Revilla v CA (G.R. No.

95329) Facts: Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, owned 2 pieces of land with buildings in Manila and 6 parcels of land in his hometown in Bulacan. These properties are worth P30M. In 1978, he executed a 13-page last will and testament, bequeathing all his properties to his 9 nephews and nieces including petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each, he gave 1/10 of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after his death and for the care of religious images he kept in a chapel in Bulacan. During his lifetime, Don Cayetano sought the probate of his will to which the CFI Manila admitted. However, the City Hall of Manila was burned by fire where the records were also burned. A petition for reconstitution of the records was filed and it was granted. After Don Cayetano died, Heracio Revilla filed another petition of a will wherein he instituted Heracio as sole heir of his uncles estate and executor of the will allegedly executed in 1982. The probate was opposed by Heracios 8 brothers and sisters on the grounds that: Since 1978 up to Cayetanos death, he never informed that he revoked the will executed in 1978 The 1982 will was not executed in accordance with law and the signature of Cayetano was different from his usual and customary signature Cayetano was of unsound mind when he executed the will That the alleged will was executed with undue pressure and influence

That the 1978 will is void for the reason that it was executed under duress or the influence of fear or threats Cayetano acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud and he did not intend that the instrument be his will at the time of fixing his signature The trial court disallowed the second will. On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in disallowing the second will. Held: When Don Cayetano testified in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which he supposedly made. He identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. He could not have executed a second will because he was sick in the hospital during that time (he stayed there for 2 months) and he could not sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital. During the reconstitution proceedings, the will was produced. It was placed in a browned envelope stating Buksan ito pagkalibing ko to which Cayetano agreed to open. He recognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. In the court records, Cayetano declared that he did not execute another last will and testament after the original will had been probated. Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, he did not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only 2months before he testified in the reconstitution proceeding. If the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will.

Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the alleged date (September 13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. Judge Eduardo Bengson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his 8 brothers and sisters to visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placed around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their visit and shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will. Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize Don Cayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the private respondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house in Manila to Heracio's house in Quezon City. The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and the disinheritance of his 8 other nephews and nieces, justified the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' belief that undue influence was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncle's estate. There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with Co, Barredo and Lim ( as witnesses) was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, but from Don Cayetano himself. That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the omission of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for holy masses and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel. That provision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted everything. *Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, the testimonies of the notary public, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental witnesses were not given credit because of major contradictions in testimonies.Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 95329 January 27, 1993 HERACIO R. REVILLA, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FORTUNATO REVILLA, LUZ REVILLA DAVID, LORETO REVILLA GUTIERREZ, VENERANDA REVILLA MANIQUEZ, NICASIO REVILLA, PERFECTA REVILLA BALACANIA, JUSTINA REVILLA DEL ROSARIO and AGRIPINA REVILLA CHACON, respondents. This is a petition for review of the decision dated September 13, 1990 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 18190 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 39, in Special Proceeding No. 86-38444 which disallowed the second will supposedly executed on September 13, 1982 by the late Don Cayetano Revilla whose first Will dated January 28, 1978 had been probated on March 21, 1980 on his own petition in Special Proceeding No. 128828 of the same court, while he was still alive. In our resolution of November 19, 1990, we denied the petition for review for it raises only factual issues. However, upon the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, we set aside that resolution and gave due course to the petition so that the parties may argue their respective positions with more depth and scope. After a more thorough consideration of those arguments, we are persuaded that the decision of the Court of Appeals should not be changed. Don Cayetano Revilla y De la Fuente owned two valuable pieces of land with buildings on Calle Azcarraga (now C.M. Recto Street) in the City of Manila, and six (6) parcels of land in his hometown of San Miguel, Bulacan. These properties, now worth some P30 million, are registered in his name and more particularly described as follows: a) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 76620 (not TCT No. 170750ind.) REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF MANILA A PARCEL OF LAND (Lot. No. 22 of Block No. 2565 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, Cadastral Case No. 46, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 229) with the buildings and other improvements now found thereon, situated on the SW, line of Calle Azcarraga, District of Quiapo, . . . containing an area of ONE THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED NINETY THREE SQUARE METERS AND SEVENTY SQUARE DECIMETERS (1,193.70), more or less, Assessed value P1,834,980.00. b) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 66173 (now TCT No. 170751ind.) REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY OF MANILA A PARCEL OF LAND ( Lot No. 24 of Block No. 2565 of the Cadastral Survey of the City of Manila, Cadastral Case No. 46, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 229) with the buildings and improvements now found thereon, situated on the SW. line of Calle Azcarraga; District of Quiapo. . . . containing an area of SEVEN HUNDRED SQUARE METERS AND SEVENTY SQUARE DECIMETERS (700.70), MORE OR LESS. Assessed value P3,297,150.00 c) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-192136 REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN

A parcel of land (Lot 1245-A-6 of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd177051, being a portion of Lot 1245-A, Psd-11366, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 700), situated in the Barrio of Salacot, Mun. of San Miguel, Prov. of Bulacan, Island of Luzon. . . . containing an area of TEN THOUSAND (10,000) SQUARE METERS, more or less. Assessed value P4.000.00 d) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-192137 REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN A parcel of land [Lot 1245-A-7 of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd177051, being a portion of Lot 1245-A, Psd-11366, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 700], situated in the Barrio of Salacot, Mun. of San Miguel, Prov. of Bulacan, Island of Luzon, . . . containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY (7,890) SQUARE METERS, more or less. Assessed value P3,790.00 e) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-22049 REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN A parcel of land (Lot 1245-A-9 of the subd. plan (LRC) Psd177051, being a portion of Lot 1245-A, Psd-11366, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 700), situated in the Barrio of Salacot, Municipality of San Miguel, Prov. of Bulacan, . . . containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FOURTEEN (1,514) SQUARE METERS, more or less. Assessed value P4,000.00 f) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 22263 REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN A parcel of land (Lot No. 722 of the Cadastral Survey of San Miguel), situated in the Municipality of San Miguel. . . . containing an area of SEVENTEEN THOUSAND AND EIGHTY SIX (17,086) SQUARE METERS, more or less. Assessed value P4,190.00 g) TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-242301 REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE PROVINCE OF BULACAN A parcel of land (Lot 108 of the Cad. Survey of San Miguel), situated in the Municipality of San Miguel. . . . containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED AND SEVENTY THREE SQUARE METERS more or less. Assessed value P8,600.00 h) Cemetery lots with a mausoleum (Lots Nos. 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 and 71, Block No. 3) situated at the Sta. Rita Memorial Park, San Miguel, Bulacan (no commercial value). (pp. 63-64, Rollo.)

On January 28, 1978, Don Cayetano Revilla, a bachelor, without issue nor any surviving ascendants, executed a last will and testament bequeathing all his properties to his nine (9) nephews and nieces, the parties herein, who are full blood brothers and sisters, including the petitioner, Heracio Revilla. To each of them, he bequeathed an undivided one-tenth (1/10) of his estate reserving the last tenth for masses to be said after his death, and for the care of the religious images which he kept in a chapel in San Miguel, Bulacan, where masses could be held also (p. 126, Records). During his lifetime, Don Cayetano had himself sought the probate of his will and on March 21, 1980 the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X, after due hearing in Special Proceeding No. 128828, allowed and admitted said will to probate. On November 19, 1981, however, the City Hall of Manila was destroyed by fire. The records of Special Proceeding No. 128828 also went up in flames. Shortly thereafter, a petition for the reconstitution of the records of Special Proceeding No. 128828 was filed, and after a proper hearing wherein Don Cayetano testified again, the petition for reconstitution was granted. (Exh. "34"). (pp. 51-52, 179, Rollo.) Don Cayetano died on November 11, 1986 at the age of 91. On November 19, 1986, Heracio Revilla, the oldest nephew, filed a petition for probate of another will, allegedly executed by Don Cayetano on September 13, 1982 wherein he (Heracio) was instituted as sole heir of his uncle's estate and executor of the will. The probate of the second will was opposed by Heracio's eight (8) brothers and sisters, the private respondents herein. As grounds for their opposition, they alleged: . . . a) that on March 21, 1980 in Special Proceeding No. 128828, the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch 10, allowed and admitted to probate the last will and testament of the deceased Cayetano Revilla and that since then and up to the time of his death, Cayetano Revilla never informed that he revoked the will dated January 28, 1978; (b) that the will sought to be probated was not executed in accordance with law and that the signature of Cayetano Revilla was different from his usual and customary signature; (c) that when the will was allegedly executed the decedent was already of unsound mind or otherwise mentally incapable of making a will or was already incompetent and could not, without outside aid, take care of himself and manage his properties becoming thereby an easy prey of deceit and exploitation; d) that the alleged will was executed with undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of he beneficiaries thereon or some other persons for their benefit; e) that the will is void and ineffective for the reason that it was executed under duress or the influence of fear or of threats; and f) that the decedent acted by mistake and the signatures in the alleged will were procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of fixing (sic) his signatures thereto (Opposition to Probate of Alleged Will, pp. 7-8, Records). The private respondents also opposed Heracio's petition for appointment as executor and/or special administrator of the estate on the ground that the alleged will is null and void, hence the designation therein of Heracio as executor is likewise null and void, and that moreover, he is unfit for the trust (pp. 9-12. Records). In an order dated May 7, 1987, the lower court held in abeyance the resolution of the issue with regard to the propriety of Heracio's being appointed as executor (pp. 34-36, Records), but ordered the parties to present their evidence pro and con vis-a-vis the probate of the second will (Ibid).

On December 1, 1987, the trial court rendered a decision disallowing the second will and, accordingly, dismissed the case with costs against the petitioner (Decision. pp. 144-184, Records; pp. 52-53. Rollo.) On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 18190, Sept. 19, 1990), the decision of the lower court was affirmed. This petition for review was filed by Heracio under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The lone issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals (and the trial court) erred in disallowing the alleged second will of Don Cayetano Revilla. After a careful examination of the records, we share the appellate court's doubts regarding the authenticity and due execution of the second will. Indeed, when Don Cayetano testified on November 27, 1982 in the reconstitution proceedings, he was unaware of the second will which he supposedly made only two months previous on September 13, 1982. He identified his first will and declared that it was his true and only will. He denied having subsequently made another will. He could not have executed a second will on September 13, 1982 because he was sick in the hospital at that time for two (2) months before October 21, 1982, or, in August to September 1982, and he did not, and could not, sign any papers while he was confined in the hospital. ATTY. DAVID May I request that this letter dated October 21, 1982, be marked Exhibit "C" . . . xxx xxx xxx By the way Mr. Revilla, will you tell us whether you can still read when you signed this letter? A Yes, I can. Q Did you read the contents of this letter? A Yes, I did. Q When you were sick, before you signed this letter on October 21, 1982, were you confined at the hospital ? A Yes. Q How long were you confined at the hospital, was it for one month? A More than one month, may be two months. Q When you were in the hospital you cannot sign because you were sick? A No, I cannot sign. xxx xxx xxx

Q Will you tell us Don Cayetano if you ever executed a last will and testament after this one has been probated by the Court? A None, sir. (pp. 20-30, tsn, November 27, 1982.) He recognized the original will and acknowledged that he signed it. ATTY. DAVID . . . we were granted by the Court permission to come here to find out from you about your will approved by the Court which was burned which needs to be reconstituted which Atty. Dacanay undertook as your counsel and I was included because your heirs requested me, . . . Since the documents were burned, we have here a brown envelope which states on its face "Buksan ito pagkalibing ko" then a signature Cayetano Revilla that one in the Court which was approved by the Court we would like to request from you if this is the envelope which contains a copy of the will and if this is your signature? xxx xxx xxx Q And at the back of this envelope are four signatures, are these your signatures? A (Looking over the four signatures at the back of the envelope) Yes, these are all my signatures. Q And your instructions were to open this envelope . . . "Buksan ito pagkalibing ko." A Yes, that is right. Q And since you are still alive you asked the Court that your last will and testament be approved and allowed and what is in the last will and testament is what will prevail? A Yes, sir. (pp. 119-120, Rollo; Emphasis ours.) He identified his first will and directed Atty. David to deliver it to the Court: "siyang ibigay sa husgado" (p. 122.Rollo). ATTY. DAVID Now that I have told you in the presence of your grandson-inlaw, Atty. Latosa, that the last will and testament which the court admitted and allowed to probate was burned, why I asked you if this is the envelope and you remember this is the envelope and you said you do, and that the five signatures appearing in this envelope are your signatures, now are you willing to have this envelope opened? A Yes, kung anong nandiyan, siyang ibigay sa husgado . (p. 122, Rollo.)

Although the envelope containing a copy of the first will was sealed, with instructions to open it after his funeral, Don Cayetano wanted "to open it now" (p. 123, Rollo). ATTY. LATOSA Can you please read what is written in that envelope which you allowed to be opened. A Yes, "buksan ito pagkalibing ko." ATTY. DAVID Do you want to open this now? A Yes. Q Do you wish to open this envelope now? A Yes, I want to open it now.(p. 23, Rollo.) Don Cayetano declared that he understood that the document inside the envelope was his will ["naiintindihan ko po iyon" (p. 131, Rollo)]. Q This envelope which contained the last will and testament which I took the contents in your presence and in the presence of the other representation here including the representatives of the Court, the document contained therein is entitled, "Unang Pahina, Huling Habilin Ni Don Cayetano Revilla," consisting of fourteen pages, the title means that this is your last will and testament? A Yes, Naiintindihan ko po iyon. Q And you executed this on the 28 of January as appearing . . . 28th of January 1978, as appearing on the 13th page of this last will and testament? A Yes. Q And all pages of this last will and testament were all signed by you which reads Cayetano Revilla, will you go over these fourteen pages and tell us if the signatures here reading Cayetano Revilla are your signatures? A (After going over the document, page by page and looking at the signature reading Cayetano Revilla in every page) Yes, these are all my signatures, the ones reading Cayetano Revilla. (p 131, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.) He recognized himself and his lawyer, Attorney Benjamin Dacanay, in the pictures that were taken during the signing of his first will. Q Now, in this envelope there are pictures five pictures in all, will you go over these and tell us if you can remember any of those persons appearing in the pictures? A This one, (testator pointing to a person in the picture) is Mr. Dacanay. ATTY. DAVID

May I request that this picture wherein Don Cayetano Revilla identified Atty. Dacanay, be marked as Exhibit "D". There is a person in this picture, the one second from the left, will you go over it and see if you remember that person? A I am that person. Q Now in this second picture, do you recognize anybody here? A Yes, I can recognize myself when I was signing the will . Q Who else do you know is present in that picture? A This one, he is Mr. Dacanay. Q How about the other one? A I don't know the others. (p. 133, Rollo; Emphasis supplied.) Don Cayetano assured Attorney David that his original will was his "genuine will and testament and not changed" (p. 134, Rollo). ATTY. DAVIDxxx xxx xxx We are doing this Mr. Revilla because in case there will be an opposition to this last will and testament we can prove that this is the genuine will and testament and not changed. A Yes, that is true sir, that is the truth. (p. 134, Rollo.) He declared that he did not execute another last will and testament after the original will had been probated. Q Will you tell us Don Cayetano if you ever executed a last will and testament after this one has been probated by the Court? A None, sir. (p. 135. Rollo.) The petitioner's contention that Don Cayetano's denial constitutes "negative declaration" which has no "probative value under the rules of evidence" (p. 73, Rollo) is not correct. Don Cayetano's assertion that he did not execute another will, was not negative evidence. Evidence is negative when the witness states that he did not see or know the occurrence of a fact, and positive when the witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur (2 Moore an Facts, p 1338). Don Cayetano's declaration that he did not execute a second will, constitutes positive evidence of a fact personally known to himself: that he did not make a second will. As correctly held by the Court of Appeals: This categorical denial by the late Cayetano Revilla must be believed by everybody. If he denied having executed another will, who are we to insist that he made another or second will after the probate of his will dated January 28, 1978? The testimonies of the alleged notary public as well as the three instrumental witnesses of the alleged second will of the late Cayetano

Revilla cannot outweigh the denial of the late Cayetano Revilla. . . . . (p. 95, Rollo.) Significantly, although the petitioner opposed the reconstitution of Don Cayetano's first will, he did not reveal the second will which Don Cayetano supposedly made only two (2) months before he testified in the reconstitution proceeding. Why was the second will kept under wraps? Did Heracio fear that if Don Cayetano were confronted with the document, he would have disowned it? The explanation of the petitioner that an inquiry into the existence of the second will "was totally uncalled for, immaterial, and irrelevant" (p. 96, Rollo), is unconvincing. For if the second will already existed on November 27, 1982, it would have been Heracio's strongest argument against the reconstitution of the probate of the first will. The petitioner's argument that Don Cayetano's testimony is inadmissible because petitioner's counsel, Attorney Layosa, had no opportunity to cross-examine him (p. 146, Rollo), does not wash. The opportunity was there all the time. Attorney Layosa simply made no attempt to exercise his right to cross-examine Don Cayetano. If Don Cayetano's testimony was "an honest mistake due to a misapprehension of fact" as the petitioner insists (p. 35, Rollo), that mistake would have been rectified by inviting his attention to the second will. It seems, however, that Attorney Layosa was under constraint not to disclose the second will to Don Cayetano. Even the letter that Don Cayetano supposedly sent to the court disowning the petition for reconstitution of the records of the first probate proceeding, did not disclose that he had already made another will. As pointedly observed by the Court of Appeals, if Don Cayetano were aware that he made a second will, he "could have easily told the Court that the reconstitution proceeding was useless" because he had already made a second will revoking the first (pp. 54-55, Rollo). The testimonies of the notary and attesting witnesses and even the photographs of what purported to be the signing of the second will were not given credit by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. The court's observation that the photographs do not show the nature of the document that was being signed, nor the date of the transaction, is valid. The lower court's distrust for the testimonies of the attesting witnesses to the second will deserves our highest respect (People vs. Sarol, 139 SCRA 125; Guita vs. CA., 139 SCRA 576; People vs. Cabanit, 139 SCRA 94). Since the execution of the second will could not have occurred on the date (September 13, 1982) appearing therein (for Don Cayetano was admittedly sick in the hospital then) it must have been procured at the time when the testator was a virtual prisoner, held incommunicado, in his house. The Honorable Judge (later Court of Appeals Justice) Eduardo Bengson had to issue an order commanding the petitioner to allow his eight (8) brothers and sisters to visit Don Cayetano. Only then were they able to penetrate the iron curtain that Heracio had placed around their uncle. A videotape, taken during their pleasant visit with the old man and shown in court, belied Heracio's allegation that Don Cayetano was displeased with his said nephews and nieces, that was why he left them out of his second will. Despite Judge Bengzon's order, Heracio did not cease his efforts to monopolize Don Cayetano and his estate. To isolate Don Cayetano and make him inacessible to the private respondents, Heracio transferred him from his own house on Claro M. Recto Avenue in Manila to Heracio's house in Novaliches, Quezon City. The execution of the second will in an environment of secrecy and seclusion and the disinheritance of his eight (8) other nephews and nieces of whom he was equally fond, justified the trial court's and the Court of Appeals' belief that undue influence was exercised by Horacio over Don Cayetano to make him sign the second will (which Don Cayetano did not

know to be such) in order to deprive his brothers and sisters of their rightful share in their uncle's estate. The employment of undue influence by Heracio was not "mutually repugnant" to fraud (p. 172, Rollo) as the petitioner insists, for it was the means employed by Heracio to defraud his brothers and sisters of their share in Don Cayetano's estate. There was fraud because Don Cayetano was not apprised that the document he was signing with Co, Barredo and Lim was a second will revoking the dispositions of property that he made in his first will. Had he been aware that it was a second will, and if it were prepared at his own behest, he would not have denied that he made it. He would probably have caused it to be probated while he was still alive, as he did with his first will. But apparently, the instrument was foisted on him without his being aware of its true nature which the petitioner assiduously concealed, not only from the court and the private respondents, but from Don Cayetano himself. That the dispositions in the second will were not made by Don Cayetano is proven by the omission therefrom of Don Cayetano's reservation of one-tenth of his properties and the income thereof to pay for holy masses for the repose of his soul and to be spent for the maintenance of his family chapel which houses the religious images he owned in San Miguel, Bulacan. That provision in his first will, for his personal benefit, would not have been deleted by Don Cayetano if his only purpose in making a second will was to disinherit his eight nephews and nieces. But Heracio overdid himself. He wanted everything. The objection to the deposition of Don Cayetano for want of an oath before he testified, is tardy. Objection to the lack of an oath should have been made at the taking of his deposition. Section 29(d), Rule 24 of the Rules of Court provides: (d) As to oral examination and other particulars Errors and irregularities occurring at the oral examination in the manner of taking the deposition, in the form of the questions or answers, in the oath or affirmation, or in the conduct of the parties and errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured if promptly prosecuted, are waived unless reasonable objection thereto is made at the taking of the deposition . (Emphasis ours.) While the petitioner puts much stock in the supposed due execution of the will and the competence of the attesting witnesses Co, Barredo and Lim the trial court, with whom the Court of Appeals agreed, gave them low marks for credibility. The factual observations of the Court of Appeals on this point are quoted below: Assuming for the sake of arguments that the second will was executed, the testimonies of the notary public who prepared and before whom the will was acknowledged, as well as those of the three (3) instrumental witnesses thereof were not given credit by the lower court, and so with this Court, because of major contradictions in testimonies. As regards notary public Atty. Mendoza, the court a quo doubted his credibility as follows: The prevarications on the testimonies of witnesses are not difficult to find especially if we consider that in a second meeting only with Don Cayetano, Atty. Mendoza would readily be entrusted with the delicate and confidential preparation of a second will, designed to disinherit his eight nephews and nieces in favor of Heracio, the operator of the

bowling alley where witness Mendoza always play; . . . (p. 36, Decision; p. 179, Records) . . . Added to this is the statement of Atty. Mendoza that the old man could understood (sic) both English or Tagalog. On this score, this Court entertains doubt as to its truthfulness because it was testified to by Barredo, prosecution witness and corroborated by Ms. Bingel, principal witness for the oppositors, that the old man is versatile in Tagalog as he is a Bulakeo but could not speak English except to say word, yes, sir. . . . . (p. 33, Decision, p. 176, Records). With respect to witness Alfredo Barredo, the truthfulness of his testimonies was doubted by the lower court in this wise: . . . . Another point noticed by this Court is the testimony of Alfredo Barredo that after talking with Atty. Mendoza at the phone he was asked by the old man to fetch the 2 witnesses however when asked on direct examination, he stated that he stayed all along with the old man and did not leave him even after talking with Atty. Mendoza, which spells a whale of difference in time element and enormously distanced from the truth. So also, his exaggerated demonstration of the ability of the old man in answering even small children yes, sir, is too good to be true. . . . . (pp. 33-34, Decision, pp. 176177, Records). Witness Dr. Co's testimony that he did not charge the late Cayetano Revilla for two services rendered by him and that he only charged when a third service was made was also doubted by the lower court. Said the court a quo: . . . witnesses Co, a practicing dentist was munificent enough not to charge Don Cayetano for two time services and only charged him the 3rd time. It may be added here that the testimony of Dr. Co that the testator read his will in silence before they were asked to affix their signatures (tsn., Aug. 17, 1987, pp. 30-31, 45) is completely different from the testimony of another witness (Fernando Lim) who testified that the late Don Cayetano read his will aloud before he gave it to the witnesses for their signatures (tsn., Aug. 13, 1987, pp. 47, 52). The above citations of the inconsistencies and contradictions fatally made by said witnesses are only some of the more important ones as discussed in the decision of the lower court. But they are enough, to say the least, to convince this Court that indeed said witnesses crossed the boundaries of their credibilities. (pp. 56-57, Rollo.) WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the petition for review is DENIED. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23079 February 27, 1970 RUBEN AUSTRIA, CONSUELO AUSTRIA-BENTA and LAURO AUSTRIA MOZO, petitioners, vs. HON. ANDRES REYES, Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, PERFECTO CRUZ, BENITA CRUZ-MENEZ ISAGANI CRUZ, ALBERTO CRUZ and LUZ CRUZSALONGA respondents. Salonga, Ordoez, Yap, Sicat and Associates for petitioners. Ruben Austria for himself and co-petitioners. De los Santos, De los Santos and De los Santos for respondent Perfecto Cruz. Villareal, Almacen, Navarra and Amores for other respondents.

CASTRO, J.: On July 7, 1956 Basilia Austria vda. de Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Special Proceedings 2457) a petition for probate, ante mortem, of her last will and testament. The probate was opposed by the present petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, and still others who, like the petitioner, are nephews and nieces of Basilia. This opposition was, however, dismissed and the probate of the will allowed after due hearing. The bulk of the estate of Basilia, admittedly, was destined under the will to pass on to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz, and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. On April 23, 1959, more than two years after her will was allowed to probate, Basilia died. The respondent Perfecto Cruz was appointed executor without bond by the same court in accordance with the provisions of the decedent's will, notwithstanding the blocking attempt pursued by the petitioner Ruben Austria. Finally, on November 5, 1959, the present petitioners filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging in substance that they are the nearest of kin of Basilia, and that the five respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., had not in fact been adopted by the decedent in accordance with law, in effect rendering these respondents mere strangers to the decedent and without any right to succeed as heirs. Notwithstanding opposition by the respondent Perfecto Cruz, as executor of the estate, the court a quo allowed the petitioners' intervention by its order of December 22, 1959, couched in broad terms, as follows: "The Petition in Intervention for Partition filed by the

above-named oppositors [Ruben Austria, et al.,] dated November 5, 1959 is hereby granted." In the meantime, the contending sides debated the matter of authenticity or lack of it of the several adoption papers produced and presented by the respondents. On motion of the petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., these documents were referred to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination and advice. N.B.I. report seems to bear out the genuineness of the documents, but the petitioners, evidently dissatisfied with the results, managed to obtain a preliminary opinion from a Constabulary questioned-document examiner whose views undermine the authenticity of the said documents. The petitioners Ruben Austria, et al., thus moved the lower court to refer the adoption papers to the Philippine Constabulary for further study. The petitioners likewise located former personnel of the court which appeared to have granted the questioned adoption, and obtained written depositions from two of them denying any knowledge of the pertinent adoption proceedings. On February 6, 1963, more than three years after they were allowed to intervene, the petitioners Ruben Austria, let al., moved the lower court to set for hearing the matter of the genuineness of the adoption of the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al., by the late Basilia. Before the date set by the court for hearing arrived, however, the respondent Benita Cruz-Meez who entered an appearance separately from that of her brother Perfecto Cruz, filed on February 28, 1963 a motion asking the lower court, by way of alternative relief, to confine the petitioners' intervention, should it be permitted, to properties not disposed of in the will of the decedent. On March 4, 1963, the lower court heard the respondent Benita's motion. Both sides subsequently submitted their respective memoranda, and finally, the lower court issued an order on June 4, 1963, delimiting the petitioners' intervention to the properties of the deceased which were not disposed of in the will. The petitioners moved the lower court to reconsider this latest order, eliciting thereby an opposition, from the respondents. On October 25, 1963 the same court denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration which set off a long exchange of memoranda from both sides, was summarily denied on April 21, 1964. Hence this petition for certiorari, praying this Court to annul the orders of June 4 and October 25, 1963 and the order of April 21, 1964, all restricting petitioners' intervention to properties that were not included in the decedent's testamentary dispositions. The uncontested premises are clear. Two interests are locked in dispute over the bulk of the estate of the deceased. Arrayed on one side are the petitioners Ruben Austria, Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Austria Mozo, three of a number of nephews and nieces who are concededly the nearest surviving blood relatives of the decedent. On the other side are the respondents brothers and sisters, Perfecto Cruz, Benita Cruz-Meez, Isagani Cruz, Alberto Cruz and Luz Cruz-Salonga, all of whom heirs in the will of the deceased Basilia, and all of whom claim kinship with the decedent by virtue of legal adoption. At the heart of the controversy is Basilia's last will immaculate in its extrinsic validity since it bears the imprimatur of duly conducted probate proceedings. The complaint in intervention filed in the lower court assails the legality of the tie which the respondent Perfecto Cruz and his brothers and sisters claim to have with the decedent. The lower court had, however, assumed, by its orders in question, that the validity or invalidity of the adoption is not material nor decisive on the efficacy of the institution of heirs; for, even if the adoption in question were spurious, the respondents

Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads: One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs. The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a freewheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance. The petitioners nephews and niece, upon the other hand, insist that the entire estate should descend to them by intestacy by reason of the intrinsic nullity of the institution of heirs embodied in the decedent's will. They have thus raised squarely the issue of whether or not such institution of heirs would retain efficacy in the event there exists proof that the adoption of the same heirs by the decedent is false. The petitioners cite, as the controlling rule, article 850 of the Civil Code which reads: The statement of a false cause for the institution of an heir shall be considered as not written, unless it appears from the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of such cause. Coming closer to the center of the controversy, the petitioners have called the attention of the lower court and this Court to the following pertinent portions of the will of the deceased which recite: III Ang aking mga sapilitang tagapagmana (herederos forzosos) ay ang aking itinuturing na mga anak na tunay (Hijos legalmente adoptados) na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz. xxx xxx xxx Kung ako ay bawian ng Dios ng buhay, ay aking ipinamamana ang aking mga ari-ariang maiiwan, sa kaparaanang sumusunod: A.Aking ipinamamana sa aking nabanggit na limang anak na sina Perfecto, Alberto, Luz, Benita at Isagani, na pawang may apelyidong Cruz, na parepareho ang kaparti ng bawa't isa at walang lamangan (en partes iguales), bilang kanilang sapilitang mana (legiti[ma]), ang kalahati () ng aking kaparti sa lahat ng aming ari-ariang gananciales ng aking yumaong asawang Pedro Cruz na napapaloob sa Actuacion Especial No. 640 ng Hukumang Unang Dulugan ng Rizal at itinutukoy sa No. 1 ng parafo IV ng testamentong ito, ang kalahati () ng mga lagay na lupa at palaisdaan na nasa Obando at Polo, Bulacan, na namana ko sa aking

yumaong ama na si Calixto Austria, at ang kalahati () ng ilang lagay na lupa na nasa Tinejeros, Malabon, Rizal, na aking namana sa yumao kong kapatid na si Fausto Austria. The tenor of the language used, the petitioners argue, gives rise to the inference that the late Basilia was deceived into believing that she was legally bound to bequeath one-half of her entire estate to the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. as the latter's legitime. The petitioners further contend that had the deceased known the adoption to be spurious, she would not have instituted the respondents at all the basis of the institution being solely her belief that they were compulsory heirs. Proof therefore of the falsity of the adoption would cause a nullity of the institution of heirs and the opening of the estate wide to intestacy. Did the lower court then abuse its discretion or act in violation of the rights of the parties in barring the petitioners nephews and niece from registering their claim even to properties adjudicated by the decedent in her will? Before the institution of heirs may be annulled under article 850 of the Civil Code, the following requisites must concur: First, the cause for the institution of heirs must be stated in the will; second, the cause must be shown to be false; and third, it must appear from the face of the will that the testator would not have made such institution if he had known the falsity of the cause. The petitioners would have us imply, from the use of the terms, "sapilitang tagapagmana" (compulsory heirs) and "sapilitang mana" (legitime), that the impelling reason or cause for the institution of the respondents was the testatrix's belief that under the law she could not do otherwise. If this were indeed what prompted the testatrix in instituting the respondents, she did not make it known in her will. Surely if she was aware that succession to the legitime takes place by operation of law, independent of her own wishes, she would not have found it convenient to name her supposed compulsory heirs to their legitimes. Her express adoption of the rules on legitimes should very well indicate her complete agreement with that statutory scheme. But even this, like the petitioners' own proposition, is highly speculative of what was in the mind of the testatrix when she executed her will. One fact prevails, however, and it is that the decedent's will does not state in a specific or unequivocal manner the cause for such institution of heirs. We cannot annul the same on the basis of guesswork or uncertain implications. And even if we should accept the petitioners' theory that the decedent instituted the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. solely because she believed that the law commanded her to do so, on the false assumption that her adoption of these respondents was valid, still such institution must stand. Article 850 of the Civil Code, quoted above, is a positive injunction to ignore whatever false cause the testator may have written in his will for the institution of heirs. Such institution may be annulled only when one is satisfied, after an examination of the will, that the testator clearly would not have made the institution if he had known the cause for it to be false. Now, would the late Basilia have caused the revocation of the institution of heirs if she had known that she was mistaken in treating these heirs as her legally adopted children? Or would she have instituted them nonetheless? The decedent's will, which alone should provide the answer, is mute on this point or at best is vague and uncertain. The phrases, "mga sapilitang tagapagmana" and "sapilitang mana," were borrowed from the language of the law on succession and were used, respectively, to describe the class of heirs instituted and the abstract object of the inheritance. They offer no absolute indication that the decedent would have willed her estate other than the way she did if she had known that she was not bound by law to make allowance for legitimes. Her disposition of the free portion of her estate ( libre disposicion) which largely favored the respondent Perfecto Cruz, the latter's children, and

the children of the respondent Benita Cruz, shows a perceptible inclination on her part to give to the respondents more than what she thought the law enjoined her to give to them. Compare this with the relatively small devise of land which the decedent had left for her blood relatives, including the petitioners Consuelo Austria-Benta and Lauro Mozo and the children of the petitioner Ruben Austria. Were we to exclude the respondents Perfecto Cruz, et al. from the inheritance, then the petitioners and the other nephews and nieces would succeed to the bulk of the testate by intestacy a result which would subvert the clear wishes of the decedent. Whatever doubts one entertains in his mind should be swept away by these explicit injunctions in the Civil Code: "The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." 1 Testacy is favored and doubts are resolved on its side, especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate, 2 as was done in this case. Moreover, so compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and the wishes of the testator allowed to prevail, that we could even vary the language of the will for the purpose of giving it effect. 3 A probate court has found, by final judgment, that the late Basilia Austria Vda. de Cruz was possessed of testamentary capacity and her last will executed free from falsification, fraud, trickery or undue influence. In this situation, it becomes our duty to give full expression to her will. 4 At all events, the legality of the adoption of the respondents by the testatrix can be assailed only in a separate action brought for that purpose, and cannot be the subject of a collateral attack.5 To the petitioners' charge that the lower court had no power to reverse its order of December 22, 1959, suffice it to state that, as borne by the records, the subsequent orders complained of served merely to clarify the first an act which the court could legally do. Every court has the inherent power to amend and control its processes and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justices.6 That the court a quo has limited the extent of the petitioners' intervention is also within its powers as articulated by the Rules of Court.7 ACCORDINGLY, the present petition is denied, at petitioners cost. Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 45425 March 27, 1992 CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS L. VDA. DE GUINTO,petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City, Branch IV and RODOLFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the Estate of the late EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, respondents.

G.R. No. 45965 March 27, 1992 ROLDOFO LIZARES and AMELO LIZARES, as Judicial Administrators of the ESTATE OF EUSTAQUIA LIZARES, petitioners, vs. HON. JUDGE ERNESTO TENGCO, CELSA L. VDA. DE KILAYKO, ENCARNACION L. VDA. DE PANLILIO and REMEDIOS VDA. DE GUINTO, respondents.

ROMERO, J.: These consolidated cases seek to annul the orders 1 dated September 20, 1976, January 7, 1977 and January 31, 1977 of the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch, IV respectively, cancelling the notice oflis pendens filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, denying the motion for reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976 filed by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., and holding in abeyance the resolution of defendants' motion to dismiss. The undisputed facts of the case are as follows: On November 20, 1962, the late Maria Lizares y Alunan executed a "Testamento" 2 which contains among its provisions, the following: DECIMA Asimismo, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en una tercera parte (1/3) de una catorce (1/14) avas partes proindivisas de la Hda. Minuluan, que he adquirido mediante permuta de mi hermano Dr. Antonio A. Lizares, se adjudique, como por el presente se adjudica, a mi sobrina Eustaquia Lizares; ENTENDIENDOSE, sin embargo, que en el caso de que mi citada sobrina Eustaquia Lizares muera soltera o sin descendientes legitimos, mi referida participacion en la Hda. Minuluan se adjudicara a mi hermano Antonio A. Lizares que me sobrevivan. UNDECIMA Tambien ordeno y dispongo que el resto de todas mis propiendades, incluyendo mis participaciones, derechos e intereses (no dispuestos mas arriba) an las Haciendas "Minuluan" (Lotes Nos. 439, 403, 1273, 1274, 1278, 1279 y 1280 del Catastro de Talisay, Negros Occidental), y "Matab-ang" (Lotes Nos. 514, 550, 552, 553 y 1287-C del Catastrado de Talisay, Negros Occidental), situadas en el Municipio de Talisay, Provincia de Negros Occidental, I.F., el resto de mis acciones en la Central Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. (unas 2,860 acciones) y de la Financing Corporation of the Philippines (unas 53,636 acciones), registradas a mi nombre y no heredadas de mi difunta madre Da. Enrica A. Vda. de Lizares, mis acciones en la Central Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., Negros Navigation Co. y otras Compaas Mineras, y todos los demas bienes no mencionados en este testamento y que me pertenezcan en la fecha de mi muerte, se adjudiquen, como por el presente adjudico, a mi sobrina Srta. Eusaquia Lizares, hija de mi difunto hermano Don Simplicio Lizares cuidados que mi citada sobrina me ha prestado y signe prestandome hasta ahora. Ordeno, sin embargo, a mi referida sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, que ella se haga cargo de pagar todas las obligaciones que tengo y que gravan sobre las propriedades adjudicadas a la misma. Asimismo ordeno a mi citada sobrina que ella mande celebrar una Misa Gregoriana cada ao en sufragio de mi alma, y misas ordinarias en sufragio de las almas de mi

difunto Padre y de mi difunta Madre, el 6 de Marzo y 17 de Deciembre de cada ao, respectivamente, y mande celebrar todos los aos la fiesta de San Jose en Talisay como lo hago hasta ahora. En el caso de que mi citada sobrina, Srta. Eustaquia Lizares, falleciere sin dejar descendientes legitimos, ordeno y dispongo que mi participacion consistente en una sexta parte (1/6) de la Hda. Matab-ang, con su correspondiente cuota de azucar y otros mejoras, se adjudique a mis hermanas y hermano antes mencionados y que me sobrevivan (Emphasis supplied) On January 28, 1968, Maria Lizares y Alunan died without any issue leaving said "testamento" in the possession and custody of her niece, Eustquia Lizares. 3 On February 6, 1968, Eustaquia filed a petition for the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares y Alunan, before the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 8452. 4 The required publication of the notice of hearing of the petition having been made, in due course, the probate court issued an order declaring the will probated and appointing Eustaquia as the executrix of the estate of Maria Lizares. 5 On July 10, 1968, Eustaquia filed a project of partition 6 which was granted by the probate court in an order dated January 8, 1971. Simultaneously, said court declared the heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries mentioned in the project of partition as the only heirs, devisees, legatees and usufructuaries of the estate; adjudicated to them the properties repectively assigned to each and every one of them, and ordered the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental and Bacolod City to effect the corresponding transfer of the real properties to said heirs as well as the transfer of shares, stocks, and dividends in different corporations, companies and partnerships in the name of Maria Lizares to the heirs and legatees, and the closure of the testate proceedings of Maria Lizares. 7 Thereafter, Eustaquia filed an urgent motion to reopen the testate proceedings in order that some properties of Maria Lizares which had been omitted in the partition be adjudicated to her. 8 The Court granted the motion and correspondingly reopened the testate proceedings. It adjudicated to Eustaquia certain shares of stocks, a revolving fund certificate, plantation credits and sugar quota allocations, and real or personal properties of Maria Lizares which were not given by her to any other person in her last will and testament. 9 On November 28, 1972, the heirs of Maria Lizares, namely: Encarnacion L. Vda. de Panlilio, Remedios L. Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an agreement of partition and subdivision, thereby terminating their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of plan SWO-7446, and 552, all of the Cadastral Survey of Talisay covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-65004, T-65005; T-65006, T-65007, and T-65008. 10 A year later or on November 23, 1973, Eustquia Lizares died single without any descendant. 11 In due time, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares were appointed joint administrators of Eustquia's intestate estate. On the strength of the testamentary provisions contained in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the will of Maria Lizares, which were allegedly in the nature of a simple substitution, Celsa Vda. de Kilayko, Encarnacion Vda. de Panlilio, and Remedios Vda. de Guinto (hereinafter collectively referred to as Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.) filed a motion in Special Proceedings No. 8452 to reopen once again the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares. They prayed among others that a substitute administrator be appointed; that the order dated January 8, 1971 be reconsidered and amended by declaring them as heirs to 1/3 of 1/14 of Hda. Minuluan and to 1/6 of Hda. Matab-ang, both of which form an

aggregate area of 33 hectares; that the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental, after such amendment, be ordered to register at the back of their respective certificates of title, the order of probate and a "declaration" that movants are the heirs of said properties, and correspondingly issue new certificates of title in their names. 12 Two (2) sets of intestate heirs of the deceased Eustaquia Lizares namely: Socorro L. Vda. de Escario, Rodolfo Lizares, Mario Lizares, Lucrecia Gustilo, and Aurora Lizares Wagner opposed the aforesaid motion. They alleged that the court had no more jurisdiction to reopen the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares as the order of closure had long become final and that the testamentary provisions sought to be enforced are null and void. 13 On April 6, 1974, the Court issued an order denying the motion to reopen the testate proceedings and holding that inasmuch as the settlement of an estate is a proceeding in rem, the judgment therein is binding against the whole world. It observed that inspite of the fact that the movants knew that the court had jurisdiction over them, they did not take part in the proceedings nor did they appeal the order of January 8, 1971. Thus, the court concluded, even if the said order was erroneous, and since the error was not jurisdictional, the same could have been corrected only by a regular appeal. The period for filing a motion for reconsideration having expired, the court opined that the movants could have sought relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, but unfortunately for the movants, the period for filing such remedy had also elapsed. 14 Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. then filed a motion for reconsideration of said order. It was denied on June 17, 1974. 15 Hence, on October 14, 1974, the said movants filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of real property against the joining administrators of the estate of Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo and Amelo Lizares. It was docketed as Civil Case No. 11639 with the then Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch IV. 16 On the same date, they availed of their rights under Rule 14, Section 24 of Rules of Court by filing a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental. 17 As duly appointed judicial joint administrators of the estate of the late Eustaquia Lizares, Rodolfo Lizares and Amelo Lizares (the joint administrators for brevity), filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the case; the cause of action was barred by prior judgment, and the complaint stated no cause of action. 18 This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs. On January 23, 1975, the joint administrators filed a motion for the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the contentions that there existed exceptional circumstances which justified the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens and that no prejudice would be caused to the plaintiffs. 19 The latter opposed said motion. The defendants having filed a reply thereto, the plaintiffs filed a rejoinder reiterating their arguments in their opposition to the motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 20 On September 20, 1976, respondent judge issued an order granting the motion for cancellation of notice of lis pendens. 21 The court simultaneously held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss the complaint. The joint administrators filed the answer to the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639. 22 Thereafter, they filed a motion for preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses. 23 Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. vigorously opposed said motion. 24 On November 3, 1976, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the order dated September 20, 1976. 25 The joint administrators having filed an opposition thereto, 26 on January 7, 1977 the lower court denied the aforesaid

motion for reconsideration. 27 It held that while a notice of lis pendens would serve as notice to strangers that a particular property was under litigation, its annotation upon the certificates of title to the properties involved was not necessary because such properties, being in custodia legis, could not just be alienated without the approval of the court. Moreover, the court added, a notice of lis pendens would prejudice any effort of the estate to secure crop loans which were necessary for the viable cultivation and production of sugar to which the properties were planted. Upon receipt of a copy of said order, Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. filed in this Court a motion for extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari. Docketed as G.R No. L-45425, the petition contends that the grounds of lis pendens, namely, that the properties are in custodia legis and the lending institutions would not grant crop loans to the estate, are not the legal grounds provided for under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court for the cancellation of a notice of lis pendens. Meanwhile, on January 31, 1977, the lower court issued an order stating that since on September 21, 1976 it had held in abeyance the resolution of the motion to dismiss, it was also proper to suspend the resolution of the affirmative defenses interposed by the defendants until after trial on the merits of the case. Accordingly, the court set the date of pre-trial for March 24, 1977. 28 On April 13, 1977, the joint administrators filed before this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and/ormandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. It was docketed as G.R. No. L-45965. Petitioners contend that the lower court had no jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 11639 as it involves the interpretation of the will of Maria Lizares, its implementation and/or the adjudication of her properties. They assert that the matter had been settled in Special Proceedings No. become final and unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 8452 which had become final and unappealable long before the complaint in Civil Case No. 11639 was filed, and therefore, the cause of action in the latter case was barred by the principle of res judicata. They aver that the claim of Celsa, Encarnacion and Remedios, sisters of Maria Lizares, over the properties left by their niece Eustaquia and which the latter had inherited by will from Maria Lizares, was groundless because paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria's will on which Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. base their claim, conceived of a fideicommissary substitution of heirs. Petitioners contend that said provisions of the will are not valid because under Article 863 of the Civil code, they constitute an invalid fideicommissary substitution of heirs. On April 26, 1977, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the lower court from further proceeding with the trial of Civil Case No. 11639. 29 After both G.R. Nos. L-45425 and L-45965 had been given due course and submitted for decision, on January 20, 1986, the two cases were consolidated. The petition in G.R. No. L-45965 is impressed with merit. In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. 30 The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. 31 The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. 32 Pertinent to the issue interposed by the petitioners in G.R. No. L-45965 is Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases. No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. Applying this rule, in the cases of De Jesus v. Daza, 33 and Torres v. Encarnacion, Court said:
34

the

. . . (T)he probate court, having the custody and control of the entire estate, is the most logical authority to effectuate this provision, within the estate proceeding, said proceeding being the most convenient one in which this power and function of the court can be exercised and performed without the necessity of requiring the parties to undergo the incovenience and litigate an entirely different action. Some decisions of the Court pertinent to the issue that the probate court has the jurisdiction to settle the claims of an heir and the consequent adjudication of the properties, are worth mentioning. In the cases of Arroyo v. Gerona,35 and Benedicto v. Javellana, 36 this Court said: . . . any challenge to the validity of a will, any objection to the authentication thereof, and everydemand or claim which any heir, legatee or party interested in a testate or intestate succession may make, must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate shall take cognizance of the question raised, inasmuch as when the day comes he will be called upon to make distribution and adjudication of the property to the interested parties. . . . (Emphasis supplied) The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to distribute the estate, has the power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributee is entitled . . .. 37 A project of partition is merely a proposal for the distribution of the heredity estate which the court may accept or reject. It is the court that makes that distribution of the estate and determines the persons entitled thereto. 38 In the instant case, the records will show that in the settlement of the testate estate of Maria Lizares, the executrix, Eustaquia Lizares submitted on January 8, 1971, a project of partition in which the parcels of land, subject matters of the complaint for reconveyance, were included as property of the estate and assigned exclusively to Eustaquia as a devisee of Maria Lizares. In accordance with said project of partition which was approved by the probate court, Encarnacion Lizares Vda. de Panlilio,

Remedios Lizares Vda. de Guinto, Felicidad Paredes Llopez, Rosario Paredes Mendoza and Eustaquia Lizares executed an Agreement of Partition and Subdivision on November 28, 1972, whereby they agreed to terminate their co-ownership over Lots Nos. 550, 514, 553, 1287-C of SWO-7446 and 552 covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T65004, T-65005, T-65006, T-65007 and T-65008. These facts taken altogether show that the Lizares sisters recognized the decree of partition sanctioned by the probate court and in fact reaped the fruits thereof. Hence, they are now precluded from attacking the validity of the partition or any part of it in the guise of a complaint for reconveyance. A party cannot, in law and in good conscience be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment and repudiate what does not suit him. 39 Thus, where a piece of land has been included in a partition and there is no allegation that the inclusion was affected through improper means or without petitioner's knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for its proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. 40The question of private respondents title over the lots in question has been concluded by the partition and became a closed matter. The admission made by Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. in their complaint, Civil Case No. 11639, that Eustaquia had been in possession of the questioned lots since March 2, 1971 up to the time of her death indicates that the distribution pursuant to the decree of partition has already been carried out. Moreover, it cannot be denied that when Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. moved for the reopening of the testate estate proceedings of Maria Lizares, the judicial decree of partition and order of closure of such proceedings was already final and executory, then reglementary period of thirty (30) days having elapsed from the time of its issuance, with no timely appeal having been filed by them. Therefore, they cannot now be permitted to question the adjudication of the properties left by will of Maria Lizares, by filing an independent action for the reconveyance of the very same properties subject of such partition. A final decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees. If the decree is erroneous, it should be corrected by opportune appeal, for once it becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem, unless properly set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud. Where the court has validly issued a decree of distribution and the same has become final, the validity or invalidity of the project of partition becomes irrelevant. 41 It is a fundamental concept in the origin of every jural system, a principle of public policy, that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite time fixed by law, interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum. "The very object of which the courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." 42 The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is the opening of the same by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which if successful, would be for another court or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. 43 The fundamental principle upon which the doctrine of res judicata rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once, that, when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them in law or estate. 44

All the requisites for the existence of res judicata are present. Thus, the order approving the distribution of the estate of Maria Lizares to the heirs instituted in said will has become final and unappealable; the probate court that rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the parties; the judgment or orders had been rendered on the merits; the special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Maria Lizares was a proceedingin rem that was directed against the whole world including Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., so that it can be said that there is a similarity of parties in Special Proceedings No. 8452 and Civil Case No. 11639, the judicial administrators of Eustaquia being privy to Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al.; there is identity of subject matter involved in both actions, namely, the properties left by Maria Lizares; there is identity of causes of action because in the first action there was a declaration of the probate court in its order dated April 6, 1974 that although the testatrix intended a fideicommissary substitution in paragraphs 10 and 11 of her will, the substitution can have no effect because the requisites for it to be valid, had not been satisfied. 45 Granting that res judicata has not barred the institution of Civil Case No. 11639, the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. that they are conditional substitute heirs of Eustaquia in the testate estate of Maria Lizares 46 is not meritorious. While the allegation of the joint administrators that paragraphs 10 and 11 of Maria Lizares' last will and testament conceives of a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 of the Civil Code is also baseless as said paragraphs do not impose upon Eustaquia a clear obligation to preserve the estate in favor of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., neither may said paragraphs be considered as providing for a vulgar or simple substitution. It should be remembered that when a testator merely names an heir and provides that if such heir should die a second heir also designated shall succeed, there is no fideicommissary substitution. The substitution should then be construed as a vulgar or simple substitution under Art. 859 of the Civil Code but it shall be effective only if the first heir dies before the testator. 47 In this case, the instituted heir, Eustaquia, survived the testatrix, Maria Lizares. Hence, there can be no substitution of heirs for, upon Maria Lizares' death, the properties involved unconditionally devolved upon Eustaquia. Under the circumstances, the sisters of Maria Lizares could only inherit the estate of Eustaquia by operation of the law of intestacy. With respect to the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens on the properties involved, there is no merit in the contention of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al., that the lower court acted contrary to law and/or gravely abused its discretion in cancelling the notice of lis pendens. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice, being a mere incident in an action, may be ordered by the court having jurisdiction over it at any given time. 48 Under Sec. 24, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled "after proper showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting the adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect the rights of the party who caused it to be recorded." 49 In this case, the lower court ordered the cancellation of said notice on the principal reason that the administrators of the properties involved are subject to the supervision of the court and the said properties are under custodia legis. Therefore, such notice was not necessary to protect the rights of Celsa L. Vda. de Kilayko, et al. More so in this case where it turned out that their claim to the properties left by Eustaquia is without any legal basis. WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari in L-45425 is hereby DENIED but the petition for certiorari and prohibition and/or mandamus in L-45965 is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order of April 26, 1977 which was issued by the Court in L-45965 is made PERMANENT. Costs against the petitioners in L-45425. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-17742 December 17, 1966

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE DON VICENTE NOBLE. JUAN NOBLE, petitionerappellee, vs. MARIA S. NOBLE, oppositor-appellant. Jesus N. Maravilla and Nicolas Belmonte, for petitioner-appellee. Farrera, Belmi and Associates for oppositor-appellant. BARRERA, J.: This is an appeal by Maria S. Noble from an order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas (in Sp. Proc. No. 343), dismissing her opposition to the probate of the purported last will of the late Don Vicente Noble, who died on April 25, 1959. The proceedings for the probate of the last will of the deceased was instituted by Juan Noble who was named executor therein and who had expressed willingness to assume the trust. This was opposed by Maria S. Noble, who claimed to be an illegitimate (spurious) child of the deceased, born on July 22, 1923 out of an illicit relation between the latter and Lucia Sinag. It was alleged that the will sought to be probated, dated August 25, 1957, was not the last will and testament of the late Don Vicente Noble; that from all indications as shown by a perusal of the alleged last will of the deceased, the same was not executed in accordance with the law, and that the said will was executed through undue influence, mistake and improper pressure on the part of one or some of the beneficiaries, and that petitioner Juan Noble, as then incumbent Assistant General Manager of the NAMARCO, a government corporation could not properly execute the trust of his office in the estate of the deceased, which consists of real and personal properties located in several provinces. Furthermore, oppositor contended that petitioner has an adverse interest against those immediately interested in the estate, like her. Thus, she prayed that the purported last Will and Testament presented to the court be disallowed; that she be declared the only surviving illegitimate daughter of the deceased; and in case the will sought to be probated be allowed, the institution of heirs made therein be declared null and void; the devises and legacies be declared ineffective for being inofficious; and oppositor be declared entitled to one-half of the entire hereditary estate of the deceased; that instead of petitioner, letters of administration be issued in favor of Mrs. Corazon Apacible de Caiza of Taal, Batangas. Simultaneously, she filed a motion asking for permission to present evidence of her alleged filiation with the deceased. This motion was opposed by petitioner Juan Noble, on the ground that the claim was in effect an action for compulsory recognition, and since it was brought after the death of the putative father and when claimant was already of majority age, the right to bring the same has already prescribed pursuant to Article 285 of the new Civil Code.1 This motion was not immediately resolved. Instead, the court proceeded with the reception of the evidence for the petitioner, during which proceeding, the oppositor was allowed to cross-examine the petitioner's witnesses. Finding, on the basis of the evidence presented by the petitioner, that the document, Exhibit "D", and its copies, Exhibits "D-1" to "D-12", constitute the last will and testament of the deceased Vicente Noble, and it was executed with all the formal requirements of the law, the aforesaid will was admitted to probate, and Juan Noble was appointed

administrator of the estate upon a bond of P30,000.00. It was also ruled that the petition of Maria S. Noble to present proof for the purpose of establishing her filiation, filed after the death of the presumed father, had been barred by prescription. Consequently, the motion to dismiss the petition of Maria S. Noble was granted. Oppositor appealed. The main issue presented in this case requiring resolution by this Court is: what is necessary to be established by an illegitimate not natural child in order that he may be entitled to successional rights under Article 887 of the new Civil Code, the fact of his bare filiation, or a filiation acknowledged by the putative parent? While the Civil Code merely provides that "in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved" (Art. 887), there are cogent reasons, both legal and moral, which require that such filiation must be acknowledged by the presumed parent. For, if the mere fact of the paternity of the supposed father is all that need be proved, that construction of the law would pave the way to unscrupulous individuals taking advantage of the death of the presumed parent who would no longer be in a position to deny the allegations, to present even fictitious claims and expose the life of the deceased to inquiries affecting his character. But more important than this, the law could not have demanded anything less than proof of an acknowledged filiation. Precisely, under Article 289 of the new Civil Code, the investigation of the paternity or maternity of children mentioned in the two preceding articles (referring to illegitimate not natural children) is specifically permitted only in the circumstances enumerated in Articles 283 and 284 of the same code. It must be noted that these two articles refer to compulsory recognition or acknowledgment. Hence, since the proof of filiation required in Article 887, necessarily involves the investigation mentioned in Article 289, and this investigation in turn refers to recognition by the putative parent, it follows that the filiation to be proven must be one that is recognized. In the present case, what is intended to be proved by appellant is simply the supposed naked paternity of the deceased. This is evident from the pertinent allegations of her opposition to the probate of the will, which state: 2. That the oppositor is in continuous possession of status of a child of the late Don Vicente Noble by the direct acts of the latter and/or his family; and, that the oppositor has in her favor evidence and/or proof that the late Don Vicente Noble is her father. It may be pointed out that the first sentence does not state that the supposed father had recognized or acknowledged the oppositor as his child. It is merely claimed that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child, an allegation which is a ground for compelling recognition under Article 283 of the new Civil Code and, therefore, presupposes no previous recognition. The last sentence alleges that oppositor has in her favor evidence and/or proof that the late Don Vicente Noble is her father. Again, there is no assertion that she has evidence that the deceased had recognized or acknowledged her as such a child. In a unanimous decision, in the case of Paulino v. Paulino (G.R. No. L-15091, Dec. 28, 1961), this Court held: It is true that by their motion to dismiss the appellees are deemed to have admitted that the appellant is the illegitimate spurious, not natural, child of the deceased Marcos Paulino. Such an admission, however, does not entitle her to inherit from her alleged putative father. It is necessary to allege that her putative father had acknowledged and recognized her as such. Such acknowledgment is essential and is the basis of her right to inherit. There being no allegation of such

acknowledgment the action becomes one to compel recognition which can not be brought after the death of the putative father . (Emphasis supplied.) This is authority to the declaration that acknowledgment is the basis of the right of a spurious child to enjoy the successional rights mentioned in Articles 287 and 887 of the new Civil Code. There being no allegation of her recognition or acknowledgment by the alleged father in the petition to establish her filiation, the same, therefore, states no cause of action and the dismissal thereof by the lower court was proper. Incidentally, the last sentence of the above-quoted portion of the decision in the Paulino case constitutes a reversal of the ruling contained in the majority opinion in the case of Zuzuarregui v. Zuzuarregui (G.R. No. L-10010, Oct. 31, 1957) relied upon by the appellant. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered. Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Castro, JJ., concur.

Footnotes "ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
1

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.