IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS (IRR) OF REPUBLIC ACT NO.

9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002 THESE RULES AND REGULATIONS ARE HEREBY PROMULGATED TO IMPLEMENT THE PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF2002. SECTION 1. This IRR, issued and promulgated pursuant to Section 94 of RA 9165, shall be referred to as the "COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS RULES OF 2002." SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the policy of the State to safeguard the integrity of its territory and the well-being of its citizenry particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs on their physical and mental well-being, and to defend the same against acts or omissions detrimental to their development and preservation. In view of the foregoing, the State needs to enhance further the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs, it being one of todays more serious social ills. Toward this end, the government shall pursue an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs and other similar substances through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects. The government shall, however, aim to achieve a balance in the national drug control program so that people with legitimate medical needs are not prevented from being treated with adequate amounts of appropriate medications, which include the use of dangerous drugs. It is further declared the policy of the State to provide effective mechanisms or measures to reintegrate into society individuals who have fallen victims to drug abuse or dangerous drug dependence through sustainable programs of treatment and rehabilitation. ARTICLE I DEFINITION OF TERMS SECTION 3. Definitions. ARTICLE II UNLAWFUL ACTS AND PENALTIES SECTION 4. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. SECTION 5. Sale, Trading,Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or

shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos(P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions. I f the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case. For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case. If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed. The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a financier of any of the illegal activities p rescribed in this Section. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a protector/coddler of any violator of the provisions under this Section.

SECTION 6. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos(P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used or sold in any form. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person or group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive, or resort where any controlled precursor and essential chemical is used or sold in any form. The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed in every case where any dangerous drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such a place. Should any dangerous drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the penalty of death and a fine ranging from One million (P1,000,000.00) to Fifteen million pesos (P15,000,000.00) shall be imposed on the maintainer, owner and/or operator. If

such den, dive or resort is owned by a third person, the same shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government: Provided, that the criminal complaint shall specifically allege that such place is intentionally used in the furtherance of the crime; Provided, further, that the prosecution shall prove such intent on the part of the owner to use the property for such purpose; Provided, finally, that the owner shall be included as an accused in the criminal complaint. The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a financier of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a protector/coddler of any violator of the provisions under this Section.

SECTION 7. Employees and Visitors of a Den, Dive or Resort. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon: (a) Any employee of den, dive or resort, who is aware of the nature of the place as such; and (b) Any person who, not being included in the provisions of the next preceding paragraph, is aware of the nature of the place as such and shall knowingly visit the same. SECTION 8. Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who unless authorized by law, shall engage in the manufacture of any dangerous drug. The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who unless authorized by law, shall manufacture any controlled precursor and essential chemical. The presence of any controlled precursor and essential chemical or laboratory equipment in the clandestine laboratory is a prima facie proof of manufacture of any dangerous drug. It shall be considered an aggravating circumstance if the clandestine laboratory is undertaken or established under the following circumstances: (a) Any phase of the manufacturing process was conducted in the presence or with the help of minor/s; (b) Any phase or manufacturing process was established or undertaken within one hundred (100) meters of a residential, business, church or school premises;

(c) Any clandestine laboratory was secured or protected with booby traps; (d) Any clandestine laboratory was concealed with legitimate business operations; or (e) Any employment of a practitioner, chemical engineer, public official or foreigner. The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who organizes, manages or acts as a financier of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a protector/coddler of any violator of the provisions under this Section.

SECTION 9. Illegal Chemical Diversion of Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. SECTION 10. Manufacture or Delivery of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals SECTION 11. Possession of DangerousDrugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof: (a) 10 grams or more of opium; (b) 10 grams or more of morphine; (c) 10 grams or more of heroin; (d) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; (e) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu; (f) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil; (g) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and (h) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or ecstasy, paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA), trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and promulgated by the Board in accordance with Section 93, Article XI of the Act. Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows: (1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams; (2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1)

day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or ecstasy, PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and (3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), i f the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or ecstasy, PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of marijuana.

SECTION 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body: Provided, that in the case of medical practitioners and various professionals who are required to carry such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their profession, the Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof. The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for any of the purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked, consumed, administered to himself/herself, injected, ingested or used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to have violated Section 15 of the Act. SECTION 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. - Any person found possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum penalties provided for in Section 11 of the Act, regardless of the quantity and purity of such dangerous drugs. The phrase "company of at least two (2) persons" shall mean the accused or suspect plus at least two (2) others, who may or may not be in

possession of any dangerous drug. SECTION 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. - The maximum penalty provided for in Section 12 of the Act shall be imposed upon any person, who shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body, during parties, social gatherings or meetings, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons. The phrase "company of at least two (2) persons" shall mean the accused or suspect plus at least two (2) others, who may or may not be in possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs.

SECTION 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. - A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provision of Article VIII of the Act. If apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, that this Section shall not be applicable where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of the Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply. SECTION 16. Cultivation or Culture of Plants Classified as Dangerous Drugs or are Sources Thereof. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who shall plant, cultivate or culture marijuana, opium poppy or any other plant regardless quantity, which is or may hereafter be classified as a dangerous drug or as a source from which any dangerous drug may be manufactured or derived: Provided, that in the case of medical laboratories and medical research centers which cultivate or culture marijuana, opium poppy and other plants, or materials of such dangerous drugs for medical experiments and research purposes, or for the creation of new types of medicine, the Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines for the proper cultivation, culture, handling, experimentation and disposal of such plants and materials. The land or portions thereof and/or greenhouses on which any of said plant is cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the State, unless the owner thereof can prove lack of knowledge of such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of due diligence on his/her part. If the land

involved is part of the public domain, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon the offender. The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who organizes, manages or acts as a financier of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section. The penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who acts as a protector/coddler of any violator of the provisions under this Section. SECTION 17. Maintenance and Keeping of Original Records of Transactions on Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. SECTION 18. Unnecessary Prescription of Dangerous Drugs. SECTION 19. Unlawful Prescription of Dangerous Drugs. SECTION 20. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution, transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, the cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of the Act. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the court shall immediately schedule a hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, that if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture . During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodia legis and no bond shall be admitted for the release of the same. The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property pending disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above expenses shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs.

SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered,for proper disposition in the following manner: (a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items; (b) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/ paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination; (c) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, that when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, that a final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours; (d) After the filing of the criminal case, the court shall, within seventy-two (72) hours, conduct an ocular inspection of the confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, including the instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, and through the PDEA shall, within twenty- four (24) hours thereafter, proceed with the destruction or burning of the same, in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, civil society groups

and any elected public official. The Board shall draw up the guidelines on the manner of proper disposition and destruction of such item/s which shall be borne by the offender: Provided, that those item/s of lawful commerce, as determined by the Board, shall be donated, used or recycled for legitimate purposes; Provided, further, that a representative sample, duly weighed and recorded is retained; (e) The Board shall then issue a sworn certification as to the fact of destruction or burning of the subject item/s which, together with the representative sample/s in the custody of the PDEA, shall be submitted to the court having jurisdiction over the case. In cases of seizures where no person is apprehended and no criminal case is filed, the PDEA may order the immediate destruction or burning of seized dangerous drugs and controlled precursors and essential chemicals under guidelines set by the Board. In all instances, the representative sample/s shall be kept to a minimum quantity as determined by the Board; (f) The alleged offender or his/her representative or counsel shall be allowed to personally observe all of the above proceedings and his/her presence shall not constitute an admission of guilt. In case the said offender or accused refuses or fails to appoint a representative after due notice in writing to the accused or his/her counsel within seventy-two (72) hours before the actual burning or destruction of the evidence in question, the Secretary of Justice shall appoint a member of the public attorneys office to represent the former;(g) After the promulgation and judgment in the criminal case wherein the representative sample/s was presented as evidence in court, the trial prosecutor shall inform the Board of the final termination of the case and, in turn, shall request the court for leave to turn over the said representative sample/s to the PDEA for proper disposition and destruction within twenty four(24) hours from receipt of the same; and (h) Transitory Provision: h.1) Within twenty-four (24) hours from the effectivity of the Act, dangerous drugs defined herein which are presently in possession of law enforcement agencies shall, with leave of court, be burned or destroyed, in the presence of representatives of the court, DOJ, Department of Health (DOH) and the accused and/or his/her counsel; and h.2) Pending the organization of the PDEA, the custody, disposition, and burning or destruction of seized/surrendered dangerous drugs provided under this Section shall be implemented by the DOH. In the meantime that the PDEA has no forensic laboratories and/or evidence rooms, as well as the necessary personnel of its own in any area of its jurisdiction, the existing National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and Philippine National Police (PNP) forensic laboratories shall continue to examine or conduct screening and confirmatory tests on the seized/surrendered evidence whether these be dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments, paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment; and the NBI and the PNP shall continue to have custody of such evidence for use in court and until disposed of, burned or destroyed in accordance with the foregoing rules: Provided, that pending appointment/designation of the full complement of the

representatives from the media, DOJ, or elected public official, the inventory of the said evidence shall continue to be conducted by the arresting NBI and PNP operatives under their existing procedures unless otherwise directed in writing by the DOH or PDEA, as the case may be.

SECTION 22. Grant of Compensation, Reward and Award. Compensation, reward and award shall, upon the recommendation of the Board, be granted to any person providing information and to law enforcers participating in the operation, which results in the successful confiscation, seizure or surrender of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals, subject to the compensation, reward and award system promulgated by the Board. SECTION 23. Plea-Bargaining Provision. -Any person charged under any provision of the Act regardless of the imposable penalty shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea-bargaining. SECTION 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug Traffickers and Pushers.- Any person convicted of drug trafficking or pushing under the Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the court, cannot avail of the privilege granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended. SECTION 25. Qualifying Aggravating Circumstances in the Commission of a Crime by an Offender Under the Influence of Dangerous Drugs. Notwithstanding the provisions of any law to the contrary, a positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs shall be a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the commission of a crime by an offender, and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code shall be applicable. Positive finding refers to the result of confirmatory test. SECTION 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same provided under the Act: (a) Importation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical; (b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical; (c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used in any form; (d) Manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical; and (e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs.

SECTION 27. Criminal Liability of a Public Officer or Employee for Misappropriation, Misapplication or Failure to Account for the Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment Including the Proceeds or Properties Obtained from the Unlawful Act Committed. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00), in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who misappropriates, misapplies or fails to account for confiscated, seized or surrendered dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment including the proceeds or properties obtained from the unlawful acts as provided for in the Act. Any elective local or national official found to have benefited from the proceeds of the trafficking of dangerous drugs as prescribed in the Act, or have received any financial or material contributions or donations from natural or juridical persons found guilty of trafficking dangerous drugs as prescribed in the Act, shall be removed from office and perpetually disqualified from holding any elective or appointive positions in the government, its divisions, subdivisions, and intermediaries, including government-owned or - controlled corporations.

SECTION 28. Criminal Liability of Government Officials and Employees . The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in the Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees. SECTION 29. Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence . - Any person who is found guilty of planting any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty of death. SECTION 30. Criminal Liability of Officers of Partnerships, Corporations, Associations or Other Juridical Entities. SECTION 31. Additional Penalty if Offender is an Alien. SECTION 32. Liability of a Person Violating Any Regulation Issued by the Board. -

SECTION 33. Immunity from Prosecutionand Punishment. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 19, Article II of the Act, who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13 and 16, Article II of the Act, as well as any commission of the offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts, identities and arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies against such person as described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her information and testimony were given , and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided, that the following conditions concur: (a) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the persons described above; (b) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State; (c) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points; (d) The informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, except when there is no other direct evidence available for the State other than the information and testimony of said informant or witness; and (e) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay, any condition or undertaking, reduced into writing, lawfully imposed by the State as further consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution and punishment. Provided, further, that this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness who does not appear to be most guilty for the offense with reference to which his/her information or testimony were given; Provided, finally, that there is no direct evidence available for the State except for the information and testimony of the said informant or witness. SECTION 34. Termination of the Grant of Immunity. - The immunity granted to the informant or witness, as prescribed in Section 33 of the Act, shall not attach should it turn out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false, malicious or made only for the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the persons described in the preceding Section against whom such information or testimony is directed. In such case, the informant or witness shall be subject to prosecution and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously accorded him under the Act or any other law, decree or order shall be deemed terminated. In case an informant or witness under the Act fails or refuses to testify without just cause, and when lawfully obliged to do so, or should he/she violate any condition accompanying such immunity as provided above, his/her immunity shall be removed and he/she shall likewise be subject to contempt and/or criminal prosecution, as the case may be, and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously accorded him under the Act

or in any other law, decree or order shall be deemed terminated. In case the informant or witness referred to under the Act falls under the applicability of this Section hereof, such individual cannot avail of the provisions under Article VIII of the Act. SECTION 35. Accessory Penalties. A person convicted under the Act shall be disqualified to exercise his/her civil rights such as, but not limited to, the rights of parental authority or guardianship, either as to the person or property of any ward, the rights to dispose of such property by any act or any conveyance inter vivos, and political rights such as, but not limited to, the right to vote and be voted for. Such rights shall also be suspended during the pendency of an appeal from such conviction.

ARTICLE III - DANGEROUS DRUGS TEST AND RECORD REQUIREMENTS SECTION 36. Authorized Drug Testing. Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratory or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of test results. The DOH shall take steps in setting the price of the drug test with DOH accredited drug testing centers to further reduce the cost of such drug test. The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of the drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. Drug test certificates issued by accredited drug testing centers shall be valid for a one year period from the date of issue which may be used for other purposes. The following shall undergo drug testing: (a) Applicants for drivers license. - No drivers license shall be issued or renewed to any person unless he/she presents a certification that he/she has undergone a mandatory drug test and indicating thereon that he/she is free from the use of dangerous drugs: Provided, that the Land Transportation Office shall see to it that no driver's license is issued without a drug test certificate indicating that the applicant is drug-free; Provided, further, that all drug testing expenses will be borne by these licensees; (b) Applicants for firearms license and for permit to carry firearms outside of residence. All applicants for firearms license and permit to carry firearms outside of residence shall undergo a mandatory drug test to ensure that they are free from the use of dangerous drugs: Provided, that all persons who by the nature of their profession carry firearms shall undergo drug testing; Provided, further, that the Philippine National Police shall ensure that no firearm's license or permit is issued without a drug test certificate indicating that the applicant is drug-free; Provided, finally, that all drug testing expenses will be borne by said licensees and permits; (c) Students of tertiary and secondary schools. - Students of tertiary and secondary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a

random drug testing: Provided, that all drug testing expenses whether in public or private schools under this Section will be borne by the government; Provided, further, that the Department of Education and the Commission on Higher Education, as the case may be, shall see to it that this provision is implemented; (d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall undergo a random drug test as contained in the companys work rules and regulations, which shall be borne by the employer, for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law: Provided, that the Department of Labor and Employment and the Civil Service Commission, as the case may be, shall see to it that this provision is implemented; (e) Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies. - Officers and members of the military, police and other law enforcement agencies shall undergo an annual mandatory drug test: Provided, that the respective heads of these agencies shall see to it that this provision is implemented;

DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL (GR No. 157870, Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, November 3, 2008) (f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall have to undergo a mandatory drug test: Provided, that the National Prosecution Office shall see to it that this provision is implemented by requiring the apprehending unit to have the persons charged drug-tested; Provided, further, that all drug testing expenditures will be borne by the government, subject to the guidelines to be issued by the Board; And ( g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo mandatory drug test: Provided, that the Commission on Elections and the Civil Service Commission, as the case may be, shall see to it that this provision is implemented; Provided, further, that the concerned candidates will bear all the drug testing expenditures . In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drug use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of the Act. The DOH shall be the sole drug-testing licensing/accrediting body of the government to the exclusion of all other agencies. It shall be responsible for setting the standards and guidelines of operations of these facilities, as well as the monitoring of the implementations thereof. SECTION 37. Issuance of False or Fraudulent Drug Test Results. Any person authorized, licensed or accredited under the Act and its implementing rules and to conduct drug examination or test, who issues false or fraudulent drug test results

knowingly, willfully or through gross negligence, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00). An additional penalty shall be imposed through the revocation of the license to practice his/her profession in case of a practitioner, and the closure of the drug testing center. SECTION 38. Laboratory Examination or Test on Apprehended/Arrested Offenders - Subject to Section 15 of the Act, any person apprehended or arrested for violating the provisions of the Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within twenty-four (24) hours, if the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable ground to believe that the person apprehended or arrested, on account of physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward manifestation, is under the influence of dangerous drugs. If found to be positive, the results of the screening laboratory examination or test shall be challenged within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in any accredited analytical laboratory equipped with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry equipment or some such modern and accepted method, and if confirmed, the same shall be prima facie evidence that such person has used dangerous drugs, which is without prejudice for the prosecution for other violations of the provisions of the Act: Provided, that a positive screening laboratory test must be confirmed for it to be valid in court of law. SECTION 39. Accreditation of Drug Testing Centers and Physicians. SECTION 40. Records Required for Transactions on Dangerous Drugs and Precursors and Essential Chemicals. ARTICLE IV PARTICIPATION OF THE FAMILY,STUDENTS, TEACHERS AND SCHOOL AUTHORITIES IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT SECTION 41. Involvement of the Family. SECTION 42. Student Councils and Campus Organizations. SECTION 43. School Curricula. -

SECTION 44. Heads, Supervisors, and Teachers of Schools. - For the purpose of enforcing the provisions of Article II of the Act, all school heads, supervisors and teachers shall be deemed persons in authority and, as such, are hereby empowered to apprehend, arrest or cause the apprehension or arrest of any person who shall violate any of the said provisions, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. They shall be deemed persons in authority if they are in the school or within its immediate vicinity, or even beyond such immediate vicinity if they are in attendance at any school or class function in their official capacity as school heads, supervisors, and teachers. Any teacher or school employee, who discovers or finds that any person in the school or within its immediate vicinity is liable for violating any of said provisions, shall have the duty to report the same to the school head or immediate superior who shall, in turn, report the matter to the proper authorities. Failure to do so

in either case, within a reasonable period from the time of discovery of the violation shall, after due hearing, constitute sufficient cause for disciplinary action by the school authorities. (a) The school heads, supervisors and teachers: a.1) shall effect the arrest of any person violating Article II of the Act inside the school campus and/or within its immediate vicinity or in other places as provided for in Section 44 of the Act, and turn over the investigation of the case to the PDEA; a.2) may summon the services of other law enforcement agencies to arrest or cause the apprehension or arrest of persons violating Article II of the Act; a.3) shall be trained on arrest and other legal procedures relative to the conduct of arrest of violators of the Act along with student leaders and Parents- Teachers Association (PTA) officials; and a.4) shall refer the students or any other violators found to be using dangerous drugs to the proper agency/office. (b) A Special Unit or Task Force from existing school personnel, student leaders and PTA officials shall be organized in every school and trained to assist in the apprehension or arrest of violators of Article II of the Act within their areas of jurisdiction. (c) Appropriate protection of the concerned school officials shall be put in place to ensure personal security and peace of mind among them, such as free legal assistance, police protection and any other assistance as may be deemed necessary. SECTION 45. Publication and Distribution of Materials on Dangerous Drugs. SECTION 46. Special Drug Education Center. SECTION 45. Publication and Distribution of Materials on Dangerous Drugs. SECTION 46. Special Drug Education Center. ARTICLE V PROMOTION OF A NATIONAL DRUG-FREE WORKPLACE PROGRAM WITH THE PARTICIPATION OF PRIVATE AND LABOR SECTORS AND THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECTION 47. Drug-Free Workplace. SECTION 48. Guidelines for the National Drug-Free Workplace Program ARTICLE VI PARTICIPATION OF THE PRIVATE AND LABOR SECTORS IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT SECTION 49. Labor Organizations and the Private Sector. SECTION 50. Government Assistance PARTICIPATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS SECTION 51. Local Government Units Assistance. SECTION 52. Abatement of Drug Related Public Nuisances. SECTION 53. Effect of the Administrative Board Declaration. -

ARTICLE VIII PROGRAM FOR TREATMENT ANDREHABILITATION OF DRUG DEPENDENTS SECTION 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of the Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, apply to the Board or its duly recognized representative, for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination by a DOH-accredited physician results in the issuance of a certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board for a period of not less than six (6) months: Provided, that a drug dependent may be placed under the care of a DOH-accredited physician where there is no Center near or accessible to the residence of the drug dependent or where said drug dependent is below eighteen (18) years of age and is a first-time offender and non-confinement in a Center will not pose a serious danger to his/her family or community. Confinement in a Center for treatment and rehabilitation shall not exceed one (1) year, after which time the court, as well as the Board, shall be apprised by the head of the treatment and rehabilitation center of the status of said drug dependent and determine whether further confinement will be for the welfare of the drug dependent and his/her family or the community. The DOH, in consultation with the DDB, shall provide standards and guidelines for the accreditation of the physicians. SECTION 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of the Act subject to the following conditions: (a) He/she has complied with the rules and regulations of the Center , the applicable rules and regulations of the Board, including the after-care and follow-up program for at least eighteen (18) months following temporary discharge from confinement in the Center or, in the case of a drug dependent placed under the care of the DOH-accredited physician, the after-care program and follow-up schedule formulated by the DSWD and approved by the Board: Provided, that capability-building of local government social workers shall be undertaken by the DSWD; (b) He/she has never been charged or convicted of any offense punishable under the Act, the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 or Republic Act No. 6425, as amended; the Revised Penal Code, as amended; or any special penal laws;

(c) He/she has no record of escape from a Center: Provided, that had he/she escaped, he/she surrendered by himself/herself or through his/her parent, spouse, guardian or relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity, within one (1) week from the date of the said escape; and (d) He/she poses no serious danger to himself/herself, his/her family or the community by his/her exemption from criminal liability. SECTION 56. Temporary Release From the Center, After-Care and Follow-up Treatment Under the Voluntary Submission Program. -

SECTION 57. Probation and Community Service Under the Voluntary Submission Program. SECTION 58. Filing of Charges Against a Drug Dependent Who is Not ehabilitated Under the Voluntary Submission Program. SECTION 59. Escape and Recommitment for Confinement and Rehabilitation Under the Voluntary Submission Program. SECTION 60. Confidentiality of Records Under the Voluntary Submission Program. SECTION 61. Compulsory Confinement of a Drug Dependent Who Refuses to Apply Under the Voluntary Submission Program. SECTION 62. Compulsory Submission of a Drug Dependent Charged with an Offense to Treatment and Rehabilitation SECTION 63. Prescription of the Offense Charged Against a Drug Dependent Under the Compulsory Submission Program. SECTION 64. Confidentiality of Records Under the Compulsory Submission Program. -

SECTION 65. Duty of the Prosecutor in the Proceedings. - It shall be the duty of the provincial or the city prosecutor or their assistants or state prosecutors to prepare the appropriate petition in all proceedings arising from the Act. SECTION 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. - An accused who is over fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense mentioned in Section 11 of the Act, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the time when judgment should have been promulgated after having been found guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits of a suspended sentence, subject to the following conditions: (a) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of the Act, or of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended; or of the Revised Penal Code; or of any special penal laws; (b) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician; and (c) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended. While

under suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the Board, under such conditions that the court may impose for a period ranging from six (6) months to eighteen (18) months. Upon recommendation of the Board, the court may commit the accused unde suspended sentence to a Center, or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician for at least six (6) months, with after-care and follow up program for not more than eighteen (18) months. In the case of minors under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of any offense penalized under the Act, Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1179 shall apply, without prejudice to the application of the provisions of this Section.

SECTION 67. Discharge After Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. SECTION 68. Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a First- Time Minor Offender. - The privilege of suspended SECTION 69. Promulgation of Sentence for First-Time Minor Offender. - If the accused SECTION 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment. SECTION 71. Records to be kept by the Department of Justice. SECTION 72. Liability of a Person Who Violates the Confidentiality of Records. SECTION 73. Liability of a Parent, Spouse or Guardian Who Refuses to Cooperate with the Board or Any Concerned Agency. SECTION 74. Cost-Sharing in the Treatment and Rehabilitation of a Drug Dependent. SECTION 75. Treatment and Rehabilitation Centers. SECTION 76. The Duties and Responsibilities of the Department of Health (DOH) Under the Act. ARTICLE IX DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD AND PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY SECTION 77. The Dangerous Drugs Board. SECTION 78. Composition of the Board. SECTION 79. Meetings of the Board. SECTION 80. Secretariat of the Board. SECTION 81. Powers and Duties of the Board. SECTION 82. Creation of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). SECTION 83. Organization of the PDEA. SECTION 84. Powers and Duties of the PDEA.

SECTION 85. The PDEA Academy

SECTION 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished, however, they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, that such personnel who are affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother agencies. The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of the Act: Provided, that personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide to join the PDEA. Nothing in the Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers of the NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, that when the investigation being conducted by the NBI, the PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of the Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, the PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA; Provided, further, that the NBI, the PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters. (a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies - The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA: Provided, that the said agencies shall, as far as practicable, coordinate with the PDEA prior to anti-drug operations; Provided, further, that, in any case, said agencies shall inform the PDEA of their antidrug operations within twenty-four (24) hours from the time of the actual custody of the suspects or seizure of said drugs and substances, as well as paraphernalia and transport equipment used in illegal activities involving such drugs and/or substances, and shall regularly update the PDEA on the status of the cases involving the said anti-drug operations; Provided, furthermore, that raids, seizures, and other anti-drug operations conducted by the PNP, the NBI, and other law enforcement agencies prior to the approval of this IRR shall be valid and authorized; Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in

consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. (b) Roles of the PNP, NBI, Bureau of Customs and Other Law Enforcement Agencies The PDEA may enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the PNP, the NBI, the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement agencies to carry out the implementation of the Act, provided that the respective MOAs shall include specific roles of enumerated agencies in the administrative and operational matters. Said MOAs shall be entered into by the PDEA and the respective agencies fifteen (15) days after the implementation of this IRR.

ARTICLE X APPROPRIATIONS, MANAGEMENT OF FUNDS AND ANNUAL REPORT SECTION 87. Appropriations. SECTION 88. Management of Funds Under the Act: Annual Report by the Board and the PDEA. SECTION 89. Auditing the Accounts and Expenses of the Board and the PDEA.

ARTICLE XI JURISDICTION OVER DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES SECTION 90. Jurisdiction. - The Supreme Court shall designate special courts from among the existing Regional Trial Courts in each judicial region to exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of the Act. The number of courts designated in each judicial region shall be based on the population and the number of cases pending in their respective jurisdiction. The DOJ, through its provincial/city prosecution offices, shall designate special prosecutors to exclusively handle cases involving violations of the Act. The preliminary investigation of cases filed under the Act shall be terminated within a period of thirty (30) days from the date of their filing. When the preliminary investigation is conducted by a public prosecutor and a probable cause is established, the corresponding information shall be filed in court within twenty-four (24) hours from the termination of the investigation. If the preliminary investigation is conducted by a judge and a probable cause is found to exist, the corresponding information shall be filed by the proper prosecutor within forty eight (48) hours from the date of receipt of the records of the case. However, when the prosecutor disagrees with the finding of the Municipal Trial Court and he/she finds the need to conduct a formal reinvestigation of the case to clarify issues, or to afford either party the opportunity to be heard to avoid miscarriage of justice, the prosecutor has to terminate the reinvestigation within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the records, and if probable cause exists, to file the corresponding information in court within

forty-eight (48) hours from termination of the reinvestigation. Trial of the case under this Section shall be finished by the court not later than sixty (60) days from the date of the filing of the information. Decision on said cases shall be rendered within a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of submission of the case for resolution.

SECTION 91. Responsibility and Liability of Law Enforcement Agencies and other Government Officials and Employees in Testifying as Prosecution Witnesses in Dangerous Drugs Cases. - Any member of law enforcement agencies or any other government official and employee who, after due notice, fails or refuses intentionally or negligently, to appear as a witness for the prosecution in any proceeding, involving violations of the Act, without any valid reason, shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), in addition to the administrative liability he/she may be meted out by his/her immediate superior and/or appropriate body. The immediate superior of the member of the law enforcement agency or any other government employee mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be penalized with imprisonment of not less than two (2) months and one (1) day but not more than six (6) years and a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if despite due notice to them and to the witness concerned, the former does not exert reasonable effort to present the latter to the court. The member of the law enforcement agency or any other government employee mentioned in the preceding paragraphs shall not be transferred or reassigned to any other government office located in another territorial jurisdiction during the pendency of the case in court. However, the concerned member of the law enforcement agency or government employee may be transferred or re-assigned for compelling reasons: Provided, that his/her immediate superior shall notify the court in writing where the case is pending of the order to transfer or re-assign, within twenty-four (24) hours from its approval; Provided, further, that his/her immediate superior shall be penalized with imprisonment of not less than (2) months and one (1) day but not more than six (6) years and a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual absolute disqualification from public office, should he/she fail to notify the court in writing of such order to transfer or re-assign. Prosecution and punishment under this Section shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any existing law. SECTION 92. Delay and Bungling in the Prosecution of Drug Cases. Any government officer or employee tasked with the prosecution of drugrelated cases under the Act, either as prosecutor, prosecution witness, or as law enforcement agent, who, through patent laxity, inexcusable neglect,

unreasonable delay or deliberately causes the unsuccessful prosecution and/or dismissal of the said drug cases, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years without prejudice to his/her prosecution under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code. ELEMENTS

When what is involved is a prosecution for illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, conviction can be had if the following elements are present: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti of the crime. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummate the buy-bust transaction between the entrapment officers and the accused.[31] The crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs is committed as soon as the sale transaction is consummated. On the other hand, for an accused to be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possesses the said drug.[40] (People of the Philippines vs Wilfredo Encila, GR No. 182419, February 10, 2009) Considering that as to this knowledge, a persons mental state of awareness of a fact is involved, we have ruled that: Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.[8] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs CARLOS DELA CRUZ,G.R. No. 182348, November 20, 2008) Note: As to sale. People v. Ong,[23] in that, he was able to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. [24] How their team came to know about appellants drug trade; the m anner of negotiation for the purchase of shabu among appellant, Mazo, and himself; the exchange of consideration between Mazo and appellant; and Mazos handing over to him of the subject of the sale. From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the prosecution succeeded in

establishing, with moral certainty, all the elements of the illegal sale of shabu, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[25] The presence of these elements is sufficient to support appellants finding of guilt and is not negated by the polices failure to find any other contraband in her house. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs MARILYN MIRANDA y RAMA, G.R. No. 174773 October 2, 2007)

Immunity SECTION 33. Immunity from Prosecutionand Punishment. xxxxany person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15 and 19, Article II of the Act, who voluntarily gives information about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13 and 16, Article II of the Act, as well as any commission of the offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts, identities and arrest of all or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies against such person as described above, shall be exempted from prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her information and testimony were given, and may plead or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: CHARGED FOR VIOLATION OF: SECTION 7. Employees and Visitors of a Den, Dive or Resort SECTION 11. Possession of DangerousDrugs SECTION 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs SECTION 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. SECTION 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs SECTION 19. Unlawful Prescription of Dangerous Drugs Give Information on violation of: SECTION 4. Importation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals SECTION 5. Sale, Trading,Administration, Dispensation, Delivery,Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. SECTION 6. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort SECTION 8. Manufacture of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals SECTION 10. Manufacture or Delivery of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals

SECTION 13. Possession of Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings

SC Declares Unconstitutional Mandatory Drug Tests for Public Office Candidates and Criminally Accused, Upholds Random Drug Tests for Students and Employees (GR No. 157870, Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, November 3, 2008) The Supreme Court (SC) has struck down as unconstitutional the provisions of the country's anti-drug abuse laws requiring mandatory drug testing of candidates for elective positions and persons accused of crimes. In a 23-page decision, the high court ruling on suits challenging provisions of the Republic Act 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002, however, upheld provisions on authorized "random" and "suspicion-less" drug testing on minor students and employees of public and private offices. The decision, written by Associate Justice Presbitero Velasco, is a consolidation of three suits filed separately by the Social Justice Society (SJS) private lawyer Manuel Laserna and Sen. Aquilino Pimentel Jr. Named respondents in the suit were the law's implementing agencies, Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB), Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and Commission on Elections (Comelec). The petitioners challenged provisions of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on authorized and mandatory drug testing for students, employees, candidates and those charged for crimes. Additional qualification In striking down paragraph "g" of Sec. 36, which requires all candidates for public office, whether appointed or elected, both in the national or local government, to first undergo drug testing , the SC explained that the same is "unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution." The Court sided with Pimentel's argument that the only requirement provided for candidates including senators are those provided in the Constitutions Sec. 3 of Art. VI which provides that "No person shall be a senator unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election." According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes this maximum of five qualifications for one to be a candidate or to be elected to and be a member of the Senate. He said that both Congress and Comelec, by requiring a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, creates an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug-free.

Not authorized to expand qualification Pimentel also pointed out that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing Congress or Comelec to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator. Agreeing with his position, the SC explained that "the Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution." It said that "in the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed." "In the same vein, the Comelec cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement RA 9165 validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the constitution provides," said the SC, as it struck down Comelec Resolution No. 6486 which implemented the drug testing.

Tool for criminal persecution The SC likewise said paragraph "f" of the law which required mandatory drug tests on all persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense carrying an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six years and one day, is also unconstitutional. The high court said there is "no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes" and that "to impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution." Drug testing, in this case, the SC said "would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves." Tests for students, employees upheld On the other hand, the high court upheld the validity of RA 9165's provisions on drug testing in secondary and tertiary schools and for employees. Citing American case law, the SC said random drug testing policy for students is "a kind of search in which a reasonable parent might need to engage" and that "minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians and schools." The court added that "schools have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty" and that "schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admissions that are fair, just and non-discriminatory." Drug testing for employees was likewise upheld, subject to the provisions of labor laws for private employees and civil service laws for government employees.

CASES INVOLVING RA 9165 CHAIN OF CUSTODY- NO INVENTORY In the case of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs RUIZ GARCIA , GR NO. 13480, FEBRUARY 25, 2009D E C I S I O N Ruiz was formally charged and pleaded not guilty under an Information that reads: n the pre-trial conference that followed, his counsel admitted the following: (1) the identity of Ruiz as the accused in the case; (2) the jurisdiction of the RTC; and (3) Ruiz lack of authority to possess or sell shabu. [4] The defense counsel also manifested that admissions could be made in the course of the trial concerning the manner and nature of the testimony of the forensic chemist.[5] The prosecution presented a single witness, PO1 Samuel Garcia (PO1 Garcia), who, as poseur-buyer, testified that Ruiz arrest was made pursuant to a legitimate buy-bust operation where Ruiz sold him marijuana. The parties dispensed with the testimony of the forensic chemist, Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa, after they entered into stipulations concerning the manner and nature of his testimony.[6] The prosecution also submitted the following evidence: Exhibit A - INFOREP dated February 7, 2003 written by Police Senior Superintendent Oscar F. Valenzuela; Exhibit B - the Dispatch Order dated February 27, 2003; Exhibit C-1 and C-2 - the photocopy of the recovered marked money; Exhibit D - the Pre-Operation Report dated February 27, 2003 prepared by PO2 Geoffrey Huertas; Exhibit E - the Sinumpaang Salaysay of PO1Samuel Sonny Garcia; Exhibit F - the corpus delicti; Exhibit H - the Request for Laboratory Examination dated February 28, 2003 submitted by Ferdinand Lavadia Balgoa, Police Inspector Chief SDEU and; Exhibit G - the Physical Sciences Report No. D-250-03 prepared by forensic chemist Jesse Abadilla Dela Rosa.

The defense relied solely on the testimony of Ruiz who claimed he was the victim of a police frame-up and extortion.

The RTC summarized the prosecutions version of events as follows: On February 27, 2003, at around 2:45 p.m., PO1 Samuel Garcia was with a confidential informer and two other policemen at the back of San Roque Church, Navotas, Metro Manila, waiting for the accused with whom the confidential informer arranged for him (Garcia) to buy marijuana. There were prior Informations [sic] from Camp Crame and the NPDO about the selling of marijuana xxx For this reason, Garcia got in touch with the confidential informer whom [sic] he learned could buy marijuana from the accused. It did not take long after the arrival of Garcia and the others at the area of operation for the accused to arrive on board a red scooter. Garcia told the accused that he will buy P200.00 worth of marijuana, as agreed upon between the confidential informer and the accused. The accused in turn gave Garcia the marijuana wrapped in a yellow page of the PLDT directory. Garcia verified the contents thereof and thereafter gave the P200.00, consisting of two P100.00 bills earlier given for him to use as buy-bust money xxx whose serial numbers were listed in the dispatch order xxx Garcia then gave the signal to his companions for them to approach. He also arrested the accused whom he told of his rights and brought him to a lying-in clinic and then to the police headquarters. According to PO1 Garcia, after the arrest, they brought Ruiz to the DEU[7] office for investigation. He (PO1 Garcia) turned over the seized items to the investigator, who then placed markings on the wrapper.[8] The seized items were thereafter sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination; they tested positive for marijuana. [9] The version of the defense, as summarized by the RTC, is as follows: Accused Ruiz Garcia y Ruiz, on the other hand, maintained that he was riding on a hopper on his way [home] to his wife at Daang Hari, Navotas, Metro Manila, when he saw a jeep with policemen on board. A policeman named Balais stopped the accused and asked for the papers of the hopper which he, at the same time, searched with nothing illegal found inside its compartment [sic]. The accused then heard someone remarked ito pala si Ruiz, and he was told to go along with the policemen, who initially brought him to the lying-in clinic, and then to the police headquarters where he was asked to make tubos or to ransom the hopper; Garcia [Ruiz] was not able to do so because he cannot afford what the policemen were demanding. As a consequence, he was detained and charged in this case which he protested, as nothing was confiscated from him. Ruiz claimed that the case was a trumped-up charge made by the police to extort money from him.[10] In making this claim, he admitted that he did not know PO1 Garcia and that he saw him for the first when he was arrested.[11] He insisted that he knew a certain Balais who arrested suspected pushers/users in their place.[12]

The prosecution and the defense thereafter entered into stipulations on the substance of the rebuttal and sur-rebuttal testimonies of PO1 Garcia and Ruiz, which were mainly reiterations of their earlier testimonies.[13] In its Decision of July 27, 2004, the RTC found Ruiz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 and costs.[14] The CA, on appeal, fully affirmed the RTCs decision.[15] In the present appeal before us, Ruiz faults the CA for believing the testimony of the lone prosecution witness, and for convicting him despite the insufficiency of supporting evidence. He observes that: (a) PO1 Garcias motive was to impress his superiors who had issued a special order against him; (b) the police officers arrested him to extort money by asking him to ransom his scooter which the police had confiscated; (c) no prior surveillance was conducted before he was arrested; (d) the informant was not presented in court; (e) his arrest was illegal because it was made without a warrant; and (f) there was no compliance with Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 or the chain of custody rule on seized drugs.[16] The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintains that the lower courts correctly found Ruiz guilty of the crime charged.[17] As established through the testimony of PO1 Garcia, his arrest was effected through a legitimate buy-bust operation that was regularly conducted, properly documented, and coordinated with the PDEA.[18] The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that Ruiz failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate his claim of frame-up; his (Ruiz) evidence also failed to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by the public officers in the case.[19] THE COURTS RULING After due consideration, we resolve to ACQUIT Ruiz, as the prosecutions evidence failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to show that the police complied with paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and with the chain of evidence requirement of this Act. Every criminal case starts with the constitutionally-protected presumption of innocence in favor of the accused that can only be defeated by proof beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution starts the trial process by presenting evidence showing the presence of all the elements of the offense charged. If the prosecution proves all the required elements, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to disprove the prosecutions case. Based on these presentations, the court must then determine if the guilt of the accused has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. It may happen though that the prosecution, even before the presentation by the defense, already has failed to prove all the elements of the crime charged, in which case, the presumption of innocence prevails; the burden of evidence does not shift to the accused, who no longer needs to present evidence in his defense.

In a prosecution for the illegal sale of a prohibited drug, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. All these require evidence that the sale transaction transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti, i.e., the body or substance of the crime that establishes that a crime has actually been committed,[20] as shown by presenting the object of the illegal transaction. In the present case, the object is marijuana which the prosecution must present and prove in court to be the same item seized from the accused. It is in this respect that the prosecution failed.

The requirements of paragraph 1, Section 21 of Article II of R.A. No. 9165. A buy-bust operation gave rise to the present case. While this kind of operation has been proven to be an effective way to flush out illegal transactions that are otherwise conducted covertly and in secrecy,[21] a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In People v. Tan,[22] this Court itself recognized that by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. Accordingly, specific procedures relating to the seizure and custody of drugs have been laid down in the law (R.A. No. 9165) for the police to strictly follow. The prosecution must adduce evidence that these procedures have been followed in proving the elements of the defined offense. The first procedural safeguard that the police failed to observe (and which both the RTC and the CA failed to take into account) is that provided under paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. This provision states: The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. [Emphasis supplied.]

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165 further elaborate on the legal requirement by providing, under its Section 21(a), that: (a) The apprehending office/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.[Emphasis supplied.]

The records utterly fail to show that the buy-bust team complied with these procedures despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the use of shall in the directives of the law and its implementing rules. The procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimony of PO1 Garcia. Testifying on the handling of the seized marijuana, he stated that: Q: After he handed to you the one pack and then you handed to him the P200.00, what happened next? A: After verifying the contents and after convincing myself that the same is marijuana, I handed to him the money and raised my hand as a pre-arrange[d] signal. xxx xxx xxx

Q: After you had arrested the person of the accused, what happened next? A: We brought him for medical examination and [thereafter] brought him to our office. xxx xxx xxx Q: So what happened to the pack of marijuana that you were able to buy from the accused? A: I turned it over to our investigator and then he placed markings on the wrapper. xxx xxx xxx

Q: I am handing to you now the improvise [sic] wrapper. Is this the marking that you placed? A: Yes, sir, RP-1. xxx xxx xxx

Q: What happened after you have seized the item from the accused or after you

have recovered this and placing [sic] markings? A: It was sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination.[23]

Thus, other than the markings made by PO1 Garcia and the police investigator (whose identity was not disclosed), no physical inventory was ever made, and no photograph of the seized items was taken under the circumstances required by R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules. We observe that while there was testimony with respect to the marking of the seized items at the police station, no mention whatsoever was made on whether the marking had been done in the presence of Ruiz or his representatives.[24] There was likewise no mention that any representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or any elected official had been present during this inventory, or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory.[25] In People v. Orteza,[26] the Court, in discussing the implications of the failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, declared: In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug. More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecution's failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu. [Emphasis supplied.] We reached the same conclusion in People v. Nazareno[27] and People v. Santos, Jr.,[28] and recently, in the cases of People v. Dela Cruz[29] and People v. De la Cruz[30] where we again stressed the importance of complying with the prescribed procedure. We also held that strict compliance is justified under the rule that penal laws shall be construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the accused.[31] In addition, we also note that PO1 Garcia testified that he marked the confiscated items when he returned to the police station after the buy-bust operation. This admission additionally shows that the marking was not done immediately after seizure of the items, but only after a significant intervening time had lapsed, i.e., after the buy-bust team had taken Ruiz to a lying-in clinic for a medical examination,[32] and from there, to the police headquarters. Significantly, Ruiz confirmed in his

testimony that the buy-bust team first took him to the San Jose Lying-in Center, before proceeding to the police headquarters.[33] In People v. Sanchez,[34] we held that in case of warrantless seizure (such as a buy-bust operation) under R.A. No. 9165, the physical inventory and photograph of the items shall be made by the buy-bust team, if practicable, at the place they were seized, considering that such interpretation is more in keeping with the laws intent of preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs.[35] The prosecution, in the present case, failed to explain why the required inventory and photographing of the seized items were not practicable and could not have been done at the place of seizure.

We further note, on the matter of identifying the seized items, that the lower courts overlooked the glaring inconsistency between PO1 Garcias testimony vis--vis the entries in the Memorandum dated February 28, 2003 (the request for laboratory examination of the seized items)[36] and Physical Science Report No. D-250-03 dated February 28, 2003 issued by the PNP Crime Laboratory with respect to the marking on the seized items.[37] PO1 Garcia testified that he had marked the seized item (on the wrapper) with the initial RP-1.[38] However, an examination of the two documents showed a different marking: on one hand, what was submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory consisted of a single piece telephone directory paper containing suspected dried marijuana leaves fruiting tops with the marking RGR-1 and thirteen pieces of rolling paper with the markings RGR-RP1 to RGR-RP13; on the other hand, the PNP Crime Laboratory examined the following items with the corresponding markings: a printed paper with the marking RGR-1 together with one small brick of dried suspected marijuana fruiting tops and thirteen pieces of small white paper with the markings RGP-RP1 to RGP-RP13. PO1 Garcias testimony is the only testimonial evidence on record relating to the handling and marking of the seized items since the testimony of the forensic chemist in the case had been dispensed with by agreement between the prosecution and the defense. Unfortunately, PO1 Garcia was not asked to explain the discrepancy in the markings. Neither can the stipulated testimony of the forensic chemist now shed light on this point, as the records available to us do not disclose the exact details of the parties stipulations. To our mind, the procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items, as well as the unexplained discrepancy in their markings, collectively raise doubts on whether the items presented in court were the exact same items that were taken from Ruiz when he was arrested. These constitute major lapses that, standing unexplained, are fatal to the prosecutions case.[39] To be sure, Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the express requirements under paragraph 1, Section 21,

Article II of R.A. No. 9165, i.e.,non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. In Sanchez, we clarified that this saving clause applies only where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds.[40] We also stressed in Sanchez, that in such case, the prosecution must show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been preserved.[41] These conditions were not met in the present case, as the prosecution, in the first place, did not even recognize the procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized items. Had the prosecution done so, it would not have glossed over the deficiencies and would have, at the very least, submitted an explanation and proof showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items have been preserved.

The chain of custody requirement In Lopez v. People,[42] we explained the importance of establishing the chain of custody of the confiscated drugs, as follows: As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witnesses' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering without regard to

whether the same is advertent or otherwise not dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. [Emphasis supplied.] The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[43] It is important enough as a concern that Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002[44] (which implements R.A. No. 9165) specifically defines chain of custody. b. Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the final disposition; In the present case, while PO1 Garcia duly testified on the identity of the buyer and seller, on the consideration that supported the transaction, and on the manner the sale took place,[45] the prosecutions evidence failed to establish the chain that would have shown that the marijuana presented in court was the very item seized from Ruiz at the time of his arrest. (a) The first crucial link in the chain of custody The first crucial link was from the time the marijuana was seized by PO1 Garcia to its delivery to the police investigator at the police headquarters. Only PO1 Garcia testified to this link. From his own testimony, he did not mark the seized marijuana after it was handed to him by Ruiz; he only marked it at the police station when he turned it over to the investigator. In the interim, he and the rest of the buy-bust team had taken Ruiz to a lying-in clinic for medical examination. The evidence does not show who was in possession of the marijuana during the ride from the crime scene to the lying-in center, and from the lying-in center to the police station.

b) The second link in the chain of custody The second link in the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is from PO1 Garcia to the police investigator. The identity of this police investigator to whom the custody of the seized marijuana was turned over was not disclosed. Although a reading of the Memorandum dated February 28, 2003 shows that a certain Ferdinand Lavadia Balgoa, as Police Inspector Chief SDEU, prepared the

request for the laboratory examination of the seized marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory, this piece of evidence does not establish the latters identity as the police inspector to whom PO1 Garcia turned over the marijuana, and who subsequently made the corresponding markings on the seized items. (c) The subsequent links in the chain of custody The evidence on record relating to the subsequent links in the chain of custody from the police inspector to the PNP Crime Laboratory did not identify the person who submitted the seized marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. Whether it was the Police Inspector Chief SDEU is not clear from the evidence that only shows that he signed the request for the laboratory examination of the seized marijuana to the PNP Crime Laboratory. At the same time, the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the seized marijuana, after it was chemically analyzed pending its presentation in court, was also not disclosed.

In this regard, Sections 3[46] and 6[47] (paragraph 8) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 2003[48] require laboratory personnel to document the chain of custody each time a specimen is handled or transferred until the specimen is disposed. The board regulation also requires the identification of the individuals participating in the chain. The available records in the case fail to show compliance with this regulation. Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the seized marijuana that the prosecution introduced into evidence. In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused. As we pointed out in the opening statement of our Ruling, this brings the case to a situation where the defense does not even need to present evidence as it has no viable case to meet. We need not therefore discuss the specific defenses raised. Nor do we need to discuss the lower courts misplaced reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, except to state that the presumption only arises in the absence of contrary details in the case that raise doubt on the regularity in the performance of official duties. Where, as in the present case, the police officers failed to comply with the standard procedures prescribed by law, there is no occasion to apply the presumption.[49]

We close with the thought that this Court is not unaware that in the five years that R.A. No. 9165 has been in place, the rate of cases that resulted in acquittals and dismissals was higher than the rate of conviction.[50] Under PDEA records, the dismissals and acquittals accounted for 56% because of the failure of the police

authorities to observe proper procedure under the law, among others.[51] A recent international study conducted in 2008 showed that out of 13,667 drug cases filed from 2003 to 2007, only 4,790 led to convictions (most of which were cases of simple possession); the charges against the rest were dismissed or the accused were acquitted.[52] The present case is now an added statistic reflecting our dismal police and prosecution records. Without casting blame, we call the attention of the authorities to exert greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society. We cannot afford to fail either in combating the drug menace or in protecting the individual rights and liberties we have enshrined in our Constitution. Either way, the consequences of continued failure are hard to imagine. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00954 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Ruiz Garcia y Ruiz is hereby ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished the Director General, Philippine National Police, and the Director General, Philippine Drugs Enforcement Agency, for their information. The Regional Trial Court is directed to turn over the seized marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with law.

SC to Police, Prosecution: Handle Drug Cases with Extra Care Without casting blame, we call the attention of the authorities to exert greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society. We cannot afford to fail either in combating the drug menace or in protecting the individual rights and liberties we have enshrined in our Constitution. Either way, the consequences of continued failure is hard to imagine. Thus the Supreme Court stressed to police authorities and prosecutors as it ordered the acquittal of appellant Ruiz Garcia for the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Ruiz is to be immediately released from detention unless he is being confined for any other lawful cause. In a 20-page decision penned by Justice Arturo D. Brion, the Court said that the

prosecution failed specifically to show that the police complied with paragraph 1, sec. 21, Art. II of RA 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, mandating the apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs to make a physical inventory of and photograph the illegal drugs in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated. The Court noted that the records utterly fail to show that the police buy-bust team had complied with the said procedure. It added that the prosecution had failed to recognize the procedural lapses the police had committed in handling the 11.02 grams of marijuana and paraphernalia seized from Ruiz. The Court ordered the Malabon City Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, which had sentenced Ruiz to life imprisonment for illegal drugs in 2004, to turn over the seized marijuana to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction. Ruizs case, the Court noted, is now an added statistic reflecting our dismal police and prosecution records. The Court said that in the five years that RA 9165 has been in place, the rate of cases that resulted in acquittals and dismissal was higher than the rate of conviction. It cited that an international study conducted last year showed that out of 13,667 drug cases filed from 2003 to 2007, only 4,790 led to convictions, while the charges against the rest were either dismissed or the accused were acquitted. (GR No. 173480, People v. Garcia, February 25, 2009) Without casting blame, we call the attention of the authorities to exert greater efforts in combating the drug menace using the safeguards that our lawmakers have deemed necessary for the greater benefit of our society. We cannot afford to fail either in combating the drug menace or in protecting the individual rights and liberties we have enshrined in our Constitution. Either way, the consequences of continued failure is hard to imagine. (GR No. 173480, People v. Garcia, February 25, 2009) NO INVENTORY- NO PICTURE BUT CONVICTED PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VERSUS ROLANDO LLAMADO, G.R. No. 185278, MARCH 13, 2009. The facts as narrated by the prosecution are as follows: Around 6:50 in the evening of February 12, 2005, PO2 Ferdinand Brubio, PO2 Ramiel Soriano, PO1 Christopher Anos and P/Supt. Romeo Abaring were on duty at the Station of the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force located in Sta. Elena Marikina City, when a police informant came to the station, informing them of the rampant selling of shabu by appellant Rolando Llamado alias Pusa in E. Dela Paz St., Sto. Nio, Marikina City. Upon learning of the information, P/Supt. Abaring formed a buy-bust team and designated PO2 Brubio as the poseur-buyer. After PO2 Brubio coordinated their plan with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), P/Supt. Abaring gave two (2) one hundred peso bills, dusted with fluorescent powder, to PO2 Brubio to be used as

buy-bust money. PO2 Brubio went with the confidential informant to the pinpointed place of operation. PO3 Soriano and PO1 Anos were assigned as back-up. Upon reaching the area, the police informant saw appellant, who was then wearing a basketball uniform, and pointed him to PO2 Brubio. When PO2 Brubio and the informant approached him, the informant introduced PO2 Brubio as the scorer. Appellant asked PO2 Brubio how much he would buy and the latter answered dos lang, meaning two hundred pesos. Appellant gave a sachet of shabu to PO2 Brubio who, in turn, gave the buy-bust money to appellant. Amid their transaction, another blonde-haired male arrived and also bought shabu from appellant. PO2 Brubio held the shoulder of the police informant, the pre-arranged signal to their back-up police officers that the drug sale transaction had been consummated. PO2 Brubio introduced himself as a police officer and arrested appellant and the blonde-haired male who, unfortunately, was able to escape later on. PO2 Brubio placed the markings RCL-FB BUYBUST 02-12-05 on the sachet of shabu bought from appellant and the buy-bust money. RCL and FB markings are appellants and PO2 Brubios initials, respectively. Appellant was taken to the Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force where the affidavit of arrest and request for laboratory examination and urine test were prepared. Thereafter, PO2 Brubio personally brought appellant to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, together with the confiscated shabu and the request for laboratory examination.

P/Sr. Insp. Maridel Rodis, Forensic Chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory based in Camp Crame, Quezon City, personally received the request for laboratory examination and the attached specimen from PO2 Brubio. She conducted a physical, chemical and confirmatory examination on the specimen recovered from appellant. In Chemistry Report No. D-115-05 prepared by P/Sr. Insp. Rodis, the specimen recovered from appellant was positive for methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu, thus: FINDINGS: Qualitative examination conducted on specimen A and B gave positive result to the tests for methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs. xxx CONCLUSION: Specimen A and B contain Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs.[4] xxx xxx

Appellant admitted that his alias is Pusa; however, he denied having sold shabu to a poseur-buyer and having held the buy-bust money. He claimed that the police officers were the ones in possession of the buy-bust money when they arrested him. Luningning Llamado, mother of the appellant, substantially corroborated the testimony of her son. She claimed that four persons suddenly barged into their house while they were having dinner; that they invited her son Jun to go with them but appellant refused claiming that he did not do anything wrong; that the men started frisking her son; that the policemen did not have any warrant but justified the intrusion as buy-bust operation; that the officers did not recover anything from appellant except money amounting to P140.00 and his cellphone.

The trial court found the prosecutions version more credible and accordingly found appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, ROLANDO LLAMADO y CRUZ, GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165. Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos. The shabu subject matter of this case is hereby confiscated in favor of the Government and to be turned over to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition, without delay. SO ORDERED.[5] On appeal, appellant alleged that the evidence seized from him was a product of illegal search; hence, inadmissible; that the acts of the policemen could not be accorded the presumption of regularity because they failed to secure either a search warrant or warrant of arrest; that the police officers failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 when they failed to make an inventory and take photographs of the paraphernalia seized during the buy-bust operation. On May 6, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision [6] denying the appeal and affirming the decision of the court a quo. The appellate court held that the failure of the police officers to coordinate with the local barangay officials prior to the conduct of the buy-bust operation did not invalidate the undertaking of the police officers; that the prosecution has established the authenticity of the buy-bust operation; that non-compliance with the requirements set forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 did not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody over the

confiscated items considering that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved by the apprehending team. Hence, the instant appeal. Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides in part: SEC 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.- The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drugs, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. In this case, appellant is charged with selling shabu, which is a dangerous drug. Section 3 (ii), Article I of R.A. No. 9165 defines selling as any act of giving away any dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals whether for money or any other consideration. For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor.[7] In the instant case, the prosecution positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance which was found to be Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Appellant sold the drug to PO2 Brubio, a police officer who acted as poseur-buyer for a sum of P200.00. The prosecution positively and categorically testified that the transaction or sale actually took place. The subject shabu[8] weighing 0.02 grams and the money amounting to P200.00[9] pesos were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court. It has been held that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation from initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense.[10]

Appellants defense of denial is unavailing. There was no evidence that PO2 Brubio was motivated by reasons other than his duty to enforce the law. In fact, appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate entrapment operation and was positively identified by the police officers who conducted the operation. As between the categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.[11] Moreover, the failure on the part of the police officers to take photographs and make an inventory of the drugs seized from the appellant was not fatal because the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the said illegal drugs. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. The prosecution satisfactorily proved the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and presented in court evidence of corpus delicti.[12] PO2 Brubio was able to put the necessary markings on the sachet of shabu bought from appellant, for identification purposes, immediately after the consummation of the drug sale. He personally delivered the same specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis on the same day the entrapment was conducted. Lastly, PO2 Brubio was able to identify the said markings in court. In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellants self-serving and uncorroborated denial.[13] WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The May 6, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC. No. 02799, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 192, finding appellant Rolando Llamado guilty of violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00, is AFFIRMED.

NO CONSTRUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE- OF POSSESSION PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS CARLOS DE LA CRUZ G.R. No. 182348, NOVEMBER 20, 2008 The Facts The facts, according to the prosecution, showed that in the morning of October 20, 2002, an informant tipped off the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Marikina Police

Station that wanted drug pusher Wifredo Loilo alias Boy Bicol was at his nipa hut hideout in San Mateo, Rizal. A team was organized to arrest Boy Bicol. Once there, they saw Boy Bicol by a table talking with accused-appellant. They shouted Boy Bicol sumuko ka na may warrant of arrest ka. (Surrender yourself Boy Bicol you have a warrant of arrest.) Upon hearing this, Boy Bicol engaged them in a shootout and was fatally shot. Accused-appellant was seen holding a shotgun through a window. He dropped his shotgun when a police officer pointed his firearm at him. The team entered the nipa hut and apprehended accused-appellant. They saw a plastic bag of suspected shabu, a digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines lying on the table. PO1 Calanoga, Jr. put the markings CVDC, the initials of accused-appellant, on the bag containing the seized drug. Accused-appellant was subsequently arrested. The substance seized from the hideout was sent to the Philippine National Police crime laboratory for examination and tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. He was thus separately indicted for violation of RA 9165 and for illegal possession of firearm. According to the defense, accused-appellant was at Boy Bicols house having been asked to do a welding job for Boy Bicols motorcycle. While accused-appellant was there, persons who identified themselves as police officers approached the place, prompting accused-appellant to scamper away. He lied face down when gunshots rang. The buy-bust team then helped him get up. He saw the police officers searching the premises and finding shabu and firearms, which were on top of a table or drawer.[2] When he asked the reason for his apprehension, he was told that it was because he was a companion of Boy Bicol. He denied under oath that the gun and drugs seized were found in his possession and testified that he was only invited by Boy Bicol to get the motorcycle from his house.[3] The RTC acquitted accused-appellant of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition but convicted him of possession of dangerous drugs.

The Courts Ruling The appeal has merit. The elements in illegal possession of dangerous drug are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.[6] On the third element, we have held that the possession must be with knowledge of the accused or that animus possidendi existed with the possession or control of said articles.[7] Considering that as to this knowledge, a persons mental state of awareness of a fact is involved, we have ruled that: Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its

perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.[8] The prior or contemporaneous acts of accused-appellant show that: he was inside the nipa hut at the time the buy-bust operation was taking place; he was talking to Boy Bicol inside the nipa hut; he was seen holding a shotgun; when PO1 Calanoga, Jr. pointed his firearm at accused-appellant, the latter dropped his shotgun; and when apprehended, he was in a room which had the seized shabu, digital weighing scale, drug paraphernalia, ammunition, and magazines. Accused-appellant later admitted that he knew what the content of the seized plastic bag was.[9] Given the circumstances, we find that the prosecution failed to establish possession of the shabu, whether in its actual or constructive sense, on the part of accused-appellant. The two buy-bust team members corroborated each others testimonies on how they saw Boy Bicol talking to accused-appellant by a table inside the nipa hut. That table, they testified, was the same table where they saw the shabu once inside the nipa hut. This fact was used by the prosecution to show that accused-appellant exercised dominion and control over the shabu on the table. We, however, find this too broad an application of the concept of constructive possession. In People v. Torres,[10] we held there was constructive possession of prohibited drugs even when the accused was not home when the prohibited drugs were found in the masters bedroom of his house. In People v. Tira,[11] we sustained the conviction of the accused husband and wife for illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Their residence was searched and their bed was found to be concealing illegal drugs underneath. We held that the wife cannot feign ignorance of the drugs existence as she had full access to the room, including the space under the bed. In Abuan v. People,[12] we affirmed the finding that the accused was in constructive possession of prohibited drugs which had been found in the drawer located in her bedroom. In all these cases, the accused was held to be in constructive possession of illegal drugs since they were shown to enjoy dominion and control over the premises where these drugs were found. In the instant case, however, there is no question that accused-appellant was not the owner of the nipa hut that was subject of the buy-bust operation. He did not have

dominion or control over the nipa hut. Neither was accused-appellant a tenant or occupant of the nipa hut, a fact not disputed by the prosecution. The target of the operation was Boy Bicol. Accused-appellant was merely a guest of Boy Bicol. But in spite of the lack of evidence pinning accused-appellant to illegal possession of drugs, the trial court declared the following: It cannot be denied that when the accused was talking with Boy Bicol he knew that the shabu was on the table with other items that were confiscated by the police operatives. The court [surmises] that the accused and boy Bicol were members of a gang hiding in that nipa hut where they were caught red-handed with prohibited items and dangerous [drugs].[13] The trial court cannot assume, based on the prosecutions evidence, that accused-appellant was part of a gang dealing in illegal activities. Apart from his presence in Boy Bicols nipa hut, the prosecution was not able to show his participation in any drug-dealing. He was not even in possession of drugs in his person. He was merely found inside a room with shabu, not as the rooms owner or occupant but as a guest. While he allegedly pointed a firearm at the buy-bust team, the prosecution curiously failed to produce the firearm that accused-appellant supposedly used. The prosecution in this case clearly failed to show all the elements of the crime absent a showing of either actual or constructive possession by the accused-appellant. Since accused-appellant was not in possession of the illegal drugs in Boy Bicols nipa hut, his subsequent arrest was also invalid. Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provides: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. The warrantless arrest of accused-appellant was effected under Sec. 5(a), arrest of

a suspect in flagrante delicto. For this type of warrantless arrest to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[14] Accused-appellants act of pointing a firearm at the buy-bust team would have been sufficient basis for his arrest in flagrante delicto; however, the prosecution was not able to adequately prove that accused-appellant was committing an offense. Although accused-appellant merely denied possessing the firearm, the prosecutions charge was weak absent the presentation of the alleged firearm. He was eventually acquitted by the trial court because of this gaffe. His arrest, independent of the buy-bust operation targeting Boy Bicol, was therefore not lawful as he was not proved to be committing any offense. In sum, we find that there is insufficient evidence to show accused-appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Having ruled on the lack of material or constructive possession by accused-appellant of the seized shabu and his succeeding illegal arrest, we deem it unnecessary to deal with the other issue raised.

INFORMANT NOT PRESENTED PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS ENRIQUE LOPEZ AND BIENVINIDA MISERICORDIA. GR NO. G.R. No. 172369 , March 7, 2007 As narrated by SPOs Manglo and Jamisolamin, the prosecutions version of the incident is as follows: At eight o'clock in the morning of July 1, 1997, a report was made that a certain Iking of Don Pepe St., Brgy. Sto. Domingo, Quezon City was engaged in the sale of shabu, marijuana and hashish. Thereafter, a surveillance team was formed headed by P/Insp. Joselito Dominguez and composed of SPO2 Wilmer G. Antonio, SPO2 Manglo, SPO4 Jamisolamin and the confidential informant. The surveillance conducted by the team from July 2 to 5, 1997 confirmed the report of illegal drug activities of Iking which turned out to be a mere alias for accused Lopez. The surveillance further disclosed that co-accused Misericordia was working with Iking in the latters illegal activities. On July 7, 1997, the police informant accompanied SPO4 Jamisolamin to the place of Lopez where a test-buy was successfully conducted. Lopez and Misericordia handed over a sample of marijuana to SPO4 Jamisolamin and it was agreed that a bigger volume of marijuana would be made available the next night.

At eight o'clock in the following evening, July 8, 1997, the team returned to the place of Lopez where its members positioned themselves in the vicinity while the informant and the disguised poseur-buyer, SPO4 Jamisolamin, entered Lopezs house. SPO4 Jamisolamin brought along P10,000.00 boodle money and a Voyager alarm signal. When SPO4 Jamisolamin flashed the money, Lopez ordered Misericordia to get the drugs and the latter promptly handed over to SPO4 Jamisolamin a rectangular object wrapped in aluminum foil. While examining the object, SPO4 Jamisolamin pressed the Voyager alarm and returned to where his companions were stationed. The team then apprehended the two accused and brought them to the police station while the seized evidence was forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for technical analysis. The standard tests were conducted, the result of which proved that the seized evidence was positive for marijuana resin (or hashish), a prohibited drug.

The defense has an entirely different account of what supposedly transpired on the evening of July 8, 1997. Through the testimonies of the two accused who both categorically denied having sold marijuana hashish on the evening in question, the defense belabored to establish that at about six oclock in the early evening of July 8, 1997, Misericordia was conversing with neighbors along Don Pepe Street when a car stopped. Among those on board the car were men, two of whom Misericordia later learned were SPO4 Jamisolamin and SPO2 Antonio. The two approached Misericordia and the neighbors she was conversing with and allegedly asked if they knew a man named Peralta. Misericordia answered in the affirmative, got into the car on request of SPO4 Jamisolamin and SPO2 Antonio and, after going around, showed them the house of Peralta where she pointed Lopez out. The two police officers picked up Lopez, made him crouch inside the car and thereafter drove around the streets of the neighborhood until about nine oclock that same evening when the two of them i.e., Misericordia and Lopez, were brought to the police station in Kamuning, thereat booked and detained and brought out for inquest days later. In a decision[4] dated August 10, 2004, the trial court found both accused GUILTY as charged. Hence, appellants present recourse raising the sole issue of whether or not the two courts below gravely erred in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 4, Article II in relation to Section 2(e)1, F and I of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by BP Blg. 179. We DENY. It is appellants' next submission that the prosecution should have presented the confidential informant as a witness, failing in which a hiatus exists in the prosecutions evidence. To back up their submission, appellants cite People v.

Bagano[9] and People v. Rojo.[10] Sadly, however, the cases relied upon do not again factually sit squarely with the case at hand. In general, the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of the informer would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence.[11]

For sure, unlike the instant case, Bagano and Rojo arose from a set of circumstances which provide exceptions to the foregoing general rule. In the two cases invoked by appellants, the testimony of the informant would not be merely corroborative and cumulative, but was direct and material to the defense of the accused. Hence, it was absolutely necessary that the accused in those cases were offered the chance to cross-examine the informants. In both Bagano and Rojo, the testimony of the witnesses presented by the prosecution in lieu of the informants suffered from the defect of being merely hearsay as only the confidential informant was in a position to testify from personal knowledge as to the actual sale. In Bagano, the testimonies of the prosecution's principal witness were mere translations and/or interpretations of what the accused supposedly said in the dialect to and interpreted by the informant. As such, the informants testimony was pure hearsay. Not only that. In Bagano, the informant's testimony was particularly crucial due to the accused's claim in that case that the prohibited drug belonged to the informant himself. The Court went on to say in Bagano: Emateo's non-production as a witness could have been excused had he merely played the part of a true informer. An informer is one who communicates knowledge of someone having committed or about to commit a crime to the proper authorities who by themselves, acting independently, may obtain evidence necessary for the prosecution of the offender. On the contrary, he did more than that. He played a substantial part in the act complained of and is in fact claimed by the appellant as the real owner of the subject marijuana. The case of Sorrentino v. U.S. (163 F. 2d 627 [1947]), provides the distinction between one who played the part of a mere informer and a decoy. There, the defendant was charged for an illegal sale of opium in favor of a person, the identity of whom the US government claims to be confidential. Objections as regards questions seeking to ascertain his identity were sustained by the trial court on the

ground that it will violate the privilege of withholding the identity of informers. In reversing the trial court, it was held that: If the person whom Grady called an informer had been an informer and nothing more, appellant would not have been entitled to have his identity disclosed; but the person whom Grady called an informer was something more. He was the person to whom appellant was said to have sold and dispensed the opium described in the indictment. Information as to this person's identity was therefore material to appellant's defense xxx. The particular factual backdrop in Rojo likewise provided for the indispensability of the confidential informant as a crucial witness: The theory of the prosecution is that the informant acted as buyer in the entrapment proceedings. However, the alleged informant was never presented as a witness. His identity was never revealed because it was supposed to be confidential information.

The evidence of the prosecution on the matter of the participation of the informant as alleged buyer in the entrapment proceedings is contradictory. xxx. xxx xxx xxx

Obviously, there is a fatal flaw in the prosecution's evidence on how the alleged entrapment proceedings took place. The so-called informant was never presented as a witness and he was never identified. His having acted as buyer in the alleged entrapment proceedings was not established as a fact by evidence beyond reasonable doubt because of the contradictory evidence as to who really posed as buyer. There is now even a doubt as to whether or not the entrapment proceedings ever took place at all. xxx xxx xxx

These are the facts as found by the trial court which show that none of the prosecution witnesses actually saw the appellant deliver the alleged bag of flowering tops of marijuana which was allegedly sold to the informant. It also indicates that they did not see the informant pay the alleged consideration of the sale with a 10-peso bill. They just assumed that the transaction was consummated upon a signal from the informant. There is, therefore, no direct evidence, much less conclusive proof, to establish the alleged unlawful sale of marijuana being pinned on appellant. On the other hand, the present case does not confront us with a situation where it can be said that the informant's testimony is indispensable such that

a conviction would be baseless without it. Here, it was SPO4 Jamisolamin, whose testimony was duly adduced, that acted as poseur-buyer. He testified as to his own personal knowledge of the sale that had taken place. The informant's testimony, then, would have been merely corroborative and cumulative because the fact of sale of the prohibited drug was already established by the direct testimony of SPO4 Jamisolamin who actively took part in the transaction. If the prosecution has several eyewitnesses, as in the instant case, it need not present all of them but only as many as may be needed to meet the quantum of proof necessary to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The testimonies of the other witnesses may, therefore, be dispensed with for being merely corroborative in nature.[12] XXXXXXXXX Besides, credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they enjoy the presumption of having performed their duties in a regular manner, unless, of course, there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on their part or deviation from the regular performance of their duties, [14] none of which exists in this case. There is absolutely no evidence to show that the members of the buy-bust team who were presented as witnesses were motivated by any reason other than their official duty. If indeed there was a frame-up, the officers must have known appellants prior to the incident.[15] However, appellant Lopez himself admitted neither knowing these police officers nor having any kind of history with them. Absent proof of any intent on the part of the police officers to falsely impute commission of a crime against appellants, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty stands. Appellants self-serving claim of a frame-up must simply collapse.

Distinction between instigation and entrapment The demarcation line distinguishing instigation from entrapment is clearly drawn. In the case of People v. Quintana,[19] we explained the distinction between the two, to wit There is a wide difference between entrapment and instigation, for while in the latter case the instigator practically induces the will be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal, in entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breaker in the execution of his criminal plan. Instigation and inducement must be distinguished from entrapment. The general rule is that instigation and inducement to commit a crime, for the purpose of filing criminal charges, is to be condemned as immoral, while entrapment, which is the employment of means and ways for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law

breaker, is sanctioned and permissible. And the reason is obvious. Under the first instance, no crime has been committed, and to induce one to commit it makes of the instigator a co-criminal. Under the last instance, the crime has already been committed and all that is done is to entrap and capture the law breaker.[20] Failure to marked /initial identity of the corpus delicte not sufficiently established Consequently, courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing, and the presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused.[35] Significantly, the Court agrees with the OSGs observation that the identity of the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently established. Tougans testimony does not definitively express that the confiscated plastic sachets of shabu have been marked/initialed at the scene of the crime, according to proper procedure. Tougan testified as follows: PUBLIC PROS. MAJOMOT Q After that, what did you do after you recovered or confiscated these plastic sachets from the accused? A After he was arrested, sir, we brought him to the police station. Q After that, what happened next? A When we reached the police station, sir, he gave his name as Salvador Santos. Q What happened to the plastic sachets? A I wrote my initials on all the plastic sachets or the evidence confiscated from him, sir, and a document was prepared for them to be examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory.[36]

The case of People v. Lim[37] specifies that any apprehending team having initial control of illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was the same drug and/or paraphernalia as that actually recovered from the accused. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SALVADOR SANTOS, JR G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007)

PEOPLE VS FREDERICK RICHIE TEODORO Y DELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 185164 violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 PROSECUTION VERSION FACTS OF THE CASE.. The Peoples version of the facts shows that on May 23, 2004, Police received information from a confidential asset that a man named Richie was conducting illegal activities at Matamis Street, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Acting on the information, Police Officers conducted surveillance. During the surveillance conducted from May 23-27, 2004, the group confirmed that appellant was involved in selling illegal drugs. On May 28, 2003, a team, was organized to conduct a buy-bust operation at the target site. PO1 Climacosa was designated as poseur-buyer while the remaining members of the team served as back up. At the same time, PSI Gadiano coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) on the conduct of the buy-bust operation. Two (2) marked P100.00 bills with serial numbers RF390501 and NS581977 were handed to PO1 Climacosa. Around 5:30 o clock in the afternoon of the same day, the team proceeded to the area. PO1 Climacosa approached the accused said, Pre, iskor ako ng dalawang piso pang gamit lang. Appellant replied sandali lang. PO1 Climacosa gave appellant the two marked P100.00 bills. Appellant, in turn, handed to PO1 Climacosa a sachet containing a white crystalline substance. PO1 Climacosa removed his cap to signal the consummation of the sale transaction to the other team members who were positioned some 10 meters away. Thereafter, PO1 Climacosa introduced himself and informed appellant that he was under arrest. Appellant resisted and ran away, but he was eventually accosted by PO1 Climacosa and the other members of the team. PO1 Antipasado then frisked appellant and found the marked money and another sachet of white crystalline substance in appellants pocket. mmediately, the team apprised appellant of his constitutional rights. Appellant was, thereafter, brought to the Mandaluyong Medical Center for medical check-up. From the hospital, appellant was turned over to the Criminal Investigation Division of the Mandaluyong City Police Station. In the said office, the confiscated sachets were marked as MC and MC-1 by PO1 Climacosa and PO1 Antipasado, respectively. The marked two (2) P100.00 bills were turned over to the evidence custodian, while the two (2) confiscated sachets were immediately brought to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory in Eastern Police District (EPD) for laboratory examination. PSI Lourdeliza Cejes, Forensic Chemist, found the two (2) sachets of white crystalline substance to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu DEFENSE DENIAL AND FRAME UP Denial, frame up and extortion were accused-appellants main exculpating line. In his Brief, appellant summarized the version of the defense as follows:

On May 28, 2004, at around two oclock (2:00) in the afternoon, FREDERICK RICHIE TEODORO was at his house in Pantaleon Street washing the dishes, when three (3) male persons entered the place and introduced themselves as police officers. He was told not to move and PO1 Climacosa told him that at last, we were able to get you Jimmy. The accused was quick to tell the policemen that he was not Jimmy, and the person they were looking for lives in the other house. One of the policemen went to the house of certa[i]n Jimmy. Meanwhile, PO1 Climacosa handcuffed the accused, while the other policeman searched the house. Unable to find anything, the policemen brought him to Mandaluyong Medical Hospital. Afterwards, he was brought to the Mandaluyong City Hall, where he met PO1 Posadas who asked him the whereabouts of the Muslims. He replied that he does not know any Muslim, and he was told to produce thirty thousand (P30,000.00) pesos. He told PO1 Posadas that he does not have money. Irked by the accuseds answer, PO1 Posadas pulled out from his drawer a small plastic sachet and lighter and was told that those are evidence against him.

2. INFORMANT was not presented.. Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that non-compliance with Section 21 will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him inadmissible. As held by this Court in People v. Lopez: In general, the presentation of an informant in an illegal drugs case is not essential for conviction nor is it indispensable for a successful prosecution because his testimony would be merely corroborative and cumulative. In a case involving the sale of illegal drugs, what should be proven beyond reasonable doubt is the fact of the sale itself. Hence, like the non-presentation of the marked money used in buying the contraband, the non-presentation of the informer would not necessarily create a hiatus in the prosecution's evidence Thus, in People v. Marilyn Naquita, we rejected a similar contention, holding that: The presentation of an informant is not a requisite in the prosecution of drug cases. The failure of the prosecution to present the informant does not vitiate its cause as the latter's testimony is not indispensable to a successful prosecution for drug-pushing, since his testimony would be merely corroborative of and cumulative with that of the poseur-buyer who was presented in court and who testified on the facts and circumstances of the sale and delivery of the prohibited drug. Failure of the prosecution to produce the informant in court is of no moment, especially when he is not even the best witness to establish the fact that a buy-bust operation has indeed been conducted. Informants are usually not presented in court because of the need to hide their identities and preserve their invaluable services to the police. It is well-settled that except when the accused vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material

inconsistencies in the testimonies of the arresting officers, or there are reasons to believe that the arresting officers had motives to falsely testify against the accused, or that only the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction, the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be corroborative of the apprehending officers' eyewitness accounts. In the case under consideration, none of the exceptions are present that would make the testimony of the confidential informant indispensable. As admitted by appellant, the police officers who testified against her were not known to her before her arrest. We likewise do not find material inconsistencies in their testimonies. Further, the informant is a person different from the poseur-buyer. What we find vital is appellant's apprehension while peddling and possessing dangerous drugs by PO1 Cosme and PO1 Llanderal. 3. CHAIN OF CUSTODY was not established Appellant further claims that the prosecution failed to establish the evidences chain of custody because the buy-bust team failed to strictly comply with Section 21 of RA 9165 and Section 2 of Dangerous Drugs Board Resolution No. 1. He adds that the policemens failure to abide by these provisions casts doubt on the admissibility of the evidence adduced against him. HELD: Contrary to what appellant wants to portray, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs was shown not to have been broken. After the seizure of the drugs from appellants possession, PO1 Climacosa and PO1 Antipasado marked the two (2) plastic sachets. The plastic sachet that was sold to PO1 Climacosa was marked MC, while the plastic sachet that was recovered by PO1 Antipasado was marked MC-1. These plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance were immediately forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory in EPD for examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. After a qualitative examination conducted on the specimens, PSI Cejes concluded that the white crystalline substance was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. There can be no doubt that the drugs seized from appellant were the same ones examined in the crime laboratory. Plainly, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized shabu from the time they were first discovered until they were brought for examination. drug addiction is one of the most pernicious evils that has ever crept into our society. More often than not, it is the young who are the victims. On the other hand, equally reprehensible is the police practice of using the law as a tool for extorting money from hapless victims. Courts must be vigilant in trying drug charges, lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.

WARRANTLESS ARREST INFORMATION CONSTITUTE PROBABLE CAUSE G.R. No. 127801. March 3, 1999] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. SAMUEL YU VALDEZ @ Bebot, accused-appellant. The prosecutions evidence upon which the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt was based is summarized by the trial court as follows: In the morning of September 1, 1994, SPO1 Bernardo Mariano was in the Municipality of Banaue, Ifugao waiting for a ride to report for work in Lagawe, Ifugao. A civilian asset approached him and intimated that an Ilocano person was ready to transport marijuana. This asset described to him the physical appearance of the suspect as thin and possessing a green bag. Mr. Mariano invited the asset and together they proceeded to Barangay O-ong, Hingyon, Ifugao. There they alighted and stopped and ordinary Dangwa passenger bus bound for Baguio City. Aboard on this bus, they did not find the person concerned and reaching Barangay Pitawan, Hingyon, Ifugao, they stepped out of the vehicle and waited for the air conditioned Dangwa bus bound for Manila. When this bus arrived, Police Officer Mariano boarded the aircon bus and looked for that person from among the passengers and noticed him holding the green bag. He immediately ordered the person to get out of the bus. This fellow followed holding the bag. Once outside, he further ordered the suspect to open the bag and saw a water jug colored red and white and a lunch box. He told this man to open the jug and the lunch box and when opened, he saw marijuana leaves as contents. At this time, suspect revealed his name to be Samuel Yu Valdez. With this discovery, the asset was left behind and Peace Officer Mariano escorted the accused to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Provincial Headquarters at Lagawe, Ifugao. He turned over the accused including the contents of the green bag to his superiors for further investigation. Appellant, through his counsel, Public Attorneys Office, raised the following assignment of errors in his appeal: I THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING THE SEIZED DRUGS IN EVIDENCE. II THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. Appellant contends that the marijuana allegedly seized from him was a product of an unlawful search, hence, inadmissible in evidence. The resolution of this case hinges on the pivotal question of the constitutionality and legality of the arrest and search of herein appellant effected by the police officer. Settled is the rule that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by a competent judicial authority. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in

their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. It further decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said rights shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The abovementioned constitutional provisions serve as safeguards against wanton and unreasonable invasion of the privacy and liberty of a citizen as to his person, papers and effects. The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. A statute, rule or situation which allows exceptions to the requirement of a warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictly construed. We cannot liberally consider arrests or seizures without warrant or extend their application beyond the cases specifically provided or allowed by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and yet, so deserving of full protection and vindication. Nevertheless, the constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. On the other hand, a lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. In this case, appellant was caught in flagrante since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. A crime was actually being committed by the appellant, thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (a) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to lawful arrest. While it is true that SPO1 Mariano was not armed with a search warrant when the search was conducted over the personal effects of appellant, nevertheless, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said police officer to believe that appellant was then and there committing a crime. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to

believe that an offense has been committed and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. The required probable cause that will justify a warrantless search and seizure is not determined by a fixed formula but is resolved according to the facts of each case.

Our jurisprudence is replete with instances where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. In People v. Tangliben, two police officers and a barangay tanod were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner terminal compound in San Fernando, Pampanga against persons who may commit misdemeanors and also on those who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on information supplied by informers. At 9:30 in the evening, the policemen noticed a person carrying a red travelling bag who was acting suspiciously. An informer pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying marijuana. They confronted him and requested him to open his bag but he refused. He acceded later on when the policemen identified themselves. Inside the bag were marijuana leaves wrapped in a plastic wrapper. The police officers only knew of the activities of Tangliben on the night of his arrest. Hence, faced with such on-the-spot tip, the police officers acted quickly as there was not enough time to secure a search warrant. In People v. Maspil, a checkpoint was set up by elements of the First Narcotics Regional Unit of the Narcotics Command at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, to monitor, inspect and scrutinize vehicles on the highway going towards Baguio City. This was done because of a confidential report by informers that Maspil and Bagking, would be transporting a large quantity of marijuana to Baguio City. In fact, the informers were with the policemen manning the checkpoint. As expected, at about 2 oclock in the early morning of November 1, 1986, a jeepney approached the checkpoint, driven by Maspil, with Bagking as passenger. The officers stopped the vehicle and saw that on it were loaded 2 plastic sacks, a jute sack, and 3 big round tin cans. When opened, the sacks and cans were seen to contain what appeared to be marijuana leaves. The policemen thereupon placed Maspil and Bagking under arrest, and confiscated the leaves which, upon scientific examination, were verified to be marijuana leaves. The Court upheld the validity of the search thus conducted, as being incidental to lawful warrantless arrest and declared that Maspil and Bagking had been caught in flagrante delicto transporting prohibited drugs. In People v. Malmstedt, Narcom agents set up checkpoint at Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province in view of reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana. They likewise received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. There was no reasonable time to obtain a search warrant, especially since the identity of the suspect could not be readily ascertained. Accuseds actuations also aroused the suspicion of the officers conducting the inspection aboard the bus. The Court held

that in light of such circumstances, to deprive the agents of the ability and facility to act promptly, including a search without a warrant, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectiveness in law enforcement, to the detriment of society. In People v. Bagista, the NARCOM officers had probable cause to stop and search all vehicles coming from the north to Acop, Tublay, Benguet in view of the confidential information they received from their regular informant that a woman having the same appearance as that of accused-appellant would be bringing marijuana from up north. They likewise had probable cause to search accused-appellants belongings since she fitted the description given by the NARCOM informant.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the policemen conducted a surveillance in an area of the Kalookan Cemetery based on information that drug addicts were roaming therein. Upon reaching the place, they chanced upon a man in front of the cemetery who appeared to be high on drugs. He was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a swaying manner. Moreover, he appeared to be trying to avoid the policemen. When approached and asked what he was holding in his hands , he tried to resist. When he showed his wallet, it contained marijuana. The Court held that the policemen had sufficient reason to accost accused-appellant to determine if he was actually high on drugs due to his suspicious actuations, coupled with the fact that based on information, this area was a haven for drug addicts. As in the instant case, police officer Mariano was tipped off by a civilian asset that a thin Ilocano person with a green bag was about to transport marijuana from Banaue, Ifugao. Said information was received by SPO1 Mariano the very same morning he was waiting for a ride in Banaue to report for work in Lagawe, the capital town of Ifugao province. Thus, face with such on-the-spot information, the law enforcer had to respond quickly to the call of duty. Obviously, there was not enough time to secure a search warrant considering the time involved in the process. In fact, in view of the urgency of the case, SPO1 Mariano together with the civilian asset proceeded immediately to Hingyon, Ifugao to pursue the drug trafficker. In Hingyon, he flagged down buses bound for Baguio City and Manila, and looked for the person described by the informant. It must be noted that the target of the pursuit was just the thin Ilocano person with a green bag and no other. And so, when SPO1 Mariano inspected the bus bound for Manila, he just singled out the passenger with the green bag. Evidently, there was definite information of the identity of the person engaged in transporting prohibited drugs at a particular time and place. SPO1 Mariano had already an inkling of the identity of the person he was looking for. As a matter of fact, no search at all was conducted on the baggages of other passengers. Hence, appellants claim that the arresting officer was only fishing for evidence of a crime has no factual basis.

Clearly, SPO1 Mariano had probable cause to stop and search the buses coming from Banaue in view of the information he got from th e civilian asset that somebody having the same appearance as that of appellant and with a green bag would be transporting marijuana from Banaue. He likewise had probable cause to search appellants belongings since he fits the description given by the civilian asset. Since there was a valid warrantless search by the police officer, any evidence obtained during the course of said search is admissible against appellant. Appellant likewise asserts that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He claims that when SPO1 Mariano apprehended him, he was not in possession of the green bag as the same was under the seat before him. The assertion is incredulous. when appellant was asked to get off the bus and bring his bag, appellant brought with him said bag. If, indeed, the bag was not his, he should not have taken it with him in alighting from the bus. Besides, denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight in law.

[G.R. No. 148586. May 25, 2004] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LI KA KIM alias ED, appellant. The totality of evidence presented is convincing and points to appellant as being a person engaged in the sale of illegal drugs. The testimony of the prosecution witnesses identifying appellant to be a seller of illegal drugs appears to be categorical and unfabricated. No ill motive on the part of the witnesses has been shown to tarnish their testimony. Such positive evidence certainly prevails over mere denial and alibi which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving unworthy of credible weight in law. Appellants argument that a surveillance or a test buy should have first been conducted deserves scant consideration. In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, it is enough to show that - (1) the accused is in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused has freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug. Neither a prior surveillance of the suspected offender nor the presentation of the informant would be an indispensable requirement to the successful prosecution of a drug case.

PP vs LOURDERICO ORTIZ DARIZAN ET. AL., GR NO. 176151, JANUARY 30, 2009 The following are the elements of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs: In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first

be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. In a prosecution for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug.

[G.R. No. 125959. February 1, 1999] JOSE MARIA M. ASUNCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. This Court, in the case of People v. Lo Ho Wing, elucidated on the rationale for the exemption of searches of moving vehicles from the coverage of the requirement of search warrants, to wit: the rules governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with impunity. We might add that a warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue of a valid warrantless search and the petitioner himself freely gave his consent to said search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence. In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly called buy-bust operations of the narcotics agents. Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug. In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. From the foregoing, it could be seen that the case under review presented different

factual circumstances which would not call for the application of the ruling in the Aminnudin case. First of all, even though the police authorities already identified the petitioner as an alleged shabu dealer and confirmed the area where he allegedly was plying his illegal trade, they were uncertain as to the time he would show up in the vicinity. Secondly, they were uncertain as to the type of vehicle petitioner would be in, taking into account reports that petitioner used different cars in going to and from the area. Finally, there was probable cause as the same police officers had a previous encounter with the petitioner, who was then able to evade arrest. As the Solicitor General argued: . . .With this knowledge and experience, the narcotic operatives had reasonable ground to believe that the gray Nissan car referred to by their confidential informant was one of the vehicles being used by their subject so that when the same was pointed to them by their confidential informant, with the information that the occupant thereof was carrying shabu, the operatives had to act quickly. Otherwise, they would again lose their subject whom they reasonably believed to be committing a crime at that instance. There would be no more time for them to secure a search warrant. Thus, when the police officers suddenly sighted petitioners gray Nissan Sentra, they obviously no longer had the time to apply for a search warrant. The dictates of urgency necessitated the flagging down of the vehicle. DISMISSED CASE ILLEGAL SEARCH. CASE DISMISSED. [G.R. No. 125754. December 22, 1999] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ZENAIDA BOLASA Y NAKOBOAN and ROBERTO DELOS REYES, accused-appellants. DECISION BELLOSILLO, J.: An anonymous caller tipped off PO3 Dante Salonga and PO3 Albert Carizon in the early evening of 11 September 1995 that a man and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St., Karuhatan, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and PO3 Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects and parked their car some three hundred (300) meters away. They walked towards their quarry's lair accompanied this time by their unnamed informer. When they reached the house they "peeped (inside) through a small window and x x x saw one man and a woman repacking suspected marijuana." They entered the house and introduced themselves as police officers to the occupants and thereupon confiscated the tea bags and some drug paraphernalia. They arrested the two (2) who turned out to be the accused Zenaida Bolasa y Nakoboan and Roberto delos Reyes. Subsequent examination of the tea bags by NBI Forensic Chemist Rubie Calalo confirmed the suspicion that the tea bags contained marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto delos Reyes were thus charged with violation of Sec. 8, Art. II, of RA 6425 otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Both however denied on the witness stand ownership over the confiscated tea bags and drug implements.

We sustain the appeal. This case clearly illustrates how constitutional guarantees against illegal arrests and seizures can be violated by overzealous police officers in the arrest of suspected drug offenders. Thus, after a meticulous evaluation of the evidence at hand, this Court finds itself with no other recourse but to strike down the process adopted by the prosecution and acquit accused-appellants for insufficiency of evidence and reasonable doubt. Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution provides The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses, papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly "cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure agreeable." For sure, this constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it obviously operates only against searches and seizures that are "unreasonable." Thus, arrests and seizures in the following instances are not deemed unreasonable and are thus allowed even in the absence of a warrant 1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence); 2. Search of evidence in plain view. The elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicles inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; and 7. Exigent and emergency circumstances. An arrest is lawful even in the absence of a warrant: (a) when the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence; (b) when an offense has in fact been committed and

he has reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed it; and, (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

The manner by which accused-appellants were apprehended does not fall under any of the above-enumerated categories. Perforce, their arrest is illegal. First, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accused-appellants had just committed, were committing, or were about to commit a crime. Second, the arresting officers had no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor did they have any reasonable ground to believe that accused-appellants committed it. Third, accused-appellants were not prisoners who have escaped from a penal establishment. Neither can it be said that the objects were seized in plain view . First, there was no valid intrusion. As already discussed, accused-appellants were illegally arrested. Second, the evidence, i.e., the tea bags later on found to contain marijuana, was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally peeped first through the window before they saw and ascertained the activities of accused-appellants inside the room. In like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a consented warrantless search, a customs search, or a stop and frisk; it cannot even fall under exigent and emergency circumstances, for the evidence at hand is bereft of any such showing. On the contrary, it indicates that the apprehending officers should have conducted first a surveillance considering that the identities and address of the suspected culprits were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the existence of probable cause for arresting accused-appellants, they should have secured a search warrant prior to effecting a valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search was likewise illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be used against accused-appellants; hence, their acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law. SEPARATE OPINION PANGANIBAN, J.: I agree with the persuasive ponencia of Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., that: 1. the search conducted on petitioner (a) was not incidental to a lawful arrest and (b) did not constitute a valid stop-and-frisk; thus, the grenade found in his person cannot be admitted as evidence against him; and 2. the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal from the trial court's decision. I wish, however, to correlate the present case with four relevant decisions I authored

for the Court: Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, People vs. Encinada, People vs. Lacerna and People vs. Cuizon, all of which were promulgated without any dissenting view. This correlation may be of benefit to the bench, the bar and, particularly, to law enforcement officers. Let me first present a background on each. Manalili Involved a Valid Stop-and-Frisk In Manalili, anti-narcotics policemen conducted a surveillance in response to information that drug addicts were roaming the area fronting the city cemetery of Kalookan, and chance upon Manalili who was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in a wobbly manner. Because his appearance was characteristic of a person "high on drugs," the lawmen approached him, introduced themselves and inquired as to what was in his hands. At first, Manalili resisted but the police prevailed and he showed them his wallet. The anti-narcotics men found inside what they suspected to be crushed marijuana residue. They took Manalili to their station for further investigation. A chromatographic test of the wallet contents positively affirmed the lawmen's suspicions. Manalili was thus charged, tried and convicted of illegal possession of the prohibited substance. He subsequently challenged before us the legality of his search and arrest, and the admission of the marijuana as evidence. He contended that the latter two were products of the illegal search. Rejecting his appeal, this Court held that the search was akin to a stop-and-frisk. The police had sufficient reason to stop Manalili, who "had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk x x x [in] a popular hangout of drug addicts," in order to investigate if he was actually "high" on drugs. The situation verily called for a stop-and-frisk. Lawmen Had Sufficient Opportunity to Secure Warrant in Encinada In Encinada, a police officer received late in the afternoon a tip from an informant that the following morning, appellant would be arriving at the Surigao port bringing marijuana. Without securing a search warrant allegedly because courts were already closed for the day, the lawmen proceeded early next morning to the city wharf. About 8:30 a.m., they saw the suspect, carrying two plastic baby chairs, disembark and thereafter board a tricycle. The police followed immediately and ordered the driver to stop. After introducing themselves, the policemen asked Encinada to alight and to hand over his luggage for inspection. found between the baby chairs was a bulky package which was later found to contain marijuana. On these particulars, he was charged, tried and convicted by the trial court for violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of RA 6425, holding that Encinada was caught in flagrante delicto. Hence, the warrantless search following his arrest was valid, and the marijuana seized was admissible in evidence. Reversing the trial court, this Court stressed the following: Encinada was not committing a crime in the presence of the police; the latter did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that he just committed an offense; and raw intelligence information was not a sufficient ground for a warantless arrest. Furthermore, "[t]he prosecution's evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the

motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances." Having known the identity of their suspect the previous day, the law enforcers could have secured a warrant of arrest even within such limited period (per Administative Circular No. 13 and Circular No. 19, s. 1987). In emphasizing the importance of according respect to every person's constitutional rights against illegal arrests and searches, the Court exhorted: "Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate every law they are expected to enforce. [The policeman's] receipt of the intelligence information regarding the culprit's identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts underscored the need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But he failed to do so. Such failure or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a constitutional right of the appellant." "x x x That the search disclosed a prohibited substance in appellant's possession and thus confirmed the police officers' initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidcnce yielded by the search."

Consent Validated an Otherwise Illegal Search in Lacerna In Lacerna meanwhile, a police officer observed that the occupants of a taxicab bowed their heads and slouched when they passed through the checkpoint he was manning, making him suspect that something was amiss. He signaled the driver to stop, then asked permission to search the vehicle. The occupants consented. Found inside a plastic bag were several blocks wrapped in newspaper, which were later discovered to contain marijuana. Lacerna questioned his warrantless arrest and seizure, claiming that they were violative of his constitutional rights. The Court, despite declaring that the prior attendant circumstances did not justify a warrantless search and seizure, ruled that the search was valid, not because Lacerna was caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to the search. Although appellant and his companion were stopped by the police on mere suspicion -- without probable cause -- that they were engaged in a felonious enterprise, the Court stressed that their permission for the search was expressly sought and obtained by the law enforcers. This consent validated the search, waiver being a generally recognized exception to the rule against warrantless search. The marijuana, therefore, was admissible in evidence. "There was no poisonous tree to speak of." Mere Suspicion of Criminal Activity Did Not Justify Search of Cuizon Lastly, in Cuizon, the NBI, after conducting a surveillance on Cuizon for about a month, received in the morning a tip from an informant that Cuizon and his wife were arriving at NAIA that same day, bringing a large quantity of shabu. A team was immediately organized and sent to the airport to intercept the suspect. Shortly after noon, the Cuizon spouses arrived. While at the airport arrival

area, Cuizon handed four travelling bags to Pua and Lee who thereafter boarded a taxicab, while the Cuizons took a different vehicle. The NBI team members posted at the NAIA parking area, however, failed to intercept the suspects. The team merely trailed the taxicab which proceeded to the Manila Peninsula Hotel in Makati. After identifying themselves to the suspects in their hotel room, the team asked permission to search their bags in the presence of the hotel's chief security officer. Pua and Lee consented in writing. Found inside three of the four bags similar to those handed to them by Cuizon at the airport were plastic packages of white crystaline substances which, upon later examination, were confirmed to be shabu. Taking with them the two accused (who, however, did not implicate Cuizon), the NBI team proceeded to the Cuizon residence where they found a bag allegedly containing the same subtance. The three were charged and convicted of illegal transport of the regulated drug. On appeal, only Cuizon challenged the validity of his warrantless arrest, search and seizure. Reiterating the doctrine that "where a person is searched without a warrant, and under circumstances other than those justifying a warrantless arrest x x x, upon a mere suspicion that he has embarked on some criminal activity, and/or for the purpose of discovering if indeed a crime has been committed by him, then the search made of such person as well as his arrest [is] deemed illegal," this Court declared unlawful the arrest of Cuizon as well as the incidental search and seizure. The warrantless arrest and search were not justified by the rules on "in flagrante delicto" or "hot pursuit" for, at the time of his arrest, Cuizon was inside his home resting with his wife and child. No offense had just been committed or was actually being committed or attempted by him in the presence of the lawmen, nor did the latter have personal knowledge of facts indicating that Cuizon authored an offense that had just in fact been committed. Consequently, any evidence obtained during the illegal search, "even if tending to confirm or actually confirming the initial suspicion, is absolutely inadmissible for any purpose and in any proceeding, the same being 'the fruit of the poisonous tree." Moreover, Encinada and Cuizon had been previously identified and subjected to surveillance. Police informants themselves, presumably reliable, tipped off their alleged criminal activity. Specifically with respect to Encinada, there was sufficient time to priorly obtain a warrant for his arrest. It must be stressed that raw unverified intelligence information alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest or search. That is why it is important to bring one's evidence before a judge who shall independently determine if probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant. It is not for the police to make such determination. As regards Cuizon, it was, worse, the ineptness of the NBI team dispatched to intercept him which foiled his arrest and search. In the present case, if it were true that the arresting officer saw Malacat two days earlier attempting to detonate a grenade in the same vicinity, again it was the policemen's ineptitude that frustrated his valid arrest there and then and, further, their inability to effectively investigate and identify the culprit -- so as to have

obtained a lawful arrest warrant -- that hindered his valid seizure thereafter. (3) In Lacerna, true, the occupants of the taxicab bowed their heads and slouched when they passed through the police checkpoint. Although such acts could raise suspicions, they did not provide sufficient reason for the police to stop and investigate them for possible criminal operation; much less, to conduct an extensive search of their belongings. A checkpoint search is limited to a roving view within the vehicle. A further search may be validly effected only if something probably illegal is within his "plain view." In Lacerna, if not for the passengers' free and express consent, the search would have been undoubtedly declared illegal. Similarly, the fast-moving eyes of Malacat, although connoting unusual behavior, was not indicative that he was armed and dangerous as to justify a search on his person. Mengote Supports Present Ponencia Bolstering the invalidity of the arrest and search of Malacat is People vs. Mengote, Another classic on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Upon receiving a telephone call shortly before noon from an informer that there were suspicious-looking persons at a certain street corner in Tondo, Manila, the Western Police District dispatched a surveillance team to said place. There they saw two men "looking from side to side" with one "holding his abdomen." The police approached them and identified themselves, whereupon the two tried to flee but failed as other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were searched, and recovered from Mengote was a fully loaded pistol; from his companion, a fan knife. The Court ruled that the situation was not one calling for a lawful warrantless search and arrest. As the Court, through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, succintly put it: "What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person 'looking from side to side' and 'holding his abdomen' and in a place not exactly forsaken?" "x x x [T]here could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that there were 'suspicious-looking' persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime."

The same would have been true as regards Pua and Lee. But Pua effectively waived his right against the warantless search when he agreed in writing for the NBI team to search his luggage. Besides, he failed to challenge the validity of his arrest and search and the admission of the evidence obtained thereby. However, the case against Lee, who could not speak English or Filipino, was remanded for a retrial, because he was effectively denied his right to counsel; for although he was provided with one, he could not understand and communicate

with him concerning his defense. After reviewing previous decisions on valid warrantless arrests and searches, the Court underscored in sum that there was need for facts providing probable cause, such as the "distinct odor of marijuana, reports about drug transporting or positive identification by informers, suspicious behavior, attempt to flee, [or] failure to produce identification papers" to justify warantless arrests and searches. Likewise, urgency must attend such arrests and searches, as where motor vehicles are used and there is great probaility that the suspect would get away before a warrant can be procured. Most important is that the law enforcers must act immediately on the information received, suspicions raised or probable cause established, and should effect the arrests and searches without any delay. Instant Case Correlated with Four cited Now to the correlation with the case at bar. (1) As in Manalili, lawmen were on surveillance in response to information that a criminal activity could be in the offing at a specified place. The stark difference, however, is that in Manalili, the reported activity involved drug use and the lawmen belonged to the anti-narcotics group, while in the instant case, the police on patrol were ordinary law enforcers on the lookout for possible bombers. In the former, the law enforcers concerned may be presumed to possess special knowledge and skill to detect the physical features exhibited by a current drug user. Thus, when these specially trained enforcers saw Manalili with reddish eyes and walking in a wobbly manner characteristic of a person "high" on drugs per their experience, and in a known hangout of drug users, there was sufficient genuine reason to stop and frisk the suspect. It is well to emphasize that under different circumstances, such as where the policemen are not specially trained, and in common places where people ordinarily converge, the same features displayed by a person will not normally justify a warrantless arrest or search on him. The case before us presents such a situation. The policemen merely observed that Malacat's eyes were moving very fast. They did not notice any bulges or packets about the bodies of these men indicating that they might be hiding explosive paraphernalia. From their outward look, nothing suggested that they were at the time armed and dangerous. Hence, there was no justification for a stop-and-frisk. (2) In relation to the cases of Encinada and Cuizon, at the time of the arrests of the suspects, none of the actions of Accused Encinada and Cuizon were beyond normal as to suggest that they were then engaged in felonious activities. The simple handing over of the baggage by Cuizon to Pua and Lee was far from being indicative of any illegal activity. Such act by itself does not, by any stretch of imagination, even appear to be suspicious. Granting that indeed and offense was committed by Cuizon at the airport, his subsequent arrest cannot even be justified under the rule on "hot pursuit." He did not attempt to flee, but was actually able to leave the premises and reach his house unhampered by the police. There was

considerable interruption between the supposed commission of the crime and his subsequent arrest in his house where he was already resting.

(3) In Lacerna, true, the occupants of the taxicab bowed their heads and slouched when they passed through the police checkpoint. Although such acts could raise suspicions, they did not provide sufficient reason for the police to stop and investigate them for possible criminal operation; much less, to conduct an extensive search of their belongings. A checkpoint search is limited to a roving view within the vehicle. A further search may be validly effected only if something probably illegal is within his "plain view." In Lacerna, if not for the passengers' free and express consent, the search would have been undoubtedly declared illegal. Similarly, the fast-moving eyes of Malacat, although connoting unusual behavior, was not indicative that he was armed and dangerous as to justify a search on his person. Mengote Supports Present Ponencia Bolstering the invalidity of the arrest and search of Malacat is People vs. Mengote, Another classic on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Upon receiving a telephone call shortly before noon from an informer that there were suspicious-looking persons at a certain street corner in Tondo, Manila, the Western Police District dispatched a surveillance team to said place. There they saw two men "looking from side to side" with one "holding his abdomen." The police approached them and identified themselves, whereupon the two tried to flee but failed as other lawmen surrounded them. The suspects were searched, and recovered from Mengote was a fully loaded pistol; from his companion, a fan knife. The Court ruled that the situation was not one calling for a lawful warrantless search and arrest. As the Court, through Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, succintly put it: "What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person 'looking from side to side' and 'holding his abdomen' and in a place not exactly forsaken?" "x x x [T]here could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and he was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that there were 'suspicious-looking' persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime." In closing, the Court lamented and thus warned: "It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a

free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security." Under our rule in Mengote, petitioner's dubious act of moving his eyes swiftly from side to side can in no way justify a stop-and-frisk. To convict a person on the basis only of his queer behavior and to sentence him to practically a lifetime in prison would simply be unfathomable. Nothing can be more wrong, unjust and inhuman. [G.R. No. 136860. January 20, 2003] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AGPANGA LIBNAO y KITTEN and ROSITA NUNGA y VALENCIA, accused. It appears from the evidence adduced by the prosecution that in August of 1996, intelligence operatives of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed in Tarlac, Tarlac began conducting surveillance operation on suspected drug dealers in the area. They learned from their asset that a certain woman from Tajiri, Tarlac and a companion from Baguio City were transporting illegal drugs once a month in big bulks. On October 19, 1996, at about 10 oclock in the evening, Chief Inspector Benjamin Arceo, Tarlac Police Chief, held a briefing in connection with a tip which his office received that the two drug pushers, riding in a tricycle, would be making a delivery that night. An hour later, the Police Alert Team installed a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan to apprehend the suspects. Witness SPO1 Marlon Gamotea, PO3 Florante Ferrer and SPO3 Roberto Aquino were assigned to man the checkpoint. At about 1:00 oclock in the morning of the following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3 Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It had two female passengers seated inside, who were later identified as the appellant Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused Rosita Nunga. In front of them was a black bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the twos uneasy behavior when asked about its ownership and content, the officers invited them to Kabayan Center No.2 located at the same barangay. They brought with them the black bag. Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to witness the opening of the black bag. In the meantime, the two women and the bag were turned over to the investigator on duty, SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the barangay captain arrived, the black bag was opened in the presence of the appellant, her co-accused and personnel of the center. Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves sealed in plastic bags and covered with newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be marijuana. To determine who owns the bag and its contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the two. For their part, both accused denied the accusation against them. Rosita Nunga testified that in the evening of October 19,1996, she went to buy medicine for her ailing child at a pharmacy near the Tarlac Provincial Hospital. The child was suffering from diarrhea, occasioned by abdominal pain. To return to their house, she boarded a tricycle bound for Barangay Tariji, where she resides. Along the way, the tricycle she was riding was flagged down by a policeman at

a checkpoint in Barangay Salapungan. She was taken aback when the officer invited her to the Kabayan Center. It was there that she was confronted with the black bag allegedly containing eight bricks of marijuana leaves. She disputed owning the bag and knowing its contents. She also denied sitting beside the appellant in the passengers seat inside the tricycle, although she admitted noticing a male passenger behind the driver.

The defense of denial and alibi has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most cases involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. The general rule is that a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a search warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, thus: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against all searches and seizures as it operates only against unreasonable searches and seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection accorded by the search and seizure clause is that between persons and police must stand the protective authority of a magistrate clothed with power to issue or refuse to issue search warrants and warrants of arrest. Be that as it may, the requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. There are certain familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which relates to search of moving vehicles. Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an automobile or other vehicle contains as item, article or object which by law is subject to seizure and destruction. In earlier decisions, we held that there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused; (b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to be acting suspiciously; (c) where the

accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a quantity of marijuana; (d) where Narcom agents had received information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province had in his possession prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian because of a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification papers when requested to do so; (f) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or spy -- one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the accused belong -- that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; (g) where the arresting officers had received a confidential information that the accused, whose identity as a drug distributor was established in a previous test-buy operation, would be boarding MV Dona Virginia and probably carrying shabu with him; (h) where police officers received an information that the accused, who was carrying a suspicious-looking gray luggage bag, would transport marijuana in a bag to Manila; and (i) where the appearance of the accused and the color of the bag he was carrying fitted the description given by a civilian asset. The warrantless search in the case at bench is not bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been conducting surveillance operation for three months in the area. The surveillance yielded the information that once a month, appellant and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19, 1996, the police received a tip that the two will be transporting drugs that night riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted three hours later, riding a tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking black bag, which possibly contained the drugs in bulk. When they were asked who owned it and what its content was, both became uneasy. Under these circumstances, the warrantless search and seizure of appellants bag was not illegal. It is also clear that at the time she was apprehended, she was committing a criminal offense. She was making a delivery or transporting prohibited drugs in violation of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425. Under the Rules of Court, one of the instances a police officer is permitted to carry out a warrantless arrest is when the person to be arrested is caught committing a crime in flagrante delicto, thus: Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

x x x. (emphasis supplied) Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she was not assisted by a lawyer when police officers interrogated her. She claimed that she was not duly informed of her right to remain silent and to have competent counsel of her choice. Hence, she argues that the confession or admission obtained therein should be considered inadmissible in evidence against her. These contentions deserve scant attention. Appellant did not make any confession during her custodial investigation. In determining the guilt of the appellant and her co-accused, the trial court based its decision on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and on the existence of the confiscated marijuana.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RICARDO BOHOL, G.R. No. 171729, JULY 28, 2008 The arrest of Bohol is legal. The Constitution proscribes unreasonable arrests and provides in the Bill of Rights that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued by competent judicial authority. However, it is a settled exception to the rule that an arrest made after an entrapment operation does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which states: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; xxxx In the present case, the arresting officers were justified in arresting Bohol as he had just committed a crime when he sold the shabu to PO2 Estrada. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which has repeatedly been accepted to be a valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Considering the legality of Bohols warrantless arrest, the subsequent warrantless search that resulted in the seizure of the shabu found in his person is likewise valid. In a legitimate warrantless arrest, the arresting police officers are authorized to search and seize from the offender (1) any dangerous weapons and (2) the things which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense. The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures admits of certain exceptions. This Court has ruled that the following instances constitute valid warrantless searches and seizures: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view; (5) search when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

ILLEGAL SEARCH. DISMISSED PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELLY SARAP y ARCANGELES and ROGER AMAR y MATEO, accused. Armed with a search warrant, SPO4 Gelacio R. Guarino, Chief of Police of Banga, Aklan together with PO2 Jhanny Navida, raided the house of Conrado Ricaforte at Rizal Street, Poblacion, Banga, Aklan on March 2, 1996, relative to the reported sale of marijuana by its occupants, Jonalyn Duran, Joysie Duran and Pepe Casabuena. The three were apprehended for illegal possession of marijuana and were detained at the Banga Police Station. In the course of their investigation, the police learned that a certain Melly from Capiz and one Roger were the suppliers of marijuana and that they will be back on March 4, 1996. On March 4, 1996, Janet Iguiz, caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte informed Guarino that there were two strangers looking for the Duran sisters. Accordingly, Guarino and Navida recorded the report in the police blotter and proceeded to the house of Conrado Ricaforte, which is more or less three hundred meters away from the police station. When they arrived there, Guarino saw a woman, who turned out to be accused-appellant Melly Sarap, walking in the alley near the house. Accused-appellant saw Guarino and Navida in police uniform and immediately threw away her black canvass bag, which her companion Roger Amar picked up. Guarino blocked Saraps path and grabbed from her the green plastic bag she was holding. Upon inspection, the plastic bag was found to contain two blocks of marijuana fruiting tops. In the meantime, Navida pursued Amar and arrested him. The marijuana confiscated from Sarap was brought to the Iloilo Headquarters for laboratory examination. The chemical analysis conducted by forensic chemist Angela Baldevieso revealed that the substance was indeed marijuana or Indian hemp and weighed approximately 900 grams as per Physical Science Report No. D-01296. Consequently, the above-quoted information was filed against Sarap and Amar. Accused-appellant, on the other hand, denied the accusation against her. She narrated that she delivered dried fish to her sister, Susanne Ricablanca, after which she went to the comfort room of the dress shop fronting Banga Public Market to relieve herself. On her way to the dress shop, she met Amar and entrusted to him her black bag. Thereafter, a woman approached and told her that there were policemen waiting for her outside. The policemen forced her to board a jeep and brought her to the office of Chief of Police Guarino at the municipal hall. Guarino poked a gun at her and pulled her hair. He also asked her to remove her pants and shirt. A certain PO3 Pedro Jerry Icay asked her to remove her bra and when she refused, he pulled her bra because he was looking for marijuana on accused-appellants person. Sarap asserted that the policemen did not get any marijuana from her. A search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a warrant validly issued by a judge as provided in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. Articles which are the product of unreasonable searches and seizures are inadmissible as evidence, pursuant to Article III, Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.

Warrantless searches and seizures may be made without a warrant in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest, (2) search of a moving motor vehicle, (3) search in violation of custom laws, (4) seizure of the evidence in plain view, (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures, (6) stop and frisk and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. These instances, however do not dispense with the requisite of probable cause before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In warrantless search cases, probable cause must only be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be committed. In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court held that: (1) the police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties, in the absence of proof of ill or improper motive on their part to falsely impute a serious crime against Sarap; and (2) the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses have more weight compared to Saraps negative testimony. It also relied heavily on the testimonies of Chief of Police Guarino that in view of the urgency of the case, they proceeded immediately to the house of Conrado Ricaforte to pursue Sarap and Amar. It concluded that the warrantless arrest was lawful considering that Sarap had committed or was actually committing a crime when arrested. It ruled that the search incident to the said arrest is sanctioned under the Rules and evidence obtained therefrom is admissible. We are not convinced. The Banga Police Officers were admittedly not armed with a warrant of arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states: Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it. xxx In the instant case, Sarap cannot be said to be committing a crime. Neither was she about to commit one nor had she just committed a crime. She was merely walking in the alley near the house of Conrado Ricaforte. It was only when Janet Iguiz led Sarap downstairs and identified her as Melly that she was singled out as the suspect. Guarino would not have apprehended Sarap were it not for Janet Iguizs identification. Moreover, the evidence on record clearly illustrated that it was only after Janet Iguiz pointed to Sarap as Melly that Guarino suspected that the bag she was holding contained marijuana. The Banga Police could have secured a search warrant when Jonalyn Duran disclosed during the investigation that a certain Melly of Capiz and one Roger would be back on March 4, 1996. The persons intended to be searched had been particularized and the thing to be seized specified. The time was also sufficiently ascertained to be March 4, 1996, although it was uncertain whether Melly would arrive. Melly turned out to be accused-appellant and the thing to be seized was marijuana. The above particulars would have provided sufficient grounds to

secure a search warrant, instead, the police only acted when the caretaker of the house of Conrado Ricaforte informed them that there were strangers looking for Jonalyn and Joysie Duran. Hence, they cannot now dispense with the requirement of a search warrant on the basis of urgency in effecting it, considering that they had twenty-four hours to do so. The apprehending officers had prior knowledge of Saraps alleged activities. Verily, there w as no excuse for the Banga Police not to secure a search warrant. Hence, the Banga Police could not effect a warrantless search and seizure since there was no probable cause and Sarap was not lawfully arrested. The law requires that the search must be incidental to a lawful arrest in order that the search itself may likewise be considered legal. XXXXXXXXXX Contrary to the finding of the trial court, the instant case did not come within the purview of the plain view doctrine. In order for the doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. In the absence of probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest, the search of Saraps bag was also not justified as seizure of evidence in plain view under the fourth exception. The marijuana fruiting tops contained in the green plastic bag carried by Sarap were not clearly visible. Chief of Police Guarino, testified, thus: Q So that when you saw Melly Sarap, she was just doing nothing in the alley? A She was walking, about to approach me. Q So that, when you saw her approaching you, you grabbed her bag? A Yes, sir. Q Why did you do that? A Because I suspected that transparent plastic bag has a marijuana. Q You were not certain that the woman you were able to apprehend was Melly Sarap? A I did not know that it was she. Q And you are not certain that the content of the bag was marijuana? A I suspected that there was marijuana and shabu inside the bag, I found out that there was tawas and other personal belongings. Q So your answer to my question is no. You are not certain? A I am not certain. The above testimony negates the conclusion of the trial court that the marijuana fruiting tops were inadvertently discovered. More importantly, the marijuana fruiting tops were also not apparent and in plain view as shown by the fact that Chief of Police Guarino still had to grab Saraps bag to ascertain its contents.

Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence to convict her. That the search disclosed marijuana fruiting tops in appellants possession, and thus confirmed the police officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search for being a fruit of a poisonous tree.

[G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005] TOMAS SALVADOR, petitioner, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. On the wee hours of June 4, 1994, Aurelio Mandin, Danilo Santos and petitioner Tomas Salvador, then aircraft mechanics employed by the Philippine Air Lines (PAL) and assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and Manila Domestic Airport, were nabbed by intelligence operatives of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) for possessing thirteen (13) packets containing assorted smuggled watches and jewelries valued at more than half a million pesos.
CONCURRING OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.: I fully concur with the exhaustive and incisive ponencia of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. This Decision rightfully brings the Court back to well-settled doctrines on warrantless arrests and searches, which have seemingly been modified through an obiter in People v. Ruben Montilla. I just wish to outline some guidelines on when an arrest or a search without a warrant is valid. Hopefully, they would be of help, especially to our law enforcers who are often faced with actual situation that promptly call for their application.
Valid Arrests Without Warrants

Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court lays down the basic rule on when an arrest without a warrant is lawful. It states: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. xxx xxx xxx I shall focus my discussion on the first two rules, which have been most frequently misapplied and misinterpreted, not only by law enforcers but some trial judges and lawyers as well.

At the very outset, I wish to underscore that in both cases the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself is a witness to the crime; under Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. Let me elaborate.

1. In Flagrante Delicto Arrests

Section 5 (a) is commonly referred to as the rule on in flagrante delicto arrests. The accused is apprehended at the very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an offense in the presence of the arresting officer. There are two elements that must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. It is not sufficient that the suspect exhibits unusual or strange acts or simply appears suspicious. Thus, in the recent en banc case of Malacat v. Court of Appeals, the Court, through now Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr., held that the fact that the appellants eyes were moving very fast and looking at every approaching person were not sufficient to suspect him of attempting to commit a crime, much less to justify his arrest and subsequent search without a warrant. The Court said that there was nothing in [Malacats] behavior or conduct which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion that he was armed with a deadly weapon. In other words, there was no overt physical act on the part of the suspect, positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was committing or attempting to commit one. There was, therefore, no valid reason for the police officers to arrest or search him. The same was true in People v. Mengote, where the arresting police tried to justify the warrantless arrest of the appellant on the ground that he appeared suspicious. The suspicious acts consisted of his darting eyes and the fact that his hand was over his abdomen. The Court, rejecting such justification, stated: By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence. In other words, the behavior or conduct of the person to be arrested must be clearly indicative of a criminal act. If there is no outward indication at all that calls for an arrest, the suspect cannot be validly apprehended under this paragraph, notwithstanding a tip from an informant that he would at the time be undertaking a felonious enterprise.

This doctrine found strength in People v. Aminnudin and again in People v.

Encinada. In both cases, the appellants were arrested while disembarking from a ship, on account of a tip received from an informant that they were carrying prohibited drugs. The Court invalidated their warrantless arrests, explaining that at the moment of their arrests, the appellants were simply descending the gangplank, without manifesting any suspicious behavior that would reasonably invite the attention of the police. To all appearances, they were not committing a crime; nor was it shown that they were about to do so or had just done so. There was, therefore, no valid reason for their arrests. Adhering to (and having faith in) the above rules, I respectfully disagreed with the distinguished Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado in People v. Montilla, when he upheld the validity of the warrantless arrest of the appellant while the latter was merely alighting from a passenger jeepney. I opined that Montilla could not have been perceived as committing a crime while merely alighting from a jeepney carrying a traveling bag and a carton. He did not exhibit any overt act or strange conduct that would reasonably arouse in the minds of the police suspicion that he was embarking on a felonious undertaking. There was no outward manifestation that he had just committed or was committing or attempting to commit an offense. Mercifully, the statement of the Court that Montillas arrest was valid because he was caught in flagrante delicto was only an obiter, for what finally nailed him down was his implied waiver of any objection to the validity of his arrest. 2. Hot Pursuit Arrests Section 5 (b) is otherwise known as the rule on hot pursuit arrests. Here, two elements must also concur prior to the arrest: (1) an offense has in fact just been committed, and (2) the arresting officer has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested xxx committed [the offense]. In effecting this type of arrest, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. xxx The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. Thus, while the law enforcers may not actually witness the execution of acts constituting the offense, they must have direct knowledge or view of the crime right after its commission. They should know for a fact that a crime was committed. AND they must also perceive acts exhibited by the person to be arrested, indicating that he perpetrated the crime. Again, mere intelligence information that the suspect committed the crime will not suffice. The arresting officers themselves must have personal knowledge of facts showing that the suspect performed the criminal act. Personal knowledge means actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion, based on actual facts, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the crime. In several cases wherein third persons gave law enforcers information that certain individuals or groups were engaged in some felonious activities, such relayed information was not deemed equivalent to personal knowledge of the lawmen. In People v. Burgos, a certain Masamlok informed police authorities that

the appellant was involved in subversive activities. Acting on the strength of such information and without securing a judicial warrant, the police proceeded to appellants house to arrest him. There, they also allegedly recovered an unlicensed firearm and subversive materials. The Court held that there was no personal knowledge on the part of the arresting officers, since the information came in its entirety from Masamlok, a civilian. We pointed out that at the time of his arrest, appellant was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document; neither was he committing a subversive act. His warrantless arrest, therefore, could not be allowed under any of the instances in Rule 113, Section 6 (now 5) of the Rules of Court. Also in Encinada, the appellant was arrested without a warrant, on the justification that the arresting officer received an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard M/V Sweet Pearl. The Court categorically stated that such [r]aw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest. And since, at the time of his arrest, no act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant, there was no valid justification for his arrest. To be distinguished from the above cases are those involving continuing offenses for which the culprit could be arrested any time in flagrante delicto. In Umil v. Ramos, there were strong objections to the warrantless arrest of a suspected member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), while he was being treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital. He alleged that there was no valid justification for his arrest without a warrant, because he was not then committing any offense nor were there any indications that he had just committed or was about to commit one; he was in fact confined in a hospital.

The Court held that subversion, for which he was arrested and subsequently charged, was a continuing offense. For purposes of arrest, the Court said, the NPA member did not cease to be, or became less of a subversive, xxx simply because he was, at the time of his arrest, confined in the xxx [hospital]. Unlike other so-called common offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and violence until the overriding object of overthrowing organized government is attained. In the above instances where the arrests without warrants were held unlawful, so were the searches conducted subsequent thereto. Thus, the items seized consequent to the invalid search, though clearly prohibited by law (e.g. marijuana or unlicensed firearm), were considered inadmissible as evidence against the person wrongfully arrested. Important to bear in mind always is that any search conducted without a judicial warrant must be preceded by a lawful arrest, whether with or without a warrant duly issued therefor. To underscore the rationale behind these strict rules, I deem it quite apt to quote these inspiring words from the precedent-setting case of People v. Burgos: The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute

or rule which allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right so often violated and so deserving of full protection. Valid Searches Without Warrants The general rule is that a judicial warrant must first be duly obtained before search and seizure may be conducted. The only allowable instances in which a search may be conducted without a warrant are: (1) search incident to lawful arrest, (2) search pursuant to the plain view doctrine, (3) search of moving vehicles, (4) searches incidental to violation of customs laws, (5) search with consent, and (6) a stop and frisk. 1. Search Incident to Lawful Arrest Section 12 of Rule 1326 provides that a lawfully arrested person may be searched without a warrant for dangerous weapons or anything else that may be used as evidence of the offense. Such incidental search is, however, limited to the person of the arrestee at the time of the apprehension. The search cannot be extended to or made in a place other than the place of the arrest. 2. The Plain View Doctrine The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the law enforcement officer is in a position where he has a clear view of a particular area or has prior justification for an intrusion; (2) said officer inadvertently comes across (or sees in plain view) a piece of incriminating evidence; and (3) it is immediately apparent to such officer that the item he sees may be evidence of a crime or a contraband or is otherwise subject to seizure. 3. Search of Moving Vehicles The warrantless search of moving vehicles (including shipping vessels and aircraft) is justified by practicability, viz.: The guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures construed as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. xxx xxx xxx

The automobile is a swift and powerful vehicle xxx Constructed as covered vehicles to standard form in immense quantities, and with a capacity for speed rivaling express trains, they furnish for successful commission of crime a distinguishing means of silent approach and swift escape unknown in the history of the world before their advent. The question of their police control and reasonable search on highways or other public place is a serious question far deeper and broader than their use in so-called bootlegging or rum running, which in itself is no small matter. While a possession in the sense of private ownership, they are but a vehicle constructed for travel and transportation on highways. Their active use is not in homes or on private premises, the privacy of which the law especially guards from search and seizure without process. The baffling extent to which they are successfully utilized to facilitate commission of crime of all degrees, from those against morality, chastity, and decency to robbery, rape, burglary, and murder, is a matter of common knowledge. Upon that problem, a condition, and not a theory, confronts proper administration of our criminal laws. Whether search of and seizure from an automobile upon a highway or other public place without a search warrant is unreasonable is in its final analysis to be determined as a judicial question in view of all the circumstances under which it is made. 4. Customs Searches Under the Tariff and Customs Code, searches, seizures and arrests may be made even without warrants, for purposes of enforcing customs and tariff laws. Without mention of the need to priorly obtain a judicial warrant, the Code specifically allows police authorities to enter, pass through or search any land, enclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board[;]or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary to law. 5. Search With Consent Waiver of any objection to the unreasonableness or invalidity of a search is a recognized exception to the rule against a warrantless search. The consent to the search, however, must be express, knowing and voluntary. A search based merely on implied acquiescence is not valid, because such consent is not within the purview of the constitutional guarantee, but only a passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and coercive circumstances. In People v. Lacerna, it was held that the otherwise prohibited intrusive search of appellants plastic bag was validated by the express consent of appellant himself, who was observed to be urbanized in mannerism and speech, and who moreover stated that he had nothing to hide and had done nothing wrong. 6. Stop and Frisk The stop and frisk concept is of American origin, the most notable case thereon being Terry v. Ohio. The idea is that a police officer may after properly introducing himself and making initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person manifesting unusual and suspicious conduct, in order to check, the latters outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The strict manner in

which this notion should be applied has been laid down as follows: xxx where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior, he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own and others safety, he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. As in the warrantless arrest of a person reasonably suspected of having just committed a crime, mere suspicious behavior would not call for a stop and frisk. There must be a genuine reason, in accordance with the police officers experience and the surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or contraband) concealed about him. A valid application of the doctrine was recognized in Posadas v. Court of Appeals and in Manalili v. Court of Appeals. In Manalili, the law enforcers, who were members of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, observed during their surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was walking in a wobbly manner along the city cemetery which, according to police information, was a popular hangout of drug addicts. Based on police experience, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of persons who were high on drugs. The Court held that past experience and the surrounding circumstances gave the police sufficient reason to stop the suspect and to investigate if he was really high on drugs. The marijuana that they found in the suspects possession was held to be admissible in evidence. Before I end, I must reiterate that the above exceptions to the general rule on the necessity of a judicial warrant for any arrest, search and seizure must all be strictly construed. Foremost in our minds must still be every persons prized and fundamental right to liberty and security, a right protected and guaranteed by our Constitution.

The denial was witnessed by Mr. Daniel Nonoy Lerio, Jr. a member of the Surigao City Press, who was invited by the Police Investigators to witness the presentation of the alleged marijuana leaves, during the said investigation; 6) After the custodial investigation, the accused was placed immediately behind bars and the Information for Violation of RA 6425 as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 was filed before the Court; xxx xxx x x x Aside from appellant, the defense also presented five (5) other witnesses whose testimony allegedly established the following: 8.a) Ruben Concha the driver of the motorela who testified that he was surprised when the motorela he was driving was forcibly stopped (while already in motion ) by the police authorities while directing his four (4) passengers, (3 males and 1 female)

to disembarked (sic) together with their (baggage). That after the search was made, the accused was singled out, and despite the protests made, was ordered to board the Police service vehicle, while the 2 other male passengers just left the scene while the female passenger continued to board the motorela who directed him to proceed to the residence of Baby Encinada to verify whether the person picked up by the police authorities was related to the latter; 8.b) Josephine Nodalo testified that she is a beautician, and that she was one of the four (4) passengers of the motorela driven by Ruben Concha, which motorela was forcibly stopped by men who are chasing it after travelling a distance of 5 to 10 meters away from its loading area near the PPA Gate. All the four (4) passengers were ordered to disembarked (sic) from the motorela whereupon they were all subjected to body search including their (baggage). That it was the male passenger who was sitting at the rear portion of the motorela who was picked up by the Police Authorities and despite the protests made was ordered to board the Police service vehicle. Upon learning from the persons who were gathered at the scene, that the one who was picked up was the son of Mr. Encinada, the latter boarded back the motorela and directed the driver to proceed to the residence of the Encinadas at Little Tondo to verify whether it was really their son who was picked up by the police authorities. She made this, as Mrs. Encinada, (the mother of the accused) is his (regular) customer; 8.c) Mr. Daniel Nonoy Lerio, Jr. testified that, being a member of the Press, he was requested by the police authorities to witness the custodial investigation conducted upon the person of the accused, who, during the entire proceedings of the investigation vehemently denied having any knowledge about the marijuana leaves placed inside the plastic bag; 8.d) Isabelita Encinada testified that she was informed by her manicurist (Josephine Nodalo) about the arrest x x x (of) her son, somewhere at the PPA Port Area and upon being informed, she and her husband immediately went to the Surigao PNP Headquarters to verify the (news) x x x; xxx xxx x x x. First Issue: Illegal Possession of Prohibited Drugs Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his possession and ownership of the plastic baby chairs. He contends that the testimonies of Bolonia and Iligan conflicted as to the number of passengers riding the motorela. Such alleged conflict is peripheral and irrelevant. Hence, it deserves scant consideration. Appellant adds that such testimonies also conflicted as to the place where appellant sat inside the motorela. This claim, aside from being flimsy, is also not supported by the transcript of stenographic notes. In his testimony, appellant vehemently denied possession of the plastic baby chairs, stressing that he was not holding them when the search was conducted. However, his denial is easily rebutted by Bolonias testimony: Q: When you saw Roel Encinada who disembarked from M/V Sweet Pearl, what did you observe in his person, if any?

A: He was carrying a (sic) baby chairs. Q: What kind of chairs? A: A (sic) plastic chairs. xxx xxx xxx Q: After you saw Roel Encinada disembarked (sic) from the boat, what did you and your companions do? A: We followed him behind because we posted in the different direction(s) in the wharf. xxx xxx xxx Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you followed him? A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him stopped (sic). xxx xxx xxx Q: By the way, where was (sic) this (sic) two plastic chairs placed in the motorize tricycle? A: He was sitting at the back of the motor at the right portion of the seat and the chairs was (sic) placed besides him. ([W]itness indicating that he was sitting (sic) an imaginary seat at the back of the motor and holding an (sic) imaginary chairs with his left arm). Between these two contentions, the choice of the trial court prevails because this is a matter that involves credibility of witnesses. On this subject of credibility, the opinion of the trial court deserves great respect as it was in a better position to observe the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on the stand; hence, it was in a superior situation to assess their testimonies. Furthermore, proof of ownership of the marijuana is not necessary in the prosecution of illegal drug cases; it is sufficient that such drug is found in appellants possession.

ILLEGAL SEARCH - DISMISSED [G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROEL ENCINADA, accused-appellant. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: In acquitting the appellant, the Court reiterates the constitutional proscription that evidence (in this case, prohibited drugs) seized without a valid search warrant is inadmissible in any proceeding. A yield of incriminating evidence will not legitimize an illegal search. Indeed, the end never justifies the means. The Facts Version of the Prosecution The Solicitor General, in the Appellees Brief, recounts the events leading to appellants arrest, as follows: At around 4 p.m. of May 20, 1992, SPO4 Nicolas Bolonia was in his house when he received a tip from an informant that Roel Encinada would be arriving in Surigao City from Cebu City in the morning of May 21, 1992 on board the M/V Sweet Pearl

bringing with him marijuana. Bolonia was then Chief of the Vice Control Squad of the Surigao City Police (pp. 27-29; TSN, November 27, 1992, 34-40; p. 10, TSN, May 14, 1993). Bolonia already knew Encinada because the latter previously was engaged in illegal gambling known as buloy-buloy. After receiving the tip, Bolonia notified the members of his team - SPO3 Marcial Tiro, SPO3 Glen Abot and SPO3 Charlito Duero - as well as his colleague SPO4 Cipriano Iligan, Jr., the chief of the Intelligence and Investigation Division, of the information he received. Because the information came late, there was no more time to secure a search warrant (pp. 38; TSN, November 27, 1992, May 14, 1993, p. 13; pp. 4, 19; TSN, March 3, 1993). In the early morning of May 21, 1992, Bolonia, Iligan and other police officers deployed themselves in different strategic points at the city wharf to intercept Encinada. At about 8:15 a.m. of the same day, the M/V Sweet Pearl finally docked. The police officers saw Encinada walk briskly down the gangplank, carrying two small colored plastic baby chairs in his hand (p. 11 TSN, May 14, 1993; pp. 4, 5, 15-16 TSN, March 3, 1993; pp. 29-30 TSN, November 27, 1992, pp. 29-30). From their various positions, the police officers followed Encinada immediately boarded a tricycle at Borromeo Street, still holding the plastic chairs. As the tricycle slowly moved forward, Bolonia chased it and ordered the driver to stop after identifying himself as a police officer. When the vehicle stopped, Bolinia identified himself to Encinada and ordered him to alight from the tricycle. Bolonia asked Encinada to hand over the plastic chairs, to which the latter complied (pp. 5, 6, 17 TSN, March 3, 1993, pp. 30-32, 35 TSN, November 27, 1992). Bolonia noticed that there were two small chairs, one green and the other blue, stacked together and tied with a piece of string. Between the stack of chairs, there was a bulky package. Bolonia examined it closely and smelled the peculiar scent of marijuana. Making a small tear in the cellophane cover, Bolonia could see and smell the what appeared to be marijuana, a prohibited drug (pp. 6-9 TSN, March 3, 1993, Exh. B, D and sub-markings; pp. 32-34. 35-39 TSN, November 27, 1992). Encinada was brought to the central police station. Bolonia, in the presence of one Nonoy Lerio who is a member of the local media and a friend of Encinada, opened the package. It was discovered that indeed, the contents consisted of dried leaves known as marijuana. In the course of the investigation, Encinada surrendered to Bolonia his passenger ticket issued by M/V Sweet Pearl (pp. 9-11 TSN, March 3, 1993, Exh. E; pp. 34-35, 39-40 TSN, November 27, 1992). On July 13, 1992, Bolonia brought the package of dried leaves for examination at the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Evangelista, Cagayan de Oro City. The forensic chemist, Inspector Vicente Armada, tested the leaves and confirmed that they were positive for marijuana. However, the marijuana only weighed 610 grams, which Armada opined to be probably due to shrinkage and moisture loss (pp. 12-17, 19-21, 24-40, 41; TSN, November 27,1992, Exh. A, B. C and sub -markings.) Version of the Defense Appellant sets up denial as his defense. In his brief, he denied ownership and possession of said plastic baby chairs, as follows: 1) In the morning of May 21, 1992, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, more or

less, the accused was seen to have disembarked from MV Sweet Pearl after an overnight trip from Cebu City; 2) The accused proceeded to the Surigao PPA Gate and boarded a motorela bound for his residence at Little Tondo, (within the City Proper), Surigao City. The Motorela was fully loaded with passengers, with the accused as the fourth passenger; 3) When the motorela was already able to travel a distance of about ten (10) meters more or less, the same was forcibly stopped by persons who ordered the passengers to disembarked (sic). Thereafter, all the (baggage) of the passengers and the driver were ordered to stand in a line for which a body search was made individually (sic); 4) After the search was made, the accused was singled out in the line and ordered to board the service vehicle of the police and was brought to the PNP Police Station. Before however the accused boarded the jeep, he was openly protesting to the action taken by the police authorities and demanded from the apprehending officers a copy of a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest for the search made and for his apprehension; 5) In the police headquarters, the accused was made to undergo custodial investigation for which a plastic bag was presented to him allegedly containing the subject marijuana leaves. The accused denied that the said plastic bag belonged to him. Second Issue: Illegal Search and Seizure Based on the foregoing discussion, appellants conviction could have been affirmed by this Court. However, the very evidence implicating him -- the prohibited drugs found in his possession -- cannot be used against him in this case or, for that matter, in any proceeding. Generally, a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is subject to challenge. Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, is apropos: SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a fruit of the poisonous tree. This principle is covered by this exclusionary rule: SEC. 3. x x x (2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The plain import of the foregoing provision is that a search and seizure is normally unlawful unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. This protection is based on the principle that, between a citizen and the police, the magistrate stands as a mediator, nay, an authority clothed with power to

issue or refuse to issue search warrants or warrants of arrest. The right against warrantless searches, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, as follows: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched. In this case, Bolonia received at 4:00 p.m. on May 20, 1992 an intelligence report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive the next morning aboard the M/V Sweet Pearl. Although such report could have been the basis of probable cause, Bolonia explained that he could not secure a warrant because the courts in Surigao City were already closed for the day. Thus, he and the other lawmen had no choice but to proceed the next morning to the port area. After appellant disembarked from the ship and rode a motorela, Bolonia stopped the motor vehicle and conducted the search. He rummaged through the two strapped plastic baby chairs which were held by appellant and found inserted between them a package of marijuana wrapped in a small plastic envelope. In his testimony, appellant vehemently denied possession of the plastic baby chairs, stressing that he was not holding them when the search was conducted. However, his denial is easily rebutted by Bolonias testimony: Q: When you saw Roel Encinada who disembarked from M/V Sweet Pearl, what did you observe in his person, if any? A: He was carrying a (sic) baby chairs. Q: What kind of chairs? A: A (sic) plastic chairs. xxx xxx xxx Q: After you saw Roel Encinada disembarked (sic) from the boat, what did you and your companions do? A: We followed him behind because we posted in the different direction(s) in the wharf. xxx xxx xxx Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you followed him? A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him stopped (sic). xxx xxx xxx Q: By the way, where was (sic) this (sic) two plastic chairs placed in the motorize tricycle?

A: He was sitting at the back of the motor at the right portion of the seat and the chairs was (sic) placed besides him. ([W]itness indicating that he was sitting (sic) an imaginary seat at the back of the motor and holding an (sic) imaginary chairs with his left arm). Between these two contentions, the choice of the trial court prevails because this is a matter that involves credibility of witnesses. On this subject of credibility, the opinion of the trial court deserves great respect as it was in a better position to observe the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on the stand; hence, it was in a superior situation to assess their testimonies. Furthermore, proof of ownership of the marijuana is not necessary in the prosecution of illegal drug cases; it is sufficient that such drug is found in appellants possession.

Appellant contended before the lower court that the warrantless search of his belongings was proscribed by the Constitution. But the trial judge rejected this contention, opining that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto at the time of his arrest. Hence, it concluded that the warrantless search conducted after his lawful arrest was valid and that the marijuana was admissible in evidence. Rule 113, Section 5, discusses the instances when a warrantless arrest may be effected, as follows: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another. xxx xxx x x x. In this case, appellant was not committing a crime in the presence of the Surigao City policemen. Moreover, the lawmen did not have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed an offense. The search cannot be said to be merely incidental to a lawful arrest. Raw intelligence information is not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest. Bolonias testimony shows that the search preceded the arrest: Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you followed him? A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him stopped (sic). xxx xxx xxx Q: You said you stopped the motor tricycle in which Roel Encinada (sic) riding, what did you do? A: At first I identified myself to the driver and to some of the passengers.

xxx xxx xxx Q: And after that, what happened next? A: I requested Roel Encinada to disembark from the motor tricycle because of that information given to us in his possession. Q: Possession of what? A: Possession of marijuana, Sir. Q: And Roel Encinada alighted from the motor vehicle? A: Yes, Sir. Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next? A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried. Contrary to the trial courts ruling, People vs. Tangliben is factually inapplicable to the case at bar. The prosecutions evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from the ship or while he rode the motorela. No act or fact demonstrating a felonious enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances. We disagree with the trial courts justification for the search: The arrest of the accused without warrant was lawful because there was a probable cause or ground for his apprehension. The police had received reliable, albeit confidential information from their informant that Roel Encinada would be bringing in marijuana from Cebu City on board the M/V Sweet Pearl. Unfortunately there was no more time for the police to apply for and secure a search warrant as the information was received late in the afternoon of May 20, 1992 and the accused was expected to arrive at seven oclock the following morning. The different courts were closed by then. Nevertheless the police felt constrained to act on the valuable piece of information. Even if the information was received by Bolonia about 4:00 p.m. of May 20, 1992 at his house, there was sufficient time to secure a warrant of arrest, as the M/V Sweet Pearl was not expected to dock until 7:00 a.m. the following day. Administrative Circular No. 13 allows applications for search warrants even after court hours: 3. Rafflling shall be strictly enforced, except only in case where an application for search warrant may be filed directly with any judge in whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located, after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, in which case the applicant is required to certify under oath the urgency of the issuance thereof after office hours, or during Saturdays, Sundays and legal holidays; (Emphasis supplied) The same procedural dispatch finds validation and reiteration in Circular No. 19, series of 1987, entitled Amended Guidelines and Procedures on Applications for Search Warrants for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Other Serious Crimes Filed in Metro Manila Courts and Other Courts with Multiple Salas: This Court has received reports of delay while awaiting raffle, in acting on applications for search warrants in the campaign against loose firearms and other serious crimes affecting peace and order. There is a need for prompt action on such applications for search warrant. Accordingly, these amended guidelines in the

issuance of a search warrant are issued: 1. All applications for search warrants relating to violation of the Anti-subversion Act, crimes against public order as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunition and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, shall no longer be raffled and shall immediately be taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located. 2. In the absence of the Executive Judge, the Vice-Executive Judge shall take cognizance of and personally act on the same. In the absence of the Executive Judge or Vice-Executive Judge, the application may be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court where the application is filed. 3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays, shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the Court having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that its issuance is urgent. 4. Any judge acting on such application shall immediately and without delay personally conduct the examination of the applicant and his witnesses to prevent the possible leakage of information. He shall observe the procedures, safeguards, and guidelines for the issuance of search warrants provided for in this Courts Administrative Circular No. 13, dated October 1, 1985.

In People vs. Aminnudin, the Court declared as inadmissible in evidence the marijuana found in appellants possession during a search without a warrant, because it had been illegally seized. The Court firmly struck down the policemens cavalier disregard for the Bill of Rights, explaining: The present case presented no urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a search warrant was not necessary. Lawmen cannot be allowed to violate the very law they are expected to enforce. Bolonias receipt of the intelligence information regarding the culprits identity, the particular crime he allegedly committed and his exact whereabouts underscored the need to secure a warrant for his arrest. But he failed or neglected to do so. Such failure or neglect cannot excuse him from violating a constitutional right of the appellant. It is significant that the Solicitor General does not share the trial judges

opinion. Taking a totally different approach to justify the search, the Republics counsel avers that appellant voluntarily handed the chairs containing the package of marijuana to the arresting officer and thus effectively waived his right against the warrantless search. This, he gleaned from Bolonias testimony: Q: After Roel Encinada alighted from the motor tricycle, what happened next? A: I requested to him to see his chairs that he carried. Q: Are you referring to the two plastic chairs? A: Yes, Sir. Q: By the way, when Roel Encinada agreed to allow you to examine the two plastic chairs that he carried, what did you do next? A: I examined the chairs and I noticed that something inside in between the two chairs. In his testimony, appellant vehemently denied possession of the plastic baby chairs, stressing that he was not holding them when the search was conducted. However, his denial is easily rebutted by Bolonias testimony: Q: When you saw Roel Encinada who disembarked from M/V Sweet Pearl, what did you observe in his person, if any? A: He was carrying a (sic) baby chairs. Q: What kind of chairs? A: A (sic) plastic chairs. xxx xxx xxx Q: After you saw Roel Encinada disembarked (sic) from the boat, what did you and your companions do? A: We followed him behind because we posted in the different direction(s) in the wharf. xxx xxx xxx Q: You said you followed Roel Encinada, what happened next when you followed him? A: I saw Roel Encinada took (sic) a ride with a motorcycle so I chased him and let him stopped (sic). xxx xxx xxx Q: By the way, where was (sic) this (sic) two plastic chairs placed in the motorize tricycle? A: He was sitting at the back of the motor at the right portion of the seat and the chairs was (sic) placed besides him. ([W]itness indicating that he was sitting (sic) an imaginary seat at the back of the motor and holding an (sic) imaginary chairs with his left arm). Between these two contentions, the choice of the trial court prevails because this is a matter that involves credibility of witnesses. On this subject of credibility, the opinion of the trial court deserves great respect as it was in a better position to observe the demeanor and deportment of the witnesses on the stand; hence, it was in a superior situation to assess their testimonies. Furthermore, proof of ownership of the marijuana is not necessary in the prosecution of illegal drug cases; it is sufficient that such drug is found in appellants possession.

We are not convinced. While in principle we agree that consent will validate an otherwise illegal search, we believe that appellant -- based on the transcript quoted above -- did not voluntarily consent to Bolonias search of his belongings. Appellants silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Furthermore, considering that the search was conducted irregularly, i.e., without a warrant, we cannot appreciate consent based merely on the presumption of regularity of the performance of duty. Appellants alleged acquiescence should be distinguished from the consent appreciated in the recent case of People vs. Lacerna. In said case, the search was conducted at a validly established checkpoint and was made in the regular performance of the policemens duty. Although it became intrusive when the policemen opened his baggage, it was validated by the consent of appellant, who testified in open court that he allowed such search because he had nothing to hide. In the present case, there was no checkpoint established. The policemen stopped the motorela and forthwith subjected the passengers to a search of their persons and baggage. In contrast to the accused in Lacerna, herein appellant testified that he openly objected to the search by asking for a warrant. Without the illegally seized prohibited drug, the appellants conviction cannot stand. There is simply no sufficient evidence remaining to convict him. That the search disclosed a prohibited substance in appellants possession, and t hus confirmed the police officers initial information and suspicion, did not cure its patent illegality. An illegal search cannot be undertaken and then an arrest effected on the strength of the evidence yielded by the search. We should stress that the Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehensions of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights. Law enforcers are required to follow the law and to respect the peoples rights. Otherwise, their efforts become counterproductive. We remind them of this recent exhortation by this Court: x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice wou ld have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.

Illegal arrest DISMISSED. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SALVADOR SANTOS, JR. y , G.R. No. 175593 October 17, 2007 October 17, 2007

In a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and seller were identified. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the dangerous drug. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt of the marked money consummates the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and the accused. An examination of the decision of the trial court reveals that apart from heavily relying on the sole testimony of Tougan, it used appellants admission of his previous convictions, his declaration as a police informer and the presumption of regularity of Tougans performance of his duties as anchor for finding appellant guilty. The Court, however, finds such reliance on Tougans testimony misplaced. Other than his bare statements, Tougans testimony is unsubstantiated by other proof that the alleged buy-bust operation, through which appellant was apprehended, took place. In light of appellants theory that he was framed up, it is imperative that the prosecution present more evidence to support Tougans allegations. The prosecution could have easily presented the other police officers, namely Arrellano and Pontilla, who Tougan claimed were members of his backup team. As it is, the lack of any other evidence to buttress Tougans declaration reduces it into a self-serving assertion. Curiously, the prosecution never offered rebuttal evidence to refute appellants defense of frame-up. This omission does not hold well for the cause of the prosecution. It creates doubts on whether there has actually been any buy-bust operation at all. The Court also agrees with the OSGs contention that the inconsistencies in Tougans testimony on the matter of the list should not be ignored. During trial, when Tougan was asked whether appellants name appeared in the list, he categorically answered in the affirmative. Then again, it surfaced that this assertion was untruthful as the list he had brought to court did not contain appellants name. The Court believes that Tougans lack of candidness on this detail renders the rest of his testimony doubtful. Moreover, the Court finds that the trial court erred in allowing Tougan to use the mantle of regularity of official functions to prop up his allegations. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable

doubt. As the Court ruled in People v. Ambrosio: The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty cannot be used as basis for affirming accused-appellants conviction because, [f]irst, the presumption is precisely just thata mere presumption. Once challenged by evidence, as in this case, x x x [it] cannot be regarded as binding truth. Second, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

While buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is well to recall that x x x by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. Needless to state, the lower court should have exercised the utmost diligence and prudence in deliberating upon accused-appellants guilt. It should have given more serious consideration to the pros and cons of the evidence offered by both defense and the State and many loose ends should have been settled by the trial court in determining the merits of the present case. Consequently, courts are required to put the prosecution evidence through the crucible of a severe testing, and the presumption of innocence requires them to take a more than casual consideration of every circumstance or doubt favoring the innocence of the accused. Significantly, the Court agrees with the OSGs observation that the identity of the corpus delicti has not been sufficiently established. Tougans testimony does not definitively express that the confiscated plastic sachets of shabu have been marked/initialed at the scene of the crime, according to proper procedure. Tougan testified as follows: PUBLIC PROS. MAJOMOT Q After that, what did you do after you recovered or confiscated these plastic sachets from the accused? A After he was arrested, sir, we brought him to the police station.

Q After that, what happened next? A When we reached the police station, sir, he gave his name as Salvador Santos. Q What happened to the plastic sachets? A I wrote my initials on all the plastic sachets or the evidence confiscated from him, sir, and a document was prepared for them to be examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory. The case of People v. Lim specifies that any apprehending team having initial control of illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused if there be any, and/or his representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with such a requirement raises doubt whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was the same drug and/or paraphernalia as that actually recovered from the accused. It negates the presumption that official duties have been regularly performed by the police officers. On the point that appellant has previously been charged with and convicted of similar offenses, the Court believes that the trial court wrongly considered such circumstance for the purpose of showing that he was likely to commit the crimes charged in the indictment. Evidence of collateral offenses must not be received as substantive evidence of the offenses on trial. Concededly, the evidence of the defense is weak and uncorroborated. This, however, cannot be used to advance the cause of the prosecution as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the defense. Moreover, when the circumstances are capable of two or more inferences, as in this case, such that one of which is consistent with the presumption of innocence and the other is compatible with guilt, the presumption of innocence must prevail and the court must acquit. All told, given the attendant circumstances, the Court entertains serious doubts as to the culpability of appellant and its mind cannot rest easily upon the certainty of his guilt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS ROLANDO LLAMADO y CRUZ, G.R. No. 185278, March 13, 2009 March 13, 2009 On May 6, 2008, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision denying the appeal and affirming the decision of the court a quo. The appellate court held that the failure of the police officers to coordinate with the local barangay officials prior to the conduct of the buy-bust operation did not invalidate the undertaking of the police

officers; that the prosecution has established the authenticity of the buy-bust operation; that non-compliance with the requirements set forth in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 did not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody over the confiscated items considering that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved by the apprehending team. Hence, the instant appeal. Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides in part: SEC 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals.- The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drugs, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions. In this case, appellant is charged with selling shabu, which is a dangerous drug. Section 3 (ii), Article I of R.A. No. 9165 defines selling as any act of giving away any dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals whether for money or any other consideration. For the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs to prosper, the following elements must be proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In the instant case, the prosecution positively identified appellant as the seller of the substance which was found to be Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. Appellant sold the drug to PO2 Brubio, a police officer who acted as poseur-buyer for a sum of P200.00. The prosecution positively and categorically testified that the transaction or sale actually took place. The subject shabu weighing 0.02 grams and the money amounting to P200.00 pesos were likewise identified by the prosecution witnesses when presented in court. It has been held that it is the duty of the prosecution to present a complete picture detailing the buy-bust operation from initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal subject of sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the buy-bust money, and the delivery of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Appellants defense of denial is unavailing. There was no evidence that PO2 Brubio was motivated by reasons other than his duty to enforce the law. In fact,

appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in a legitimate entrapment operation and was positively identified by the police officers who conducted the operation. As between the categorical testimony that rings of truth on one hand, and a bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail. Moreover, the failure on the part of the police officers to take photographs and make an inventory of the drugs seized from the appellant was not fatal because the prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the said illegal drugs. What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense. The prosecution satisfactorily proved the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and presented in court evidence of corpus delicti. PO2 Brubio was able to put the necessary markings on the sachet of shabu bought from appellant, for identification purposes, immediately after the consummation of the drug sale. He personally delivered the same specimen to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis on the same day the entrapment was conducted. Lastly, PO2 Brubio was able to identify the said markings in court. In cases involving violations of Dangerous Drugs Act, credence should be given to the narration of the incident by the prosecution witnesses especially when they are police officers who are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there be evidence to the contrary. Moreover, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime against the appellant, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall prevail over appellants self-serving and uncorroborated denial. XXXXXXXX NORGIE CRUZ y CASTRO, VS PP G.R. No. 164580 February 6, 2009 A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan. For the successful prosecution of the illegal sale of shabu, the following elements must be established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and its payment. What is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. Thus, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully consummate the buy-bust transaction.

The failure of the poseur-buyer to testify on the actual purchase is not fatal to the prosecutions cause. SPO1 Nepomuceno, the poseur-buyer, was already assigned in Iloilo City, Region VIII, when the cases were being tried. However, SPO1 Saddoy and PO1 Cruz saw the illicit transaction as both of them positioned themselves at the barber shop opposite the Dunkin' Donuts establishment. PO1

Cruz witnessed the whole transaction where the marked money was exchanged for two sachets of shabu. He was positioned at Reparo Street where he saw the exchange of shabu and the marked money along Reparo Street. SPO1 Saddoy, on the other hand, was the one who recovered the marked money from petitioner. As long as there is proof that the sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence, a conviction for illegal sale of shabu can be sustained. Petitioner was arrested in flagrante delicto during the buy-bust operation. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that SPO1 Saddoy and PO1 Cruz were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, and none has been adduced by the defense, their testimonies with respect to the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. The identity of petitioner cannot be doubted having been caught in flagrante delicto in an entrapment operation conducted by the police. The failure to present the buy-bust money is likewise not fatal. The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable but merely corroborative in nature. In the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation. What is material to a prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The prosecution duly established both in this case. Petitioner argues that SPO1 Saddoy was not part of the team that conducted the surveillance operation and the surveillance was conducted only for the purpose of identifying the residence of petitioner without verifying if indeed he was engaged in illegal drugs. Petitioner further contends that the police officers or law enforcement agents violated the Constitution casting doubt on the presumption of regularity of the apprehension made upon petitioner. Petitioner also claims that the accounts of the police officers were full of material contradictions and inconsistencies. Petitioner was allegedly made to confess without the assistance of a competent counsel in violation of his constitutional right. He did not undergo the regular procedure of being fingerprinted. And since the search of his house was declared unconstitutional by the lower court, petitioner argues, the presumption of regularity has been rebutted. The contention is untenable. Settled is the rule that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation especially so if the buy-bust team is accompanied by the informant, as in this case. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need of prior surveillance.

The absence of a prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug dealers. Furthermore, if a police operation requires immediate implementation, time is of the essence and only hasty preparations are sometimes possible. What is important is whether the speed of preparation compromised the rights of the accused. Moreover, when a person is apprehended in flagrante delicto, the police is not only authorized, but duty-bound, to arrest him even without a warrant. Petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto when SPO1 Nepomuceno gave him the marked money in exchange for two sachets of shabu. Petitioners arrest, as correctly found by the trial court and the appellate court, was valid and legal. Petitioner is harping on the declaration of the Court of Appeals that the search of his house was unconstitutional and thus the presumption of regularity has been rebutted. This is likewise untenable. There is no connection between the prior entrapment of petitioner, which the Court of Appeals and this Court found to be regular, legal and valid, and the subsequent search of his house, which the Court of Appeals found to be irregular. In the prior entrapment, petitioner was charged with and convicted of illegal sale of shabu, an offense separate and distinct from the offense of illegal possession of shabu for which he was acquitted. Petitioner further points to certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It should be emphasized that inconsistencies regarding prior surveillance and subsequent investigation relate to the credibility of witnesses. It involves a question of fact which cannot be raised and is not proper for consideration in the present petition for review. This Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court in assessing the credibility of the witnesses, unless some facts or circumstances of weight and influence have been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted by the trial court. This is because the trial judge has the unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude during direct and cross-examination. After a careful review of the entire records of this case, we do not find any such oversight by the trial court. XXXXXXXXXXX

BUY BUST OPERATION WITHOUT PARTICIAPTAION OF pdea PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS ALVIN PRINGAS y PANGANIBAN G.R. No. 175928 August 31, 2007 We find this claim untenable. In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest, it is stated that That, on or about 10:30 PM April 22, 2003, as instructed by SPO4 DANILO TUAO, OIC/SDEU, this Office

effected a coordination to (sic) Metro Manila Regional Office of PDEA and formed a team of SDEU operatives with a confidential informant to conduct anti-narcotics/Buy-bust operation against the said person x x x. This portion of the affidavit clearly negates appellants claim that the buy-bust operation subject of the case was not with the involvement of the PDEA. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the aforementioned statement was not contained in the affidavit, appellants claim of lack of involvement of the PDEA will render neither his arrest illegal nor the evidence seized from him inadmissible. Quoting People v. Sta. Maria, we resolved the very same issue in this wise: Appellant would next argue that the evidence against him was obtained in violation of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 because the buy-bust operation was made without any involvement of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Prescinding therefrom, he concludes that the prosecutions evidence, both testimonial and documentary, was inadmissible having been procured in violation of his constitutional right against illegal arrest. The argument is specious. Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 reads: Sec. 86. Transfer, Absorption, and Integration of All Operating Units on Illegal Drugs into the PDEA and Transitory Provisions. The Narcotics Group of the PNP, the Narcotics Division of the NBI and the Customs Narcotics Interdiction Unit are hereby abolished; however they shall continue with the performance of their task as detail service with the PDEA, subject to screening, until such time that the organizational structure of the Agency is fully operational and the number of graduates of the PDEA Academy is sufficient to do the task themselves: Provided, That such personnel who are affected shall have the option of either being integrated into the PDEA or remain with their original mother agencies and shall, thereafter, be immediately reassigned to other units therein by the head of such agencies. Such personnel who are transferred, absorbed and integrated in the PDEA shall be extended appointments to positions similar in rank, salary, and other emoluments and privileges granted to their respective positions in their original mother agencies.

The transfer, absorption and integration of the different offices and units provided for in this Section shall take effect within eighteen (18) months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That personnel absorbed and on detail service shall be given until five (5) years to finally decide to joint the PDEA. Nothing in this Act shall mean a diminution of the investigative powers

of the NBI and the PNP on all other crimes as provided for in their respective organic laws: Provided, however, That when the investigation being conductetd by the NBI, PNP or any ad hoc anti-drug task force is found to be a violation of any of the provisions of this Act, the PDEA shall be the lead agency. The NBI, PNP or any of the task force shall immediately transfer the same to the PDEA: Provided, further, That the NBI, PNP and the Bureau of Customs shall maintain close coordination with the PDEA on all drug related matters. Cursory read, the foregoing provision is silent as to the consequences of failure on the part of the law enforcers to transfer drug-related cases to the PDEA, in the same way that the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9165 is also silent on the matter. But by no stretch of imagination could this silence be interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. As we see it, Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead agency in the investigations and prosecutions of drug-related cases. Therefore, other law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter. Additionally, the same provision states that PDEA, serving as the implementing arm of the Dangerous Drugs Board, :shall be responsible for the efficient and effective law enforcement of all the provisions on any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical as provided in the Act. We find much logic in the Solicitor Generals interpretation that it is only appropriate that drugs cases being handled by other law enforcement authorities be transferred or referred to the PDEA as the lead agency in the campaign against the menace of dangerous drugs. Section 86 is more of an administrative provision. By having a centralized law enforcement body, i.e., the PDEA, the Dangerous Drugs Board can enhance the efficacy of the law against dangerous drugs. To be sure, Section 86(a) of the IRR emphasizes this point by providing: (a) Relationship/Coordination between PDEA and Other Agencies. The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA x x x. Provided, finally, that nothing in this IRR shall deprive the PNP, the NBI, other law enforcement personnel and the personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from effecting lawful arrests and seizures in consonance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.

As regards the non-participation of PDEA in a buy-bust operation, we said: [T]he challenged buy-bust operation, albeit made without the participation of PDEA, did not violate appellants constitutional right to be protected from illegal arrest. There is nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 which even remotely indicate the intention of the legislature to make an arrest made without the participation of the PDEA illegal and evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible. Moreover, the law did not deprive the PNP of the power to make arrests. As regards Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, appellant insists there was a violation of said section when pictures, showing him together with the confiscated shabu, were not immediately taken after his arrest. He added that the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of the apprehending team did not indicate if the members thereof physically made an inventory of the illegal drugs in the presence of the appellant or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and given a copy thereof. In short, appellant insists that non-compliance with Section 21 regarding the custody and disposition of the confiscated/seized dangerous drugs and paraphernalia, i.e., the taking of pictures and the making of an inventory, will make these items inadmissible in evidence. We do not agree. Section 21 reads: SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity

and the evidentiary value of the confiscated/seized items, are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. Its non-compliance will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the case under consideration, we find that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the items involved were safeguarded. The seized/confiscated items were immediately marked for proper identification. Thereafter, they were forwarded to the Crime Laboratory for examination. Though the justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21 was not expressly stated by the arresting/buy-bust team, this does not necessarily mean that appellants arrest was illegal or the items seized/confiscated inadmissible. In the case at bar, as in Sta. Maria, the justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question during the trial the custody and disposition of the items taken from him. Assuming that Sections 21 and 86 were indeed breached, appellant should have raised these issues before the trial court. This, he did not do. Never did he question the custody and disposition of the items that were supposedly taken from him. It was only on appeal before the Court of Appeals that he raised them. This, he cannot do. We held: The law excuses non-compliance under justifiable grounds. However, whatever justifiable grounds may excuse the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation in this case from complying with Section 21 will remain unknown, because appellant did not question during trial the safekeeping of the items seized from him. Indeed, the police officers alleged violations of Sections 21 and 86 of Republic Act 9165 were not raised before the trial court but were raised instead for the first time on appeal. In no instance did appellant least intimate at the trial court that there were lapses in the safekeeping of seized items that affected their integrity and evidentiary value. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; when a party desires the court to reject the evidence offered, he must so state in the form of objection. Without such objection he cannot raise the question for the first time on appeal.

Appellant was charged with violations of Sections 5, 11 and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165. Appellant was charged with violation of Section 5 for selling 0.03 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction took place, coupled with the presentation in court of

evidence of corpus delicti. The evidence for the prosecution showed the presence of all these elements. The poseur-buyer and the team leader of the apprehending team narrated how the buy-bust happened, and that the shabu sold was presented and identified in court. The poseur-buyer, PO1 Joselito Esmallaner, identified appellant as the seller of the shabu. Esmallaners testimony was corroborated by the team leader, SPO3 Leneal Matias. The white crystalline substance weighing 0.03 grams which was bought from appellant for P100.00 was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) per Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E. In this jurisdiction, the conduct of a buy-bust operation is a common and accepted mode of apprehending those involved in the illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs. It has been proven to be an effective way of unveiling the identities of drug dealers and of luring them out of obscurity. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit. In the case at bar, we find the testimonies of PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias credible. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respects when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. Finding no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we stand by their findings. We, likewise, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Said presumption was not overcome, as there was no evidence showing that PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias were impelled by improper motive. Appellant and his common-law wife testified that the members of the buy-bust team were complete strangers. Appellants defense that there was no buy-bust operation deserves scant consideration. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail. Being his common-law wife, we find Gina Dean not to be a credible witness. Appellant said three of his neighbors witnessed the violent entry made by the policemen in his house, but he failed to present them or any of them to prove his point. Appellant was, likewise, charged with possession of three sachets of shabu

with a total weight of 0.29 gram. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. All these elements have been established. SPO3 Leneal Matias narrated how he discovered the three pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance and other drug paraphernalia on top of a small chair (bangkito) in the house of appellant. Q. After the accused handed something to PO1 Esmallaner, what else happened? A. I saw PO1 Esmallaner try to grab the hand of the accused, but the accused was able to run inside their house, and tried to close the door, sir. Q. As a member of the back-up team upon seeing this incident, what did you do, if any? A. We gave support to PO1 Esmallaner, sir. Q. Will you please tell us what kind of support did you give to PO1 Esmallaner? A. To arrest the accused, sir. Q. What did you do in particular? A. PO1 Esmallaner followed the accused inside me and my group followed Esmallaner also inside the house, sir.

Q. A. Q.

So, in other words you, and your co-members also went inside the house? Yes, sir. When [you] went inside the house, what did you find out if any?

A. PO1 Esmallaner accosted the accused, while I discovered three (3) pieces of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing undetermined amount of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, and other paraphernalia on top of the small bangkito, sir. Q. Were these three (3) sachet and paraphernalia were scattered on the small bangkito? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what did you do, if any when you discovered the presence of these items? A. Q. I confiscated it and then I marked it, sir. When you said it what would this?

A.

The drug paraphernalia, and the heat plastic sachet, sir.

Q. Could you remember one by one what are those paraphernalia that you confiscated and marked it? A. The paraphernalia are two (2) disposable lighter colored red and yellow, six (6) pieces of small stripe of aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu improvised water pipe used as tooter, improvised burner, wooden sealer, and the three (3) pieces heat plastic sachet, fourteen (14) pieces of transparent plastic sachet. That is all I can remember, sir. Q. A. Did you place markings on that items that you confiscated? Yes, sir.

Appellant was indeed the owner of these items for they were found in his house on top of the bangkito following the buy-bust operation and after his arrest. The substance in the plastic sachets was shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E. Finally, the drug paraphernalia seized are sufficient to prove that appellant also violated Section 12 of Republic Act No. 91 July 23, 200965. XXXXXXXXX

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS ELSIE BARBA y BIAZON ,G.R. No. 182420. July 23, 2009 In the case at bar, we find the testimonies of PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias credible. It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial courts which are factual in nature and which involve credibility are accorded respects when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts and speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the credibility of witnesses, having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. Finding no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we stand by their findings. We, likewise, uphold the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Said presumption was not overcome, as there was no evidence showing that PO1 Joselito Esmallaner and SPO3 Leneal Matias were impelled by improper motive. Appellant and his common-law wife testified that the members of the buy-bust team were complete strangers.

Appellants defense that there was no buy-bust operation deserves scant consideration. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, his identity as seller of the shabu can no longer be doubted. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellants plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail. Being his common-law wife, we find Gina Dean not to be a credible witness. Appellant said three of his neighbors witnessed the violent entry made by the policemen in his house, but he failed to present them or any of them to prove his point. Appellant was, likewise, charged with possession of three sachets of shabu with a total weight of 0.29 gram. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. All these elements have been established. SPO3 Leneal Matias narrated how he discovered the three pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance and other drug paraphernalia on top of a small chair (bangkito) in the house of appellant. Q. After the accused handed something to PO1 Esmallaner, what else happened? A. I saw PO1 Esmallaner try to grab the hand of the accused, but the accused was able to run inside their house, and tried to close the door, sir. Q. As a member of the back-up team upon seeing this incident, what did you do, if any? A. Q. A. Q. We gave support to PO1 Esmallaner, sir. Will you please tell us what kind of support did you give to PO1 Esmallaner? To arrest the accused, sir. What did you do in particular?

A. PO1 Esmallaner followed the accused inside me and my group followed Esmallaner also inside the house, sir. Q. A. Q. So, in other words you, and your co-members also went inside the house? Yes, sir. When [you] went inside the house, what did you find out if any?

A. PO1 Esmallaner accosted the accused, while I discovered three (3) pieces of heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing undetermined amount of white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu, and other paraphernalia on top of the small bangkito, sir. Q. Were these three (3) sachet and paraphernalia were scattered on the small bangkito? A. Yes, sir.

Q. And what did you do, if any when you discovered the presence of these items? A. Q. A. I confiscated it and then I marked it, sir. When you said it what would this? The drug paraphernalia, and the heat plastic sachet, sir.

Q. Could you remember one by one what are those paraphernalia that you confiscated and marked it? A. The paraphernalia are two (2) disposable lighter colored red and yellow, six (6) pieces of small stripe of aluminum foil with traces of suspected shabu improvised water pipe used as tooter, improvised burner, wooden sealer, and the three (3) pieces heat plastic sachet, fourteen (14) pieces of transparent plastic sachet. That is all I can remember, sir. Q. A. Did you place markings on that items that you confiscated? Yes, sir.

Appellant was indeed the owner of these items for they were found in his house on top of the bangkito following the buy-bust operation and after his arrest. The substance in the plastic sachets was shabu as confirmed by Chemistry Report No. D-733-03E. Finally, the drug paraphernalia seized are sufficient to prove that appellant also violated Section 12 of Republic Act No. 91 July 23, 200965. XXXXXXXXX PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS ELSIE BARBA y BIAZON ,G.R. No. 182420. July 23, 2009

Our Ruling

To reiterate, the essential elements in a prosecution for sale of illegal drugs are: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it. The prohibited drug is an integral part of the corpus delicti of the crime of possession or selling of regulated/prohibited drug; proof of its identity, existence, and presentation in court are crucial. A conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict. The identity of the subject substance is established by showing the chain of custody. In Espinoza v. State, an adequate foundation establishing a continuous chain of custody is said to have been established if the State accounts for the evidence at each stage from its acquisition to its testing, and to its introduction at trial. In a prosecution for sale of illegal drugs, this foundation takes more significance because of the nature of the evidence involved. The more fungible the evidence, the more significant its condition, or the higher its susceptibility to change, the more elaborate the foundation must be. In those circumstances, it must be shown that there has been no tampering, alteration, or substitution. The chain of custody presented by the prosecution in this case suffers from incompleteness. After the illegal drugs were seized from Barba, PO2 Rabina marked the plastic sachets with his initials. PO1 Almacen marked the tooter in the same manner. The seized aluminum foil was marked AA, presumably after PO2 Arnulfo Aguillon but there is no testimony on this. Once at the police station, the drugs and paraphernalia were then made the subject of a Request for Examination issued by Inspector Bauto. The specimens were then turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory Office where Forensic Chemist Jabonillo made his conclusion that the sachets and the aluminum foil contained shabu. During trial, he testified that the specimen he examined was the same one he brought to the court. Exhibit G or Chemistry Report No. D-086-2003 was also presented as evidence to show that the seized items were positive for dangerous drugs. Pieced together, the prosecutions evidence, however, does not supply all the links needed in the chain of custody rule. The records do not tell us what happened after the seized items were brought to the police station and after these were tested at the forensic laboratory. Doubt is now formed as to the integrity of the evidence. The latest jurisprudence on illegal drugs cases shows a growing trend in acquittals based on reasonable doubt. These reasonable doubt acquittals underscore the lack of strict adherence that law enforcement agencies and prosecutors have shown with regard to the chain of custody rule.

In Malillin v. People, we laid down the chain of custody requirements that must be met in proving that the seized drugs are the same ones presented in court: (1) testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence; and (2) witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the item.

In People v. Sanchez, the accused was acquitted since the prosecution did not make known the identities of the police officers to whom custody of the seized drugs was entrusted after the buy-bust operation. Likewise absent from the evidence is any testimony on the whereabouts of the drugs after they were analyzed by the forensic chemist. In People v. Garcia, the conviction was overturned due in part to the failure of the state to show who delivered the drugs to the forensic laboratory and who had custody of them after their examination by the forensic chemist and pending their presentation in court. In People v. Cervantes, a total of five (5) links in the chain of custody were not presented in court: the desk officer who received the drugs at the police station; the unnamed person who delivered the drugs to the forensic laboratory; the recipient of the drugs at the forensic laboratory; the forensic chemist who did the examination of the drugs; and the person who acted as custodian of the drugs after their analysis. Although the non-presentation of some of the witnesses who can attest to an unbroken chain of evidence may in some instances be excused, there should be a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with their testimonies. Here, however, no explanation was proffered as to why key individuals who had custody over the drugs at certain periods were not identified and/or not presented as witnesses. Uncertainty, therefore, arises if the drugs and paraphernalia seized during the buy-bust operation on January 2003 were the same specimens presented in court in December of that same year. The very identity of the illegal drug is in question because of the absence of key prosecution witnesses. No one knows if the drug seized at the time of the buy-bust operation is the same drug tested and later kept as evidence against Barba. Though there was a stipulation during trial that the specimens submitted as evidence yielded positive for shabu, this only touches on one link in the chain of custody. Thus, given the failure of the prosecution to identify the continuous whereabouts of such fungible pieces of evidence, we are unable to conclude that all elements of the crime have been established

beyond reasonable doubt.

Illegal search- un-counseled admission -custodial investigation [G.R. No. 129296. September 25, 2000] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABE VALDEZ y DELA CRUZ, Simply stated, the issues are: (1) Was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in the present case lawful? (2) Were the seized plants admissible in evidence against the accused? (3) Has the prosecution proved appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt? (4) Is the sentence of death by lethal injection correct? The first and second issues will be jointly discussed because they are interrelated. Appellant contends that there was unlawful search. First, the records show that the law enforcers had more than ample time to secure a search warrant. Second, that the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot does not remove appellant from the mantle of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. He relies on the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, 20 L. Ed 2d 898, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), to the effect that the protection against unreasonable government intrusion protects people, not places. For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the records clearly show that there was no search made by the police team, in the first place. The OSG points out that the marijuana plants in question were grown in an unfenced lot and as each grew about five (5) feet tall, they were visible from afar, and were, in fact, immediately spotted by the police officers when they reached the site. The seized marijuana plants were, thus, in plain view of the police officers. The instant case must, therefore, be treated as a warrantless lawful search under the "plain view" doctrine. The court a quo upheld the validity of the search and confiscation made by the police team on the finding that: "...It seems there was no need for any search warrant. The policemen went to the plantation site merely to make a verification. When they found the said plants, it was too much to expect them to apply for a search warrant. In view of the remoteness of the plantation site (they had to walk for six hours back and forth) and the dangers lurking in the area if they stayed overnight, they had a valid reason to confiscate the said plants upon discovery without any search warrant. Moreover, the evidence shows that the lot was not legally occupied by the accused and there was no fence which evinced the occupant's desire to keep trespassers out. There was, therefore, no privacy to protect, hence, no search warrant was required." The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial

fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant. But they did not. Instead, they uprooted the plants and apprehended the accused on the excuse that the trip was a good six hours and inconvenient to them. We need not underscore that the protection against illegal search and seizure is constitutionally mandated and only under specific instances are searches allowed without warrants. The mantle of protection extended by the Bill of Rights covers both innocent and guilty alike against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers, regardless of the praiseworthiness of their intentions.

We find no reason to subscribe to Solicitor General's contention that we apply the "plain view" doctrine. For the doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; and (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant was arrested without a warrant. Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply. Nor can we sustain the trial court's conclusion that just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot, appellant could not invoke the protection afforded by the Charter against unreasonable searches by agents of the State. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is the immunity of one's

person, which includes his residence, his papers, and other possessions. The guarantee refers to "the right of personal security" of the individual. As appellant correctly points out, what is sought to be protected against the State's unlawful intrusion are persons, not places. To conclude otherwise would not only mean swimming against the stream, it would also lead to the absurd logic that for a person to be immune against unreasonable searches and seizures, he must be in his home or office, within a fenced yard or a private place. The Bill of Rights belongs as much to the person in the street as to the individual in the sanctuary of his bedroom. We therefore hold, with respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution, we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant. They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant. We now proceed to the third issue, which revolves around the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence to prove appellant's guilt. Having declared the seized marijuana plants inadmissible in evidence against appellant, we must now address the question of whether the remaining evidence for the prosecution suffices to convict appellant? In convicting appellant, the trial court likewise relied on the testimony of the police officers to the effect that appellant admitted ownership of the marijuana when he was asked who planted them. It made the following observation: "It may be true that the admission to the police by the accused that he planted the marijuana plants was made in the absence of any independent and competent counsel. But the accused was not, at the time of police verification; under custodial investigation. His admission is, therefore, admissible in evidence and not violative of the constitutional fiat that admission given during custodial investigation is not admissible if given without any counsel."

Appellant now argues that his admission of ownership of the marijuana plants in question cannot be used against him for being violative of his right to counsel during the police investigation. Hence, it was error for the trial court to have relied upon said admission of ownership. He submits that the investigation conducted by the police officers was not a general inquiry, but was meant to elicit information on the ownership of the marijuana plants. Appellant theorizes that since the investigation had narrowed down to him, competent and independent counsel should have assisted him, when the police sought information from him regarding the ownership of the prohibited plants. Appellant claims the presumption of regularity of duty of officers cannot be made to apply to his purported voluntarily confession of ownership of the marijuana plants. Nor can it override his constitutional right to counsel during investigation.

The Office of the Solicitor General believes otherwise. The OSG avers that appellant was not yet under custodial investigation when he admitted to the police that he owned the marijuana plants. His right to competent and independent counsel, accordingly, had not yet attached. Moreover, appellants failure to impute any false motive for the police officers to falsely accuse him indicates that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties by police officers was not sufficiently rebutted. The Constitution plainly declares that any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right: (1) to remain silent; (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice; and (3) to be informed of such rights. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel. An investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or exacting a confession from the suspect in connection with an alleged offense. The moment the police try to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a person suspected of having committed an offense, he should at that juncture be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the right in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the instant case we find that, from the start, a tipster had furnished the police appellant's name as well as the location of appellant's farm, where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. While the police operation was supposedly meant to merely "verify" said information, the police chief had likewise issued instructions to arrest appellant as a suspected marijuana cultivator. Thus, at the time the police talked to appellant in his farm, the latter was already under investigation as a suspect. The questioning by the police was no longer a general inquiry. Under cross-examination, PO2 Balut stated, he "did not yet admit that he is the cultivator of that marijuana so we just asked him and I think there is no need to inform (him of) his constitutional rights because we are just asking him..." In trying to elicit information from appellant, the police was already investigating appellant as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial investigation and had a right to counsel even if he had not yet been arrested. Custodial investigation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." As a suspect, two armed policemen interrogated appellant. Behind his inquisitors were a barangay peace officer and three other armed policemen. All had been dispatched to arrest him. From these circumstances, we may infer that appellant had already been deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way, even before the actual arrest. Note that even before he was arrested, the police made him incriminatingly pose for photos in front of the marijuana plants. Moreover, we find appellant's extrajudicial confession flawed with respect to its admissibility. For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in

writing. The records show that the admission by appellant was verbal. It was also uncounselled. A verbal admission allegedly made by an accused during the investigation, without the assistance of counsel at the time of his arrest and even before his formal investigation is not only inadmissible for being violative of the right to counsel during criminal investigations, it is also hearsay. Even if the confession or admission were "gospel truth", if it was made without assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver of such assistance, the confession is inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. It is fundamental in criminal prosecutions that before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused is the author thereof. The evidence arrayed against the accused, however, must not only stand the test of reason, it must likewise be credible and competent. Competent evidence is "generally admissible" evidence. Admissible evidence, in turn, is evidence "of such a character that the court or judge is bound to receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial." In the instant case, the trial court relied on two pieces of probative matter to convict appellant of the offense charged. These were the seized marijuana plants, and appellant's purportedly voluntary confession of ownership of said marijuana plants to the police. Other than these proofs, there was no other evidence presented to link appellant with the offense charged. As earlier discussed, it was error on the trial court's part to have admitted both of these proofs against the accused and to have relied upon said proofs to convict him. For said evidence is doubly tainted. First, as earlier pointed out, the seized marijuana plants were obtained in violation of appellant's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. The search and seizure were void ab initio for having been conducted without the requisite judicial warrant. The prosecution's very own evidence clearly establishes that the police had sufficient time to obtain a warrant. There was no showing of such urgency or necessity for the warrantless search or the immediate seizure of the marijuana plants subject of this case. To reiterate, said marijuana plants cannot be utilized to prove appellant's guilt without running afoul of the constitutional guarantees against illegal searches and the inadmissibility of evidence procured pursuant to an unlawful search and seizure.

Second, the confession of ownership of the marijuana plants, which appellant allegedly made to the police during investigation, is not only hearsay but also violative of the Bill of Rights. The purported confession was made without the assistance of competent and independent counsel, as mandated by the Charter. Thus, said confession cannot be used to convict appellant without running afoul of the Constitution's requirement that a suspect in a criminal investigation must have the services of competent and independent counsel during such investigation. In sum, both the object evidence and the testimonial evidence as to appellant's voluntary confession of ownership of the prohibited plants relied upon to prove appellant's guilt failed to meet the test of Constitutional competence.

The Constitution decrees that, "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved..." To justify the conviction of the accused, the prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the accused. Absent the required degree of proof of an accused's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal. In this case, the seized marijuana plants linking appellant to the crime charged are miserably tainted with constitutional infirmities, which render these inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." Nor can the confession obtained during the uncounselled investigation be used against appellant, "it being inadmissible in evidence against him. Without these proffered but proscribed materials, we find that the prosecution's remaining evidence did not even approximate the quantum of evidence necessary to warrant appellant's conviction. Hence, the presumption of innocence in his favor stands. Perforce, his acquittal is in order. In acquitting an appellant, we are not saying that he is lily-white, or pure as driven snow. Rather, we are declaring his innocence because the prosecution's evidence failed to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. For that is what the basic law requires. Where the evidence is insufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, then his "acquittal must follow in faithful obeisance to the fundamental law."

No search warrant uprooted marijuana plantation -but was convicted [G.R. No. 110163. December 15, 1997] EDUARDO A. ZANORIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent. The prosecutions recital of facts is summarized as follows: Sergeants Joel Absin and Hermes Recla, both members of the Philippine Army detailed with the 7th Narcotics Command (Narcom) stationed at Camp Lapu-lapu, Cebu City, testified that on or about 3:30 oclock in the morning of February 16, 1988, they were briefed by their commanding officer, Major Vivencio Ramilo, on a mission to uproot full-grown marijuana plants in the mountains of Sitio Kabulihan, Barangay Guba and Talamban, Cebu, allegedly cultivated or cultured by a certain Eddie. The assault teams proceeded on board a military truck to the area and reached the place at around 5:00 oclock a.m. With the help of a guide, the group was able to determine the exact location of the marijuana plantation. While casing the area, they noticed a person, later identified as petitioner, emerging from a nipa hut to inspect the plantation. The Narcom agents immediately apprehended him and they alleged that during tactical interrogation, he broke down and cried and admitted ownership of the field. The agents uprooted a total of 3,500 marijuana plants and loaded the same on a military truck and brought them to their headquarters. Twenty samples of the seized items were submitted to the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory in Cebu City and forensic chemist Myrna Areola confirmed that they were indeed marijuana plants. The rest of the plants were incinerated.

A careful and judicious examination of the subject affidavit shows no reason to disturb the findings of both the trial and appellate courts. It can be gleaned therefrom that the operation conducted by the Narcom agents consisted of two stages: first, their arrival at the site and the consequent apprehension of petitioner and second, after interrogation, when he personally led them to the plantation site. These facts confirm the absence of inconsistency that was imputed by petitioner against the prosecution witnesses. It must be noted further that the agents launched their operations after receiving a report that marijuana plants were being cultured in the hinterlands of Sitio Kabulihan and that a certain Eddie supervised the same. Petitioner argues that his mere presence at the site during the operations cannot justify his conviction for knowingly, planting, growing or raising of any plant which is the source of a prohibited drug. He contends that conviction under Section 9 of R.A. No. 6425 requires a series of human activities, that is, the deliberate planting, growing or raising of these plants. Such assertion is misplaced. Evident on record is that petitioner failed to adequately explain his presence at the site teeming with fully grown marijuana plants. His claim that he has never seen nor heard of marijuana is incredulous. Needless to state, the defense of denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. Moreover, the latter failed to show any reason why the Narcom agents would make such a serious charge against him considering that they do not know each other. The settled rule is that when the issue of credibility of witnesses is raised, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court. We quote with approval the respondent courts observation, thus: Indeed, if it is true as the accused claimed that at about 3 in the morning of the date in question, it was his wife who wake (sic) him and told him to rise because somebody was calling his name from downstairs, and as he stood up and opened the door, he saw armed men pointing their firearms at him, his wife should be the right person to confirm what actually happened. But there is nothing in her testimony that (would) suggest or corroborate his claim that he was apprehended at their house. (Emphasis supplied) The testimony of Expedita pertained solely to Geonzons probable participation in the arrest of her husband. To further prove petitioners innocence, Barangay Captain Borres was presented as witness. On this score, we subscribe to the findings of the lower court that the apparent alterations in the record book were made only to accomodate the defenses theory that petitioner was indicted on trumped-up charges. Page 24 thereof shows that no case was ever brought before the barangay office for the month of June 1987. Under an entry dated July 1987, which is written in black ink, the alleged confrontation and settlement between Geonzon and petitioner was reduced to writing. On the same page, however, an entry which appears to be dated Aug. 1987 was obliterated using a blue -colored pen and transferred to a line following the last entry of the supposed settlement between the parties. We, therefore, share the lower courts incredulity that these entries were made by Borres in July 1987.

The defense would like the Court to believe that the arrest of petitioner was fomented by a disgruntled Geonzon for having been required to pay P950.00 as indemnity for killing a pig. This excuse is too flimsy to even be considered by this Court and it utterly fails to convince us of petitioners innocence. The factual milieu of this case cannot but lead us to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused as the author of the crime. Requisites for issuing search warrant NO RECORDS OF SEARCHING QUESTIONS [G.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant. Our Ruling Appellants contention is meritorious. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution, thus: Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, thus: Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines. Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted. Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form of searching questions and answers. Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, who was requested to testify on the available records kept in their

office regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51, presented before the court only the application for search warrant and the supporting affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez. Atty. Castillo could not produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in writing as required by law. Atty. Castillo testified, thus: xxx xxx xxx Q Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of the proceedings of a searching questions and answers made by the Executive Judge upon the complainant as well as the two (2) witnesses not only in connection with application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those application covered by that record namely, 99-49, 99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-54? A Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic notes. Q Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata Ariston about said transcript? A I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday and she told me that she will try to find on (sic) the said transcript. Q But until now there is no transcript yet? A Yes, sir. Q Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the records of this case together with the application for search warrant as well as the supporting affidavit of the said application, but there is no records available to have it with you and there is no proof with you? A Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store room which they placed is topsy turvy and all the records are scattered. So, we are having a hard time in scanning the records, sir. Q But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate said transcript, Mr. Witness? A Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said transcript. Q You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes? A No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir. Q That is by a machine steno? A Yes, sir. Q Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who are using the machine steno to identify what cases does that stenographic notes (sic)? A Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the transcript of stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant No. 99-49 to 99-54. (Underscoring ours) Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. The records only show the existence of an application for a search warrant and the affidavits of the

complainants witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona, we held: Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record, rendering the search warrant invalid. We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing judge examined under oath, in the form of searching questions and answers, the applicant SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda and his witnesses on January 25, 1999 as it is so stated in Search Warrant No. 99-51. Although it is possible that Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the depositions in writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the record, together with the affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor General that the subject stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court because of the confused state of the records in the latters branch wh en he assumed office.

The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question the legality of the search because he did not protest against it, and even admitted during his testimony that he was neither threatened nor maltreated by the policemen who searched their residence. We disagree. The cases cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless search. In this case, the police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant before his residence was searched. At that time, appellant could not determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with the law. It was only during the trial of this case that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued causing appellant to file a motion with memorandum objecting to the admissibility of the evidence formally offered by the prosecution. In People v. Burgos, we ruled: Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish

the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra): x x x x x x xxx x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent, or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp.1180, 1181). We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against wa iver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458). In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said warrant during the trial of the case, after the prosecution formally offered its evidence. Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.

No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate an invalid warrant. In Mata v. Bayona, we ruled: .[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera: It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it. We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers was not

complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution. It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to exclude the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant. Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to sustain the conviction of appellant.

NOT A PLAIN VIEW-conducted surveillance for four days [G.R. No. 124442. July 20, 2001] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO COMPACION y In the instant case, the search and seizure conducted by the composite team in the house of accused-appellant was not authorized by a search warrant. It does not appear either that the situation falls under any of the above mentioned cases. Consequently, accused-appellants right against unreasonable search and seizure was clearly violated. It is extant from the records that accused-appellant did not consent to the warrantless search and seizure conducted. While the right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure may, like every right, be waived either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The act of the accused-appellant in allowing the members of the military to enter his premises and his consequent silence during the unreasonable search and seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission or an implied acquiescence to warrantless search and seizure especially so when members of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein accused-appellants lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. The case of People v. Burgos, is instructive. In Burgos, the Court ruled that the accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search simply because he failed to object. There, we held: xxx To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right (Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. De Garcia v. Locsin (supra); xxx xxx xxx x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold

that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. Neither could the members of the composite team have justified their search of accused-appellants premises by invoking the necessity and urgency of the situation. It was admitted by the members of the arresting team that the residence of accused-appellant had already been put under surveillance following a tip from a confidential informant. The surveillance was conducted on July 9, 1995 while the alleged marijuana plants were seized four (4) days later or on July 13, 1995. Surely, the raiding team had all the opportunity to have first secured a search warrant before forcing their way into accused-appellants premises. In fact, they earlier had approached then Executive Judge Ponferrada of Bacolod City who declined to issue one on the ground that the matter was outside his territorial jurisdiction. Then, they went to Executive Judge Javellana of San Carlos City in the evening of July 12, 1995 who asked them to come back in the morning as it was already nighttime and outside of office hours. However, in their haste to apprehend the accused-appellant on the pretext that information of his impending arrest may be leaked to him, the team proceeded to go to his residence to arrest him and seize the alleged marijuana plants. The teams apprehension of a tip-off was unfounded. It is far-fetched that one could have gone to accused-appellants place before the following morning to warn him of his impending arrest as barangay Bagonbon is an isolated and difficult to reach mountain barangay. The road leading to it was rough, hilly and eroded by rain and flood. A few hours delay to await the issuance of a warrant in the morning would not have compromised the teams operation. In justifying the validity of the warrantless arrest, search and seizure on July 13, 1995, the trial court ruled that the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of having planted, grown and cultivated the marijuana plants which was easily visible from outside of the residence of the accused. Thus, the trial court concluded that: xxx (T)he said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, were the very corpus delicti of the crime the accused has been committing since the time he planted them in the backyard of his residence for whatever reason a corpus delicti which the NARCOM agents saw with their very own eyes as the same were in plain view when they made a surveillance in the accuseds place on July 9, 1995. Said corpus delicti has remained on the spots in accuseds backyard where they had been growing since the time they were planted there and, therefore, any peace officer or even private citizen, for that matter, who has seen said plants and recognized them as marijuana, was by law empowered and authorized to arrest the accused even without any warrant of arrest. The accused was caught in flagrante delicto for he was carrying marijuana, hence, committing a crime, at the time of his arrest. The warrantless search which was conducted following a lawful arrest, was valid.

- People vs. Bandin (Dec. 10, 1993) 226 SCRA 299, at p. 300 The accused was caught in flagrante delicto growing, cultivating and culturing said two (2) marijuana plants, Exh. F, in the backyard of his residence, which the NARCOM agents uprooted from there at the time they arrested and apprehended him. Under said circumstances, a search warrant and/or warrant of arrest were not legally needed before the NARCOM agents could effect the arrest of the accused. As a general rule, objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a warrant. It is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Thus, the following elements must be present before the doctrine may be applied: (a) a prior valid intention based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and (d) plain view justified were seizure of evidence without further search. Here, there was no valid warrantless arrest. They forced their way into accused-appellants premises without the latters consent. It is undisputed that the NARCOM agents conducted a surveillance of the residence of accused-appellant on July 9, 1995 on the suspicion that he was growing and cultivating marijuana when they allegedly came in plain view of the marijuana plants. When the agents entered his premises on July 13, 1995, their intention was to seize the evidence against him. In fact, they initially wanted to secure a search warrant but could not simply wait for one to be issued. The NARCOM agents, therefore, did not come across the marijuana plants inadvertently when they conducted a surveillance and barged into accused-appellants residence.

In People v. Musa, the Court held: The plain view doctrine may not, however, be used to launch u nbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L.Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine: What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to

extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L.Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas v. Brown, 460 U.G. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)] It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether the plants involved herein were indeed marijuana plants. After said plants were uprooted, SPO1 Linda had to conduct a field test on said plants by using a Narcotics Drug Identification Kit to determine if the same were indeed marijuana plants. Later, Senior Inspector Villavicencio, a forensic chemist, had to conduct three (3) qualitative examinations to determine if the plants were indeed marijuana. Since the evidence was secured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure, the same is tainted and illegal and should therefore be excluded for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree. In People v. Aruta, we held that: The exclusion of such evidence is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizure. The non-exclusionary rule is contrary to the letter and spirit of the prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. While conceding that the officer making the unlawful search and seizure may be held criminally and civilly liable, the Stonehill case observed that most jurisdictions have realized that the exclusionary rule is he only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against abuse. This approach is based on the justification made by Judge Learned Hand that only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong, will the wrong be repressed. Unreasonable searches and seizures are the menace against which the constitutional guarantees afford full protection. While the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public welfare, still it may be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of government. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. DOCUMENTS REQUIRED in filing drug cases 1. Chemistry Report or certificate of laboratory examination duly signed by the forensic chemist or duly authorized officer, or if unavailable, the field test results on the seized drugs, as attested to by PNP Narcotics Command Opeartive or other competent person, in which case, the inquest prosecutor shall direct the arresting officer to immediately fortward the seized drug to the crime laboratory for expert testing and to submit the final forensic chemistry report to the prosecutors office within five (5) days from the date of inquest; 2. Machine copy or photograph of the buy bust money, if available;

3. Affidavit of the poseur buyer, if any. 4. Affidavit of apprehending officer and witnesses; 5. Inventory (if with warrant at the place search, if w/o at the police station or fiscals office), the drug seized should be pre marked and initialed by the apprehending officers; 6. Certificate of coordination with the PDEA; 7. Request for laboratory/ urine examination; 8. Picture of the drugs seized and the accused; 9. Pre-operating and post operation report/ police blotter; 10. Field test Report??? 11. Investigation Report SUGGESTED ADDITIONAL DOCUMENT TO ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY. 1. AFFIDAVIT OF THE INVESTIGATOR THAT HE RECEIVED THE CONFISCATED DRUGS, INVENTORIED , REQUEST FOR LABORATORY EXAMINATION AND TURNED OVER TO THE PNP CRIME LABORATORY WITH MARKINGS AND INITIALS. ACTUAL OBSERVATION DURING TRIAL 1. UNPREPARED WITNESSES SOMETIMES THEY WILL BRING WITH THEM THEIR AFFIDAVIT AND ARE USSUALLY CAUGHT READING IT; 2. SOMETIMES THE RELATIVE OF THE ACCUSED AND COUNSEL OF THE ACCUSED WILL PRESSURE THE WITNESSESS; 3. THE MARIJUANA WAS BROUGHT TO LABORATORY FOR EXAMINATION AFTER THREE MONTHS IT WAS UPROOTED; 4. THE WITNESS CANNOT CATEGORICALLY STATE THAT THEY KNOW THAT IT WAS REALLY A PROHIBITED DRUGS; 5. No pre-operation and post operation report or blotter; 6. No photographs during the inventory, they will take photographs but will not submit copy (who will pay for the development?); 7. The qualifying and aggravating circumstances were not given importance in the affidavit. (Owner of the land, used minor as courier, who owns the house, paraphernalia;) 8. Cell phone transcription not transcribed; 9. Test Buy not included in the inventory; 10. Transfer of personnel without informing the court and the prosecution; 11. The chain of possession not cannot be established. No initials, no inventory; n o markings; 12. Illegal arrest. ( Went to the house of the suspect because of the lgu executive order and arrested without searc or warrant of arrest; 13. Operation Kap-Kap or stop and frisk without probable cause; 14. No surveillance possibility of arresting a wrong person; 15. Poseur buyer not protected (two of the poseur buyer was killed); 13. Hearsay failure to take the affidavit of the informant raid plantation upproated 1, 700 hills no one was in the plantation charged the suspect on the basis

of the informant verbal allegation; 15. The 1,0000 plus hills was burned in the public without courts order, without the presence of the accused counsel or representative 16. Use of the apprehended person then the target eluded arrest. How can the apprehended person be used as witness?? 17. The procedure in handling the drugs was not followed no PDEA personnel the court does not order the burning/ destruction of the drugs 18. Seized drugs not immediately brought to the laboratory for examination; 19. Witnesses / prosecutors not protected; 20. submitted dried marijuana leaves examined marijuana Fruting tops; 21. question and answer of two witnesses during the application of search warrant should be attached to the records of the case. 22. The aggravating circumstances not alleged in the affidavit and information; 23. Allegation of planting the evidence 24. The accused swallowed the marijuana the police officer have the suspect drink much water to make the accused vomit. 25. Informant who lead the Police and indentify the owner of marijuana plantation did not execute affidavit;

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTATNCES If the sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution or transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical transpires within one hundred (100) meters from the school, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case. For drug pushers who use minors or mentally incapacitated individuals as runners, couriers and messengers, or in any other capacity directly connected to the dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential chemicals trade, the maximum penalty shall be imposed in every case. If the victim of the offense is a minor or a mentally incapacitated individual, or should a dangerous drug and/or a controlled precursor and essential chemical involved in any offense herein provided be the proximate cause of death of a victim thereof, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed. The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a financier of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section. (Sec 5); The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed in every case where any dangerous drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use the same in such a place. Should any dangerous drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or resort, the penalty of death and a fine ranging from One million (P1,000,000.00) to Fifteen million pesos (P15,000,000.00) shall be imposed on

the maintainer, owner and/or operator. If such den, dive or resort is owned by a third person, the same shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the government: Provided, that the criminal complaint shall specifically allege that such place is intentionally used in the furtherance of the crime; Provided, further, that the prosecution shall prove such intent on the part of the owner to use the property for such purpose; Provided, finally, that the owner shall be included as an accused in the criminal complaint. The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person who organizes, manages or acts as a financier of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section. (Sec 6); Any person found possessing any dangerous drug during a party, or at a social gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons, shall suffer the maximum penalties provided for in Section 11 of the Act, regardless of the quantity and purity of such dangerous drugs. The phrase "company of at least two (2) persons" shall mean the accused or suspect plus at least two (2) others, who may or may not be in possession of any dangerous drug (Sec 13); The maximum penalty provided for in Section 12 of the Act shall be imposed upon any person, who shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body, during parties, social gatherings or meetings, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons. The phrase "company of at least two (2) persons" shall mean the accused or suspect plus at least two (2) others, who may or may not be in possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. (Sec14); The land or portions thereof and/or greenhouses on which any of said plant is cultivated or cultured shall be confiscated and escheated in favor of the State, unless the owner thereof can prove lack of knowledge of such cultivation or culture despite the exercise of due diligence on his/her part. If the land involved is part of the public domain, the maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon the offender. The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who organizes, manages or acts as a financier of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section; (Sec15) The maximum penalty provided for under this Section shall be imposed upon any person, who organizes, manages or acts as a financier of any of the illegal activities prescribed in this Section. (sec 16); The maximum penalties of the unlawful acts provided for in the Act shall be imposed, in addition to absolute perpetual disqualification from any public office, if those found guilty of such unlawful acts are government officials and employees (Sec 28); Criminal Liability for Planting of Evidence. - Any person who is found guilty of planting any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, regardless of quantity and purity, shall suffer the penalty of death.

Liability of Law Enforcemnet and other Govt officials SECTION 91. Responsibility and Liability of Law Enforcement Agencies and other Government Officials and Employees in Testifying as Prosecution Witnesses in Dangerous Drugs Cases. - Any member of law enforcement agencies or any other government official and employee who, after due notice, fails or refuses intentionally or negligently, to appear as a witness for the prosecution in any proceeding, involving violations of the Act, without any valid reason, shall be punished with imprisonment of not less than twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), in addition to the administrative liability he/she may be meted out by his/her immediate superior and/or appropriate body. The immediate superior of the member of the law enforcement agency or any other government employee mentioned in the preceding paragraph shall be penalized with imprisonment of not less than two (2) months and one (1) day but not more than six (6) years and a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if despite due notice to them and to the witness concerned, the former does not exert reasonable effort to present the latter to the court. The member of the law enforcement agency or any other government employee mentioned in the preceding paragraphs shall not be transferred or reassigned to any other government office located in another territorial jurisdiction during the pendency of the case in court. However, the concerned member of the law enforcement agency or government employee may be transferred or re-assigned for compelling reasons: Provided, that his/her immediate superior shall notify the court in writing where the case is pending of the order to transfer or re-assign, within twenty-four (24) hours from its approval; Provided, further, that his/her immediate superior shall be penalized with imprisonment of not less than (2) months and one (1) day but not more than six (6) years and a fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and in addition, perpetual absolute disqualification from public office, should he/she fail to notify the court in writing of such order to transfer or re-assign. Prosecution and punishment under this Section shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any existing law.

Liability of bungling in the prosecution SECTION 92. Delay and Bungling in the Prosecution of Drug Cases. Any government officer or employee tasked with the prosecution of drugrelated cases under the Act, either as prosecutor, prosecution witness, or as law

enforcement agent, who, through patent laxity, inexcusable neglect, unreasonable delay or deliberately causes the unsuccessful prosecution and/or dismissal of the said drug cases, shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years without prejudice to his/her prosecution under the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code. MIRANDA WARNING YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, ANYTHING YOU SAY MAY AND WILL BE USED AGAINST YOU IN ANY COURT OF LAW. YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO AN ATTORNEY FINAL STATEMENT We should stress that the Court is not unmindful of the difficulties of law enforcement agencies in suppressing the illegal traffic of dangerous drugs. However, quick solutions of crimes and apprehensions of malefactors do not justify a callous disregard of the Bill of Rights. Law enforcers are required to follow the law and to respect the peoples rights. Otherwise, their efforts become counterproductive. We remind them of this recent exhortation by this Court: x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means. While buy-bust operations deserve judicial sanction if carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, it is well to recall that x x x by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. Thus, courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses. [G.R. No. 116720. October 2, 1997] PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROEL ENCINADA, accused-appellant. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding

the rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price to pay for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes declared: I think it is less evil that some criminals escape than that the government should play an ignoble part. It is simply not allowed in free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is the Constitution itself. (People v. Musa)

THANK YOU FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA PROSECUTOR I- COMVAL PROVINCE