Digested Cases for midterms: Land bank of the Philippines vs CA et al. [G.R. No. 118712.

July 5, 1996] Department of Agrarian Reform vs CA etal [G.R. No. 118745. July 5, 1996] Facts: The case is about the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners seeking to annul the judgment rendered against them in a petition for certiorari. it is argued that there is no legal basis for allowing the withdrawal of the money deposited in trust for the rejecting landowners pending the determination of the final valuation of their properties. Petitioner DAR maintains that "the deposit contemplated by Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657, absent any specific indication, may either be general or special, regular or irregular, voluntary or involuntary (necessary) or other forms known in law, and any thereof should be, as it is the general rule, deemed complying." ISSUE: WON the contention of the petitioners is valid? Held: We reject this contention. Section 16(e) of Republic Act 6657 was very specific in limiting the type of deposit to be made as compensation for the rejecting landowners, that is in "cash" or in "LBP bonds", to wit: "Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands xxx xxx xxx (e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. x x x" (Italics supplied) The provision is very clear and unambiguous, foreclosing any doubt as to allow an expanded construction that would include the opening of "trust accounts" within the coverage of term "deposit. Accordingly, we must adhere to the well-settled rule that when the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no reason for interpretation or construction, but only for application. It is significant to note that despite petitioner's objections to the immediate release of the rejected compensation, petitioner LBP, taking into account the plight of the rejecting landowners, has nevertheless allowed partial withdrawal through LBP Executive Order No. 003, limited to fifty (50) per cent of the net cash proceeds. This is a clear confirmation that petitioners themselves realize the overriding need of the landowners' immediate access to the offered compensation despite rejecting its valuation. But the effort, though laudable, still falls short because the release of the amount was unexplainably limited to only fifty per cent instead of the total amount of the rejected offer, notwithstanding that the rejecting landowner's property is taken in its entirety. Anent the aforecited risks and disadvantages to which the government allegedly will be unnecessarily exposed if immediate withdrawal of the rejected compensation is allowed, suffice it to say that in the absence of any substantial evidence to support the same, the contemplated scenarios are at the moment nothing but speculations. To allow the taking of the landowners' properties, and in the meantime leave them empty handed by withholding payment of compensation while the government speculates on whether or not it will pursue expropriation, or worse for government to subsequently decide to abandon the property and return it to the landowner when it has already been rendered useless by force majeure, is undoubtedly an oppressive exercise of eminent domain that must never be sanctioned. Legislations in pursuit of the agrarian reform program are not mere overnight creations but were the result of long exhaustive studies and even heated debates. In implementation of the program, much is therefore expected from the government. Unduly burdening the property owners from the resulting flaws in the implementation of the CARP which was supposed to have been a carefully crafted legislation is plainly unfair and unacceptable. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' motions for reconsideration are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

ROXAS & CO., INC., petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, et al [G.R. No. 127876. December 17, 1999] Facts: This case involves three (3) haciendas in Nasugbu, Batangas owned by petitioner and the validity of the acquisition of these haciendas by the government under Republic Act No. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The petitioner owns 3 Haciendas which are subjected to acquisition by the Government. As to the Hacienda Palico: On September 29, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice entitled Invitation to Parties to petitioner. On October 27, 1989, a Summary Investigation Report was submitted and signed jointly by the MARO, representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), and by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The Report recommended that 333.0800 hectares of Hacienda Palico be subject to compulsory acquisition at a value of P6,807,622.20.[8] The following day, October 28, 1989, two (2) more Summary Investigation Reports were submitted by the same officers and representatives. They recommended that 270.0876 hectares and 75.3800 hectares be placed under compulsory acquisition at a compensation of P8,109,739.00 and P2,188,195.47, respectively. On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR through then Department Secretary Miriam D. Santiago sent a Notice of Acquisition to petitioner. Petitioner was informed about the acquisition and was required within 30 days to reply to the aforementioned notice and that that in case of petitioners rejection or failure to reply within thirty days, respondent DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings with notice to petitioner to determine just compensation for the land; that if petitioner accepts respondent DARs offer, or upon deposit of the compensation with an accessible bank if it rejects the same, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land. As to the Hacienda Balidad: On August 23, 1989, respondent DAR, through respondent MARO of Nasugbu, Batangas, sent a notice to petitioner. The MARO informed Pimentel that Hacienda Banilad was subject to compulsory acquisition under the CARL; that should petitioner wish to avail of the other schemes such as Voluntary Offer to Sell or Voluntary Land Transfer, respondent DAR was willing to provide assistance thereto. The results of these Reports were discussed at the conference. Present in the conference were representatives of the prospective farmer beneficiaries, the BARC, the LBP, and Jaime Pimentel on behalf of the landowner. On December 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Department Secretary, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Notices of Acquisition over Hacienda Banil ad. These Notices were sent on the same day as the Notice of Acquisition over Hacienda Palico. On September 26, 1991, the DAR Regional Director sent to the LBP Land Valuation Manager a Request to Open Trust Account in petitioners name as compensation f or 234.6493 hectares of Hacienda Banilad. On May 4, 1993, petitioner applied for conversion of both Haciendas Palico and Banilad. As to Hascienda Caylaway: Hacienda Caylaway was voluntarily offered for sale to the government on May 6, 1988 before the effectivity of the CARL. The Hacienda has a total area of 867.4571 hectares and is covered by four (4) titlesTCT Nos. T-44662, T-44663, T-44664 and T-44665. On January 12, 1989, respondent DAR, through the Regional Director for Region IV, sent to petitioner two (2) separate Resolutions accepting petitioners voluntary offer to sell Hacienda Caylaway, particularly TCT Nos. T -44664 and T-44663. Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses. Nevertheless, on August 6, 1992, petitioner, through its President, Eduardo J. Roxas, sent a letter to the Secretary of respondent DAR withdrawing its VOS of Hacienda Caylaway. The Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly authorized the reclassification of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to non-agricultural. As a result, petitioner informed respondent DAR that it was applying for conversion of Hacienda Caylaway from agricultural to other uses.

In a Resolution dated October 14, 1993, respondent DARAB held that the case involved the prejudicial question of whether the property was subject to agrarian reform, hence, this question should be submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform for determination. On October 29, 1993, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals CA-G.R. SP No. 32484. It questioned the expropriation of its properties under the CARL and the denial of due process in the acquisition of its landholdings. Meanwhile, the petition for conversion of the three haciendas was denied by the MARO on November 8, 1993. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied on January 17, 1997 by respondent court. Hence, this recourse. ISSUES: The assigned errors involve three (3) principal issues: (1) whether this Court can take cognizance of this petition despite petitioners failure to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) whether the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas were valid and in accordance with law; and (3) assuming the haciendas may be reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural, whether this court has the power to rule on this issue. HELD: I. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies As a general rule, before a party may be allowed to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts of justice, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress. This is not absolute, however. There are instances when judicial action may be resorted to immediately. Respondent DAR issued Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to farmer beneficiaries over portions of petitioners land without just compensation to petitioner. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) is evidence of ownership of land by a beneficiary under R.A. 6657, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Before this may be awarded to a farmer beneficiary, the land must first be acquired by the State from the landowner and ownership transferred to the former. The transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government are conditioned upon the receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or deposit by the DAR of the compensation with an accessible bank. Until then, title remains with the landowner.There was no receipt by petitioner of any compensation for any of the lands acquired by the government. The kind of compensation to be paid the landowner is also specific. The law provides that the deposit must be made only in cash or LBP bonds. Trust account deposits are not cash or LBP bonds. The replacement of the trust account with cash or LBP bonds did not ipso facto cure the lack of compensation; for essentially, the determination of this compensation was marred by lack of due process. fact, in the entire acquisition proceedings, respondent DAR disregarded the basic requirements of administrative due process. Under these circumstances, the issuance of the CLOAs to farmer beneficiaries necessitated immediate judicial action on the part of the petitioner. II. The Procedure A.) SUMMARY: In the compulsory acquisition of private lands, the landholding, the landowners and the farmer beneficiaries must first be identified. After identification, the DAR shall send a Notice of Acquisition to the landowner, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post it in a conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located. Within thirty days from receipt of the Notice of Acquisition, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer. If the landowner accepts, he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the government and surrenders the certificate of title. Within thirty days from the execution of the deed of transfer, the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) pays the owner the purchase price. If the landowner rejects the DARs offer or fails to make a reply, the DAR conducts summary administrative proceedings to determine just compensation for the land. The landowner, the LBP representative and other interested parties may submit evidence on just compensation within fifteen days from notice. Within thirty days from submission, the DAR shall decide the case and inform the owner of its decision and the amount of just compensation. Upon receipt by the owner of the corresponding payment, or, in case of rejection or lack of response from the latter, the DAR shall deposit the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds with an accessible bank. The DAR shall immediately take possession of the land and cause the issuance of a transfer certificate of title in the name of the Republic

of the Philippines. The land shall then be redistributed to the farmer beneficiaries. Any party may question the decision of the DAR in the regular courts for final determination of just compensation. The DAR has made compulsory acquisition the priority mode of land acquisition to hasten the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). Under Section 16 of the CARL, the first step in compulsory acquisition is the identification of the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries. However, the law is silent on how the identification process must be made. To fill in this gap, the DAR issued on July 26, 1989 Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989, which set the operating procedure in the identification of such lands. The procedure is as follows: II. OPERATING PROCEDURE

A. The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer, with the assistance of the pertinent Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), shall: 1. Update the masterlist of all agricultural lands covered under the CARP in his area of responsibility. The masterlist shall include such information as required under the attached CARP Masterlist Form which shall include the name of the landowner, landholding area, TCT/OCT number, and tax declaration number. 2. Prepare a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title (OCT/TCT) or landholding covered under Phase I and II of the CARP except those for which the landowners have already filed applications to avail of other modes of land acquisition. A case folder shall contain the following duly accomplished forms: a) CARP CA Form 1MARO Investigation Report b) CARP CA Form 2-- Summary Investigation Report of Findings and Evaluation c) CARP CA Form 3Applicants Information Sheet d) CARP CA Form 4Beneficiaries Undertaking e) CARP CA Form 5Transmittal Report to the PARO The MARO/ BARC shall certify that all information contained in the above-mentioned forms have been examined and verified by him and that the same are true and correct. 3. Send a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/ meeting to the landowner covered by the Compulsory Case Acquisition Folder. Invitations to the said conference/ meeting shall also be sent to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the BARC representative(s), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) representative, and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property. He shall discuss the MARO/ BARC investigation report and solicit the views, objection, agreements or suggestions of the participants thereon. The landowner shall also be asked to indicate his retention area. The minutes of the meeting shall be signed by all participants in the conference and shall form an integral part of the CACF. 4. Submit all completed case folders to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). B. The PARO shall: 1. Ensure that the individual case folders are forwarded to him by his MAROs. 2. Immediately upon receipt of a case folder, compute the valuation of the land in accordance with A.O. No. 6, Series of 1988.[47] The valuation worksheet and the related CACF valuation forms shall be duly certified correct by the PARO and all the personnel who participated in the accomplishment of these forms. 3. In all cases, the PARO may validate the report of the MARO through ocular inspection and verification of the property. This ocular inspection and verification shall be mandatory when the computed value exceeds 500,000 per estate. 4. Upon determination of the valuation, forward the case folder, together with the duly accomplished valuation forms and his recommendations, to the Central Office. The LBP representative and the MARO concerned shall be furnished a copy each of his report. C. DAR Central Office, specifically through the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall: 1. Within three days from receipt of the case folder from the PARO, review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property covered by the case folder. A summary review and evaluation report shall be prepared and duly certified by the BLAD Director and the personnel directly participating in the review and final valuation.

2. Prepare, for the signature of the Secretary or her duly authorized representative, a Notice of Acquisition (CARP CA Form 8) for the subject property. Serve the Notice to the landowner personally or through registered mail within three days from its approval. The Notice shall include, among others, the area subject of compulsory acquisition, and the amount of just compensation offered by DAR. 3. Should the landowner accept the DARs offered value, the BLAD shall prepare and subm it to the Secretary for approval the Order of Acquisition. However, in case of rejection or non-reply, the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB) shall conduct a summary administrative hearing to determine just compensation, in accordance with the procedures provided under Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1989. Immediately upon receipt of the DARABs decision on just compensation, the BLAD shall prepare and submit to the Secretary for approval the required Order of Acquisition. 4. Upon the landowners receipt of payment, in case of acceptance, or upon deposit of payment in the designated bank, in case of rejection or non-response, the Secretary shall immediately direct the pertinent Register of Deeds to issue the corresponding Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. Once the property is transferred, the DAR, through the PARO, shall take possession of the land for redistribution to qualified beneficiaries. Administrative Order No. 12, Series of 1989 requires that the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) keep an updated master list of all agricultural lands under the CARP in his area of responsibility containing all the required information. The MARO prepares a Compulsory Acquisition Case Folder (CACF) for each title covered by CARP. The MARO then sends the landowner a Notice of Coverage and a letter of invitation to a conference/ meeting over the land covered by the CACF. He also sends invitations to the prospective farmer-beneficiaries, the representatives of the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC), the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) and other interested parties to discuss the inputs to the valuation of the property and solicit views, suggestions, objections or agreements of the parties. At the meeting, the landowner is asked to indicate his retention area. The MARO shall make a report of the case to the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) who shall complete the valuation of the land. Ocular inspection and verification of the property by the PARO shall be mandatory when the computed value of the estate exceeds P500,000.00. Upon determination of the valuation, the PARO shall forward all papers together with his recommendation to the Central Office of the DAR. The DAR Central Office, specifically, the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution (BLAD), shall review, evaluate and determine the final land valuation of the property. The BLAD shall prepare, on the signature of the Secretary or his duly authorized representative, a Notice of Acquisition for the subject property.From this point, the provisions of Section 16 of R.A. 6657 then apply. For a valid implementation of the CAR Program, two notices are required: (1) the Notice of Coverage and letter of invitation to a preliminary conference sent to the landowner, the representatives of the BARC, LBP, farmer beneficiaries and other interested parties pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989; and (2) the Notice of Acquisition sent to the landowner under Section 16 of the CARL. The importance of the first notice, i.e., the Notice of Coverage and the letter of invitation to the conference, and its actual conduct cannot be understated. They are steps designed to comply with the requirements of administrative due process. The implementation of the CARL is an exercise of the States police power and the power of eminent domain. To the extent that the CARL prescribes retention limits to the landowners, there is an exercise of police power for the regulation of private property in accordance with the Constitution. Clearly then, the notice requirements under the CARL are not confined to the Notice of Acquisition set forth in Section 16 of the law. They also include the Notice of Coverage first laid down in DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989 and subsequently amended in DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990 and DAR A. O. No. 1, Series of 1993. This Notice of Coverage does not merely notify the landowner that his property shall be placed under CARP and that he is entitled to exercise his retention right; it also notifies him, pursuant to DAR A. O. No. 9, Series of 1990, that a public hearing shall be conducted where he and representatives of the concerned sectors of society may attend to discuss the results of the field investigation, the land valuation and other pertinent matters. Under DAR A. O. No. 1, Series of 1993, the Notice of Coverage also informs the landowner that a field investigation of his landholding shall be conducted where he and the other representatives may be present. B.)The Compulsory Acquisition of Haciendas Palico and Banilad

The procedure in the sending of these notices is important to comply with the requisites of due process especially when the owner, as in this case, is a juridical entity. Petitioner is a domestic corporation,and therefore, has a personality separate and distinct from its shareholders, officers and employees. The Notice of Acquisition in Section 16 of the CARL is required to be sent to the landowner by personal delivery or registered mail. Whether the landowner be a natural or juridical person to whose address the Notice may be sent by personal delivery or registered mail, the law does not distinguish. The DAR Administrative Orders also do not distinguish. In the proceedings before the DAR, the distinction between natural and juridical persons in the sending of notices may be found in the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Service of pleadings before the DARAB is governed by Section 6, Rule V of the DARAB Revised Rules of Procedure. Similarly, the Revised Rules of Court of the Philippines, in Section 13, Rule 14. Summonses, pleadings and notices in cases against a private domestic corporation before the DARAB and the regular courts are served on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent or any of its directors. These persons are those through whom the private domestic corporation or partnership is capable of action. Jaime Pimentel is not the president, manager, secretary, cashier or director of petitioner corporation. Is he, as administrator of the two Haciendas, considered an agent of the corporation? Curiously, respondent DAR had information of the address of petitioners principal place of business. The Notices of Acquisition over Haciendas Palico and Banilad were addressed to petitioner at its offices in Manila and Makati. These Notices were sent barely three to four months after Pimentel was notified of the preliminary conference.Why respondent DAR chose to notify Pimentel instead of the officers of the corporation was not explained by the said respondent. Nevertheless, assuming that Pimentel was an agent of petitioner corporation, and the notices and letters of invitation were validly served on petitioner through him, there is no showing that Pimentel himself was duly authorized to attend the conference meeting with the MARO, BARC and LBP representatives and farmer beneficiaries for purposes of compulsory acquisition of petitioners landholdings. Respondents admit at the same time, however, that not all areas in the haciendas were placed under the comprehensive agrarian reform program invariably by reason of elevation or character or use of the land. The acquisition of the landholdings did not cover the entire expanse of the two haciendas, but only portions thereof. Hacienda Palico has an area of 1,024 hectares and only 688.7576 hectares were targetted for acquisition. Hacienda Banilad has an area of 1,050 hectares but only 964.0688 hectares were subject to CARP. The haciendas are not entirely agricultural lands. In fact, the various tax declarations over the haciendas describe the landholdings as sugarland, and forest, sugarland, pasture land, horticulture and woodland. Upon receipt of this notice, therefore, petitioner corporation had no idea which portions of its estate were subject to compulsory acquisition, which portions it could rightfully retain, whether these retained portions were compact or contiguous, and which portions were excluded from CARP coverage. Even respondent DARs evidence does not show that petitioner, through its duly authorized representative, was notified of any ocular inspection and investigation that was to be conducted by respondent DAR. Neither is there proof that petitioner was given the opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired compulsorily. C. The Voluntary Acquisition of Hacienda Caylaway Executive Order 229 does not contain the procedure for the identification of private land as set forth in DAR A. O. No. 12, Series of 1989. Section 5 of E.O. 229 merely reiterates the procedure of acquisition in Section 16, R.A. 6657. In other words, the E.O. is silent as to the procedure for the identification of the land, the notice of coverage and the preliminary conference with the landowner, representatives of the BARC, the LBP and farmer beneficiaries. Does this mean that these requirements may be dispensed with regard to VOS filed before June 15, 1988? The answer is no. Respondent DAR, on the other hand, avers that surveys on the land covered by the four titles were conducted in 1989, and that petitioner, as landowner, was not denied participation therein. The results of the survey and the land valuation summary report, however, do not indicate whether notices to attend the same were actually sent to and received by petitioner or its duly authorized representative.To reiterate, Executive Order No. 229 does not lay down the operating procedure, much less the notice requirements, before the VOS is accepted by respondent DAR. Notice to the landowner, however, cannot be dispensed with. It is part of administrative due process and is an essential requisite to enable the landowner himself to exercise, at the very least, his right of retention guaranteed under the CARL.

III. The Conversion of the three Haciendas. Petitioner claims that Proclamation No. 1520 was also upheld by respondent DAR in 1991 when it approved conversion of 1,827 hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area known as the Batulao Resort Complex, and 13.52 hectares in Barangay Caylaway as within the potential tourist belt. We do not agree. Respondent DARs failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioners landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petit ioners application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR. At the time petitioner filed its application for conversion, the Rules of Procedure governing the processing and approval of applications for land use conversion was the DAR A. O. No. 2, Series of 1990. Under this A. O., the application for conversion is filed with the MARO where the property is located. The MARO reviews the application and its supporting documents and conducts field investigation and ocular inspection of the property. The findings of the MARO are subject to review and evaluation by the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO). The PARO may conduct further field investigation and submit a supplemental report together with his recommendation to the Regional Agrarian Reform Officer (RARO) who shall review the same. For lands less than five hectares, the RARO shall approve or disapprove applications for conversion. For lands exceeding five hectares, the RARO shall evaluate the PARO Report and forward the records and his report to the Undersecretary for Legal Affairs. Applications over areas exceeding fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Land Use refers to the manner of utilization of land, including its allocation, development and management. Land Use Conversion refers to the act or process of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use as approved by the DAR.The conversion of agricultural land to uses other than agricultural requires field investigation and conferences with the occupants of the land. They involve factual findings and highly technical matters within the special training and expertise of the DAR. DAR A. O. No. 7, Series of 1997 lays down with specificity how the DAR must go about its task. This time, the field investigation is not conducted by the MARO but by a special task force, known as the Center for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (CLUPPI- DAR Central Office). The procedure is that once an application for conversion is filed, the CLUPPI prepares the Notice of Posting. The MARO only posts the notice and thereafter issues a certificate to the fact of posting. The CLUPPI conducts the field investigation and dialogues with the applicants and the farmer beneficiaries to ascertain the information necessary for the processing of the application. The Chairman of the CLUPPI deliberates on the merits of the investigation report and recommends the appropriate action. This recommendation is transmitted to the Regional Director, thru the Undersecretary, or Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Applications involving more than fifty hectares are approved or disapproved by the Secretary. The procedure does not end with the Secretary, however. The Order provides that the decision of the Secretary may be appealed to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals, as the case may be, viz: Appeal from the decision of the Undersecretary shall be made to the Secretary, and from the Secretary to the Office of the President or the Court of Appeals as the case may be. The mode of appeal/ motion for reconsideration, and the appeal fee, from Undersecretary to the Office of the Secretary shall be the same as that of the Regional Director to the Office of the Secretary. Indeed, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special competence.Respondent DAR is in a better position to resolve petitioners application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing the necessary expertise on the matter. The power to determine whether Haciendas Palico, Banilad and Caylaway are non-agricultural, hence, exempt from the coverage of the CARL lies with the DAR, not with this Court. Finally, we stress that the failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOAs already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993.[92] Since then until the present, these farmers have been cultivating their lands.It goes against the basic precepts of justice, fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land they till. Anyhow, the farmer beneficiaries hold the property in trust for the rightful owner of the land.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted in part and the acquisition proceedings over the three haciendas are nullified for respondent DAR's failure to observe due process therein. In accordance with the guidelines set forth in this decision and the applicable administrative procedure, the case is hereby remanded to respondent DAR for proper acquisition proceedings and determination of petitioner's application for conversion. ROLANDO SIGRE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES, as coadministratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, respondents.[G.R. No. 109568. August 8, 2002] LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LILIA Y. GONZALES, as co-administratrix of the Estate of Matias Yusay, respondents.[G.R. No. 113454. August 8, 2002] FACTS: Ernesto Sigre was private respondents tenant in an irrigated rice land located in Barangay Naga, Pototan, Iloilo. He was previously paying private respondent a lease rental of sixteen (16) cavans per crop or thirty-two (32) cavans per agricultural year. In the agricultural year of 1991-1992, Sigre stopped paying his rentals to private respondent and instead, remitted it to the LBP pursuant to the Department of Agrarian Reforms Memorandum Circular No. 6, Series of 1978, w hich set the guidelines in the payment of lease rental/partial payment by farmer-beneficiaries under the land transfer program of P.D. No. 27. he pertinent provision of the DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6 reads: A. Where the value of the land has already been established. The value of the land is established on the date the Secretary or his authorized representative has finally approved the average gross production data established by the BCLP or upon the signing of the LTPA by landowners and tenant farmers concerned heretofore authorized. Payment of lease rentals to landowners covered by OLT shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant-farmers shall pay their lease rentals/amortizations to the LBP or its authorized agents: provided that in case where the value of the land is established during the month the crop is to be harvested, the cut-off period shall take effect on the next harvest season. With respect to cases where lease rentals paid may exceed the value of the land, the tenant-farmers may no longer be bound to pay such rental, but it shall be his duty to notify the landowner and the DAR Team Leader concerned of such fact who shall ascertain immediately the veracity of the information and thereafter resolve the matter expeditiously as possible. If the landowner shall insist after positive ascertainment that the tenant-farmer is to pay rentals to him, the amount equivalent to the rental insisted to be paid shall de deposited by the tenant-farmer with the LBP or its authorized agent in his name and for his account to be withdrawn only upon proper written authorization of the DAR District Officer based on the result of ascertainment or investigation. According to private respondent, she had no notice that the DAR had already fixed the 3-year production prior to October 1972 at an average of 119.32 cavans per hectare,and the value of the land was pegged at Thirteen Thousand Four Hundred Five Pesos and Sixty-Seven Centavos (P13,405.67). Thus, the petition filed before the Court of Appeals, assailing, not only the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6, but also the constitutionality of P.D. 27. ISSUE: WON the assailed administrative promulgation and the law is invalid. HELD:We disagree. The power of subordinate legislation allows administrative bodies to implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by "filling in" the details. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. The rationale for the Circular was, in fact, explicitly recognized by the appellate court when it stated that (T)he main purpose of the circular is to make certain that the lease rental payments of the tenant-farmer are applied to his amortizations on the purchase price of the land. x x x The circular was meant to remedy the situation where the tenant-farmers lease rentals to landowner were not credited in his favor against the determined purchase price of the land, thus making him a perpetual obligor for said purchase price. The Court cannot see any irreconcilable conflict between P.D. No. 816and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 6. Enacted in 1975, P.D. No. 816 provides that the tenant-farmer (agricultural lessee) shall pay lease

rentals to the landowner until the value of the property has been determined or agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR. In Curso v. Court of Appeals,involving the same Circular and P.D. 816, it was categorically ruled that there is no incompatibility between these two. Thus: Actually, we find no inconsistency nor incompatibility between them. whereas clauses of P.D. 816 quoted hereunder: x x x Clearly, under P.D. No. 816, rentals are to be paid to the landowner by the agricultural lessee until and after the valuation of the property shall have been determined. In the same vein, the MAR Circular provides: x x x In other words, the MAR Circular merely provides guidelines in the payment of lease rentals/amortizations in implementation of P.D. 816. Under both P.D. 816 and the MAR Circular, payment of lease rentals shall terminate on the date the value of the land is established. Thereafter, the tenant farmers shall pay amortizations to the Land Bank (LBP). The rentals previously paid are to be credited as partial payment of the land transferred to tenant-farmers. Both Memorandum Circular No. 6 and P.D. 816 were issued pursuant to and in implementation of P.D. 27. These must not be read in isolation, but rather, in conjunction with each other. Under P.D. 816, rental payments shall be made to the landowner. After the value of the land has been determined/established, then the tenant-farmers shall pay their amortizations to the LBP, as provided in DAR Circular No. 6.Clearly, there is no inconsistency between them. Au contraire, P.D. 816 and DAR Circular No. 6 supplement each other insofar as it sets the guidelines for the payments of lease rentals on the agricultural property. Clearly therefrom, unless both the landowner and the tenant-farmer accept the valuation of the property by the Barrio Committee on Land Production and the DAR, the parties may bring the dispute to court in order to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, a task unmistakably within the prerogative of the court. WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions filed by Rolando Sigre and the Land Bank of the Philippines are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE and the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 28906 is DISMISSED for lack of merit. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., et al vs HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM [G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989] ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, et al. vs JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL [G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989] INOCENTES PABICO vs HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, et al [G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989] NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN HERMANO, JR., vs HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989] Fact: In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for his life on his way to Mycenae after performing his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and Hercules flung his adversary to the ground thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even stronger to resume their struggle. This happened several times to Hercules' increasing amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling, it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son of Gaea and could never die as long as any part of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil, and crushed him to death. Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of life, without whose invigorating touch even the powerful Antaeus weakened and died. Of significance are the two

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental forces of life and death, of men and women who, like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the precious earth to stay alive. The above-captioned cases have been consolidated because they involve common legal questions, including serious challenges to the constitutionality of the several measures mentioned above. They will be the subject of one common discussion and resolution, The different antecedents of each case will require separate treatment, however, and will first be explained hereunder. G.R. No. 79777 Squarely raised in this petition is the constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, and R.A. No. 6657. The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5-hectare riceland worked by four tenants and owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The tenants were declared full owners of these lands by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D. No. 27. The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for public use without just compensation. In connection with the determination of just compensation, the petitioners argue that the same may be made only by a court of justice and not by the President of the Philippines.Moreover, the just compensation contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or other things of value. G.R. No. 79310 The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of 1,400 plantermembers. This petition seeks to prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229. The petitioners claim that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to Congress and not the President. Although they agree that the President could exercise legislative power until the Congress was convened, she could do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. At that, even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection. The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of the two measures, no effort was made to make a careful study of the sugar planters' situation. There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas that can justify the application of the CARP to them. To the extent that the sugar planters have been lumped in the same legislation with other farmers, although they are a separate group with problems exclusively their own, their right to equal protection has been violated. G.R. No. 79744 The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of due process and the requirement for just compensation, placed his landholding under the coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the private respondents, who then refused payment of lease rentals to him. The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0. Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides violating the doctrine of separation of powers. The legislative power granted to the President under the Transitory Provisions refers only to emergency measures that may be promulgated in the proper exercise of the police power. In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits that the petition is premature because the motion for reconsideration filed with the Minister of Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. G.R. No. 78742

The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. ISSUE: WON the laws and the presidential decrees promulgated are valid. HELD: 1. The argument of some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they do not provide for retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. 2. The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 299 on the ground that no retention limits are prescribed has already been discussed and dismissed. It is noted that although they excited many bitter exchanges during the deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously enough, not being questioned in these petitions. We therefore do not discuss them here. The Court will come to the other claimed violations of due process in connection with our examination of the adequacy of just compensation as required under the power of expropriation. 3.But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed no power is absolute). The limitation is found in the constitutional injunction that "private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation" and in the abundant jurisprudence that has evolved from the interpretation of this principle. Basically, the requirements for a proper exercise of the power are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation. Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State should first distribute public agricultural lands in the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly acquiring private agricultural lands. Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only public agricultural lands may be covered by the CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event, the decision to redistribute private agricultural lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was made by the legislative and executive departments in the exercise of their discretion. We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in the absence of a clear showing that it has been abused. 4. JUST COMPENSATION : Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking possession of the condemned property, as "the compensation is a public charge, the good faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and all the resources of taxation may be employed in raising the amount." Nevertheless, Section 16(e) of the CARP Law provides that: Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or no response from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries. A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides: Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the

exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will readily show that it does not suffer from the arbitrariness that rendered the challenged decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although the proceedings are described as summary, the landowner and other interested parties are nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit evidence on the real value of the property. But more importantly, the determination of the just compensation by the DAR is not by any means final and conclusive upon the landowner or any other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly provides: Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation. The determination made by the DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will still have the right to review with finality the said determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function. 5. PAYMENT IN MONEY ; It cannot be denied from these cases that the traditional medium for the payment of just compensation is money and no other. And so, conformably, has just compensation been paid in the past solely in that medium. However, we do not deal here with the traditional excercise of the power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary expropriation where only a specific property of relatively limited area is sought to be taken by the State from its owner for a specific and perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of expropriation. With these assumptions, the Court hereby declares that the content and manner of the just compensation provided for in the afore- quoted Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our decision on this issue, but after all this Court is not a cloistered institution removed from the realities and demands of society or oblivious to the need for its enhancement. The Court is as acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant masses during all these disappointing decades. We are aware that invalidation of the said section will result in the nullification of the entire program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they approach realization and resurrecting the spectre of discontent and dissent in the restless countryside. That is not in our view the intention of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall decree today. 6. Title Transfer : it was obviously referring to lands already validly acquired under the said decree, after proof of full-fledged membership in the farmers' cooperatives and full payment of just compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly proper for the Order to also provide in its Section 2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972 (pending transfer of ownership after full payment of just compensation), shall be considered as advance payment for the land." The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. Hence, the argument that the assailed measures violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully paid for must also be rejected. It is worth stressing at this point that all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This should counterbalance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."

By the decision we reach today, all major legal obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform program are removed, to clear the way for the true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse the day he will be released not only from want but also from the exploitation and disdain of the past and from his own feelings of inadequacy and helplessness. At last his servitude will be ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother Earth that will give him not only the staff of life but also the joy of living. And where once it bred for him only deep despair, now can he see in it the

fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling future. Now at last can he banish from his small plot of earth his insecurities and dark resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the dream." WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: 1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against all the constitutional objections raised in the herein petitions. 2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be transferred to the State only upon full payment of compensation to their respective owners. 3. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. 4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. 5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE PASCUAL[G.R. No. 128557. December 29, 1999] FACTS: Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three (3) parcels of land located in Guttaran, Cagayan. Parcel 1 covered by TCT No. 16655 contains an area of 149,852 square meters as surveyed by the DAR but the actual land area transferred is estimated at 102,229 square meters and classified as unirrigated lowland rice; Parcel 2 covered by TCT No. 16654 contains an area of 123,043 square meters as surveyed by the DAR but the actual land area transferred is estimated at 85,381 square meters and classified as cornland; and, Parcel 3 covered by TCT No. 16653 contains an area of 192,590 square meters but the actual land area transferred is estimated at 161,338 square meters and classified as irrigated lowland rice.[1 Pursuant to the Land Reform Program of the Government under PD 27[2 and EO 228,[3 the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) placed these lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT). Under EO 228 the value of rice and corn lands is determined thus - Hence, the formula for computing the Land Value (LV) or Price Per Hectare (PPH) of rice and corn lands is 2.5 x AGP x GSP = LV or PPH. In 1991 private respondent Jose Pascual, opposing the recommended AGP of the PARO, filed a petition for the annulment of the recommendation on the productivity and valuation of the land covered by OLT, subject matter hereof, with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Oscar Dimacali, Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Cagayan heard the case. Despite due notice however Francisco Baculi, the PARO who issued the assailed recommendation, failed to appear at the trial. Only private respondent Jose Pascual and Atty. Eduard Javier of petitioner LBP were present.Thereafter private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte. On 11 June 1992 the PARAD ruled in favor of private respondent nullifying the 2 December 1989 AGP recommended by the PARO.He then ordered petitioner LBP to pay private respondent P613,200.00 for Parcel 1, P148,750.00 for Parcel 2, and P1,200,000.00 for Parcel 3, or a total amount of P1,961,950.00. On 29 June 1994 Secretary Ernesto Garilao Jr. of the DAR wrote a letter to petitioner LBP requiring the latter to pay the amount stated in the judgment of the PARAD. Again, petitioner LBP rejected the directive of Secretary Garilao. Petitioners Executive Vice President, Jesus Diaz, then sent a letter to Secretary Garilao arguing that (a) the valuation of just compensation should be determined by the courts; (b) PARAD could not reverse a previous order of the Secretary of the DAR;[15 and, the valuation of lands under EO 228 falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR and not of the DARAB. Petitioner LBP having consistently refused to comply with its obligation despite the directive of the Secretary of the DAR and the various demand letters of private respondent Jose Pascual, the latter finally filed an action for Mandamus in the Court of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by the PARAD. On 15 July 1996 the appellate court granted the Writ now being assailed. The appellate court also required petitioner LBP to pay a compounded interest of 6% per annum in compliance with DAR Administrative Order No. 13, series of 1994.[21 On 11 March 1997 petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied. PETITIONER'S CONTENTIONS: 1).First, it cannot enforce PARADs valuation since it cannot make such determination for want of jurisdiction hence void. Section 12, par. (b), of PD 946[23 provides that the

valuation of lands covered by PD 27 is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Court's Ruling on Contention Number 1) We do not agree. Thus, petitioners contention that Sec. 12, par. (b), of PD 946 is still in effect cannot be sustained. It seems that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform erred in issuing Memorandum Circular No. I, Series of 1995, directing the DARAB to refrain from hearing valuation cases involving PD 27 lands. For on the contrary, it is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform[30 although such valuation may only be considered preliminary as the final determination of just compensation is vested in the courts. 2)Second, petitioner LBP contends that the Court of Appeals cannot issue the Writ of Mandamus because it cannot be compelled to perform an act which is beyond its legal duty. Court's Ruling : As may be gleaned from the aforementioned section, the landowner, the DAR and the Land Bank are the only parties involved. The law does not mention the participation of the farmerbeneficiary. However, petitioner insists that Sec. 18 of RA 6657[35 does not apply in this case as it involves lands covered by PD 27. It argues that in appraising PD 27 lands the consent of the farmerbeneficiary is necessary to arrive at a final valuation. Without such concurrence, the financing scheme under PD 251 cannot be satisfied. Having established that under Sec. 18 of RA 6657 the consent of the farmer-beneficiary is unnecessary in the appraisal of land value, it must now be determined if petitioner had agreed to the amount of compensation declared by the PARAD. If it did, then we can now apply the doctrine in Sharp International Marketing v. Court of Appeals.[39 In that case, the Land Bank refused to comply with the Writ of Mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it was not obliged to follow the order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to pay the landowner. This Court concurred with the Land Bank saying that the latter could not be compelled to obey the Secretary of Agrarian Reform since the bank did not merely exercise a ministerial function. Instead, it had an independent discretionary role in land valuation and that the only time a writ of mandamus could be issued against the Land Bank was when it agreed to the amount of compensation determined by the DAR. Anent petitioners argument that the government will lose money should the farmer-beneficiary be unwilling to pay, we believe such apprehension is baseless. In the event that the farmer-beneficiary refuses to pay the amount disbursed by petitioner, the latter can foreclose on the land as provided for in Secs. 8 to 11 of EO 228. Petitioner LBP would then be reimbursed of the amount it paid to the landowner. 3)petitioner LBP asserts that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued where there is another plain, adequate and complete remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner claims that private respondent had three (3) remedies. The first remedy was to ask the sheriff of the DARAB to execute the ruling of PARAD by levying against the Agrarian Reform Fund for so much of the amount as would satisfy the judgment. Another remedy was to file a motion with the DAR asking for a final resolution with regard to the financing of the land valuation. Lastly, private respondent could have filed a case in the Special Agrarian Court for the final determination of just compensation. Court's Ruling : We hold that as to private respondent the suggested remedies are far from plain, adequate and complete. After the judgment of PARAD became final and executory, private respondent applied for a writ of execution which was eventually granted. However, the sheriff was unable to implement it since petitioner LBP was unwilling to pay. The PARAD even issued an order requiring petitioners manager to explain why he should not be held in contempt. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the Writ of Mandamus directing petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines to pay private respondent Jose Pascual the total amount of P1,961,950.00 stated in the Decision dated 11 June 1992 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Cagayan is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the 6% compounded interest per annum provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 is DELETED, the same being no longer applicable.

EDGARDO SANTOS, represented by his attorney-in-fact ROMEO L. SANTOS, petitioner, vs. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, JESUS DIAZ, ROBERTO ONG and AUGUSTO AQUINO [G.R. No. 137431. September 7, 2000] FACTS: A preliminary valuation in the amount of P3,543,070.66 had in fact been previously released by the Land Bank in cash and bond; thus deducting it from the total amount adjudged, the balance unpaid amount[ed] to P45,698,805.34 which was ordered by the Regional Trial Court to be paid in accordance with RA 6657. The Land Bank elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which eventually dismissed the appeal in its Resolution dated December 17, 1997. Accordingly, a writ of execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court on December 4, 1997 and a notice of garnishment was served on the Land Bank on December 17, 1997. Respondent Regional Trial Court presided over by a new judge, resolved the two motions on April 24, 1998. It held that the payment of just compensation must be computed in the manner provided for in Section 18, Republic Act No. 6657. Thus, it ruled that: "To summarize, the very issue to be resolved in the instant case is to determine how much should be paid in cash and how much also should be paid in bonds, to fully satisfy the judgment herein rendered in the amount of P49,241,876.00, the computation of which is as follows: Total land value per judgment P49,241,876.00 Amount payable in bonds: 70% (50 has) P22,323,932.75 75% (excess) P13,012,907.41 35,336,840.16 Amount payable in cash: 30% (50 has) P9,567,399.75 35% (excess) 4,337,635.81 13,905,035.56 Less: Preliminary valuation: P3,543,070.66 Commissioner's Fee: 948,857.52 Payment to plaintiff on 12-24-97 3,621,023.01 P 8,112,951.19 ______________ P 5,792,084.37 n the basis of the foregoing discussion, this Court finds no merit [i]n the motion to cite in contempt of court the Land Bank of the Philippines. ISSUES: "1. Did respondent judge act without jurisdiction when she issued the Order dated 24 April 1998 amending the final Judgment dated 12 August 1997? "2. Is it a ministerial duty of the respondent judge to order the release and of the Land Bank to release the garnished amount under Section 9 (c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court?

"3. May respondent Land Bank question the legality of its own compliance with the Writ of Execution? "4. Are the respondent judge and the respondent Land Bank and its officials liable for damages under Section 3 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court?" RULING: We find no merit in this Petition. Main Issue: Propriety and Efficacy of the April 24, 1998 RTC Order Petitioner insists that the April 24, 1998 Order of Judge Llaguno was issued without jurisdiction. That is, it allegedly amended the August 12, 1997 judgment of the Special Agrarian Court by requiring the payment of compensation in cash and bonds. Assailed Order Not an Amendment, But an Iteration of Final Judgment The argument is not persuasive. The April 24, 1998 Order was not an illegal amendment of the August 12, 1997 judgment which had become final and executory. The reason is that the Order did not revise, correct, or alter the Decision. Rather, the Order iterated and made clear the essence of the final judgment. Misplaced is petitioner's reliance on Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, because the final judgment decrees payment in cash and bonds. Indeed, this provision must be taken in conjunction with RA 6657. Since respondent bank had already given petitioner the entire adjudged amount in the required proportion of cash and bonds, it must be deemed to have complied with its duty under Rule 39. We understand petitioner's desire to be paid in cash; after all, his compensation was long overdue. However, we cannot grant his Petition because it is not sustained by the law. In this regard, we recall the Court's explanation in Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.