IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO Civil Action No.

12-cv-02716-WJM-MEH LISA KAY BRUMFIEL, Plaintiff, v. US BANK, LARRY CASTLE, in his corporate capacity, LARRY CASTLE, in his individual capacity, CASTLE STAWIARSKI LLC, ROBERT J. HOPP, ATTORNEY, CYNTHIA MARES, Public Trustee in her official capacity, MERS a division of MERSCORP Inc. and DOES 1-100 Defendants PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO US BANKS MOTION TO REMAND TO COLORADO STATE COURT ACTION 2013-cv-825

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT AND INTRODUCTION This court has already assumed original federal question jurisdiction to determine if the Colorado State Foreclosure Statute--- 38-38-101 violates Section 1 of the 14th Amendment, which governs both non judicial foreclosures (Rule 120), and judicial foreclosures 105 (Exhibit A p. 1), and therefore both are unconstitutional. At issue is the burden of proof required under the 14th Amendment before plaintiffs fundamental property interest (her home) is taken through foreclosure proceedings whether non judicial or judicial. Both procedures are in controversy, and will be affected by this courts decision. In Defendants response to opposition to plaintiffs MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE

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THIS NOTICE OF REMOVAL AND PETITION INTO THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE [Dkt #163, p. 2] which US Bank incorporates in its Motion to Remand [Dkt # 171, p 2, 4] defendant US Bank states: The State Court Action does not involve the Rule 120 Public Trustee Foreclosure in any fashion. Plaintiffs constitutional questions before this Court are moot. Similarly, the State Court Action also does not involve any constitutional or federal issues. But the State Court Action is fully involved since it is also governed by 38-38-101 which is the subject of Plaintiffs constitutional challenge, and therefore this court has already assumed federal question jurisdiction over that question. At p. 3 of Defendants Response, defendant states : Plaintiff does not have the required unanimous written consent of all party defendants in the State Court Action. The failure of all defendants to join in or consent to the removal request precludes removal But as this court reviews plaintiffs argument, unanimity was not necessary since the non joining defendants were only nominal defendants. In the Order Granting plaintiff an Injunction [Docket #94, pgs 13, 14] this Court expressed serious concern over the procedures employed in the Rule 120 Foreclosure governed by 38-38-101 as amended through HB 06-1387 when it said: Rather, with respect to Plaintiffs Ninth Claim, the Court finds that she has met her burden with respect to the modified standard. (See ECF No. 45.) According to Plaintiffs legal theory, Colo.Rev. Stat. 38-38-101 does two things: (1) it lowers the standard of proof that a creditor must meet in order to proceed to foreclosure from original documentary evidence to an unsworn statement; and (2) it creates an additional burden upon a debtor to establish evidence of the creditors identity which the creditor, itself is not required to locate. Whether these issues create due process concerns within the limited scope of a Rule 120 hearing creates serious constitutional questions. [B,U] At the May 6th, 2013 hearing, from the Reporters Transcript Docket # 117, p. 41, lns

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22-25, p. 42, lns1-25, this Court said:

THE COURT: Well, if we were operating in a procedural setting pre-2006 where in order to prevail at a Rule 120 hearing the holder in due course would have to come in with an original deed of trust and an original promissory note, or a verified assignment document, I would agree with you, because then the real party in interest and who is the true holder of the note would not have been an issue. But what this lawsuit raises in my mind is we have a totally changed landscape post-2006, and there's a very real issue as to who is actually the owner of this property. If it turns out that U.S. Bank, your clients -- are not the owners right now, Ms. Brumfiel is the owner*** ***[I]f your clients are not the actual holders in due course of the note and deed of trust, then she's the victim, because she loses her property to folks who can't prove they actually own the deed of trust or promissory note. So because I can't answer that question today, I can't answer that question preliminarily, it's something that has to be viewed in the longer term as to how the merits develop in this case, isn't that an argument for maintaining the status quote now, issuing the temporary restraining order, freezing things where they are, in place, and then allowing the suit to go forward to see if your clients can prove that they are the actual current holders of the deed of trust and promissory note? [B, U] Accordingly, the answer to the question above posed by this Court in the May 6th, 2013 hearingdetermination of who is the current holder of the deed of trust and promissory note, will be raised in both the proposed judicial foreclosure and this federal action, in which the defendants seek to evade the scrutiny of this court and will ultimately determine if US Bank N.A. can foreclose irrespective of whether the proceeding is non-judicial or judicial. This court has assumed original federal question jurisdiction (12-cv-02716), and that issue is inextricably linked to the issues in this case. So why subject plaintiff to two forums to determine the same issue? Would two forums lead to judicial economy? .Would the federal ruling and the state court ruling harmonize? It is inappropriate for two courts to effectively

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retain jurisdiction over the same controversy, under the same set of predicate facts, as this will inexorably lead to conflicts between the courts. We must remember that the Colorado non-judicial foreclosure Rule 120, and the Colorado Judicial foreclosure Rule 105 are governed by the same statute 38-38-101 (See JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACTIONS PROCEDURES AND TACTICS, Exhibit A) which is the focus of the constitutional challenge, and lays the foundation for the burden of proof the lender is required to produce to show that it is the holder of the note with standing to foreclose without regard to a higher burden of proof requirement imposed by the 14 th Amendment when a fundamental property right is involved. By reference to the transcript of the May 6th, 2013 hearing, and subsequent orders of this court DIRECTING defendants to file the original deed of trust, and original promissory note with original endorsements, this court has been made aware of the evasive tactics that defendants employ to avoid producing the evidence that the lender is the holder of the note entitled to foreclose. At the May 6th hearing defendants asserted that they had the Original Deed of Trust and Promissory Note in hand [Reporters Transcript, Docket # 117, p.63, RT: 20-25] : MS. BRUMFIEL: Yes, that is true, your Honor. We had been asking for the note, by the way, for -- in writing for over probably -- I don't know, probably a year now, over and over and over and over. And it -- even at the point in time when they started the foreclosure proceedings, they had not had the original note in their possession. ` At p. 67, RT: 19-22 COURT: Mr. Vaglica, Ive asked you earlier to file by Wednesday a copy of the original deed of trust and promissory note, so well be looking forward to that. MR. VAGLICA: Yes, your honor.

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At p. 68, RT:21-23 MR. VAGLICA: Would you like us to deposit the original with the clerk downstairs as opposed to filing it through the system? THE COURT: Well, I will take your representation as an officer of the Court that what you will be filing is an accurate copy of what you have in your hand, and for now that will suffice. At p. 69, RT:3-7 MR. VAGLICA: We'll bring it to the hearing. THE COURT: Yes, please. MR. VAGLICA: Just in case his Honor wants to look at the original signatures. THE COURT: I would appreciate that. Thank you. In the ORDER GRANTING PLFS REQUEST FOR INTERIM PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION footnote 2, p. 2, 3, [Docket 94, May 6th, 2013] this Court said: The Court notes that during the course of todays hearing, the Castle Defendants offered to provide original evidence of the debt. To date, Defendants have been relying upon a document titled Statement By Attorney for Qualified Holder pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. 38-38-101. (ECF No. 9-4.) That document has been relied upon by Defendant Trust in the Rule 120 foreclosure proceedings. The issue of original evidence is relevant to Plaintiffs arguments based on her Amended Complaint. Plaintiff [Defendant] has until Wednesday, May 8, 2013 at 9:00 a.m. to file with the Court such evidence. It will be duly considered by this Court at the evidentiary hearing, and the parties are on notice that it could potentially have a bearing on the Courts view whether a preliminary injunction should be granted. In addition, the Court will be giving much scrutiny to which entities signed the original documentation, and in what capacity. On May 8th, 2013 Defendants filed copies of the originals Deed of Trust & note. On May 9th, 2013 [Docket # 110] the Court ORDERED that defendants file the Original Deed of Trust, the Original Promissory Note, and all Original endorsements to be submitted by May 10th, 2013 at 4:00 p.m. In Documents # 111-113 Filed 05/10/13 p.1, CS Defendants stated:

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Defendants Larry Castle and Castle Stawiarski, LLC (collectively, the Castle Defendants), through their attorneys, The Castle Law Group, LLC, by Phillip A. Vaglica, of counsel, and Christopher T. Groen, hereby respond to the courts order of May 9, 2013: The Castle Defendants previously filed a true and correct copy of the original note and all endorsements, along with a true and correct copy of the original deed of trust on Wednesday, May 8, 2013 [Doc. #104]. The Castle Defendants hereby submit a true and correct copy of the original Assignment of Deed of Trust, dated October 4, 2011. The Castle Defendants have no other original documents in their possession with regard to this matter. Defendants US Bank N.A. and Castle Defendants are Judicially Estopped to deny that they do not have the original Deed of Trust and Promissory Note and must produce the originals in this case and explain the manner of procurement , or admit that they never had the originals. On the other hand, a state court obligated to follow the foreclosure statute 38-38-101, would allow the copies to be submitted with a statement of qualified holder that the lender is the holder entitled to foreclose. ARGUMENT UNANIMITY FOR REMOVAL MAY BE DISREGARDED Plaintiff did not seek approval of defendants because the state court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Doctrine, the statute governing the judicial foreclosure, 38-28-101 as amended is unconstitutional, and the non-joining defendants (parties with an interest in the property, See 2013cv825 compl. Parties) were nominal defendants who (i) are only nominal defendants because they would not be liable to pay a resulting judgment and (ii) a nominal defendant is not counted for jurisdictional purposes , and therefore is not a bar from removing this case.. The Supreme Court of the United States has long held that a federal court must

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disregard nominal or formal parties and rest jurisdiction only upon the citizenship of real parties to [a] controversy. Navarro Savings Assn v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458, 461 (1980) INITIAL LACK OF THE RIGHT OF REMOVAL MAY BE CURED WHEN THE FINAL POSTURE DOES NOT WRONGFULLY EXTEND JURISDICTION Any defect in the removal process in state court can be subsequently cured. In MOFFITT v. RESIDENTIAL FUNDING COMPANY LLC JP, , Nos. 10-1316, 101319, 10-1321., May 03, 2010 citing American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 16 (1951)) said, . As we explained, an initial lack of the right to removal may be cured when the final posture of the case does not wrongfully extend federal jurisdiction. In Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211 (2000), for instance, the Supreme Court reasoned that because the plaintiff had amended her complaint to add federal claims, said: we therefore have jurisdiction regardless of the correctness of the removal But this court already had assumed original federal question jurisdiction and can assume supplemental jurisdiction as well regardless of the correctness of the removal. This court has derivative jurisdiction under 28 USC 1441(f) when The court to which a civil action is removed under this section is not precluded from hearing and determining any claim in such civil action because the State court from which such civil action is removed did not have jurisdiction over that claim Plaintiff has claimed that 38-38-101 which governs judicial foreclosures as well is unconstitutional. [T]he presence of even one claim arising under federal law is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that the case be within the original jurisdiction of the district court for removal. Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 386 (1998)

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TWO CONCURRENT JUDICIAL BODIES CANNOT OCCUPY THE SAME SPACE Two courts may not exercise simultaneous in rem jurisdiction over the same subject matter of the case. A federal court may enjoin a state court proceeding "where the federal court's jurisdiction is in rem and the state court action may effectively deprive the federal court of the opportunity to adjudicate as to the subject matter." The Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Doctrine was precisely created for the situation now before this court because The threat posed by a parallel state court proceeding is most acute when federal jurisdiction is dependent upon a res. For that reason, the most prominent "in aid of jurisdiction" exception is for in rem actions. Where a state court proceeding interferes with a federal court's jurisdiction over a res, the federal court may enjoin the state court proceeding. BENNET V MEDTRONIC, No. 01-55966, (March, 2002, 9th, Circuit) Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 Plaintiff US Bank N.A. Claims that the state action 2013cv825 was properly before the state court. Defendant Lisa Kay Brumfiel claims that the state court did not have subject matter jurisdiction under the Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Doctrine also known as the Colorado Priority Jurisdiction, or The First to File Rule. Where concurrent proceedings in state and federal court are both suits in rem or quasi in rem, the court first assuming jurisdiction over the property may maintain and exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of the other. Knaefler v. Mack, 680 F.2d 671, 675 (1982) On October 12th, 2012, Plaintiff Lisa Kay Brumfiel filed an in rem action over the subject matter (res) of the case (plaintiffs home at 1499 South Jasper St., Aurora,

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Colorado 80017) in the above entitled action under 42 USC 1983, 1985 against defendants which includes US Bank. On May 24th, 2013, after dismissing the non judicial foreclosure, US Bank filed in rem judicial foreclosure action on essentially the same subject matter, involving the same foreclosure statute 38-38-101 against plaintiff (2013cv825) as in the federal court case 12-cv-02716 in which the statute is the subject of a constitutional challenge. In this case as in the state case, which US Bank is forum shopping, the same nucleus of facts are present which may give rise to contrary opinions. On June 4th, 2013 plaintiff filed a notice of removal in the State case no. 2013cv825 and concurrently filed a Notice of Removal and petition in the federal case 12-cv-02716 with a motion to join the state case in the above entitled action.. The Judicial foreclosure 105 is governed by Colo. Rev. Stat. 38-38-101, where the burden of proof required of lenders to show that they are the real party in interest with standing to foreclose has been intentionally reduced through a broad conspiracy by the defendants to deprive homeowners like Plaintiff of due process and equal protection of fundamental property interests The burden of proof allowed in a foreclosure under section 38-38-101 as amended by HB 06-1387 in the state case 2013cv825 is not allowed in other actions such as Adverse Possession 38-41-101et seq, where the party claiming a right to the property must prove by Clear and convincing evidence their right to the property. Raftopoulos v. Monger, 656 P.2d 1308, 1311(Colo. 1983). Therefore, even in a judicial foreclosure plaintiff will be denied the equal protection of the law under the 14th Amendment. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)

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RULES OF ENGAGEMENT IN PARALLEL LITIGATION AND SUPPLIMENTAL JURISDICTION In SASCO vs BRUCE BYERS, Case Number C 08-5641 JF (RS) (Cal. 2009) The United States District Court for Northern California, San Jose Div., remanded the case on the grounds of the First to File Rule.. The court explained the Rule: There is a generally recognized doctrine of federal comity which permits a district court to decline jurisdiction over an action when a complaint involving the same parties and issues has already been filed in another district. Pacesetter Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 678 F.2d 93, 94-5 (9th Cir. 1982). This doctrine, known as the first-to-file rule, gives priority, for purposes of choosing among possible venues when parallel litigation has been instituted in separate courts, to the party who first establishes jurisdiction. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 989 F.2d 1002, 1006 (8th Cir. 1993). The rule serves the purpose of promoting efficiency well and should not be disregarded lightly. Church of Scientology of Cal. v. U.S. Dept of Army, 611 F.2d 738, 750 (9th Cir. 1979). In this case the First to File Rule, or Priority Rule or Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Doctrine militates against remand to the state court The state court lacked in rem jurisdiction under the Prior Exclusive Jurisdiction Doctrine, also known as the Priority Rule in Colorado. In both in rem cases, Colorado Rev Stat. 38-38-101 is involved, and is the subject in this federal action of plaintiffs challenge to the constitutionality of the foreclosure statute and the Rule 120 proceeding. A District Court has supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that form part of the same case or controversy as the claim over which the court has original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 1367(a). The Supreme Court has provided further guidance, holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over an entire action, including state-law claims, whenever the federal-law claims and state-law claims in the

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case derive from a common nucleus of operative facts and are such that would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988) Cohill Principles: Economy, Convenience, Fairness, and Comity The factors of economy and convenience weigh heavily in favor of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the entire action. If the Court chose to remand Plaintiffs state-law claims, it would splinter the litigation into two separate forums. Requiring the parties to manage two different lawsuits in two different forums would force both sides to expend significantly more time, money, and effort than by having the parties litigate the entire action before this Court. Thus, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over all of Plaintiffs state-law claims would be significantly more economical and convenient for both parties. Likewise, the principles of fairness and comity favor the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Plaintiff asserted, inadvertently or not, a federal claim against Defendant and, as a result, Defendant had the statutory right to remove the case to federal court. It would be unfair for the Court to subvert Defendants statutory right by forcing it to fight two separate legal battles in two different forums without a compelling justification. While Plaintiff would prefer to argue his case in state court, the holding is nonetheless fair to him as well because he will still have the opportunity to fully and fairly argue his case, albeit in a federal forum. [U] Therefore, after considering the impact of removal on both parties, the Court finds that it is appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over all of Plaintiff's state law claims. Should the Court ultimately dismiss or otherwise resolve all federal claims, the Court will reconsider whether remand of any remaining state-law claim is appropriate. Allowing competing courts to proceed could lead to conflicting rulings in which the first opinion rendered could serve as a retraxit If a state court reaches the decision that copies are perfectly fine and constitutional, then plaintiffs only recourse is an appeal in state court leaving the Federal court nothing left.. In the Colorado Revised Statute entitled PART 1. FORECLOSURE SALE 38-38-101 (2012) states in relevant part: (II) A copy of the evidence of debt and a certification signed and properly acknowledged by a holder of an evidence of debt acting for itself or as agent, nominee, or trustee under subsection (2) of this section or a statement signed by C.R.S.

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the attorney for such holder, citing the paragraph of section 38-38-100.3 (20) under which the holder claims to be a qualified holder and certifying or stating that the copy of the evidence of debt is true and correct and that the use of the copy is subject to the conditions described in paragraph (a) of subsection (2) of this section. If this Court is concerned over the effect Colo. Rev. Stat. 38-38-101 has on the Rule 120 Foreclosure as it had declared because the standard of proof that a creditor must meet in order to proceed to foreclosure from original documentary evidence to an unsworn statement; and because (2) it creates an additional burden upon a debtor to establish evidence of the creditors identity which the creditor, itself is not required to locate, it should be an equally valid concern of this Court over proceedings in the Judicial Foreclosure action 2013cv825 which US Bank N.A. seeks to pursue because the Judicial Foreclosure is also governed by Colo. Rev. Sta. 38-38-101 (See JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE ACTIONS PROCEDURES AND TACTICS, Exhibit A) where US Bank will present the same copies of the Deed of Trust and Promissory Note and a unsworn Statement of Qualified Holder that the lender is the real party in Interest. [A]n additional burden will be placed on the debtor to establish evidence of the creditors identity which the creditor, itself is not required to locate [Docket #94, court quote] The First to File Rule has been applied in the Colorado District Court in the case of ANIMAL HEALTH INTERNATIONAL, INC., v. LIVINGSTON ENTERPRISES, INC.,, Civil Case No. 12-cv-00369-LTB (April 26th, 2012 the court applied the First to File Rule and dismissed the action in favor of the Nebraska federal court which pre-dated the Colorado lawsuit. As the court explained at p. 3 and 4: Regardless of whether this court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction over defendants, whether venue is proper in this district*** , the fact remains that there are now two parallel federal lawsuits implicating the same set of facts.

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Under the first-filed or first to file rule, the first federal district court which obtains Jurisdiction of parties and issues should have priority and the second court should decline consideration of the action until the proceedings before the first court are terminated.*** [W]hen parallel litigation has been instituted in separate courts, to the party who first establishes jurisdiction in order to conserve judicial resources and avoid conflicting rulings.). The rational for the rule is that [t]he simultaneous prosecution in two different courts of cases relating to the same parties and issues leads to the wastefulness of time, energy and money. (Cite) Livingston argues that the first to file rule applies and that the instant case should be dismissed, stayed, or transferred as a result. In support, it asserts that the pending Nebraska Action predates this one, that the parties are the same, and that the actions require the respective courts to decide many of the same issues. [B, U] COLORADO PRIORITY RULE In Town of Minturn, Colo. v. Sensible Housing Co., Inc., 2012 CO 23, (April 8th, 2012) the Supreme Court of Colorado said: The court of appeals agreed and applied the priority rule*** the court first acquiring jurisdiction [over] the parties and the subject matter has exclusive jurisdiction .(cite) .. The purpose of the priority rule is to promote judicial efficiency and avoid unnecessary duplication and multiplicity of suits. (Cite) In SEXTON v. NDEX WEST LLC FSB, No. 1117432. 2013, the court stated: Under the Supreme Court's long-standing prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, if a state or federal court has taken possession of property, or by its procedure has obtained jurisdiction over the same, then the property under that court's jurisdiction is withdrawn from the jurisdiction of the courts of the other authority as effectually as if the property had been entirely removed to the territory of another sovereign.(cite) In BENNET V MEDTRONIC, INC., No. 01-55966, (9th Cir. 2002) the court explained the reasoning in enjoining state court proceeding under the exceptions to the AntiInjunction Statute. As the court outlined: I. THE ANTI-INJUNCTION ACT The Anti-injunction Act provides as follows: A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments. 28 U.S.C. 2283. ***

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The threshold question we address is whether the district court's order constitutes "an injunction to stay [state court] proceedings." Because the issue before us is a legal one, we review the injunction de novo. (Cite) II. THE EXCEPTIONS The next question is whether the circumstances of this case fall within one of the three exceptions to the Act-- injunctions that: (1) Congress has expressly authorized; (2) are necessary in aid of the federal court's jurisdiction; or (3) are necessary to protect or effectuate the federal court's judgments.*** The exceptions applicable in this action are 1 and 2. This court has already determined that Plaintiffs action under than 42 US 1983, 85 is one of the actions that is expressly authorized exception to the Anti Injunction Statute. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 235 (1972); Moreover, this court is also authorized under the second exception by Congress in aid of the federal courts jurisdiction. As the Court in Bennet said: In Atlantic Coast, the Supreme Court explained that "some federal injunctive relief may be necessary to prevent a state court from so interfering with a federal court's consideration or disposition of a case as to seriously impair the federal court's flexibility and authority to decide that case." 398 U.S. at 295. In CHAPMAN v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, No. 10 15215, June 23, 2011 Ninth Circuit held that the prior exclusive jurisdiction doctrine Is no mere discretionary abstention rule. Rather, it is a mandatory jurisdictional limitation. (cite) [B, U[ Plaintiff should not be put under the ordeal of two cases determining the same issues of fact in a proceeding where the burden of proof applied in the state case will be the one mandated by 38-38-101 which does not require Clear and convincing evidence to show that the lender is the note holder entitled to foreclose. In the Reporters transcript of the May 6th hearing [Docket # 117, pg 10, lns 22-25; and p. 11, lns 1-22] Plaintiff Lisa Kay Brumfiel recounts how she had attended several of

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the evidentiary hearings in the Rule 120, noting that when the homeowner raised the Real Party in Interest Defense as was required by the Goodwin, the court will listen and then say : Limited in scope, and does not rule on any of your evidence. The judge in the judicial foreclosure who will determine the case is among the same judges that determine the evidentiary hearing in the non-judicial foreclosure. If the determination of the Real Party in Interest is guided by the Colo. Rev. Stat 38-38-101 then Plaintiff will experience the same result as in the non judicial evidentiary hearing. Colo. Rev Stat 38-38-101 as amended by HB 06 1387, which plaintiff claims is substantively and procedurally defective under section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, is the governing statute for both the Rule 120 and the 105 and is the lynchpin of plaintiffs constitutional challenge. The constitutional infection of Colorado Rev Stats 3838-101 as amended by HB 06-1387, is no less a threat to plaintiffs due process protections by subjecting plaintiff to a Rule 105. The same rationale for applying the First File Rule is present in this case. It would be in the best interests of efficiency, judicial economy, and avoiding conflicting rulings. In Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S.226 (1922) the Court said: It is settled that, when a state court and a court of the United States may each take jurisdiction of a matter, the tribunal whose jurisdiction first attaches holds it, to the exclusion of the other, until its duty is fully performed, and the jurisdiction involved is exhausted. . . . The rule is limited to actions which deal either actually or potentially with specific property or objects.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this court should deny plaintiff US Bank N.A. remand. Respectfully submitted,

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_______________ LISA KAY BRUMFIEL

Date: ___________, 2013

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