AD-A25 8 361

Research Report
A STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FOR THE

DI
ELECTI

ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

THOMAS A. MAHR COLONEL, USAF 1992

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AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY

A STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

by Thomas A. Colonel, Mahr USAF

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY IN FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM REQUIREMENT

Professor:

Dr.

J.

Richard Walsh
Acoa"91j F~or

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, APRIL 1992

ALABAMA

NTT?

AVIv "!

it? Codes

--

Dis Aw'~1 2and/or "Dtst 1 Sp\clal

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC THEATER

I.

Strategic Direction. Union have

Recent

dramatic events in United

Europe and 40-year

the old

former Soviet grand

outmoded the on containing

States'

strategy focused

communism.

President George this way:

Bush outlined the United States'

new role in

the world in

Within the broader community of nations, we see our own role clearly. We must not only protect our citizens and our interests but help create a new world in which our fundamental values not only survive but flourish. (38:v) These fundamental values form the basis for the global

components of U.S. a.

national security strategy outlined below.

Major 'Components of National Security Strategy (1) Global Components. The global components of U.S.

national security strategy and their underlying aims are: a. The survival of the United States as a free independent nation, with its fundamental values in tact and institutions and people secure. and its

b. A healthy and growing economy to ensure opportunity for individual prosperity and resources for national endeavors at home and abroad. c. relations with allies d. economic freedom, (38:3-4) (2) policy Healthy, cooperative and and friendly nations. politically vigorous

A stable and secure world, where political and human rights and democratic institutions flourish. The United States pursues a the

Regional components. engagement

of peaceful

and bilateral

relationships in

Asia-Pacific region which entails: paragraph id. (a) below. (b) the region; Maintaining the military alliances outlined in

Actively promoting

free and expanding markets in

Seeking to reduce the U.S.' $41 billion trade (c) imbalance with Japan by gaining full access to the Japanese market; to fields environment; (d) like Working to expand the U.S.- Japanese partnership and the relief, non-proliferation, refugee the continued (ROK); economic

committed to (e) Remaining growth and security of the Republic of Korea Seeking appropriate (f) with the People's Republic of China (PRC); (g) Fostering between Taiwan and the PRC;

contact

and consultations interchange in Cambodia

constructive and peaceful

(h) Seeking a resolution of the conflict under the auspices of the U.N.; and authority relations. b. and (i) Promoting professionalism, in for human rights respect

support for civilian military-to-military

Major Components of National Military Strategy (1) Global components. August 1990 sees in The new defense strategy President the major threat facing the U.S. either Europe or the Pacific, The goal

Bush as

announced in a major

regional contingency global

rather than a short-warning, of its to this allies defeat new strategy remains and interests. aggression on

war

with the Russians.

to deter aggression

against the U.S., our strategy seeks

Should deterrence fail, terms favorable to

U.S.

interests. are:

The

fundamental

military capabilities necessary to do this

(a) Survivable and highly capable and defense forces to deter war;

strategic offense

(b) Forward presence in key areas to promote regional response and capability for crisis and provide an initial stability escalation control; to responding threatening U.S. of effectively forces capable Conventional (c) and contingencies regional crises short-notice interests; and

(d) Capacity to reconstitute a larger force structure if the nation once again is faced with the threat of a massive conflict. (11:5)

Our strategy demands we be able to move men and scene of a crisis at a pace and To do this, our (38:29) in

materiel to the field an to use and

numbers sufficient to ability

overwhelming force. air and sea

we must assure our space

lanes and

access to

through maritime

aerospace superiority. sea to preserve

As a maritime nation dependent on the commercial interest. verifiable ties, freedom of

legitimate security and a vital U.S.

the seas is, U.S.

and will remain,

military strategy continues to stress equitable, agreements to reduce military threats, relationships, (11:5)

arms control

inject greater

predictability into international postures in

and to channel force Stopping the global weapons, as well as

more stabilizing directions. chemical is

proliferation df nuclear,

and biological a top priority. with

the missiles that deliver them, Alliances critical to our and other

partnerships

friendly nations provide stability,

are

security interests. and

Alliances

deter aggression, For these

support the forward we have entered and into

presence of U.S. various bi-lateral

forces. and region.

reasons, treaties

multilateral (40:11-1) To help the Third

alliances in

the

Asia-Pacific

deter low-intensity conflicts and we support representative

promote stability government,

in

World,

integrate We do

security assistance efforts, this through political,

and promote economic development. -a

"peacetime engagement" economic and military

coordinated combination of aimed primarily at

actions

counteracting Powerful

local violence and promoting nation-building. drug cartels threaten the economy, institutions of the regions in drugs to the ecology,

(11:5-6) political

process and social The supply of illicit

which they operate. from abroad, the

United States

associated

violence and within

international country the

instability, to

and the pose a

use of national of the

illegal drugs

this

continue

security threat. production,

As a result,

detection and countering a

trafficking,

and use of illegal drugs is

high-priority (43:85) the past, on

national security mission of the Department of Defense. Our sec-,rity our ability into a it in the future depends, as it has in

to quickly

incorporate the latest the field.

technological

advances been

weapons systems in

Technology has historically

comparative advantage for American forces;

we have often relied on

to overcome numerical shortages and to reduce the risk to American The spread of advanced technology weapons systems will surely det~rrent value of our forces -unless we act -and our competitive edge now to maintain our

lives.

erode the in

warfare

decisively

technological superiority in In a related vein,

the future. we must

(38:30) sufficient industrial

maintain

capacity in to

the United States to provide and sustain modern equipment expansion of our armed forces should the need

support a rapid

occur. (2) military Regional components. in the The principal elements have been of our forward

strategy

Asia-Pacific region and bilateral ensure

deployed forces, (3:5)

overseas bases,

security arrangements. a rapid and flexible

Our forward

deployed forces: enable significant

response capability; the number of U.S. :osts; U.S. (3:7) Adjustments to

economy of force by reducing to share in defense

units required;

allow allies

provide an effective logistics base; commitment to the region to our allies

and demonstrate a visible and potential enemies.

current U.S.

force levels

in

the

Pacific are

eing ur

made in allies as In

light of reduced tensions and improved capabilities of a result of political self-confidence we announced our the region. and economic a

rosperity. hased asting 5,000

February 1990, of U.S.

intent to begin The first

withdrawal one to

forces in

phase, personnel

three years,

consists of

removing 7,000 5,000-6,000

Army and 2,000 Air Force) and all U.S.

from Korea;

Army troops Philippines.

rom Japan; 25:40;

military

personnel from the be made in

24:12)

Subsequent withdrawals will

the 3-10 year

imeframe as the situation warrants. For the foreseeable future, hroughout the awaii. region is we plan to maintain maritime forces forces in Korea, Japan and

and land-based

Our joal

to transition from We anticipate little

a leading to change in

a supporting deployment

efense role in atterns in

Korea.

Japan. the Philippines is region as will depend reduced, on new

As access to bases such as those in ur continued forward presence in the

ccess

agreements with nations in response. backed by deterrence

the region,

well as increased place a premium forces

lexibility and speed of n naval capabilities, apable 38:31) c. Other a National of providing

Our forces will long-range air and immediate

and ground crisis

response.

Sources

Foreign economic of American foreign

and

security Our

ssistance is

vital instrument

policy.

Dreign assistance program is emocratic values; rotecting against orism, narcotics,

focused on promoting and consolidating promoting peace; ter-

promoting free market principles; transnational threats such as

international

AIDS and environmental

degradation which threaten (38:17)

11 peaceful

nations; and meeting urgent human needs.

Security military sales,

assistance

activities

such

as

grant

aid,

foreign

and the international

military education and training (PACOM). (31:15)

program have been effective in d.

the Pacific Command

Alliance or Coalition Components.

Seven of

the U.S.'s ten

mutual defense and security arrangements are in

the Pacific region:

(ANZUS) States Australia-New Zealand-United (1) The Relations strong allies. U.S. remain (Australia and the Treaty. New of because are strained U.S. and the New Zealand between Zealand's barring of nuclear equipped or powered weapons systems.) The Mutual Defense (2) and the Republic of Korea. Treaty Between the United States

(3) The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan. (Japan's only defense treaty.) Treaty between the (4) ' The Mutual Defense and the Republic of the Philippines. remains in Asia Collective Defense (5) The Southeast effect on a bilateral basis with Thailand.) of Free Association with the Free Association with the United States Treaty (which

The Compact (6) the Marshall Islands.

Republic of Federated

of (7) The Compact (57:79) States of Micronesia. Two The

regional organizations have

important security dimensions. (ASEAN), formed in 1967 by

Association of Southeast Asia Nations Malaysia, in Indonesia, Brunei,

Singapore, decided

Thailand and the Philippines, to engage member states in (4:24). For the most by

January 1992 "to seek avenues

iew areas of cooperation in part, members are seeking

security matters" this increased

defense cooperation

atrengthening the existing network of bilateral defense ties. The kustralia, Five Power Malaysia, Defence New Arrangement, Zealand and consisting of

Britain,

Singapore,

serves The

primarily to arrangement

integrate air defenses of is twenty years old and 6

participating countries.

the only remaining multilateral

iecurity network in

Southeast Asia.

(45:8)

Theater Strategic Situation. a. !overs quare Characteristics half the miles; 17 of the Theater. an PACOM's theater of operations area of more time zones; than 100 million and touches 40

world's surface, of the

world's 24

:ountries and eight American territories. The

(57:74)

theater can be broken into various sub-regions on the basis geography, four cultures and language. when South The area is frequently issues:

of history, iroken into

sub-regions

discussing Asia;

security

lortheast Asia; 56:1) *aiwan, ambodia,

Southeast Asia; Asia consists Southeast Malaysia,

and the North and

South Pacific. South Korea, Laos, the

Northeast and Japan.

of China, Asia

consists of Singapore,

Vietnam, Brunei, and

Thailand,

Indonesia,

'hilippines. ri Lanka,

South Asia is Nepal

comprised of India,

Pakistan,

Bangladesh,

Burma,

and Bhutan.

The South Pacific region consists (34:293) armed (China, U.S.)

f the Polynesian, b. Pith,

Micronesian and Melanesian island chains. The region

Intelligence Estimate. of the North Three

remains heavily establishments Vietnam and the

seven

world's largest military Korea, South Korea,

ussia,

Japan,

perating here. eploy

of these countries

(U.S.,

China,

and Russia) the area. In

nuclear weapons and major conventional the U.S. and allies systems. and the some

forces in

ddition, lients ilitary The

former Soviet Union of their

have provided their conventional

most sophisticated

area

shows

tangible

signs of forces

tension

reduction. and a

The peace

'ietnamese have ccord was alking to

withdrawn their October 1991.

from Cambodia

signed in

The two Korean

governments are other

each other about

nuclear weapons 7

inspections and

.ension reducing activities. dillion and the ;ino-Soviet 'inal

China reduced its

armed forces

by one

Soviets subsequently reduced their forces Mongolia and in Vietnam. the (52:13)

along the

border in of the

Although the is still

outcome

fragmentation of

Soviet Union reduction in

Lnknown, of its

Russia recently

announced an overall

the size military

military forces and (50:1). a result of these

the intent to adopt a defensive

loctrine As

changes,

the

potential for

conflict is

-everting to traditional forms: 'eninsula; and civil in wars

the continuing standoff on the Korean and dissidence suppression/counterand Indonesia. between

.nsurgency operations 'erritorial apan

Cambodia, on

the Philippines, the

disputes continue and Russia in

Sino-Soviet border; between

the Northern Islands;

Territories;

Vietnam and Islands which

!hina over the Paracel Lre occupied by

and over the Spratley Taiwanese, Chinese,

Vietnamese,

Malaysian

and

ilipino forces.

Resolution of these disputes appears to depend more

,n easing ethnic tensions and historic antagonisms than on diplomatic rocedures. The greatest immediate threat orth Korea's nuclear weapons to regional security, development program. however, The is

U.S.

stimates the Koreans will have a nuclear device o size) CUD-C by by 1994 and the a nuclear

(non deliverable due by the growing be

weapon possibly deliverable (30:102) There is a

mid-to-late

1990s.

onsensus that alted. In

the North Korean the past year, all the

nuclear weapons U.S., Japan,

program should South Korea

and the full Atomic part

ormer Soviet nspection

Union have nuclear

called on facilities by

North Korea

to allow

of its

the International agreed on its

nergy Agency (IAEA).

Towards this end,

the U.S.

make the Korean Peninsula nuclear free. alemate. tual eated In March 1992, their North and

This may

have broken the to allow and

South Korea agreed by

inspections of a

nuclear facilities to draw up

June 1992

joint commission

plans for

banning nuclear the head of

apons from the Korean Peninsula.

(33:14A)

In addition,

e North Korean delegation to the IAEA said EA inspections to begin in In clear clear 1985, Free June. (33:14A)

his country would allow

fifteen South Pacific Zone Treaty (SPNFZT),

states signed the South creating a formally

Pacific declared

free zone.

The treaty Transit of

forbids members to nuclear weapons is its

acquire or test not prohibited,

clear weapons.

ough each merfber is

permitted to determine

own policy regarding

ansit by ships which may be nuclear armed. d China signed protocols not to use, the zone. The U.S. declared it test,

The former Soviet Union or base nuclear weapons the intent of the

will follow

NFZT protocols,

but declined to sign them. biological,

(19:9) and chemical weapons a growing

The proliferation of nuclear, d the missiles to deliver them ncern. By the year 2000,

by Third World nations is as nine

as many

developing countries and

ald have nuclear weapons, n could possess king steps to =lude: aq, Israel, North is

up to 30 could have chemical weapons, (44:65)

a biological weapons capability. develop nuclear Libya, Kore", Brazil, weapons or who Argentina, South

Nations them

have acquired

South Korea, Africa and

Pakistan, In

Iran,

Taiwan,

India.

dition, it

widely known the U.S.,

France,

Britain,

China and the The concern nuclear the

nmonwealth of Independent States Dut proliferation is exacerbated

have nuclear weapons. by fears

that Soviet

ipons experts may sell their services to the 9

highest bidder in

rtermath of the breakup of the Soviet Union. Lssile system capabilities are 20

Third

World ballistic as well. By

spreading and growing,

ie year 2000, aunchers.

nations will have their own ballistic 35:24) Half of these governments (15:16)

rockets and will have

(27:65;

Lssiles with a range of 5,000 miles or more. c. Global Implications. (1) iture will :onomic nflict. and Conditions and be maintaining territorial circumstances.

A key

task

for the

regional balances and disputes before they

resolving social, erupt into armed

The Asian-Pacific region is

home to some

of the world's The region also the face

)st economically and politically icludes some 6f the the earth. last

dynamic societies.

traditional

communist regimes on tensions are

Although

superpower

diminishing,

-aditional regional

ethnic unrest may rise. trends

Donald Zagoria described four post-Cold War international iich are visible in First is a in the area. (58) in political alignments.

transformation Eastern

The

-amatic changes trhaps, the

Europe and the former Soviet evidence affected. of this The trend.

Union are, The AsianUnion

most convincing been formal similarly ties

icific has itablished

former

Soviet

with South It

Korea,

while

cooling relations

.th Vietnam and North Korea. kd Japan. )rmal ties )rmer )t to China opened a

also began new dialogues with China Korea and began the

trade office with South Singapore. in

with Indonesia and

Most dramatically,

Soviet Union played a major role view the conflict as a

the Gulf War by agreeing between superpower

confrontation

kterests or The

client states. trend is the increasing tendency to see economic

second

10

power that

as a determinant trade, not territorial

of military

power.

Related to this might,

is is

the fact becoming

expansion international continues

or military

accepted structure reflecting Malaysia, economic Japan Prime is

as the key to of the vibrant Thailand, superpower beginning area

wealth to

and power.

The economic systems; Singapore, of Japan's

move toward in South

market Korea,

economic performance and status to flex Taiwan. is its at

Clearly, the center

recognition of this

realization. superpower. January 1992

muscles as

an economic during the

Minister Kiichi

Miyazawa's comments

summit of said

world leaders are an example. say in

During the meeting Miyazawa peacekeeping (2:14A) activities, I'm sure

Japan should have a

future U.N.

or he couldn't'guarantee

Japan would finance them. U.N. the

the leaders of the cashed-strapped The third trend has been

got his message. downgrading of ideology in

international

affairs.

Throughout the

region,

second-

and third-

generation postrevolutionary leaders are economic development

placing a higher premium on

and pragmatic foreign policies than on ideology.

Most recent and striking was Russian President Boris Yeltsin's appeal for economic last (2:1A) The communism. completely radically fourth trend It is a result of the spectacular collapse of aid at the recent world leaders summit: the world has "This is the

opportunity to defend democracy,

to know that."

seems likely now that communism will either disappear 21st century, or as in Eastern Europe, be so

by the

transformed in

the direction of capitalism that it the politics of

will be the

unrecognizable. region continue freedom. (58)

At the same time,

countries in

to evolve toward multiparty

practices and increased

11

(2)

Influences.

The

following factors may

influence how

one or more of the nations in (a) II

of

this area act or react to world events:

Japanese occupation of the region during World War on the region; both in terms
the

continues to have a profound affect

anti-militarism in Japan

and fear of Japanese

expansionism in

rest of the area. (b) of bilateral The lack of a widely agreed upon threat, multilateral security agreements, a history and the

versus

proliferation of arms in

the region makes comprehensive regional arms

control agreements unlikely. (c) and a perception Growing of unfair U.S. concern about its trade imbalance to tensions South

trade practices, the area,

may lead

between the U.S. Korea,

and countries in

particularly Japan,

and Taiwan. (d) Political uncertainties in are growing in

anticipation will occur in e. underpin

of the China,

major changes North Korea, The

generational

leadership that

Singapore, ability

Vietnam and Indonesia. our power will able to deploy region where where and infraAs our and

Logistics Estimate. our strategy forces and of

to project We in must be of the be

more than ever. sustain them will

substantial

parts

prepositioning adequate bases where, there is

equipment

not always

feasible, crisis)

may not be available a

(at least before a industrial they have the sealift,

less well-developed forces once down airlift, in

base and arrived.

structure to overall force

support our levels draw

theater, and
--

sustaining where

expanding our investment in

--

possible

prepositloning will be become more important.

(38:29)

12

f.

Command,

Control,

and Communications Estimate.

The smaller,

highly mobile

U.S.

forces envisioned control

for

the 1990s

will (C3)

require systems

robust and flexible command, that are as mobile as

and communications they support. As

the forces will

Desert Storm

demonstrated,

this requirement Current C3

increasingly be met by satellite are adequate to support

communications.

systems

operations to counter terrorism, and major crises. and, to a C3 systems

insurgencies,

narcotics trafficking,

may rely on augmentation by commercial allied and of communications communications threats including to support U.S. will be

lesser degree, Command, to,a control

Forces. vulnerable jamming, g.

systems

wide array

physical attack,

exploitation,

deception,

and nuclear effects. The U.S. Pacific Command contained In one accord Army

Personnel Estimate.

approximately 383,000 men and women with the division South battle Secretary of Defense's

as of March 1, 1991. "base force" concept,

and one or two Air Force and one one Force or two

fighter wings will be deployed in fighter wings, Group, Japan. one carrier Marine

Korea; group,

Air Force

Marine will

Amphibious Ready be deployed in

and one

Expeditionary consist of

Reinforcements Hawaii, an

an Army division and Air Force fighter wing in Alaska,

Air Force fighter wing in homeported in 3. the U.S.

and five Navy carrier battle groups

(22:19)

Strategic Concepts. a. Military Dimensions. (1) Nuclear, chemical and biological. The U.S. seeks to the

deter United

nuclear conflict.

Should a nuclear attack occur, attempt to control Therefore, 13

however,

States must and will wartime

escalation and deny must maintain

the aggressor its

goals.

the U.S.

the

ability The

to respond U.S.

appropriately to

any level

of aggression.

(43:51)

has no offensive biological

warfare capabilities.

Defensive biological warfare capabilities equipment and a strong medical system.

include personal protective U.S. offensive chemical shells. the The

warfare capability U.S.

centers on binary chemical these weapons weapons

artillery in

halted production of down its binary

and is

process of Until a U.S. forces

drawing global,

production capability. is concluded,

verifiable

chemical

warfare ban

will maintain robust

a modest retaliatory chemical warfare defensive program.

warfare capability and a U.S. chemical warfare 11-15) as

chemical

defensive capabilities (2) precise Space.

are limited, Space

but effective.(40:11-14,

forces provide

capabilities such warning,

positioning,

reliable communications, forces

and timely

surveillance to U.S.

on a worldwide basis.

During peacetime

and wartime operations, the ability of

space forces provide or significantly enhance tactical commanders to exercise on-scene

decision makers and

command and control over their commanders, and to carry out

forces,

to communicate with

thousands of routine

tasks that would (43:74-75) is U.S.

otherwise be enormously Space Command,

expensive or impossible. Force Space Command, warning,

through Air time

responsible for surveillance

providing precise support to U.S. (3) broadest forward level

and navigation,

and

forces worldwide. Conventional. rests on U.S. national military strategy at the deterrence,

three interrelated principles: It

presence, if

and coalition warfare. for the U.S. in

would be prohibitively

expensive, superior

not impossible,

to maintain a numerically Pacific theater. The face,

level of

military presence

the

nature of this maritime region

and the most likely threats we

14

therefore,

require air and

naval forces backed by highly airlift and fast sealift

mobile and to deploy

flexible ground forces them. a rapid,

and the

Our strategy also requires a strong amphibious capability and CONUS-based reinforcement (4) Low-intensi+y military and capability. The global will spread enable of a

conflict.

sophisticated

dual-use

technologies

growing number of regional porers to arm themselves with capabilities that in U.S. the past were reservcd only for the superpowers. be able to couiter these threats with (44:5) The

must

selectivity, To do this, terrorism, and

flexibility U.S. drug

and the

prospect of a

favorable outcome. respond to as

forces must trafficking

be trained and

and equipped to as well (44:12-13)

insurgencies,

peacekeeping

noncombatant evacuation operations.

Success in

this area

will depend on maintaining a strong alliance structure; superiority; be used in and specially tailored military

technological

capabilities which can power. (44:6) as

conjunction with other elements of national (5) Logistics.

Logistic functions should be performed

routinely as To

possible throughout the entire extent possible, and procedures

spectrum of operations. should utilize departments.

the maximum

logistic functions of the military

existing

policies

(54:3-57,3-58)

Implementation and

execution of

logistic functions component

remain the responsibility of commander. Furthermore, of its is

the services and the service

each of the services is own forces in

responsible for the except when or

logistic support logistic support

the PACOM area, for by

otherwise

provided

agreements

assignments servicing.

concerning common (40:11-19)

servicing, Joint servicing,

or cross

15

(6) assists allies

Security Assistance. and friends

The security assistance program interests; promotes aids U.S.

and protects mutual

peace and stability; friends and allies internal to

helps maintain U.S.

defense alliances;

defend themselves against external aggression, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking; and helps advance supports

subversion,

democratically values; FY 1992, to

elected

governments

democratic (43:10) In

and helps wage for example,

the fight against

illegal drugs.

the security assistance in direct

funding was programmed to Cambodia and an

provide: $5

$20 million

assistance

additional and medical

million for leadership training,

human rights education (14:105); $2.3

aid projects for the Cambodian Resistance military education,

million for prbfessional technical 79); than and training

management training and program (14:177in aiding more restored in

to support

the Indonesian F-16 the Royal Thai Army an elected

$2.5 million to assist when

300,000 refugees (14:283) (7)

government was

Thailand.

Host-nation support. in

We expect increasing assistance In the Republic of Korea of U.S.

from our allies (ROK), forces we

the area of cost sharing. beginning of a

seek the

ROK-funded relocation in Korea's share

out of Seoul

and an increase

of the costs We

associated also seek Japan.. In

with maintaining U.S.

forces on the Korean Peninsula.

increased financial support of U.S. addition, system we continue to in stress our

forces operating from the importance systems of by

maintaining

interoperability from

weapons

encouraging maximum procurement flowback, increased

the U.S.,

increasing technology

discouraging the development of political-military (3:10) 16 dialogue,

non-complementary systems, and a revitalized security

consultative process.

b.

Diplomatic Dimensions.

The U.S.

is

committed to maintaining

visible,

credible presence

in

the

Asia-Pacific region security arrangements.

through (28:1A)

forward deployed

forces and bilateral

The Bush Administration has identified peacet" in the region:

"six keys to promoting lasting liberalization; a shared

progressive trade human rights; environment;

commitment to democracy and innovation; respect for the

educational and scientific an appreciation for (6:841) our DoD

distinct cultural supports relief, these

heritages; goals

and security cooperation. peacekeeping

through

operations,

disaster

nation-building

assistance,

humanitarian

assistance,

military-to-military In each 4nstance,

contacts and

the security of DoD's

assistance program.

the effectiveness

contribution hinges on operational

clearly translating foreign policy objectives into clear, military tasks. c. (44:13) The United States is

Economic Dimensions. expands and

committed to a around the markets and industrial and to apply countries.

strategy which world. expand

strengthens market economies efforts to among open major

This requires trade; to

international

strengthen

cooperation financial problems

countries and with international imaginative (38:19) military solutions to the

institutions; of developing

The U.S.

seeks a leadership role in

the Pacific because our in

presence here sets the stage of our economic involvement With a total two-way transPacific trade

the region.

exceeding $320 it is and

billion annually, clearly stability in in our

almost 50% more than our transAtlantic trade, own best interests to help preserve peace

the region.

(3:5)

17

d.

Sociopsychological

Dimensions.

The Sociopsychological

aspect

of national diplomatic, activities.

strategy deals with the combined psychological political, Psychological economic, operations ideological, (PSYOP) is and

effects of military

one of the forms of the attitudes and the achievement

activity used by

military commanders in

to influence

behavior of foreign groups of U.S. national

a manner favorable to As with or as to other

objectives.

military operations, part of other

PSYOP

may be on

used independently a theaterwide

an integral

operations

basis

attain mission

objectives.

(54:4-28,4-29) e. Other Dimensions.

4

N/A

4.

Specific

Courses of

Action.

The

1990s as it

will be

decade of of

transition for the Asia-Pacific region, the world. the U.S. region. I'll begin this section

will be for the rest

with several courses of

action the

should pursue which affect most or all of the nations in I'll

then outline a series of specific courses of action for on the first-hand experience I gained from my

Japan and Korea based February 1992 trip a.

to these countries and independent research. Courses of Action. The following courses

Multilateral

of action have regional or multi-national (1) to ban chemical arms Arms control. weapons on

dimensions. must continue it efforts

The U.S.

a global basis; at (CSCE) the

encourage follow-on and Helsinki Conference on

increased

control agreements Europe

Security and Cooperation in for this spring; security-building adherence (North

Review Conference scheduled the confidence 1990; the and

encourage wider participation in measures agreed Korea) and wider 18 to in

Vienna in in

encourage

participation

Nuclear Non

Proliferation initiative weaponry (21:8) to

Treaty facilitate

(India)

(44:12);

and on

continue sales of armed

its

1991

consultation tension or

conventional conflict". the

that "increases DISCUSSION: region, and

aggravates

Conventional especially Indonesia. arms

weapons sales are in Thailand, Washington buildup to:

booming in

Asia-Pacific Malaysia, Jeffrey instability

Singapore, Post

Taiwan,

Brunei Smith in

correspondent of future

attributes the China,

fears

North Korea,

and Myanmar; in supply as

declining prices for a result of reduced

advanced weapons tensions in by announced U.S.

and an increase and regional

Europe;

fears about a power in

vacuum created (51:1) The the

reductions of US forces on the horns of is

Japan and Korea. On the

finds its6lf for weapons

a dilemma.

one hand,

demand last

good news for American defense contractors who $3.2 billion in arms to the region and are President Bush last Fall in the

year sold roughly

hoping for strong sales this year. called for restraint in

On the other hand, arms sales

international

recognition of the fact the world's five primary arms merchants-US, France, China, the former Soviet Union, and

Britain-- sold Iraq prior to these five

billions its

of dollars worth of of Kuwait.

conventional weapons to At U.S. initiative,

1990 invasion (who

countries

coincidently also are are in

the five permanent

members of

the UN Security Council) listings China's of

the midst of negotiations to exchange The talks are prior to stalled by shipment insistence

weapons export to disclose

contracts. weapons

refusal

contracts

(presumably the any

because of fears of ballistic

interdiction)

and by its

sale of short range more stringently

missiles should

not be regulated The

than

fighter aircraft.

(51:1,10,15.)

proliferation of dual use

(military and civilian)

space- and missile-

19

critical

systems, of

components weapons of

and mass

technologies destruction 27:65;

and in

the

expected add

proliferation

the region

special urgency to the problem. (2).

(39:91;

23:9) The U.S.

Increase Access to

Overseas Facilities.

must continue negotiations to Asian-Pacific for ports, use during In

to create a network airfields, contingency 1990, storage

of access agreements areas and repair of

facilities crisis. naval

operations

and periods

DISCUSSION:

November

Singapore agreed to permit US at its Sembawang Port and U.S. the Paya Lebar Airport.

ships to use repair facilities

fighters to make (45:8; 55:2)

month-long deployments to

In January 1992, Navy may be

Malaysian Defense Minister NaJib Razak

said the U.S. to

allowed to use Malaysia's Lumut naval base (1:25) Negotiations for and Brunei; U.S.

maintain frigates and smaller warships. are going

similar access rights officials

on with Thailand

are hopeful they will produce accords. (3) Broaden ASEAN's Security Role. military nations. limiting exchanges, In addition,

(46:31) The United States and

should

seek

to expand

combined training the U.S. in

exercises ASEAN's

with. ASEAN support in In

should seek the region.

nuclear proliferation

DISCUSSION: engage

January 1992, states in

ASEAN members agreed to "seek avenues to new areas of cooperation in security have ever

member (4:24)

matters".

This was

the first

time ASEAN members

explicitly discussed security matters either among themselves or with non-member countries. in U.S. the region and are (4:25) For (4:24) Most ASEAN nations favor increased U.S. presence

interested in

cooperation with the providing U.S. and airfields. complexity of

these reasons,

some are considering to their ports scope and

forces

increased access

(see above)

"They may also be

willing to

increase the

20

their

participation David E.

in

joint

military

exercises.

Doing so, Joint

according Chiefs

to Admiral of Staff, nations together stated likely proliferation region.

Jeremiah,

vice chairman

of the U.S. the

would increase by in desire member helping to the event that to

interoperability ensure they it would

between

participating to work ASEAN's extremely the the

"understand how (46:32) it

was ever required." region nuclear

make the nations

free makes efforts to

will

support

prevent weapons in

of chemical,

biological

and nuclear

(4)

Continue

to refuse

to

sign

the South

Pacific

Nuclear

Free

Zone Treaty

(SPNFZT).
and

The

U.S.

should

continue to
the region a

oppose the nuclear U.S.'s U.S. North free ability

SPNFZ treaty zone because to effectively

other attempts

to make it

of the restrictions operate in

would put

on the The

the region.

DISCUSSION: free

agreed to make the Korea not to

Korean Peninsula nuclear weapons

to encourage encourage the

develop nuclear process. The U.S.

and to it

Korean reunification intent verification. and/or of the

also said

will follow the provide for nuclear-armed

SPNFZT even (19:9)

though the treaty limitations in the

does not on U.S.

Additional aircraft

powered ships or military

region would significantly in the region.

hamper U.S.

and deterrent

capability

(5)
oppose naval arms

Naval arms control.

control continues

The U.S.
in

should continue to
the Asian-Pacific. dependent on

discussions to be a

DISCUSSION:

The U.S.

maritime power,

its

ability

to use the seas and international waterways for access to markets in and to move its forces quickly and without

overseas

restriction forces in

support of U.S.

interests worldwide. most likely to

Because the U.S. a regional

the Asia-Pacific

respond to

21

contingency are naval meet interests. U.S. treaty (3:15)

forces,

naval

restrictions

limit protect

our ability

to

obligations

and to otherwise

our national

b.

Country Recommendations. (1) Japan. U.S. in is their crucial and Japanese belief military and civilian relationship stability and are

officials between prosperity in

are

unambiguous

the security

the two countries in the region. interest (a)

to future peace,

(8:38)

The following courses of action

the U.S.

national

and support these goals. Partnership. equal partner The U.S. in should do

True Global Japan as an

all

it

can

to

treat

international

affairs

and to draw Japan system.

into positions of greater responsibility in DISCUSSION: world affairs Japan sees an increasing role (16:10) and would like to be expressed for the in In a

the international

for the United Nations in a part of hope the it.

Japanese military and

civilian officials an expanded role

Japanese Diet

would authorize (JSDF) in UN

Japanese Self the future;

Defense Force Cambodia has was

peacekeeping activities specifically. interest (49:15) in (20,41) becoming

mentioned

addition,

Japan

expressed

growing

permanent member of the UN Security Council. actively support this goal. The Japanese affairs. are already Japan of the playing pledged (and

The U.S.

should

leadership paid) a total

role

in

international billion (10:33) in

of $13 nation.

support

Gulf War,

more than

any other

Japan devotes a larger U.S. and

percentage of its aid is

GNP to foreign aid to other Asian October

than does the nations. 1991 (5:6)

60% of that

devoted

They pledged $2.5 billion in

aid to Russia in in

(10:37)

and are evaluating participation 22

the $24 billion aid

package being discussed by G-7 nations now. in support of the UN's to of the Kent consider

They pledged $25 million effort $1 in (29) and were (49:15)

Cambodian peacekeeping a total of

asked Because however,

contributing as

billion.

Japan's image

Samurai warriors

business suits, for these

Japanese rarely

receive public appreciation

efforts.

Calder sums the problem up in

the context of Japan's

contributions to finance the Gulf War: Japan's huge contributions were going unrecognized, and Japan remained an outsider in a New World Order dominated once again The economic alliance. trans-Atlantic by a revitalized had as Yoichi Funabashi succinctly put it, superpower Japan, one machine -"merely an automatic teller been exposed as Not only cash." dispensing the that needed a kick before that, but it seemed to the Japanese that few Americans seemed function in a legitimate cash-dispensing was to admit that even as they demanded large amounts of cash to world affairs, fulfill unilaterally determined objectives. (10:36) The Japanese have a legitimate complaint. policy of "global partn3rship" The U.S. (9) should give it can

substance to its to ensure

and do all peace

Japan's contributions

to international

receive the

recognition they deserve. (b) U.S. should actively DISCUSSION: (MOFA) Support Northern Territories Return. The to

support return of Toshi

the Northern Territories

Japan. Affairs

Ozawa of the Japanese Ministry $2.5 billion aid package to expressed hope further

of Foreign Russia to progress 1992

linked Japan's

return of the would be visit its

Northern Islands and

made during Russian (41) The U.S.

President Boris Yeltsin's

summer

to Japan.

should privately and publicly declare islands to Japan and be willing to program for Russia to this

support for the return of the participation in

link its action.

the G-7 aid

(c)

Decrease U.S.

Presence

on Okinawa.

The U.S.

23

should consolidate

its

military

activities

on Okinawa and DISCUSSION: (37)

return as The U.S. Toshi

auch land to the Okinawans as soon as possible. ias 47 installations on the Island of Okinawa.

MOFA's

)zawa said there was strong sentiment to return facilities knd limit ie night-landing and low-level was becoming increasingly flying by U.S. difficult

on Okinawa forces there. central

added it

for the

;overnment to put

off these requests and indicated expectations were would be returned on May 20, (41) of its Facilities In its April on 1992, the 20th

Uigh that some facilities

knniversary of Okinawan reversion. ;ongress, DoD noted consolidation the bilateral

1990 report to Okinawa were Process and

facilities

proceeding through stated its

Adjustment

aiL was the return of "property to improve civil-military (3:10-11) Contrary to USFJ expectations (37), the U.S. the

,elations".

should get on lay 20,

with the process and

do something meaningful for

1992 anniversary. (d) Japanese Participation in GPALS. The U.S. in

ihould actively he Global

campaign for

significant Japanese participation Limited Strikes (GPALS)

Protection Declines in up the

Against the U.S. U.S.

program.

IISCUSSION: eed

defense budget and an election year may put the $41 billion GPALS

to shore

economy

,rogram out of iPALS 'irst, 986 in could

reach for the U.S. save the program and

Major Japanese participation in is plausible for five reasons.

the Japanese have been participating in areas such as superconductivity

the SDI program since and magnetic field

echnology. defensive" lefense

Second,

the GPALS program seems tailor-made for Japan's and foreign policy. was In fact, Japanese U.S.

constitution (JDA)

Agency

officials involvement

said Japan in

studying the Third,

equest for Japanese

GPALS now.

(20)

Japan's

24

aversion to nuclear attack and growing to ballistic Japanese clearly the missile interest

awareness

of it (18)

vulnerability may increase Fourth, Japan

attack from neighboring states in and support for the system.

has the human, project. Finally, Japan's

technical

and financial to Colonel Office,

resources Ed Hind

to devote to of the U.S. in in the

according

Embassy in GPALS

Defense Attache's

major participation

would avoid several

of the stumbling blocks encountered

FSX

program;

notably in

it

would be

program both

countries

were

actively interested

pursuing and it

would be one which lent itself

to sharing technology,

since both countries have unique technological

strengths needed to field the system. (e) U.S. Encourage Japanese Force Improvements. The

must continue to press the Japanese for force improvements which their ability to perform agreed upon roles. Japan to ability DISCUSSION: territorial sea lanes The

enhance U.S. must

continue to encourage

increase its to defend its

defense to

capabilities and enhance its nautical

a distance of 1,000 Five Year

miles.(3:10) includes naval

Although the current and air forces to by

Japanese

Defense Plan (53:6),

perform this mission

the U.S.

must ensure they do not fall

the way side as a result of defense cuts reflecting people". (20) (2) Korea. General Colin in March L. Powell,

"the voice of the

Chairman

of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the Republic of (42:77)

testified (ROK)

1991 he believes the people lot more of action for their own

Korea The

"can do a

defense". belief,

following courses interests in

reflect this

while protecting U.S. (a)

the region. to a Supporting Role.

Transition the

U.S.

U.S.

forces should continue to identify 25

military roles and missions

currently

performed

by the U.S.

which can

be assumed by ROK forces.

DISCUSSION:

U.S.

forces have begun the process of transitioning

from

a leading to a supporting role by transferring greater responsibility to the South Koreans for combined operations. A ROK General has been

appointed to head the UN side of the Armistice commission; assumed responsibility for guarding the in October to 1991 (26:23); the and in March

ROK troops

PanmunJom armistice compound 1992 the U.S. and South Korea from U.S. to

agreed

transfer

279-mile Trans-Korea (32) If

Pipeline

military to renounce the U.S. its

ROK military control. nuclear ambitions,

North

Korea agrees

or perhaps as an incentive to do so,

should seriously consider transferring the leadership of the Command to a Korean general. This act, perhaps

UN Combined Forces more

than any other,

would visibly demonstrate U.S. (7)

intent to assume

a supporting role on the Korean Peninsula. (b) continue to press maintaining U.S. maintaining (7:477) be U.S. Host Nation

Support.

The

U.S.

should of of

Korea to assume forces forces in in Korea. Korea

a greater share DISCUSSION: is estimated The

of the costs annual cost

to be

$20 billion. estimated to year to 5:8) The

(The cost of the 2nd Infantry Division alone is The ROK pledged $180

$2.4 billion a year.)

million this (44:16;

offset these costs,

rising to $450 million by 1995.

1995 amount represents one-half of the won-based costs of maintaining U.S. forces in country. (48) by 1995, In contrast, Japan currently pays $3

billion annually and, costs. U.S. (5:8)

will pay 100 percent of the yen-based

The South Koreans have agreed to pay $3 billion to move (the value of the land is there is estimated at *10

forces out of Seoul (48) Clearly,

billion).

though,

much room for

increased

ROK contributions.

26

(c)

Encourage

Confidence

Building

Measures.

The

U.S.

should

continue

to

encourage

confidence

building

measures the

between

North and

South Korea. of State for

DISCUSSION: East Asian

Richard Solomon, and Pacific

Assistant Secretary asserts the process Koreans themselves. encourage and

Affairs, the

of building At the same the

confidence must be time he says the

created by

major powers can Three confidence First, to

support

dialogue. (52:247)

building measures consistent with this Japan, China, Russia and the U.S.

approach come to mind. can use their of the

influence

encourage along the

North

Korea to

pullback some/all (DMZ). (19:15)

650,000 troops Robert W.

demilitarized zone Commhnder, U.S.

General

RisCassi,

Forces Korea,

says the

North Koreans have launchers to and testified

added 1,000 tanks and their force

6,000 artillery last

tubes and rocket decade (47:36)

structure during the troops are "still

recently these (36:23) Seoul does Second, the

arrayed

unequivocally for attack". might within 35 miles of the South Koreans. the forced problem.

This amount of offensive military little to inspire

confidence among National

ROK Ministry of

Unification states is an important

separation of ten (39)

million Korean families

Encouraging the negotiation of

some way for families to visit a humanitarian gesture negotiation China, the process U.S. and

loved ones for even a brief which would also inspire

period of time is confidence in the

between the two Koreas. the two exercises Koreas could in all

Finally, agree

Russia,

Japan, each

to notify

other of

military This

advance and invite

observers to attend.

(24:22)

seemingly small measure would bring military forces into regular contact dialogue. with each other and offer

of these nations for

another avenue

27

(d) U.S. with should continue the Nuclear Non

Halt

the North Korean Nuclear seek North Treaty and

Program.

The

to aggressively Proliferation

Korean compliance insist on IAEA

inspections of A

known and suspected nuclear of the U.S. has been and was

facilities. to halt

DISCUSSION: the North Korean agreed to step to

major policy aim weapons

nuclear

program. by June In

The North 10th, which

South Koreans seen as

mutual inspections forward. (33:14A) announce (33:14A)

a major

addition, to

the

North Koreans

are expected

their willingness

allow IAEA

inspections this

month.

(e) its the phased withdrawal of North Korean threat. of forces from
its forces

U.S.

Troop Cuts.

The U.S.

should continue diminution of

troops from Korea subject to DISCUSSION: DoD is

pursuing a three-phased The U.S.

by the

withdrawal
would cut

the Asian-Pacific.
Korea 6,000 to 36,000

announced

it

in

end of

1992 and

planned to cut an additional

people as part

of phase two during

1993 and 1995.(13)

on hold in November

Secretary Cheney put the

1991 (13) and General the U.S.'s

second phase troop cuts

reiterated not to during

RisCassi intention

recent

Congressional

testimony

remove nuclear

additional

troops until

questions
(36)

about the

North Korean

weapons program are answered.

5.

Decisions.

This assessment presents a variety

of reasons why the and forward

U.S.

must continue its in

policies of peacetime engagement region. President

presence

the Asian-Pacific

Bush acknowledged

this during his January 1992 visit

to Singapore when he said:

We will maintain a visible, credible presence in the Asia-Pacific region with our forward deployed forces, and through bilateral defense arrangements with nations of the region." (28:14A)

28

He added: presence as The United States does not maintain our security Your security and your prosperity serve some act of charity. our interests because you can better help build a more stable, more prosperous world. (55:7) Thus, allies' a continued US presence in the region serves both our

and our own interests.

Admiral

Larson sums it

up this way:

Two key factors are needed to maintain security and stability Economic economic growth and U.S. presence. in the region: growth will enable our friends to assume a larger responsibilOur presence protects the sea lanes ity for their defense. as a honest our role reinforces vital to expanding trade, the need tensions and reduces broker to help avoid regional their military capability in to expand Asian countries for ways which might be destabilizing. (31:4) This does not mean, however, that US policy in Adjustments to the Asia-Pacific our bi-lateral The

region must or.should agreements,

remain static.

force structure and

national policies can be made. all by itself.

simple truth is

the United States can no longer do it

The courses of action outlined in offer a realistic way for

this paper recognize this truth and to protect its in vital interests

the U.S.

while acknowledging growth and transformations

the region.

29

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