just and equitable, including the financial
17 condition of the parties, the nature and value of their respective property, the duration of the marriage,
18 the husband's income, eaing capacity, age, health, and ability to labor and the wife's income age,
19 health, station, and ability to ea a living.
20
Alimony is an equitable award serving to meet post-divorce needs. As stated by the Nevada
21 Supreme Court in Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192,954 P.2d 37 (1998): "".two of the primary
22 puroses of alimony, at least in marriage of significant length, are to narow any lage gaps between the
23 post-divorce earing capacities of the parties .. . and to allow the recipient spouse to live 'as nearly as
24 fairly possible to the station in life enjoyed before the divorce. "
,
25 C. DEBTS/OBLIGATIONS
26 ASHWIN has enumerated credit charge accounts. BHARTI has no direct information about
27 these charges; and she cannot recall any accrued benefi t to the community. These debts should be set
28 aside to ASHWIN as his sole and separate obligation. It is believed that these enumerated accounts are
2

1 solely in ASHWIN'S name.
2 IV. SCHEDULES OR SUMMARIES

3
At this time, Defendant does not anticipate the use of any schedules or summaries as
4 contemplated by WDCR led).
5 V. WITNESSES
6 Defendant and Plaintiff
7 VI. CERTIFICATION OF COUNSEL
8
The undersigned counsel certifies that he has made reasonable efforts to resolve as many
9
issues as possible with Plaintiff s counsel. Settlement efforts will continue until trial.
10
II
The undersigned does hereby afrm that the preceding document does not contain the social
12 security number of any person.
13 DATED this Iday of March, 2009.
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HARY B. COUGHLIN, ESQ.
Attorey for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certif that I am an employee of Washoe Legal Services, and
that on th day of March, 2009, I served the foregoing:
DEFENDANT'S TRIAL STATEMENT
by depositing with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the
within document addressed to:
Law Ofices of
Reno, NV 89501
4
Deborah Pringle
=m==m==
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LW OFFICES OF
JOHN P SPRINGGATE
21lJ S. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO, NEVADA 8951
(n5) 323-8881
F I L E D
Electronically
03-11-2009:04:56:07PM
HowardW.Conyers
ODE: 4220
ClerkoftheCourt
OHN P. SPRlNGGATE, ESQ.
Transaction#644213
evada Bar #1350
Reno, N 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
Attorey for Plaintiff
*****
ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff, CASE NO.: DV08-01168
vs. DEPT. NO.: 14
BHARTl JOSHI,
Defendant.
TRIAL STATEMENT OF PLAINTIFF
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ASHWl JOSHI, by and through his attorey of record,
JOHN P. SPRlGGATE, ESQ., and hereby submits his Trial Statement in accordance with
WCDR 5.
A. Concise Statement of Claimed Facts.
Mr. Joshi commenced this action by his Complaint for Divorce on July 1, 2008. The
parties have been married for ahost 22 years, and both children are of majority age. They are both
residing in Washoe County. Mr. Joshi is 51 years of age; and Mrs. Joshi is 46 years of age.
There are community assets and debts which the Court will need to determine the
distribution of. Mrs. Joshi is in possession of almost all of the community friture and
Undisputed
Statement
Appropriate Comments. Sugestions
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furshings. They each have cars, and debt thereon. Mrs. Joshi is a phannacy tech at Raleys,
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earing $29,500 in 2008 while Mr. Joshi is a catering manager, earing $41,500 in 2008.
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4 B. Statement of Admitted or Facts
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The parties' ages and date of marriage are admitted. As well, there is "woman's wealth,"
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or dowry, which Mrs. Joshi brought into the marriage. The parties were married in India, and
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10 primarily jewelry.
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C. ofIssues of Law
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None. While it may seem to be an alimony case, Mr. Joshi's earngs are subject to the
travel and convention business fluctuations, while hers are not. More importantly, he is prepared
to take an unfair amount of the community debt, which he has been servicing, which equalizes
their incomes.
D. or Information
The parties, through their attoreys, have stipulated to use the beginning of the trial as a
frther settlement conference, as there are relatively few issues.
DATED this day of March, 2009.
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L\,' OFFICE OF -2-
JOHN P SPRlNGGATE
:(3 S. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO. NEVADA 89501
(5)32H881
x
c{
nda Kno1
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I hereby certi1 that I am an employee of THE LAW OFFICES
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4 OF JOHN SPRING GATE, and that on this date I personally served at Reno, Nevada, a true copy
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of the within Defendant'S Trial Statement, flly addressed to:
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Zack Coughlin, Esq.
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Washoe Legal Services
299 S. Arlington Avenue
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Reno, N 89501
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for mailing by frst class mail, postage prepaid
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by personal delivelY
by telephonic facsimile (329-5509)
by Federal Express or other overight delivery
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by placing a true copy thereof for collection and delivery by Reno/Carson
Messenger Service on this date.
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The undersigned does hereby afirm that the preceding document does not contain the
-
Dated this day of March, 2009
A.
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L OFPICES OF -3-
JOHN P SPRINGGATE
cn_l S. ARLINGTON AVENUE
RENO, NEVADA 89501
(n5) 323-888\
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________________
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CODE: 1845
INTHE FAMILYDIVISION
OFTHESECONDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURTOFTHESTATEOFNEVADA
INANDFORTHECOUNTYOFWASHOE
ASHWINJOSHI,
Plaintiff, CaseNo. DV08-01168
vs.
Dept.No. 14
BHARTIJOSHI,
Defendant/ Counterclaimant.
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ORDERAFTER TRIAL
AComplaintfor Divorcewasfiled by ASHWINJOSHI (hereinafterMr.Joshi),by
andthroughhisattorney,JOHNP.SPRINGGATE,ESQ.,onJuly8,2008. AnAnswerand
Counterclaimwasfiledby BHARTIJOSHI (hereinafter'Ms.Joshi'),byandthroughher
attorneyofrecord,ZACHARYB. COUGHLIN,ESQ.,onJuly18,2008. Argumentwas
heardonMarch12,2009andMarch17,2009. Mr.Joshiwaspresentandrepresentedby
JohnP.Springgate,Esq.;andMs.Joshi, waspresentandrepresentedbyZacharyB.
Coughlin,Esq., ofWashoeLegalServices.
Alltestimonyandargumentshavingbeenheard,allpleadingson filehavingbeen
read,allexhibits,tapes,andnoteshavingbeenreviewed,theCourtfindsandOrdersas
follows.
III
III
F I L E D
Electronically
04-13-2009:09:23:48 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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FINDINGS OF FACT
1. The parties were married May 11, 1987, in Bombay, India.
2. The parties have two children, both of whom are now adults.
Although Mr. Yoshi has no obligation to support said children any longer
pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b), Ms. Yoshi requests the financial assistance of Mr. Yoshi so
as to provide for the children's continuing education. (Answer, pg. 2, lines 16-18).
The Court notes that on August 1,2008, Mr. Joshi filed a 'Motion For Return Of
Personal Property' requesting that Ms. Joshi return his passport, green card and social
security card. On August 7, 2008, Ms. Joshi, by and through her attorney of record,
Mr. Coughlin, filed an Opposition to the return of Mr. Joshi's passport citing case law
involving minor children and their support. Ms. Yoshi filed said opposition while
acknowledging the parties' children were both over eighteen years of age at the time. On
August 18,2008, Judge Schumacher ordered Ms. Joshi to immediately return Mr. Joshi's
passport within five days.
3. There is community property to be divided.
In Mr. Joshi's Complaint filed July 8, 2008, he indicated there was community
property and debts which should be divided by the Court.
Ms. Joshi filed an Answer and Counterclaim on July 18, 2008, indicating the
parties' community property should be equitably divided, including Ms. Joshi's
"women's wealth", the vehicles in each party's possession, the vehicles in their children's
possession, and "the money the [Ms. Yoshi] earned while working for Legendary Luxury
Camping Safari in Houston Texas which was automatically deposited in [Mr. Yoshi's]
account every month for two and one-half years, [and] which [Mr. Yoshi] told [Ms. Yoshi]
he would give to her." (Answer, pg. 2, lines 21-26).
The Court notes the following information has been provided and has been taken
into consideration on this issue:
a. "Women's Wealth" Property - The parties agreed that the parties'
community interest in the "woman's wealth" jewelry (location unknown) belongs to Ms.
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Joshi. Mr. Joshi stated that he would contact his relatives, who may have some of the
property, and will request its immediate return to Ms. Joshi.
b. Mr. Joshi's Vehicle - Mr. Joshi introduced evidence that the balance
on his 2005 Chevrolet Blazer is $15,009.75 as of March 6, 2009. (Trial Exhibit"A"); and
Kelley Blue Book value for the Blazer is $10,910 (Exhibit "B"). Therefore, a deficit in the
amount of approximately $4,100.00 exists on the vehicle. At the conclusion of trial, Mr.
Joshi requested that he be awarded the Chevrolet Blazer.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue. To the Court's knowledge, Ms.
Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue.
c. Ms. Joshi's Vehicle - There was no evidence introduced regarding the
value of Ms. Joshi's car.
d. Son's Vehicle - Mr. Joshi testified that his adult son is presently
driving the Jeep Grand Cherokee and is making the payments for the car directly to the
lender, Clear Star Financial. Both parties testified that Ms. Joshi and the parties' son are
named on the title. No evidence was presented regarding the balance owed on the Jeep
Grand Cherokee.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue. To the Court's knowledge,
Ms. Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue.
e. Daughter's Vehicle - Mr. Joshi testified that the parties' adult
daughter drives and makes payments on the Honda Accord and that title is held in the
name of both Mr. Joshi and the parties' daughter.
Ms. Joshi testified that she made a payment of $6,000.00 on her credit card for said
automobile and the present balance on the credit card was approximately $5,000.00.
However, Ms. Joshi presented no evidence to corroborate this contention. Ms. Joshi did
not specify a date on which said debt was incurred, she did not provide evidence of any
payments made on said credit card, and she did not present evidence of any credit card
with a balance in the amount of $5,000.00 remaining thereon.
Ms. Joshi presented no further evidence on this issue.
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e. London Bank Account - Mr. Joshi testified that that he did not know
if Ms. Joshi's earnings from Tanzania were placed in a London bank account. Mr. Joshi
testified he did not control Ms. Joshi's money at that time.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence that her earnings were placed in a London bank
account. To the Court's knowledge, Ms. Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue.
f. Community Bank Accounts - Ms. Joshi testified that she requested
access to the bank accounts from Mr. Joshi, but that he would not let her see the bank
statements. Further, Ms. Joshi testified that she did have her own credit and she did have
access to Mr. Joshi's credit card statements.
There was no further evidence presented as to the community bank accounts.
4. There is community debt to be divided.
a. General Credit Card Debt - Mr. Joshi testified that he owes
approximately $15,650 in credit card debt (Trial Exhibit "E"), and argued the charges
were incurred for community expenses, holidays, family expenses and household
expenses.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence regarding community credit card debt.
b. Best Buy Credit Card Debt - Mr. Joshi stated that the parties
purchased a computer and T.V. at Best Buy for approximately $1,314.00. Mr. Joshi
testified Ms. Joshi has both of these items.
Mr. Joshi requested he be awarded the computer presently in Ms. Joshi's
possession and that she retain the T.V.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue.
c. Medical Debt - Mr. Joshi testified he owes $6,735.00 to St. Mary's
Hospital for surgery in May 2008 (Trial Exhibit "F") and $500.00 to REMSA (Trial Exhibit
"G").
At trial, Mr. Joshi offered to pay these community debts.
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Ms. Joshi presented no evidence on this issue. To the Court's knowledge, Ms.
Joshi conducted no discovery on this issue.
d. Family Debt - there are two debts owing to family members or on
behalf of family members that were presented at trial.
Mr. Joshi introduced evidence at trial regarding a $5,000.00 debt to Rod and
Meena Fowler (Trial Exhibit "H") in the form of a letter from Rod and Meena Fowler.
The letter states that the parties owe money in the amount of $6,000.00, which was "long
overdue" by approximately six (6) years, for money loaned to Mr. Joshi's mother when
she was ill. The letter references a "copy of your letter agreeing to pay us back", but did
not attach a copy of said letter. At trial, Mr. Joshi testified that he did not have a copy of
the referenced letter. Ms. Joshi testified that this debt was "made up."
Mr. Joshi testified regarding a debt of approximately $5,000 owing to a family
member by the name of Ashik Nanaby (sp?), for buying plane tickets for the Joshi family
to come to the Unites States in 2001. Ms. Joshi testified that she could not obtain any
information regarding this debt as the other party "wanted to stay out of the divorce."
At trial, Mr. Joshi offered to pay these community debts.
e. General Community Debt - Mr. Joshi testified that he pays
approximately $600 per month for community debts, excluding his car and insurance.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence regarding general community debt.
Mr. Joshi offered to pay the community debt in his name that he had been paying
and take an unequal division of community debt.
5. Ms. Joshi requests spousal support.
Specifically, Ms. Joshi requested spousal support "until her death or remarriage,
whichever occurs first." (Answer, p. 3, lines 5-6).
Mr. Joshi is 51 years of age and Ms. Joshi is 46 years of age. The parties moved to
the United States from Tanzania in 2001.
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Ms. Joshi is a college graduate and has worked continuously since the parties
moved to the United States. Ms. Joshi is presently employed by Raley's as a
pharmaceutical technician and earned approximately $29,500.00 in 2008. Ms. Joshi has
testified she has raised the parties' children and thereby has foregone educational
opportunities and has put her dreams aside.
Mr. Joshi testified he is a high school graduate. Mr. Joshi is employed as a catering
manager. In 20m3, Mr. Joshi earned approximately $41,500.00 while working for two
companies - American Bar and Restaurant and Sierra Sport Service. At trial, Mr. Joshi
introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant reflecting earnings of $4,157.
(Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the amount of $37,504.18
(Trial Exhibit "D"). Mr. Joshi testified that business is slow and he is presently working
for only one company - American Bar and Restaurant. Mr. Joshi testified he has only two
weeks of work scheduled for March, 2009; and he filed for unemployment benefits in
March, 2009.
Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting taxes, factor
in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and set off any
alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of community debt.
Further, to protect Ms. Joshi in the event Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi
suggested that the court maintain jurisdiction over the issue of spousal support for five
years.
5. Ms. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's fees be paid to Washoe Legal
Services for the services of Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's fees be
paid to his attorney, Mr. Springgate.
On July 18, 2008, Mr. Coughlin filed a Statement of Legal Aid Representation
which states Defendant is receiving "free legal assistance" from Washoe Legal Services
pursuant to NRS 12.015.
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On October 3, 2008, Judge Jordan presided over the parties' Case Management
Conference. At that hearing, the parties were unable to reach a settlement. Further, on
March 12, 2009, Judge Gardner conducted a Settlement Conference for approximately one
and one-half hours, prior to starting the trial at approximately 3:00 pm. The parties did
not agree on settlement and trial was commenced.
In his closing argument at trial, Mr. Coughlin, on behalf of Ms. Joshi, stated that he
did not understand and could not agree with equalizing debt when one party ended up
with a nicer car. He stated that he had"crunched the numbers" and could not see it the
other way. Mr. Coughlin cited an ALR article regarding community debt and stated his
client"does not have much for the creditors to take." He requested that his client assume
one-half the community debt and that the Court find Plaintiff's two $5,000 debts to family
members and friends as Mr. Joshi's separate debts. Mr. Coughlin stated his client is being
asked to "foot the bill" for Plaintiff's debts and referenced that Ms. Joshi is a caring and
committed mother.
Mr. Joshi testified that he had paid Mr. Springgate $4,000.00 since July, 2008,
for attorney's fees and costs.
Mr. Joshi requested that Mr. Coughlin personally pay his attorney's fees for 4.15
hours of trial at the rate of $225 per hour pursuant to NRS 7.085. Mr. Springgate testified
Mr. Coughlin had not conducted any discovery, had produced no evidence regarding
Ms. Joshi's community debts other than her Financial Declaration on file, had presented
no evidence regarding alimony, and had acted in a vexatious and unreasonable manner
in representing Ms. Joshi in this divorce proceeding.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Ongoing Support for the Adult Children's Education-
Pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b), except where a contract providing otherwise has
been executed pursuant to NRS 123.080, the obligation for care, education, maintenance
and support of any minor child created by any order entered pursuant to this section
ceases: (a) Upon the death of the person to whom the order was directed; or (b) When
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the child reaches 18 years of age if he is no longer enrolled in high school, otherwise,
when he reaches 19 years of age.
There has been no evidence presented by Ms. Joshi justifying a request for
continuing support of the parties' adult children. As there has been no legal basis
presented to make such a finding, the Court denies Ms. Joshi's request that Mr. Joshi
financially provide for the adult children's education.
2. Community Property/Debt -
Pursuant to NRS 125.150(1)(b) and Putterman v. Putterman, 113 Nev. 606, 939 P.2d
1047 (1997), in granting a divorce, the Court shall ensure an equal disposition of the
community estate, absent compelling reasons justifying an unequal distribution. The
Court must make written findings as to why such a division is appropriate.
a. "Women's Wealth" - The parties have agreed that the parties'
community interests in the "women's wealth" belongs entirely to Ms. Joshi according to
their customary beliefs, and thereby should be declared her sole and separate property.
As such, Mr. Joshi is ordered to contact any and all relatives who may have this property
and immediately return said property to Ms. Joshi as soon as possible.
b. Mr. Joshi's Vehicle - The 2005 Chevrolet Blazer shall be considered
Mr. Joshi's sole and separate property. Mr. Joshi shall be responsible for the debt
remaining thereon. As the car is worth $10,910.00but there is $15,009.75 due and owing
on said car, the Court will consider Mr. Joshi's assumption of this asset as an undertaking
of community debt of approximately $4,100.00.
c. Ms. Joshi's Vehicle - Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered her sole and
separate property. Ms. Joshi shall be responsible for any debt remaining thereon. As
there was no evidence presented as to its value (either positive or negative), the Court is
unable to determine a value for this community asset.
d. Son's Vehicle - As the only evidence presented on this issue was the
fact that the parties' adult son drives this vehicle and makes the payments thereon, this
asset will not be divided among the community.
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e. Daughter's Vehicle - The only evidence presented on this issue was
the fact that the parties' adult daughter drives this car and makes payments thereon. Ms.
Joshi presented no evidence of a balance owing on the car or its fair market value.
Thereby, this car will not be divided as a community asset.
f. London Bank Account - there was no evidence presented to the
Court verifying said bank account exists. As such, there is no factual basis to support an
order dividing it as a community asset.
g. Community Bank Accounts - there was no evidence presented as to
the existence of community bank accounts. As such, there is no factual basis to support
an order dividing it as a community asset.
h. Computer - Mr. Joshi is awarded the computer purchased at Best
Buy. Ms. Joshi shall deliver said computer to Mr. Springgate's office on or before Friday,
April 17, 2009, at 5:00pm.
1. Television - Ms. Joshi is awarded the television purchased at Best
Buy. It is the Court's understanding this television is currently in Ms. Joshi's possession.
J. General Credit Card Debt - The evidence presented indicates a
general debt of approximately $15, 650.00 which has been expended for community
purposes.
Mr. Joshi agreed to be responsible for this debt at trial. As such, Mr. Joshi shall be
solely and separately responsible for this debt.
k. Best Buy Credit Card Debt - The evidence presented indicates there
is a debt of approximately $1,314.00 outstanding for the purchase of the television and
computer.
Mr. Joshi agreed to be responsible for this debt at trial. As such, Mr. Joshi shall be
solely and separately responsible for this debt.
/ / /
/ / /
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1. Medical Debt - As Mr. Joshi has offered to pay these debts, he shall
be solely and separately responsible for the payment of $6,735.00 to St.Mary's Hospital;
and $500.00 to Remsa.
m. Family Debt - There was no documentary evidence presented as to
the debt owing to Ashik Nanaby (sp?) for buying plane tickets for the Joshi family.
Further, as the only evidence provided regarding the $5,000.00 debt to Rod and Meena
Fowler indicates said debt was incurred for the benefit of Mr. Joshi's mother. As
Mr. Joshi has agreed to take on both of these debts, they shall henceforth be his sole and
separate responsibility.
n. General Community Debt - There was no evidence other than
testimonial evidence to establish community debts. As Mr. Joshi has offered to pay any
remaining community debt in his name that is hereafter outstanding, said debt shall be
the sole and separate responsibility of Mr. Joshi.
The Court notes Mr. Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution of the
community debt in this case. The Court finds his testimonial acquiescence at trial to take
on this debt is a compelling reason to make an unequal distribution of the community
debt.
3. Spousal Support-
The statutory mandate for alimony is that it be "just and equitable."
NRS 125.150(1)(a). Alimony is an equitable award to serve the post-decree needs and
rights of the former spouse. Wolff v. Wolff, 112 Nev. 1355, 929 P.2d 916 (1996). Although
post-decree incomes need not be equalized, in marriages of some duration, alimony may
be used to narrow large gaps between the post-divorce earning capacities of the parties
and to allow the recipient spouse to live"as nearly as possible to the station in life
enjoyed before the divorce." Shydler v. Shydler, 114 Nev. 192, 196954 P.2d 37,39 (1998).
The individual circumstances of each case will determine the appropriate amount and
length of any alimony award. Id.
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Pursuant to NRS 125.150(8), there are eleven (11) factors the court shall consider in
awarding alimony.
Ms. Joshi presented no evidence in support of her request for alimony other than
her own testimonial evidence that she raised the parties' children, had foregone
educational opportunities, and put her dreams on hold while married. Ms. Joshi testified
that she is healthy and has always worked. There was no reference to any of the eleven
factors in NRS 125.150(8) in Ms. Joshi's presentation and argument in support of an
award of spousal support.
The Court finds that the parties presently earn approximately the same amount,
Ms. Joshi earns $2,458 per month and Mr. Joshi earned approximately $3,125 per month
in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009 and has filed for
unemployment benefits the beginning of March 2009. (See NRS 125.150(8)(a)). The
parties have been married 21 years and Ms. Joshi has always been employed during that
time. (See NRS 125.150(8)(d)). Ms. Joshi obtained a college degree prior to marriage and
Mr. Joshi has a high school degree. (See NRS 125.150(8)(h)). Both parties are healthy and
able to work. (See NRS 125.150(8)(k)).
Based upon the evidence presented and the applicable law, this Court does not
believe Ms. Joshi is entitled to an award of alimony.
4. Attorney's Fees-
This Court enjoys discretion to award attorney's fees in a divorce action. (See
NRS 125.150(3); Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998).) Also, pursuant to
NRS 18.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's fees "when the court finds
that the... defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable
ground or to harass the prevailing party." Finally, pursuant to NRS 7.085, if a court
finds that an attorney has: (a) filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding
in any court in this State and such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact or is not
warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the existing law that is made
in good faith; or (b) unreasonably and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding
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beforeanycourtinthisState,thecourtshallrequiretheattorneypersonallytopaythe
2 additionalcosts,expensesandattorney'sfeesreasonablyincurredbecauseofsuch
3 conduct.
4 At trial,Mr.SpringgatestatedthatMr.Coughlinhadconductedno discoveryin
thiscase. Inaddition,Mr.Coughlinfailedtopresentonedocumentarypieceofevidence
6 attrialonbehalfofMs.Joshi'sclaims. Mr.CoughlinarguedincessantlywiththeCourt
7 throughouttrialandmadesarcastic,derogatoryremarksto theCourt,Mr.Springgate,
8 andMr.Joshithroughouttrial.
9 TheCourtnotesthattherewerewellover40objectionsduringfour(4)hoursof
trial. Mr.Springgate'sobjectionswerewell-foundedandcontinuouslysustainedexcept
11 inoneinstance. Mr. Coughlinwasoverruledoneveryobjectionexceptoneandargued
12 withtheCourtovermostrulings. Mr.Coughlinwasadmonishedapproximately15times
13 by the Courtto quitarguing,to askspecificquestions,to discontinueaskingquestions
14 callingfor alegalconclusion,andtorefrainfrommakingdegradingremarkstobothMr.
Joshi andMr.Springgate.
16 TheCourtnotesthatatonepoint,afteranexhibithadbeenadmitted,
17 Mr. Coughlincouldnotfindthecopyprovidedby Mr.Springgatein discovery. Mr.
18 Coughlindemandedacopybe providedat trial,stating"amIsupposedtoberifling
19 throughmypapers? My understandingisthatyouaresupposedto provideacopy."
Whenaskedif he hadthecopyofthedocument,Mr.Coughlinstated,"1 donotknow. I
21 couldspendmytimeandmentalenergylookingaroundfor Mr.Springgate'sdocument
22 likeIamhis assistant,or wecouldask Mr.Springgateto provideacopyatthetimeheis
23 seekingadmissionlikeIbelievetherulestates." Mr. Coughlincitednoruleandthen
24 proceededto interrupttheproceedingstwiceapproximatelyfive (5)minutesandtwelve
(12)minutespostrulingtore-arguethe point. Mr.Springgaterepliedto thearguments
26 byreferencingwhenexactlythecopyhadbeenprovidedtoMr. Coughlinduring
27 discoveryandwherethecopycouldbe located. The Courthadto admonishMr.
28 Coughlinto quitarguingthepointandreiteratethattheexhibithadbeenadmitted.
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Mr. Coughlinfiled anAnswerandCounterclaimon Ms.Joshi'sbehalfthat
includedallegationsunsupportedby law;andfiled anOppositionto therequestfor
returnofMr.Joshi'spassportwithoutanyfactualorlegalbasis. Further,attrial,Mr.
Coughlinpresentedalmostno evidencetosupportMs.Joshi'srequestsandclaims.
ThemosttroublingaspectofthiscasewasMr. Coughlin'srude,sarcasticand
disrespectfulpresentationattrial;Mr. Coughlin'sinabilityto understandabalancesheet;
hisfailuretoconductdiscovery;andhis lack ofknowledgewithregardto the rulesof
evidenceandtrialprocedure. Allofthiswascompoundedwithacontinuously
antagonisticpresentationofthecase thatresultedinashiftfromafairlysimpledivorce
case toacontentiousdivorcetriallastinganexcessiveamountoftime.
For allthesereasons,theCourtfindsthatMr. Coughlin'spresentationofthecase
andargumentsinsupportthereofto be unfoundedinfact, unwarrantedby existinglaw,
unreasonable,andvexatiousthroughoutthisentireproceeding.
Basedupontheforegoing,Mr.Springgate'srequestthatMr. Coughlinpersonally
payMr.Joshi4.15hoursattherateof$225perhourfor thecostofthetrialisGRANTED.
Mr.Coughlinshallsubmitacheckto Mr.Joshi intheamountof$934within30daysof
thisOrder.
5. PreparationoftheDecree-
Mr. Springgateshallpreparethedecreeofdivorceconsistentwiththis
memorandumdecision. Mr. Springgateshalltenderhis proposeddecreetoMr.
Coughlin,pursuanttoWDCR9,within20daysfromthedateofthisorder.
GOODCAUSEAPPEARING,IT ISSOORDERED.
Dated: April 2009. ..;/ /7

DISTRICTJUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Pursuantto NRCP5(b),IcertifythatIamanemployeeofthe SecondJudicial
DistrictCourt,andthatonthe dayofApril,2009,Ielectronicallyfiled the foregoing
withthe ClerkoftheCourtSystemwhichwillsendanoticeofelectronicfilingto the
following:
Document: ORDER AFTERTRIAL
JOHNP.SPRINGGATEESQ
ZACHARYB.COUGHLINESQ

AdministrativeAssistant
14

Request for Reconsideration - 1
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Code 2490
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
299 S. Arlington Ave
Bar No.: 9473
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Attorney for Zach Coughlin

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
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)

Dept. 14

REQUEST FOR ADJUSTMENT OF FILING DATE OR EXTENSION OF TIME
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq., on behalf of himself with respect to the personally
liability for attorneys fees pursuant to NRS 7.085. Mr. Coughlin attempted to timely file a
Request for Reconsideration on eFile, however, a technical deficiency regarding the signature
line resulted in a rejection of the filing. Annie of the filing office communicated this to Mr.
Coughlin on April 29
th
, 2009, and indicated it required a refilling (775 328 3112 is Annie contact
number).
Dated this 29
th
day of April, 2009
/sig/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

This watermark does not appear in the registered version - http://www.clicktoconvert.com
F I L E D
Electronically
04-29-2009:04:48:38 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND MAILING
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that I am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq. and that on
the 27
th
day of April, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the within
REQUEST FOR ADJUSTMENT OF FILING DATE OR EXTENSION OF TIME, fully
addressed to:
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ
203 S. Arlington Ave.
Reno, NV 89501


The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number of any person.

Dated this 29
th
Day of April, 2009

Melissa Ulloa /sig/
Melissa Ulloa
Agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq.


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Code 2490
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Bar No.: 9473
Reno, NV 89501
775 338 8118
Attorney of Record for Joshi Bharti*

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIVISION OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
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Dept. 14

REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION; REQUEST FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO
RESPOND
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq., on behalf of himself with respect to the personally
liability for attorneys fees pursuant to NRS 7.085, and commenting to the Court in regard to his
representation of the Defendant, Joshi Bharti, and moves the Court to Reconsider the Order After
Trial it entered and served electronically on April 13
th
, 2009. This motion is made and based
upon the attached memorandum of points and authorities and all the papers and pleadings on file
in this action.

F I L E D
Electronically
04-30-2009:03:35:14 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court

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(Please Note: Mr. Coughlin attempted a to timely file this Request on eFile, however, a technical
deficiency regarding the signature line resulted in a rejection of the filing, communicated to Mr.
Coughlin on April 29
th
, 2009, and required a refilling after being informed of the problem by
Annie at the filing office (775 328 3112 is Annie contact number).
Dated this 27
th
day of April, 2009
/sig/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

The Order Requiring Attorney to Personally Pay Opposing Counsels Legal Fees Should be
Reconsidered and Set Aside.

Mr. Coughlin wishes to express his sincere and profound respect for this Court and for
opposing counsel John Springgate, Esq. He recognizes the valuable opportunity presented by
the criticisms set forth and is resolved to redouble his efforts in developing along the path of
becoming a consummate professional of the ilk to which Judge Gardner and Mr. Springgate
belong. Mr. Coughlin feels is fair to point out that subsequent to this Trial Mr. Springgate
reached out to Mr. Coughlin and a very productive communiqu resulted which has led to Mr.
Coughlin being fortunate enough to be provided much useful instruction in aid of Mr. Coughlins
journey to, hopefully, one day becoming anywhere near as accomplished and respected a
professional as Mr. Springgate.
*It is important to note at the outset that Mr. Coughlin does not believe he is currently
representing Ms. Joshi. It is Mr. Coughlins understanding that Washoe Legal Services
substituted a different attorney to represent Ms. Joshi henceforth in this case. Mr. Coughlin has

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and intends to continue to make every appropriate attempt to accomplish this transition in a
manner that attends to all matters of concern to Ms. Joshi.
This Court enjoys discretion to award attorney's fees in a divorce action. (See NRS
125.150(3); Love v. Love, 114 Nev. 572, 959 P.2d 523 (1998)). Also, pursuant to NRS
18.010(2)(b), the court has authority to order attorney's fees "when the court finds that
the...defense of the opposing party was brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to
harass the prevailing party." Finally, pursuant to NRS 7.085, if a court finds that an attorney has:
(a) filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such
action or defense is not well- grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by an
argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or (b) unreasonably and
vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State, the court shall
require the attorney personally to pay the additional costs, expenses and attorney's fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
Whether counsel defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State where such
action or defense is not warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the
existing law that is made in good faith?

Should Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half the community credit card debt (for
which her personal property probably could not be used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on
nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent failure on her part to do so could likely not be
used as a proper basis to set off any alimony award received. However, the Courts Order
After Trial points out that Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting
taxes, factoring in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and
set off any alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of
community debt. (Emphasis added). The Courts Order seems to endorse this arrangement as

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fair and acceptable and the Courts statements to Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Joshi at the Settlement
Conference explicitly indicated how well grounded in legal custom this scenario was thought to
be. However, the majority rule in the various states and overwhelming balance of recorded case
law suggests otherwise, sometimes very strongly. Nevada may not have authority directly on
point, though In Re Anders (a bankruptcy case from Nevada) may be.
The court in each of the following cases determined that an offset against an arrearage of
alimony for payments to various third parties on behalf of a former spouse, including tuition and
sums spent in satisfaction of a bank loan or credit card charges, would not be permitted. The
special nature and purpose of the support obligation owed by a divorced spouse to her former
spouse will be a consideration affecting the court's determination of the propriety of an offset in
most instances. For example, in several jurisdictions in which the courts have determined that
the support obligation is a "duty" and not a "debt," it has been held that a setoff of an ordinary
debt should not permitted as a matter of right against the support obligation. It should be noted
that in a few jurisdictions, there is no indication that an offset considered by the court to
retroactively modify the decree will be permitted under any, or at least most, circumstances.
Nevada does not appear to have any reported case law on this issue, as can sometimes be the
case.
Remanding the case for a new trial to determine whether the wife consented to certain
payments to third parties in lieu of alimony arrearages due under a separation agreement, the
court in Lopez v Lopez (1980, App) 125 Ariz. 309, 609 P2d 579, observed that support
payments, whether for the wife's or child's support, are to be disbursed by the supported spouse
as she sees fit, and the supporting spouse ordinarily is not entitled to credits against past-due
support for monies that he paid to third parties on his own accord and without her consent.

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The court in Morel v Morel (1982, La App 5th Cir) 425 So 2d 1289, cert den (La) 430 So
2d 99, refused to allow as an offset against delinquent alimony pendente lite and child support
several non-complying expenditures by the husband, including the payment of the children's
tuition, a community debt, when the amount expended could be recovered by him at the time of
the settlement of the marital community, and the payment was not made pursuant to the spouses'
agreement. A request by the wife that the husband make such payments during a later time
period was found irrelevant to the instant indirect payments.
Although apparently agreeing with jurisprudence to the effect that the supported spouse is
entitled to spend support funds as she chooses, and the supporting spouse may not usurp this
right by making payments to others on his own accord, the court in Feazell v Feazell (1984, La
App 3d Cir) 445 So 2d 143, held that the husband's payments to third parties on behalf of his
former wife were not unilateral, but in accordance with the wife's direction and, consequently,
permissible.
Where the wife testified that she used the credit card to "balance out" household expenses
for herself and the children while the couple was separated, the court in Youngberg v Youngberg
(1986, La App 4th Cir) 499 So 2d 329, would not permit an offset against post-divorce
permanent alimony and child support arrearages for one-half of the credit card charges. The
husband had been ordered to pay alimony pendente lite and child support during the period in
which the charges were made, but was current in his payments at that time, and asserted that the
wife made the charges without his permission. The wife maintained that the credit card charges
were for expenses for which the husband was responsible. The court concluded that neither
spouse intended such a credit when the husband paid the credit card account balance, denying the
offset apparently based on the lack of evidence of an agreement between the parties.

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In Gottsegen v Gottsegen (1987, La App 4th Cir) 508 So 2d 162, the court disallowed
credit against past-due permanent alimony for pre-award payments made on veterinarian and
cable television bills when those items could not be considered necessary for the wife's support,
pursuant to La.R.S. 9:310, which provided for the retroactive effect of such awards subject to
credit for any support provided.
Credit card charges for the purchase of luggage and an airline ticket by the wife
immediately prior to separation, which apparently fell to the husband to pay, were not offset
against arrears in alimony pendente lite by the court in Rauch v Rauch (1988, La App 5th Cir)
535 So 2d 1317, when the husband's claim was not "liquidated" within the meaning of LSA-C.C.
art. 1893, the statutory setoff provision.
Although affirming the lower court's postponement of a decision respecting the husband's
right to credit until the divorce trial because this aspect of the decision was not appealed, the
court in Keff v Keff (1983, 3d Dept) 95 App Div 2d 888, 464 NYS2d 29, remarked that a
judgment requiring the husband to pay the full amount of the claimed arrears in temporary
maintenance and child support would have been appropriate, notwithstanding a claimed setoff
for amounts paid by him for attorney's fees owed by the wife (Ms. Joshi should receive a similar
set off for the fees paid to Mr. Springgate). The court noted that the husband neither moved for
relief of the support order, nor proffered any reason for his neglect, and his unilateral reduction
of support was improper.
The court in Gluck v Gluck (1987, 2d Dept) 134 App Div 2d 237, 520 NYS2d 581,
concluded that a husband's payment of the spouses' credit card bills, apparently prior to divorce,
could not be offset against arrears in (temporary) maintenance and child support owed to his
wife.

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In Bruner v Bruner (1978, La App 2d Cir) 356 So 2d 1101, cert. gr. (La) 358 So 2d 641,
it was held that the trial court erred in allowing a husband credit or an offset against a claimed
arrearage of alimony pendente lite for payments made by him to third parties on his wife's behalf
where the evidence did not show that the payments were made at the request of, or with the
consent of, his wife.
A husband was not entitled to credit against arrears in pendente lite maintenance and
child support for voluntary payments he made to third parties for his wife's and children's
benefit, according to the court in Krantz v Krantz (1991, 2d Dept) 175 App Div 2d 865, 573
NYS 2d 738, on the ground that several of the payments also satisfied the husband's
contractual obligations.
And, in Kerpen v Kerpen (1991, 2d Dept) 172 App Div 2d 496, 567 NYS2d 849, the
court refused to credit a husband with voluntary payments made on behalf of his wife for "club
and other items" toward the sum of money owed by him for maintenance and child support under
a pendente lite order.
Mr. Springgate presented no case law or other legal authority beyond his own
professional opinion as to the legal basis for including such a set off for payments owed to third
party creditors in satisfying a domestic support obligation. Courts universally have embraced
the position that the unique nature or purpose of the support obligation owed to the former
spouse must be considered in any determination as to whether a setoff would be permitted
against that obligation. Mr. Springgate, who provided a thorough exposition in court (that
astutely referenced the Hein and Rodriguez cases) regarding the precedential history of
excluding evidence of the respective fault of the parties in property distribution and also in,
perhaps, an alimony determination, seemingly was unaware of the reasonableness and firm

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grounding in multitudinous precedent for sticking to the position that a debt to a third party
creditor might not be used to properly offset an alimony obligation.
This, so much so that Mr. Springgate felt it reasonable to move for Mr. Coughlin to
personally pay Mr. Joshis legal fees, at least in part, for Mr. Coughlins part in Ms. Joshis
declining to accept the offered settlement. One might wonder whether Mr. Springgates request
for sanctions in that regard was well- grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or by an
argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith, or whether it unreasonably
and vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State.
The court in Palmer v Palmer (1966) 52 Misc 2d 610, 275 NYS2d 978, recognized the
principle that a husband may not set off against unpaid alimony and child support payable to his
wife debts or claims owed to him by her, nor payments made by the husband to third parties for
the benefit of his wife or child without the wife's prior consent that they be instead of the amount
fixed by the matrimonial judgment or order, although in the controversy before the court,
concerning summer camp expenses paid by the husband on behalf of a daughter, the wife waived
the rule. The court added that without consent, indirect payments must be regarded in addition to,
not in lieu of, the support fixed by the court, that is a gift.
The court in Compton v Compton (1987, Tenn. App. Middle Section) No. 86-258-II,
held that a husband could not offset against alimony arrearages bills paid on behalf of his wife
without her request or agreement that the payments were in lieu of alimony, but in making the
payments had conferred to her an "officious benefit." The husband paid less alimony per month
than the amount ordered by the court, but contended that he also paid bills for his wife which
more than offset the deficiency for that period. Refusing to permit the offset against the
deficiency in alimony, the court pointed out that to vary the terms and allow a set off for the

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payment of other bills not included in the decree would subject the courts to a plethora of
such claims, making enforcement of the simplest divorce decree a quagmire for the trial
judge.
The language emphasized immediately above brings up an interesting point. The
Settlement, and ultimately the Order After Trial call for a situation where Ms. Joshi may well
(and it is very likely according to Mr. Springgate) need to ask this Court to have another hearing
in the future should Mr. Joshi discharge any of the debts he has been ordered to pay (or perhaps
even where Ms. Joshi has done so). However, the resolution urged by Ms. Joshis counsel would
arguably be more in line with judicial economy were courts in this State to adopt the majority
rule forbidding the offset of alimony due through payment to third party creditors. To the extent
the case loads in Family Court are so overburdening, having such a clear statement of the law
would obviate the need to have more and more contempt hearings following the discharge of a
supporting spouses obligations in bankruptcy.
Can it be said, considering NRS 7.085, that Mr. Coughlin filed, maintained or defended
a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State and such action or defense [was] not well-
grounded in fact or warranted by existing law or by an argument for changing the existing law
that is made in good faith in the instant case? Mr. Coughlin respectfully urges this Court to
consider the arguments set forth herein for reasons why the sanctions entered could be
reconsidered.
Seemingly, the award of attorneys fees relates, in part, to Mr. Coughlins failing to
counsel his client to accept a settlement offer whereby Ms. Joshi would agree to take $1.00 of
alimony for five years in exchange for Mr. Joshi agreeing to be responsible for about $20,000 of
consumer debt. This is the arrangement contemplated by Siragusa, and it makes sense when

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courts are adjudicating the marital dissolutions of extremely wealthy parties. This is not one of
those situations. This consumer debt was largely incurred on the Mr. Joshis credit cards, to
which Ms. Joshi was not a co-signer or authorized user and was never allowed to examine any
sort of itemized statement of the charges incurred (despite Mr. Coughlins written requests to
opposing counsel and indication that allowing her to do so would further settlement
negotiations). Exhibits A and B (please note that not all such correspondences are immediately
available to Mr. Coughlin given the situation referenced elsewhere in this Motion). Whether the
large balance transfers Mr. Joshi testified to making were made to transfer debt from an account
for which he was the only signatory to one where Ms. Joshi was a co-signatory (and thus could
see her separate property used to satisfy the debt) is certainly a valid point of inquiry.
Mr. Coughlin argued against accepting such a settlement (though he certainly informed
Ms. Joshi that the decision to go to trial was largely hers, but an attempt will be made to veer
away from considering the divergent interests of attorney and client in situations such as these, as
well as the lack of notice constitutional problems associated with NRS 7.085 awards). Mr.
Coughlin anticipated the trial may well result in an alimony award to Ms. Joshi of roughly $500
per month, potentially for over 10 years, when considering that equalizing payments for a
$12,000 yearly income disparity was a good yardstick for a 21 year marriage that produced two
children. This seems particularly true where it would take 12-20 years of payments to get Ms.
Joshi to social security age.
Should Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half the community credit card debt (for
which her personal property probably could not be used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on
nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent failure on her part to do so could likely not be
used as a proper basis to set off any alimony award received. However, the Courts Order

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After Trial points out that Mr. Joshi requested the Court consider his net income after deducting
taxes, factor in the present $600 per month he is presently paying for community debt, and set
off any alimony responsibility by his assumption of an unequal distribution of community
debt. (Emphasis added). Additionally, the Court noted that to protect Ms. Joshi in the event
Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi suggested that the court maintain jurisdiction over the
issue of spousal support for five years.
Indeed at the Settlement Conference (which was conducted the same day as the Trial,
something Mr. Coughlin agreed to in an effort to appease Mr. Joshis counsel stated desire to
encourage judicial economy) the Court seemed to indicated the reasonableness of this settlement
proposal and the jurisdictional $1.00 payment. It was unclear whether any subsequently
increased support obligation over and above the $1.00 set forth in the decree would enjoy
priority over third party creditors should Mr. Joshi file bankruptcy. It is clear that support
obligations enjoy priority in bankruptcy proceedings, it is not as clear whether this priority is
with respect to the original $1.00 per year award, or to any subsequently modified amount.
Like many domestic violence cases, the Settlement offered essentially exerted a good
deal of inappropriate power and control (a la the Duluth model) over Ms. Joshi and her rights
and Mr. Coughlin objected to that and is hopeful others can see why he felt strongly that doing
so was the right thing to do.
The Courts Order after Trial is not sufficiently detailed and specific to support an award
personally requiring counsel to pay opposing sides attorneys fees.

-Requirements of specific findings

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In the following cases, the courts held or recognized that specific findings by the trial
court were required before an attorney could be assessed with his opponent's fees. Major v First
Va. Bank, 97 Md. App 520, 631 A2d 127 (1993). (RICO claim; $25,000 for counsel fees).
In O'Brien v Cseh, (1983, 2d Dist) 148 Cal App 3d 957, 196 Cal Rptr 409 ( 12[b]), the court
found that an order by the trial court assessing attorney fees against counsel and giving only
"good cause appearing" as a reason for the sanction failed to meet the statutory requirement of a
detailed recital of the circumstances justifying the imposition of sanctions.
The court reversed an award of fees against an attorney that was imposed by the trial
court without any finding as to the actual costs incurred by the opposing parties, in City of El
Monte v Takei, (1984, 2d Dist) 158 Cal App 3d 244, 204 Cal Rptr 559 ( 9[a]). The case was
remanded for a hearing to determine reasonable expenses and counsel fees, since under the
applicable court rules the sanctions were limited to that amount.
If Mr. Joshis bare and inconsistent assertions in court regarding the various debts he
sought this Court to divide constitutes sufficient evidence for the court a question arises. Why
is this proof deemed sufficient with regard to the evidence presented where, when Ms. Joshis
points of contention are backed by similar evidence (testimony and financial declarations), the
court takes issue with the lack of evidence presented? Mr. Coughlin recognizes the level of skill
Mr. Springgate displays in court, when combined with the far superior reputation amongst his
peers in legal circles that Mr. Springgate enjoys arguably entitles Mr. Springgate the benefit of
the doubt.
Trial court abused its discretion in imposing a monetary sanction on the ground of failure
to perform a reasonable investigation before filing claims; no evidence was presented at the
sanctions hearing, and the sanctions order did not state that the trial court considered evidence.

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Russell v. McBride Elec., Inc., 2006 Tex. App. LEXIS 2022 (Tex. App. Dallas Mar. 16 2006).
Administrative findings and decision were not supported by substantial evidence and the record
did not demonstrate a reasonable basis for the ALJ's refusal to set aside the default order;
however, the record did not demonstrate that the department's motion for new trial was a
pleading frivolously presented for an improper purpose, unwarranted by existing law, and
without evidentiary support, and there was no showing that the motion was filed in bad faith to
support an award of attorney's fees. Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Frieda, 112 S.W.3d 768, 2003
Tex. App. LEXIS 6604 (Tex. App. Beaumont 2003). In a lawyer's action to impose sanctions
against another lawyer, the sanctions were reversed as the stated bases for the sanction were
violations of Tex. Civ. Pac. & Rem. Code Ann. chs. 9, 10 and Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; both the lack of
evidence for the amount of necessary attorney's fees and the failure of the trial court to
demonstrate either the rationale for the sanction imposed or that a lesser sanction would have
sufficed, required a remand. Hemphill v. Hummel, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 5799 (Tex. App.
Corpus Christi July 31 2008). In a case where a mother was trying to recover real property from
her daughter, sanctions were properly not awarded because there was some evidence supporting
the daughter's counterclaims for breach of contract and fraud; the mother did not disprove
allegations made by the daughter that she and her husband had paid part of the cost of a septic
system, as well as the taxes on the property. Delahoussaye v. Kana, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS
8561 (Tex. App. Houston 1st Dist. Nov. 13 2008).
In Charles v Charles, (1986, Dist Col App) 505 A2d 462 ( 4[a]), the court reversed an
assessment of attorney fees against an attorney, where the trial court had failed to make a
specific finding of bad faith. The court stated that it is within the inherent authority of trial
courts to assess attorney fees against an attorney who has acted in bad faith, if the sanction is

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imposed after fair notice and an opportunity for a hearing on the record. But although counsel's
conduct in this case made an assessment of fees appropriate, and there had been fair notice
and a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for attorney fees, the court decided that the absence of
a specific finding of bad faith required reversal and remand for a new hearing directed to that
issue.
The Courts Order after Trial in the Joshi divorce matter did not contain any language
related to this intent question. This Order failed to specify whether the court found counsels
actions to exhibit bad faith. As such the sanction should not be upheld as it is not sufficiently
detailed and specific.
Before a proper finding of a Frivolous claim may be made under a statute authorizing fee
awards against attorneys on that basis, it is necessary for the trial court to find that the
attorney knew that the action was without any reasonable basis in law and could not be
supported by a good- faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,
held the court, in Radlein v Industrial Fire & Casualty Ins. Co., (1984) 117 Wis. 2d 605, 345
NW2d 874. The court stated a two-pronged test for determining an attorney's responsibility in
sanctions for commencing a Frivolous action: first, is the law ready for an extension,
modification, or reversal; and if not, then second, was the argument for such change made in
good faith even though not successful. Frivolous action claims are an especially delicate area,
said the court, since the ingenuity, foresightedness, and competency of the bar should be
encouraged and not stifled.
The Courts Order After Trial in the case at bar should reconsider any finding that
counsel put forth an action that was without basis in law (it is not entirely clear what NRS 7.085
contemplates necessary with respect to the intent issue). Mr. Coughlin mentioned the Siragusa

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and Allen opinions in court and referenced the American Law Reports covering the pertinent
issues underlying the dispute with regard to the appropriateness of the settlement discussed. The
ALRs counsel was referring to are Debts for alimony, maintenance, and support as
exceptions to bankruptcy discharge, under 523(a)(5) of Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (11
U.S.C.A. 523(a)(5)), 69 A.L.R. Fed. 403; Spouse's right to set off debt owed by other
spouse against accrued spousal or child support payments, 11 A.L.R.5th 259 (Originally
published in 1993); Change in financial condition or needs of husband or wife as ground for
modification of decree for alimony or maintenance, 18 A.L.R.2d 10 (Originally published in
1951) .
In a post-divorce proceeding, the court did not err in modifying husband's alimony
obligation by continuing it beyond term called for in decree where original decree called for
husband to make alimony payments to wife of $3,000 per month for sixty months, where decree
also required husband to pay wife $1.250 million over fifteen years for her share of community
property interest in husband's medical practice, where husband fell behind in his payments and
his property settlement obligation was later discharged in bankruptcy although his alimony
obligation was not, where court properly considered discharged obligation as "changed
circumstance" justifying modification in that discharge of obligation had changed both husband's
and wife's financial circumstances, and where modification of alimony award based upon
discharged property settlement obligation did not re-create debt discharged under federal
bankruptcy laws. Siragusa v Siragusa, 108 Nev 987, 843 P2d 807, CCH Bankr L Rptr 75035
(1992); In re Siragusa, 27 F.3d 406, 31 Collier Bankr.Cas.2d 890, Bankr. L. Rep. P 75,965,
C.A.9 (Nev.), June 20, 1994 (NO. 92-16788).

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There is no explicit relation of debt allocation and community property distributions to
the spouses. The Nevada statutes do not mandate any particular order of decision among child
support, spousal support, property division, or debt allocation. This has led to a certain amount of
confusion as judges attempt to achieve equity through a holistic approach to deciding all issues
in the case. (Marshall Willick, Esq. article at http://www.willicklawgroup.com/get_file/id=283).
The Nevada Supreme Court has opined that where a party does not pay the debts that
were supposed to be paid, that party is not entitled to the property share that was awarded based
on anticipation of such payment. Allen v. Allen, 112 Nev. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Adv. Opn. No.
149, Oct. 22, 1996). The Nevada Supreme Court has likewise allowed the reopening of alimony
to the party to whom a debt fell because the other party was supposed to pay that debt but failed
to do so. Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d 390 (1992). What is still lacking, however,
is any clear guideposts as to which party should have been allocated what debt to begin with.
The Nevada case law, however, appears to presume that the debt terms set out in the decree are
absolute, and that other terms, such as alimony (See Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d
390 (1992)), or property division (See Allen v. Allen, 112 Nev. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Adv. Opn.
No. 149, Oct. 22, 1996)), will be amended to enforce the debt division. In the interests of
judicial economy it is important to note that, while there is no significant appellate authority on
these subjects, costly proceedings in the lower courts to enforce debt payment terms by less
drastic means (primarily, contempt sanctions) are common.
To the extent that the Courts sanctions in the case at bar were motivated by a concern for
judicial economy, fashioning a decree that will potentially see these parties returning to court to
litigate costly contempt proceedings should Mr. Joshi (or perhaps Ms. Joshi, though much case

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law is presented here that would argue against it) discharge his various debts in bankruptcy
seems ill advised.
In Nevada, except for real estate and jointly- managed businesses, it appears that both
spouses have free reign to incur debt for which the community is responsible. It also seems
rather clear that the creditors of such community debt are unaffected by anything in a divorce
decree from pursuing either of the parties for repayment. See Marine Midland Bank v.
Monroe, 104 Nev. 307, 756 P.2d 1193 (1988) (bank is free to pursue wife for delinquent joint
credit card debt despite divorce courts order for husband to pay such debt). It is typically very
difficult to pursue a spouse who is not a cosigner with respect to using that spouses separate
property covers any community debt.
In Martin v. Martin, 108 Nev. 384, 832 P.2d 390 (1992), an August 1988 divorce decree
ordered child support and for the husband to pay two Visa accounts. He filed bankruptcy in
September, and had them discharged in April of 1989. The wife filed a motion for spousal
support; after an evidentiary hearing, the lower court found that the debt payment terms were
characterized as being in the nature of alimony, maintenance and support and so ordered
support in an amount sufficient to repay wife for credit debts now falling to her. On appeal, the
Nevada Supreme Court affirmed that in this case the hold harmless provisions qualified as
maintenance or support, since court found that without it the spouse would be inadequately
supported. The husbands assumption of debt was tied to an agreement for lower child support,
and when he breached the agreement, he left her inadequately supported. While discharge was
proper, he could not discharge obligations arising out of the decree. The appellate court
apparently did not address timeliness question of how wife could file a motion for alimony
nearly a year after the divorce was final (local rules permit only six months to modify a decree

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under NRCP60(b)), but there may have been additional procedural facts not recited in the
opinion.
In Allen v. Allen, the husband and wife entered into an oral property settlement; the wife
waived child support, and the husband agreed to pay certain debts and pay $16,250.00 to the
wife to equalize the division of community property. 112 Nev. ___, ___ P.2d ___ (Adv. Opn.
No. 149, Oct. 22, 1996). The agreement was made during a settlement conference held by the
district court judge, but was not reduced to writing for a year, when the court entered a divorce
decree nunc pro tunc adopting the agreement. In the interim, the husband filed bankruptcy, and
was released from most of the financial obligations. The wife claimed that the husband used
the bankruptcy to defraud her out of her share of the community property and that because of the
bankruptcy there was a failure to equalize the division of community property as intended. The
wife moved to set aside the decree, which was denied by the district court as barred by federal
law.
The Supreme Court, noting that the district court knew all these facts, expressed no
understanding of why the district court would enter the decree in the first place, but held that in
any event, it was error to refuse to set it aside. Noting its holding in Siragusa v. Siragusa (108
Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992)), the Court again held that the lower court could consider the
effect of the husbands bankruptcy upon the community and the rights of the parties, but this is
not to say the state court would be interfering in any way with the bankruptcy courts decree.
The Court expressly rejected the husbands assertion that the wifes fraud claim was waived
under 11 U.S.C. 524 because she failed to file a complaint in the bankruptcy action. Finally,
the Court concluded that even aside from the question of fraud, the decree entered was inherently
unfair and should be set aside: Under no circumstances, bankruptcy or no bankruptcy, should

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one party to a divorce be allowed to take all of the benefits of the divorce settlement and leave
the other party at the disadvantage suffered by the wife in the present case. Although some of
these comments may be dicta, Allen provides authority for the proposition that whenever a
bankruptcy has an effect upon the community and the rights of the parties, a motion can be
entertained to ameliorate that effect.
However, it appears that an intervening bankruptcy has no effect on the liability of
the non-custodian for child support arrears, or the ability of the custodian to collect them.
In In Re Anders, No. BK-S-91-24783-LBR (Bk. Ct., D. Nev., Mar. 10, 1993), the court held that
a former wife who declares chapter seven bankruptcy could retain a child support arrears
judgment (granted after she filed bankruptcy) despite the bankruptcy. The court held that child
support is a property interest belonging to the child and the custodian merely has a right to
enforce the childs property interest. The 11 U.S.C. 541(b) exception from the property of the
bankruptcy estate for powers which are exercisable solely for the benefit of another apply to
child support by analogy. This argument should arguably be expanded to include the duty
associated with other support obligations, such as alimony, ahead of the debt to monolithic third
party multi- national credit card and insurance companies being rewarded with trillions of dollars
in bailouts whilst throwing luxury executive getaways weekend bashes.
The proposition supported by In Re Anders speaks to a situation addressed at trial in the
case at bar. What should or would happen if Ms. Joshi was granted alimony and subsequently
moved to discharge her share of the community debt in bankruptcy or simply just failed to pay
these debts (or, as Mr. Springgate suggested, if she was forced into bankruptcy)? In Re Anders
and the large number of cases representing persuasive authority (all non-Nevada and non-U.S.
Supreme Court cases are cited herein merely as persuasive authority, of course) cited

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elsewhere in this motion support the position that a support obligation (alimony too, not just
child support) should be upheld even where the supported party has failed to live up to the debt
distribution terms of a Courts divorce decree. Following this rule would cut down on the costly
contempt proceedings that Mr. Springgate suggested he may bring should Ms. Joshi be granted
alimony and fail to pay her share of the debt distribution (something that case law from Nevada,
In re Anders arguably bars).
Indeed, the very existence of this majority rule would seem to vitiate Mr. Springgates
argument that counsels actions were vexatious in regard to the position counsel argued on behalf
of Ms. Joshi at trial. Mr. Coughlin stated in court at trial that the public policy underlying
alimony and other support obligations did not warrant placing the interests of behemoth multi-
national credit card conglomerates ahead of those of the citizens of Nevada who have been
granted an alimony award by the courts of this state. Perhaps it is for that reason that, at one
point during trial, Mr. Springgate announced to the Court that he could basically see the logic in
the position opposing counsel was taking and could understand why one would make the
argument. Mr. Springgates Trial Statement mentions that this probably would seem like an
alimony case to most people. Mr. Springgate moved for attorneys fees to be personally assessed
against opposing counsel at the conclusion of trial, a point at which Mr. Springgate for the first
time broached the subject of moving for such personally liability for fees against opposing
counsel. Clearly the lack of notice in this regard is troubling from a constitutional law
perspective.
One might ask how Mr. Springgate, in making such a motion (never mind presenting a
divergence of interests between opposing counsel and opposing counsels client) has not himself
violated NRS 7.085. Can one really seek personally liability for fees, alleging that opposing

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counsel has filed, maintained or defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State
and such action or defense is not well- grounded in fact or is not warranted by existing law or by
an argument for changing the existing law that is made in good faith; or unreasonably and
vexatiously extended a civil action or proceeding before any court in this State when one has
plainly announced in open court that they actually see the validity of opposing counsels
position?
This brings up the question of a legal services attorney who is not charging the client for
his services asking the court to award attorneys fees to his client. This Courts Order After Trial
perhaps takes issue with such a request, noting that Ms. Joshi requests reasonable attorney's fees
be paid to Washoe Legal Services for the services of Mr. CoughlinThe Court notes the
following information has been provided and has been taken into consideration on this issue: On
July 18, 2008, Mr. Coughlin filed a Statement of Legal Aid Representation which states
Defendant is receiving "free legal assistance" from Washoe Legal Services pursuant to NRS
12.015. However, Miller v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (September 22, 2005) the
Nevada Supreme Court concluded that a party is not precluded from recovering attorney fees
solely because his or her counsel served in a pro bono capacity. While Nevada law has been
silent on this issue, many courts have concluded that an award of attorney fees is proper, even
when a party is represented without fee by a nonprofit legal services organization. There exist
many decisions to support such a ruling: Martin v. Tate, 492 A.2d 270, 274 (D.C. 1985); In re
Marriage of Brockett, 474 N.E.2d 754, 756 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984); Butler v. Butler, 376 So. 2d 287,
287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); In re Marriage of Gaddis, 632 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982); Ferrigno v. Ferrigno, 279 A.2d 141, 142 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971); Sellers v.
Wollman, 510 F.2d 119, 123 (5thCir. 1975) (holding that it is proper to award attorney fees to

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legal aid society in Truth- in-Lending Act action); Folsom v. Butte County Assn of
Governments, 652 P.2d 437, 447 n.26 (Cal. 1982) (concluding that an attorney fee award is
proper to a legal service organization in a suit to enforce a public transportation law).
In addition to the various state courts, the United States Supreme Court has concluded
that an award of attorney fees to a nonprofit legal services organization is to be calculated
according to the prevailing market rate, stating that Congress did not intend the calculation of fee
awards to vary depending on whether plaintiff was represented by private counsel or by a
nonprofit legal services organization. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 894 (1984).
The Courts Order in Joshi arguably does not comply with the dictates set forth in Miller
v. Wilfong, and thus should not stand. Second, while it is within the trial courts discretion to
determine the reasonable amount of attorney fees under a statute or rule, in exercising that
discretion, the court must evaluate the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National
Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). The Nevada Supreme Court noted that under
Brunzell, when courts determine the appropriate fee to award in civil cases, they must consider
various factors, including the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work
performed, the work actually performed by the attorney, and the result obtained. We take this
opportunity to clarify our jurisprudence in family law cases to require trial courts to evaluate the
Brunzell factors when deciding attorney fee awards. Id. at 349. (Emphasis added).
Additionally, the Nevada Supreme Court ruled in Wright v. Osburn, that family law trial
courts must also consider the disparity in income of the parties when awarding fees. 114 Nev.
1367, 1370, 970 P.2d 1071, 1073 (1998). The Court in Miller v. Wilfong clarifies the Wright
language, noting that parties seeking attorney fees in family law cases must support their fee
request with affidavits or other evidence that meets the factors in Brunzell and Wright. Miller

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v. Wilfong, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (September 22, 2005). Ms. Joshis counsel submitted
such in affidavit, seeking a fee waiver. The Courts Order notes that Mr. Coughlin filed a
Statement of Legal Aid Representation which states Defendant is receiving "free legal
assistance" from Washoe Legal Services pursuant to NRS 12.015.
Mr. Joshi seemingly did not produce the required materials pursuant to the language in
the cases cited above, nor did the Courts Order set forth an application of specific elements
required in an award of attorneys fees. The result obtained in this case would not seem to argue
on favor of an award of attorneys fees. Mr. Joshi would not seem to be able to argue that he
was the prevailing party where he has been ordered solely responsible for the vast majority of
community debt. Pursuant to NRS 125.150(1)(b) and Putterman v. Putterman, 113 Nev. 606,
939 P.2d 1047 (1997), in granting a divorce, the Court shall ensure an equal disposition of the
community estate, absent compelling reasons justifying an unequal distribution. The Court must
make written findings as to why such a division is appropriate. The Courts Order here notes
that Mr. Joshi has likely incurred an unequal distribution of the community debt in this case.
The Court finds his testimonial acquiescence at trial to take on this debt is a compelling reason to
make an unequal distribution of the community debt.
It is not clear to Ms. Joshis counsel that any such testimonial acquiescence on Mr.
Joshis part took place at trial. Mr. Joshis counsel may have broached a suggested disposition,
though it is not clear to Mr. Coughlin how this differs from discussing settlement negotiations at
trial. Typically statements against interest made during settlement negotiations are not
admissible. If such acquiescence did take place at trial, then why would Mr. Springgate devote
the majority of the Trials four and a quarter hours running time to entering credit card balance
statements (devoid of itemization and only representing very recent balances), one after another?

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Mr. Springgates case took over three hours to conclude. By that time, Mr. Coughlin felt forced
to present a much shorter case on Ms. Joshis behalf, resulting on only approximately forty
minutes being devoted to Ms. Joshis presentation. This was a particular disadvantage with
respect to the presentation of evidence in support of an alimony award. The Court found a lack
of factual support for an award of alimony to be one of these reasons supporting awarding
sanctions. Perhaps, Mr. Springgate could have sent some discovery of his own to speed up that
part of the Trial in the form of Requests for Admissions. Mr. Coughlin does not recall Mr.
Springgate sending any discovery requests, though access to the file would certainly enable Mr.
Coughlin to verify this to be the case. Mr. Springgate did not do this. Indeed, there was a real
paucity of discovery requests sent out by Mr. Springgate, though the Court spent much of its
opinion on the sparseness of discovery sent out by the non- moving party. Additionally, though
no formal Offers of Judgment appears to have been exchanged between these parties, NRCP
68(e) and NRS 17.115(3) makes offers during settlement negotiations inadmissible.
No evidence was presented at trial or cited in the Courts Order as to the qualities of the
advocate, the character and difficulty of the work performed, or the work actually performed by
the attorney. The Courts Order did make one mention of the difficulty of the work performed
here, pointing out that issues the Court took with Mr. Coughlins counsel were compounded
with a continuously antagonistic presentation of the case that resulted in a shift from a fairly
simple divorce case to a contentious divorce trial lasting an excessive amount of time.
(Emphasis added). The Court viewed this as a simple divorce case in its bare essence. The court
viewed a trial that lasted 4.15 hours to have taken an excessive amount of time.
Ms. Joshi has paid taxes during her adult life, taxes which fund the administration of
justice. If, where, as here, there are genuine disputes with regard to how the law should be

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applied, and Ms. Joshis position is supported by a vast body of reported case law (though,
admittedly, Mr. Coughlins Trial Statement was wholly insufficient in setting out the authority in
support of the position taken at trial and it is inappropriate to essentially put the Court in the
position at trial of knowing every arcane point of law that might come up), and the opposing side
has refused to honor requests (See Exhibit A and Exhibit B) to produce proof in support of
various points of contention (i.e., support for whether Mr. Joshi had made efforts to track down
the womans wealth, sufficient documentation to prove two personal loans totaling over $11,000,
proof that his surgery was necessary, itemized statements proving that his incongruously high
amount of credit card debt was all incurred for community purposes in a marriage where
expenses were essentially shared and paid for out of each spouses respective personal credit
accounts), the trial length in the present case does not appear excessive. 4.15 hours for a
Divorce Trial stemming from a 21 year marriage that produced two children, where a short
Settlement Conference was conducted the same day and immediately preceding the beginning of
the Trial, would not seem to be so excessive, especially in an age where some partys divorce
trials last several days or weeks.
Indeed, some parties Divorce Settlement Conferences, whether singular or multiple, last
longer than this combined Settlement Conference/Trial did. Ms. Joshis counsel chose not to
penalize Ms. Joshi by accepting a settlement where the only legal precedent offered in support of
the positions it contained was the esteemed opinion of opposing counsel as to the imminent
reasonableness of the offer on the table, along with Mr. Joshis counsel mentioning perhaps one
case where jurisdiction was reserved to increase alimony where a millionaire physician had
offered to cover some debts along with agreeing to a very, very large cash payout (in the
millions) to the spouse he was pledging to support. Mr. Coughlin recognizes the deficiencies in

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his own presentation and admits that a thoroughly briefed Trial Statement or Settlement
Conference Statement by Mr. Coughlin likely would have gone a long way towards determining
whether the Court believed the issues related to using third party debts as a set off for alimony
where a worthy use of the Courts limited resources and in line with the concerns for judicial
economy that all competent practitioners need to keep foremost in their minds. Regarding
Siragusa, such a case simply does not resonate with someone in Ms. Joshis set of circumstances.
Regardless, such a case says one could proceed with such a settlement arrangement (dependent
upon the chance to come back to court to litigate contempt proceedings in the future and possibly
be put in a better position as a result), it does not say that one must or risk having ones attorney
face the peril of being personally responsible for opposing counsels attorneys fees.
The Courts Order did not compare the result obtained at trial to the settlement discussed,
nor was any exposition given to the relative merits of either during the Settlement Conference,
save a very strong and prolonged suggestion to accept the settlement both by the Court and
opposing counsel. The Courts Order did not set forth anything that seemed to evaluate the
Brunzell factors when deciding attorney fee awards. Miller at 349. Nor did the Court address
the proviso in Wright that family law trial courts must also consider the disparity in income of
the parties when awarding fees (Id. at 1370), and Miller that parties seeking attorney fees in
family law cases must support their fee request with affidavits or other evidence that meets the
factors in Brunzell and Wright. Mr. Joshi did not appear to submit such an affidavit, unless one
considers his Financial Declaration to suffice. The parties respective Financial Affidavits
indicate that Mr. Joshi makes approximately $12,000 more per year than Ms. Joshi. When Ms.
Joshis requests were supported only by her testimony and Financial Declaration on file the
Court took the view that the evidence was so little so as to support sanctions against Ms. Joshis

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attorney. Further, the Courts Pre-Trial Order mandates that Mr. Joshi file an updated Financial
Declaration wherein he swears, under penalty of perjury that his recent reduction in income is
based in fact.
In another case, the trial court did not satisfy requirements for exercising its inherent
authority to impose attorney fees against an attorney for bad faith conduct when it ordered
husband's counsel to remit one half of his fees received to wife's counsel, where trial court did
not permit husband's counsel to present witnesses or other Evidence in his defense, trial court did
not make an express finding of bad faith or findings justifying the relief ordered, and order did
not show how the fees awarded directly related to the fees incurred as a result of the alleged bad
faith conduct by husband's counsel. Finol v. Finol, 912 So. 2d 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist.
2005), related reference, 2005 WL 2373889 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 2005) and reh'g denied,
(Nov. 7, 2005).
Another court ruled that petitioner's request for costs and expenses of litigation, including
attorney fees, did not provide notice to respondent's attorney that she could be held liable for
attorney fees under statute that awarded fees in situations where an attorney brought or defended
an action that lacked substantial justification; there was no motion requesting attorney fees from
attorney, there was no mention that the trial court was considering an award against attorney, and
the notice of the hearing contained no reference to the statute that awarded fees against attorneys
for bringing or defending an action that lacked substantial justification or to the possibility that
attorney could be assessed attorney fees for her conduct; overruling Cohen v. Feldman, 219
Ga.App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237. West's Ga.Code Ann. 9-15-14(b). Williams v. Cooper, 625
S.E.2d 754 (Ga. 2006). See Kukui Nuts of Hawaii, Inc. v R. Baird & Co., (1990, Hawaii App)
789 P2d 501, 8[a].

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At trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr. Coughlin had conducted no discovery in
this case. To the extent that discovery can exist outside of asking Mr. Joshi to produce something
via a Request for Production or the like, it is not clear how Mr. Springgate is able to be certain
with regard to what Ms. Joshis counsel did or did not do with respect to conducting discovery.
Mr. Springgate did not appear to send Ms. Joshi any Interrogatories, Request for Productions, or
Request for Admissions, nor did he take anyones deposition. Mr. Coughlin would need access
to the file to determine this with surety, however eFlex and CourtConnect provide no indication
that any was sent out. Ms. Joshis counsel did send Mr. Springgate several written
correspondences suggesting documentation that Mr. Joshi could produce in an effort to speed
these parties along towards settlement.
Whether Mr. Coughlin defended a civil action or proceeding in any court in this State
where such action or defense is not well-grounded in fact?

The Courts Order After Trial points out that, at trial, Mr. Springgate stated that Mr.
Coughlin had conducted no discovery in this case. Apparently Mr. Springgate did not mention
the attached written correspondence wherein Mr. Coughlin suggested a multitude of documents
that Mr. Joshi could provide if he sought to expedite settlement, including a request for
documentation that would help establish that the debts Mr. Joshi claims were exclusively for the
benefit of the community and the existence of a valid medical debt incurred out of necessity.
Exhibit A. Further Mr. Coughlin requested documentation from Mr. Joshi related to three of
the car loans involving these parties and the respective title holders for each of these vehicles.
Exhibit B. Additionally, Mr. Coughlin sent Mr. Joshi written correspondence requesting that
Mr. Joshi provide some indication of what he meant on his Financial Declaration when he listed
jewelry in a Wells Fargo safe deposit box and India Locker safe deposit box. Exhibit B. This

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written request asked that Mr. Joshi provide information related to the whereabouts of this
jewelry, what a description of this jewelry would entail, and what happened to this jewelry.
The Court also notes, in explaining its decision to personally charge this legal aid
attorney with the legal fees of the accused perpetuator of domestic violence, that Mr. Coughlin
failed to present one documentary piece of evidence at trial on behalf of Ms. Joshi's claims.
This is not so, Mr. Coughlin presented Mr. Joshis own Financial Declaration, as well as that of
Ms. Joshi, both of which clearly supported the claim for alimony in establishing at the least a
$12,000 yearly disparity in the parties respective incomes. Nonetheless, there does not seem to
exist any legal precedent supporting the implication that failing to produce some specific form or
type of evidence (here documentary evidence is mentioned) plays some role in a proper
application of NRS 7.085. Were this the case, attorneys could arguably be told they violated
NRS 7.085 for failing to conduct even one deposition, or send out one request for admission, etc.
Such an arbitrary interpretation of NRS 7.085 simply should not stand when considering the
potentially devastating policy implications and chilling effect on attorneys ability to zealously
advocate for their clients. Were this application upheld it would perhaps encourage attorneys to
further over utilize the sometimes ineffective and inefficient practice documentary discovery has
become in so many instances. This is not meant to suggest that attorneys should not be gravely
concerned with discovering all items necessary to protect their clients interests to the fullest, but
rather, to merely consider what is the judicious use of discovery techniques.
Indeed, discovery is hopefully conducted to further some legitimate objective, rather than
to satisfy some perceived need to send out what may be unnecessary and overly burdensome
discovery requests in an attempt to avoid sanctions that may later arise. This situation arises, by
analogy, in modern medicine, where, in some cases, the practice of the day is to order every

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diagnostic test known to science, no matter how costly and ineffective is and without regard to
whether any intelligence was actually utilized in making the decision to order such a test,
whether or not some analysis and deduction could obviate the need to make such arrangements.
Further some people can afford more discovery than others, and many legal services attorneys
would likely attest to the need to make do with less when representing domestic violence
victims.
With respect to whether the position taken by Mr. Coughlin and Ms. Joshi was supported
by the facts, Mr. Joshis own admission at trial and the partys financial declarations prove the
income disparity necessary to support any alimony award. The undisputed length of the
marriage, 21 years (included in the Courts Findings of Fact), certainly argues in favor of an
alimony award and is, pursuant to NRS 125.150(8) (and the six Sprenger factors,), among the
eleven (11) factors the court shall consider in awarding alimony. The fact that Ms. Joshi worked
fewer hours than Mr. Joshi, largely to enable her to be the childrens primary caregiver,
particularly in the childrens younger years, similarly argues for an alimony award and is
included among these factors.
Ms. Joshis counsel feels strongly that existing law did indeed warrant the position taken
at trial. The court also took some issue with Ms. Joshis counsels repeated objections to
opposing counsel entering exhibits into evidence without providing a copy to opposing counsel
at the time they were being introduced (indicating that the documents were produced at some
earlier stage of the litigation). However, the courts own Pre- Trial Order indicated that should
more than ten exhibits be used at trial, the introducing party is to provide opposing counsel with
copies that are bound, tabbed, and indexed. It is possible more than ten exhibits were
introduced into evidence. Mr. Coughlin has not been afforded sufficient opportunity to review

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the tape of the trial to determine exactly how many exhibits were offered. Nonetheless the Court
can amend the Pre-Trial Order at any time and in any way necessary.
The Courts Order finds that the parties presently earn approximately the same amount,
Ms. Joshi earns $2,458 per month and Mr. Joshi earned approximately $3,125 per month
in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009 and has filed for unemployment
benefits the beginning of March 2009. The Court may have failed to include both jobs Mr.
Joshi worked in 2008 in assessing the income disparity of the parties. This may have been done
on purpose given Mr. Joshis testimony regarding the reduction in hours offered by his employer,
though that is not clear. Mr. Joshi violated the rules set forth in the Courts Pre-Trial Order by
failing to submit and updated Financial Declaration upon his claim of substantially changed
circumstances bearing on any potential alimony liability. Ms. Joshis counsels experience is
that an inordinately high percentage of litigants experience just such a set of circumstances
immediately prior to trial. The Courts Order After Trial states that Mr. Joshi earned
approximately $3,125 per month in 2008, but testified he is working substantially less in 2009
and has filed for unemployment benefits the beginning of March 2009.
However, dividing by 12 the amount Mr. Joshi himself reports in his own Financial
Declaration indicates that Mr. Joshi actually earned $3,458 per month in 2008. At trial, Mr.
Joshi introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant reflecting earnings of $4,157.
(Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the amount of $37,504.18
(Trial Exhibit "D").If the Court finds Mr. Joshis mincing, erratic, testimonial evidence regarding
the prospects of his future unemployment (and how he kind of applied for unemployment though
he knew he would be working a few shifts in the next couple weeks except for the fact that he
also said he would not have any shifts at all in the next couple weeks) to be persuasive, one must

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wonder why Ms. Joshis testimonial evidence regarding the reduction in hours she is facing at
her employment was not similarly instructive to the Court. In 2008, Mr. Joshi earned
approximately $41,500.00 while working for two companies -American Bar and Restaurant and
Sierra Sport Service. At trial, Mr. Joshi introduced his W-2 from American Bar and Restaurant
reflecting earnings of $4,157. (Trial Exhibit "C"); and his W-2 from Sierra Sport Service in the
amount of $37,504.18 (Trial Exhibit "D").
The Court may have left out the additional $333 per month that Mr. Joshi has reported
making at Sierra Sport Service by introducing his 2008 W-2. The Court makes no mention of
the fact that Mr. Joshi failed to present any sort of evidence, save his own testimony, to support
his contention that his income will be changing substantially in 2009. It is not clear to Mr.
Coughlin that Mr. Springgate, though an officer of the court, can sufficiently corroborate such an
income reduction to an appropriate degree of certainty by merely discussing it with Mr. Joshi and
then proceeding to attest to it in court (without submitting an updated Financial Declaration). To
suggest this is in no means meant to impugn Mr. Springgates reputation. However, Mr.
Springgates reputation (that of an extremely skilled and versatile litigator who has taken on
some of the most high profile cases around) does not make something Mr. Joshi said true and in
need of no further evidentiary support simply upon Mr. Springgates repeating it to the court.
Bringing of frivolous civil claim or action as ground for discipline of attorney, 85 A.L.R.4th
544 (Originally published in 1991).
The Courts opinion chose not to describe Mr. Joshis failure to file the required updated
Financial Declaration in the terms it chooses to describe similar situations involving Ms. Joshi.
Indeed, the Courts opinion sets forth no less than thirteen instances where Ms. Joshi failed to
present any evidence relating to some specific issue. However, just going on the testimony

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referenced in the Courts opinion, one has to wonder why the Court failed to similarly point out
that Mr. Joshi failed to introduce any evidence (or documentary evidence or non-testimonial
evidence per the Courts varying descriptions of what is and is not evidence) to support his
claims that he had contacted his family to try to ascertain what they had done with the
approximately $7,000 golden jewelry bridal dowry, that all the consumer debt he alleges was
indeed incurred for the benefit of the community (realizing the presumption found in Nevada
law), that his surgery was necessary or that he was even sure it was surgery (he testified he had
no idea what kind of procedure was performed or why somebody, apparently a surgeon, took a
sharp object and cut open his body and presented him with a large billcertainly there was no
documentary evidence presented to prove that this was not an elective procedure or that it was
necessary and not a result of Mr. Joshis negligence in the same way that his failure to opt in to
the health insurance offered by his employer was, though Mr. Coughlin recognizes he was remiss
in not doing the appropriate discovery in this regard, to the extent that it was not barred by the
physician-patient privilege), that he had actually written some letter to Meena Fowler indicating
that he was pledging to pay back some $6,000 Ms. Fowler was sending to Mr. Joshis mother,
that he had taken out a loan of $5,000 from Mr. Anaby to purchase plane tickets for the familys
2001 immigration (the Courts Order did note the paucity of evidence in this regard), that he
actually does pay or has been paying $600 per month towards the community credit card debts
(though he apparently has been making these payments with community funds, in much the same
way that he has paid Mr. Springgate, though Mr. Joshi did appear to indicate that he used his
personal property, his IRS tax return, to pay Mr. Springgate, though the community is apparently
liable for such a necessary), that he actually has paid Mr. Springgate the various amounts he
inconsistently testified too, or that he has only two weeks of work scheduled for late March,

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2009; and he filed for unemployment benefits in March, 2009, or that the large balance transfers
he made in this year of divorce were actually for the purpose of obtaining a better interest rate
rather than making sure as much of the debt as possible was placed in an account where Ms.
Joshi was a co-signer, rather than in an account that Mr. Joshi was the sole signatory to.
The Court simply did not choose to comment on Mr. Joshis failure to present any
documentary evidence regarding these pertinent claims. Alternatively, the Court seemingly did
not miss any opportunity to point out an instance (on at least thirteen occasions) where Ms. Joshi
did not present the type of evidence the Court apparently wished to see (documentary evidence,
apparently, was sought, as opposed to the proffered testimonial evidence or statements against
interest under oath by the opposing party regarding the fishy payment arrangements related to the
daughters motor vehicle, the mode of payment used to purchase it, and the existence of a $6,000
cash advance taken from Ms. Joshis personal credit to fund the cash purchase). Mr. Joshi
testified that his wife had taken out a $6,000 cash advance from her personal credit card and
given the cash to Mr. Joshi who converted that cash to a money order to purchase the car the
daughter uses, but which is titled in the daughters and Mr. Joshis name.
Why Ms. Joshi would need to present documentary evidence regarding these matters
when Mr. Joshi readily admitted the case in question is unclear, particularly where Mr. Joshi has
been involved for some curious reason in transferring the monthly car payments made by the
daughter to Ms. Joshi for the car that Ms. Joshi took out a $6,000 cash advance from her credit
card account, to which she was the sole signatory, the same car that has Mr. Joshis name on the
title and does not have Ms. Joshis name on the title.
Miscellaneous Other Issues

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Given the decision in Lofgren v.Lofgren, (if community property is lost, expended or
destroyed through the intentional misconduct of one spouse, the court may consider such
misconduct as a compelling reason for making an unequal disposition of community property
and may appropriately augment the other spouses share of the remaining community property.
112 Nev. ___, 926 P.2d 296 (Adv. Opn. No. 156, Nov. 7, 1996).
Arguably, Mr. Joshi and Ms. Joshis combined testimony (together with Mr. Joshis early
Financial Declaration where he lists two separate safety deposit boxes containing gold jewelry)
support the view that the disappearance of the womans wealth ceremonial wedding jewelry at
issue here should be held against Mr. Joshi, and accordingly an unequal disposition of
community property (or community debt) may be appropriate to the extent of the approximate
value of these items. Ms. Joshi testified their value was in the $6,000 range. The womans
wealth is arguably Ms. Joshis separate property to begin with, as per Indian custom (though at
times in court Mr. Joshis grasp of the culture from which he apparently came was astoundingly
faint), however, the holding in Lofgren could arguably be extrapolated to apply in such a
situation.
Mr. Joshis own Trial Statement (line 12, page 2) comments on the case at bar, stating
that while it may seem to be an alimony case Mr. Joshis earnings are subject to the travel and
convention business fluctuations, while hers are not. Further, Mr. Springgates Trial Statement
was filed at 5 p.m. the day before Trial. Mr. Joshis Trial Statement was filed more than 5
calendar days before Trial, in accordance with Rule 5 of the Second Judicial District Court
Rules. Mr. Joshis Trial Statement notes that Mr. Joshi he is prepared to take an unfair amount
of the community debt, which he has been servicing, which equalizes their incomes. (emphasis
added). Whether it is appropriate to include the terms of a settlement negotiation in a Trial

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Statement is debatable. However, Mr. Springgate clearly wrote that the case may seem like an
alimony case and then clearly moved for opposing counsel to have personal liability for fees
under NRS 7.085 for the first time in his closing statement at Trial, seemingly asserting that
opposing counsel could not reasonably see this as an alimony case. Ironically, it would seem
Mr. Springgates moving for fees under NRS 7.085 was not reasonably grounded in fact or law.
WDCR 5(1)(c)-(d) requires that Trial statements shall be served and filed 5 calendar
days before trial, and that each party shall serve and file a trial statement which shall set forth
the following matters in the following order:
(c) A statement of issues of law supported by a memorandum of
authorities.
(d) In non-jury cases, a list of summaries of schedules referring to
attached, itemized exhibits concerning any subject matter which involves
accounting, computation, chronology, or similar data reasonably calling for
orderly itemization, e.g., wages, income, expenses, inventories, business
operations, tax computations, disability periods, property losses, itemizations
of claimed losses or injuries, and the data and reasons upon which an expert
bases his opinion (not the opinion itself), which clearly reflect the claims,
defenses, or evidence of the party, together with references to the records or
other sources upon which such summaries or schedules are based.

Mr. Springgates Trial Statement, at page 2, line 14, lists none under the heading of
Statement of Issues of Law. His Trial Statement fails to cite a single source of authority in
support of this, or any authority in support of the matters for which are apparently so well
established by precedent that there are literally no real issues worth disputing. Mr. Springgates
Trial Statement does not contain any a list of summaries of schedules referring to attached,
itemized exhibits concerning any subject matter which involves accounting, computation,
chronology, or similar data reasonably calling for orderly itemization, e.g., wages, income,
expenses, inventories, business operations, tax computations, disability periods, property losses,
itemizations of claimed losses or injuries, and the data and reasons upon which an expert bases

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his opinion (not the opinion itself), which clearly reflect the claims, defenses, or evidence of the
party, together with references to the records or other sources upon which such summaries
or schedules are based. (emphasis added). There simply is nothing attached to his Trial
Statement. There were no exhibits attached to the Trial Statement submitted at 5 p.m. the day
before Trial by Mr. Joshi. WDCR 5(d) calls for attaching exhibits to the Trial Statement. Mr.
Springgate failed to do this. Ms. Joshis counsel objected on that basis. The Court seemingly
took Mr. Springgates word that he had provided the documents forming the basis of the exhibits
he introduced at some earlier point in the litigation, likely as part of his 16.2 production, though
even if that were the case, the documents provided at that time clearly were not marked as
exhibits or organized by an index. Mr. Coughlin does believe Mr. Springgate provided these
documents in the 16.2 production and that they were bates stamped in the manner Mr. Springgate
indicated. Mr. Coughlin recognizes that, in the future, he should be prepared to utilize such
production at trial should it be offered as an exhibit without having an additional copy,
specifically marked as an exhibit provided at the time it is sought to be introduced into evidence.
In some cases, argument may be appropriate that suggests that to simply announce that one
previously included the needle they are now wishing to introduce into evidence at Trial in the
haystack that they had produced to the opposing party several months earlier is simply
insufficient. This may be a stronger argument where a partys Trial Statement is deficient in
some ways, such as note referencing with any specificity the documents a party intends to offer
as exhibits. Lastly, the Courts own Pre-Trial Order was not followed by Mr. Joshis counsel.
The Courts Order and reasoning for imposing sanctions focused in large part on Ms.
Joshis counsels objections to Mr. Joshis counsel introducing exhibits into evidence without
providing opposing counsel a copy at the time in which Mr. Joshi was seeking to introduce these

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exhibits. The Courts own Order Re Pre-Trial Procedure Orders that if a party intends to offer
more than ten trial exhibits, the proposed exhibits must be bound, tabbed and indexedeach
party shall submit two copies of the proposed exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing
counselfor trials which are scheduled for less than one full day, exhibits shall be marked
immediately prior to the convening for trial, and counsel shall arrive at least 15 minutes before
the scheduled time of trialeach party must file with the Court a trial statementfive days
before trialfailure to timely deliver these documents may result in sanctions against the
offending party as set forth in NRCP 37if the financial circumstances of a party have changed
substantially since the filing of the most recent financial declaration, that party is to file an
updated financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement.
Mr. Joshis case relied in large part upon the idea that his income had been greatly
reduced and would continue to be so hindered. There was testimony on his part that he might
have filed for unemployment, that he probably was not schedule to work anymore at one or both
of his jobs in the foreseeable future, only to be contradicted minutes later by his testimony that
he had a shift or two scheduled at his main job, the one where he earned $37,500 in 2008. How
he could still qualify to file for unemployment without yet losing his job completely is another
question. Nevadas unemployment system allows one to file if his hours have been reduced
such that he is no longer earning more than his weekly benefit amount. Mr. Joshis weekly
benefit amount, based on his Financial Declaration could be no more than the $350 maximum
cap set by law. Mr. Joshi grossed approximately $700 per week in 2008. Mr. Joshi did not file
an update Financial Declaration, as required by the Pre-Trial Order (financial circumstances of
a party have changed substantially since the filing of the most recent financial declaration, that
party is to file an updated financial declaration at the same time as filing the trial statement)

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Mr. Joshis arguments against alimony were largely based on the idea that his income had
declined significantly, yet Ms. Joshi did not have the benefit of enforcing the requirement that
Mr. Joshi file, under penalty of perjury, an updated Financial Declaration attesting to as much.
The court should not criticize Ms. Joshi for a lack of discovery in this regard while viewing Mr.
Joshis testimonial assertions (however erratic and inconsistent they may have been) at trial as
presenting sufficient evidence (though lacking in the documentary evidence required by the
Pre-Trial Order and perhaps NRS), while at the same time sanctioning Ms. Joshis counsel for
essentially not trying the case in the way the Court (which does not have the benefit of knowing
everything that goes on behind the scenes) would suggest it be tried. The Court essentially
overlooked multiple instances of divergence from the NRCP and the Pre-Trial Order by Mr.
Springgate while sanctioning what could perhaps be deemed optional litigation decisions that are
customarily left up to the parties own volition as to whether or not to proceed upon some specific
course (such as choosing to conduct a deposition). Mr. Coughlin recognizes that the direction
given by Judge Gardner during this Trial as to the type of evidence that should be offered or the
manner of presentation at trial were absolutely dictates that he should adopt immediately if he
hopes to function at all effectively as an attorney.
It appears that Mr. Joshi may have offered more than ten exhibits at Trial (especially if
the documents representing the various money transfers in regard to the Meena Fowler debt were
considered separate exhibits), though the proposed exhibits were not bound, tabbed and indexed.
They were never even proposed until the exact point in time at which Mr. Joshi sought to
introduce them. Surely they were not all being offered for impeachment purposes. For this
Trial, which was scheduled for less than one full day, the exhibits were not marked immediately
prior to the convening for trial, and Ms. Joshis counsel did indeed arrive at least 15 minutes

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before the scheduled time of trial. Mr. Joshis counsel did not submit two copies of the proposed
exhibits to the Court and one copy to the opposing counsel. See Cardenas v. Peterson Bean Co.,
180 Neb. 605, 611-612, 144N.W.2d 154, 159 (1966); Priest v. McConnell, 219 Neb 328, 330
(1985); In Re OBryan, 246 B.R. 271, 276-279 (1999).
To qualify as an exhibit a document should be marked as an exhibit or in some way
contain some indication that it is an exhibit. Though arguably the relatively slight amount of
documents produced in the instant case makes such an argument irrelevant, one should not be
able to pick several needles out of a haystack they produced in their 16.2 productions and claim
that they are exhibits previously provided to the opposing party. This places an inappropriately
high burden on the opposing party to index and organize the documents produced by Mr. Joshi.
Many litigators suggest that if one is following the other side they are not leading the litigation.
Rule 46. TrialStatements and documentary evidence.
1. Stipulating to documents. Before trial, the parties shall stipulate
which documents are admissible. Such stipulation will avoid the need for
foundational witnesses.
2. Exchanging documents. Copies of documents shall be exchanged
by counsel and marked for identification by the court clerk no later than 1
business day prior to the commencement of trial.
3. A trial statement shall be filed in accordance with Rule 5. (Local
Rules of Practice for the Second Judicial District Court).

Rule 12. Form of papers presented for filing; exhibits; documents; legal
citations.
4. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers shall clearly show the
exhibit number at the bottom or on the right side thereof. Copies of
exhibits must be clearly legible and not unnecessarily voluminous, and
must be reduced to 8 1/2 inches by 11 inches, or conveniently folded to
that size. Original documents shall be retained by counsel for introduction
as exhibits at the time of a hearing or at the time of trial rather than
attached to pleadings. Rules of the District Courts of the State of
Nevada.


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Mr. Joshis counsel clearly did not comply with Rule 46 or Rule 12. Ms.
Joshis counsel should not be sanctioned for objecting to the introduction of Mr.
Joshis exhibits. The exhibits entered clearly were not marked for identification
by the Court one day prior to trial. Mr. Springgate had not provided any
documents prior to Trial that contained any attempt to mark them as exhibits such
that compliance with the rules could be inferred. They were only marked at the
time Mr. Joshi sought to introduce them. There is ample persuasive authority for
the position taken by Ms. Joshis counsel with regard to the introduction of Mr.
Joshis exhibits.
LR 9017. Use of Alternate Direct Testimony and Exhibits at Trials
(d) Submission of Declarations, Exhibits , and Objections. Unless
the court orders otherwise, copies of all declarations of witnesses
and exhibits that are intended to be presented at trial or at the
hearing on a contested matter must be furnished to opposing
counsel and lodged with the court as follows:
(1) The plaintiff or movant must submit to opposing counsel all
declarations and exhibits in its case in chief not less than ten (10)
business days before the trial or the hearing on the contested
matter;
(2) The defendant or respondent must submit all declarations and
exhibits in its case five (5) business days before the trial or the
hearing on the contested matter;
(3) Two (2) business days before trial or the hearing on a contested
matter each party must lodge with the courtroom deputy clerk of
the judge to whom the matter is assigned, one (1) copy of all
declarations and exhibits that the party intends to present at trial,
and an original and one (1) copy of that party's written objections
to the admission of any of the declarations or exhibits of an
opposing party. Copies of exhibits lodged with the clerk must
be premarked by counsel, and must be accompanied by a cover
sheet index containing a brief description of each exhibit ; and
U.S.Dist.Ct.Rules D.Nev., LR 9017.

3. Selecting exhibits
After all possible exhibits are identified, counsel should select those that
he himself will bring to the trial, and those that he will subpoena another

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to bring. He should have available everything that he might have to
produce at the request of his opponent, and, if he doesn't have original
documents or articles, he should be prepared with copies, and/or testimony
concerning the originals.

4. Preparing exhibit lists

Counsel should prepare a list of his witnesses with an outline of the points
to be established by each one. The outline should indicate which exhibits
the witness can identify, the number tentatively assigned to the exhibit,
and a description of it 5 Am. Jur. Trials 553.

WDCR 10: Form of Pleadings:
6. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must be 8 1/2 x 11 inches
in size; must be separated with bottom-tabbed divider pages; must be
labeled numerically, i.e., Exhibit 1, 2, 3, etc., rather than alphabetically,
and it will be mandatory effective January 1, 2008, that all exhibits be
identified numerically. Exhibits that are smaller must be affixed to a blank
sheet of paper 8 1/2 x 11 inches in size, with invisible adhesive tape on all
sides. Staples must not be used to affix an exhibit to a sheet of paper.
Exhibits that are larger than 8 1/2 x 11 inches must be reduced to 8 1/2 x
11 inches. Exhibits such as maps must be folded so as to appear 8 1/2 x 11
inches in size. All exhibits attached to pleadings or papers must be
separated by a bottom- tabbed divider page and clearly marked with the
exhibit number at the top and bottom of the page. All exhibits attached to
pleadings or papers must be preceded by an Index of Exhibits indicating
the exhibit number, exhibit description, and the length of each exhibit
(number of pages). Copies of exhibits must be clearly legible and not
unnecessarily voluminous. Original documents must be retained by
counsel for introduction as exhibits at the time of a hearing or at the time
of trial rather than attached to pleadings.

Ms. Joshis counsels comments were not rude or sarcastic, especially considering the
totality of the circumstances here, as more fully discussed above. Nonetheless, the Court failed
to include much at all in the way of specific examples of the rude, sarcastic, or derogatory
language or behavior that formed the basis for these sanctions. Specificity is required as set forth
in the cases cited supra. Specifics are very important in using judgments as precedent. Further,
it might be somewhat unfair to criticize Ms. Joshis counsel for a lack of knowledge with regard

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to the rules of evidence and trial procedure where Mr. Springgates presentation was counter to
the rules and Pre-Trial Order in so many ways. However, Ms. Joshis counsel certainly will
utilize the Courts Order as an important and informative guide to the areas of counsels trial
presentation and practice that need immediate improvement.
The sanctions issued in this case were improper in that they apparently relied upon the
delay in the return of Mr. Joshis Tanzanian passport early in this litigation. The Courts Order
notes that Ms. Joshis counsel filed an Opposition to the request for return of Mr. Joshi's
passport without any factual or legal basis that on August 1, 2008, Mr. Joshi filed a 'Motion
For Return Of Personal Property' requesting that Ms. Joshi return his passport, green card and
social security card. On August 7, 2008, Ms. Joshi, by and through her attorney of record,
Mr. Coughlin, filed an Opposition to the return of Mr. Joshi's passport citing case law involving
minor children and their support. Ms. Joshi filed said opposition while acknowledging the
parties' children were both over eighteen years of age at the time. On August 18, 2008, Judge
Schumacher ordered Ms. Joshi to immediately return Mr. Joshi's passport within five days.
Regardless, Judge Schumacher already ruled on Mr. Springgates request for attorneys
fees related to this issue. No Attorneys fees were granted by Judge Schumacher. Mr. Joshi did
not file a Motion for Reconsideration at that time. The issue is barred under the law of the case
doctrine. The law of the case doctrine is a species of collateral estoppel and it applies to intra-
action issues. Tien Fu Hsu v. County of Clark, 2007 WL 4532623 (Nev. 12/27/2007). Thus,
once an issue has been decided on the merits, the law of the case doctrine makes that issue
binding not only on the parties, but on the court as well: no other judge of coordinate
jurisdiction may undo the decision (Siegel, NY Prac 448, at 723 [3d ed.]).

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Mr. Springgate filed a Motion seeking the return of this passport which on a somewhat
questionable interpretation of 18 USC 1028 and 18 USC 1544, claiming Ms. Joshis failure to
immediately return it to him amounted to extortion. Ms. Joshis counsel merely asked Mr.
Springgate to provide some law that was relevant to the issue at hand or allow a reasonable
amount of time for Mr. Coughlin to determine the prudence of turning over the Tanzanian
passport. Mr. Coughlin did not suggest Mr. Joshi was committing a RICO violation by
withholding or doing nothing to aid in the return of Ms. Joshis womans wealth. Granted, a
passport may deserve a greater degree of protection, but this is the type of judgment call that can
take some time for attorneys to consistently and immediately make in an appropriate fashion.
Mr. Springgates Motion and Reply on this issue failed to cite any particular section of these
statutes or include much in the way of their statutory language. Ms. Joshis counsel has looked
up these statues and included the only parts that could seem even tangentially relevant below:
18 U.S.C. 1544Misuse of a Passport: Section 1544 of Title
18 proscribes the use or attempted use of someone else's passport,
or its use in violation of any applicable regulation or law. It also
proscribes giving one's passport to another for the other's use
18 USC 1028: Fraud and related activity in connection with
identification documents, authentication features, and information
(4) knowingly possesses an identification document (other than
one issued lawfully for the use of the possessor), authentication
feature, or a false identification document, with the intent such
document or feature be used to defraud the United States;
(7) knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person with the
intent to commit, or to aid or abet, or in connection with, any
unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that
constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law; or

To assert that Ms. Joshi was committing some form of extortion such to bring this
situation within the purview of either of these sections of the U.S.C. is not entirely fair.

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The Courts Order appears to have taken issue with the request made for ongoing child
support where the two children of the marriage were 19 and 20 years old and in college, noting
that 1. Ongoing Support for the Adult Children's Education- Pursuant to NRS 125.510(9)(b),
except where a contract providing otherwise has been executed pursuant to NRS 123.080, the
obligation for care, education, maintenance and support of any minor child created by any order
entered pursuant to this section ceases: (a) Upon the death of the person to whom the order was
directed; or (b) When the child reaches 18 years of age if he is no longer enrolled in high school,
otherwise, when he reaches 19 years of age. There has been no evidence presented by Ms. Joshi
justifying a request for continuing support of the parties' adult children. As there has been no
legal basis presented to make such a finding, the Court denies Ms. Joshi's request that Mr. Joshi
financially provide for the adult children's education.
Nevertheless, in appropriate cases, a support obligation may be imposed on the basis of
estoppel or implied contract. In re Marriage of Johnson, 88 Cal.App.3d 848, 152 Cal.Rptr. 121
(1979); In re Marriage of Valle, 53 Cal.App.3d 837, 126 Cal.Rptr. 38 (1975). See, also,
Clevenger v. Clevenger, supra; V.L.P. v. J.S.S., Del., 407 A.2d 244 (1978); Fuller v. Fuller,
D.C., 247 A.2d 767 (1968); Mace v. Webb, 614 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah 1980); Gingery (not
reported) 1992 WL 150269; Watkins, 117 P.3d 1114; Kass, 235 A.D. 2d 150 (1997); Callahan v.
Dye, L 1667668, 8-10 (Alaska 2006); Ramsey, 23 N.E. 69, 71 (Ind. 1889). Additionally, the
demonstrable needs of the child, not the child's age, are determinative of the duty of support.
Therefore, while parents are not generally required to support a child over eighteen, his or her
enrollment in a full- time educational program has been held to require continued support.
Newburgh, supra, 88 N.J. at 543; Khalaf v. Khalaf, 58 N.J. 63, 71-72 (1971); Limpert, supra, 119

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N.J. Super. at 442-43; Schumm, supra, 122 N.J. Super. 149-50. See, also, Ross v. Ross, 167
N.J. Super. 441, 444-46 (Ch. Div. 1979) (law school).
Testimonial evidence was presented by Ms. Joshi that these spouses had planned to help
their children financially during college. An implied contract to contribute to the adult childrens
educational expenses is supported by the evidence presented. Ms. Joshis testimony showed that
this family adhered to the strong cultural tradition in many families with ties to India in that the
education and furtherance of their childrens careers was of paramount importance to these
parties and that Ms. Joshi had lived and planned her life I accordance with that belief. Ms. Joshi
anticipated and believed, quite reasonably, that Mr. Joshi would contribute something to his
childrens college expenses.
There exists more attenuated support for this proposition. In Miller v. Miller, 16 Ill. 298,
where one remains with a parent, or with a person standing in the relation of a parent, after
arriving at majority, and remains in the same apparent relation as when a minor, the presumption
is that the parties do not contemplate the payment of wages for services.
Additionally, this presumption may be overthrown, and the reverse established, by proof
of an express or implied contract, and the implied contract may be proven by facts and
circumstances which show that both parties, at the time services were performed, contemplated
or intended pecuniary recompense other than such as naturally arises out of the relation of parent
and childin the absence of express proof a contract may be implied from circumstances.
Schwarz v. Schwarz, 26 Ill. 81.
Incidentally, one of the objections the Court ruled against Ms. Joshis counsel on
concerned a recently proposed bill before our States Legislature:

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Assembly Bill 125 AN ACT relating to domestic relations;
requiring the court, in certain actions for divorce, to consider any history
of domestic violence between the spouses when determining whether to
award temporary maintenance or alimony; creating a rebuttable
presumption in certain actions for divorce that an award of temporary
maintenance or alimony should not be made to a spouse who engaged in
certain acts of domestic violence against the other spouse; and providing
other matters properly relating thereto.
Legislative Counsels Digest: Existing law provides that a court
in any action for divorce may: (1) require one spouse to pay money for the
temporary maintenance of the other spouse; and (2) award alimony to
either spouse in a manner that appears just and equitable. (NRS 125.040,
125.150) This bill requires a court that is considering whether to award
temporary maintenance or alimony in certain actions for divorce to
consider evidence of any history of domestic violence between the
spouses. This bill also creates a rebuttable presumption in certain actions
for divorce that temporary maintenance or alimony should not be awarded
to a spouse who has engaged in acts of domestic violence not more than 5
years before the filing of the action for divorce or at any time after the
action is filed.) (http://www.leg.state.nv.us/74th/Bills/AB/AB125.pdf)
(Referred to Committee on Judiciary)

The Court was not precluded from considering the abuse allegations in the instant case.
It was arguably appropriate to let the abuse allegations into evidence for purposes of the alimony
determination. Mr. Springgate gave a detailed explanation of the validity of basing property
distributions and, perhaps, alimony on such fault issues. This led to the Court ruling such abuse
allegations were inadmissible. However many courts allow such evidence. Bernard, L206411,
2-7 (Ohio 2002); Havell, 186 Misc. 2d 726; The Place of Fault in Modern Divorce Law, 28
Ariz. St. L.J. 773 (Fall 1996); Divine, 752 S.W. 2d 79 (1988). The Court at times seemed to be
object to Ms. Joshis counsel desire to respond to the various objections, or make his own
objections, seemingly out of annoyance with Ms. Joshis counsels trial presentation. Ms.
Joshis counsel has great respect for Judge Gardner and deeply regrets any trial presentation
found objectionable and is resolved to improving as an advocate with renewed vigor. Hopefully
this Motions attempt at thoroughly presenting some of the issues that arose at trial will

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demonstrate such a desire. Objections must be entered into the record to preserve issues for
appeal (particularly such potentially precedent making questions of law).
The Courts seeming annoyance is understandable. The expectations on Family Court
Judges in Nevada are enormous, the case loads crushing, and the need to enforce standards of
practice that aid in judicial economy is high. This is combined with the extreme emotional
intensity of the subject matter and the litigants very personal connections to the issues at hand.
Further, it is likely very frustrating to have attorneys who are a mere work in progress practicing
in ones courtroom, particularly where such an attorney may feel the opposing side is seeking an
advantage through intimidation, causing such an attorney to react in an overly antagonistic
manner, to the detriment of ones trial presentation.
Many of Nevadas Family Courts do allow evidence of abuse to be presented in arguing
for an award of alimony. Nevada is a no- fault state; consequently, marital fault is not an issue in
the division of property or the awards that the court makes. The Nevada Supreme Court has set
forth a series of factors in the Sprenger case [Sprenger v. Sprenger, 110 Nev. 855, 878 P.2d 284
(1994)] called the Sprenger Factors. There are six different factors that the court set forth in
determining how to award alimony. They have also addressed the fault issue in the Rodriguez
case [Rodriguez v. Rodriquez, 116 Nev. 993, 13 P.3d 415(2000), and Hein, and these two cases
may be contradictory]. There is no current factor that says the issue of domestic battery must be
considered, but many of the courts already do consider it. (see Minutes for AB 125: Assembly
Committee on Judiciary February 26, 2007, pages 4-5).
Conclusion
For the reasons cited in the various arguments contained in this Motion for
Reconsideration, the sanction assessing Ms. Joshis counsel to personally pay Mr. Joshis

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attorneys fees for 4.15 hours of Trial should not be upheld. Ms. Joshis counsel had found no
authority supporting a request under NRS 7.085 on account of a failure to accept a settlement
that proposes using consumer credit card debt as a set off for an alimony award. To ask for fees
under these circumstances may be a NRS 7.085 violation itself. Ms. Joshi should be awarded an
alimony payment of $500 per month for a period of twenty years, taking her to social security
age. Mr. Joshi should be ordered to contribute $6,000 to each of his two childrens college
expenses. The childrens contributions to the car payments should not be considered in dividing
each party half of the respective debt related to these vehicles, which the parties admitted at trial
were incurred during the marriage. The partys testimony and Mr. Joshis admissions establish
the amount owing on these vehicles. Mr. Joshi should be ordered to refinance the vehicle
awarded to him in this Courts Order. Any debt amounts that Mr. Joshi balance transferred from
an account to which he was the sole signatory to an account both spouses were signatories to
should be subtracted from the community debt apportioned to Ms. Joshi. As a side note, Mr.
Coughlin has been prevented from accessing Ms. Joshis files, contact information, and other
items necessary to prepare this Motion. Perhaps this Motion is not an appropriate place to go
into why that has occurred, but Mr. Coughlin wishes to implore this Court to preserve for Ms.
Joshi, the opportunity to seek Reconsideration, and possibly an Appeal, and to allow an
extension of time for another attorney at Washoe Legal Services to appear as counsel (though
Mr. Coughlin remains counsel of record as of this date). Alternatively, this Motion would seem
to provide support for the various issues that Ms. Joshi may seek Reconsideration of. Mr.
Coughlin also asks that he be allowed more time to more fully develop this Motion for
Reconsideration and to access the necessary materials from Washoe Legal Services to do so,
including the relevant file, work product, video of the trial, and record of correspondences

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between opposing counsel and Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Coughlin has been prevented from doing so
despite making all reasonable efforts to do so. More information related to this set of
circumstances can be provided, however, it seems prudent at this juncture not to set forth details
in this Motion at this time.

Respectfully submitted to the Court this 27
th
day of April, 2009
/sig/ Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

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the 27
th
day of April, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the within
Request For Reconsideration and Motion for Extension of Time, fully addressed to:
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ
Reno, NV 89501


The undersigned does hereby affirm that the preceding document does not contain the social
security number of any person.

Dated this 27
th
Day of April, 2009

Melissa Ulloa /sig/
Melissa Ulloa


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LIST OF EXHIBITS
1. Exhibit 1- email from Zach Coughlin, Esq. to John Springgate, Esq. sent October 22
nd
,
2008. Two pages long.
2. Exhibit 2- email from Zach Coughlin, Esq. to John Springgate, Esq., sent November 10
th
,
2008. Two pages long.

oz L I )
cb
0
> n s
OCE03
0
Code: 3980
Caryn R. Stemlicht, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 4391
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: (775) 329-2727
Facsimile: (775) 324-5509
Attorneys for Defendant
ASHWIN JOSHI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.
STIPULATION AND ORDER TO ENLARGE TIME PERIOD FOR MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, ASHWIN JOSHI, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and Defendant, BHARTI JOSHI, by and through her undersigned counsel, and hereby
agree and stipulate, pursuant to WDCR 12(8), to enlarge the period of time for Defendant to
file a motion for reconsideration of this Honorable Court's "Order After Trial" as filed herein
on April 13, 2009. Plaintiff mailed a "Notice of Entry of Order After Trial" to Defendant on
April 13, 2009; thus Defendant would have as and through April 30, 2009, so as to file said
/ / /
/ / /
/ / /

FILED
APR 3 0 2009
HOWARD .
VERB, CLERK
By: ) Arriutin
E L
Dept. No.: 14
DISTRICT JUDGE
E LEGAL SERVICES W
Caryn ternlicht, Esq.
Attorn 'r Defendant

Motion. The parties agree to allow Defendant an additional fifteen (15) judicial days from
April 30, 2009, so as to file any motions for reconsideration of this Court's prior Order.
DATED this 28
th
day of April, 2009
ORDER
Pursuant to the Stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendant, by and through counsel, shall have as
and through May 21, 2009, to file a Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's "Order After
Trial" as filed herein on April 13, 2009.
DATED this day of April, 2009.
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2
F I L E D
Electronically
05-13-2009:01:13:53 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
F I L E D
Electronically
05-13-2009:01:13:53 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
[''''
,
EAY 13
Li: I I

13 Y
$1670
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Bar No. 9473
945 W. I 2
th
St.
Rena, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
Attorney for Bharti Joshi and Zach Coughlin
No.: DVO8-01168 Dept. 14
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
VS.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
Defendant's Emer encv Motion for Order Shortenin Time and Order Grantin
Emergency Request to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis
COMES NOW, BHARTI JOSHI, Defendant above name (hereinafter "Ms. Joshi"),
by and through her attorney of record, ZACH COUGHLIN, ESQ., and hereby requests
entry of Order Shortening Time and a Decision on, in reference to "DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" filed and served April 30', 2009 (though eFile
attempts were submitted on April 27', 2009; however, a filing technicality resulted in
delay of this electronic filing appearing on eFlex), as follows:
1. The Order requested here would facilitate the timely entry of an appropriate
Page 1
Order on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. Although an order granting or denying
a Motion for Reconsideration is not itself appealable, the Supreme Court will consider
arguments raised in the Motion for Reconsideration so long as the District Court considers
the motion on the merits, the Notice of appeal is filed after the Order disposing of the
Motion, and the motion and order are included in the record on appeal. Arnold v. Kip,
123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 41, 168 P. 3d 1050 (Nev. 2007). Due to the short time one has to
file a Motion for Reconsideration and have it properly preserve issues for appeal, Ms.
Joshi respectfully requests that this Court hear and decide her Motion for Reconsideration
on an Order Shortening Time.
2. The Court is authorized to enter and Order Shortening time pursuant to WDCR Rule
11 (re extension or shortening of time), and the facts in the instant case make it appropriate
for the Court to do so as requested her by Ms. Joshi.
3. The instant Motion, and the substantive Motion which is concerns, are being
personally served Wednesday, March 12, 2009, and notice is hereby given to opposing
counsel that each such Motion will be submitted to this Honorable Court for decision on or
after 9:00 a.m. March 12
th
, 2009.
4. This Court's Order After Trial, on page 13, states that "5. Preparation of the Decree -
Mr. Springgate shall prepare the decree of divorce consistent with this memorandum
decision. Mr. Springgate shall tender his proposed decree to Mr. Coughlin, pursuant to
WDCR 9, within 20 days from the date of this order." In this regard, Ms. Joshi and her
counsel are not sure if this Court's Order After Trial is a Final Decree from which the 30
days to file a Notice of Appeal runs, or for that matter, the 10 days to file a Motion for
Reconsideration (also, eFlex and Court Connect indicate an extension of time to file a
Motion for Reconsideration was granted; however, the 30 days within which to file a Notice
of Appeal after the filing of a Notice of Entry of Order is jursidictional and can not be
Page 2
waived), see, Power of Trial Court Indirectly to Extend Time for Appeal, 89 ALR 941
(1934), supplemented 149 ALR 740 (1944); "to hold that the decree to be appealed from
was the docket entry rather than the formal decree is to go directly contrary to the judges
opinion quoted above, in which he directed the counsel to prepare the decree and provide
for exceptions."; In Re Hurley, Mercantile Co., 56 F.2d 1023, 1024, 1025 (5 Cir., 1932);
Scott Et Al. v. Gearner Et Al., 197 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1952);
Spreader Specialists, Inc, v.
Monroc, Inc., 114 Idaho 15, 752 P.2d 617 (Ct. App. 1988).
5. Ms. Joshi and her counsel respectfully request that the relief sought in Mr. Coughlin's
Motion for Reconsideration be granted as to Mr. Coughlin's personally liability for Mr.
Joshi's attorney's fees. With respect to the other rulings included in this Court's Order After
Trial, Ms. Joshi requests the opportunity to make use of the extension of time granted by
this court for her to file a Motion for Reconsideration. To the extent that Ms. Joshi will not
be able to have such a Motion for Reconsideration heard or decided after the time for which
filing a Notice of Appeal has run (which is arguably May 12t
h
, 2009), Ms. Joshi requests that
this Court utilize the Motion for Reconsideration Mr. Coughlin filed on his own behalf with
respect to attorney's fees in finding that Ms. Joshi should have been awarded alimony greater
than the $1.00 per year, "jurisdictional hook" as contemplated by Siragusa. An analysis
utilizing the "Tonopah Formula" (see, in Search of a Coherent Theoretical Model for
Alimony, Nevada Lawyer, by M. Willick, Esq. {April 2007); The So-Called "Tonopah
Formula" for Alimony Explained, Nevada Family Law Report, T. Torvinen, Esq.,
(September 2002)) suggests that Ms. Joshi, as one who is leaving a marriage that last 16
years longer than 5 years, who is 16 years past her 30' birthday, who has two children born
of this marriage, and whose education consists of a degree from a foreign country and in a
field for which she is not currently working nor for which she has worked in in many years,
and where there is a $12, 000 yearly income disparity (which would be over 40% of Ms.
Joshi's income), and where Mr. Joshi developed his skill and earning capacity during the
marriage and during a time when Ms. Joshi was more of a hands on caregiver with regard to
their two children, is potentially entitled to an alimony award of approximately $400 per
Page 3
month for a period of at least 10 years (if not for her lifetime as this was a 21 year marriage
and many practitioners note that the 20 year mark is a fairy common bench mark for
awarding lifetime alimony). Further, Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d
200 (1997), notes that a child support obligation can not be set off by a shared debt owed by
the spouses to a third party creditor. "Set off' of one spouse's support obligation against
other spouse's obligation to pay equity in marital residence not allowed. The Court in
Wheeler held that the trial court erred in completely releasing non-custodial parent from
obligation to pay child support by allowing the non-custodial parent a "set-off' of her child
support obligation against her husband's obligation to pay her one-half the equity in the
marital residence. Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200, 1997 Nev.
LEXIS 135 (1997). , and the holding in In Re Anders, arguably weigh against this Court
using such debts as an off set to an award of alimony to Ms. Joshi.
Similarly, if spousal abuse or marital misconduct has an adverse economic impact on
the victim spouse, the court may consider it when determining whether an unequal division
of community property is warranted. Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d
200 (1997). Ms. _Tashi arguably deserves a new trial or having her motion for
reconsideration granted in light of the exclusion of evidence of domestic violence as creating
economic consequence which may have affected the alimony award, debt distribution, or
property distribution. Even if a legitimate compelling reason exists to support an unequal
distribution of property, such unequal distribution cannot be accomplished by reducing or
eliminating the non-custodial parent's obligation to pay child support. Wheeler v. Upton-
Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200, 1997 Nev. LEXIS 135 (1997). Further, contrary to
the interpretation Mr. Springgate cited at trial, the Rodriguez case (Rodriguez v. Rodriquez,
116 Nev. 993, 13 P.3d 415 (2000)); Fault as a determinative factor in alimony awards in
Nevada and other community property jurisdictions, Mazzeo, Catherine, 2 Nev. L.J. 177-
195 (2002). Rodriguez, perhaps contrary to Mr. Springgate's interpretation, held that:
"A year after Lofgren was decided, we decided the case of
Wheeler v. Upton-Wheeler, 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997).
Page 4
We concluded in Wheeler that the district court erred by relying on
evidence of the husband's spousal abuse as a basis for making an
unequal division of the parties' community property. [***10] Id. at
1190, 946 P.2d at 203. We noted that by amending NRS
125.150(1) in 1993, the legislature sought to preserve the concept
of no-fault divorce in Nevada. See id. at 1189-90, 946 P.2d at 203.
We also recognized the legislature's determination that "in divorce
proceedings, testimony regarding the relative faults of the parties
could have an adverse effect on the children and could increase the
expense of litigation." Id. at 1190, 946 P.2d at 203 (citing Hearing
on A.B. [3]47 Before the Senate Committee on Judiciary, 67th
Leg. (Nev., May 10, 1993, and April 30, 1993)).
However, in Wheeler, we also recognized that sometimes marital
misconduct results in adverse economic consequences for one of
the parties. 113 Nev. at 1190, 946 P.2d at 203. We determined that
a district court may consider evidence of the economic
consequences of marital misconduct in determining whether an
unequal division of community property is warranted. See id. As
we noted in Heim, "alimony is wholly a creature of statute." Id. at
607, 763 P.2d at 679. The legislature has elected to distinguish the
appropriate considerations [***11] for the division of community
property from those which exist for an award of alimony. The
legislature has devised a scheme that permits the court to deviate
from the rule requiring an equal division of community property if a
compelling reason exists for doing so. However, the legislature has
not seen fit to permit the court to withhold an otherwise just and
equitable alimony award for any similar reason.
According to both the legislative history and the plain language of
the statute, a judge is not permitted to consider the fault or
misconduct of either of the parties when considering an award of
alimony. We hold that when considering an award of alimony, the
court may not consider either party's misconduct or fault. We
perceive no reason to engraft the "misconduct resulting in an
economic impact" exception to the alimony portion of the statute.
We have previously determined in Wheeler that the relevance of
fault or misconduct is limited to instances where, because of its
economic impact on one of the parties, fault or misconduct
constitutes a compelling reason to deviate from an equal division of
the community estate.
Moreover, an exception is unnecessary. Nevada has well [*** 12]
settled case law that provides guidelines for the trial court to
consider when making a just and equitable alimony award.
Commonly referred to as the "Buchanan factors, " these guidelines
were enunciated over twenty-five years ago in Buchanan v.
Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209, 523 P.2d 1 (1974). They include: [419]
Page 5
the financial condition of the parties; the nature and value of [the
parties'] respective property; the contribution of each to any
property held by them as tenants by the entirety; the duration of the
marriage; the husband's income, his earning capacity, his age, health
and ability to labor; and the wife's age, health, station and ability to
earn a living. Id. at 215, 523 P.2d at 5. While we acknowledge the
archaic tenor of the language, as well as the unnecessary variation
between the [*9991 considerations articulated for the husband and
the wife, we also note with approval the commonsense approach
that permeates these points. And the durability of the factors over
time is a testament to their viability.
So, for example, if one spouse commits repetitive acts of physical
or mental abuse against the other, causing a condition in the injured
spouse which [***13] generates expense or affects that person's
ability to work, the physical and/or mental condition caused by the
misconduct can be taken into account in two ways: first, as a
compelling reason to make an unequal distribution of property or
second, without considering evidence of fault or misconduct, the
court in deciding alimony will, per Buchanan, take that spouse's
physical and mental condition into account when examining his or
her financial condition, health and ability to work."
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant request this Court grant the relief
requested, including granting the Order to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis.
Dated this 12t
h
day of May, 2009 by:
/signature/ Za h Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar No: 9473
Law Office of Zach Coughlin, Esq.
945 W.12'
h
St., Reno, NV 89503
Tel: 775 338 8118
Page 6
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that 1 am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq, and that on
the 12
th
Day of May, 2009, 1 electronically filed and or personally served at Reno,
Nevada, a true copy of the within Defendant's Emergency Motion for Order
Shortening Time and Granting Emergency Request to Proceed on Appeal
In Forma Pauperis, fully addressed to:
John Springgate, Esq.
Attorney for Ashwin Bharti
Reno, NV 89501
Caryn Sternlicht, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Dated this 12
th
Day of May, 2009.
/signature/ Melissa Ulloa
Melissa Ulloa
Page 7
FAMILY COURT
MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE
(REQUIRED)
CASE NO. V
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DEPT. NO. -
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(-c/1-tivtfk,
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VS.
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IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
* * *
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NOTICE: THIS MOTION/OPPOSITION NOTICE MUST BE ATTACHED AS THE
LAST PAGE to every motion or other paper filed pursuant to chapter 125, 125B
or 125C of NRS and to any answer or response to such a motion or other paper.
A.
Mark the CORRECT ANSWER :with an X
YES NO
1. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in this
case? If m. then continue to Question 2. If no, you do not
need to answer any other questions.
2. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed to
change a final order? If m, then continue to Question 3. If
no, you do not need to answer any other questions.
3. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion filed only to
change the amount of child support? _.
4. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion for
reconsideration or a new trial and the motion was filed
within 10 days of the Judge's Order`?
---
4:
.

IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the filing
Date
q 1 t /' date found on the front page of the Judge's Order.
B.
If you answered NO to either Question 1 or 2 or YES to Question 3 or 4, you are exempt
from the $25.00 filing fee. However, if the Court later determines you should have paid the
filing fee, your motion will not be decided until the $25.00 fee is paid.
I affirm that the answers provided on this Notice are true.
Date:
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Zach Coughlin, Esq,
Bar No. 9473
945 W.12th St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
on his own behalf and
Attorney of Record for Joshi
Bharti/Defendant, see explanation
No.: DV08-01168
Dept. 14
IN THE SECOND JUDICIALDISTRICT COURT OFTHE
STATE OFNEVADA IN AND FOR
TIM COUNTY OFWASHOE
Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Bharti Joshi, Defendant
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OFMOTION TO PROCEED
ON APPEALIN FORMA PAUPER'S
Pursuant to NRS 12.015, and based on the following Affidavit, I request
permission form this Court to proceed without paying courts costs or other costs and
fees as provided in NRS 12.015 because I lack sufficient financial ability.
Dated this 12th day of May, 2009:
A
L
/signatureFlach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar. No. 9473
945 W.12th St., Reno, NV 89503
Tel: 775 338 8118
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Page 1 Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
AFFIDAVIT
State of Nevada
}ss.
County of Washoe }
1, Zach Coughlin being first duly sworn, depose and say that I am the
Appellant in the above-entitled case; that in support of my motion to proceed on
appeal without being required to prepay fees, cost or give security therefor, I state
that because of my poverty I am unable to pay the costs of said proceeding or to give
security therefor; that I believe I am entitled to redress; and that the issues which I
desire to present on appeal are the following:
Whether is was appropriate to use debts to third party creditors to off set an
alimony award to Ms. Joshi. Whether evidence of domestic violence should have
been admitted for determining alimony, debt distribution, and community property
distribution. Whether charging attorney Zach Coughlin, Esq. to pay the opposing
party's attorney's fees was an abuse of discretion or otherwise inappropriate and not
supported with sufficiently specific detail or based on appropriate grounds in Judge
Gardner's Order After Trial. Whether the $1.00 per year alimony award to Ms. Joshi
is insufficient in light of the facts, evidence presented, existing case law, and the
Tonopah formula for an Appellant who is 46 years old, the parties were married for
21years and had two children during the marriage, the Appellant's education was
received in a foreign country and is not related to her current employment, an
Extended Protection Order was granted against Respondent, and Respondent
developed his skill and earning capacity during the marriage while Appellant spent
more time at home devoted to raising the party's two children. Whether the time for
filing the Notice of Appeal ran from Notice of Entry of the Order After Trial where
the Order After Trial directed John Springgate, Esq. to prepare a Final Decree within
20 days (and this was not done). Whether Mr. Joshi's income was incorrectly stated
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
Page 2
in Judge Gardner's Order After Trial and therefore not an appropriate basis on which
to deny alimony.
Whether John Springgate, Esq. should have been permitted to introduce
exhibits that were not identified in his Pre-Trial Statement (which was filed at 5 p.m.
the day before Trial) and where Mr. Springgate did not provide opposing counsel a
copy of the exhibits introduced at trial at the time they were admitted into evidence,
or fifteen minutes before Trial as ordered in the Pre-Trial Order (rather, Mr.
Springgate indicated that the documents which formed the basis of the exhibits he
introduced at the Trial were provided as part of his client's 16.2 production).
Whether it was inappropriate for Judge Gardner to, during the Settlement Conference,
tell Ms. Joshi's attorney to "shut up" and directed Ms. Joshi to not listen to her
attorney.
I further swear that the responses which 1have made to the questions and
instructions below relating to my ability to pay the cost of prosecuting the appeal are
true.
1. Are you presently employed? Mr. Coughlin is not currently employed.
a. If the answer is yes, state the amount of your salary or wages per month and
give the name and address of your employer. nia
b. If the answer is no, state the date of your last employment and the amount of
the salary and wages per month which you received. Mr. Coughlin was employed,
within the last week, at Washoe Legal Services and received a yearly salary of
approximately $50,000,
2. Have you received within the past twelve months any income from a business,
profession or other form of self-employment, or in the form of rent payments, interest,
dividends, or other source? No.
a. If the answer is yes, describe each source of income, and state the amount
received from each during the past twelve months. nia
3. Do you own any cash or checking or savings account?
Page 3
a. If the answer is yes, state the total value of the items owned. Mr. Coughlin has
approximately $8,000 in a checking account.
4. Do you own any real estate, stocks, bonds, notes, automobiles, or other
valuable property (excluding ordinary household furnishings and clothing)? No.
a. If the answer is yes, describe the property and state its approximate value: Mr.
Coughlin owns a 1996 Honda Accord worth approximately $2,000.
5. List the persons who are dependent upon you for support and state your
relationship to those persons. n/a.
6.
I have total monthly expenses of approximately $2,200.
I understand that a false statement or answer to any question in this affidavit will
subject me to penalties for perjury.
c_av6104-1-oN1
Cou_o 0-t
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SUBS BED AND SWORN to before me this day of May, 2009)
b/
A-A- Zael,
a
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bVe(--
Notary Public II
........ 1 .1"1111101101 .... 1.1114.11.11. ....................... 1.11.11141...... I...
KIMBERLY K. FOSTER
Notary Putotio - State of Nevada
Appointment Recorded in Washoe County
No: 98-0552-2 - Expires July 13, 2011
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Page 4
ORDER
Let the applicant proceed without prepayment of costs or fees or the necessity of
giving security therefor.
DATED this ................. day of ....... 2009
District Judge
Dated this 12' day of May, 2009:
/signature/ Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Nevada Bar. No. 9473
945 W.12
th
St., Reno, NV 89503
Tel: 775 338 8118
Page 5
CERTIFICATE OFSERVICE AND MAILING
Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certify that 1am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq. and that on
the 12
th
Day of May, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OFMOTION TO PROCEED ON
APPEALTN FORMA PAUPERIS fully addressed to:
203S. Arlington Ave.
Reno, NV 89501
Reno, NV 89501
Judge Linda Gardner
Dept. 14
Second Judicial District Court
Washoe County
social security number of arty person.
Dated this 12th Day of May, 2009.
/signature/ Melissa Ulloa
Melissa Ulloa
Affidavit in Support of Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis Page 6
IN THE FAMILY DIVISION OFTHE SECOND JUDICIALDISTRICT COURT
OFTHE STATE OFNEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OFWASHOE
* * *
X 14
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A.
Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an X.
YES NO
1. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in this
case? If y_, then continue to Question 2. If no, you do not
need to answer any other
q
uestions.
chan
g
e a final order? If yes, then continue to Question 3. If
no you do not need to answer anv other
q
uestions.
chan
g
e the amount of child support?
Y
within 10 days of the Jud
g
e's Order?
IFthe answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the filin
g
Date
d a t e found on the front pa
g
e of the Jud
g
e's Order.
B. if you answered NO to either Question 1or 2 or YES to Question 3or 4, you are
from the 525.00 filin
g fee. However, if the Court later determines you should have
Filin
g fee, your motion will not be decided until the 525.00 fee is paid.
exempt
paid the
Date: /
1
1 4 ria 2 0 0 Signature:
Print Name: '
.1
2 - 1 1 4 e , J/ f-
tAi,
1
2, '1
Print Address:
FAMILY COURT
(REQUIRED)
CASE NO, VOY - o f / 6 ,
DEPT. NO.
i 1 - 1
N
Telephone Number:
77c
-
5 3 ?/ 1
Rev. 10124/2002
N Y 13
PN 4:
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$1310
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Bar No. 9473
945 W.12
th
St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
No.: DV08-01168 Dept. 14
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
STATE OF NEVADA IN AND FOR
THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
CASE APPEAL STATEMENT
1. Name of appellant filing this case appeal statement: Bharti Joshi and Zach
Coughlin.
Identify the judge issuing the decision, judgment, or order appealed from:
Judge Linda Gardner, Department 14, Second Judicial District Court.
3. Identify all parties to the proceedings in the district court: Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff Bharti Joshi, Defendant.
4. Identify all parties involved in this appeal: Bharti Joshi and Zach Coughlin,
Appellants. Ashwin Joshi, Respondent.
5. Zach Coughlin, Esq., is the attorney for Bharti Joshi and Zach Coughlin.
Case Appeal Statement Page I
Mr. Coughlin is no longer with Washoe Legal Services. Mr. Coughlin's address
is: 945 W.12
th
St., Reno, NV 89503; Tel: 775 338 8118.
John Springgate, Esq. is the attorney for Ashwin Joshi. Mr. Springgate's
address is 203 S. Arlington Ave., Reno, NV 89501; Tel: 775 323 8881.
6. Indicate whether appellant was represented by appointed or retained counsel in
the district court: Appellant filed a Statement of Legal Aid Representation as she was
represented by Zach Coughlin, Esq. of Washoe Legal Services, counsel which she
retained.
7. Indicate whether appellant is represented by appointed or retained counsel on
appeal: Bharti Joshi is represented by Zach Coughlin, Esq.; Zach Coughlin, Esq. is
also representing himself with respect to the order that he personally pay Mr. Joshi's
attorney's fees.
8. Indicate whether appellant was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and
the date of entry of the district court order granting such leave: Applicant has not
heard received and Order from Dept. 14 with regard to this issue though an Affidavit
in Support of Motion to Proceed on Appeal In Forma Pauperis was filed.
9. indicate the date the proceedings commenced in the district court (e.g., date
complaint, indictment, information, or petition was filed): A Complaint for Divorce
was filed July l , 2008 by Ashwin Joshi.
Dated this 12t
h
day of May, 2009 by:
/signat e/ Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
945 W.12
th
St., Reno, NV 89503
Tel: 775 338 8118
Case Appeal Statement Page 2
the 12
th
Day of May, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within Case Appeal Statement, fully addressed to:
John Springgate, Esq.
Attorney for Ashwin Bharti
Reno, NV 8950!
Reno, N V 89501
Dated this 12
th
Day of May, 2009.
/signature/ elissa Ulloa
Melissa Ulloa
Case Appeal Statement Page 3
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CODE:
INTHE FAMILYDIVISION
OFTHESECONDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURTOFTHESTATEOFNEVADA
IN ANDFORTHECOUNTYOFWASHOE
ASHWINJOSHI,
Plaintiff, CaseNo. DV08-01l68
v.
Dept.No. 14
BHARTIJOSHI,
Defendant.
-------------/
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION
Uponreviewofthepleadingsandpapersfiledherein,theCourtfindsandOrders
asfollows.
Initially,theCourtwouldlike to clarifyithastakenunderdeliberationonlythose
portionsofthemotionwhicharerelevanttotheawardofattorney'sfees. Baseduponthe
'NoticeofSubstitutionofCounsel'filed May14,2009,Ms.Joshihaschosentoretain
WashoeLegalServicestorepresentherfor the remainderofthiscaseintheplaceand
steadofMr.Coughlin,andrequestsafinaldecreeofdivorceenteredassoonaspossible.
(Notice,1:15-21).
Apartymovingfor reconsiderationmustdosowithinten(10)daysofthenoticeof
entryoftheorderatissue. WDCR12(8). If timelyfiled,motionsfor reconsiderationare
onlyappropriatelygrantedwhenthecourthasmisapprehendedor madeamistake
regardingapertinentcasefact or issueoflaw. Haroeq'e Wagon Wheel, Inc. v. MacSween, 96
Nev.215,606P.2d1095(1980). This typeofmotionmaynotbe usedto presentnew
F I L E D
Electronically
05-21-2009:11:27:19 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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information or to reargue a previously litigated issue. In Re Ross, 99 Nev. 657, 688 P.2d
1089 (1983); see also DCR 13(7).
A 'Notice of Entry of Order' was filed April 13, 2009. Pursuant to WDCR 12(8),
Mr. Coughlin should have filed the request for reconsideration by April 27, 2009.
Mr. Coughlin filed a 'Request for Adjustment of Filing Date or Extension of Time' on
April 29, 2009, in which he indicates he II attempted to file a timely Request for
Reconsideration on eFile, however, a technical deficiency regarding the signature line
resulted in a rejection of the filing." (Request,l:17-1:19). This pleading was never
submitted to the Court for a decision and Mr. Coughlin was never granted leave to file his
motion. Mr. Coughlin then proceeded to file a 'Request for Reconsideration; Request for
Extension of Time to Respond' on April 30, 2009.
Despite the procedural deficiencies, the Court finds a review of the substantive
argument presented herein is warranted in consideration of the grave nature of the Court'
holding that Mr. Coughlin is to personally pay opposing counsel's trial fees.
(1) Counsel defended a civil action or proceeding in this Court where such action or
defense was not warranted by existing law, or there was no good faith argument
for a modification of existing law -
Mr. Coughlin urges the Court to reconsider its ruling that he maintained and
defended this action without existing law, or made no good faith argument to change
existing law. Mr. Coughlin contends his position throughout this case was that his client i
entitled to more than $1.00 in alimony per year in exchange for Mr. Joshi taking on over
$20,000.00of consumer debt. (Request, 9:23-9:27). Mr. Coughlin cites to various opinions
submitted by courts across the country to support the proposition that a II debt to a third
party creditor may not be used to properly offset an alimony obligation." (Request, 1:18 -
11:21, 15:11-21:7). The persuasive authority presented herein was never submitted to the
Court prior to this time and thereby cannot be taken into account as it attempts to present
new evidence to support an already litigated issue.
/ / /
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The Court understands from this motion that Mr. Coughlin's position was that his
client was willing to take on community debt so long as she also received an alimony
award. It has become apparent that Mr. Coughlin's underlying intent was to create a
'judgment proof' client in that she would ultimately not be able to pay the community
debt allocated to her, but her alimony payments would remain intact. Mr. Coughlin asks
" [w]hat should or would happen if Ms. Joshi was granted alimony and subsequently
moved to discharge her share of the community debt in bankruptcy or simply just failed to
pay these debts?" (Request, 19:21-19:25). Mr. Coughlin's answer to this question is that"a
support obligation (alimony too, not just child support) should be upheld even where the
supported party has failed to live up to the debt distribution terms of a Court's divorce
decree." (Request, 20:1-20:3). Mr. Coughlin advocated for this position although he knew
third party creditors could, and likely would, ultimately go after Mr. Joshi when his client
failed to pay the community debt allocated to her in the decree of divorce. (Mr. Coughlin
states"creditors of such community debt are unaffected by anything in a divorce decree
from pursuing either of the parties for repayment... [and] it is typically very difficult to
pursue a spouse who is not a cosigner with respect to using that spouses separate property
[to] cover any community debt" and " [s]hould Ms. Joshi have been ordered to pay half of
the community credit card debt (for which her personal property probably could not be
used to satisfy as she was not a cosigner on nearly all of the accounts), any subsequent
failure on her part to do so could likely not be used as a proper basis to set off any alimony
award received." (Request 10:24-10:27; 17:3-17:11).
Mr. Springgate contends Mr. Coughlin's position lacks merit pursuant to
NRS 125.150 and Siragusa v. Siragusa, as it is well established that this Court has
jurisdiction to modify an award of alimony when one party fails to pay their attributed
share of the community debt. 108 Nev. 987, 843 P.2d 807 (1992). Mr. Springgate specifies it
has been Mr. Coughlin's position that Ms. Joshi preferred an equal distribution of debt in
addition to an award of alimony so that she could continue to collect alimony even if she
failed to pay her half of the community debt. Mr. Springgate contends Mr. Coughlin's
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pursuit of this matter was vexatious and frivolous "in that it was not grounded under
existing law, and in fact, was essentially urging a distribution of debts and assets in bad
faith." (Opp.5:11-5:13).
Mr. Coughlin has presented various decisions by courts throughout the United
States in support of his position on alimony and the distribution of community debts.
However, as stated above, the argument and case law presented herein were never
presented to the Court prior to this time. As such, there is no valid argument that the
court has misapprehended or made a mistake regarding a pertinent case fact or issue of
law when Mr. Coughlin is presenting argument and persuasive authority for the first time
in an attempt to re-litigate the issue. Not only did Mr. Coughlin fail to present any of the
argument contained herein at trial, he also failed to present any relevant Nevada law
regarding alimony at trial to sustain the contention that his client was entitled to such
support.
Overall, this portion of Mr. Coughlin's motion lends credence to this Court's
finding that his presentation of the case and arguments in support thereof were
unfounded in fact, unwarranted by existing law, unreasonable, and vexatious (Order,
13:11-13:13). At no point does Mr. Coughlin demonstrate that any of the information
contained herein was presented at trial for the Court to take into consideration. Further,
Mr. Coughlin acknowledges he advocated for a 'judgment proof' client and ultimately
contemplated placing Mr. Joshi in such a position that he would be pursued by third party
creditors should Ms. Joshi have been allocated any of the community debt in the decree of
divorce.
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies reconsideration of the award of attorney's
fees.
(2) The Court's 'Order After Trial' is sufficiently detailed and specific to support an
award personally requiring counsel to pay opposing side's attorney's fees -
Mr. Coughlin argues the Court failed to be sufficiently detailed and specific in its
Order with regard to Mr. Coughlin's sanctionable behavior, and with regard to the
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reasonableness of attorney's fees as the Court did not require an affidavit pursuant to
Willer v. Wilfong. (Request, 11:22 - 21:7; 22:10; 24:16).
The Court would direct Mr. Coughlin to review pages 11-13 of its 'Order After
Trial' for specific instances as to why this Court awarded attorney's fees to Mr. Springgate.
As for the contention that Miller was not satisfied, Mr. Coughlin's assertion of Miller
is unmeritorious under these circumstances. The Supreme Court specified that parties
seeking attorney fees in family law cases must support their fee request with affidavits or
other evidence that meets the factors in Brunzell and Wright. 112 Nev. At 623-624.
The Court witnessed first hand any and all evidence required under Brunzell during the
trial as it observed the qualities of the advocate, the character and difficulty of the work
performed, the actual work performed by the attorney, and the result obtained.
As Mr. Springgate is requesting attorney's fees for only that time spent at trial, there is no
need for any additional evidence to support the reasonableness of Mr. Springgate's fees.
Further, the requirement that the Court take into account the disparity in income pursuant
to Wright is nonsensical as the Court is not requiring the fees to be paid by a litigant.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies Mr. Coughlin's request for
reconsideration.
(3) Request for extension of time is denied -
Mr. Coughlin requests he be granted "more time to more fully develop this Motion
for Reconsideration and to access the necessary materials from Washoe Legal Services to
do so, including relevant file, work product, video of trial, and record of correspondences
between opposing counsel and Mr. Coughlin." (Request, 49:24-50:1).
This Court has substantively considered Mr. Coughlin'S 50 page motion despite its
procedural deficiencies. No good cause appears to grant Mr. Coughlin further lenience on
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thismatter. Accordingly,Mr. Coughlin'srequestforanextensionoftimeto morefully
develophis requestfor reconsiderationisdenied.
GOOD CAUSE APPEARING, IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May.z]:2009.

Gardner
DistrictCourtJudge
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Pursuantto NRCP5(b),IcertifythatIamanemployeeofthe SecondJudicial
DistrictCourt,andthatonthe ~ dayof 2009,Idepositedformailing,first
classpostagepre-paid,atReno,Nevada,atrueandcJrectcopyofthe foregoing
documentaddressedto:
Document: Order Denying Request for Reconsideration
ZachCoughlin,Esq.
945W.12
th
Street
Reno,NV89503
IalsocertifythatonthecJ. 1 dayof 2009,Ielectronicallyfiledthe
foregoingwiththeClerkofthe Courtsystemwhichwillsendanoticeofelectronicfilingto
thefollowing:
JohnP.Springgate,Esq.
Marc Ashley,Esq.
~ e ~
AdministrativeAssistant- Dept.14
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Z ach Co ughlin, Esq.
Bar No . 9473
945 W.12
th
St.
Reno , NV 89503
Pho ne 775 338 8118
Atto r ney fo r Z ach Co ughlin
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2009 11
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40

F I NI AL) - YERS
BY
D EPU T
-Dept:4
-
4
r
I NT HE F AMI LY D I VI SI ONOF T HE SECOND JU D I CI AL
D I ST RI CT COU RT OF T HE
ST AT E OF NEVAD A I NAND F OR
T HE COU NT Y OF WASHOE
Ashwin Jo shi,
Plaintiff,
VS
Bhar ti Jo shi,
D efendant
bvc91--o t16

111

REPLY TO OPPOSITION
Co mesNo w, Z ach Co ughlin, Esq., to file thisReply to Oppo sitio n to
Mo tio n F o r Reco nsider atio n o f the Or der After T r ial. T hisReply to Oppo sitio n is
made and based upo n the attached Memo r andum o f Po intsand Autho r ities, Exhibit,
and all the paper sand pleadingso n file in thisactio n
D AT ED this20
th
day o f May, 2009.
ach Co ughlin, Esq
Page 1
Mr . Jo shi'sco unsel'sOppo sitio n to Mo tio n fo r Reco nsider atio n pr esentsand
o ppo r tunity to r eally clar ify so me o f the salient po intsat issue in thislitigatio n. T he
decisio n in thiscase isclear ly er r o neo us. Mr . Spr inggate inco r r ectly asser tsthat two
Settlement Co nfer enceso ccur r ed in thiscase. T hat ispatently inco r r ect. T he ar gument Mr .
Spr ing gate leadswith isthat past due alimo ny isfar differ ent than so o n to be due alimo ny
and ther efo r e the multitude o f case o ffer ed in suppo r t o f denying a set o ff fo r debtsto thir d
par ty cr edito r swith alimo ny ar e no t r elevant.
F ur ther , Mr . Spr inggate makesano ther misstatement when o n page 3 o f his
Oppo sitio n he claimsto quo te fr o m Mr . Co ughlin'sMo tio n fo r Reco nsider atio n, citing that
"cr edito r so f such co mmunity debt ar e unaffected by anything in a divo r ce decr ee fr o m
pur suing either o f the par tiesfo r r epayment. See Mar ine Midland Bank v. Mo nr o e, 104
Nev. 307, 756 1
3
.2d 1193 (1988) (bank isfr ee to pur sue wife fo r delinquent joint credit
card debt despite divo r ce co ur t'so r der fo r husband to pay such debt)." (Emphasisadded).
T hisistr ue, per haps, wer e both spo usesar e signato r iesand o n the cr edit applicatio ns.
I ndeed, the po r tio n Mr . Spr inggate quo tesr efer sto a situatio n invo lving a joint credit card
acco unt, that iswher e bo th spo usesar e signato r ies. T he po int Mr . Spr inggate seemsto be
making isno t so tr ue wher e, asher e, o nly Mr . Jo shi isa signato r y to the cr edit acco untsat
issue. Per hapsthiswasan ano ther inno cent mistake o n Mr . Spr inggate'spar t. Ho wever ,
the ver y next sentence, o n page 17 o f the Reco nsider atio n Mo tio n po intso ut that it "is
typically ver y difficult to pur sue a spo use who isno t a co signer with r espect to using that
spo usessepar ate pr o per ty co ver sany co mmunity debt." Mr . Spr inggate iscur io usly silent
asto wher e the law fallsin that r espect. Given the year sand year so f exper ience that Mr .
Spr inggate r eminded the Co ur t he po ssesses(at o ne po int, dur ing the T r ial he mentio ned
that "while Mr . Co ughlin wasno t pr acticing in tho se unfo r tunate dayswher e fault wasstill
a facto r in an alimo ny analysis, I was...") it wo uld be ver y desir able fo r Mr . Spr inggate to
pr o vide hisinput with r egar d to what cr edito r smight do to execute upo n Ms. Jo shi's
Page 2
pr o per ty in thissituatio n. I n fact, Mr . Spr inggate did, aswill be discussed, make so me
vague ar gumentswith r espect to the do ctr ine o f necessar ies.
Mr . Spr inggate attemptsto encapsulate what he believesMr . Co ughlin'sar gument to
have been when, in hisOppo sitio n, o n page 3, that Mr . Co ughlin'spo sitio n "wasbased o n a
flawed pr emise. He seemed to be ar guing fo r a equal distr ibutio n o f debt, with the
kno wledge that Ms. 3 o shi wo uld essentially be judgment pr o o f because o f her limited assets
and inco me." Her e, again, Mr . Spr inggate cur io usly failsto addr essthe mo r e pr essing issue
that stemsfr o m the fact that hisclient isthe sole signatory o n all the cr edit acco untsat
issue. Per hapsit isthe weaknesso f the do ctr ine o f the necessar iesapplicatio n the factso f
thiscase pr esent that r esult in Mr . Spr inggate'sfailing to pur sue such a line o f ar gument and
instead fo cuso n r elative no n sequitur s, such asMs. Jo shi'spo st-divo r ce inco me o r near
co mplete lack o f assets. I nstead, Mr Spr inggate r ever tsto a tactic he seemsto emplo y just
abo ut ever y time hisar gumentsco me up sho r t, that o f accusing o ppo sing co unsel o f "bad
faith", and usually, calling fo r sanctio ns. T o the extent that no r eal pr ecedent iso ffer ed in
suppo r t o f such an assessment, Mr . Spr inggate'sar gument ar e veer ing, r egr ettably to the ad
ho minem.
Again, o n line 28, page 3 o f hisOppo sitio n, Mr . Spr inggate misstatesNevada law, in
spite o f hismany, many year so f exper ience. With r egar d to the asser tio n that any failur e o n
Ms. Jo shi'spart to fulfill an o bligatio n to pay a third party creditor stemming fr o m a divo r ce
decr ee co uld no t be pr o per ly used to set o ff a spo usal suppo r t o bligatio n, Mr . Spr inggate
no t o nly br ingsin an ar gument that iso nly r elevant to situatio nswher e both spouses are
signatories o n a cr edit acco unt and applicatio n, but he go eso n to seemingly misstate
Nevada law asit r elatesto the Co ur t'sability to r educe a suppo r ted spo usesalimo ny awar d
wher e the suppo r ted spo use failed to fulfill so me debt distr ibutio n ter m in a decr ee. Mr .
Spr inggate statesthat hisclient co uld "mo ve the Court for amodification of his alimony
awar d to r educe the same." Mr . Spr inggate may have been able to get so me o ppo sing par ty
o r o ppo sing co unsel to agr ee to so me settlement alo ng tho se lines, but Nevada law wo uld
seemingly pr event (o r at least str o ngly ar gue against) tho se Nevada D istr ict Co ur tsbo und
Page 3
by U pto n-Wheeler fr o m enter ing such a mo dificatio n under such cir cumstances. T hisis
discussed in mo r e detail, mfra. Mr . Co ughlin do esadmit that he isno t sur e the extent to
which U pto n-Wheeler wo uld pr event a co ur t fr o m enter ing a mo dificatio n o f an alimo ny
awar d based o n a suppo r ted spo usesfailur e to co mply with a debt distr ibutio n, ho wever ,
the pr ecedent do esseem to pr eclude an o ffset. T he differ ence between an "o ffset" and a
"mo dificatio n" seem dubio us, o r at least, difficult to fully under stand.
Pur suant to NRS 7.085, if a co ur t findsthat an atto r ney has: "(a) filed, maintained o r
defended a civil actio n o r pr o ceeding in any co ur t in thisState and such actio n o r defense is
no t well-gr o unded in fact o r isno t war r anted by existing law o r by an ar gument fo r
changing the existing law that ismade in go o d faith; o r (b) unr easo nably and vexatio usly
extended a civil actio n o r pr o ceeding befo r e any co ur t in thisState, the co ur t shall r equir e
the atto r ney per so nally to pay the additio nal co sts, expensesand atto r ney'sfeesr easo nably
incur r ed because o f such co nduct." Neither basisissuppo r ted by the r eco r d with r egar d to
the sanctio n issued.
T he Co ur t'sOr der After T r ial isno t sufficiently detailed no r specific eno ugh to be
upheld. T he Co ur t'sOr der , with r espect to atto r ney'sfees(set fo r th belo w), givesa br o ad
indicatio n o f what it wasMr . Co ughlin did that it fo und o bjectio nable I t do esno t
specifically identify which actio nsvio lated NRS 7.085(a) o r which vio lated NRS 7.085(b).
F ur ther , the Co ur t impr o per ly r elied o n 'testimo ny' by o ppo sing co unsel Spr inggate. Mr .
Spr inggate wasnever swo r n in, no r did he pr o vide any affidavitsto suppo r t hisvar io us
asser tio ns, including the extent to which Mr Co ughlin co nducted disco ver y, the amo unt
and difficulty o f the wo r k Mr . Spr inggate per fo r med, the extent to which Mr . Spr inggate
himself sent o ut any disco ver y, etc.
T he no testhat Mr . Co ughlin "made sar castic, der o gato r y r emar ks_thr o ugho ut the
tr ial..". Ho wever , aside fr o m quo ting Mr . Co ughlin in o ne instance wher e Mr . Co ughlin
co r r ectly po inted o ut that Mr Spr inggate wasno t in co mpliance with co ur t r uleswith
r espect to hisattemptsto enter exhibitsinto evidence at tr ial, the Co ur t never pr o videsany
specificity o r detail with r egar d to ho w Mr . Co ughlin'sco nduct was"sar castic" o r
Page 4
"der o gato r y
-
. T hisallo wslittle to no tr anspar ency and per mitsan imper missible amo unt o f
unfetter ed discr etio n to the Co ur t. T he po tential fo r abuse issimply to high to upho ld a
sanctio n wher e o nly mer e br o ad, gener al, and co ncluso r y basisar e o ffer ed asthe Co ur t's
fo r the sanctio ns. T he po tential fo r sanctio nsbeing handed do wn because o f a mer e
differ ence o f philo so phy, po litical ideo lo gy, viewpo int, o r o ther imper missible char acter istic
must be str o ngly cur tailed.
T hisispar ticular ly tr ue in family co ur t wher e temper sr un ho t, the subject matter is
quite emo tio nal and per so nal, and the demandso n the Co ur t, atto r ney's, and litigantsar e
high. Atto r ney'sliability under state law fo r o ppo sing par ty'sco unsel fees, 56 A.L.R.4th
486 See Anno tatio n: What co nduct co nstitutesmultiplying pr o ceedingsunr easo nably and
vexatio usly so asto war r ant impo sitio n o f liability o n co unsel under 28 U 1927 fo r
excessco sts, expenses, and atto r ney fees, 81 A, L.R. F ed. 36 (the Co mmittee Minutesfr o m
the Nevada Legislatur e'sdiscussio nso f NRS 7.085 indicate that thisfeder al statute and
F RCP Rule 11
played a significant r o le in the fo r mulatio n o f NRS 7.085, see Exhibit #1)
(T hisCo ur t o ften r efer encesthe legislative histo r y o f statutesand amendmentsto statutes,
to ver ify the intended o bjectsand go also f legislatio n, and o ften makesr efer ence to the
pr o po sed o bjective o f statuto r y amendments, and the co mmentso f tho se pr o po sing the
changes, to ensur e that the inter pr etatio n o f statutesisco nsistent with legislative intent
See, e g., Stewar d v. Stewar d, 111 Nev. 295, 890 P.2d 777 (1995) (explo r ing bill dr aft and
quo ting co mmittee minutesat length to ensur e that the Co ur t'sinter pr etatio n was
"co nsistent with the intent o f the legislatur e" in enacting the pr o visio n), Jo seph F . Sanso n
I nvestment v. 286 Limited, 106 Nev. 429, 795 P.2d 493 (1990) (no ting that co mmittee
minuteswo uld be r eviewed to discer n legislative intent and pur po se if such minutes
existed), Wheeler v. U pto n-Wheeler , 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997) (same);
McKellar v. McKellar , 110 Nev. 200, 871 P.2d 296 (1994) (r eviewing 1987
amendment to child suppo r t statute fo r legislative intent). Mr . Spr inggate'sOppo sitio n
makesmentio n o f the clear intent o f the legislatur e with r egar d to NRS 7, 085. I t isno t
clear fr o m wher e o r with what Mr . Spr inggate wasable to divine the intent o f the
Page 5
legislatur e Exhibit A, attached her eto , isa co mpr ehensive co llectio n o f all r elevant
Co mmittee Minutesand o ther do cumentatio n r elated to the Legislatur escr eatio n and
subsequent amendmentsto NRS 7.085.
T her e isa wealth o f autho r ity to suppo r t a r equir ement o f specific and detailed
findingsin a Co ur t'so r der ing sanctio ns. I n the fo llo wing cases, the co ur tsheld o r
r eco gnized that specific findingsby the tr ial co ur t wer e r equir ed befo r e an atto r ney co uld be
assessed with hiso ppo nent'sfees. Majo r v F ir st Va. Bank (1993) 97 Md App 520, 631
A2d 127 (RI CO claim; $25, 000 fo r co unsel fees).
I n O'Br ien v Cseh (1983, 2d D ist) 148 Cal App 3d 957, 196 Cal Rptr 409 ( 12[b]), the
co ur t fo und that an o r der by the tr ial co ur t assessing atto r ney feesagainst co unsel and
giving o nly "go o d cause appear ing" asa r easo n fo r the sanctio n failed to meet the statuto r y
r equir ement o f a detailed r ecital o f the cir cumstancesjustifying the impo sitio n o f sanctio ns.
T he co ur t r ever sed an awar d o f feesagainst an atto r ney that wasimpo sed by the tr ial
co ur t witho ut any finding asto the actual co stsincur r ed by the o ppo sing par ties, in City o f
El Mo nte v T akei (1984, 2d D ist) 158 Cal App 3d 244, 204 Cal Rptr 559 ( 9[a]). T he case
wasr emanded fo r a hear ing to deter mine r easo nable expensesand co unsel fees, since under
the applicable co ur t r ulesthe sanctio nswer e limited to that amo unt.
I n Char lesv Char les(1986, D ist Co l App) 505 A2d 462 ( 4[a]), the co ur t r ever sed an
assessment o f atto r ney feesagainst an atto r ney, wher e the tr ial co ur t had failed to make a
specific finding o f bad faith. T he co ur t stated that it iswithin the inher ent autho r ity o f tr ial
co ur tsto assessatto r ney feesagainst an atto r ney who hasacted in bad faith, if the sanctio n
isimpo sed after fair no tice and an o ppo r tunity fo r a hear ing o n the r eco r d. But altho ugh
co unsel'sco nduct in thiscase made an assessment o f feesappr o pr iate, and ther e had been
fair no tice and a hear ing o n the plaintiffsmo tio n fo r atto r ney fees, the co ur t decided that
the absence o f a specific finding o f bad faith r equir ed r ever sal and r emand fo r a new hear ing
dir ected to that issue.
Befo r e a pr o per finding o f a fr ivo lo usclaim may be made under a statute autho r izing fee
awar dsagainst atto r neyso n that basis, it isnecessar y fo r the tr ial co ur t to find that the
Page 6
atto r ney knew that the actio n waswitho ut any r easo nable basisin law and co uld no t be
suppo r ted by a go o d-faith ar gument fo r an extensio n, mo dificatio n, o r r ever sal o f existing
law, held the co ur t, in Radlein v I ndustr ial F ir e & Casualty I ns. Co . (1984) 117 Wis2d 605,
345 NW2d 874. T he co ur t stated a two -pr o nged test fo r deter mining an atto r ney's
r espo nsibility in sanctio nsfo r co mmencing a fr ivo lo usactio n: fir st, isthe law r eady fo r an
extensio n, mo dificatio n, o r r ever sal; and if no t, then seco nd, wasthe ar gument fo r such
change made in go o d faith even tho ugh no t successful. F r ivo lo usactio n claimsar e an
especially delicate ar ea, said the co ur t, since the ingenuity, fo r esightedness, and co mpetency
o f the bar sho uld be enco ur aged and no t stifled. I n thiscase, ho wever , the co ur t decided
that a special hear ing befo r e the tr ial co ur t o n the issue o f fr ivo lo usnesswasno t necessar y,
because the atto r ney had been placed o n no tice to defend hispo sitio n bo th in the tr ial co ur t
and o n appeal. T he co ur t affir med the awar d against the atto r ney, o bser ving that ther e was
no po ssible r easo nable ar gument fo r histheo r y,
See Williamsv CappsT r ailer Sales, I nc. (1992, Ala App) 607 So 2d 1272, 6[a].
T r ial co ur t did no t satisfy r equir ementsfo r exer cising itsinher ent autho r ity to impo se
atto r ney feesagainst an atto r ney fo r bad faith co nduct when it o r der ed husband'sco unsel to
r emit o ne half o f hisfeesr eceived to wife'sco unsel, wher e tr ial co ur t did no t per mit
husband'sco unsel to pr esent witnesseso r o ther evidence in hisdefense, tr ial co ur t did no t
make an expr essfinding o f bad faith o r findingsjustifying the r elief o r der ed, and o r der did
no t sho w ho w the feesawar ded dir ectly r elated to the feesincur r ed asa r esult o f the alleged
bad faith co nduct by husband'sco unsel. F ino l v. F ino l, 912 So . 2d 627 (F la. D ist Ct. App.
4th D ist. 2005), r elated r efer ence, 2005 WL 2373889 (F la. D ist Ct. App. 4th D ist. 2005)
and r eh'g denied, (No v. 7, 2005).
Petitio ner 'sr equest fo r co stsand expenseso f litigatio n, including atto r ney fees, did no t
pr o vide no tice to r espo ndent'satto r ney that she co uld be held liable fo r atto r ney feesunder
statute that awar ded feesin situatio nswher e an atto r ney br o ught o r defended an actio n that
lacked substantial justificatio n; ther e wasno mo tio n r equesting atto r ney feesfr o m atto r ney,
ther e wasno mentio n that the tr ial co ur t wasco nsider ing an awar d against atto r ney, and the
Page 7
no tice o f the hear ing co ntained no r efer ence to the statute that awar ded feesagainst
atto r neysfo r br inging o r defending an actio n that lacked substantial justificatio n o r to the
po ssibility that atto r ney co uld be assessed atto r ney feesfo r her co nduct; o ver r uling Co hen
v F eldman, 219 Ga.App. 90, 464 S.E.2d 237 West'sGa.Co de Ann. 9-15-14(b). Williams
v. Co o per , 625 S.E.2d 754 (Ga. 2006). See Kukui Nutso f Hawaii, I nc v R Bair d & Co .
(1990, Hawaii App) 789 P2d 501.
F ur ther , it canno t be said that Mr . Co ughlin unr easo nably and vexatio usly extended a
civil actio n o r pr o ceeding befo r e any co ur t in thisState. I n Eber ly v Eber ly (1985, D el Sup)
489 A2d 433, a divo r ce actio n, the co ur t assessed atto r ney feesagainst a lawyer who has
acted in bad faith o r willfully abused the judicial pr o cess, sanctio ning the wife'satto r ney fo r
tacticsthat unr easo nably and vexatio usly pr o lo nged the pr o ceedingsand incr eased the co st
o f r epr esentatio n to bo th par ties. T hese tacticsincluded filing r epeated mo tio nsto ho ld the
husband in co ntempt fo r failur e to pay alimo ny o n time, even tho ugh the husband was
ho spitalized and had explained to the tr ial co ur t the go o d faith effo r tshe wasmaking to
meet hiso bligatio ns, and advising hisclient to deny that the mar r iage wasir r etr ievably
br o ken even tho ugh she had made such an allegatio n her self, in o r der to delay the
pr o ceedings. T he co ur t o r der ed the amo unt o f the husband'sr easo nable atto r ney fees
attr ibutable to such tactics, bo th at tr ial and o n appeal, to be deter mined o n r emand and
assessed against the wife'satto r ney per so nally.
T he extent to which the Co ur t deemed Mr . Co ughlin co nduct to be vexatio uso r
unr easo nably pr o lo nging the pr o ceedingsin thisactio n seemsto r est o n a finding that Mr .
Co ughlin "ar gued incessantly with the Co ur t thr o ugho ut tr ial and made sar castic,
der o gato r y r emar ksto the Co ur t, Mr . Spr inggate, and Mr . Jo shi thr o ugho ut tr ial. T he
Co ur t no testhat ther e wer e well o ver 40 o bjectio nsdur ing fo ur (4) ho ur so f tr ial." Mr .
Co ughlin iso bliged to make such o bjectio nsgiven that hisfailur e to do so will pr event the
pr eser vatio n o f the var io usissuesfo r appeal. Atto r ney'sin Nevada'sD istr ict Co ur tsar e
no t o bligated to take a co ntinuing o bjectio n and co ntempo r aneo uso bjectio nsar e
suppo r table co nduct under all applicable r ules. One o f Mr Co ughlin'sar gumentswith
Page 8
r espect to an o bjectio n co ncer ned the admissibility o f evidence o f abuse o r do mestic
vio lence fo r the pur po seso f establishing mo netar y damagesto be co nsider ed in the pr o per ty
o r debt distr ibutio n aswell asany alimo ny deter minatio n T her e isNevada case law that
ar guably setsthe pr ecedent that the admissio n o f evidence o f such co nduct fo r the pur po se
o ffer ed ismandato r y. See Cather ine Mazzeo , No te, Ro dr iguez v Ro dr iguez: F ault asa
D eter minative F acto r in Alimo ny Awar dsin Nevada and Other Co mmunity Pr o per ty
Jur isdictio ns, 2 NEV. L.J. 177, 182-83 (2002). T he eco no mic co nsequenceso f spo usal
abuse o r mar ital misco nduct can pr o vide co mpelling r easo nsfo r unequal dispo sitio n o f
co mmunity pr o per ty. Wheeler v. U pto n-Wheeler , 113 Nev. 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997).
I n Ro dr iguez, the Nevada Supr eme Co ur t added example o f facto r sthat "co nceivably co uld
fr o m time to time be r elevant aswell" such as"r epetitive actso f physical o r mental abuse"
by o ne spo use "causing a co nditio n in the injur ed spo use which gener atesexpense o r affects
that per so n'sability to wo r k." I n Wheeler , the Nevada Supr eme Co ur t "r eco gnized that
so metimesmar ital misco nduct r esultsin adver se eco no mic co nsequencesfo r o ne o f the
par ties." 113 Nev. at 1190, 946 P.2d at 203. "We deter mined that a distr ict co ur t may
co nsider evidence o f the eco no mic co nsequenceso f mar ital misco nduct in deter mining
whether an unequal divisio n o f co mmunity pr o per ty iswar r anted." See id.
F ur ther , the Ro dr iguez Co ur t seemed to suggest that evidence o f spo usal abuse co uld
facto r in to an alimo ny analysis, no t so much asa fault facto r , but asa par t o f an analysiso f
the facto r sspecifically set fo r th by statute o r Buchanan. "Mo r eo ver , an exceptio n is
unnecessar y. Nevada haswell settled case law that pr o videsguidelinesfo r the tr ial co ur t to
co nsider when making a just and equitable alimo ny awar d. So , fo r example, if o ne spo use
co mmitsr epetitive actso f physical o r mental abuse against the o ther , causing a co nditio n in
the injur ed spo use which gener atesexpense o r affectsthat per so n'sability to wo r k, the
physical and/o r mental co nditio n caused by the misco nduct can be taken into acco unt in two
ways: fir st, asa co mpelling r easo n to make an unequal distr ibutio n o f pr o per ty o r second,
without considering evidence of fault or misconduct, the co ur t in deciding alimo ny will,
per Buchanan, take that spo use'sphysical and mental co nditio n into acco unt when
Page 9
examining hiso r her financial co nditio n, health and ability to wo r k." I d. at 998-99.
Mr . Co ughlin so ught to have thisissue intr o duced at tr ial fo r bo th debt distr ibutio n and
alimo ny, ho wever the Co ur t r uled against it. T o the extent that the sanctio nsissued r elate
to a lack o f evidence pr esented, do cumentar y o r o ther wise, such an inadmissibility r uling
pr esentsa Catch-22 Mr . Co ughlin sho uld no t be sanctio ned in such a situatio n.
Mr . Spr inggate seemingly misstated the ho lding o f the Nevada Supr eme Co ur t in
Ro dr iguez to the Co ur t. Mr . Co ughlin sho uld no t be sanctio ned fo r ar guing o bjectio ns
based o n mandato r y pr ecedent in suppo r t o f hispo sitio n at tr ial. A similar ar gument exists
fo r Mr . Co ughlin o bjecting to Mr . Spr inggate'svio latio n o f WD CR 5 and the Co ur t'so wn
Pr e-T r ial Or der with r espect to attempting to have exhibitsintr o duced into evidence
witho ut pr o per ly identifying such exhibitspr evio usly and wher e Mr . Spr inggate failed to
co mply with co ur t r ulesby neglecting to pr o vide an appr o pr iate co py o f such exhibitsat the
appr o pr iate time.
T he Co ur t'sOr der After T r ial isinstr uctive in po inting o ut the differ ence between
pr o viding a co py o f a do cument and pr o viding a co py o f an appr o pr iately identified and
mar ked exhibit. "When asked if he had the co py o f the do cument, Mr . Co ughlin stated, "I
do no t kno w I co uld spend my time and mental ener gy lo o king ar o und fo r Mr . Spr inggate's
do cument like I am hisassistant, o r we co uld ask Mr . Spr inggate to pr o vide a co py at the
time he isseeking admissio n like I believe the r ule states." Mr . Co ughlin cited no r ule and
then pr o ceeded to inter r upt the pr o ceedingstwice appr o ximately five (5) minutesand
twelve(12) minutespo st r uling to r e-ar gue the po int. Mr . Spr inggate r eplied to the
ar gumentsby r efer encing when exactly the co py had been pr o vided to Mr . Co ughlin dur ing
disco ver y and wher e the co py co uld be lo cated. T he Co ur t had to admo nish Mr . Co ughlin
to quit ar guing the po int and r eiter ated that the exhibit had been admitted." (Emphasis
added).
T her e isa significant differ ence between a do cument and an exhibit. An inappr o pr iate
advantage isgr anted a par ty who can deliver a lar ge quantity o f do cumentsin the 16.2
pr o ductio n, o nly to subsequently fail to ever pr o per ly mar k o r identify which o f these
Page 10
do cumentsit cho o sesto make exhibits, and who then r efusesto pr o vide a co py o f the .
exhibit at the time itsintr o ductio n isso ught at tr ial. T hisplacesan inappr o pr iate bur den o n
the r eceiving par ty to index, catego r ize, and maintain the 16.2 pr o ductio n o f the par ty
seeking intr o ductio n o f a do cument asan exhibit. WD CR 5 wasenacted fo r a r easo n, and
thisver y situatio n ar guesin favo r o f enfo r cing WD CR 5 and the Co ur t'so wn Pr e-T r ial
Or der Gr anting Mr . Spr inggate such an advantage isunfair , par ticular ly wher e Mr .
Spr inggate never filed a Case Management Co nfer ence Statement, filed hisSettlement
Co nfer ence Statement at 5 p m. the day befo r e tr ial (in co ntr aventio n o f WD CR 5 aswell),
i
mpr o per ly indicated in hisOppo sitio n to the Mo tio n fo r Reco nsider atio n that two
Settlement Co nfer enceshad taken place in thiscase when o nly o ne existed (and the o ne
Settlement Co nfer ence wasactually co mbined with the fir st day atr ial in defer ence to Mr .
Spr inggate'sr equest and suggestio n that the par tiesdo so in the inter est o f judicial
eco no my and, pr esumably, to keep Mr . Spr inggate'sfeesdo wn fo r hisclient'sbenefit), and
wher e Mr . Spr inggate failed to co mply with the Co ur t'sdir ectio n that he dr aft a F inal
D ecr ee fr o m the Co ur t'sOr der After T r ial within 20 dayso f that Or der 'sdate o f entr y.
Mr . Spr inggate ho ldso ppo sing co unsel to an extr ao r dinar ily high standar d co nsider ing
so me o f the ar easin which hiso wn executio n islacking. F ur ther , Mr . Spr inggate actually
tr ied to ar gue that o ppo sing co unsel'spr udence in seeking to ascer tain the availability. o f
having Mr . Jo shi'spasspo r t put in the Co ur t'scusto dy pending the r eso lutio n o f thismatter
o r the state o f the law with r egar d to the pr o pr iety o f a spo use r etaining the o ther spo use's
passpo r t dur ing a divo r ce pr o ceeding wastantamo unt to exto r tio n. Mr . Spr inggate was
thr eatening sanctio nseven at that ear ly stage o f thislitigatio n. Sur pr isingly Mr . Spr inggate
did no t asser t a RI CO o r F D CPA claim at that time aswell. Mr . Jo shi'sfailur e ever co ntact
anyo ne in hisfamily with r egar d to r etur ning Ms. Jo shi's"wo man'swealth" o r Mr . Jo shi's
dubio usinability to r emember anything abo ut hiscultur e'scusto msin thisr egar d seemingly
wer e no t r elevant to Mr . Spr inggate'spasspo r t issue analysis.
Regar dless, Judge Schumacher did no t see fit to enter sanctio ns, assuch, the law o f the
case do ctr ine bar sJudge Gar dner fr o m r elying o n that issue to suppo r t the pr esent sanctio n.
Page 11
I t issimply in po o r taste fo r co unsel to co nstantly use the thr eat o f sanctio nsin lieu o f
actually pr o ducing so me wr itten legal autho r ity o r pr ecedent to suppo r t the po sitio nsMr
Spr inggate seeksto maintain. I t seemsMr . Spr inggate wo uld r ather pr efer to attempt to
intimidate, thr eaten calling fo r sanctio ns, o r suggest what a small little co mmunity the family
law bar isand ho w quickly wo r d getsar o und, aso ppo sed to pr esent co gent legal analysis.
T he Co ur t'sOr der After T r ial fur ther no testhat "Mr . Co ughlin filed an Answer and
Co unter claim o n Ms. Jo shi'sbehalf that included allegatio nsunsuppo r ted by law." Page 13
"T he par tieshave two childr en, bo th o f who m ar e no w adults. Altho ugh Mr . Yo shi (sic)
hasno o bligatio n to suppo r t said childr en any lo nger pur suant to NRS 125 510(9)(b), Ms.
Yo shi (sic) r equeststhe financial assistance o f Mr . Yo shi (sic) so asto pr o vide fo r the
childr en'sco ntinuing educatio n. (Answer , pg. 2, lines16-18)." I d. at page 2 Mr Co ughlin
clear ly stated, o n sever al o ccasio ns, dur ing the Settlement Co nfer ence, to Ms. Jo shi and
Judge Gar dner , that ther e waslittle suppo r t fo r the claim Ms. Jo shi co ntinued to ur gently
implo r e Mr . Co ughlin to pr esent, that o f suppo r t fo r the co ntinuing educatio n o f the par ty's
childr en, who bo th r ecently r eached the age o f majo r ity. Mr . Co ughlin co unseled Ms. Jo shi,
in fr o nt o f Judge Gar dner and o ut lo ud, that ther e waslittle to no chance that Judge
Gar dner wo uld r ule favo r ably to Ms. Jo shi o n that issue. Mr . Co ughlin'sMo tio n fo r
Reco nsider atio n, ho wever , do esestablish that ther e isa basisin law fo r seeking such a
co ntr ibutio n. Assuch, sanctio nsar e inappr o pr iate to the extent they ar e based o n thisissue,
an issue which no t a seco nd o f co ur t time at tr ial wasspent. Judge Gar dner waspr esent
and acr o ssthe table when Mr . Co ughlin implo r ed hisclient to accept Judge Gar dner 's
str o ng indicatio n that the o ngo ing child suppo r t o r educatio nal co stsco ntr ibutio n issue fo r
the adult childr en wasa dead end that wo uld likely tr y the co ur t'spatience.
"At tr ial, Mr . Spr inggate stated that Mr Co ughlin had co nducted no disco ver y in this
case. I n additio n, Mr Co ughlin failed to pr esent o ne do cumentar y piece o f evidence at tr ial
o n behalf o f Ms. Jo shi'sclaims. Mr . Co ughlin ar gued incessantly with the Co ur t thr o ugho ut
Page 12
tr ial and made sar castic, der o gato r y r emar ksto the Co ur t, Mr . Spr inggate, and Mr Jo shi
thr o ugho ut tr ial. T he Co ur t no testhat ther e wer e well o ver 40 o bjectio nsduring fo ur (4)
ho ur so f tr ial. Mr Spr inggate'so bjectio nswer e well-fo unded and co ntinuo usly sustained
except in o ne instance. Mr . Co ughlin waso ver r uled o n ever y o bjectio n except o ne and
ar gued with the Co ur t o ver mo st r ulings. Mr Co ughlin wasadmo nished appr o ximately 15
timesby the Co ur t to quit ar guing, to ask specific questio ns, to disco ntinue asking
questio nscalling fo r a legal co nclusio n, and to r efr ain fr o m making degr ading r emar ksto
bo th Mr .Jo shi and Mr . Spr inggate. T he Co ur t no testhat at o ne po int, after an exhibit had
been admitted, Mr . Co ughlin co uld no t find the co py pr o vided by Mr . Spr inggate in
disco ver y. Mr . Co ughlin demanded a co py be pr o vided at tr ial, stating"am I suppo sed to be
r ifling thr o ugh my paper s? My under standing isthat yo u ar e suppo sed to pr o vide a co py."
When asked if he had the co py o f the do cument, Mr . Co ughlin stated, "1 do no t kno w. I
co uld spend my time and mental ener gy lo o king ar o und fo r Mr . Spr inggate'sdo cument like
1 am hisassistant, o r we co uld ask Mr . Spr inggate to pr o vide a co py at the time he is
seeking admissio n like I believe the r ule states." Mr . Co ughlin cited no r ule and then
pr o ceeded to inter r upt the pr o ceedingstwice appr o ximately five (5) minutesand twelve(12)
minutespo st r uling to r e-ar gue the po int. Mr . Spr inggate r eplied to the ar gumentsby
r efer encing when exactly the co py had been pr o vided to Mr . Co ughlin dur ing disco ver y
and wher e the co py co uld be lo cated. T he Co ur t had to admo nish Mr . Co ughlin to quit
ar guing the po int and r eiter ate that the exhibit had been admitted Mr . Co ughlin filed an
Answer and Co unter claim o n Ms. Jo shi'sbehalf that included allegatio nsunsuppo r ted by
law; and filed an Oppo sitio n to the r equest fo r r etur n o f Mr . Jo shi'spasspo r t witho ut any
factual o r legal basis. F ur ther , at tr ial, Mr . Co ughlin pr esented almo st no evidence to
suppo r t Ms. Jo shi'sr equestsand claims.
T he mo st tr o ubling aspect o f thiscase wasMr . Co ughlin'sr ude, sar castic and
disr espectful pr esentatio n at tr ial; Mr . Co ughlin'sinability to under stand a balance sheet; his
failur e to co nduct disco ver y; and hislack o f kno wledge with regard to the r uleso f evidence
and tr ial pr o cedur e. All o f thiswasco mpo unded with a co ntinuo usly antago nistic
Page 13
pr esentatio n o f the ease that r esulted in a shift fr o m a fair ly simple divo r ce case to a
co ntentio usdivo r ce tr ial lasting an excessive amo unt o f time.
F o r all these r easo ns, the Co ur t findsthat Mr . Co ughlin'spr esentatio n o f the case and
ar gumentsin suppo r t ther eo f to be unfo unded in fact, unwar r anted by existing law,
unr easo nable, and vexatio usthr o ugho ut thisentir e pr o ceeding."
Mr . Jo shi'sco unsel'sactio nsdid no t unr easo nably and vexatio usly extend a civil actio n
o r pr o ceeding befo r e any co ur t in thisState.
Mr . Co ughlin pr esentsa wealth o f legal pr ecedent and autho r ity in suppo r t o f the
po sitio n taken at tr ial, much co ming fr o m co mmunity pr o per ty jur isdictio ns. I ndeed, the
sum o f Amer ican jur ispr udence suggeststhe majo r ity r ule with r espect to an o ff set o f
alimo ny and jo int o bligatio nsto thir d par tiesisin line with the po sitio n ar gued by Mr .
Co ughlin at tr ial.
F o r example, the r equest to o ffset the husband'spayment o f a pr e-existing jo int
o bligatio n against a suppo r t o bligatio n wasdenied when catego r ized by the co ur t asa
r equest by the husband fo r co ntr ibutio n o f the wife'sshar e o f a pr e-existing jo int o bligatio n.
Malo o f v Malo o f, 1991 Ohio App LEXI S 523 (Ohio App, Cuyaho ga Co 1991). it sho uld
be no ted that the co ur t also fo und that the spo usesdid no t agr ee to the o ffset. I d.
I t isdebatable whether the cr edit car d debt Mr . Jo shi asked the co ur t to co nsider in
failing to awar d alimo ny isa "jo int o bligatio n". Mr . Jo shi wasthe so le signato r y o n all the
cr edit acco untsfo r which he pr esented debt at tr ial. While Nevada'sco mmunity pr o per ty
law pr esumessuch debtswer e incur r ed fo r the benefit o f the co mmunity, and assuch, jo int
o bligatio ns, the F air D ebt Co llectio n Pr actice Act and Nevada'sco mmo n law "do ctr ine o f
necessar ies" ar guably do no t expo se Ms. Jo shi to any liability fo r these debtso n the facts
Page 14
pr esented, and cer tainly ther e islittle chance o f per so nal liability being attr ibuted to Ms.
Jo shi. F ur ther , the ability o f these thir d par ty cr edito r sto actually get and enfo r ce any so r t
o f judgment against Ms. Jo shi isar guably infinitesimally small, if no t bar r ed by feder al law
and o r the F D CPA. See, "Ar ticleso r ser vicesfo r husband per so nally as"family expenses"
o r "necessar ies, " within statute making wife liable ther efo r e, " 13 A.L R. 1396.
I n an actio n by a ho spital against a wife to r eco ver the r easo nable value o f ho spital
ser vicesfur nished dur ing the last illnesso f her late husband, who died leaving no pr o per ty,
and who had no t abando ned o r deser ted hiswife o r secur ed a decr ee o f separ ate
maintenance, the co ur t held in Swo gger v Sunr ise Ho spital, I nc., 88 Nev 300, 496 P2d 751
(1972) , that in view o f a statute pr o viding that a wife must suppo r t her husband o ut o f her
separ ate pr o per ty when he had no separ ate pr o per ty, they had no co mmunity pr o per ty, and
he co uld no t suppo r t himself, the wife'ssepar ate pr o per ty wasliable fo r the ho spital debt
incur r ed by her husband. I t acco r dingly affir med a judgment o f the lo wer co ur t in favo r o f
the ho spital. Asa gener al r ule, the co ur t explained, the separ ate pr o per ty o f a wife isno t
liable fo r the debtso f her husband. I t po inted o ut, ho wever , that the statute in questio n was
an exceptio n to the r ule. T he duty to suppo r t aspr o vided in the statute, the co ur t explained,
necessar ily r an to the benefit o f cr edito r s, such asthe ho spital, who supplied necessar ieso f
life to an infir m, impecunio ushusband.
T he factspr esented in the mar ital disso lutio n at bar do no t suppo r t finding Ms. Jo shi
liable o n a do ctr ine o f the necessar iesanalysis, asMr . Spr inggate suggested at tr ial and
thr o ugho ut thislitigatio n Mr . Jo shi iscur r ently an able bo died and emplo yed adult. T her e
wasno sho wing that MR. Jo shi co uld no t suppo r t himself
T he co ur t in Keck v Keck (1933) 219 Cal 316, 26 P2d 300, r ever sed an o r der which in
effect allo wed a husband to o ffset a pr e-existing judgment debt in hisfavo r against accr ued
alimo ny o wed hisfo r mer wife, saying that alimo ny wasfo unded o n the mar ital duty o f a
husband to suppo r t hiswife and no t an o r dinar y debt, and the two demandsdid no t by
o per atio n o f law co mpensate and dischar ge o ne ano ther under Califo r nia Co de o f Civil
Pr o cedur e 440. Co nsequently, the co ur t decided that the husband co uld no t, in the
Page 15
manner o f an o r dinar y judgment debto r , asa matter o f r ight, and by mo tio n, avail himself o f
the r emedy pr o vided fo r by the statute. T he judgment against the wife, who had been
appo inted asguar dian o f her husband fo r a per io d o f year sdur ing the mar r iage, ar o se asthe
r esult o f a settlement o f guar dianship acco unts.
U po n the wife'so r der to sho w cause, the co ur t in Williamsv Williams(1970, 1st D ist) 8
Cal App 3d 636, 87 Cal Rptr 754, r uled that a husband co uld no t auto matically set o ff,
under Califo r nia Co de o f Civil Pr o cedur e 440, hisfo r mer wife'spo r tio n o f a net deficit
r esulting fr o m the o per atio n o f a co mmunity pr o per ty apar tment ho use against either
alimo ny o r child suppo r t ar r ear agesfo r the r easo n that a suppo r t o bligatio n wasno t an
o r dinar y debt but r ather wasa co ur t-impo sed mar ital duty. T he husband had made no ne o f
the suppo r t paymentspr o vided fo r in a divo r ce decr ee, but managed, by agr eement, the
apar tment ho use, dischar ging the lo ssincur r ed in itso per atio n by paying taxes, tr ust deed
payments, and fo r r epair sand impr o vements, subsequently ar guing that the past-due
suppo r t o bligatio nsand the apar tment ho use deficit wer e "cr o ssdemands" within the
pur view o f the Co de which sho uld be deemed satisfied so far that they wer e equal. T he
co ur t r uled that to allo w the set o ff o f a wife'spo r tio n o f a net deficit r esulting fr o m the
o per atio n o f a co mmunity pr o per ty apar tment ho use against the husband'salimo ny
ar r ear ageswo uld amo unt to a r etr o active alter atio n o f the alimo ny debt which had accr ued,
in vio latio n Califo r nia Co de o f Civil Pr o cedur e 139.
Many co ur tsado pt a view that the suppo r t r ecipient'sco ntr o l o f suppo r t fundsisa
co nsider atio n in deter mining o ther spo use'sr ight to set o ff T he co ur tsin the fo llo wing
casesexpr essed o r r eco gnized the view that a set o ff wo uld no t be per mitted wher e the
suppo r ting spo use usur ped the r ight o f the r ecipient o f suppo r t to co ntr o l tho se funds, but
allo wed the r equested set o ff, o r fo und it suppo r table, wher e the suppo r ted spo use, by
agr eeing to an alter native meanso f paying the suppo r t o wed, wasfo und to have co ntr o lled
the disbur sement o f the funds.
Obser ving that suppo r t payments, whether fo r the wife'so r child'ssuppo r t, ar e to be
disbur sed by the suppo r ted spo use asshe seesfit, and the suppo r ting spo use o r dinar ily is
Page 16
no t entitled to cr editsagainst past-due suppo r t fo r mo niesthat he paid to thir d par tieso n his
o wn acco r d, the co ur t in Lo pez v Lo pez, (1980, App) 125 Ar iz 309, 609 P2d 579,
r emanded the case fo r a new tr ial to deter mine whether the wife had co nsented to allo w
cer tain indir ect payments, made to do cto r sand dentistsand o ther s, to substitute fo r
paymentsto her o f alimo ny and child suppo r t, and the gr ant o f the r equested cr edits
co nsequently allo wable.
Wher e, asthe r esult o f a dispute between the spo uses, the husband made dir ect
mo r tgage paymentso n a co mmunity pr o per ty, tho se paymentsco uld no t be set o ff against
alimo ny due hiswife acco r ding to the co ur t in Van Mo r kho ven v Kleiner , (1965, La App 3d
Cir ) 180 So 2d 601, under the r ule that the wife wasentitled to spend her alimo ny asshe
cho o ses. I t wassho wn that so o n after a judgment o f separ atio n, a dispute ar o se asto
whether the wife wasr equir ed to pay fr o m an awar d o f alimo ny the mo nthly mo r tgage
payment o n the co mmunity ho me which she o ccupied, which she r efused to do . T her eupo n,
the husband made the paymentsdir ectly to the mo r tgage ho lder , deducting the same
amo unt fr o m the alimo ny due her . T he co ur t applied the gener al test to deter mine what
paymentsmade by the husband sho uld be cr edited to alimo ny: whether the wife had the
unr estr icted r ight to deter mine ho w the fundswer e disbur sed. D isallo wing cr edit fo r the
mo r tgage payments, the co ur t fo und a clear r estr ictio n asto ho w the wife spent her
alimo ny.
Nevada case law suppo r tsthe view that a Nevada co ur t hasno autho r ity to per mit set
o ff o f a suppo r ted spo usesdebt which wasdischar ged in bankr uptcy. Wheeler v. U pto n-
Wheeler , 113 Nev 1185, 946 P.2d 200 (1997). Also , it wasdecided in the case r elated
belo w that it wasbeyo nd the autho r ity o f the co ur t to enter a judgment against a spo use to
who m suppo r t wasto be paid, subsequent to bankr uptcy pr o ceedings, in o r der to effect an
o ffset against the suppo r t o bligatio n fo r mar ital debts, avo ided by the spo use in bankr uptcy,
that the suppo r ting spo use wasr equir ed to satisfy.
Wher e the wife'so bligatio ns, assumed aspar t o f the pr o per ty divisio n pur suant to the
divo r ce, wer e dischar ged in bankr uptcy, and tho se debtsco uld in no way be co nsider ed
Page 17
no ndischar geable alimo ny o r suppo r t, it wasdecided in Macy v Macy, (1986, Wyo ) 714
P2d 774, that the co ur t had no autho r ity to enter a po st-bankr uptcy judgment fo r the
husband, to be o ffset against past-due child suppo r t, fo r paymentshe had paid, asco -
debto r , o r might ultimately be r equir ed to pay in satisfactio n o f the mar ital debts. T he
divo r ce decr ee o r der ed the husband to pay child suppo r t, and awar ded to the wife a van, the
family ho me, and a flo r al business, all subject to the indebtednessincur r ed against them, and
r equir ed her to pay appr o ximately $13, 650 in o ther debts, including cer tain cr edit car d bills.
T he wife wasdischar ged in bankr uptcy with r espect to all o f these debts. Ho wever , mo st o f
the ar r ear sin child suppo r t accr ued when the husband deducted paymentsmade o n the
cr edit car d debtsfr o m the o r der ed child suppo r t. T he judgment appealed by the wife
allo wed the husband to r eco ver fo r all paymentsmade o n the dischar ged debts, then and in
the futur e. T he co ur t vo ided mo st o f the pr o visio nso f the judgment due to the supr emacy
o f the feder al bankr uptcy law, the pur po se o f which wasto affo r d the debto r a new
o ppo r tunity in life unhamper ed by pr e-existing debt. Mo r eo ver , the co ur t enjo ined the
husband, asa cr edito r named in the bankr uptcy pr o ceedings, fr o m tr ying in any fashio n to
o ffset the debtsin the futur e. T he husband wasallo wed to r eco ver fo r po st-visitatio n air
far e he had paid in o r der to r etur n the childr en to the wife when thiso bligatio n might be
catego r ized asno ndischar geable suppo r t o wed by the wife under the bankr uptcy laws. T he
co ur t also wasinfluenced in small measur e by the pr inciple that child suppo r t isfo r the
benefit o f the childr en and o nly administer ed in tr ust fo r them by the wife.
And see, in the co ntext o f thisdiscussio n, Re Mar r iage o f Mills(1989, I o wa App) 441
NW2d 416, in which the co ur t r efused to allo w the o ffset, against suppo r t ar r ear s, o f a lien
o n the mar ital ho me o wed to the husband under the ter mso f the decr ee, which sur vived
bankr uptcy pr o ceedings, based in so me par t o n equitable gr o unds, when that wife lo st the
ho me thr o ugh fo r eclo sur e, r ather than pr o fited fr o m itssale. Ho wever , the Co ur t in the
pr esent case seemed to find even the impr essio n that Mr . Co ughlin might so meho w
co ntemplate such an applicatio n wassanctio nable. "Mr Co ughlin cited an AI R ar ticle
r egar ding co mmunity debt and stated hisclient "do esno t have much fo r the cr edito r sto
Page 18
take " He r equested that hisclient assume o ne-half the co mmunity debt and that the Co ur t
find Plaintiffstwo $5, 000 debtsto family member sand fr iendsasMr . Jo shi'ssepar ate debts
Mr . Co ughlin stated hisclient isbeing asked to "fo o t the bill" fo r Plaintiffsdebts..." Or der
Amer T r ial, Page 7.
T he co ur t in Malo o f v Malo o f, 1991 Ohio App LEX1S 523, (1991, Ohio App,
Cuyaho ga Co ), did no t believe that it waser r o r to deny a husband cr edit against hissuppo r t
o bligatio n fo r mo ney paid in satisfactio n o f a deficiency judgment ar ising fr o m the
fo r eclo sur e sale o f the mar ital ho me, in so me measur e, because the o r iginal mo r tgage lo an
fo r the pr o per ty wasunder taken by the spo usespr io r to their divo r ce and, assuch, the debt
wasno t made o n the cr edit o f alimo ny awar ded to the wife subsequently. Co nsequently,
acco r ding to the co ur t, the husband, asan assignee standing in the sho eso f the lending
institutio n, the assigno r , co uld no t attach alimo ny and child suppo r t paymentsto co llect o n
the judgment when the lending institutio n co uld no t have do ne so .
Wher e the husband so ught cr edit fo r o ne-half the paymentso f debtso n var io usjo intly
o wned pr o per ties, the co ur t in Hanshaw v Hanshaw, (1988, W Va) 377 SE2d 470, held it
waspr o per to r efuse to o ff set unpaid tempo r ar y alimo ny o wed to the wife by such
paymentswhen the debtswer e incur r ed pr io r to the spo uses' separ atio n.
T he co ur t in Mo r el v Mo r el (1982, La App 5th Cir ) 425 So 2d 1289, cer t den (La) 430
So 2d 99, r uled that payments, no t in co mpliance with the suppo r t o r der , o n a co mmunity
o bligatio n incur r ed to pur chase an auto mo bile in po ssessio n o f the wife wer e no t available
to r educe ar r ear sin alimo ny pendente lite and child suppo r t when tho se paymentswer e
r eco ver able by the husband at the time o f the settlement o f the mar ital co mmunity, and the
wife did no t agr ee that they sho uld be made in lieu o f suppo r t payments. T he wife'slater
r equest that the husband make the payments, to gether with sever al o ther indir ect payments,
wasfo und insufficient to pr o ve an o ffset against ar r ear sthat accr ued dur ing the per io d at
issue.
A husband who had paid co mmunity auto mo bile lo an paymentswaspr o per ly denied
cr edit fo r hiswife'sshar e o f such paymentsagainst hisaccr ued alimo ny o bligatio n to her
Page 19
wher e the par tieshad no t "clear ly agr eed" that the husbandspaymentso n the vehicle wer e
in lieu o f par t o f the alimo ny o bligatio n, acco r ding to the co ur t in T ho mpso n v T ho mpso n
(1983, La App 1st Cir ) 428 So 2d 858. T he r ule applied by the co ur t wasthat an alimo ny o r
child suppo r t judgment r emainsin fo r ce until the par ty liable appliesto the co ur t and
o btainsa mo dificatio n, unlessthe par ty to who m paymentsar e made r equestso r co nsentsto
indir ect paymentso r waivesthe payments. Altho ugh the wife had been awar e that the
husband wasmaking paymentso n the vehicle because she called the lender each mo nth to
ask if he had, and she wo uld have used any equivalent amo unt paid dir ectly to her to
dischar ge the same debts, the co ur t fo und that, at mo st, the wife had mer ely acquiesced in
the husband'spaymentso n the vehicle r ather than agr eed to an alter native metho d o f
alimo ny payment. T he co ur t also no ted that the husband admitted that ther e wasno mentio n
o f alimo ny at the time he expr essed the desir e to pr o vide hiswife with tr anspo r tatio n T he
co ur t did agr ee that the r esultsin thiscase wer e inequitable, and that a tacit under standing
between two adultsasthe par tiesher e o btained sho uld be per missible in law in tho se cases
no t invo lving child suppo r t. T he co ur t suggested that the husband wasfr ee to seek
appr o pr iate cr edit fo r dischar ging a co mmunity o bligatio n in a pr o per ty settlement with his
wife, but r ejected the ar gument that she wasper so nally liable to him fo r the amo unt paid
under a theo r y o f quasico ntr act.
So me co ur tshave r efused an o ffset when the o bligatio n asso ciated with an auto mo bile
o r r esidence wasincur r ed pr io r to the divo r ce and, thus, the payment benefited the spo use
o bligated to pay suppo r t aswell.
Wher e the wife testified that she used the cr edit car d to "balance o ut" ho useho ld
expensesfo r her self and the childr en while the co uple wassepar ated, the co ur t in
Yo ungber g v Yo ungber g (1986, La App 4th Cir ) 499 So 2d 329, wo uld no t per mit an
o ffset against po stdivo r ce per manent alimo ny and child suppo r t ar r ear agesfo r o ne-half o f
the cr edit car d char ges. T he husband had been o r der ed to pay alimo ny pendente lite and
child suppo r t dur ing the per io d in which the char geswer e made, but wascur r ent in his
Page 20
paymentsat that time, and asser ted that the wife made the char geswitho ut the his
per missio n. T he wife maintained that the cr edit car d char geswer e fo r expensesfo r which
the husband wasr espo nsible. T he co ur t co ncluded that neither spo use intended such a
cr edit when the husband paid the cr edit car d acco unt balance, denying the o ffset appar ently
based o n the lack o f evidence o f an agr eement between the par ties.
I n the fo llo wing cases, in which the par ticular type o f payment o r debt wasno t
disclo sed by the co ur t o r at issue, it wasdecided that a spo use wasno t entitled to the
r equested set o ff against accr ued alimo ny.
I n Br uner )/ Br uner (1978, La App 2d Cir ) 356 So 2d 1101, cer t gr (La) 358 So 2d 641,
it washeld that the tr ial co ur t er r ed in allo wing a husband cr edit o r an o ffset against a
claimed ar r ear age o f alimo ny pendente lite fo r paymentsmade by him to thir d par tieso n his
wife'sbehalf wher e the evidence did no t sho w that the paymentswer e made at the r equest
o f, o r with the co nsent o f, hiswife. Had Ms. Jo shi co nsented to the settlement agr eement
she wasso ur gently implo r ed to accept, she co uld no t avail her self o f thisar gument. A
husband wasno t entitled to cr edit against ar r ear sin pendente lite maintenance and child
suppo r t fo r vo luntar y paymentshe made to thir d par tiesfo r hiswife'sbenefit, acco r ding to
the co ur t in Kr antz v Kr antz (1991, 2d D ept) 175 App D iv 2d 865, 573 NYS2d 738, o n the
gr o und that sever al o f the paymentsalso satisfied the husband'sco ntr actual o bligatio ns.
Cr edit Matter s:
T hingsar e lessthan cheer y fo r cr edito r spur suing pr emar ital debt, o r a debt incur r ed by
o nly o ne o f the spo usesafter mar r iage. T hisisno t Mr . Co ughlin'sfault and he sho uld no t
be sanctio ned o n acco unt o f this. Nevada do es, ho wever , r eco gnize "the do ctr ine o f
necessar ies." NRS 123.090 pr o vides:
"I f the husband neglectsto make adequate pr o visio n fo r the suppo r t o f hiswife, any
o ther per so n may in go o d faith supply her with ar ticlesnecessar y fo r her suppo r t, and
r eco ver the r easo nable value ther eo f fr o m the husband. T he separ ate pr o per ty o f the
husband isliable fo r the co st o f such necessitiesif the co mmunity pr o per ty o f the spo usesis
Page 21
no t sufficient to satisfy such debt."
See Ro dger sv. Ro dger s, 110 Nev 1370, 887 P.2d 269 (1994); Lewisv. Hicks, 108
Nev. 1107,
16; 843 P.2d 828 (1992), co ntr a, Phillipsv. Mo r r o w, 104 Nev 384, 760 P.2d 115
(1988).
Ho wever , a cur io usduality existed in the Jo shi T r ial. T he Co ur t seemed to be upset
with Mr . Co ughlin, implying so me bad faith to the extent that the po sitio n Mr . Co ughlin
ar gued might so meho w take advantage o f the cr edito r sdifficulty in fo r cing Ms. Jo shi to pay
them o n acco untsto which Mr . Jo shi isthe so le signato r y. T he Co ur t'sco nster natio n in
thisr egar d wasin str ange inco ngr uity to the claimso f Mr . Spr inggate that the do ctr ine o f
necessar ieswo uld necessar ily aid these cr edito r sin executing upo n Ms. Jo shi'spr o per ty. I t
wo uld seem o ne canno t have it bo th ways.
NRS 123 110 statesa differ ent standar d fo r when husbandsmust be suppo r ted by
wives:"T he wife must suppo r t the husband o ut o f her separ ate pr o per ty when he hasno
separ ate pr o per ty and they have no co mmunity pr o per ty and he, fr o m infir mity, isno t able
o r co mpetent to suppo r t himself."
T hisstatuto r y exceptio n to the pr o tectio n o f separ ate pr o per ty o nly appliesif a cr edito r
suppliesgo o dso r ser vices"necessar y!' fo r the life o f the o ther spo use. Altho ugh the limits
o f thishave no t been defined, the Nevada Supr eme Co ur t hasheld that a husband canno t be
held per so nally liable under NRS 123 090 fo r the debtso f hiswife which wer e incur r ed
pur suant to a co ntr act to r ent an auto mo bile F er r eir a v. P.C.H. I nc., 105 Ney. 305, 774
P.2d 1041 (1989). T hus, it islikely that the wo r d "necessar y" will be nar r o wly co nstr ued by
the Nevada co ur ts, ther efo r e pr o viding pr o tectio n fo r the per so nal pr o per ty o f spo uses.
T he factso f the case at bar do no t suppo r t ho lding MsJo shi per so nally liable fo r Mr .
Jo shi'satto r ney'sfees, asMr . Spr inggate state the law r equir ed, no r do they suppo r t
pr ecluding MsJo shi an appr o pr iate alimo ny awar d in light o f the fact that Mr . Jo shi cho se
to be the so le signato r y o n all hiscr edit acco unts. Mr . Jo shi wanted the po wer and co ntr o l
o f being a so le signato r y, he sho uld no t be r escued by the do ctr ine o f the necessar ies.
Page 22
zs
Regar dless, Mr . Co ughlin sho uld no t be sanctio ned fo r failing to agr ee to such a r escue o f
Mr . Jo shi.
By way o f analo gy, Nevada case law hasexpr essed the bur den o f pr o o f aso ne o f clear
and cer tain evidence that a lender o r vendo r pr imar ily r elied o n that spo use'ssepar ate
per so nal pr o per ty to secur e the cr edit r ather than o n that spo use'sear ning capacity to
establish that lo an pr o ceedsar e separ ate pr o per ty. T hisiskno wn asthe "intent o f the
lender " test. See Schulman v. Schulman, 92 Nev. 707, 716-17, 558 P.2d 525, 530-31
(1976). Co nver sely, the ar gument can be made that Mr . Jo shi'sthe debtso n the acco unts
to which Mr . Jo shi isthe so le signato r y sho uld no t be viewed asco mmunity debtsgiven that
the lender appar ently did no t co nsider Ms. Jo shi'sstatusat all. F ur ther , feder al law may
pr event such co nsider atio n in the event Mr . Jo shi qualified fo r cr edit o n hiso wn. Cr edito r s
thusneed to have the signatur e o f bo th par tieso n an applicatio n fo r cr edit in o r der pur sue
co llectio n o f the cr edit debt fr o m bo th par ties.
Asa theo r etical matter , cr edito r swo uld appear to be r estr icted to co llectio n against the
per so n (o r pr o per ty o f the per so n) incur r ing the o bligatio n, either dur ing the mar r iage, o r
after the divo r ce. At least when the cr edito r isso meo ne o ther than a fo r mer spo use o f o ne
o f the par tiesto the mar r iage, asin Gr eear v. Gr eear , supr a, 303 F .2d 893 (9th Cir . 1962).
Asa pr actical matter , thisr estr ictio n appear sto pr o vide no bar r ier ; banksdo no t typically
car e abo ut the so ur ce o f mo ney in acco untsbeing gar nished, but o nly the name o n the
acco unt (See, also , D imick v. D imick, 112 Nev. 402, 915 P 2d 254 (1996) (husband's
signatur e o f bo th spo uses' nameso n a tr ade-o ut pur chase agr eement, and bo th par ties'
signatur eso n "vesting instr uctio ns" that wo uld have made them jo int tenantso f the
pr o per ty at the clo se o f escr o w, did no t actually tr ansfer any pr o per ty inter est to the wife)).
One no table exceptio n by which o ne spo use can cr eate a debt that beco mesan
o bligatio n o f the o ther spo use asa matter o f law isthr o ugh "the do ctr ine o f necessar ies, ",
discussed abo ve, altho ugh the stated statuto r y gr o undsfo r when husbands' pr o per ty is
liable fo r the suppo r t o f wivesisdiffer ent fr o m that in which wives' pr o per ty isliable fo r the
Page 23
suppo r t o f husbands.
T he o nly appellate case discussing the 1873 statute fo r a husband'spayment o f
"necessar ies" fo r a wife indicatesthat the ter ms"necessar y fo r her suppo r t" and
"necessities" will be co nstr ued
so mewhat clo sely. I n o ne such Nevada case, a husband wasfo und no t liable fo r his
wife'scar
r ental fo r "failur e to pr o vide adequately fo r her suppo r t" wher e ther e wasno co nver sio n
o f the
auto mo bile and no pr o o f o f co mmunity pur po se in itsr ental. T hisar guesin favo r o f the
po sitio n Mr . Co ughlin ar gued at tr ial. F er r eir a v. P.C.H. I nc., 105 Ney. 305, 774 P.2d 1041
(1989); see, also , U nited F ir e I ns. Co . v. McClelland, 105 Nev. 504, 780 P.2d 193 (1989).
NRS 123.110 statesa gender -based standar d fo r when husbandsmust be suppo r ted by
wives:
T he wife must suppo r t the husband o ut o f her separ ate pr o per ty when he hasno
separ ate pr o per ty and they have no co mmunity pr o per ty and he, fr o m infir mity, isno t able
o r co mpetent to suppo r t himself.
I f a debt isincur r ed dur ing mar r iage and o wed by bo th spo uses, no thing in the divo r ce
decr ee
pr eventsthe cr edito r fr o m chasing whichever spo use it cho o sesfo r payment. Mar ine
Midland Bank v. Mo nr o e, 104 Nev. 307, 756 P.2d 1193 (1988). Whether o ne must be a
signato r y fo r the debt to be "o wed" isso mewhat dependant o n who isdo ing the enfo r cing,
the cr edito r o r a F amily Co ur t Judge and whether o r no t mo r e than o ne spo use wasa
signato r y o n the cr edit applicatio n. Of co ur se, wher e such a cr edito r chaseso ne spo use fo r
a debt allo cated to the o ther upo n divo r ce, the spo use saddled
with the o ther 'sadjudicated debt hasr eco ur se to the divo r ce co ur tsto o btain
r eimbur sement See, e.g., Putter man v. Putter man, supr a, 113 Nev 606, 939 P.2d 1047
(1997) (upho lding the tr ial co ur t'sunequal divisio n o f co mmunity pr o per ty fo r , amo ng
o ther things, the husband'svio latio n o f a jo int pr eliminar y injunctio n by char ging sever al
Page 24
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tho usandso f do llar sin cr edit car d debt after the separ atio n, which the wife paid).
Str angely, while spo usescanno t do so dir ectly, to so me extent the duty o f suppo r t can
be enfo r ced indir ectly, but thisseemspr imar ily to benefit cr edito r s, no t a mar ket-
disadvantaged spo use. U nder the do ctr ine o f necessar iesthe untitled spo use, in theo r y, is
allo wed to pledge the o ther spo use'scr edit to pur chase a necessar y. A cr edito r but no t a
spo usemay have the r ight to sue to enfo r ce the duty and co llect the debt. F o r a r ecent
ar ticle ar guing that the necessar iesdo ctr ine and the co mmunity pr o per ty r egime mo r e
br o adly, may place cr edito r s' r ightsabo ve spo uses, see Andr ea Car r o ll, T he Super io r
Po sitio n o f the Cr edito r in the Co mmunity Pr o per ty Regime: Hasthe Co mmunity Beco me a
Mer e Cr edito r Co llectio n D evice?, SANT A CLARA L. REV. 1 (2007)
Cr edito r sdo r ely o n the suppo r t do ctr ine quite r egular ly, par ticular ly medical car e
pr o vider s. A typical example iswher e medical car e ispr o vided with the assumptio n that the
patient spo use will pay, but then do esno t. At that po int (fr equently after the death o f the
patient spo use), the medical car e pr o vider attempts, o ften successfully, to establish liability
o f the no n-patient spo use based o n the necessar iesdo ctr ine. T he no n-patient spo use iso ften
held acco untable fo r the medical bills, and even no n-mar ital wealth can be r eached. See,
e.g., Jer sey Sho r e Med. Ctr . F itkin Ho sp. v. Estate o f Baum, 417 A.2d 1003, 1010 (N.J.
1980). Co ur tshave r ecently gr appled with whether liability isso le, jo int, o r pr imar y and
seco ndar y. T he tr end seemsto be to war d pr imar y liability fo r the debto r spo use and
seco ndar y fo r the no n-debto r . Mr . Jo shi'sso le signato r y debtsar e lar gely ver y po o r
candidatesfo r a do ctr ine o f the necessar iesappr o ach to war dsMs. Jo shi by the var io us
cr edito r s. Mr . Jo shi did have abo ut $7, 000 o f medical debt fo r a sur ger y, but to the extent
that Mr . Jo shi seemingly had no idea what sur ger y wasper fo r med o r why, it wasar guably
no t a necessar y pr o cedur e. T he fact that the ho spital o r medical pr o vider appar ently
"wr o te-o ff' near ly $50, 000 o f the debt wo uld ar gue against such an applicatio n aswell
T he thir d par ty cr edito r sin thiscase (especially co nsider ing the bulk o f the debt isno t
medical debt) likely r ealize it isno t at all clear they will have a r ight to get paid by Ms.
Jo shi, and even if they do , it likely will take co stly litigatio n to deter mine liability. See, e.g.,
Page 25
Mar ie T . Reilly, Yo u and Me Against the Wo r ld: Mar r iage and D ivo r ce fr o m Cr edito r s'
Per spective, in RECONCEI VI NG T HE F AMI LY 195, 196 (Ro bin F r etwell Wilso n ed.,
2006).
Mr . Jo shi'sar gumentsco ncer ning hisso le signato r y cr edit debtslar gely based o n the
illuso r y pr o mise o f the necessar iesdo ctr ine F o r fur ther discussio n and citatio nsr egar ding
the mer chant'sbur den o f pr o o f, see id. See, also , Mistaking Mar r iage fo r So cial Po licy,
Vivian Eulalia Hamilto n, William & Mar y Law Scho o l, Vir ginia Jo ur nal o f So cial Po licy and
the Law, Vo l. 11, p. 307, Spr ing 2004. T he Settlement o ffer ed to Ms. Jo shi was, ther efo r e,
lar gely a chimer a. Mr . Co ughlin indicated asmuch in co ur t. He sho uld no t be sanctio ned
fo r that. Actually, o ne may co nsider Mr . Co ughlin'sr eco gnitio n o f such an ar cane wr inkle
in the law to be fair ly impr essive fo r an atto r ney being paid at the lo w end o f salar iesfo r o ne
in the legal pr o fessio n. Such analysisdo esno t co me witho ut substantial dedicatio n. T his
seemingly wo uld no t be a r easo n to levy a sanctio n. Wher efo r e, the Or der sho uld no t be
maintained, the Request fo r Reco nsider atio n gr anted.
D ated this20' day o f May, 2 09 b :
isi matur e! Z a Co u hlin Es
I n Pr o Per
945 W.12
th
St., Reno , NV 89503
T el: 775 338 8118
Page 26
CERT I F I CAT E OF SERVI CE AND MAI LI NG
Pur suant to NRCP 5(b), 1 cer tify that I am an agent o f Z ach Co ughlin, Esq and that o n
the 12
th
D ay o f May, 2009, I electr o nically filed at Reno , Nevada, a tr ue co py o f the
within Reply to Oppo sitio n, fully addr essed to .
Jo hn Spr inggate, Esq.
Atto r ney fo r Ashwin Bhar ti
203 S Ar lingto n Ave.
Reno , NV 89501
AF F I RMAT I ONPU RSU ANT T O NRS 239B.030
T he under signed do esher eby affir m that the pr eceding do cument do esno t co ntain the
so cial secur ity number o f any per so n.
D ated this20
th
D ay o f May, 2009.
/signatur e/ Melissa U llo a
Melissa U llo a
Agent o f Z ach Co ughlin, Esq.
Page 27
INDEX TO EXHIBITS
1. Exhibit #1- T hir ty (30) pageslo ng
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. ,
CODE: FILED
Marc Ashley, Esq.
Nevada Bar No. 8326
2009 MY 21 RH 9: 58
WASHOE LEGALSERVICES
Hap,Ru W. CONYERS
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: (775) 785-5712
BY
Facsimile: (775) 324-5509
DEPUTY
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF
NEVADA IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF WASHOE
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs.
BHARTI JOSHI,
MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE
BHARTIJOSHI, Defendant/Counterclaimant, by her attorneys, Washoe Legal Services by Marc
Ashley, objects to the form of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce and
moves that it be corrected because key provisions have been omitted through mistake, inadvertence or
excusable neglect, as more fully set forth in the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities.
DATED this 26th day of May, 2009.
ivn
Marc Ashley, Esq.
State Bar No. 8326
Reno, NV 89501
775-329-2727 ext. 5716
Dept. No.: 14

MEMORANDUM OFPOINTS AND AUTHORITIES
NRCP Rule 60 allows a Court to relieve a party from the terms of a final judgment, order or
other proceeding on the grounds of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect. Defendant in this case
contends that the final decree was to have contained certain provisions to protect her in case Plaintiff
fails to pay the indebtedness he has been ordered to pay. These debts are in Defendant's name and they
will be asserted against her if he does not pay or files bankruptcy.
Specifically, in its Order After Trial, page 6 lines 18-20, the Court notes that "to protect Ms.
Joshi in the event Mr. Joshi filed for bankruptcy, Mr. Joshi suggested that the court mintain jurisdiction
over the issue of spousal support for five years." It was Defendant's understanding that this was to be
done through an award of maintenance of One Dollar ($1.00) per year for five years. If Plaintiff ceased
paying the debts, she would then be able to request maintenance to offset the added payments. In
discussing the form of the decree with Plaintiff's attorney, he was likewise of this understanding and
maintained that the $1.00 per year language would be in the final decree. However, in preparing the
final papers he noticed that the court denied maintenance altogether at page 11, lines 17-18, so did not
include the expected language.
Accordingly, Defendant moves the court to amend the order to include an award of maintenance
in the amount of One Dollar ($1.00) per year for five years, so Defendant will have recourse to protect
her credit if Plaintiff defaults on the debts in her name.
The debt on the car which is titled in Plaintiff's name and their daughter is also in Defendant's
personal name. Defendant was of the understanding that Plaintiff was also to re-title the car in the name
of Defendant and their daughter, and Defendant moves for amendment of the order to accomplish this.
Dated this 26
th
day of May, 2009.
Marc Ashley, Esq.
State Bar No. 8326
Reno, NV 89501
775-329-2727 ext. 5716
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C09-
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11;
2

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), Ihereby certify that Iam an employee of Washoe Legal Services, and that
on they day of May, 2009, Iserved the foregoing:
MOTION TO CORRECT PROPOSED DECREE
by depositing with the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, at Reno, Nevada, a true and correct
copy of the within document addressed to:
Law Offices of
Reno, NV 89501
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Deborah Pringle, CP
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F I L E D
Electronically
06-08-2009:08:55:54 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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Code 2475
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Bar No. 9473
945 W. 12
1h
St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
on behalf of himself
13(
N A I F SLED
ZEti J1.111 -8 Mi 10: 54
11
Dept. 14
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Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintiff,
VS.
Bharti Joshi,
Defendant
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MOTION TO STRIKE; or in the alternative Mr. Coughlin's OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCE; AND 2) MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED DECREE OF
DIVORCE
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq., on behalf of himself (and not on behalf of his
former client Ms. Joshi) with respect to the personally liability for attorney's fees
pursuant to NRS 7.085, and commenting to the Court in regard to his former
representation of the Defendant, Joshi Bharti, and moves the Court to grant his Motion
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Page 1
/si hlin
Zac Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

to Strike the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, & DECREE OF
DIVORCE submitted by John Springgate, Esq. on May 22' , 2009. This motion is
made and based upon the attached memorandum of points and authorities and all the
papers and pleadings on file in this action,
DATED this 29t
h
of May, 2009
WDCR Rule 9 holds that "Preparation of findings, conclusions, and judgment. In a
non-jury case, where a judge directs an attorney to prepare findings of fact, conclusions
of law, and judgment, the attorney shall serve a copy of the proposed document upon
counsel for all parties who have appeared at the trial and are affected by the judgment.
Five days after service counsel shall submit the same to the court for signature together
with proof of such service."
Mr. Coughlin was not appropriately served a copy of this proposed Order by either
Mr. Springgate or anyone connected with Washoe Legal Services. It is important to
note that Mr. Coughlin is not Ms. Joshi's attorney anymore, however, WDCR 9 calls for
the attorney, here Mr. Springgate per the court's instructions, to "serve a copy of the
proposed document upon counsel for all parties who have appeared at the trial and are
affected by the judgement."
Mr. Coughlin is arguably a intervening real party in interest, though he has not
Page 2
i

technically made such an appearance. Mr. Coughlin is likely not a "party" for the
purposes of a NRAP 3A analysis (attorney representing a client in a case is not a party to
the action and does not have standing to appeal. Albany v. Arcata Associates, 106 Nev.
688, 799 P.2d 566 (1990). However, the FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, & DECREE OF DIVORCE Mr. Springgate has submitted does affect Mr.
Coughlin. Further the proposed final decree Mr. Springgate submitted does not contain
a sufficiently detailed or specific recitation of why attorney's fees sanctions were entered,
as called for by NRCP 11 and NRS 7.085. By way of analogy such specificity was
required in Houston v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 51 (2006).
Mr. Coughlin is not Ms. Joshi's attorney; however, to some extent Mr. Coughlin
will be affected by the shape Ms. Joshi winds up in after all is said and done in this
divorce matter. As such Mr. Coughlin would like to voice his objection (while
requesting and reserving additional time to have an appropriate opportunity, in
compliance with WDCR 9 to review the proposed Order and voice further objections)
with respect to the proposed final decree's amibiguity, and or silence, with respect to the
characterization of the debt distributed and whether such a distribution is in some way a
form of alimony in light of the restrictions found in 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(5) and 523(a)
(15).
Under 523(a)(15), many courts have held that there must be "hold harmless" or
other indemnification language in a divorce decree in order for one spouse to be
obligated to avoid discharge. See, In re: LaRue, 204 B.R. 531, 535 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1997) Hold harmless agreements and indemnity provisions contained in divorce decrees
are often times characterized as non-dischargeable support awards in bankruptcy,
although the underlying debts to third parties may still remain dischargeable. Bailey v.
Bailey, 254 B.R 901(6thCir. B.A.P. 2000). The debt is non-dischargeable to the ex-
spouse to extent that the other party is required to pay it. Sanders v. Lanfare, 187 B.R.
Page 3
588 (Bankr. W.D.Va. 1996). Other courts have held that debts owed to third parties may
not qualify for non-dischargeability under 523 (a)(5) and (a)(15) without a hold-
harmless provision creating the debt to the ex-spouse. Gibson v. Gibson, 201 B.R. 113
(Bankr. N.D.Oh. 1997); McCracken v. LaRue, 204 B.R. 531,535 (Bankr. E.D.
Tenni 997).
Pursuant to 523(a)(5), "a given domestic obligation is not dischargeable if it is
'actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support." In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902,
904 (11th Cir.1985). Whether a given debt is in the nature of support is an issue of
federal law. In re Strickland, 90 F.3d 444, 446 (11th Cir.1996). Although federal law
controls, state law does "provide guidance in determining whether the obligation should
be considered 'support' under 523(a)(5)." Id. To make this determination a bankruptcy
court should undertake "a simple inquiry as to whether the obligation can legitimately be
characterized as support, that is, whether it is in the nature of support." In re Harrell, 754
F.2d at 906.
In conducting this inquiry, a court cannot rely solely on the label used by the
parties. As other courts have recognized, "'it is likely that neither the parties nor the
divorce court contemplated the effect of a subsequent bankruptcy when the obligation
arose.' " In re Gianakas, 917 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir.1990) (citation omitted). The court
must therefore look beyond the label to examine whether the debt actually is in the
nature of support or alimony. ld. A debt is in the nature of support or alimony if at the
time of its creation the parties intended the obligation to function as support or alimony.
See In re Brody, 3 F.3d 35, 38 (2d Cir.1993); In re Sampson, 997 F.2d 717, 723-24
(10th Cir.1993); In re Davidson, 947 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (5th Cir.1991); In re Gianakas,
917 F.2d at 762; Williams v. Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057-58 (8th Cir.1983). Thus,
"the party seeking to hold the debt nondischargeable has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the parties intended the obligation as support...." In
Page 4
hlin E 'Si
Respectfully submitted to the Court this 29
th
day of May, 2009
re Sampson, 997 F.2d at 723.
However, the above analysis and precedent must be considered in light of the
recent BAPCPA, as at least one court has ruled that debt arising from a divorce decree
was non-dischargeable even where it was not alimony or support. Proctor v. Tulloss,
Adv. No. 06-4112, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 1571 (Bankr. N.D. Ga., March 21, 2007).
(Debtor's obligation, pursuant to a divorce decree, to pay for ex-spouse's vehicle was
non-dischargeable pursuant to Section 523(a)(15).) The BAPCPA amendments also
omit any time limt for contesting the dischargeability of such debts.
Further, it is unclear whether the stipulations to extend the time for filing a Motion
for Reconsideration allows for filing such a proposed decree at this time or the extent to
which that stipulation applied to Mr. Coughlin's interests, albeit the fact that this Court
has entered an Order Denying Mr. Coughlin's Motion for Reconsideration (though
apparently entered prior to receiving Mr. Coughlin's Reply to Opposition) may be
dispositive in that regard.
Accordingly, the undersigned asks the Court to strike the proposed final decree
given the non compliance with WDCR 9 and the other objections cited above.
Zac Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf
Page 5
S
the 29
th
day of May, 2009, I electronically filed at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within MOTION TO STRIKE; or in the alternative Mr. Coughlin's OBJECTIONS TO
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND DECREE OF DIVORCELAND 2) MOTION TO
STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR SUBMISSION OF PROPOSED DECREE OF
DIVORCE, fully addressed to
.

JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Marc Ashley, Esq. or Caryn Sternlicht, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Dated this 29
th
Day of May, 2009
Melissa 4a
1
/sig
.----

Melissa Ulloa
Page 6
S
* * *
FAMILY COURT
(REQUIRED)
CASE NO. 0 t/0`3 - c7
a
DEPT. NO.
0[,
A
-
er
4
= AS
A. Mark the CORRECT ANSWER with an X.
YES
,
NO
I. Has a final decree or custody order been entered in this
case? If m, then continue to Question 2. If no, you do not
change a final order? If des, then continue to Question 3. If
no, you do not need to answer any other questions.

change the amount of child support?
1N
within 10 days of the Judge's Order?
.

M
1
IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the filing
date found on the front page of the Judge's Order.
Date

B.
from the $25.00 filing fee However, if the Court later determines you should have paid the
filing fee, your motion will not be decided until the $25.00 fee is paid.
Date: Signature:
Print Name
.

Print Address:
Telephone Number:

z
-1/A
c
-
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-2

Rev. 10/24/2002
''
-
F1
. ,
:D
2009 JUN -B AN 10:54
BY
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4T f Y
41-

Coughlin, Esq.
On his own behalf

Code 2645
Zach Coughlin, Esq.
Bar No. 9473
945 W. 12
th
St.
Reno, NV 89503
Phone 775 338 8118
on behalf of himself
CEs r )
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10
11
Case No. : DV08-01168
Dept. 14
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Ashwin Joshi,
Plaintif f ,
VS.
Bharti Joshi,
Def endant
20
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE
COMES NOW, Zach Coughlin, Esq. , on behalf of himself (and not on behalf of his
f ormer client Ms. Joshi) f iles this Opposition to Mr. Joshi's Motion to Strike.
DATED this 29' of May, 2009
21
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Page 1
S
Mr. Joshi argues that Mr. Coughlins Appeal (which was also plead in the
alternative as a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus) is untimely in that there may not have
been a f inal order.
"There is simply no principled reasons to distinguish the appealability of an order
determining liability on motion f or summary judgment f rom the appealability of such an
order af ter trial " Metropolitan Dade County v. Green, 596 So. 2d 458 (Fla. 1992).
An appeal could not be interlocutory where it was f rom a f inal order af ter trial. People
v. Voss, 191 Colo. 338, 552 P. 2d 1012 (1976) An order of a district court denying writ
of mandamus is a "f inal judgment" within meaning of rule authorizing appeals f rom final
judgments. Rules App. Proc. , Rule 3A(b)(1). Ashokan v. State, Dept of Ins. , 1993, 856
P. 2d 244, 109 Nev. 662.
It is not at all clear that the Order Af ter Trial entered by Judge Gardner on April
12% 2009 is not an appealable f inal order. It certainly is not worth risking given the
deadline f or f iling an appeal is jurisdictional. The question is perhaps irrelevant,
however, given that this case will likely be treated as a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus
which has not similar jurisdictional deadline within which to f ile. Mr. Coughlin will be
submitting a Writ f or Petition of Mandamus that f ully complies with the dictates of
NRAP 21 very soon, likely bef ore June 15
th
, 2009. There is suf f icient precedent to
support a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus to challenge sanctions against and attorney
issued by a district court. Houston v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 122 Nev. Adv. Op.
51 (2006);Of f ice of Washoe County Dist. Atty. v. Second Judicial Dist Court ex rel.
County of Washoe, 2000, 5 P. 3d 562, 116 Nev. 629;"A writ of mandamus will issue to
control a court's arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion. " Marshall v. District
Court, 108 Nev. 459, 466, 836 P. 2d 47, 52 (1992).
While Mr. Springgate has seemed to indicate that he sees such an appeal or
Page 2

mandamus action to be a big waste of everybody's time, he also writes to Mr. Coughlin,
in a May 21", 2009 letter to direct him to drop the appeal, "buy his way out of the
sanctions" and, instead, "workon repairing your [Mr. Coughlin's] reputation with the
Family Court Judges. " Mr. Springgate gives not explicit indication of exactly how Mr.
Springgate knows what the "Family Court Judges" consider Mr. Coughlin's reputation to
be or the extent to which Mr. Springgate plays a role in f ormulating these views. Mr
Springgate's statement veers dangerously close to violating the NEVADA RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8. 4. , which proscribes "Misconduct. It is
prof essional misconduct f or a lawyer to: (e) State or imply an ability to inf luence
improperly a government agency or of f icial or to achieve results by means that violate
the Rules of Prof essional Conduct or other law. "
Mr. Coughlin does not see challenging the sanctions in this case as a waste of time.
Rather, it is a necessary step in preserving or creating an environment where attorneys
f eel saf e in zealously advocating f or clients, where sanctions are required to be
suf f iciently detailed and specif ic so as to reduce the chance of sanctions being used f or
purposes f or which they are not intended or based on rationale that is impermissible, and
to counteract the growing tide of attorneys who would rather imply they enjoy some
vague and ominous inf luence while calling f or sanctions than f ind, apply, and argue
precedent. On that note, Mr. Springgate's Motion to Strike contains no precedent at all
to help this Court determine whether its Order Af ter Trial is a "f inal order" and thus
appealable This is similar to Mr. Springgate's asking f or sanctions without citing any
cases, much less one's that have some cognizable relation to the conduct f or which the
Court apparently tookissue. Perhaps that is because the positions Mr. Springgate
asserts are contradictory, which makes it hard to accurately argue that Mr. Coughlin was
proceeding in bad f aith. One cannot argue that Ms. Joshi will be easily pursued by
creditors collecting on the accounts to which Mr Joshi was the sole signatory via a
Page 3

doctrine of necessaries theory while also asserting that Mr. Coughlin's alleged conduct
exhibits "bad f aith" in that Ms. Joshi would apparently also be judgment proof f rom
these same creditors.
Mr. Coughlin is arguably a intervening real party in interest, though he has not
technically made such an appearance. Mr. Coughlin is likely not a "party" f or the
purposes of a NRAP 3A analysis (attorney representing a client in a case is not a party to
the action and does not have standing to appeal. Albany v Arcata Associates, 106 Nev.
688, 799 P. 2d 566 (1990); Houston v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 122 Nev. Adv.
Op 51 (2006),
Further, it is unclear whether the stipulation to extend the time f or f iling a Motion
f or Reconsideration f iled in this case allows f or f iling such a proposed decree at this time
or the extent to which that stipulation applied to Mr. Coughlin's interests, albeit the f act
that this Court has entered an Order Denying Mr. Coughlin's Motion f or Reconsideration
(though apparently entered prior to receiving Mr. Coughlin's Reply to Opposition) may
be diapositive in that regard.
Accordingly, the undersigned asks the Court to deny Mr Joshi's Motion to Strike
the Notice of Appeal. Mr. Springgate apparently has not f iled any sort of Motion to
Strike with regard to the Second Amended Notice of Appeal (which is also plead in the
alternative as a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus). Mr. Coughlin realizes that the Nevada
Supreme Court has a well established precedent holding an attorneys avenue to challenge
sanctions to lie in the f orm of a Petition f or Writ of Mandamus rather than appeal
(despite many f ederal and state courts allowing attorneys to appeal FRCP 1 I sanctions
against an attorney). Mr. Coughlin may arguably, in good f aith, seekto proceed via
appeal rather than mandamus given the lower standard of review given to sanctions
when proceeding on appeal as compared to the standard when proceeding via
mandamus.
Page 4
Respectf ully submitted to the Court this 29
th
day of May, 2009
Coughlin, Esq.
n his own behalf

On direct appeal, an award of attorney's f ees under NRCP 11 is reviewed under
the abuse of discretion standard. Bergmann v. Boyce,
109 Nev. 670, 676, 856 P 2d 560,
564 (1993). "However, because "[m}andamus will not lie to control discretionary action,
unless discretion is manif estly abused or is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, " we
review this matter under a manif est abuse of discretion standard. Of f ice of Washoe
County Dist. Atty v. Second Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Washoe, 2000, 5
P. 3d 562, 116 Nev. 629.
Accordingly, the undersigned asks the Court to deny Mr. Joshi's Motion to Strike
Mr Coughlin's Notices of Appeal (to the extent they are f or Mr. Coughlin only;Mr.
Coughlin has withdrawn any Notices of Appeal f iled on Ms. Joshi's behalf ) or (to the
extent that Mr. Joshi's prior f iled Motion to Strike can be said to apply to it) the Petition
f or Writ of Mandamus (the def iciencies of which, pursuant to NRAP 21, will be cured in
short order).
Page 5

Pursuant to NRCP 5(b), I certif y that I am an agent of Zach Coughlin, Esq and that on
the 29
th
day of May, 2009, I electronically f iled at Reno, Nevada, a true copy of the
within OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO STRIKE, f ully addressed to
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
Marc Ashley, Esq or Caryn Sternlicht, Esq.
Reno, NV 89501
AFFIRMATION PURSUANT TO NRS 239B. 030
The undersigned does hereby af f irm that the preceding document does not contain the
social security number of any person
Dated this 29
th
Day of May, 2009
Melissa Ulloa
Page 6
VS.
**
FAMILY COURT
(REQUIRED)
CASE NO. tVc27
5 ?
Cl
-7
DEPT. NO.
f LI
LAST PAGE to every motion or other paper f iled pursuant to chapter 125, 125B
A. Markthe CORRECT ANSWER with an X.
YES NO
I. Has a f inal decree or custody order been entered in this
case? If yss, then continue to Question 2. If no, you do not
I
I
2. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion f iled to
change a f inal order? If des, then continue to Question 3. If
no. you do not need to answer any other questions.

Ig4 I
3. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion f iled only to
change the amount of child support? Ai
IIP
y 4. Is this a motion or an opposition to a motion f or

within 10 days of the Judge's Order?
-
IF the answer to Question 4 is YES, write in the f iling
Date
date f ound on the f ront page of the Judge's Order.
B.
f rom the $25. 00 f iling f ee. However, if the Court later determines you should have paid the
f iling f ee, your motion will not be decided until the $25. 00 f ee is paid.
I af f irm that the answers rovided on this Notice are true.
0
Signature.
C C C
Print Name:
Print Address:
Telephone Number:
77 5
-
0
- )7
5 33 S'M
Date:
Roy 10124/2002

Date, Judge, Officers
of Court Present APPEARANCES/HEARING .
March 12, 2009
HONORABLE
L. GARDNER,
DISTRICT
JUDGE
Dept. No. 14
M. Andrews,
Clerk
Reporter-JAVS
T. MARTIN,
Bailiff
Page 1 of 2

HEARING-SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE/TRIAL

THE COURT HELD A SETTLEMENT CONFERENCE OFF RECORD. NO AGREEMENT WAS
REACHED AND THE MATTER CONVENED ON THE RECORD FOR TRIAL.

Plantiff Ashwin Joshi was present with counsel, Zachary Coughlin, Esq., and was sworn to testify.
Defendant Bharti Joshi was present with counsel, John Springgate, Esq., and was sworn to testify.

Mr. Springgate waived opening statement and called Mr. Joshi to testify. Mr. Joshi testified on direct-
examination: Is renting his residence for approximately the last 9 months when he had to leave the marital
residence as per a Protection Order. He took some belongings but the bulk of the belongings are at the
marital residence. Beside the cars, the TV and computer are at issue. He wants the computer. His
information (files) was wiped off the computer. Testified regarding Defendants exhibits A (Clearstar
statement) and B (Kelley Blue Book value print out). Mr. Springgate offered the exhibits into evidence.
They were admitted with no objection by Mr. Coughlin. Mr. Joshi testified he used to work for two
employers, has worked six hours in the past 2 weeks and has filed for unemployment. He hasnt received
unemployment yet but expects to receive $320 per week. He has projected 30 hrs. of work next week, 30
hrs. during three days following that, and no other projected work for the following 2 months. He testified
regarding accounts, balances, and his expenses, referring to Defendants exhibit E. Mr. Coughlin objection
to a question regarding purchase of the computer as a community expense arguing it is leading. The
objection was overruled and the question ruled foundational. Mr. Joshi testified regarding the Discover
account. Mr. Coughlin objection to a question regarding whether it was community expense arguing it calls
for a legal opinion. The objection was sustained. Mr. Joshi testified further regarding Discover, WaMu,
Wells Fargo, other debts, and that the St. Marys account is from an operation he had in May. He didnt
have insurance, didnt have insurance through his employer because he forgot and missed the enrollment
period, and thought he was on his wifes insurance. St. Marys discounted the bill. Mr. Joshi testified
regarding Defendants exhibit F, the St. Marys bill. Mr. Coughlin stated he was not provided a copy, he
may have or not been provided one (on Mr. Springgates comment that it was provided to him prior), and
had no objection to its admittance. Exhibit F was admitted.
Mr. Coughlin moved to not admit the Remsa (marked as exhibit G) bill as an exhibit stating he wasnt
provided a copy. Mr. Springgate provided a prior one, it was marked as Plaintiffs exhibit G and Mr.
Springgate stated it was provided, in his supplemented production of documents, to Mr. Coughlin on
February 17th. Mr. Coughlin stated he didnt know if he received it. The Court overruled Mr. Coughlins
objection as him having already received a copy. Mr. Coughlin argued further. The Court continued to hear
testimony.
Mr. Joshi testified regarding exhibit G. Exhibit G was admitted. Mr. Joshi testified regarding the
anesthesiology bill. Exhibit E was offered and admitted with no objection. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi
testified further regarding medical bills and money owed to friends who facilitated the parties move to the
US and to his sister and brother in law. Exhibit H was marked. Mr. Joshi testified to exhibit H, transfers
from his sister and brother in law; the debt in the amount of 3.600 (approximately $5,000). Regarding the
letter referenced in the exhibit, Mr. Joshi stated it was no his computer. Mr. Coughlin stated he doesnt
know if he objects to the exhibit. Exhibit H was admitted. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi stated
information on money owed to his friends was on his computer, Mrs. Joshi cancelled his email, and he
doesnt know if he can retrieve it from the company.
Mr. Coughlin objected on hearsay. The Court found that the exhibit was already admitted. The
objection was overruled. Mr. Coughlin argued further that Mr. Springgate is to bring a copy for him. The
Court reviewed the applicable rule and found that copies have been provided and the statute has been
complied with. Mr. Coughlin argued further. Testimony continued. Mr. Coughlin objected to the testimony
on hearsay. Mr. Springgate rephrased the question and continued his direct-examination. Mr. Joshi
testified further regarding money owed to friends. Mr. Coughlin objected that a question called for a legal
conclusion. Upon arguments presented, the Court overruled the objection. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi
testified regarding the vehicles.
Mr. Coughlin objected regarding the earlier discussion as to production of documents. The Court found
that Mr. Springgate complied with the rule.
F I L E D
Electronically
06-08-2009:03:45:55 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
DV08-01168
3/12/09
Page 2 of 2
Mr. Joshi continued his testimony regarding the vehicles. Mr. Coughlin objected on hearsay. The
objection was overruled. Mr. Coughlin argued further. Mr. Springgate continued the questioning. Mr.
Coughlin objected. The objection was overruled. Testimony continued regarding the vehicles, Mrs. Joshis
womans wealth, and regarding the parties debt. Mr. Coughlin objected that Mr. Springgates questioning
is discussing settlement discussions. Upon arguments presented, the objection was overruled. Testimony
continued and concluded on direct examination.
Mr. Joshi testified on cross-examination by Mr. Coughlin: Mr. Joshi testified regarding his tip
earnings. Mr. Springgate objected that a question regarding his tips in that Mr. Joshi is incompetent to
speak as to the IRS and requested the question be rephrased. Mr. Coughlin rephrased the question.
Testimony continued. An objection by Mr. Springgate was sustained. Testimony continued regarding his
unemployment and probability of employment in the next week. Regarding his line of questioning, Mr.
Coughlin agreed that he would stipulate to Mr. Joshis earnings as shown on his W2, and has questions to
Mr. Joshis testimony that he is earning less. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi testified further regarding his
employment. Mr. Springgate objected to a question as argumentative. The Court found the question was
asked and answered. Mr. Coughlin argued further. After discussion, the Court allowed the question. Mr.
Springgate objected that the question Are you lying? is argumentative, improper, and prejudicial. After
discussion, the Court directed proceeding beyond the question. Mr. Joshi testified further regarding his
unemployment filing and medical billings from Reno Physicians. The Court noted Mr. Joshi testified that
bill has been paid off and no longer an issue as community debt. On inquiry by the Court as to his
questioning of the bill, Mr. Coughlin stated his question goes to impeachment. Mr. Joshi continued
testimony regarding his medical bills. Two objections by Springgate as argumentative were sustained. Mr.
Joshie argued further. The Court sustained the objections. Testimony continued. There was a further
objection as argumentative and further discussion. After discussion, testimony continued regarding the
charges incurred. There was an objection on relevance regarding loans to family. After discussion,
questioning continued. Mr. Joshi testified regarding charges incurred. An objection by Mr. Springgate that
a question calls for a legal conclusion was sustained. Questioning continued. An objection by Mr.
Springgate as argumentative was sustained. Questioning continued. Mr. Joshi testified regarding accounts
and whose name they are in, and regarding debts. An objection by Springgate regarding certain
expenditures and whether they are community in that the question calls for a legal conclusion was sustained
and the Court directed questions be asked that dont call for a legal conclusion. Testimony continued. Mr.
Springgate objected. The Court heard arguments. The objection was sustained. Testimony continued. Mr.
Joshi testified regarding a trip with his sister, regarding account balance transfers, his medical operation, his
legal representation charges, and the IRS income tax filing. Mr. Springgate objected on relevancy to a
question regarding the IRS refund used for legal charges. The objection was sustained.

The Court recessed and the matter was continued to March 17, 2009 at 8:15 am.
F I L E D
Electronically
06-09-2009:02:59:35 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
F I L E D
Electronically
06-09-2009:02:59:35 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court


Date, Judge, Officers
of Court Present APPEARANCES/HEARING .
March 17, 2009
HONORABLE
L. GARDNER,
DISTRICT
J UDGE
Dept. No. 14
M. Andrews,
Clerk
Reporter-J AVS
T. MARTIN,
Bailiff
Page 1 of 2

HEARING-CONTINUED TRIAL
Plaintiff Ashwin J oshi was present with counsel, Zachary Coughlin, Esq., and was sworn to testify.
Defendant Bharti J oshi was present with counsel, John Springgate, Esq., and was sworn to testify.
This matter continued from March 12
th
. Plaintiff Ashwin Joshi, took the stand and continued his testimony
on cross-examination. Mr. J oshi testified: He paid attorneys fees with a credit card (US Bank) that he then paid
with a tax refund and testified further regarding the debts. An objection by Mr. Springgate as a
mischaracterization of Mr. Joshis prior testimony was sustained. Testimony continued regarding debts. Mr.
Springgate objected on relevance to a question regarding community property. Mr. Coughlin argued that Mr.
Joshi is making a concerted effort to determine what is community property. The objection was sustained.
Testimony continued. Mr. J oshi stated the vehicles were all purchased during the marriage and testified further
regarding the vehicles. An objection by Mr. Springgate that a question regarding the cars, listed in the financial
declaration, is compound and misrepresentative of the testimony was sustained. Mr. Joshi argued further. The
Court informed Mr. Joshi the objection was sustained and requested he proceed with questioning. Mr. Joshi
stated he is going to respond though sustained. The Court held a bench conference with the attorneys.
The matter reconvened. Mr. J oshi continued his testimony on cross examination: He didnt collect
unemployment last year and testified further regarding his employment and debts; testified regarding family visits,
travels, and costs covered by him and Ms. Joshi. Tow objections by Mr. Springgate on hearsay was sustained. An
objection by Mr. Springgate on relevance was overruled. Testimony continued. Mr. J oshi testified that Ms.
J oshis employment check was not deposited to any bank account in London; Ms. J oshis earnings while in
Tanzania were used by the household, she had control of them, and were not deposited into an account; testified
further regarding the Honda. Mr. Coughlin objected to testimony that the daughter is paying for the car. The
objection was sustained. A question by Mr. Coughlin was objected to by Mr. Springgate as argumentative. The
objection was sustained. The Court noted that the Honda was purchased with cash from Ms. Joshi advanced from
a credit card. Mr. J oshi testified further: He and his daughter took the cash to the seller, purchased the car, and
the car was titled in his and the daughters name; the daughter made payments to him by transfer from her account
to Mr. J oshis account, Mr. Joshi took the payment and deposited into Ms. Joshis account to pay the credit card;
when he was out of the house, the daughter started paying Ms. J oshi directly. Mr. Springgate testified as
argumentative to a question as to whether he has proof and argued that Mr. Coughlin could obtain proof on
discovery. Mr. Coughlin argued that Mr. Springgate doesnt know what documents he has on discovery. The
objection was sustained. There was further discussion.
Testimony continued. Mr. J oshi testified further regarding accounts. Objections as argumentative by Mr.
Springgate were sustained. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi stated he hasnt made an effort to ask his family
about Ms. J oshis womans wealth, Ms. J oshi is on talking terms with them and can ask them; stated Ms. J oshi left
her womans wealth with his mother, his mother has passed, and then left it with his sister, but he really doesnt
know. After discussion regarding testimony, questioning continued. Mr. Joshi stated he doesnt know about a
specific custom but the bride retains her wealth that she brings with her, she keeps it, and she decides whether to
keep it anywhere else. Mr. Springgate objected that Mr. Coughlin is arguing with the witness. The objection was
sustained. There were a further objection and discussion regarding the questioning regarding womans wealth.
The Court addressed the issue of objections. Testimony continued. Mr. Joshi testified further that his
understanding is that Ms. J oshi left her womans wealth with his sister. Mr. Springgate objected to question
whether he attempted to retrieve it from his sister as argumentative. The objection was sustained. The Court
cautioned counsel about broad arguments, about the manner of questioning, and about being argumentative with
the witness. Mr. J oshi stated he told Ms. J oshi she could call his sister and to not involve him; testified regarding
loans from friends and family; testified as to what he (vs. Ms. Joshi or them both) paid for during the marriage.
There were no further questions on cross-examination.
Mr. Joshi testified on re-direct examination: During his surgery, he was off work, applied for unemployment
but didnt receive any. An objection by Mr. Coughlin as argumentative was overruled. Mr. Joshi stated there are
trips of Ms. Joshis also placed on the cards-a vacation to India for two weeks. An objection by Mr. Coughlin to a
question by Mr. Springgate in that it calls for a legal opinion was sustained. Mr. J oshi testified regarding his
legal fees and payments. An objection by Mr. Coughlin as leading was overruled. Mr. J oshi testified further
regarding his legal costs. On re-cross, Mr. Joshi testified that he has paid his attorney $4000-by the end of
February, he paid his attorney $4,000, paid $600 a couple of days ago, stated he has it in writing, and agreed he
has paid a total of $4600; he didnt receive unemployment because he was hospitalized; he didnt receive any
money from the government. There were no other questions and the witness was excused.
Mr. Springgate rested Plaintiffs case.
F I L E D
Electronically
06-10-2009:03:04:30 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
DV08-01168
March 13, 2009
Page 2 of 2
Mr. Coughlin called Ms. J oshi to testify. Ms. Joshi testified on direct examination: She didnt ask for access
to bank statements; asked for credit card statements but didnt get them; she could have access to Wells Fargo
because the statements were lying around the house but not to credit card statements; she asked the companies for
statements. Two objections by Mr. Springgate to hearsay were sustained. Testimony continued. Ms. J oshi stated
she went to US Bank and was told she couldnt have access with Mr. Joshi present. An objection by Mr.
Springgate to leading was sustained. Testimony continued. Ms. Joshi stated she was never made aware of any of
the $5000 loans; she incurred expenses related to immigration; regarding the letter, exhibit H, stated she thinks
they are trying to make up a debt; she never took any money from them. An objection by Mr. Springgate was
sustained. Ms. J oshi continued her testimony regarding the daughters car, theres $5000 still owed; testified
regarding the Jeep-theres a loan with Clearstar, she and her son; testified further regarding the cars; her children
help her pay the rent, phone, pays expenses with her paycheck; asked for spousal support-got some initially but is
not anymore. Objections by Mr. Springgate to questions regarding whether she considers Mr. Joshi should be
half responsible for her living costs were sustained. Ms. J oshi testified that stated she thinks Mr. J oshi made up
the other $5000 debt owed to Mr. Joshis friend; she asked the friend about it and the friend stated he wanted to
stay out of the divorce and didnt want to discuss it; she didnt inquire to the Fowlers regarding the other debts;
she sent an email to Mr. J oshis sister regarding her womans wealth and received no response; Mr. Joshi also sent
his sister an email after hers. There was discussion regarding Mr. Joshis email, Mr. Coughlin stated hes not
sure if he has a copy and requested to ask questions about it. The request was denied. Ms. J oshi testified
regarding a safety deposit box listed in Mr. J oshis deposit box. There was argument regarding Mr. Coughlins
questioning. The Court directed Mr. Coughlin to ask questions on direct without impeaching his own witness or
arguing with her. Ms. Joshi continued her testimony regarding the safety box. Objections by Mr. Springgate as
argumentative were sustained. Mr. Springgate objected on relevance to a question regarding whether Mr. Joshi
threaten her. Mr. Coughlin argued in response that it goes toward determination of Mr. Josh running up debts.
Mr. Springgate stated his objection is based on Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 116 Nev 993. Mr. Coughlin was
admonished for interrupting. Mr. Coughlin argued that the question was not made to determine fault for purposes
of alimony but for purposes of the validity of the debt. The objection was sustained. Testimony continued. Ms.
J oshi stated she got a TPO on Mr. Joshi. Mr. Springgate objected on the same basis as the prior objection. The
Court admonished Mr. Coughlin to be respectful and took judicial notice. Mr. Coughlin argued further. Mr.
Springgate objected to a question regarding whether accepting alimony made her responsible for debts in that it
called for a legal conclusion. The objection was sustained.
Testimony continued. Ms. Joshi testified further regarding the debts; regarding the car loans, stated each
should take the loan for his/her car; testified regarding her caretaking of the children. Mr. Springgates objection
on lack of foundation was sustained. Ms. Joshi stated she has basically always worked; gave up some of her
dreams for the family and believes Mr. J oshi did not take the same responsibility to the marriage. An objection by
Mr. Springgate to a question whether Mr. Joshi exerted control over the marriage was overruled. Mr. Coughlin
had no further questions.
Ms. Joshi testified on cross-examination: Ms. J oshi stated the parties didnt have joint accounts; testified
regarding the car debt-her daughter makes the payments directly to the credit card account around $200.
Objections by Mr. Coughlin to a question whether Mr. Joshi should sign the title over to the daughter on the basis
that it calls for speculation, on relevance, and argumentative were overruled. Ms. Joshi stated she is concerned
about Mr. Joshi owning the car and the debt for it of about $5000; the son is paying for his car and its in his
name. Mr. Coughlin objected on relevance to whether the parties children live with her was overruled. Ms.
J oshi stated she has a safety deposit box, her womans wealth is not in it; her womans wealth from Mr. J oshi was
left with his family; her womans wealth from her side is with her. An objection on relevance to whether she has
attorneys fees was overruled. Ms. Joshi continued testimony: In Tanzania Mr. Joshi owned a restaurant and she
helped him in the business; testified regarding her employment in the US; she has a degree in commerce from
Bombay; she has individual accounts in her name.
Ms. Joshi testified on re-direct examination. Ms. J oshi testified that there was domestic violence during
the marriage. Mr. Springgate objected on relevance. Mr. Coughlin argued that it goes toward her ability to have
any reasonable opportunity to object to any incurred debts. Mr. Springgate argued that whether or not she
incurred debts (for representation) are relevant to community debt and domestic violence is not relevant. Upon
arguments presented, the objection was sustained. There were no other questions and the witness was excused.
There were no other witnesses or testimony. The Court recessed. Upon reconvening, the Court heard closing
arguments from the attorneys.
Mr. Springgate moved the Court for attorneys fees, imposed on Mr. Coughlin directly, under NRS 7.085.
Mr. Coughlin argued in response and in opposition.

The Court took the matter under submission and will issue an Order.
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CODE: 1745
JOHN P. SPRINGGATE,ESQ.
NevadaBar#1350
203 SouthArlingtonAvenue
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
Attorneyfor Plaintiff
INTHEFAMILYDIVISION
IN THESECONDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURTOFTHESTATEOFNEVADA
INAND FORTHECOUNTYOFWASHOE
*****
ASHWINJOSHI,
Plaintiff, CASENO.: DV08-01168
vs. DEPT.NO.: 14
BHARTIJOSHI,
Defendant.
____________----'1
FINDINGSOFFACT,
CONCLUSIONSOFLAW,
AND DECREEOFDIVORCE
The above-entitled mattercame on for trial before this Court on March 11, 2009 and
March 12,2009. ASHWINJOSHI,Plaintiff,waspresentandrepresentedbyhiscounsel,JOHN
P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ. BHARTI JOSHI, Defendant, was present and represented by her
counsel, ZACHCOUGHLIN, ESQ. The Courtissuedits OrderAfterTrial whichwas filed on
April 13,2009.
FINDINGSOFFACT
1. Plaintiff is a residentof the Stateof Nevada, and for a periodof more than six (6)
weeksbeforecommencementofthisactionhasresidedandbeenphysicallypresentanddomiciled
inthe StateofNevada.
2. Defendantisaresidentofthe State ofNevada,and foraperiodof more thansix
(6) weeks before commencement ofthis action has resided and been physically present and
domiciledinthe Stateof Nevada.
F I L E D
Electronically
06-19-2009:09:57:23 AM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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3. Plaintiffand Defendant were married on May 11, 1987 in Bombay, India, and ever
sincethatdate have been, andnoware, Husbandand Wife.
4. There aretwo childrenofthismarriage,bothofwhomare now adults.
5. Defendantisnotpregnantatthis time.
6. Plaintiff and Defendant have become, and continue to be, incompatible in
marriage,and no reconciliationispossible.
7. The currentaddressofPlaintiffis 1644FieldcrestDrive, Sparks,NV 89434.
8. The currentaddressof Defendantis260BoothStreet, Apt. Q, Reno, NV 89509.
9. The Courtadopts,asFindingsof Fact, each and everyConclusionof Lawbelow,
whichbythis referenceareexpresslyincorporatedherein.
CONCLUSIONSOFLAW
1. JURISDICTION. This CourthasjurisdictionofPlaintiffand Defendant,and of
the subjectmatterherein.
2. GROUNDS. Plaintiffis entitledto aDecreeofDivorcefromDefendanton the
grounds ofincompatibility.
3. CHILDSUPPORT/ADULTCHILDREN'SEDUCATION. MrJoshi willnotbe
held responsibleforthe continuingeducationofthe adult childrenofthis marriage.
4. COMMUNITYPROPERTY/DEBT.
A) Women'sWealth:The"women'swealth"atissuehereinisthe sole andseparate
propertyofthe Defendant. Plaintiffisto contactany and all relativeswho may
have this property and immediately ask them to return said property to the
Defendantassoon aspossible.
B) Mr.Joshi'sVehicle: The 2005 ChevroletBlazershall beconsideredasPlaintiff's
soleandseparatepropertyandPlaintiffshallberesponsibleforthedebtremaining
thereon. Sincethecarisworthabout$10,910.00andthere is$15,009.75dueand
owingon the vehicle,Mr. Joshi'sassumptionofthis asset istobe consideredas
anundertakingofcommunitydebt ofapproximately$4,100.00.
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C) Ms. Joshi's Vehicle: Ms. Joshi's car shall be considered as her sole and separate
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property and she shall be responsible for any debt remaining thereon. Since no
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evidence was presented to the Court as to the value of the auto, either positive or
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negative, there is no value for this community asset.
D) Son's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be divided
6 among the community.
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E) Daughter's Vehicle: This vehicle is not considered as an asset and will not be
8 divided among the community.
9
F) London Bank Account: There is no factual basis to support that this account exists
and therefore it is not being considered a community asset.
11 G) Community Bank Accounts: There is no factual basis to support that community
12 bank accounts exist and therefore the same is not being considered a community
13 asset.
14 H) Computer: The computer which was purchased at Best Buy is awarded to Mr
Joshi.
16 I) Television: Ms. Joshi is awarded the television which was purchased at Best Buy.
17 Said television is currently in Ms. Joshi's possession and shall be deemed her sole
18 and separate property.
19 J) General Credit Card Debt: There is general debt of approximately $15,650.00
which has been expended for community purposes. Mr. Joshi has agreed to be
21 responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as his sole and separate
22 responsibility.
23 K) Best Buy Credit Card Debt: There is an approximately balance of $1,314.00
24 outstanding for the purchase ofthe television and computer. Mr. Joshi has agreed
to be responsible for this debt and the same shall be considered as his sole and
26 separate responsibility.
27 III
28 III
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L) Medical Debt: There isadebtduetoSt.Mary'sHospital for$6,735.00andadebtto
REMSA for$500.00. Mr.Joshihasagreedtoberesponsible forthesedebtsandthe
sameshallbeconsidered ashissoleandseparateresponsibility.
M) Family Debt: ThereisadebtduetoAshikNanaby anda$5,000.00 debtduetoRod
andMeena Fowler. Mr.Joshihasagreedtoberesponsible forthesedebtsandthe
sameshallbeconsidered ashissoleandseparateresponsibility.
N) General CommunityDebt: Therewasnoevidencetoestablish community debt. Mr.
Joshiagreedtotaketheremainingcommunity debt inhisnamethatisoutstanding
andthedebtshallbehissoleandseparateresponsibility. ItshouldbenotedthatMr.
Joshihas likely incurred an unequal distributionof the community debtof the parties
andtheCourtfindshistestimonytobeacompelling reasonformakinganunequal
distributionof thecommunitydebt.
5. Spousal Support: TheCourthasfoundthat Mr.Joshi is51andMs.Joshiis46;the
partiesearnroughly equivalent amounts;thepartieshavebeenmarried 21yearsbutMs.Joshihas
alwaysbeenemployed duringthattime;Ms.Joshihasacollegedegree; bothpartiesareableto
work; and after considerationof the net income, deduction of taxes, and the amount paid in
communitydebtbyMr.Joshi, anawardofalimonyintheamount ofonedollar($1.00)shallbe
awardedtoMs.JoshipursuanttoNRS 125.150,Wolffv. Wolff 112Nev. 1355,929P.2d 196,and
Shydler v. Shydler, 194Nev. 192,196,954P.2d37,39(1988).
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
III
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JUDGEMENTANDDECREEOF DIVORCE
NOW,THEREFORE,IT ISHEREBYORDERED,ADJUDGED,ANDDECREED 1.
Plaintiff,ASHWINJOSHIbe, and he is,finally and absolutelydivorcedfrom Defendant,
BHARTIJOSHI,and that the bonds ofmatrimonyheretoforeexistingbetweenPlaintiffASHWIN
JOSHI, and Defendant,BHARTIJOSHI,be,and theyherebyare, dissolved,and thepartieshereto
arerestoredtothe statusofsingleandunmarriedpersons.
2. There Defendant'snameshall berestoredtothat ofBHARTIR.DAVE.
3. The matter,assetforthin theprecedingFindingsof Fact, ConclusionsofLaw, and
DecreeofDivorce,isherebyratified, adopted,and approved,and thepartiesare
Orderedto complywith thetermsofsuch.
GOODCAUSEAPPEARING,IT IS SOORDERED.
Dated: June1
lui
.
,1 \ /
.' .:
Lin M. Gardner
DistrictCourtJudge
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CODE:
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ASHWIN JOSHI,
11
v.
12
13
BHARTI JOSHI,
14
Plaintiff, Case No. DV08-01168
Dept. No. 14
Defendant.
--------------/
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART; ORDER GRANTING
16
MOTION TO STRIKE IN PART
17
On April 13, 2009, the Court entered an Order After Trial specifying its findings of
18
fact and conclusions of law based upon the divorce trial that took place March 12 and
19
March 17,2009.
On May 12, 2009, a Notice of Appeal was filed by Zachary Coughlin, Esq.,
21
specifying he was appealing the Order After Trial entered April 13, 2009.
22
On May 13, 2009, a Motion to Strike was filed by John P. Springgate, Esq., alleging
23
the Notice of Appeal filed on May 12, 2009, was untimely filed pursuant to NRAP 3A.
24
Specifically, Mr. Springgate argued there was no final judgment entered in this
matter yet as the Order After Trial had not been memorialized into a Findings of Fact,
26
Conclusions of Law, Judgment and Decree of Divorce'.
27
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1 A Decree of Divorce was entered in this case on June 19,2009.
F I L E D
Electronically
07-15-2009:02:34:56 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
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On May 27, 2009, a Request for Submission was filed by Mr. Springgate.
On June 8, 2009, Mr. Coughlin opposed the motion and argued it was not clear
whether the Order After Trial was a final order, and " [i]t certainly is not worth risking the
deadline for filing an appeal. .. " Opposition 2:13-2:14.
On June 8, 2009, a Request for Submission was filed by Mr. Coughlin,
Upon review of the pleadings and papers filed herein, the Court finds and Orders
as follows.
Insofar as Mr. Coughlin is appealing the award of attorney's fees, the Court finds
the Order After Trial entered April 13, 2009, was a final order from which Mr. Coughlin
may appeal as the Court did not intend the award of attorney's fees to be included in the
Decree of Divorce. Accordingly, Mr. Springgate's Motion to Strike is denied with respect
to the appealability of the Order After Trial as it pertains to the award of attorney's fees.
With regard to appeal of the issues pertaining to the Joshi marriage/ divorce, the
Court finds the Order After Trial was not a final order from which Mr. Coughlin may
appeal as the Court intended all issues pertaining to the Joshi marriage/ divorce to be
separate and apart from the award of attorney's fees. Accordingly, Mr. Springgate's
Motion to Strike is granted with respect to the appealability of the issues pertaining solely
to the Joshi divorce.
GOOD IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: July J ,2009. de: ('
/{IJ / .t-Vf:i II
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CERTIFICATEOF MAILING
PursuanttoNRCP5(b),IcertifythatIamanemployeeofthe SecondJudicial
DistrictCourt,andthatonthe ; {P dayofJuly, 2009,Idepositedfor mailing,firstclass
postagepre-paid,atReno, Nevada,atrueandcorrectcopyofthe foregoingdocument
addressedto:
Document: OrderDenyingMotionto StrikeinPart;OrderGrantingMotionto Strike
inPart
ZacharyCoughlin,Esq.
945W.12
th
Street
Reno,NV89503
J5
foregoingwiththe ClerkoftheCourtsystemwhichwill sendanoticeofelectronicfilingto
the following:
JohnSpringgate,Esq.
Marc Ashley,Esq.
8f/J1JYnu
StephenieBroome
AdministrativeAssistant- Dept. 14
3
DEPUTY
BY
A
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CODE: 4050
Nevada Bar #1350
Reno, NV 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
Attorney for Plaintiff
FILED
2E3JUL 22 Mi 9: 32
RO
0; ERS
* * * * *
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs. DEPT. NO.: 14
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.
STIPULATION TO AMEND DECREE OF DIVORCE
COME NOW the parties hereto, ASHWIN JOSHI, Plaintiff, by and through his counsel
of record, JOHN P. SPRINGGATE, ESQ., and BHA.RTI JOSHI, by and through her counsel of
record, MARC ASHLEY, ESQ., of Washoe Legal Services, and hereby stipulate and agree to an
Order Amending the Decree of Divorce in the following regards:
In response to Ms. Joshi's motion, the Court amended the proposed Findings of Fact to
include a finding of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) per year alimony for Ms. Joshi. However, the Decree,
as amended by the Court, did not include a term. The parties had originally agreed or suggested
a term of five (5) years and they therefore stipulate and agree that this Stipulation and Order
///
///
///
1 41
Ya"S ft A E, ESQ.
iii
203 ' outh Arli E , on Avenue
Re o, NV 895 a
Te : 775.323, :881
("K
MARC ASHLEY,
thereon shall amend the Decree of Divorce to include ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) alimony for five (5)
years in favor of Ms. Joshi.
DATED: per /9 DATED: - - 09
299 S. Arlington Avenue
Reno, NV 89501
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CODE: 3370
IN THE FAMILYDIVISION
INTHE SECONDJUDICIALDISTRICTCOURTOFTHE STATEOFNEVADA
INAND FORTHECOUNTYOF WASHOE
* * * * *
ASHWIN JOSHI,
vs. DEPT. NO.: 14
BHARTI JOSHI,
Defendant.
/
ORDERTO AMENDDECREEOFDIVORCE
The parties having stipulated and agreed to an Order Amending the Decree of Divorce to
provide alimony of ONE DOLLAR ($1.00) per year for five (5) years, and good cause appearing
therefor,
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATEDthisl-5 dayof ,2009. 1.ry
Submitted by:
Reno, NY 89501
Telephone: 775.323.8881
F I L E D
Electronically
07-23-2009:04:17:13 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court
F I L E D
Electronically
08-04-2009:03:02:18 PM
Howard W. Conyers
Clerk of the Court

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