120746651

Is hypnosis a real phenomenon?

Student ID Number: 120746651 SBC614 Consciousness and Causality Dr. Magda Osman February 4th, 2012

120746651 Hypnosis is an elusive topic that has intrigued psychologists for centuries. Throughout the years, there has been much debate over what exactly is hypnosis. From the eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries, hypnosis was believed to be a physical process that impacted mental functioning (Osman, 2013a). This view began to evolve during the mid nineteenth century to early twentieth century, when hypnosis began to be recognized as a mental process, and presently hypnosis is believed to be a primarily mental process (Osman, 2013a). But while there has been much research and there are many theories surrounding

hypnosis, it still cannot definitively be declared a real phenomenon for four primary reasons: first, no one knows exactly what hypnosis is or how it works (Mazzoni, Venneri, McGeown & Kirsch, 2012); second, psychologists and scientists do not agree upon whether or not there is a connection between the mind and body, which is essential to the hypnotic debate; third, in order for hypnosis to be considered a real phenomenon, it must be confirmed as an altered state of consciousness by concrete, empirical evidence, or else it is just another facet of normal consciousness; and fourth, theorists strongly disagree over what causes hypnotic experience, further highlighting how little is known about hypnosis and its effects, and begging a question about the ethicality of declaring such a poorly understood psychological experience a real phenomenon. The first challenge with declaring hypnosis a real phenomenon is that, while there is a commonly accepted description of hypnosis a procedure involving cognitive processesin which a subject is guided by a hypnotist to respond to suggestions for changes in sensations, perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (American Psychological Association, 2007) and while researchers commonly employ the same basic methodology offering subjects a hypnotic suggestion, which can be said to induce an altered state of consciousness, testing subjects experiences, and then cancelling the suggestion (Barnier et

120746651 al., 2009) the research and literature are inconclusive about the definition of hypnosis or

how it works (Mazzoni et al., 2012). Hypnotic experiences are subjective and variable, which means there are no definitive criteria that describe exactly what hypnosis looks or feels like (Barnier, Dienes & Mitchell, 2009). Further, while researchers have developed standardized tests like the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility and the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale (Consciousness in Hypnosis, 2007; Osman, 2013a) to measure hypnotic susceptibility (a personality trait indicating how easy it is for one to be hypnotized (Osman, 2013a)), there is not enough scientific evidence to determine if there is a true difference between hypnotic susceptibility and suggestibility, which occurs during normal consciousness (Mazzoni et al., 2012). Absent concrete evidence that supports one clear definition of hypnosis, researchers have proposed many distinct definitions and theories, indicating just how little widely accepted evidence there is leading the field of hypnotic practice and investigation. The second challenge to be resolved is that psychologists and scientists do not agree if and where there are boundaries between mind and body, which is essential to hypnosis, as it fundamentally requires a union of the mind and body in order for hypnotic suggestions to be performed by the subject. The mind-body debate centres on the two primary theories of Monism and Dualism and their sub-theories (Osman, 2013b). Monism divides into the subtheories of Idealism (that there is only the mind/cognition) and Materialism (that there is only the physical brain) (Osman, 2013b). Dualism contains the sub-theories of Substance Dualism (the brain is not cognitive, and cognition is not physical) and Property Dualism (mind and brain coexist but function separately) (Osman, 2013b). A strict adherence to either of these theories or sub-theories, thus suggesting that the mind and body to not interact, impedes the consideration of hypnosis as a phenomenon.

120746651

However, another mind-body theory, Emergent Interactionalism, postulates that there is both an upward and subjectively downward causal relationship between cognitive and physiological processes, thus entertaining the possibility of hypnosis (Osman, 2013b). Emergent Interactionalism posits that physical experiences can trigger cognition, and that the mind can trigger physical experiences. This is important to hypnosis, as it can be regarded as a manifestation of an experimenters cognitive suggestions in the physical or emotional experiences of the subject during an altered state of consciousness (American Psychological Association, 2007). The third challenge to declaring hypnosis a real phenomenon is empirically demonstrating that it is an altered state of consciousness (ASC) independent of normal consciousness. An ASC differs from normal consciousness in that, the neurocognitive background mechanisms of consciousness have an increased tendency to produce misrepresentations (Revonsuo, Kallio & Sikka, 2009). This means that during an ASC ones mind and body produce misrepresentations of reality. Revonsuo et al.s (2009) definition of an ASC could allow for various degrees of normal and altered consciousness, but requires evidence that ones neurocognitive mechanisms are producing misrepresentations. It is possible that there are varying degrees of consciousness and that hypnotic experience is a type of ASC, but hypnosis cannot definitively be declared an ASC distinct from normal consciousness until researchers determine that it causes specific neurocognitive happenings that produce misrepresentations of the subjects reality. The fourth challenge that requires resolution is that theorists strongly disagree over the causes of hypnotic experience. As there is no clear definition of hypnosis, there is a multitude of theories regarding hypnosis and hypnotic experience. Two theoretical views of hypnosis are the Neodissociation Theory, and the sociocognitive theories, of which the three

120746651 most popular are the Interactionalist Theory, the Discrepancy-Attribution Theory, and the Cold Control Theory (American Psychological Association, 2007; Barnier et al., 2008). The Neodissociation Theory centres on the supposed division between controlling ones actions and monitoring ones cognition during hypnotic experience (Barnier et al., 2008). Ernest Hilgard posited that, during hypnosis, the mind engages in an ASC called a trance (American Psychological Association, 2007). Hilgard argued that a trance is required for hypnotic suggestions to be effective, as it impairs the subjects control and monitoring capabilities, thus allowing the subject to be hypnotized; but Hilgard also posited that part of

the mind disassociates from the trance during hypnosis (American Psychological Association, 2007). According to Hilgard, the disassociated part of the mind, known as the Hidden Observer, continues to control/monitor as the full mind does during normal consciousness (American Psychological Association, 2007). The primary flaw in the Neodissociation Theory is that there is not enough conclusive evidence to support the claim that part of the mind enters a trance during hypnosis, thereby compromising part of the subjects controlling and monitoring. It is possible that the subject is entirely in control of his or her monitoring and controlling capabilities throughout the hypnotic experience, but that he or she, responding to demand characteristics of the experiment, constructs and invests in the idea of a trance-like experience, when really he or she is continuing to experience a normal conscious state (American Psychological Association, 2007). There is not enough objective evidence to declare, as Hilgard does, that part of the mind enters a trance during hypnosis (Mazzoni et al., 2012). The Neodissociation Theory is challenged by the sociocognitive theories, which share three conclusions: 1) that subjects control their experiences; 2) that subjects experience compromised monitoring capabilities, so they misattribute their experiences to hypnosis; and 3) that subjects do no recognize the active role that they play in responding to hypnotic

120746651 suggestions, so they perceive their behaviour as involuntary (Barnier et al., 2008). Each theorys distinguishing characteristics are discussed below. The first sociocognitive theory, the Interactionalist Theory, suggests that during hypnosis, subjects want to please the hypnotist, and the environment created by the experimenter is conducive to deeply focusing on hypnotic suggestions (Barnier et al., 2009). As a result, subjects, prioritize the hypnotists suggestions over reality; they actively

choose to focus on, perform, and believe in the hypnotists suggestions (Barnier et al., 2009). Sheehan and McConkey (1982) elaborated on this theory, adding that subjects construct a hypnotic experience using their personality traits and cognition (Barnier et al., 2008). Sutcliff (1961) expanded upon Sheehan and McConkeys (1982) additions to say that hypnotic experience depends not only upon the subjects personality characteristics and cognition, but also upon the hypnotists ability to create an environment that encourages the subject to perform and believe in hypnotic suggestions (Barnier et al., 2008). Clearly, the Interactionalist Theory does not propose that hypnosis creates or requires an ASC, which therefore means that hypnosis, as explained by this theory, is not a distinct event from normal consciousness. The second sociocognitive theory, the Discrepancy-Attribution Theory, explores the relationship between production (hallucinating an object) and evaluation (attributing the hallucination to either hypnosis or imagination) (Barnier et al., 2008). The theory posits that there is a discrepancy between how difficult subjects expect fulfilling a hypnotic suggestion to be and how difficult it actually is (Barnier et al., 2008). Subjects are surprised by how easily they perform the hypnotists suggestions, so they attribute that ease to something, which, in the context of an experiment, is usually an involuntary hypnotic response (Barnier et al., 2008; Barnier et al., 2009). Usually, it is demand characteristics of the experiment and the distraction-free, relaxing environment that facilitates subjects undivided concentration on

120746651 actively performing the hypnotic suggestion (Barnieret al., 2008; Barnier et al. 2009).

However, like the Interactionalist Theory, the Discrepancy-Attribution Theory does not argue that hypnosis is an ASC, which implies that hypnosis does not occur outside of normal consciousness, meaning that it cannot be real phenomenon. The final sociocognitive theory, the Cold Control Theory, employs the Higher-Order Thought Theory to distinguish between a first order state, where one experiences a certain state of consciousness, and higher-order states, where one is aware of experiencing certain states of consciousness (Barnier et al., 2008). Dienes and Perner (2007) posited that, during hypnosis, subjects do not have higher-order thought about their intention to perform a hypnotic suggestion, which means that they exert executive control over their actions without being aware of their control (Barnier et al., 2008). Higher-order thoughts are not established during hypnotic suggestions because subjects expect that their behaviour will involuntary, and so they perceive it as such (Barnier et al., 2008). Cold Control Theory postulates that hypnotic suggestions are equally as easy to perform as doing the same behaviour during a normal state of consciousness because the subjects executive control remains uncompromised during both conditions; the only difference is the way in which subjects attribute their behaviour (Barnier et al., 2008). There are two important criticisms of the Cold-Control Theory. Firstly, there is a lack of evidence to explain why fully anticipating an experience (for example, perceiving an object) makes that experience occur during hypnotic suggestions (hallucinating the object), but not during normal consciousness; and, conversely, why subjects can experience things during hypnotic suggestions that they were not fully anticipating (Barnier et al., 2008). Secondly, as with the two aforementioned sociocognitive theories, this theory does not postulate that subjects experience an ASC during hypnotic suggestions, but rather that they

120746651

unknowingly exert executive control over their actions during normal consciousness and then incorrectly attribute their behaviour to the hypnotic suggestions (Barnier et al., 2008). In summary, hypnosis cannot be declared a real phenomenon independent of normal consciousness because there is a lack of conclusive, broadly accepted evidence, such as brain-imaging studies, to support that it is an ASC (Mazzoni et al., 2012). Further, as with the sociocognitive theories above, some hypnotic theories do not identify hypnosis is an ASC, which undermines the claim that hypnosis is a real phenomenon independent of normal consciousness. This is important, as the medical community ethically cannot risk the well-being of patients by declaring hypnosis a real phenomenon, thereby opening the door to hypnotic treatments, without significant scientific evidence supporting the methodology and benefits of the practice. Further, the public should be made aware of the lack of conclusive evidence surrounding hypnosis so that they do not invest in potentially useless treatments. Until there is substantial and widely accepted evidence that hypnosis is an altered state of consciousness, it should not be declared a real phenomenon by the medical community.

120746651 References American Psychological Association. (2007). Introduction to hypnosis [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from www.apa.org/divisions/div30/forms/intro_to_hypnosis.ppt Barnier, A. J., Dienes, Z., Mitchell, C. A. (2008). Chapter 6 - how hypnosis happens: New cognitive theories of hypnotic responding. In A. J. Barnier & M. R. Nash (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of hypnosis: Theory, research, and practice (pp. 141-177). Oxford University Press. Retrieved from

http://books.google.co.uk/books?hl=en&lr=&id=UxlTjKiy23IC&oi=fnd&pg=PA141 &dq=Barnier+%26+Mitchell,+2005+hypnosis+discrepancy+attribution+theory&ots= u5r35oSigH&sig=jqFcAJzLFrk1uohqzQosPEq2APU#v=onepage&q=Barnier%20%2 6%20Mitchell%2C%202005%20hypnosis%20discrepancy%20attribution%20theory &f=false Barnier, A. J., Dienes, Z., & Mitchell, C. A. (2009). Chapter 6 - how hypnosis happens: New cognitive theories of hypnotic responding. In (pp. 1-90). Retrieved from https://www2.sbcs.qmul.ac.uk/modules/sbc614;((%22k%22%20.%20%22(73295%20 1%2041553873)%22)) Consciousness in Hypnosis. (2007). In Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. Retrieved from http://newman.richmond.edu:2048/login?qurl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.credoreference .com/entry/cupcon/consciousness_in_hypnosis Dienes, Z., & Perner, J. (2007). The cold control theory of hypnosis. In G. Jamieson (Ed.), Hypnosis and conscious states: The cognitive neuroscience perspective (pp. 293-314). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

120746651 10 Mazzoni, G., Venneri, A., McGeown, W. J., & Kirsch, I. (2012). Neuroimaging resolution of the altered state hypothesis. Elsevier, 1-11. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2012.08.005 Osman, M. (2013a). Hypnosis [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from https://www2.sbcs.qmul.ac.uk/modules/sbc614;((%22k%22%20.%20%22(73295%20 1%2041553873)%22)) Osman, M. (2013b). Minds & Bodies [PowerPoint slides]. Retrieved from https://www2.sbcs.qmul.ac.uk/modules/sbc614;((%22k%22%20.%20%22(73295%20 1%2041553873)%22)) Revonsuo, A., Kallio, S., & Sikka, P. (2009). What is an altered state of consciousness? Philosophical Psychology, 22(2), 187-204. doi:10.1080/09515080902802850 Sheehan, P. W., & McConkey, K. M. (1982). Hypnosis and experience: An analysis of phenomenon and process. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Sutcliffe, J. P. (1961). Credulous and skeptical views of hypnotic phenomena: Experiments on esthesia, hallucination and delusion. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 62, 189-200.