U.S.

-Pakistani Relations After the bin Laden Raid

May 2, 2011 | 2002 GMT

Summary
While details on the May 2 U.S. operation that killed Osama bin Laden remain scarce, it is now known that the United States acted unilaterally in Pakistan, not informing the government in Islamabad until after its forces had exited Pakistani airspace. This is an example of the deep distrust between Washington and Islamabad and is concerning to the Pakistani government, which sees unilateral U.S. operations on its soil as having the potential to exacerbate instability in the country. However, Washington continues to rely on Islamabads connections as it attempts to extricate itself from Afghanistan an opportunity for Pakistan to portray itself as a trustworthy partner.

Analysis
The U.S. operation that killed Osama bin Laden early May 2 in Abottabad, Pakistan, is an example of the deep distrust between the United States and Pakistan in the war against al Qaeda. Bin Laden was not killed in the lawless tribal borderland between Afghanistan and Pakistan; he was living with family members in a large, highly secured compound about three hours by car from Islamabad, just down the road from the Pakistan Military Academy. Though details of the operation remain scarce, it is now known that the United States informed the Pakistani government of the operation only once its forces had exited Pakistani airspace taking lessons from previous instances in which U.S. information sharing with Pakistan compromised operations against high-value targets. The Pakistani government expressed surprise that bin Laden was in Abbottabad. Though U.S. President Barack Obama said in his address after the raid, Pakistan helped lead us to bin Laden and the compound where he was hiding, this appears to have been a reference to the long-existing intelligence sharing between the two countries rather than to any specific operation. Obama added in the address that he had long said the United States would act unilaterally in order to capture or kill bin Laden, adding that he had spoken with Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari only after the operation was completed. Obama then said continued Pakistani cooperation against al Qaeda and its affiliates was essential. Following the address, highly placed Pakistani sources expressed to STRATFOR that they had been surprised by the operation itself but not at the lack of advance warning of the raid, given the lack of trust between the United States and Pakistan. Indeed, suspicions are already building over the possible role of Islamabads security establishment in sheltering bin Laden and the broader issue of jihadist sympathizers within the Pakistani intelligence apparatus. While there undoubtedly will be myriad conspiracy theories, a number of serious questions will be raised on the depth of Pakistani collusion with high-value jihadist targets, which will further sour the U.S.Pakistani relationship. Particularly concerning for Pakistan is the precedent set in this attack for

unilateral U.S. action against major jihadist targets. At the public level, anger already abounds over the U.S. ability to operate freely in Pakistan. Now, the United States may feel empowered to expand the reach of its counterterrorism operations, perhaps hitting targets in cities like Quetta and Lahore to get at high-value targets such as Afghan Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, Haqqani network leader Sirajuddin Haqqani and leaders from the militant Islamist group Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan has strongly objected to suggestions that bin Laden had received official protection from the government, with one highly placed Pakistani source telling STRATFOR that hiding in Pakistan could be easily accomplished without help from the authorities. Pakistan will continue to make such assertions while reminding the United States of two critical points. First, unilateral U.S. action deep inside Pakistan could refuel the countrys jihadist insurgency and provoke outrage in its citizens, further derailing U.S. counterterrorism efforts. While the operation that killed bin Laden is unlikely to immediately provoke such a reaction the population currently seems split between anger at the unilateral U.S. operation and acceptance that bin Ladens elimination is a positive development further U.S. operations along these lines will weaken the latter argument. Second, the United States remains reliant on Pakistani cooperation as it seeks to extricate itself from Afghanistan. Pakistan has vital intelligence links and deep relationships in Afghanistan, and the U.S. exit from Afghanistan requires a political understanding with the Taliban that only Pakistan can forge. This reality, Pakistan hopes, will act as an arrester to unilateral U.S. counterterrorism actions in Pakistan. As such, Pakistan potentially has an opportunity in the coming months to demonstrate to Washington that it is a trustworthy partner through its actions as a mediator in Afghanistan. As Islamabad sees the potential for Washington to increasingly engage in unilateral actions, it may decide to accommodate the Americans in an attempt to deter further violations of its sovereignty and stave off the domestic instability brought on by foreign military operations on its soil.