Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No.

L-13250 October 29, 1971 THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO CAMPOS RUEDA, respondent.. Assistant Solicitor General Jose P. Alejandro and Special Attorney Jose G. Azurin, (O.S.G.) for petitioner. Ramirez and Ortigas for respondent. FERNANDO, J.: The basic issue posed by petitioner Collector of Internal Revenue in this appeal from a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals as to whether or not the requisites of statehood, or at least so much thereof as may be necessary for the acquisition of an international personality, must be satisfied for a "foreign country" to fall within the exemption of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code 1 is now ripe for adjudication. The Court of Tax Appeals answered the question in the negative, and thus reversed the action taken by petitioner Collector, who would hold respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of the estate of the late Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, liable for the sum of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes for the transfer of intangible personal properties in the Philippines, the deceased, a Spanish national having been a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to the time of her death in 1955. In an earlier resolution promulgated May 30, 1962, this Court on the assumption that the need for resolving the principal question would be obviated, referred the matter back to the Court of Tax Appeals to determine whether the alleged law of Tangier did grant the reciprocal tax exemption required by the aforesaid Section 122. Then came an order from the Court of Tax Appeals

submitting copies of legislation of Tangier that would manifest that the element of reciprocity was not lacking. It was not until July 29, 1969 that the case was deemed submitted for decision. When the petition for review was filed on January 2, 1958, the basic issue raised was impressed with an element of novelty. Four days thereafter, however, on January 6, 1958, it was held by this Court that the aforesaid provision does not require that the "foreign country" possess an international personality to come within its terms. 2 Accordingly, we have to affirm. The decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, now under review, sets forth the background facts as follows: "This is an appeal interposed by petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda as administrator of the estate of the deceased Doa Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira, from the decision of the respondent Collector of Internal Revenue, assessing against and demanding from the former the sum P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties situated in the Philippines and belonging to said Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira. Maria de la Estrella Soriano Vda. de Cerdeira (Maria Cerdeira for short) is a Spanish national, by reason of her marriage to a Spanish citizen and was a resident of Tangier, Morocco from 1931 up to her death on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise she left, among others, intangible personal properties in the Philippines." 3 Then came this portion: "On September 29, 1955, petitioner filed a provisional estate and inheritance tax return on all the properties of the late Maria Cerdeira. On the same date, respondent, pending investigation, issued an assessment for state and inheritance taxes in the respective amounts of P111,592.48 and P157,791.48, or a total of P369,383.96 which tax liabilities were paid by petitioner ... . On November 17, 1955, an amended return was filed ... wherein intangible personal properties with the value of P396,308.90 were claimed as exempted from taxes. On November 23, 1955, respondent, pending investigation, issued another assessment for estate and inheritance taxes in the amounts of P202,262.40 and P267,402.84, respectively, or a total of P469,665.24 ... . In a letter dated January 11, 1956, respondent denied the request for exemption on the ground that the law of Tangier is not reciprocal to Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. Hence,

respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P239,439.49 representing deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including ad valorem penalties, surcharges, interests and compromise penalties ... . In a letter dated February 8, 1956, and received by respondent on the following day, petitioner requested for the reconsideration of the decision denying the claim for tax exemption of the intangible personal properties and the imposition of the 25% and 5% ad valorem penalties ... . However, respondent denied request, in his letter dated May 5, 1956 ... and received by petitioner on May 21, 1956. Respondent premised the denial on the grounds that there was no reciprocity [with Tangier, which was moreover] a mere principality, not a foreign country. Consequently, respondent demanded the payment of the sums of P73,851.21 and P88,023.74 respectively, or a total of P161,874.95 as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes including surcharges, interests and compromise penalties." 4 The matter was then elevated to the Court of Tax Appeals. As there was no dispute between the parties regarding the values of the properties and the mathematical correctness of the deficiency assessments, the principal question as noted dealt with the reciprocity aspect as well as the insisting by the Collector of Internal Revenue that Tangier was not a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122. In ruling against the contention of the Collector of Internal Revenue, the appealed decision states: "In fine, we believe, and so hold, that the expression "foreign country", used in the last proviso of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which, although not an international person in the sense of international law, does not impose transfer or death upon intangible person properties of our citizens not residing therein, or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is, therefore, not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our Government order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits of the proviso of Section 122 of our Tax. Code." 5 Hence appeal to this court by petitioner. The respective briefs of the parties duly submitted, but as above indicated, instead of ruling definitely on the question, this Court, on May 30, 1962, resolve to inquire further into the

question of reciprocity and sent back the case to the Court of Tax Appeals for the motion of evidence thereon. The dispositive portion of such resolution reads as follows: "While section 122 of the Philippine Tax Code aforequoted speaks of 'intangible personal property' in both subdivisions (a) and (b); the alleged laws of Tangier refer to 'bienes muebles situados en Tanger', 'bienes muebles radicantes en Tanger', 'movables' and 'movable property'. In order that this Court may be able to determine whether the alleged laws of Tangier grant the reciprocal tax exemptions required by Section 122 of the Tax Code, and without, for the time being, going into the merits of the issues raised by the petitioner-appellant, the case is [remanded] to the Court of Tax Appeals for the reception of evidence or proof on whether or not the words `bienes muebles', 'movables' and 'movable properties as used in the Tangier laws, include or embrace 'intangible person property', as used in the Tax Code." 6 In line with the above resolution, the Court of Tax Appeals admitted evidence submitted by the administrator petitioner Antonio Campos Rueda, consisting of exhibits of laws of Tangier to the effect that "the transfers by reason of death of movable properties, corporeal or incorporeal, including furniture and personal effects as well as of securities, bonds, shares, ..., were not subject, on that date and in said zone, to the payment of any death tax, whatever might have been the nationality of the deceased or his heirs and legatees." It was further noted in an order of such Court referring the matter back to us that such were duly admitted in evidence during the hearing of the case on September 9, 1963. Respondent presented no evidence." 7 The controlling legal provision as noted is a proviso in Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. It reads thus: "That no tax shall be collected under this Title in respect of intangible personal property (a) if the decedent at the time of his death was a resident of a foreign country which at the time of his death did not impose a transfer tax or death tax of any character in respect of intangible person property of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country, or (b) if the laws of the foreign country of which the decedent was a resident at the time of his death allow a similar exemption from transfer taxes or death taxes of every character in respect of intangible personal property owned by citizens of the Philippines not residing in that foreign country." 8 The only obstacle therefore to a definitive ruling is

whether or not as vigorously insisted upon by petitioner the acquisition of internal personality is a condition sine qua non to Tangier being considered a "foreign country". Deference to the De Lara ruling, as was made clear in the opening paragraph of this opinion, calls for an affirmance of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals. It does not admit of doubt that if a foreign country is to be identified with a state, it is required in line with Pound's formulation that it be a politically organized sovereign community independent of outside control bound by penalties of nationhood, legally supreme within its territory, acting through a government functioning under a regime of law. 9 It is thus a sovereign person with the people composing it viewed as an organized corporate society under a government with the legal competence to exact obedience to its commands. 10 It has been referred to as a bodypolitic organized by common consent for mutual defense and mutual safety and to promote the general welfare. 11Correctly has it been described by Esmein as "the juridical personification of the nation." 12 This is to view it in the light of its historical development. The stress is on its being a nation, its people occupying a definite territory, politically organized, exercising by means of its government its sovereign will over the individuals within it and maintaining its separate international personality. Laski could speak of it then as a territorial society divided into government and subjects, claiming within its allotted area a supremacy over all other institutions. 13 McIver similarly would point to the power entrusted to its government to maintain within its territory the conditions of a legal order and to enter into international relations. 14 With the latter requisite satisfied, international law do not exact independence as a condition of statehood. So Hyde did opine. 15 Even on the assumption then that Tangier is bereft of international personality, petitioner has not successfully made out a case. It bears repeating that four days after the filing of this petition on January 6, 1958 in Collector of Internal Revenue v. De Lara, 16 it was specifically held by us: "Considering the State of California as a foreign country in relation to section 122 of our Tax Code we believe and hold, as did the Tax Court, that the Ancilliary Administrator is entitled the exemption from the inheritance tax on

the intangible personal property found in the Philippines." 17 There can be no doubt that California as a state in the American Union was in the alleged requisite of international personality. Nonetheless, it was held to be a foreign country within the meaning of Section 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code. 18 What is undeniable is that even prior to the De Lara ruling, this Court did commit itself to the doctrine that even a tiny principality, that of Liechtenstein, hardly an international personality in the sense, did fall under this exempt category. So it appears in an opinion of the Court by the then Acting Chief Justicem Bengson who thereafter assumed that position in a permanent capacity, in Kiene v. Collector of Internal Revenue. 19 As was therein noted: 'The Board found from the documents submitted to it proof of the laws of Liechtenstein that said country does not impose estate, inheritance and gift taxes on intangible property of Filipino citizens not residing in that country. Wherefore, the Board declared that pursuant to the exemption above established, no estate or inheritance taxes were collectible, Ludwig Kiene being a resident of Liechtestein when he passed away." 20 Then came this definitive ruling: "The Collector hereafter named the respondent cites decisions of the United States Supreme Court and of this Court, holding that intangible personal property in the Philippines belonging to a non-resident foreigner, who died outside of this country is subject to the estate tax, in disregard of the principle 'mobilia sequuntur personam'. Such property is admittedly taxable here. Without the proviso above quoted, the shares of stock owned here by the Ludwig Kiene would be concededly subject to estate and inheritance taxes. Nevertheless our Congress chose to make an exemption where conditions are such that demand reciprocity as in this case. And the exemption must be honored." 21 WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Tax Appeals of October 30, 1957 is affirmed. Without pronouncement as to costs. Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result. Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-34937 March 13, 1933

P16,673 and P13,951.45, respectively. Of these sums P15,191.48 was levied as tax on the donation to Concepcion Vidal de Roces and P1,481.52 on her legacy, and, likewise, P12,388.95 was imposed upon the donation made to Elvira Vidal de Richards and P1,462.50 on her legacy. At first the appellants refused to pay the aforementioned taxes but, at the insistence of the appellee and in order not to delay the adjudication of the legacies, they agreed at last, to pay them under protest. The appellee filed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the facts alleged therein were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. After the legal questions raised therein had been discussed, the court sustained the demurrer and ordered the amendment of the complaint which the appellants failed to do, whereupon the trial court dismissed the action on the ground that the afore- mentioned appellants did not really have a right of action. In their brief, the appellants assign only one alleged error, to wit: that the demurrer interposed by the appellee was sustained without sufficient ground. The judgment appealed from was based on the provisions of section 1540 Administrative Code which reads as follows: SEC. 1540. Additions of gifts and advances. After the aforementioned deductions have been made, there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all gifts or advances made by the predecessor to any those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs, devisees, legatees, or donees mortis causa. The appellants contend that the above-mentioned legal provision does not include donations inter vivos and if it does, it is unconstitutional, null and void for the following reasons: first, because it violates section 3 of the Jones Law which provides that no law should embrace more than one subject, and that subject should be expressed in the title thereof; second that the Legislature has no authority to impose inheritance tax on donations inter vivos; and third, because a legal provision of this character contravenes the

CONCEPCION VIDAL DE ROCES and her husband, MARCOS ROCES, and ELVIRA VIDAL DE RICHARDS, plaintiff-appellants, vs. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee. Feria and La O for appellants. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee. IMPERIAL, J.: The plaintiffs herein brought this action to recover from the defendant, Collector of Internal Revenue, certain sums of money paid by them under protest as inheritance tax. They appealed from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing the action, without costs. On March 10 and 12, 1925, Esperanza Tuazon, by means of public documents, donated certain parcels of land situated in Manila to the plaintiffs herein, who, with their respective husbands, accepted them in the same public documents, which were duly recorded in the registry of deeds. By virtue of said donations, the plaintiffs took possession of the said lands, received the fruits thereof and obtained the corresponding transfer certificates of title. On January 5, 1926, the donor died in the City of Manila without leaving any forced heir and her will which was admitted to probate, she bequeathed to each of the donees the sum of P5,000. After the estate had been distributed among the instituted legatees and before delivery of their respective shares, the appellee herein, as Collector of Internal Revenue, ruled that the appellants, as donees and legatees, should pay as inheritance tax the sums of

fundamental rule of uniformity of taxation. The appellee, in turn, contends that the words "all gifts" refer clearly to donations inter vivos and, in support of his theory, cites the doctrine laid in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas (54 Phil., 289). After a careful study of the law and the authorities applicable thereto, we are the opinion that neither theory reflects the true spirit of the aforementioned provision. The gifts referred to in section 1540 of the Revised Administration Code are, obviously, those donations inter vivos that take effect immediately or during the lifetime of the donor but are made in consideration or in contemplation of death. Gifts inter vivos, the transmission of which is not made in contemplation of the donor's death should not be understood as included within the said legal provision for the reason that it would amount to imposing a direct tax on property and not on the transmission thereof, which act does not come within the scope of the provisions contained in Article XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which deals expressly with the tax on inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa. Our interpretation of the law is not in conflict with the rule laid down in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, supra. We said therein, as we say now, that the expression "all gifts" refers to gifts inter vivos inasmuch as the law considers them as advances on inheritance, in the sense that they are gifts inter vivos made in contemplation or in consideration of death. In that case, it was not held that that kind of gifts consisted in those made completely independent of death or without regard to it. Said legal provision is not null and void on the alleged ground that the subject matter thereof is not embraced in the title of the section under which it is enumerated. On the contrary, its provisions are perfectly summarized in the heading, "Tax on Inheritance, etc." which is the title of Article XI. Furthermore, the constitutional provision cited should not be strictly construed as to make it necessary that the title contain a full index to all the contents of the law. It is sufficient if the language used therein is expressed in such a way that in case of doubt it would afford a means of determining the legislators intention. (Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. II, p. 651.) Lastly, the circumstance that the Administrative

Code was prepared and compiled strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Jones Law on that matter should not be overlooked and that, in a compilation of laws such as the Administrative Code, it is but natural and proper that provisions referring to diverse matters should be found. (Ayson and Ignacio vs. Provincial Board of Rizal and Municipal Council of Navotas, 39 Phil., 931.) The appellants question the power of the Legislature to impose taxes on the transmission of real estate that takes effect immediately and during the lifetime of the donor, and allege as their reason that such tax partakes of the nature of the land tax which the law has already created in another part of the Administrative Code. Without making express pronouncement on this question, for it is unnecessary, we wish to state that such is not the case in these instance. The tax collected by the appellee on the properties donated in 1925 really constitutes an inheritance tax imposed on the transmission of said properties in contemplation or in consideration of the donor's death and under the circumstance that the donees were later instituted as the former's legatees. For this reason, the law considers such transmissions in the form of gifts inter vivos, as advances on inheritance and nothing therein violates any constitutional provision, inasmuch as said legislation is within the power of the Legislature. Property Subject to Inheritance Tax. The inheritance tax ordinarily applies to all property within the power of the state to reach passing by will or the laws regulating intestate succession or by gift inter vivos in the manner designated by statute, whether such property be real or personal, tangible or intangible, corporeal or incorporeal. (26 R.C.L., p. 208, par. 177.) In the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, supra, it was also held that section 1540 of the Administrative Code did not violate the constitutional provision regarding uniformity of taxation. It cannot be null and void on this ground because it equally subjects to the same tax all of those donees who later become heirs, legatees or donees mortis causa by the will of the donor. There would be a repugnant and arbitrary exception if the provisions of the law were not applicable to all donees of the same kind. In the case cited above, it was said: "At any rate the argument adduced against its

constitutionality, which is the lack of Uniformity, does not seem to be well founded. It was said that under such an interpretation, while a donee inter vivos who, after the predecessor's death proved to be an heir, a legatee, or a donee mortis causa, would have to pay the tax, another donee inter vivos who did not prove to he an heir, a legatee, or a donee mortis causa of the predecessor, would be exempt from such a tax. But as these are two different cases, the principle of uniformity is inapplicable to them." The last question of a procedural nature arising from the case at bar, which should be passed upon, is whether the case, as it now stands, can be decided on the merits or should be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. According to our view of the case, it follows that, if the gifts received by the appellants would have the right to recover the sums of money claimed by them. Hence the necessity of ascertaining whether the complaint contains an allegation to that effect. We have examined said complaint and found nothing of that nature. On the contrary, it be may be inferred from the allegations contained in paragraphs 2 and 7 thereof that said donations inter vivos were made in consideration of the donor's death. We refer to the allegations that such transmissions were effected in the month of March, 1925, that the donor died in January, 1926, and that the donees were instituted legatees in the donor's will which was admitted to probate. It is from these allegations, especially the last, that we infer a presumption juris tantum that said donations were made mortis causa and, as such, are subject to the payment of inheritance tax. Wherefore, the demurrer interposed by the appellee was well-founded because it appears that the complaint did not allege fact sufficient to constitute a cause of action. When the appellants refused to amend the same, spite of the court's order to that effect, they voluntarily waived the opportunity offered them and they are not now entitled to have the case remanded for further proceedings, which would serve no purpose altogether in view of the insufficiency of the complaint. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.

Avancea, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers and Buttes, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting: I sustain my concurrence in Justice Street's dissenting opinion in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas (54 Phil., 289). The majority opinion to distinguish the present case from above-mentioned case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, by interpreting section 1540 of the Administrative Code in the sense that it establishes the legal presumption juris tantum that all gifts inter vivos made to persons who are not forced heirs but who are instituted legatees in the donor's will, have been made in contemplation of the donor's death. Presumptions are of two kinds: One determined by law which is also called presumption of law or of right; and another which is formed by the judge from circumstances antecedent to, coincident with or subsequent to the principal fact under investigation, which is also called presumption of man (presuncion de hombre). (Escriche, Vol. IV, p. 662.) The Civil Code as well as the code of Civil Procedure establishes presumptions juris et de jure and juris tantum which the courts should take into account in deciding questions of law submitted to them for decision. The presumption which majority opinion wishes to draw from said section 1540 of the Administrative Code can neither be found in this Code nor in any of the aforementioned Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, said presumption cannot be called legal or of law. Neither can it be called a presumption of man (presuncion de hombre) inasmuch as the majority opinion did not infer it from circumstances antecedent to, coincident with or subsequent to the principal fact with is the donation itself. In view of the nature, mode of making and effects of donations inter vivos, the contrary presumption would be more reasonable and logical; in other words, donations inter vivos made to

persons who are not forced heirs, but who are instituted legatees in the donor's will, should be presumed as not made mortis causa, unless the contrary is proven. In the case under consideration, the burden of the proof rests with the person who contends that the donation inter vivos has been made mortis causa. It is therefore, the undersigned's humble opinion that the order appealed from should be reversed and the demurrer overruled, and the defendant ordered to file his answer to the complaint. Street, J., concurs.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-36770 November 4, 1932

Felix Dison on April 9, 1928, in favor of his sons Luis W. Dison, the plaintiffappellant. This deed of gift transferred twenty-two tracts of land to the donee, reserving to the donor for his life the usufruct of three tracts. This deed was acknowledged by the donor before a notary public on April 16, 1928. Luis W. Dison, on April 17, 1928, formally accepted said gift by an instrument in writing which he acknowledged before a notary public on April 20, 1928. At the trial the parties agreed to and filed the following ingenious stipulation of fact: 1. That Don Felix Dison died on April 21, 1928; 2. That Don Felix Dison, before his death, made a gift inter vivos in favor of the plaintiff Luis W. Dison of all his property according to a deed of gift (Exhibit D) which includes all the property of Don Felix Dizon; 3. That the plaintiff did not receive property of any kind of Don Felix Dison upon the death of the latter; 4. That Don Luis W. Dison was the legitimate and only child of Don Felix Dison. It is inferred from Exhibit D that Felix Dison was a widower at the time of his death. The theory of the plaintiff-appellant is that he received and holds the property mentioned by a consummated gift and that Act No. 2601 (Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code) being the inheritance tax statute, does not tax gifts. The provision directly here involved is section 1540 of the Administrative Code which reads as follows: Additions of Gifts and Advances. After the aforementioned deductions have been made, there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all gifts or advances made by the predecessor to any of those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs, devises, legatees, or donees mortis causa.

LUIS W. DISON, plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant. Marcelino Aguas for plaintiff-appellant. Attorney-General Jaranilla for defendant-appellant.

BUTTE, J.: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in favor of the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, in a suit filed by the plaintiffs, Luis W. Dison, for the recovery of an inheritance tax in the sum of P2,808.73 paid under protest. The petitioner alleged in his complaint that the tax is illegal because he received the property, which is the basis of the tax, from his father before his death by a deed of gift inter vivos which was duly accepted and registered before the death of his father. The defendant answered with a general denial and with a counterdemand for the sum of P1,245.56 which it was alleged is a balance still due and unpaid on account of said tax. The plaintiff replied to the counterdemand with a general denial. The courta quo held that the cause of action set up in the counterdemand was not proven and dismissed the same. Both sides appealed to this court, but the cross-complaint and appeal of the Collector of Internal Revenue were dismissed by this court on March 17, 1932, on motion of the Attorney-General.1awphil.net The only evidence introduced at the trial of this cause was the proof of payment of the tax under protest, as stated, and the deed of gift executed by

The question to be resolved may be stated thus: Does section 1540 of the Administrative Code subject the plaintiff-appellant to the payment of an inheritance tax? The appellant argues that there is no evidence in this case to support a finding that the gift was simulated and that it was an artifice for evading the payment of the inheritance tax, as is intimated in the decision of the court below and the brief of the Attorney-General. We see no reason why the court may not go behind the language in which the transaction is masked in order to ascertain its true character and purpose. In this case the scanty facts before us may not warrant the inference that the conveyance, acknowledged by the donor five days before his death and accepted by the donee one day before the donor's death, was fraudulently made for the purpose of evading the inheritance tax. But the facts, in our opinion, do warrant the inference that the transfer was an advancement upon the inheritance which the donee, as the sole and forced heir of the donor, would be entitled to receive upon the death of the donor. The argument advanced by the appellant that he is not an heir of his deceased father within the meaning of section 1540 of the Administrative Code because his father in his lifetime had given the appellant all his property and left no property to be inherited, is so fallacious that the urging of it here casts a suspicion upon the appellants reason for completing the legal formalities of the transfer on the eve of the latter's death. We do not know whether or not the father in this case left a will; in any event, this appellant could not be deprived of his share of the inheritance because the Civil Code confers upon him the status of a forced heir. We construe the expression in section 1540 "any of those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs", to include those who, by our law, are given the status and rights of heirs, regardless of the quantity of property they may receive as such heirs. That the appellant in this case occupies the status of heir to his deceased father cannot be questioned. Construing the conveyance here in question, under the facts presented, as an advance made by Felix Dison to his only child, we hold section 1540 to be applicable and the tax to have been properly assessed by the Collector of Internal Revenue.

This appeal was originally assigned to a Division of five but referred to the court in banc by reason of the appellant's attack upon the constitutionality of section 1540. This attack is based on the sole ground that insofar as section 1540 levies a tax upon gifts inter vivos, it violates that provision of section 3 of the organic Act of the Philippine Islands (39 Stat. L., 545) which reads as follows: "That no bill which may be enacted into law shall embraced more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of the bill." Neither the title of Act No. 2601 nor chapter 40 of the Administrative Code makes any reference to a tax on gifts. Perhaps it is enough to say of this contention that section 1540 plainly does not tax gifts per se but only when those gifts are made to those who shall prove to be the heirs, devisees, legatees or donees mortis causa of the donor. This court said in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas 954 Phil., 289):lawphil.net When the law says all gifts, it doubtless refers to gifts inter vivos, and not mortis causa. Both the letter and the spirit of the law leave no room for any other interpretation. Such, clearly, is the tenor of the language which refers to donations that took effect before the donor's death, and not to mortis causadonations, which can only be made with the formalities of a will, and can only take effect after the donor's death. Any other construction would virtually change this provision into: ". . . there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all gifts mortis causa . . . made by the predecessor to those who, after his death, shall prove to be his . . . donees mortis causa." We cannot give to the law an interpretation that would so vitiate its language. The truth of the matter is that in this section (1540) the law presumes that such gifts have been made in anticipation of inheritance, devise, bequest, or gift mortis causa, when the donee, after the death of the donor proves to be his heir, devisee or donee mortis causa, for the purpose of evading the tax, and it is to prevent this that it provides that they shall be added to the resulting amount." However much appellant's argument on this point may fit his preconceived notion that the transaction between him and his father was a consummated gift with no relation to the inheritance, we hold that there is not merit in this

attack upon the constitutionality of section 1540 under our view of the facts. No other constitutional questions were raised in this case. The judgment below is affirmed with costs in this instance against the appellant. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Vickers and Imperial, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-34583 October 22, 1931

4. The lower court erred in not declaring that it would be unconstitutional to impose an inheritance tax upon the insurance policy here in question as it would be a taking of property without due process of law. The present complaint seeks to recover from the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, the amount of P1,209 paid by the plaintiff under protest, in its capacity of administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, as inheritance tax upon the sum of P20,150, which is the amount of an insurance policy on the deceased's life, wherein his own estate was named the beneficiary. At the hearing, in addition to documentary and parol evidence, both parties submitted the following agreed statement of facts of the court for consideration: It is hereby stipulated and agreed by and between the parties in the aboveentitled action through their respective undersigned attorneys:

THE BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze,plaintiff-appellant, vs. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee. Araneta, De Joya, Zaragoza and Araneta for appellant. Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.: The Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the estate of the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, has appealed to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, from the complaint filed against him by said plaintiff bank, and dismissing the complaint with costs. The appellant has assigned the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit: 1. The lower court erred in holding that the testimony of Mrs. Schuetze was inefficient to established the domicile of her husband. 2. The lower court erred in holding that under section 1536 of the Administrative Code the tax imposed by the defendant is lawful and valid. 3. The lower court erred in not holding that one-half () of the proceeds of the policy in question is community property and that therefore no inheritance tax can be levied, at least on one-half () of the said proceeds.

1. That the plaintiff, Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze, window of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, is of legal age, a native of Manila, Philippine Islands, and is and was at all times hereinafter mentioned a resident of Germany, and at the time of the death of her husband, the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, she was actually residing and living in Germany; 2. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands, is and was at all times hereinafter mentioned a banking institution duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippine Islands; 3. That on or about August 23, 1928, the herein plaintiff before notary public Salvador Zaragoza, drew a general power appointing the above-mentioned Bank of the Philippine Islands as her attorney-in-fact, and among the powers conferred to said attorney-in-fact was the power to represent her in all legal actions instituted by or against her; 4. That the defendant, of legal age, is and at all times hereinafter mentioned the duly appointed Collector of Internal Revenue with offices at Manila, Philippine Islands;

5. That the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze came to the Philippine Islands for the first time of March 31, 1890, and worked in the several German firms as a mere employee and that from the year 1903 until the year 1918 he was partner in the business of Alfredo Roensch; 6. That from 1903 to 1922 the said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze was in the habit of making various trips to Europe; 7. That on December 3, 1927, the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze coming from Java, and with the intention of going to Bremen, landed in the Philippine Islands where he met his death on February 2, 1928; 8. That on March 31, 1926, the said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, while in Germany, executed a will, in accordance with its law, wherein plaintiff was named his universal heir; 9. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands by order of the Court of First Instance of Manila under date of May 24, 1928, was appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze; 10. That, according to the testamentary proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, civil case No. 33089, the deceased at the time of his death was possessed of not only real property situated in the Philippine Islands, but also personal property consisting of shares of stock in nineteen (19) domestic corporations; 11. That the fair market value of all the property in the Philippine Islands left by the deceased at the time of his death in accordance with the inventory submitted to the Court of First Instance of Manila, civil case No. 33089, was P217,560.38; 12. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the estate of the deceased rendered its final account on June 19, 1929, and that said estate was closed on July 16, 1929; 13. That among the personal property of the deceased was found lifeinsurance policy No. 194538 issued at Manila, Philippine Islands, on January

14, 1913, for the sum of $10,000 by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila branch, a foreign corporation duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of Canada, and duly authorized to transact business in the Philippine Islands; 14. That in the insurance policy the estate of the said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze was named the beneficiary without any qualification whatsoever; 15. That for five consecutive years, the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze paid the premiums of said policy to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila branch; 16. That on or about the year 1918, the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila branch, transferred said policy to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, London branch; 17. That due to said transfer the said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze from 1918 to the time of his death paid the premiums of said policy to the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, London Branch; 18. That the sole and only heir of the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is his widow, the plaintiff herein; 19. That at the time of the death of the deceased and at all times thereafter including the date when the said insurance policy was paid, the insurance policy was not in the hands or possession of the Manila office of the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, nor in the possession of the herein plaintiff, nor in the possession of her attorney-in-fact the Bank of the Philippine Islands, but the same was in the hands of the Head Office of the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, at Montreal, Canada; 20. That on July 13, 1928, the Bank of the Philippine Islands as administrator of the decedent's estate received from the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, Manila branch, the sum of P20,150 representing the proceeds of the insurance policy, as shown in the statement of income and expenses of the estate of the deceased submitted on June 18, 1929, by the administrator to the Court of First Instance of Manila, civil case No. 33089;

21. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands delivered to the plaintiff herein the said sum of P20,150; 22. That the herein defendant on or about July 5, 1929, imposed an inheritance tax upon the transmission of the proceeds of the policy in question in the sum of P20,150 from the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze to the sole heir of the deceased, or the plaintiff herein, which inheritance tax amounted to the sum of P1,209; 23. That the Bank of the Philippine Islands as administrator of the decedent's estate and as attorney-in-fact of the herein plaintiff, having been demanded by the herein defendant to pay inheritance tax amounting to the sum of P1,209, paid to the defendant under protest the above-mentioned sum; 24. That notwithstanding the various demands made by plaintiff to the defendant, said defendant has refused and refuses to refund to plaintiff the above mentioned sum of P1,209; 25. That plaintiff reserves the right to adduce evidence as regards the domicile of the deceased, and so the defendant, the right to present rebuttal evidence; 26. That both plaintiff and defendant submit this stipulation of facts without prejudice to their right to introduce such evidence, on points not covered by the agreement, which they may deem proper and necessary to support their respective contentions. In as much as one of the question raised in the appeal is whether an insurance policy on said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's life was, by reason of its ownership, subject to the inheritance tax, it would be well to decide first whether the amount thereof is paraphernal or community property. According to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, the estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada on January 14, 1913. During the following five years the insured paid the

premiums at the Manila branch of the company, and in 1918 the policy was transferred to the London branch. The record shows that the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano on January 16, 1914. With the exception of the premium for the first year covering the period from January 14, 1913 to January 14, 1914, all the money used for paying the premiums, i. e., from the second year, or January 16, 1914, or when the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano, until his death on February 2, 1929, is conjugal property inasmuch as it does not appear to have exclusively belonged to him or to his wife (art. 1407, Civil Code). As the sum of P20,150 here in controversy is a product of such premium it must also be deemed community property, because it was acquired for a valuable consideration, during said Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's marriage with Rosario Gelano at the expense of the common fund (art. 1401, No. 1, Civil Code), except for the small part corresponding to the first premium paid with the deceased's own money. In his Commentaries on the Civil Code, volume 9, page 589, second edition, Manresa treats of life insurance in the following terms, to wit: The amount of the policy represents the premiums to be paid, and the right to it arises the moment the contract is perfected, for at the moment the power of disposing of it may be exercised, and if death occurs payment may be demanded. It is therefore something acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage, though the period of its fulfillment, depend upon the death of one of the spouses, which terminates the partnership. So considered, the question may be said to be decided by articles 1396 and 1401: if the premiums are paid with the exclusive property of husband or wife, the policy belongs to the owner; if with conjugal property, or if the money cannot be proved as coming from one or the other of the spouses, the policy is community property. The Supreme Court of Texas, United States, in the case of Martin vs. Moran (11 Tex. Civ. A., 509) laid down the following doctrine:

COMMUNITY PROPERTY LIFE INSURANCE POLICY. A husband took out an endowment life insurance policy on his life, payable "as directed by will." He paid the premiums thereon out of community funds, and by his will made the proceeds of the policy payable to his own estate. Held, that the proceeds were community estate, one-half of which belonged to the wife. In In re Stan's Estate, Myr. Prob. (Cal.), 5, the Supreme Court of California laid down the following doctrine: A testator, after marriage, took out an insurance policy, on which he paid the premiums from his salary. Held that the insurance money was community property, to one-half of which, the wife was entitled as survivor. In In re Webb's Estate, Myr. Prob. (Cal.), 93, the same court laid down the following doctrine: A decedent paid the first third of the amount of the premiums on his life-insurance policy out of his earnings before marriage, and the remainder from his earnings received after marriage. Held, that one-third of the policy belonged to his separate estate, and the remainder to the community property. Thus both according to our Civil Code and to the ruling of those North American States where the Spanish Civil Code once governed, the proceeds of a life-insurance policy whereon the premiums were paid with conjugal money, belong to the conjugal partnership. The appellee alleges that it is a fundamental principle that a lifeinsurance policy belongs exclusively to the beneficiary upon the death of the person insured, and that in the present case, as the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze named his own estate as the sole beneficiary of the insurance on his life, upon his death the latter became the sole owner of the proceeds, which therefore became subject to the inheritance tax, citing Del Val vs. Del Val (29 Phil., 534), where the doctrine was laid down that an heir appointed beneficiary to a life-insurance policy taken out by the deceased, becomes the absolute owner of the proceeds of such policy upon the death of the insured.

The estate of a deceased person cannot be placed on the same footing as an individual heir. The proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the estate of the insured passed to the executor or administrator of such estate, and forms part of its assets (37 Corpus Juris, 565, sec. 322); whereas the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to an heir of the insured as beneficiary belongs exclusively to said heir and does not form part of the deceased's estate subject to administrator. (Del Val vs. Del Val, supra; 37 Corpus Juris, 566, sec. 323, and articles 419 and 428 of the Code of Commerce.) Just as an individual beneficiary of a life-insurance policy taken out by a married person becomes the exclusive owner of the proceeds upon the death of the insured even if the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, so, it is argued, where the beneficiary named is the estate of the deceased whose life is insured, the proceeds of the policy become a part of said estate upon the death of the insured even if the premiums have been paid with conjugal funds. In a conjugal partnership the husband is the manager, empowered to alienate the partnership property without the wife's consent (art. 1413, Civil Code), a third person, therefore, named beneficiary in a life-insurance policy becomes the absolute owner of its proceeds upon the death of the insured even if the premiums should have been paid with money belonging to the community property. When a married man has his life insured and names his own estate after death, beneficiary, he makes no alienation of the proceeds of conjugal funds to a third person, but appropriates them himself, adding them to the assets of his estate, in contravention of the provisions of article 1401, paragraph 1, of the Civil Code cited above, which provides that "To the conjugal partnership belongs" (1) Property acquired for a valuable consideration during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition is made for the partnership or for one of the spouses only." Furthermore, such appropriation is a fraud practised upon the wife, which cannot be allowed to prejudice her, according to article 1413, paragraph 2, of said Code. Although the husband is the manager of the

conjugal partnership, he cannot of his own free will convert the partnership property into his own exclusive property. As all the premiums on the life-insurance policy taken out by the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, were paid out of the conjugal funds, with the exceptions of the first, the proceeds of the policy, excluding the proportional part corresponding to the first premium, constitute community property, notwithstanding the fact that the policy was made payable to the deceased's estate, so that one-half of said proceeds belongs to the estate, and the other half to the deceased's widow, the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze. The second point to decide in this appeal is whether the Collector of Internal Revenue has authority, under the law, to collect the inheritance tax upon one-half of the life-insurance policy taken out by the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, which belongs to him and is made payable to his estate. According to the agreed statement of facts mentioned above, the plaintiff-appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order dated March 24, 1928, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. On July 13, 1928, the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then returned the money to said widow. Section 1536 of the Administrative Code, as amended by section 10 of Act No. 2835 and section 1 of Act No. 3031, contains the following relevant provision: SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. Every transmission by virtue of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in

anticipation of inheritance, devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine Islands and real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be exercised in the Philippine Islands; of any shares, obligations, or bonds issued by any corporation or sociedad anonimaorganized or constituted in the Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in any partnership, business or industry established in the Philippine Islands or of any personal property located in the Philippine Islands shall be subject to the following tax: xxx xxx xxx

In as much as the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze were paid to the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's estate, for management and partition, and as such proceeds were turned over to the sole and universal testamentary heiress Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze, the plaintiffappellant, here in Manila, the situs of said proceeds is the Philippine Islands. In his work "The Law of Taxation," Cooley enunciates the general rule governing the levying of taxes upon tangible personal property, in the following words: GENERAL RULE. The suits of tangible personal property, for purposes of taxation may be where the owner is domiciled but is not necessarily so. Unlike intangible personal property, it may acquire a taxation situs in a state other than the one where the owner is domiciled, merely because it is located there. Its taxable situs is where it is more or less permanently located, regardless of the domicile of the owner. It is well settled that the state where it is more or less permanently located has the power to tax it although the owner resides out of the state, regardless of whether it has been taxed for the same period at the domicile of the owner, provided there is statutory authority for taxing such property. It is equally well settled that the state where the owner is domiciled has no power to tax it where the property has acquired an actual situs in another state by reason of its more or less permanent location in that state. ... (2 Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th ed., p. 975, par. 451.)

With reference to the meaning of the words "permanent" and "in transit," he has the following to say: PERMANENCY OF LOCATION; PROPERTY IN TRANSIT. In order to acquire a situs in a state or taxing district so as to be taxable in the state or district regardless of the domicile of the owner and not taxable in another state or district at the domicile of the owner, tangible personal property must be more or less permanently located in the state or district. In other words, the situs of tangible personal property is where it is more or less permanently located rather than where it is merely in transit or temporarily and for no considerable length of time. If tangible personal property is more or less permanently located in a state other than the one where the owner is domiciled, it is not taxable in the latter state but is taxable in the state where it is located. If tangible personal property belonging to one domiciled in one state is in another state merely in transitu or for a short time, it is taxable in the former state, and is not taxable in the state where it is for the time being. . . . . Property merely in transit through a state ordinarily is not taxable there. Transit begins when an article is committed to a carrier for transportation to the state of its destination, or started on its ultimate passage. Transit ends when the goods arrive at their destination. But intermediate these points questions may arise as to when a temporary stop in transit is such as to make the property taxable at the place of stoppage. Whether the property is taxable in such a case usually depends on the length of time and the purpose of the interruption of transit. . . . . . . . It has been held that property of a construction company, used in construction of a railroad, acquires a situs at the place where used for an indefinite period. So tangible personal property in the state for the purpose of undergoing a partial finishing process is not to be regarded as in the course of transit nor as in the state for a mere temporary purpose. (2 Cooley, The Law of Taxation, 4th ed., pp. 982, 983 and 988, par. 452.) If the proceeds of the life-insurance policy taken out by the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze and made payable to his estate, were delivered to

the Bank of the Philippine Islands for administration and distribution, they were not in transit but were more or less permanently located in the Philippine Islands, according to the foregoing rules. If this be so, half of the proceeds which is community property, belongs to the estate of the deceased and is subject to the inheritance tax, in accordance with the legal provision quoted above, irrespective of whether or not the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze was domiciled in the Philippine Islands at the time of his death. By virtue of the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2) that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3) that the proceeds of a lifeinsurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside.1awphil.net Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is ordered to return to the plaintiff the one-half of the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium, without special pronouncement of costs. So ordered. Avancea, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

IMPERIAL, J., dissenting: I cannot concur with the majority in holding that one-half of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, excepting the proportional part corresponding to the first year's premium is community property belonging to the deceased's widow, named Rosario Gelano, and as such is not subject to the inheritance tax. There is no question in regard to the facts: It is admitted that Schuetze insured himself in the Sun Life Insurance Company of Canada in Manila, and that the policy was issued on January 14, 1913, payable to his estate after death. He died in Manila on February 2, 1928, leaving his widow as his sole testamentary heiress. The appellant, the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the late Schuetze's testamentary estate, received from the insurer the amount of this policy, or the net sum of P20,150. It is an established and generally recognized principle that in a lifeinsurance policy where the insured has named a beneficiary, the proceeds belong to said beneficiary, and to him alone. "Vested Interest of Beneficiary. In practically every jurisdiction it is the rule that in an ordinary life insurance policy made payable to a beneficiary, and which does not authorize a change of beneficiary, the named beneficiary has an absolute, vested interest in the policy from the date of its issuance, delivery and acceptance, and this is true of a policy payable to the children of the insured equally, without naming them, or their executors, administrators or assigns." (14 R.C.L., 1376.) (Del Val vs. Del Val, 29 Phil., 534 et seq.; Gercio vs. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 48 Phil., 53 et seq.) When in a life-insurance policy the insured's estate is named beneficiary, the proceeds must be delivered not to the decedent's heirs, but to his administrator or legal representative. "Policy Payable to Insured, His Estate, or Legal Representatives. ... Ordinarily the proceeds of a life insurance policy are payable to the executor or administrator of insured as assets of his estate where by the terms of the

policy the proceeds are payable to insured, his estate, his legal representatives, his executors or administrators, his "executors, administrators, or assigns," or even his "heirs, executors, administrators, or assigns." ..." (37 C.J., 565.) "Personal Representatives or Legal Representatives. While there is some authority to the effect that "legal representatives" means the persons entitled to the estate of the insured, and not his executor or administrator, the better view is that ordinarily the proceeds of such a policy pass to his executor or administrator." (14 R.C.L., 1372.) If the foregoing are the principles which should govern life-insurance policies with reference to beneficiaries and the right to the proceeds of such policies, it is evident that Schuetze's estate, and not his widow or the conjugal partnership, is entitled to the proceeds of said policy exclusively, and may receive them from the insurer. The parties must have so understood it when the insurer delivered the net amount of the policy to the Bank of the Philippine Islands, as judicial administrator of the insured. It is stated in the majority opinion that the money with which the premiums were paid during the marriage of the Schuetzes is presumed to have been taken from the conjugal funds, according to article 1407 of the Civil Code, which provides that "All the property of the spouses shall be deemed partnership property in the absence of proof that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife." This is the very argument which led to the settlement of the point of law raised. The provisions of the Civil Code on conjugal property have been improperly applied without considering that a life-insurance contract is a peculiar contract governed by special laws, such as Act No. 2427 with its amendments, and the Code of Commerce, which is still in force. In Del Val, supra, it was already held: We cannot agree with these contentions. The contract of life insurance is a special contract and the destination of the proceeds thereof is determined by special laws which deal exclusively with that subject. The Civil Code has no provisions which relate directly and specially to life insurance contracts or to the destination of life insurance proceeds. That subject is regulated exclusively by the Code of Commerce which provides for the terms

of the contract, the relations of the parties and the destination of the proceeds of the policy. The main point to be decided was not whether the premiums were paid out of conjugal or personal funds of one of the spouses, but whether or not the proceeds of the policy became assets of the insured's estate. If it be admitted that the estate is the sole owner of the aforesaid proceeds, which cannot be denied, inasmuch as the policy itself names the estate as the beneficiary, it is beside the point to discuss the nature and origin of the amounts used to pay the premiums, as the title to the proceeds of the policy is vested in the insured's estate, and any right the widow might have should be vindicated in another action. In such a case she might be entitled to reimbursement of her share in the conjugal funds, but not in the present case, for she has been instituted the sole testamentary heiress. From the foregoing, it follows that as the proceeds of the policy belong to Schuetze's estate, and inasmuch as the inheritance tax is levied upon the transmission of a deceased person's estate upon, or, on the occasion of his death, it is clear that the whole proceeds, and not one-half thereof, are subject to such tax. In my opinion the judgment appealed from should have been affirmed in its entirely. Romualdez, J., concurs.

Collector of Internal Revenue vs Campos Rueda Political Law Definition of State Maria Cerdeira died in Tangier, (an international zone [foreign country] in North Africa), on January 2, 1955. At the time of her demise, she was married to a Spanish Citizen and a permanent resident of Tangier from 1931 up to her death, on January 2, 1955. She left properties in Tangier as well as in the Philippines. Among the properties in the Philippines are several parcels of land and many shares of stock, accounts receivable and other intangible personal properties. On the real estate the respondent Antonio Campos Rueda, as administrator of her estate, paid the sum of P111,582.00 as estate tax and the sum of P151,791.48 as inheritance tax, on the transfer of her real properties in the Philippines, but refused to pay the corresponding deficiency estate and inheritance taxes due on the transfer of her intangible personal properties, claiming that the estate is exempt from the payment of said taxes pursuant to section 122 of the Tax Code and that he could avail of the reciprocal provisions of our Tax Code. The Collector of Internal Revenue in a decision assessed the estate of the deceased, as deficiency estate and inheritance taxes, the sum of P161,874.95 including interest and penalties, on the transfer of intangible personal properties of Maria Cerdeira.. ISSUE: Whether or not Rueda is rightfully assessed those taxes. HELD: Foreign Country used in Sec 122 of the National Internal Revenue Code, refers to a government of that foreign power which although not an international person in the sense of international law, DOES NOT impose transfer of death taxes upon intangible personal properties of citizens not residing therein. Or whose law allows a similar exemption from such taxes. It is not necessary that Tangier should have been recognized by our government in order to entitle the petitioner to the exemption benefits provided by our Tax Law. But since such law has not been alleged, this case is to remanded to the lower court for further trial.

Vidal de Roces v. Posadas G.R. No. 34937 March 13, 1933 Imperial, J.: Facts: 1. Sometime in 1925, plaintiffs Concepcion Vidal de Roces and her husband, as well as one Elvira Richards, received as donation several parcels of land from Esperanza Tuazon. They took possession of the lands thereafter and likewise obtained the respective transfer certificates.

2.The donor died a year after without leaving any forced heir. In her will, which was admitted to probate, she bequeathed to each of the donees the sum of P5,000. After the distribution of the estate but before the delivery of their shares, the CIR (appellee) ruled that plaintiffs as donees and legatees should pay inheritance taxes. The plaintiffs paid the taxes under protest.

3. CIR filed a demurrer on ground that the facts alleged were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court sustained the demurrer and ordered the amendment of the complaint but the appellants failed to do so. Hence, the trial court dismissed the action on ground that plaintiffs, herein appellants, did not really have a right of action.

4. Plaintiffs (appellant) contend that Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code does not include donationinter vivos and if it does, it is unconstitutional, null and void for violating SEC. 3 of the Jones Law (providing that no law shall embrace more than one subject and that the subject should be expressed in its titles ; that the Legislature has no authority to tax donation inter vivos; finally, that said provision violates the rule on uniformity of taxation.

5. CIR however contends that the word 'all gifts' refer clearly to donation inter vivos and cited the doctrine in Tuason v. Posadas.

Issue: Whether or not the donations should be subjected to inheritance tax

2. The plaintiff (herein petitioner) alleged in his complaint that the tax is illegal since he received the property by a deed of gift inter vivos duly accepted and registered before the death of his father. He also contended that Act 2601 being an inheritance tax statute, does not tax gifts. The defendant answered in general denial with a countermand. The court dismissed the countermand. Both sides appealed, but the CIR appeal was dismissed. Issue: Whether or not the gifts inter vivos are taxable (inheritance tax)

YES. Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code clearly refers to those donation inter vivos that take effect immediately or during the lifetime of the donor, but made in consideration of the death of the decedent. Those donations not made in contemplation of the decedent's death are not included as it would be equivalent to imposing a direct tax on property and not on its transmission.

YES. Inheritance tax is imposed upon the gift inter vivos that plaintiff received from his father as this was really an advancement upon the inheritance to which he would be entitled upon the death of the latter. Sec. 1540 of the Administrative Code did not tax gifts per se but only those which are made to those who shall prove to be heirs, devisees, legatees and donees mortis causa of the donor. The term 'heirs' include those given the status of heirs irrespective of the quantity of property they may receive as such.

The phrase 'all gifts' as held in Tuason v. Posadas refers to gifts inter vivos as they are considered as advances in anticipation of inheritance since they are made in consideration of death. Dison v. Posadas G.R. No. 36770 November 4, 1932 Butte, J.: Facts: 1. Plaintiff Luis Dison filed a suit against CIR to recover inheritance tax paid under protest amounting to P2,808.73. Felix Dison, plaintiff's father executed a deed of gift which transferred 22 tracts of land, reserving to himself during his lifetime the usufruct of 3 tracts. The donation was formally accepted by plaintiff.

BPI vs Posadas 56 Phil 215 FACTS: The estate of Adolphe Oscar Schuetze is the sole beneficiary named in the life-insurance policy for $10,000, issued by the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada on January 14, 1913. During the following five years the insured paid the premiums at the Manila branch of the company, and in 1918 the policy was transferred to the London branch. The record shows that the deceased Adolphe Oscar Schuetze married the plaintiff-appellant Rosario Gelano on January 16, 1914. Bank of the Philippine Islands, was appointed administrator of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze's testamentary estate by an order dated March 24, 1928, entered by the Court of First Instance of Manila. On July 13, 1928, the Sun Life Assurance Company of Canada, whose main office is in Montreal, Canada, paid Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze upon her arrival at Manila, the sum of P20,150, which was the amount of the insurance policy on the life of said deceased, payable to the latter's estate. On the same date Rosario Gelano Vda. de Schuetze delivered the money to said Bank of the Philippine Islands, as administrator of the deceased's estate, which entered it in the inventory of the testamentary estate, and then returned the money to said widow. The present complaint seeks to recover from the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, the amount of P1,209 paid by the plaintiff under protest, in its capacity of administrator of the estate of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, as inheritance tax upon the sum of P20,150, which is the amount of an insurance policy on the deceased's life, wherein his own estate was named the beneficiary.

community property, and belong one-half to the husband and the other half to the wife, exclusively; (2) that if the premiums were paid partly with paraphernal and partly conjugal funds, the proceeds are likewise in like proportion paraphernal in part and conjugal in part; and (3) that the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate as the beneficiary, if delivered to the testamentary administrator of the former as part of the assets of said estate under probate administration, are subject to the inheritance tax according to the law on the matter, if they belong to the assured exclusively, and it is immaterial that the insured was domiciled in these Islands or outside. CA decision is reversed. Defendant is ordered to return of the tax collected upon the amount of P20,150, being the proceeds of the insurance policy on the life of the late Adolphe Oscar Schuetze, after deducting the proportional part corresponding to the first premium.

ISSUE: WON the proceeds of a life-insurance policy is subject to inheritance tax.

RULING: By virtue of the foregoing, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the proceeds of a life-insurance policy payable to the insured's estate, on which the premiums were paid by the conjugal partnership, constitute