What is feasibility study?

A feasibility study is an evaluation and analysis of the potential of the proposed project which is based on extensive investigation and research to support the process of decision making. Feasibility studies aim to objectively and rationally uncover the strengths and weaknesses of an existing business or proposed venture, opportunities and threats present in the environment, the resources required to carry through, and ultimately the prospects for success. [1][2] In its simplest terms, the two criteria to judge feasibility are cost required and value to be attained.[3] As such, a well-designed feasibility study should provide a historical background of the business or project, description of the product or service, accounting statements, details of the operations and management, marketing research and policies, financial data, legal requirements and tax obligations. [1] Generally, feasibility studies precede technical development and project implementation

Objective of feasibility study?

A feasibility study evaluates the project's potential for success; therefore, the perceived objectivity is an important factor in the credibility to be placed on the study by potential investors and lending institutions. [citation needed] It must therefore be conducted with an objective, unbiased approach to provide information upon which decisions can be based.[citation needed]

Technology and system feasibility

The assessment is based on an outline design of system requirements, to determine whether the company has the technical expertise to handle completion of the project. When writing a feasibility report, the following should be taken to consideration:

A brief description of the business to assess more possible factor/s which could affect the study The part of the business being examined The human and economic factor The possible solutions to the problems

At this level, the concern is whether the proposal is both technically and legally feasible (assuming moderate cost).

Legal Feasibility

Determines whether the proposed system conflicts with legal requirements, e.g. a data processing system must comply with the local Data Protection Acts.

Operational Feasibility
Operational feasibility is a measure of how well a proposed system solves the problems, and takes advantage of the opportunities identified during scope definition and how it satisfies the requirements identified in the requirements analysis phase of system development.[4] The operational feasibility assessment focuses on the degree to which the proposed development projects fits in with the existing business environment and objectives with regard to development schedule, delivery date, corporate culture, and existing business processes.

Economic Feasibility
The purpose of the economic feasibility assessment is to determine the positive economic benefits to the organization that the proposed system will provide. It includes quantification and identification of all the benefits expected. This assessment typically involves a cost/ benefits analysis.

Technical Feasibility
The technical feasibility assessment is focused on gaining an understanding of the present technical resources of the organization and their applicability to the expected needs of the proposed system. It is an evaluation of the hardware and software and how it meets the need of the proposed system[5]

Schedule Feasibility
A project will fail if it takes too long to be completed before it is useful. Typically this means estimating how long the system will take to develop, and if it can be completed in a given time period using some methods like payback period. Schedule feasibility is a measure of how reasonable the project timetable is. Given our technical expertise, are the project deadlines reasonable? Some projects are initiated with specific deadlines. You need to determine whether the deadlines are mandatory or desira

Other feasibility factors

Market and real estate feasibility
Market feasibility studies typically involve testing geographic locations for a real estate development project, and usually involve parcels of real estate land. Developers often conduct market studies to determine the best location within a jurisdiction, and to test alternative land uses for given parcels. Jurisdictions often require developers to complete feasibility studies before they will approve a permit application for retail, commercial, industrial, manufacturing, housing, office or mixed-use project. Market Feasibility takes into account the importance of the business in the selected area.

Resource feasibility
This involves questions such as how much time is available to build the new system, when it can be built, whether it interferes with normal business operations, type and amount of resources required, dependencies,

Cultural feasibility
In this stage, the project's alternatives are evaluated for their impact on the local and general culture. For example, environmental factors need to be considered and these factors are to be well known. Further an enterprise's own culture can clash with the results of the project.

Financial feasibility
In case of a new project, financial viability can be judged on the following parameters:

Total estimated cost of the project Financing of the project in terms of its capital structure, debt equity ratio and promoter's share of total cost Existing investment by the promoter in any other business Projected cash flow and profitability

The financial viability of a project should provide the following information:[citation needed]

Full details of the assets to be financed and how liquid those assets are. Rate of conversion to cash-liquidity (i.e. how easily can the various assets be converted to cash?). Project's funding potential and repayment terms. Sensitivity in the repayments capability to the following factors:

o o o o o o o

Time delays. Mild slowing of sales. Acute reduction/slowing of sales. Small increase in cost. Large increase in cost. Adverse economic conditions.

Market research study and analysis

This is one of the most important sections of the feasibility study as it examines the marketability of the product or services and convinces readers that there is a potential market for the product or services.[citation needed] If a significant market for the product or services cannot be established, then there is no project. Typically, market studies will assess the potential sales of the product, absorption and market capture rates and the project's timing.[citation needed]

BANDRA WARLI SEA LINK

Introduction of Bandra warli sea link

The BandraWorli Sea Link, officially called Rajiv Gandhi Sea Link, is a cable-stayed bridge with pre-stressed concrete-steel viaducts on either side that links Bandra in the Western Suburbs of Mumbai with Worli in South Mumbai.[1] The bridge is a part of the proposed Western Freeway that will link the Western Suburbs to Nariman Point in Mumbai's main business district. The 16 billion (US$290 million) bridge was commissioned by the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC), and built by the Hindustan Construction Company. The first four of the eight lanes of the bridge were opened to the public on 30 June 2009.[8] All eight lanes were opened on 24 March 2010. The sea-link reduces travel time between Bandra and Worli during peak hours from 6090 minutes to 2030 minutes.[9] As of October 2009, BWSL had an average daily traffic of around 37,500 vehicles.[10]

History
Mahim Causeway was the only road connecting the western suburbs to Mumbai's central business district. This north-southwestern corridor became a bottleneck and was highly congested at peak hours. The West Island Freeway project was proposed to span the entire western coastline of Mumbai to ease congestion. The BandraWorli Sea-Link, a bridge over Mahim Bay, was proposed as the first phase of this freeway system, offering an alternative route to the Mahim Causeway. The sea-link connects the intersection of the Western Express Highway and Swami Vivekanand Road in Bandra to the Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan Road in Worli. From Worli Seaface, it connects to Mumbai's arterial Annie Besant Road. The project was commissioned by the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Limited (MSRDC). The contract for construction was awarded to the Hindustan Construction Company (HCC), with project management led by the UK offices of Dar Al-Handasah, with significant technology transfer from China.[11] The foundation stone was laid in 1999 by Bal Thackeray. The original plan estimated the cost at 6.6 billion (US$120 million) to be completed in five years.[12] But the project was subject to numerous public interest litigations, with the 5-year delay resulting in the cost escalating to 16 billion (US$290 million),[13] with the additional interest cost alone accounting for 7 billion (US$130 million).[12] BWSL was named in the memory of late prime minister Rajiv Gandhi.[4]

Planning
The overall project consisted of five parts, contracted separately to accelerate the overall schedule.

Package I: Construction of a flyover over Love Grove junction in Worli Package II: Construction of a cloverleaf interchange at the intersection of the Western Express Highway and S.V. Road in Bandra Package III: Construction of solid approach road from the interchange to the Toll Plaza on the Bandra side along with a public promenade Package IV: Construction of the central cable-stayed spans with northern and southern viaducts from Worli to the Toll Plaza at the Bandra end Package V: Improvements to Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan Road

Package IV was the main phase, with the other packages providing supporting infrastructure.

Bridge management

Toll gates of Bandra-Worli sea link

Toll collection
The Bandra end of the toll plaza has 16 approach lanes. The toll plaza is equipped with an electronic toll collection system. At both ends, the toll collection options include:

Automatic electronic payment system through On-board Units mounted on vehicles for frequent-commuters that enable vehicles to pass without stopping[17] Semi-automatic cash-less electronic payment via a smart card in unattended lanes

Manual toll collection for payment by cash, to a toll attendant

Single Journey Car 55 (US$1.00) Tempo/LCV 80 (US$1.50) Truck/Bus 110 (US$2.00)

Vehicle

Toll Return Journey Day Pass 82.50 (US$1.50) 137.50 (US$2.50) 120 (US$2.20) 200 (US$3.70) 165 (US$3.00) 275 (US$5.00)

Monitoring
An intelligent bridge management system (IBS) provides traffic information, surveillance, monitoring and control systems. It comprises CCTVs, automatic traffic counters and vehicle classification system, variable message signs, remote weather information system and emergency telephones. The control centre is located near the toll plaza along with the electronic tolling controls. The control system uses fibre-optic cables running the entire span of the BWSL. The toll management system and advanced traffic management system was instal For traffic enforcement, the bridge includes facilities for vehicles to pull over when stopped by enforcement officers or in the event of a breakdown.

Security
The bridge uses mobile explosive scanners[18] for vehicles travelling on the sea link.[19][20] Scans take less than 20 seconds for each vehicle with sensors above and below the vehicles. Over 180 cars can be scanned per hour by each scanner. The pillars and the towers supporting the bridge are protected by buoys designed to withstand explosions and collisions. These inflated buoys surround each pillar of the sea link to avoid any damage.[21] The bridge tower and the control centres feature lightning protection, designed to protect the bridge monitoring, communication and power equipment from possible surges.

Power supply & lighting

The Bandra Worli Sea link, at night. The bridge has a reliable and redundant power supply, backed up by diesel generators and auto mains failure panels for critical loads, such as monitoring, surveillance, emergency equipment and communication services including aviation and obstruction indicators. BWSL exclusively uses energy saving illlumination systems.

Panorama View of Bandra Worli Sea Link

Criticisms
The Economic Times was critical of the BandraWorli Sea Link in every particular. First, the cost was not the projected 3 billion but actually cost 16 billion or about 430% cost overrun. Second, the project was 5-year behind schedule. Third, the supposedly reduction in commute

time did not occur. Traffic bunched up at both ends of the Link causing nightmarish grid lock. The blame rest, as usual, on the notorious Indian corruption and political in-efficiencies.[22]

Sea link finances cause concern

Chittaranjan Tembhekar, TNN Oct 2, 2009, 04.53am IST

Tags:

Mumbai

MUMBAI: The Bandra-Worli Sea Link may be Mumbai's soaring new landmark, but it's giving some state officials a sinking feeling. Financial results for the first quarter (which ended on Wednesday) after the commissioning of the Rs 1,634-crore bridge have raised fears that it's a white elephant in waiting. Mantralaya sources say the state government is falling Rs 4 lakh short of revenue projections per day. This shortfall adds up to Rs 1.2 crore per month and nearly Rs 4 crore over the first passing quarter (June 30 to September 30). Sources in the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC), which owns the Sea Link, admitted that the estimate of 70,000 vehicles a day was far off the mark, with actual traffic averaging only 37,500 vehicles a day. So instead of the expected daily toll collection of Rs 21 lakh, the road was fetching just Rs 16.2 lakh. As per the agreement, Mumbai Entry Point Toll Ltd (MEPTL), which handles Sea Link toll collection, is expected to raise Rs 1.44 crore a week. Since it can't do that due to awry projections, sources say MEPTL may ask the state for compensation of Rs 4 crore every year, which the state may have to pay up. "Companies pay Rs 21 lakh a day for events. If losses mount, the Sea Link may become more of a venue for corporate events than for traffic," said a senior official. MSRDC sources said that even allowing 120 BEST buses on the link wouldn't help. "They'll fetch only Rs 6 lakh per month, at a toll rate of Rs 5,000 per bus per month. But losses are Rs 4 lakh per day," they said. Moreover, security agencies charge substantial sums to keep the link safe.

From 2012, using your car on the Bandra-Worli Sea Link may cost you Rs. 20 more. A beleaguered Maharashtra State Road Development (MSRDC) Corporation, which is losing Rs15 crore every year in toll collection on the Bandra-Worli Sea Link, is planning to increase the toll for cars using the sea link from Rs. 50 to Rs. 70. The MSRDC had been hoping that the sea link would attract around 90,000 vehicles every day. However, on a good day, barely 40,000 vehicles use it. We are losing close to Rs15 crore every year as revenue on the sea link. The toll rate has remained unchanged at Rs. 50 since 2009. We will now request the state government to allow us to increase it to Rs. 70, a senior MSRDC official said. The state government had permitted MSRDC to charge a toll of Rs. 70 when the sea link was opened in June 2009. However, in an attempt to attract more commuters, MSRDC had decided to keep it at Rs. 50 initially. The toll is being collected by a private operator, Mumbai Entry Point Ltd (MEPL), since the bridge was thrown open in June 2009. MEPL bagged the rights to do so after paying MSRDC Rs74 crore. However, less-than-expected traffic on the sea link has meant that neither the toll operator nor MSRDC are happy with the returns. The contract, which was initially for one year, is now being renewed every three months, as MSRDCs hope that Reliance Infrastructure will take up toll collection has not materialised. Reliance Infrastructure has bagged the contract for building the Worli-Haji Ali Sea Link. As per the terms of the contract it also had to take over the Bandra-Worli Sea Link and would get the rights to collect the toll on the project. There is however a stalemate between MSRDC and Reliance Infrastructre over building of the Worli-Haji Ali Sea Link. MSRDC has given the company a January deadline to take over the Bandra-Worli Sea Link and start construction on the Worli Haji Ali link. There are, however, indications that both parties may call off the contract. MSRDC has now decided that rather than wait for someone to take over the project, a better option would be to increase the toll. As per MSRDCs plans, by early 2012, the toll for cars will increase from Rs50 to Rs70, LCVs (Light Commercial Vehicles) from Rs. 75 to Rs. 105 and HCVs (Heavy Commercial Vehicles) from Rs. 100 to Rs. 140.

However, the proposal will have to be approved by the state government. MSRDC vice chairman and managing director Bipin Shrimali did not respond to calls or messages.

Bandra-Worli- Haji Ali Sea links status

Panel clears plan to extend sea link to Versova Source: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/cow/9499378.cms MUMBAI: The Cabinet sub-committee on infrastructure has cleared the proposal for extending the Bandra-Worli sea link to Versova. Government officials said the proposal, which was cleared on Wednesday, comes as a boost for the 10-km link plan, which is expected to cost Rs 4,000 crore. Officials said at present, two connectors-at Otters Club on Carter Road, Bandra (West) and at Juhu Koliwada-have been planned. However, when the plan was first announced, citizens groups had objected to these connectors. Planners had been considering a coastal road for part of the link, however, they are now in favour of a link over the sea, said officials. The sea link may ultimately be extended from Versova to Vasai-Virar in the future. Though the Bandra-Versova plan has been talked about for several years, it has remained on the drawing board. The reason was that it took long to build the Bandra-Worli sea link itself, the officials said. City planners has first proposed using a cut-and-cover tunnel at Juhu beach so as not to affect the area but the residents had objected to it. 2 yrs on, Bandra-Worli sea link fails to attract motorists Zeeshan Shaikh, Hindustan Times Mumbai, June 13, 2011 The Bandra-Worli sea link was touted as the solution to the citys traffic woes with the state government claiming 1.2 lakh vehicles would use the road by 2011. However, as per figures released by the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC), less than 28,000 vehicles ply on the sea link daily. A report by Dar Consultants, private consultants appointed for the project in 2006, had claimed that after completion, the sea link would attract 79,335 vehicles in 2009. It also said the number would increase to 1.2 lakh by 2012 if the sea link was extended to Haji Ali.

However, these traffic estimates are less by around 90,000 vehicles. This raises doubts over the feasibility of sea links built for the convenience of 2.4% of the citys vehicle-owning population. Transport expert Ashok Datar criticised the state governments resolve in creating capitalintensive sea links instead of improving public transport systems. The government plans to build three more sea links worth Rs11,000 crore, but is not willing to spend Rs1,300 crore for the Bus Rapid Transport Project, which will benefit an estimated 4.5 million commuters. The bureaucrats are running after big ticket projects and shelling out crores on sea links and bridges. Elementary systems to improve public transport are however neglected, Datar said. A senior MSRDC official, on condition of anonymity, however, claimed that once the entire sea link, stretching from Versova till Nariman Point, is completed, it will attract more traffic. MSRDCs acting head Satish Gavai and minister Jaydutt Kshirsagar were unavailable for comment.
Less than 50%targeted traffic, Bandra-Worli suffers shortfall of Rs4 lakh/day
Published: Sunday, May 29, 2011, 5:00 IST By Kishore Rathod | Place: Mumbai | Agency: DNA

Its the perfect stretch to slide out of your sedans sunroof on a Sunday morning, a great setting for fat bankers to push the envelope during their annual run-n-fun event, and a superb backdrop for an action sequence in a Bollywood flick. Ironically enough, this is what the Bandra Worli Sea-Link, built at a cost of Rs1,634-crore, has been reduced to. With the volume of vehicles plying on the 4.7-km long express-bypass not even adding up to 50% of the targeted numbers, Mumbais big-ticket infrastructure project is emerging as its costliest indulgence. For the record, the sea-link is suffering a revenue shortfall of Rs4 lakh a day Rs14.4 crore annually and each passing day is making things more difficult for Mumbais flagship public-private partnership project. One reason for the low traffic could be the toll, which, at Rs50 one way and Rs75 for a return, is considered by many to be on the higher side. Another obviously is the traffic jams at either end of the sea link, which would nullify the entire point of using the bridge. The Bandra-Worli sea link has become symbolic of everything thats wrong with the way we execute our public projects. From political interference and multiple delays to shoddy implementation and cost escalations, its all gone into making the sea-link a white elephant that we can ill-afford, says urban development expert Chandrashekhar Prabhu, adding that when infrastructure projects become part of a political partys manifesto, its the common man who suffers.

The political interference has cost us dear, says Ramakant Jha, MSRDCs former executive director, who was part of then Chief Minister Manohar Joshis core team for infrastructure development during the Sena-BJP rule. Jhas team had clearly defined the blue-print of the sea-link from Bandra to Nariman Point, work on the first phase up to Worli had commenced, and tenders for the second stretch were to be announced, when the change of guard at Mantralaya derailed the entire project. We had even secured the environmental clearance for the Worli-Nariman Point stretch way back in 2002, but the new government had a new look at the project and before long, the entire schedule was thrown out of gear, says Jha, adding that had the sea-link project gone ahead as per the original schedule, not only would the sea-link be up to Nariman Point today, it would also have also been a good example of cost-effective infrastructure management. What should have taken three years, took ten years and we are just half way there, says Jha, adding that lack of political will and clarity are the biggest deterrents to infrastructural \ The Bandra-Worli sea link is not only a money-guzzling masterpiece, but also a nightmare from the traffic management perspective. The routine traffic jams at Worli, Haji Ali and Peddar Road are a testimony to the sea-links inefficacy. Unless it goes all the way to Nariman Point, the sea link will be more of a problem than a solution, says former-DGP and traffic management expert Dr PS Pasricha. Be it the western carriageway from Bandra to Nariman Point or the eastern carriageway from Sion to CST, there should be dedicated roads for the point-to-point traffic without passing it through the areas en route, he adds. The need of the hour is not only to create an effective, integrated transportation infrastructure thats a mesh of roads, railways, metros and mono-rails, but also to have a computerised traffic management system that will factor in every part of the network. As much as it is an example of how things can go wrong, the sea link is also a case-study for Mumbais future infrastructure projects. Ideally, politicians from all parties should come together and arrive at a consensus on what needs to be done for Mumbai. They should not review each others decisions and derail the development work, says Prabhu, who feels that the bureaucrats should leave the drawing of the blueprint and planning of the project to experts from the respective fields. Citing the example of the still-upcoming Mumbai Trans-Harbour Sea link (MTHS) from Sewri to Nhava Sheva, Jha says that a good 16 alternatives with all the pros and cons were explored way backin2000, before the final plan for the sea link was zeroed in on. Instead of reinventing the wheel, they should just set it rolling. Delays can derail projects and the political bosses should know that, remarks Jha. Meanwhile, the elected representatives have their own reasons to justify their involvement in execution of public projects. MLA Krishna Hegde, whose Vile Parle constituency is seeing a string of government projects being executed cites the case of the Sahar elevated road project, in which 1,400 families are being rehabilitated, Infrastructure doesnt happen in isolation, it involves people. And the electedrepresentatives are the voice of the people. I am not opposed to the expansion of the airport, but if poor people who have been staying here for 40 years are going to make way for five-star hotels and malls, then I have to oppose such plans, he says,

adding that politicians bring in the necessary checks-and-balances to any public work and their inputs can help the implementing agencies execute a project better. http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_less-than-50pcttargeted-traffic-bandra-worli-suffersshortfall-of-rs4-lakh-day_1548700 Update 11 Feb 2011 End of the road for Worli-Haji Ali sea link? MUMBAI: Many Mumbaiites with fast cars have been dreaming of more sea links to indulge their need for speed in the city of eternal snarl-ups. But less fortunate fellow citizens have been crying hoarse over the massive cost of such bridges and steep toll, instead demanding less spectacular but more utilitarian infrastructure. Lending them an ear, the government is mulling over scrapping the Worli-Haji Ali sea link project, work on which is scheduled to start on April 1. The proposed alternative is a coastal road along the stretch, which can be built with just Rs 500 crore compared to the sea links Rs 4,500 crore. The road may extend till Priyadarshini Park. We will study the technical and financial feasibility of the coastal road before April, said Bipin Shrimali, MD and vice chairman, Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC). We are looking into the legal aspect of whether the road can be built on reclaimed land. The new Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) rules specify that coastal roads should be built on stilts if there are mangroves. But the trees are not present along the Worli-Haji Ali stretch. Jaidutt Kshirsagar, minister for public works and chairman of the MSRDC, said the coastal road is being considered because of strong public opposition to the sea link project. A meeting with environment department officials and experts is slated soon. The contract for the sea link project is with Reliance Infrastructure (RInfra), which has already made a preliminary investment of Rs 200 crore. If the government decides in favour of the coastal road, it may either ask RInfra to lay it or invite tenders afresh. An RInfra official greeted the news sceptically, calling it a figment of imagination. Talk that our sea link project will be scrapped is baseless. The contract is in place; we do not wish to comment further. State environment secretary Valsa Nair Singh said that seeking clearances for the coastal road will be easy, since the new CRZ rules permit such roads, albeit with the stipulation that they be built on stilts to avoid damage to mangroves; clearance from the Union environment ministry will not be necessary. The CRZ panel and the state environment committee can clear the project after examining it. Welcoming the news, a transport expert and social activist, who lobbied against the Worli-Haji Ali sea link, said: Sea links do not ease life for the ordinary citizen. The companies building

them recover costs through steep toll. Who can afford to pay Rs 200 as toll? The sum is a likely rate. Read more: End of the road for Worli-Haji Ali sea link? The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/End-of-the-road-for-Worli-Haji-Ali-sealink/articleshow/7472194.cms#ixzz1Dd5ScwLe State wants coastal road, not sea links Zeeshan Shaikh, Hindustan Times Mumbai, February 11, 2011 Encouraged by the recent easing of Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) norms for Mumbai, the state government is considering scrapping the entire Versova-to-Nariman Point sea link project and building a coastal road along the stretch instead by reclaiming land. A coastal road, the state thinks, can be built at just one-third the cost of the sea link project, estimated at Rs 10,000 crore. The BandraWorli sea link was opened in 2009. The state had initially planned two more links Worli to Haji Ali and Haji Ali to Nariman Point but later decided to extend the link to Versova. But the new CRZ regulations, which allow construction of coastal roads by land reclamation or use of stilts, has made the state rethink because sea links are capital-intensive. At a meeting held on Monday, chief minister Prithviraj Chavan asked the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC) to check the feasibility of building a coastal road. We are evaluating the option of constructing a coastal road instead of capital-intensive sea links, MSRDC vice-chairman and managing director Bipin Shrimali said. MSRDC has now asked the environment department about the projects feasibility, he added. http://www.hindustantimes.com/State-wants-coastal-road-not-sea-links/Article1-660969.aspx

Pay more to drive on Bandra-Worli Sea Link from April 1 TNN, Jan 13, 2011, 01.54am IST MUMBAI: Motorists will have to shell out Rs 65 for a one-way journey on the Bandra-Worli Sea Link (BWSL) from April 1. The toll for a mini bus (12-seater) or goods vehicle will be Rs 100, Rs 25 more than the current charges, while for a truck or a bus the one-way toll will be Rs 130 as against the existing Rs 100. The hike has been mandated in a government notification, which states that the toll can be revised by the link operator, an official said. Reliance Infrastructure (RInfra), the new toll collector from April 1, will operate the link for the next 40 years. The company will offer 25% discount to regular commuters on monthly, daily or night passes. The new toll rates are implemented after every three years across all toll posts in the state though they increase by 3 per cent every year as the per governments notification. The contract of the existing toll collector__the Mumbai Entry Point Toll__ will end the moment Reliance achieves financial closure for building the next link between Worli and Haji Ali and starts the construction work. Interestingly, RInfra is all set to make an upfront payment of Rs 1,634 crore to MSRDC for buying the BWSL for a period of 40 years. During first 32 months of this period, RInfra has to construct the new sea link between Worli and Haji Ali (WHSL), with connectors at Worli and Haji Ali, and recover the total cost of maintaining the BWSL as well as constructing and maintaining the WHSL for 40 years by charging toll from commuters as stipulated in the government policy. According to MSRDC minister Jaidutta Kshirsagar, after the financial closure in March, RInfra will immediately start the construction work for WHSL and will take over the toll collection. Even though we have granted 32 months for construction work, the new link will ready before that, said a government official. Even RInfra sources were confident of completing the work before time. We will use advanced technologies to build the 3.8 km link with connectors. RInfra and its foreign collaboration have almost completed the survey and soil testing for the link,a source said. However, once the WHSL is completed, the one-way toll rate for each vehicle will go up by another minimum Rs 32 to Rs 50. This means by 2015, the one-way sea link toll could be minimum Rs 90 for a car, Rs 130 for a minibus and Rs 160 for a bus.

Read more: Pay more to drive on Bandra-Worli Sea Link from April 1 The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/Pay-more-to-drive-on-Bandra-Worli-Sea-Linkfrom-April-1/articleshow/7271970.cms#ixzz1AvZP0iXD All clear for Worli-Haji Ali Sea Link TNN, Jan 13, 2011, MUMBAI: The Union environment ministry on Wednesday sanctioned the construction of the Worli-Haji Ali Sea Link. If everything goes according to plans, work on the project will start by March and is expected to finish by 2014. Clearing the decks for the crucial link, the ministry gave the long-awaited green nod to the newly designed alignment of the sea links Haji Ali connector that will now land on Dr Annie Besant Road, 400 metres ahead of the dargah square. According to the initial plan, it was to land very close to the Haji Ali chowk. Significantly, the MoEF has also endorsed the location of the controversial Pratiksha building connector on Dr Abdul Gaffar Khan Road in Worli. The Centres nod will facilitate the state and Reliance Infrastructure to kick off work on the project as soon as possible. We expect RInfra to wrap up the work in 32 months as specified during awarding the project, said MSRDC Minister Jaidutta Kshirsagar. Clearance for the (Haji Ali) connector was a major hurdle in starting the construction work. The application was pending with the MoEF for more than a year now. Incidentally, the MoEF has already accorded environmental clearance to the entire western freeway sea link from Bandra to Nariman Point, an official said. The approved link will cost Rs 4,000 crore and the MSRDC will stand to make a profit of over Rs 240 crore, the official added. Now after taking the sea link from Bandra or Worli, the traffic will be able land ahead of Love Grove junction near Rajani Patel square on Dr Annie Besant road. As per government sources RInfra has promised the state to achieve the financial closure to start the construction work by March. During the closure RInfra is supposed to buy Bandra-Worli sea link (BWSL) by paying upfront Rs 1634 crore to the MSRDC. Similarly MSRDC has to pay Rs 1392 crore in three equal installments in the next three years as its share towards building Worli-Haji Ali Sea link (WHSL). So the net gain for MSRDC is around Rs 242 crore. The total cost of the new link is estimated to be around Rs 4000 crore. After the financial closure in March Reliance will also take over the toll collection which is set to increase from April 1 this year. Even though MSRDC had earlier planned to build the connector near Worli Dairy, the existing Worli connector near Pratiksha building is as per the original plan, the clearance stated. Read more: All clear for Worli-Haji Ali Sea Link The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/All-clear-for-Worli-Haji-Ali-SeaLink/articleshow/7271969.cms#ixzz1AvZeEusw

Update 28 Dec 10 Bandra-Worli sea link promenade (walkway) may be ready by March 2011 If the officials of the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC) are to be believed, the Bandra-Worli Sea Link will soon see a world-class promenade. However, sources said that DB Realty, the contractor for the work,has been facing problems during its construction in the Bandra reclamation area. Till about two years back the corporation was maintaining the garden in the reclamation along the approach way to the sea link. But it decided to outsource this area to a private player who could develop it into a promenade. Through tendering the contract was awarded to DB Realty. While the contractor struggled for over a year to take the work ahead, after much deliberation, the corporation decided to go ahead with the project. Subsequently, the work began a few months back; however, according to sources in the corporation, the contractor faced trouble due to poor quality of concrete which was used during the construction. A senior MSRDC official confirmed that the contractor had to re-dig the concreted area on more than one occasions. However, it should not bother the progress of the project. The contractor will be maintaining the promenade for a period of 15 years. So, he has his own commitment to follow. We have been assured that the entire 1.25km stretch will be ready by March-April next year. We are hopeful that the contractor would meet his deadline, said the official. Top officials of DB reality were not available for comment despite repeated attempts. The promenade promises to add to the beauty of the sea link. Among other things, an open air theatre, the seven island columns or the Saptdeep Stambh, Bollywood Celebrity Walk and Board Walk, Tower of Destiny or Sheesh Minar and an area for meditation as well as sitouts are parts of the promenade. The total area to be developed is 1.25km long and 40m wide. The corporation will get a lump sum amount of Rs7.8 crore for the contract. The contractor will also put up 25 plaques across the area as corporate social responsibility (CSR). Source: http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_bandra-worli-sea-link-promenade-may-beready-by-march-2011_1487021 Update 24 Dec 10

The 4.7-km stretch of Bandra-Worli Sea Link may be providing some respite to thousands of motorists plying on it. But even before the laying of a single brick, it seems like the next stretch of the sea link, taking it up to Haji Ali, is in for delays. While the official version seems to be that the delays are mainly due to the environmental clearance to the connector in Haji Ali, sources have told DNA that the consortium constructing the sea link has not been able to close in on their financial needs. The next phase of the sea link from Worli to Haji Ali is to be constructed on a private-public partnership basis and the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC) had awarded the contract to the consortium of Reliance Infrastructure and Hyundai Engineering more than two years back. A senior official of the corporation confirmed that the consortium is likely to ask for an extension of three months to declare their financial preparedness. The banks which are to lend money to the consortium have been asking for all the clearances on paper. However, we are yet to get the final nod for the Worli connector from the central government (Ministry of Environment and Forests). Since this is going to take some time, the consortium is likely to be given an extension of three months for declaring financial preparedness, said the official. However, sources in the corporation have told DNA that though, on the face of it, the environmental clearance has been given as a reason, the real cause of delay is because the consortium has not been able to raise the required funds. There has been no progress over the final designs. This can only be done after the financial soundness is declared. It is ironic that it is going to cause delays, said a source. When asked about the development, a Reliance Infrastructure spokesperson confirmed that an extension has been asked for. There are various project prerequisites being worked out between MSRDC and Reliance. The project prerequisites are extremely critical for commencement of the project as well as for its successful implementation. RInfra has completed all necessary activities with the project lenders and they are ready to fund the project in its entirety. The extension of time has been sought in consultation with MSRDC, said the spokesperson. The consortium needs to pay Rs1,634 crore to MSRDC and buy out the existing sea link. Once that is done, the consortium will construct and maintain the stretch between Bandra and Haji Ali for a period of minimum 40 years. Source: http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report_bandra-worli-sea-link-s-2nd-stretch-may-facedelay_1485366

Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandra%E2%80%93Worli_Sea_Link Bandra-Worli Sealinks The BandraWorli Sea Link (BWSL) , officially the Rajiv Gandhi Sea Link, is a cablestayed bridge with pre-stressed concrete viaduct approaches, which links Bandra and the western suburbs of Mumbai with Worli and central Mumbai, and is the first phase of the proposed West Island Freeway system. The 1,600 crore (US$353.6 million) project of Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation (MSRDC) was executed by Hindustan Construction Company, with design and project management by DAR Consultants. The bridge was dedicated to the public on 30 June 2009 by Congress President and UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, although only 4 of 8 lanes were opened to service. All the 8 lanes were opened to traffic on 24 March 2010. The Sea Link reduces travel time between Bandra and Worli from 4560 minutes to 7 minutes. The link has an average daily traffic of around 37,500 vehicles per day, about half the preopening estimate of 70,000. The BWSL project is a part of the Western Freeway Sea Project, which, in turn, is a part of a larger proposal to upgrade the road transportation network of greater Mumbai. It is primarily meant to provide an alternative to the Mahim Causeway route that is presently the only connection between South Mumbai and the Western and Central suburbs. The project starts from the intersection of Western Express Highway and SV Road at the Bandra end, and connects it to Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan Road (Worli Seaface) at the Worli end which in turn connects to Mumbais arterial Annie Besant Road at the Narayan Pujari Nagar corner. The MSRDC is planning to open the remaining four lanes of the sea link by March 2010.

The project has been commissioned by the Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Ltd (MSRDC), designed by DAR Consultants and is being built by Hindustan Construction Company (HCC).

Pic Source: http://bandraworlisealink.com/map.html

Maharashtra State Road Development Corporation Limited Highlights The cost of the Bandra-Worli Sea Link Project originally (July 1999) estimated at Rs.665.8 crore was revised (August 2004) toRs.1,306.25 crore. Though Packages-I, II and III i.e . flyover at Worli,Mahim Intersection, Solid approach road up to the start of toll plaza anda public promenade were completed (February 2003), the crucialPackage-IV i.e. the main cable stayed bridge across the sea was delayed.The increase in project cost was mainly due to payments of escalation(Rs.213 crore) to Contractors on account of inordinate delay incompletion (61 months), introduction of new technical changes in thebridge at the behest of the new Consultant (Rs.70 crore), provision foradditional claims made by the Contractor for delay in award of work etc .(Rs.125 crore) and increase in interest liability due to delayed completion(Rs.230 crore). (Paragraphs 2.1.8 and 2.1.14) Though the project was originally expected to be completed byMarch 2003, the expected date of completion is now stated to beApril 2008. Expenditure of Rs.683.75 crore had been incurred on theproject as on 30 June 2007. The delay was mainly due to technicalchanges brought in by new Consultants during execution. (Paragraphs 2.1.8 and 2.1.13) Against a commitment of Rs.580 crore by way of grants, the StateGovernment had provided only Rs.100 crore till June 2007. This forcedthe Company to borrow funds resulting in additional annual financialburden of Rs.37.05 crore on the project. (Paragraph 2.1.10) Chapter-II2. Performance reviews relating to Government companies 2.1 Bandra-Worli Sea Link Project Chapter-II-Performance reviews relating to Government companies 19The Company is headed by the Chairman who is the Ex-officio Minister for Public Works Department (Special projects). The day to day management ishandled by the Vice Chairman and Managing Director who is assisted by theJoint Managing Directors, Chief Engineers and the Secretary and FinancialAdvisor. 2.1.2 The performance audit review, conducted during January-March 2007,covers the performance of the Company pertaining to project planning andfinancing, award of consultancy contracts,

construction contracts andexecution of works in all the four packages of the BWSL project up toMarch 2007. The project is in progress and the projected date of completion isApril 2008.Some of the Audit observations relating to this project noticed earlier duringaudit are contained in Audit Reports (Commercial) for the years 2003-04 and2005-06. 2.1.3 The audit objectives of the performance review were to ascertainwhether the: project was identified after detailed study as regards necessity/economicviability; management took up the work after detailed planning of the project; consultant/contractors selected were technically competent and the processof selection was transparent and fair; project was executed keeping in view the principles of efficiency, economyand effectiveness; and monitoring of the project was adequate and effective. 2.1.4 The following audit criteria were adopted: Traffic and feasibility study including the necessity and viability of the project as conducted by the Company; Requirements of necessary statutory approvals/permissions, project design, project estimates; Scope of AuditAudit objectiveAudit criteria Audit Report (Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 2007 24Company itself has been charging higher rates # towards interest duringconstruction (IDC) in its books of accounts. The State Government had guaranteed the loans raised by the Company for the project at a commission of 0.25 per cent per annum in the year 2000,which was, however, subsequently increased to one per cent

per annum in2004. The increased rate of guarantee commission, which has been provided for by the Company has an impact of Rs.3.69 crore per annum inrespect of guarantee commission payable by the Company for bonds of Rs.492 crore raised for the project. This resulted in further escalation in the project cost.The Management stated (August 2007) that it has not been making payment of guarantee commission at one per cent and that the provision is being made inthe accounts as an abundant caution. The reply is not tenable, as there is aspecific provision in the GR (August 2004) for payment of guaranteecommission, which has not been waived so far (August 2007). The projection that the bridge will be self-earning i.e. toll collection bySeptember 2007 is also not attainable, as the completion would be atleaststretched to 2011 as assessed (May 2006) by the engineer/consultantconsidering the slow rate of progress of work. Thus, the project has alreadylost potential toll revenue of Rs.80 crore per annum. This postponement of the toll revenue is bound to extend the projected debt service period well beyond 2019 with reduced IRR.The Management stated (August 2007) that given the Government support andconsidering a concession period of 30 years the project could be viable. Thereply is, however, not based on facts, as the inordinate delay in completion of project, additional interest burden and postponement of the revenue, therepayment period will extend beyond 2019 and unless there is a substantialhike in toll rates the IRR is also likely to be lower than projected. The replywas silent about the future increase in cost of repair and maintenance andother overhead costs. The Western Freeway between Bandra and Nariman Point is an importantlink of this project. The additional traffic assumed by 2010 is not likely to be achieved as the preliminary work of finalising tenders for WesternFreeway was taken up only in 2007 and hence the likely completion dates by 2010 are visibly unachievable. All these developments would upset thetoll revenue projected between 2010 and 2019 and further extend the periodof repayment beyond 2019, thus, rendering the project financially unviable. # For the year 2002-03 14.49 per cent ; 2003-04 13.53 per cent ; 2004-05 11.64 per cent and 2005-06 12.42 per cent . Increase in theguaranteecommission byStateGovernmentresulted inadditionalexpenditure of Rs.3.69 crore perannum.

Audit Report (Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 2007 24Company itself has been charging higher rates # towards interest duringconstruction (IDC) in its books of accounts. The State Government had guaranteed the loans raised by the Company for the project at a commission of 0.25 per cent per annum in the year 2000,which was, however, subsequently increased to one per cent per annum in2004. The increased rate of guarantee commission, which has been provided for by the Company has an impact of Rs.3.69 crore per annum inrespect of guarantee commission payable by the Company for bonds of Rs.492 crore raised for the project. This resulted in further escalation in the project cost.The Management stated (August 2007) that it has not been making payment of guarantee commission at one per cent and that the provision is being made inthe accounts as an abundant caution. The reply is not tenable, as there is aspecific provision in the GR (August 2004) for payment of guaranteecommission, which has not been waived so far (August 2007). The projection that the bridge will be self-earning i.e. toll collection bySeptember 2007 is also not attainable, as the completion would be atleaststretched to 2011 as assessed (May 2006) by the engineer/consultantconsidering the slow rate of progress of work. Thus, the project has alreadylost potential toll revenue of Rs.80 crore per annum. This postponement of the toll revenue is bound to extend the projected debt service period well beyond 2019 with reduced IRR.The Management stated (August 2007) that given the Government support andconsidering a concession period of 30 years the project could be viable. Thereply is, however, not based on facts, as the inordinate delay in completion of project, additional interest burden and postponement of the revenue, therepayment period will extend beyond 2019 and unless there is a substantialhike in toll rates the IRR is also likely to be lower than projected. The replywas silent about the future increase in cost of repair and maintenance andother overhead costs. The Western Freeway between Bandra and Nariman Point is an importantlink of this project. The additional traffic assumed by 2010 is not likely to be achieved as the preliminary work of finalising tenders for WesternFreeway was taken up only in 2007 and hence the likely completion dates by 2010 are visibly unachievable. All these developments would upset thetoll revenue projected between 2010 and 2019 and further extend the periodof repayment beyond 2019, thus, rendering the project financially unviable. # For the year 2002-03 14.49

per cent ; 2003-04 13.53 per cent ; 2004-05 11.64 per cent and 2005-06 12.42 per cent . Increase in theguaranteecommission byStateGovernmentresulted inadditionalexpenditure of Rs.3.69 crore perannum.

Chapter-II-Performance reviews relating to Government companies 25 2.1.11 The BWSLP is an ecologically sensitive project and involvesreclamation of land. The Company obtained (January 1999) the firstenvironmental clearance of the project from the Union Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), which inter alia stated that reclamationshould be kept to bare minimum i.e. not exceeding 4.7 hectare. The Companyresorted to further reclamation of land without ensuring that there were validenvironmental approvals. The MoEF sought (December 1999) explanationfrom the Company construing the same as violation of Coastal RegulationZone notification. On filing a fresh request (March 2000), approval(April 2000) for reclamation of total land of 27 hectare was given by MoEF. Itwas observed that, the Company made no provision in the project cost for contingencies, which may arise due to environmental disturbances.As per the opinion of some experts, $ the reclamation of land at project areawould upset the flow of effluents and floodwaters into the Arabian Sea due to pressure exerted at the mouth of the Mahim creek. This would also result in blocking up of Mithi River and cause inordinate flooding in adjacent areas. Itwas observed that the Company had not addressed these environmental issuesas well as the likely financial implications. 2.1.12 The entire project was originally conceived as one large project withdifferent components combined together but in order to accelerate the overallconstruction schedule, the project was divided into five construction packages.Package-I: Construction of flyover over Love Grove Junction at Worli(commissioned in March 2002).Package-II: Construction of cloverleaf interchange at Mahim intersection(commissioned in February 2003); Package- III: Construction of solid approach road from the Mahim intersectionup to the start of the Toll Plaza on the Bandra side and a public promenade(commissioned in February

2003);Package-IV: Construction of cable stayed Bridges at Bandra and Worlitogether with viaduct approaches extending from Worli up to Toll Plaza,Intelligent Bridge System (estimated to be commissioned by April 2008); andPackage-V: Improvement to KAGK Road has not been taken up by theCompany (August 2007). It is informed that this work is being shifted toPhase II. i.e . WFSLP. $ Indian Peoples Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights in their report (July 2001) onAn Enquiry into Bandra-Worli Sea Link Project. Environmental clearanceProject overview Chapter-II-Performance reviews relating to Government companies 25 2.1.11 The BWSLP is an ecologically sensitive project and involvesreclamation of land. The Company obtained (January 1999) the firstenvironmental clearance of the project from the Union Ministry of Environment and Forest (MoEF), which inter alia stated that reclamationshould be kept to bare minimum i.e. not exceeding 4.7 hectare. The Companyresorted to further reclamation of land without ensuring that there were validenvironmental approvals. The MoEF sought (December 1999) explanationfrom the Company construing the same as violation of Coastal RegulationZone notification. On filing a fresh request (March 2000), approval(April 2000) for reclamation of total land of 27 hectare was given by MoEF. Itwas observed that, the Company made no provision in the project cost for contingencies, which may arise due to environmental disturbances.As per the opinion of some experts, $ the reclamation of land at project areawould upset the flow of effluents and floodwaters into the Arabian Sea due to pressure exerted at the mouth of the Mahim creek. This would also result in blocking up of Mithi River and cause inordinate flooding in adjacent areas. Itwas observed that the Company had not addressed these environmental issuesas well as the likely financial implications. 2.1.12 The entire project was originally conceived as one large project withdifferent components combined together but in order to accelerate the overallconstruction schedule, the project was divided into five construction packages.Package-I: Construction of flyover over Love Grove Junction at Worli(commissioned in March 2002).Package-II: Construction of cloverleaf interchange at Mahim intersection(commissioned in February 2003);

Package- III: Construction of solid approach road from the Mahim intersectionup to the start of the Toll Plaza on the Bandra side and a public promenade(commissioned in February 2003);Package-IV: Construction of cable stayed Bridges at Bandra and Worlitogether with viaduct approaches extending from Worli up to Toll Plaza,Intelligent Bridge System (estimated to be commissioned by April 2008); andPackage-V: Improvement to KAGK Road has not been taken up by theCompany (August 2007). It is informed that this work is being shifted toPhase II. i.e . WFSLP. $ Indian Peoples Tribunal on Environment and Human Rights in their report (July 2001) onAn Enquiry into Bandra-Worli Sea Link Project. Environmental clearanceProject .. overview Audit Report (Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 2007 26The operation and execution of these packages are discussed in the succeeding paras: 2.1.13 The project was originally slated to start in October 2000 for completion by March 2003. Due to technical changes made in Package-IV, thecompletion date was however revised to April 2008. Considering the slow progress of Package-IV work (38.35 per cent completed as on June 2007), the project is not likely to be completed before 2011 as assessed (May 2006) bythe Consultant/Engineer. The delays were noticed earlier too in execution of Packages-I to III but they were completed before the construction of crucialmain bridge (Package-IV). The various reasons for such inordinate delay incompletion of Package-IV were analysed in audit and the deficiencies noticedare discussed below: As per condition of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) (July 1999), theresponsibility for setting up of the casting yard on identified land and jettyrested entirely with the Contractor. Though the land was made available(September 2000) to the Contractors for casting yard, the Contractors, incontravention of NIT chose an alternative site for casting yard elsewhere,which could be made available to them only after five months, thus,adversely contributing towards delaying the completion of Package-IVworks.The Management stated (August 2007) that it was necessary for thecontractors to locate the casting yard close to the jetty. The reply shows that project report and NIT was not framed with care and resulted in avoidabledelay in completion of project on this account by five months. As against the projected requirement of 27 hectares of land reclamation for approach road, the original approval obtained by the Company(January 1999) from the MoEF was for 4.7 hectares only. However, theCompany went ahead with the reclamation of land in excess without

anexpress approval of MoEF. Due to protests from the environmental groups,the State Government stayed (January 2000) the execution of work till suchtime the Company obtained MoEF approval. The approval could, however, be obtained only in April 2000. This resulted in stoppage of work for 105 days for which extension was given to the Contractor.The Management stated (August 2007) that it was constrained to take up the burden of filling low lying areas in the interest of environmental preservation.The reply is not tenable. As per codal provisions clear title to land is necessary before award of work so as to avoid delays. Dar Consultants (second Consultant) proposal (January 2003) of twintowers with two four-lanes each and conversion of the approved Arch Time overrun of the project Absence of MoEF clearance,frequenttechnical changesand impropermonitoring of thework byconsultantsresulted in delay. Audit Report (Commercial) for the year ended 31 March 2007 26The operation and execution of these packages are discussed in the succeeding paras: 2.1.13 The project was originally slated to start in October 2000 for completion by March 2003. Due to technical changes made in Package-IV, thecompletion date was however revised to April 2008. Considering the slow progress of Package-IV work (38.35 per cent completed as on June 2007), the project is not likely to be completed before 2011 as assessed (May 2006) bythe Consultant/Engineer. The delays were noticed earlier too in execution of Packages-I to III but they were completed before the construction of crucialmain bridge (Package-IV). The various reasons for such inordinate delay incompletion of Package-IV were analysed in audit and the deficiencies noticedare discussed below: As per condition of Notice Inviting Tender (NIT) (July 1999), theresponsibility for setting up of the casting yard on identified land and jettyrested entirely with the Contractor. Though the land was made available(September 2000) to the Contractors for casting yard, the Contractors, incontravention of NIT chose an alternative site for casting yard elsewhere,which could be made available to them only after five months, thus,adversely contributing towards delaying the completion of Package-IVworks.The Management stated (August 2007) that it was necessary for thecontractors to locate the casting yard close to the jetty. The reply shows that project report and NIT was not framed with care and resulted in avoidabledelay in completion of project on this account by five months. As against the projected requirement of 27 hectares of land reclamation for approach road, the original approval obtained by the Company(January 1999) from the MoEF was for 4.7 hectares only. However, theCompany went ahead with the reclamation of land in excess without anexpress approval of MoEF. Due to protests from the environmental groups,the State Government stayed (January 2000) the execution of work till suchtime the Company obtained

MoEF approval. The approval could, however, be obtained only in April 2000. This resulted in stoppage of work for 105 days for which extension was given to the Contractor.The Management stated (August 2007) that it was constrained to take up the burden of filling low lying areas in the interest of environmental preservation.The reply is not tenable. As per codal provisions clear title to land is necessary before award of work so as to avoid delays. Dar Consultants (second Consultant) proposal (January 2003) of twintowers with two four-lanes each and conversion of the approved Arch Time overrun of the project Absence of MoEF clearance,frequenttechnical changesand impropermonitoring of thework byconsultantsresulted in delay.

WHAT WERE CHALLENGES FACE DURING THE CONSTRUCTION OF BANDRA WARLI SEA LINK?