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PHENOMENOLOGY IN COMMUNICATION AND INTERDISCIPLINARY R ELATIONS: MUTUAL INTERCONNECTIONS AND TENSIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE P HENOMENOLOGICAL

METHODOLOGY OF THE SIXTH C ARTESIAN MEDITATION


Jaroslava Vydrov

The phenomenological reduction (when it is first performed) is the peritrope in the drama of world-constitution, and phenomenologizing is a transcendental procedure which introduces a decisive caesura into the history of world-constituting life. Sixth Cartesian Meditation1

Ever since its foundation, phenomenology has been an inspiring and influencing force in philosophy and in related scientific areas. However, at the same time, it has been entering into open disputes concerning the foundations of disciplines. In the former case, we may observe the development of phenomenology-enriched interpretations of works of art, of aesthetics, or of the creative process. An example of the latter case would be the antagonism of positivist versus phenomenological psychology. In the wider sense, the humanities and natural sciences have been entering into a dialogue with (not only Husserls) phenomenology; in the more narrow sense, with individual principles of Husserls philosophy itself. In this diverse field many thematic and methodological peculiarities were born that make
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Eugen Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Teil 1. Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre (Texte aus dem Nachlass Eugen Finks 1932 mit Anmerkungen und Beilagen aus dem Nachlass Edmund Husserls 1933/34), ed. Hans Ebeling, Jann Holl and Guy van Kerckhoven (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1988), VI CM, p. 125. (Finks text will be quoted as VI CM, Husserls text as Dok. II/1). English translation: Sixth Cartesian Meditation, The Idea of a Transcendental Theory of Method. With textual notations by Edmund Husserl (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 113.

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the outlook on phenomenology and interdisciplinarity more stimulating, multilayered, but often not easy to see through. The most distinct and lively discussion of the present day is stirred by the interconnection between phenomenology and cognitive science. From the thematic point of view, it brings forth a new outlook on issues related to consciousness, corporeal awareness, behavior, ontogenesis, dysfunctions, etc. From the methodological point of view, it approaches (and sometimes misses) the core of the phenomenological method, the problem of subjective streams of consciousness in contrast to the objective results of inquiryit clears up the position of the first (second) and third personand, last but not least, it poses the question of the relationship between theory and practice. From this diverse field abundant with method-related and thematic stimuli, we shall select three motifs that describe selected coordinates defining possibilities and barriers of communicating phenomenology, or that map mutual approaching and distancing of phenomenological and cognitive (in the wider sense, interdisciplinary) research projectsin our case, from the point of view of the phenomenological process. The coordinates are located on two interconnected axes moving in the direction of subjectivity to intersubjectivity, and in the direction of the theoretical toward the practical. Although the scope and the depth of analyses in this context is immense, which leads to a complex outlook on the phenomena, we shall not concentrate on following discussions that move along the lines of phenomenology and/versus cognitive science (although they do provide a source of inspiration).2 And although we travel back to some latter-day Husserlian analyses, we shall try to seek topics that are relevant and topical in the present day discourse. We shall allow ourselves to be led by possibilities stemming from the discussion about one of the complex problems of phenomenologyabout the basics and the construction of the phe2

There are multiple possibilities and avenues that could be extracted from a very lively discussion between phenomenology and cognitive science. Their diversity is captured for example in the extensive volume of papers edited by Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Schmicking titled The Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science (Dordrecht et al.: Springer 2010). We would also like to mention the publication by Zahavi and Gallagher titled The Phenomenological Mind. An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science (New York: Routledge 2008). One of the inspirational and novel solutions includes the project of three authors who come from the field of phenomenology, cognitive neuroscience and psychology: Natalie Depraz, Francisco J. Varela and Pierre Vermesch, On Becoming Aware. A Pragmatics of Experiencing (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2003). Some methodological problems were raised in a paper by Jaroslava Vydrov, Dva svety redukcie: neuro/fenomenolgia, Vnma, kona, myslie, ed. Rbert Karul, Martin Murnsky and Jaroslava Vydrov (Bratislava: Fi SAV in cooperation with OZ Schola Philosophica, 2008), pp. 250-257.

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nomenological system discussed by Eugen Fink and Edmund Husserl. What could the reasoning of the Sixth Cartesian Meditation3 offer in relation to the current demand for an interdisciplinary interconnection between phenomenology and cognitive sciences?

Similarities and Differences in the Language There is an array of terms and descriptions used both by cognitive science and phenomenologyalthough the question remains whether they describe the same things and cover the same range of meaning. However, some special terms anchored in individual discourses that are hard to grasp outside phenomenology or outside a special science may actually be quite close to each other and offer descriptions of the same thing. The issue of creating and using terms brings in the phenomenological procedure of the Sixth Cartesian Meditation that redefines and establishes a basic terminology such as onlooker, givenness, method, theme, etc. against the background of the phenomenological methodand also discusses the problem of the phenomenological language itself. At the same time, it offers a classification of phenomenology that makes this approach clearer and brings new depth to it. To grasp phenomenological terms in a new light, it is important to take a look at the horizon where the asking of these questions is situated. The new theoretical situation is connected with the reduction and otherness of an onlooker who adopts a phenomenological attitudewhile at the same time, paradoxically, trying to be unengaged. This otherness is actually the expression of a turning point that we arrive at in all areas of theory and practice once we accomplish the reduction. It is otherness towards what used to be related to the natural attitude as well as to the science that is related to selected structures of the natural world. If a phenomenologist and a scientist use the same expressions they do not necessarily talk about the same thing because they are situated in diverse contexts, in diverse frames of referencea phenomenologist in a transcendental situation, a scientist in a mundane situation. Fink together with Husserl try to emphasize the differences between the levels of interpretation and point to the problem that arises in
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Fink is here the author of the main text, which is commented upon and annexed by Husserl. Although we shall not specifically comment on the tension that occurs between Finks and Husserls concepts we shall mention it at least on a cursory basisfor more, see the systematic analysis by Sebastian Luft in his Phnomenologie der Phnomenologie. Systematik und Methodologie der Phnomenologie in der Auseinandersetzung zwischen Husserl und Fink (Dordrecht et al.: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002).

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the transformed or transforming adoption of language from the realm of natural language into the realm of phenomenologizing. The process of analogization that creates the bridge between the context of the phenomenological and the (mundane) scientific approach is at the same time an expression of radical disproportion. Understandably, the transformation does not occur on the level of the vocabulary. Rather, transformation occurs on the level of what the word signifies (bedeuten).4 This is the reason why we can encounter mutual misunderstandings and stereotypes when trying to communicate between phenomenology and a special science. To say this explicitly, there is a chance for hybris to occur. This gives rise to tension, a counter-movement that expresses inadequacy and divergence. Husserl even talks about the rebellion of expression.5 The origin of this tension lies in relationships between the natural and the phenomenological which refers us to the foundation of the problem. In analyses of the Sixth Cartesian Meditation, this foundation is introduced in its structured and radicalized form. The issue of the language of phenomenology6 does not arise in the Meditation as a theme by itself. It is only one side of a more fundamental question. So let us situate it into the context of three other areas of investigation: 1. How is it related to the question of the content of phenomenologizing. The manner of speech is obviously related to the manner of givenness, in this case reductive givenness. 2. How is it related to the phenomenologizing onlooker: Science is a product arising in acquired subjective activities...In speech the discourse which at first is a subjective product externalizes itself, thus too scientific discourse and science with its expressional truth-products.7 3. The intersubjective level guarantees the possibility of communicating and understanding the knowledge gained by reduction but orients itself in two directionstoward phenomenologists and toward nonphenomenologists. I. What is the subject matter of mundane science and phenomenological science? If we do not limit ourselves to verbal expressionswhich may, at the first glance, simply overlap, or which may seem to be different and yet cover identical meaningswe may proceed to the fundamental distinction that the phenomenological attitude puts into question what can never be put into question at all in the
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Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, p. 96. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 87.) Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, p. 101f., Dok. II/1, p. 98f. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, VI CM, p. 92, Dok II/1, p. 89.) Th is question is reviewed, in particular, in Logical Investigations, and although Husserl tries to circumvent it in other texts or mentions it within the context of different philosophical questions, its urgency is revived also in the Sixth Cartesian Meditation. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, p. 93. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 84.)

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natural attitude. Phenomenology puts into question that which others8 presuppose.9 The radicalized phenomenological procedure opens up a new sphere of knowing. It does away with the prejudices and boundaries associated with the natural attitude. Givenness does not mean here the ability to manipulate the objects of inquiry or to simply have them available, but refers to their possible accessibility through the unfolding of the phenomenological reduction.10 The latter creates a new field of interpretation. The Sixth Cartesian Meditation is interesting by virtue of extending the basic framework of phenomenological givenness to include also what is not-given, what does not only have a thematic or contentbased focus. This is the domain of so-called constructive phenomenology that can survey such questions as the beginning and the end, death, birth, the phenomena of early childhood development, developing awareness of time and space, etc.,11 that really are not available for exploration in the exact sense. They are connected with every subjectivity. However, these are experiences of a different kind than those with common phenomena. The way these special phenomena are given and the way they appear transcends the common manner or may not reach up to it. By this understanding, they are either saturated, excessive or minimized, poor.12 Once more, we shall emphasize expressions that are connected with reductive givenness or with the form of non-givenness and define them anew, possibility and accessibility. In addition to describing and uncovering, phenomenology thus brings new procedures onto the table that are typical for this layer of phenomenologizing, constructing and producing. These activities contain within themselves some tension between the possibility that nothing is at stake, that we do not have any givenness available, and the other possibility that everything is at stake, that the field of phenomena may be extended to any possibility. But this does not mean
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Th is expression is set into the context of existential philosophy, but also expresses a principle that has more general validity. Othersin the meaning of what they presuppose are objects of individual steps of elimination. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, pp. 37, 51. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, pp. 33, 46.) Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation,VI CM, p. 64. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 57.) Luft, Phnomenologie der Phnomenologie, p. 188: On the side where Hegelian and Heideggerian influences manifest themselves, they give this problem an original turn. Th is problematic has been significantly developed in the work of several contemporary phenomenologists. Let us mention philosophical concepts of J.-L. Marion, A. J. Steinbock, and, in our context, also texts by R. Karul, Jeden spsob pasivity. Obraz u J.-L. Mariona, Filozofia 61 (2006), no. 8, pp. 667-671; A. Vydra, K Marionovmu prekonaniu nihilizmu vo fi lozofi i, Nboenstvo a nihilizmus. Z pohadu filozofie existencie a fenomenolgie, Martin Murnsky et al. (Bratislava: Fi SAV, 2010), pp. 193-206; J. Trajtelov, Vzdialenos a blzkos mystiky. Fenomenologick tdia (Krakw: Towarzystwo Sowakv w Polsce, 2011).

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zero action or limitless action (Tun). What comes into play here is a leading clue that anchors these actions in the form of the phenomenologizing Self. Nongiven transcendental life can only come to itself in the onlooker of given transcendental life.13 II. Since we are not dealing with givenness as such but with that which is given for (gegeben fr), let us proceed to the second coordinate of our mapping and that is subjectivity. The phenomenological emphasis and problematization of the subjective pole of knowing represents one of the most inspiring questions discussed in the interdisciplinary context. The Sixth Cartesian Mediation once again deals with this to some extent in a non-traditional way, especially in the methodological context, resulting in the dualism of the constituting I and the phenomenologizing Iin other words, it differentiates three levels of I. The possibility of their differentiation, but also maintaining their relationship, is by and large a precondition for defining the scientific nature of phenomenology. In what aspect? This proves the emphasis placed by phenomenology on the scientist, the onlooker, subjectivity. In natural science there exists homogeneity of theme and thematization (as is the case of psychologycf. 4), while, in phenomenology, what is uncovered by the phenomenological reduction as well as what is extended by a transcendental dimension is becoming permeated with heterogeneity.14 In other words, in this analysis we capture three Is (or three levels of I): the human I standing in the natural attitude, the transcendental constituting I, and the transcendental phenomenologizing I.15 Every I has an area where it is being exposed and where it is being active. The different kinds of who, the differences in relating to objectivity, the differences in the manner of knowing could be described as assigning a special index and at the same time as defining the framework of
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Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, p. 73. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, pp. 6566.) It is precisely because the subjective performance of phenomenologizing is different from the transcendental performance of <world-, Husserls note 44> constitution, precisely because the uncovering of constitutive becoming <of the world, Husserls note 44> itself is not constituting, that the problem, the question of the transcendental being of phenomenologizing exists in the fi rst place. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation,VI CM, pp. 24-25. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, pp. 22-23.) Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, s. 43. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 39.) At several points in the text, Husserl mentions three layers. In the notes to this Meditation, for instance, they are the reflection of my monadic acting, the reflection of the second degreethe phenomenologizing I, and the highest level of the third Ithe eidetics of the I that phenomenologizes, that constitutes the universe of monads, and that thereby constitutes the world. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, p. 205. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 180.)

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thematizationwhich is a possible object at any layer of I, and for which I it has been given (gegeben fr). This exposes and applies relevant explicating forms as the constitutive analysis of [the same].16 III. The third array represents the movement from the egological to the intersubjective reduction. In the Meditation there moreover occurs the strengthening of the so-called road through intersubjectivity, which is not simply an extension to yet another layer of phenomenologizing but which has its own methodological justifiability and strictness. The loneliness into which an onlooker is cast after the basic performance of reduction inevitably proceeds to the otherand this is true in two meanings ( 11 b). The other here acts firstly as another philosophizing subject that creates the community of plural performers of reduction. And this could also be a non-phenomenologist, in other words, a mundane scientist, a nonscientist, a non-philosopher, an agent within his or her natural attitude, and on this level they meet a phenomenologist who brings his or her knowledge to the level of the natural worldwe could say a phenomenologist offers it as communicable. The intersubjective level could thus be described through several nuances that are remarkable not only for their multiplicity but also for their heterogeneity, which also influences the level of (possible) mutual communication because there are differences that emerge whether a phenomenologist wants to communicate at the level of the natural attitude with the informed agent or the mundane agent or the agent otherwise involved, and vice versa. The emphasis of the phenomenological investigation on the how of communication must be shifted to the form of a certain openness that is brought by the question with whom. The implication of this is that the intersubjective layer acquires its own expression also in the context of the relationship between the phenomenological and the natural attitude. The phenomenological attitude is brought to life in actualizations. A phenomenologist does not live permanently in the cognizant attitude, but rather repeatedly reacts to the tendency to know, which is a property of the life of subjectivity,17 and thus inevitably acts towards the other as a transcendental ego and also as a man in the world.18 The question we will have to come back to is the manner of transition between the phenomenological and the natural. With the previous coordinate we emphasized that it fi xates on the scientific character. In this case, intersubjectivity allows for the genetic but also the generative extension of the horizon, thus anchoring phenomenology in historicity and tradition, mak16 17

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Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, p. 56. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 51.) Th is is also heading toward the question of motivation to phenomenologize or perform reduction (Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, 5, 11 b). Elsewhere Husserl describes so called tendentionality (Tendenziositt) (Dok. II/1, Appendix VIII). Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, p. 129. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 117.)

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ing it a cultural construct.19 This theoretical transition is, on the one hand, hard to describe and lets phenomenology enter a certain worldly and thus historical situation, and is, on the other hand, demonstrated in simple everyday activities as suggested by Fink, ...the phenomenological cognizer philosophizes as a functionary of the human community, he fits himself into the human generative habituality of philosophizing, he transmits, lectures, publishes, etc.20 This is the sphere where such components of inquiry are anchored such as institutionalisation, the freedom of exploration, education, the cultural context, etc. All three points above appear in contrast to the problems and solutions offered by mundane sciencemoreover, they describe areas where phenomenology strengthens its own concept of objectivity. However, we may also find their common points of intersection. What is being problematized is the what, i.e. the object of phenomenological investigation, as well as the how, i.e. the way in which the object is given, or not-given, as we saw in the first case. Here phenomenology overlaps with the area of questions that are being dealt with by cognitive science (such as early childhood development), and points to an important problem related to how accessible these questions are to investigation. In the second case, we saw how it grasped the issue of subjective streams anew and redefined it by placing emphasis on I as the agent of the process of knowing that is, on the one hand, a part of the whole phenomenological systemhere we need to define what place it occupies (through the processes of constitution and phenomenologizing)and, on the other hand, a part of living in the world. This layer has its counterpart in cognitive science, so, looking from the other side, we may say that every he is also an I. The third point is a logical consequence of the demand for intersubjectivity (every I is a part of some we), and shared knowledge (every we is somehow situated in history). Phenomenology is not an isolated, private matterto use Francisco Varelas expression, it is not a private trip.21 In the following section, we shall emphasize a different optics that has been present since the beginning and that has taken the form of two movements. Phenomenology unwinds in two directions. If the first one is reductive de-worlding (ent-), then its continuation is en-worlding (ver-). Phenomenology appears, localizes itself, temporalizes, en-worlds, and communalizes itself on the soil of the worldin other words, it communicates.
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Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, p. 214. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 189.) Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, p. 145. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 132.) Francisco J. Varela, Neurophenomenology: A Methodological Remedy for the Hard Problem, Journal of Consciousness Studies (1996). [online]. URL: <http://members.tripod. com/enaction/id151.htm>.

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The Constitution of Science and its Appearance If we want to find some space in the context of the Sixth Cartesian Meditation for starting constructive cooperation within the inter-disciplinary dialogue, we need to establish the minimum grounds for what is common, or in other words, for where the common core of our disagreement lies, to quote one famous philosophical polemic.22 Every discussion presupposes some common ground; a philosophical discussion presupposes the communality of the problems and problematic.23 One way of opening phenomenology to an interdisciplinary context could be the transition of phenomenologizing into the sphere of the natural world, the process of so-called Verwissenschaftlichung, or of making into a science. What happens is that this doubles or multiplies the problem if the topic is not only the appearance of phenomena, but also the appearance of phenomenology itself. Phenomenology explicates itself, it departs from itself (Hinausgehen) and it applies itself in a certain sense. Th is opens a space for describing the transition from theory to practice, or their mutual overlapping, and thus also for defining them in a more specific way. What comes into play is the demand that phenomenology be transcendental idealism, which is quite complex, so we shall not consider its entire scope, but rather just the methodological procedure that should lead to discovering the common ground for discussion. Fink finds a solution here as well as a logical outcome for the phenomenological effort which expresses its own characteristics, its own understanding, in and for the mundane situation of its appearance as phenomenology.24 Fink gradually describes how the platform of mutual understanding among disciplines should be capturedalthough their individual positions and vocabularies may not overlap at first and, as we have seen, they really do not. Methodologically, this dialogical procedure should depart from seemingly identical terms and gradually loosen the appearance of this identity in the course of defining and destructing the termsbut as a final consequence it should aim at positive expressions. If the appearance of phenomenology, its self-explication, is the place for communication, then this activity follows two parallel directions. Firstly, a phenomenologist presents not only phenomenological topics, but also the manner of know22

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We borrow the words of Ernst Cassirer in his polemics against Martin Heidegger during the Davos debate: Davos Disputation between Ernst Cassirer and Martin Heidegger, Martin Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), p. 205. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, p. 171. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 153.) Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, p. 170. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 153.)

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ing, that is, of phenomenologizing (i.e. the self-thematization of phenomenology). Secondly, phenomenology proceeds according to two tendencies that are being conceived similarly, as in the case of intersubjectivity. We can notice this for example in the last Appendix XV to the Sixth Cartesian Meditation written by Husserl. On the one hand phenomenology projects itself in relation to positive science (monitoring positive science through phenomenological science), on the other hand, in the development of the phenomenological society, which means extending the phenomenological style into other areas of science and creating common areas for investigation as well as for life. If we, however, want to use the optics of doubleness, we need to weaken it somehow or place it into an adequate context. We are not really talking about two worlds or about creating yet another world. We are talking about man in the world, now, however, as new man,25 and yet this still means the same man. A phenomenologist, even one adopting the new type of attitude, is a corporal (leiblicher) man. What attitude he or she adopts has nothing to do with their constitution. A phenomenologist does not acquire the privilege of some sovereign, secondary or alternative constitution, otherwise phenomenology would lose its frames of reference, provided by reduction, by an experiencing uncovering (ein erfahrendes Enthllen), 26 by the principle of all principles: only within the limits in which it is presented there.27 Within the concept of enworlding there is a discrepancy between the approach taken by Fink and by Husserl. While Fink introduces primary and secondary enworlding, Husserl considers the latter step to be speculative and non-phenomenological (it does not have any phenomenological ground) because there it is possible to give only one constitutive process.28 In other words, that and how phenomenology appears in the natural world, is according to Fink, the object of a secondary and improper enworlding. However, Husserl considers such a step to be redundant because anything other than proper constitution is not possible. It is possible to stream in phenomenology and the activities of a phenomenological onlooker into the life of the natural worldand, in essence, this is not only possible but even inevitable29and, according to Husserl, it is a part of one single process that uncovers a different aspect, that is a phenom25 26 27

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Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, p. 214. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 189.) Luft, Phnomenologie der Phnomenologie, pp. 267, 268. Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), p. 44. Luft, Phnomenologie der Phnomenologie, p. 267. Luft points out that Husserl, instead of enworlding, prefers the term localization as the attitude of a newly exposed knowledge within the expanded horizon of the world (pp. 272-273). The transcendentally explicated I and We phenomenologists is necessarily enworlded. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, p. 216. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 191.)

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enological and richer30 dimension of the natural world. Based on this the natural attitude acquires a transcendental interpretation. What is Husserl suggesting in practice? How is phenomenology localized within the world? One process has multiple possibilities for its implementation, so there may exist several transitions (sich Umstellen): Again and again I, the one phenomenologizing, (and we) can place ourselves back in the stance toward the world and humanity and then must find in the world everything transcendental enworlded in souls.31 In this process of finding and localizing, Husserl prefers, on a practical level, the method of psychological-phenomenological reductioni.e. of inserting that which is disclosed into the psychic32 life. Because the exclusive topic of the phenomenological attitude are the ego, phenomenologizing actions (Tun), reflexivity and its iterationalways based on the attitude of inhibitionthe I, the human, the psychically subjective (Ich-Mensch, psychisch-subjektives) are being correlatively enworlded.33 In other words phenomenology is being localized within the natural attitude, firstly, on the level of specific phenomenological psychology, investigating the conscious, but its internal tendency is to proceed to further activities and topics. The field of its interests has a horizontal character not only in the sense that it finds new topics, but also in the sense that it moves from the practical toward the theoretical and then again toward the practical.34 On the solipsist level, where we first find the phenomenologizing ego just by itself in its solitude, Husserl wants to proceed toward the others. He wants to arouse the interest of non-phenomenologists in phenomenology, to create a society of coinvestigators and co-experiencers with everything that belongs to it, generally speaking, from education all the way to creating norms.

Movement toward the Other In the introduction, we described our approach to communicating phenomenology through mapping where coordinates create two axes, moving from subjectivity to
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Cf. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, p. 205f. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 180f.) Husserl uses the word reicher here, but immediately asks: But is that not the same as the one that by constitution of the monad world becomes a monad in it? Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, VI CM, p. 206. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 181.) Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, p. 213. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 188.) Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, p. 213. (Sixth Cartesian Meditation, p. 189.) Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, Appendix II. Fink, VI. Cartesianische Meditation, Dok. II/1, Appendix VIII.

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intersubjectivity and from theory to practice. However, this progress is not linear (meaning that it goes fromto) so much as it oscillates. Such movement appeared natural, on the one hand, because it stemmed from the nature of phenomenological communication with whom and how. On the other hand, it has another side to it that has not been made clear yet and this is the nature of contemporary science that dynamically develops and acquires new features with new research and techniques. If we do not want to apply Finks and Husserls notion ofmundane, special and naturalizedscience in an inadequate and anachronic way, we must find a space where such communication is possible, natural and effective. This space can perhaps be found, for instance (and to the largest possible extent), in contemporary cognitive research projects. Proceeding according to the logic of Husserls prediction, it is primarily the area of psychology where phenomenological investigations are focused. These research projects prove that the phenomenological approach may be inspiring and meaningful for them. This obviously does not concern all streams within cognitive scienceespecially not those that consider consciousness to be a strictly scientific matter and that view the subjective experience with suspicion.35 Does this also work the other way around? Let us formulate two questions that define the interdisciplinary point of viewwithout covering fully the thematically extensive area of such research projects. Firstly: Why and how should phenomenology be interested in cognitive science? Phenomenology is enriched by mutual dialogue especially on a thematic level. Phenomenology is thankful to cognitive science for reviving phenomenological research and topics in the most current discussions of the contemporary scientific and interdisciplinary community. Let us mention several areas pointed out, for instance, by Dan Zahavi, (1) neuropsychological descriptions of anosognosic disorders by body-awareness, (2) psychopathological descriptions of schizophrenic disturbances of self-experience and intentionality, (3) developmental descriptions of social interactions in early childhood, (4) ethnological descriptions of culture
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This description comes from F. J. Varela, who in the chapter The cognitive sciences, follows the gradual development and tendencies in investigating consciousness within cognitive science. He differentiates the scale of research from right to left, from eliminativists, neuroreductionists and functionalists all the way to an approach described as giving an explicit and central role to fi rst-person accounts and to the irreducible nature of experience, while at the same time refusing either a dualistic concession or a pessimistic surrender to the question, as is the case for the mysterianists. Th is is in line with the identification of where the hard problem lies. (p. 119) Varela places in this category G. Lakoff and M. Johnsons (1987) approach to cognitive semantics, J. Searles (1994) ideas on ontological irreducibility, G. Globus (1995) post-modern brain, O. Flanagans (1992) reflective equilibrium, and B. Baarss theatre of consciousness. Depraz, Varela and Vermesch, On Becoming Aware. A Pragmatics of Experiencing, p. 116f.

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specific emotions, (5) descriptions of various types of memory provided by cognitive psychologyand by Francisco J. Varelaattention, body image and voluntary motion, perceptual fi lling-in, fringe and center, emotion.36 Another answer could be phenomenologys affinity to science. This aspect has been very close to phenomenology since its very beginning, although it has not been equally dominant in different periods of time. It was Edmund Husserl himself 37 who was actively engaged in the discussion of the foundations of scientific disciplines, especially mathematics and psychology. However, the close proximity of the scientific environment that is vital for philosophical work was also sought by other phenomenologists. On the methodological level, the practical aspect of reduction can be developed. This is an inspiring step in the area of methodology that can be more broadly applied to other related investigations, extending its scope of interest and reviving it in a new context. But its basic nature and position remain an inevitable demand on the phenomenological level. When taking a step away from this, one would also step away from phenomenology. Secondly, the question from the other side is: Why and how should scientists be concerned with phenomenology? Phenomenology can see how and why the world of science becomes disenchanted, when it remains in the binary mode of thinking eitheror38 and does not grasp the meaning and understanding of problematic and borderline terms that cannot be explained only from the scientific or technical point of view. This impoverishes their understanding within the frame of reference of science. This could get to the point where science has gone so far away that it loses sight of them altogetheralthough they are still used in its work or in its presuppositions. Another pressing question for science is aimed by phenomenology at the center of the investigation of special science, which it deepens: Who is the agent of science? And both these questions result in the third: What is the relationship between these questions, or does the search for their answers even run on the same level? Win-win situations presume mutual communication. However, as we saw, such
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Dan Zahavi, Naturalized Phenomenology, Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, ed. Shaun Gallagher and Daniel Schmicking (Dordrecht et al.: Springer, 2010), pp. 8-9. Cf. Dan Zahavi, Phnomenologie und Kognitionswissenschaft: Mglichkeiten und Risiken, Interdisziplinre Perspektiven der Phnomenologie, ed. Dieter Lohmar and Dirk Fonfara (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), pp. 299-308; Depraz, Varela and Vermesch, On Becoming Aware. A Pragmatics of Experiencing, pp. 122-125. As reminded in this context by Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher (The Phenomenological Mind, p. 2f.). Daniel Dwyer, The Logic of Disenchantment: A Phenomenological Approach, Epistemology, Archeology, Ethics. Current Investigation of Husserls Corpus, ed. Sebastian Luft and Paule Vandevelde (London and New York: Continuum, 2010), p. 61.

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communication has multiple differentiated aspects. Moreover, it would be too simplistic to view inter-disciplinary convergence through the quantitative proportionality of give and take. Therefore we perceive the following statement by Sebastian Luft on phenomenologys communication and its interdisciplinary overlappings not economically but qualitatively: The problem of sharing phenomenological knowledge has been up to now introduced by phenomenologists as enworlding, however, it also works the other way around. When attempting to share there must be some understanding of reaching out toward (entgegenkommen).39 In addition to following ones own line, a phenomenologist cannot avoid (openly) perceiving that which is reaching out. Although the approach we followed against the background of the Sixth Cartesian Meditation can result in seemingly natural conclusionswhat should phenomenology be counting on if it does not only want to create a space for enclosed deliberations by isolated thinkers, although they may be focused on an intersubjective directionby emphasizing such conclusions we wanted to highlight a theme that could have otherwise remained implicit or expected without any problems. The road to such conclusions leads through researching ones fundamental principles. In our case, the motivation came from the fundamental principles of the phenomenological procedure that were indicated by the Sixth Cartesian Meditation. In the beginning we connected reductionin its first performance with fateful acting as a peritrope in the drama of human constitution. This reversal, this radical redirection in the flow of cognition, has its own developments and reactivations that may happen over and over again, in a nonetheless dramatic way, within certain phenomenological reiterations. Husserls famous words, immer wieder knnen, hereby meet the Greek , movements of turning, winding around, directing toward the center.40 Translated by Radomr Masaryk

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Luft, Phnomenologie der Phnomenologie, p. 278. Let us also mention the approach developed by N. Depraz, F. J. Varela and P. Vermesch, Mutual Circulation through Generative Constrains (Depraz, Varela and Vermesch, On Becoming Aware. A Pragmatics of Experiencing, e. g., p. 128). The etymology of the word peritrope and its use in antique texts extends its meaning from the purely logical level, where it means a turning point in an argument that is self-refuting (Socrates vs. Protagoras). A peritrope is also a turn from all sides to a centre, rounding up (Homer), turning about, changing (Herodotos), diverting (Aristotle), overturning, turning round, whirling round in rotatory motion (Plutarch). Cf. Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott and Henry Stuart Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), Frantiek Lepa, Homrovsk slovnk ecko-esk (Mlad Boleslav: Valena). I am thankful to Mat Porubjak for pointing out the antique context of this expression.

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This article was produced at the Institute of Philosophy of the Slovak Academy of Sciences as part of the grant project VEGA no. 2/0201/11.

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