The following ad supports maintaining our C.E.E.O.L.

service

PoliticalCultureandInstitutionBuilding:DemocraticEvolutionatWork
andtheCaseofPoland
PoliticalCultureandInstitutionBuilding:DemocraticEvolutionatWorkandtheCase
ofPoland
byWojtekLamentowicz
Source:
PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:1+2/1990,pages:6473,onwww.ceeol.com.
POLITICAL CULTURE
INSTITUTIO
DEMOC ATIC EVOLUTIO AT
AND THE CASE OF POLA
Wojtek Lamentowicz
Some of the East European states (Poland and Hungary are the most pivotal
cases) are amidst a process of transition from bureaucratic authoritarian rule. What
I refer to as the "transition'" is a period when the rules of the game are not defined.
They are in a constant flux because those in power are too weak to protect the
old pattern and those who are pushing for change are too weak to impose the new
code. The rules and institutions which are at stake shall define which new collective
actors will be permitted to enter the political arena and which means of influence
can legitimately be used by the competing political coalitions.
Although international factors (dependence on the Soviet Union and detente
between East and West) may condition or affect the course of the change, the major
participants and the dominant forces are basically domestic. They include
1. Historical circumstances unique to each country, domestic traditions shaping
a given people's sense of freedom;
2. The way in which Soviet-type rule was established and a previous regime broken
down;
3. The means the authoritarian system used to obtain legitimacy and handle threats
to its grip on power;
4. The initiative and timing of experimental moves toward liberalization - "too-
little and too late" - under the pressure from below seems to be the East
European pattern of experiments);
5. The degree of security and self-confidence of the regime's elites;
6. The confidence and competence of leaders (and counter-elites) and of groups
pushing for change.
In this article I will develop the categories essential to understanding the transi-
tions to democracy in East Europe. Then I will take a closer look at the uneasy
and difficult conditions in contemporary Poland.
I. Modes of structural changes in Eastern Europe
Destalinization, launched in the thaw of 1955-1956, was never fully implemented.
It brought about some changes as a result of revolutionary defeats as in Hungary in
1956 and Poland in 1980-1981, as a result of the evolutionfrombelow (Poland after
1955 and again after 1983) or as a result of reformsfrom above (Yugoslavia after 1948,
Praxis International 10:1/2 April & July 1990 0260-8448 $2.00
Praxis International
65
Hungary after 1968, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Poland after 1981, and the Soviet Union
after 1985). These changes made the monopoly systems less totalitarian even though
they kept their basic authoritarian and monocentric characteristics intact.
1. Revolutions (or rather rebellions since they were not fully successful) were
rapid and radical. What was most significant was that these changes were caused
by the self-mobilization of despairing masses of people. They were almost totally
uncontrolled, or they were controlled from below by leaders who were fully
independent of those in power. An essential precondition to systemic resistance
- the synchronization of urban and rural discontent - was exactly what happened
in all cases. The society's resistance to the monopoly system was total and very
few participants believed that the system could be corrected through the modification
of certain policies or the replacement of particular leaders. The aim was to bring
down the entire regime and to reconstruct the very foundations of authority. These
revolutionary upheavals resulted from extreme frustration (Hungary 1956, Romania
1989) or from relative deprivation (Poland 1980-81, GDR 1989, Czechoslovakia
1989). The violence of the Hungarian resistance in 1956 and the nonviolence of
the Polish August (1980) ended with violent reaction from the defenders of the
status quo. The revolutions of Autumn 1989 (in GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania)
were in contrast accepted by Gorbachev.
2. Reforms were gradual, planned and implemented through the legislative process
that was exclusively controlled by the ruling group. These changes in economy
could not destroy the foundation on which the dominance of the communist party
over the society was based. So the identity of the monocentric order was not
changed. The vested interests of local power elites and their dependence on the
Soviet superpowers prevented reforms from becoming coherent and irreversible.
In the end, these reforms proved to be the least reliable path to democratic, civil
society. All economic reforms launched in the sixties and in the seventies (except
the Hungarian one) were effectively dismantled. Hungarian reform proved to be
totally impotent as far as a viable market economy is concerned.
3. Evolution is similar to reform in its gradual, peaceful, and legal character.
On the other hand, it is similar to revolution since the sources and scope of the
evolution are not planned or controlled by the ruling elite. It grows from below
while the reform is controlled from above. Many changes proved, in the end, to
come from a long term peaceful evolution, that was unwanted by the rulers but
which they, nevertheless, accepted ex post facto. Table 1 may be helpful in
explaining the categories which I have developed.
It should be noted that even the lost revolutions were not useless. They revived
the sense of moral and political rights among the dependent clients of the state.
The lost Hungarian revolution paved the way for the economic reforms of 1968
and, perhaps, political reforms in the future. The Polish August revolution provided
the necessary conditions for a mix of reforms and democratic evolution in the 19808.
The Polish experience, including the organized existence of a genuine political
opposition, was so strong a challenge to the Soviet leaders that it pushed them
to launch Gorbachev's perestroika.
Access via CEEOL NL Germany
66
Table 1
Praxis International
Modes of
changes
Revolution
Evolution
Reform
Who controls?
no one, or control
from below
control from below
organized by
counter-elites
from above by the
ruling elites
What is the
speed of a
change?
rapid
slow
slow or
very slow
What happens to the
identity of the system?
identity openly
questioned and
destroyed
identity may be
transcended in the
longer run without
open questioning
(peaceful devolution of
the system's identity)
no threat to the
identity of the system
11. Stages of learning from experience
The policy outcomes in particular East European states vary considerably. To
assess these changes, three basic questions need to be asked about their contents:
(a) what human needs are better satisfied? (b) what new rights are acquired by
the citizens? and (c) are these accomplishments reversible and, if so, what are
the costs of reversion?
With these questions in mind we can distinguish four levels of changes in the
monopoly regime. These changes may be perceived as steps leading to the decom,-
position ofmonocentric regimes, as well as the improvement of prospects for the
emergence of civil society.
1. Humanization is the least ambitious change. No new rights are won by the
non-ruling groups, but the style of ruling becomes more sensitive, more humane
and, sometimes, more responsive to basic needs. The improvement is mainly visible
in the field of consumption and in the conditions of work. The first efforts of post-
Stalinist policy in the Soviet Union limited the scope and the level of the unpredict-
ability of repressive measures. The numbers of deaths and imprisonments for
political reasons were smaller under Khrushchev than under Stalin. The very essence
of the system, however, was hardly changed. The monopoly system was humanized
mostly by reforms in the Soviet Union but, in many countries, democratic revolution
(Hungary and Poland in 1956) contributed a great deal to that limited success.
2. Rationalization of the monopoly systems means that bureaucratic and
ideological rationality in the party is supplemented by the influx of piecemeal social
engineering based on some meritocratic or technocratic principles. Many highly
trained professionals are recruited by coaptation from above. Their presence in
the inner party provides some constraints to the system's "ideological logic" .
Praxis International
67
The most wasteful projects may be stopped. The most exaggerated lies in statistics
or propaganda may be replaced by half-truths. These sorts of change, usually
implemented as minor and fully reversible economic reforms, allow for more
independence of local managers. Thus, an economy more open to the markets
but still centrally planned, becomes less wasteful but it hardly adequately satisfies
the consumers' needs. The system is slightly less centralized and less rigid but
it falls short of liberalization or democratization. No redefinition and extension
of civil rights has been accomplished. Polish reforms of the 1970s were tailored
in that manner. But the technocratic influences were too weak and could not replace
the bureaucratic anarchy of monocentrism.
3. Liberalization may be perceived as the process leading to some normative
or structural constraints in decision-making.
The revolutionary emergence of Soviet rule in Russia and then the military
imposition of that system in East European countries destroyed the normative con-
straints which might limit the political intervention into the social life. The emergent
systems destroyed not only the legal opposition (' 'oppositionless state" is an
adequate term as coined by G. Ionescu) but all norms which could regulate the
scope and intensity of power. Traditional culture and religion were perceived by
the new elites as the "remnants" of the prerevolutionary past that needed to be
fully eliminated. No wonder that they could not accept obligations flowing from
religion, tradition and - last but not least - from old moral views. Destruction of
the inherited laws and the use of new laws simply as a means for the perpetuation
of the new order's political elite made impossible the rule of law. The fmal outcome
of this destruction was the lack of normative constraints in decision making; what
was perceived by the rulers technically possible was simply put into practice.
Liberalization means that:
1. The authoritarian elites begin to modify their own rules in the direction of self-
limiting their powers;
2. The ruling parties promise to replace their unlimited power with a bit more
predictable rule within the framework of the due process of law;
3. The citizens' rights may be redefined, better protected and in some areas even
extended.
Due process and the rule of law are not mere slogans but become reality in some
areas of public life. Morals and religious beliefs are not suppressed by force. The
Communist elite becomes less faithful to its own ideology; a mix of cynicism and
reflexive pragmatism makes the elite more concerned with legal and moral limits
to its power. Power is kept by the party without open competition, but the rulers
recognise that there are some non-technical limits to their power. They do not
try to dominate the private life of citizens: as 0 'Donne!l and Schmitt noted, " ... the
reacquisition of some individual rights generally precedes the granting of guarantees
for collective action." More than that, some less important areas of public life
are open to the independent action of individuals or informal groups of indivduals.
Better protection of civil rights may be different on the level of individuals and
on the level of groups. As far as individuals are concerned the newly acquired
guarantees include the classical heritage of the liberal tradition: habeas corpus,
68
Praxis International
sanctity of the private home and correspondence, the right to be defended in a
fair trial according to preestablished laws, and freedom of movement, speech and
petition. On the level of groups, these '''new' rights may cover such things as
freedom from punishment for expressions of collective dissent from government
policy, freedom to associate voluntarily with other citizens, and freedom from
censorship.
Liberalization in most East European states is advanced so far as to make the
collective dissent no longer punishable. Defection from the party - the lack of
participation in politics - is regarded by the majority of citizens as a basic human
right. Enforced and ritual participation that is not voluntary tends to be an exception.
The regime gives more official toleration to religious beliefs but it fails to bring
about genuine improvement in the population's material condition and in the
efficiency of an unwieldy economic system. Liberalization is better for the soul
than for the body of the people, so far.
Liberalized authoritarianism opens up certain spaces for individual and group
action; they can obtain needed information and support without altering the structure
of authority, that is without subjecting their claim to rule to fair and competitive
elections. The party competition and electoral choice, even if only in rudimentary
forms, goes beyond the horizon of liberalization.
4. Democratization refers to the processes whereby new collective and indepen-
dent political actors are permitted to enter the political arena. We may distinguish
between the two levels of political pluralism which opens up the road to a com-
petitive and liberal democracy: the lame and the party pluralism. "Lame pluralism"
denotes the existence of legally organized pressure groups such as trade unions
and associations if these are independent from the party-state and are able to
protect their own identity. Pressure-group-politics is based on two principles:
Ca) pressure groups may legally seek political influence without questioning the
Communists' claims to power; (b) the Communist party mediates between com-
peting demands and no opposition party is recognized as the legitimate form of
representation.
Party pluralism refers to a stage of development when the ruling party is ready
to compete with the legally acting opposition party which claims it has the right
to state authority. Party politics becomes thus competitive and claims to rule are
subjected to free and fair elections.
This final stage of political development was reached by 1990 in most countries
of the region.
The most important institutional devices that contributed greatly to the democratic
evolution in Poland were an innovative mixture of both mass mobilization and
a wisely controlled demobilization. The innovations that were used as vehicles
for democratic change include the following:
1. The strike movement was turned into a multifunctional and independent trade
union. The basic characteristics of the Solidarity union in 1980-1981 were
horizontal and territorial and very fluid structures that successfully confronted
vertical, branch and the rather rigid structures of the one-party state.
2. The underground civil society after imposition of martial law was conceived
Praxis International
69
as a step back and a sort of controlled demobilization in order to limit the costs
of the confrontation with the state's repressive violence.
3. The round table negotiations in Spring 1989 were invented in Poland (and later
on copied in Czechoslovakia and the GDR) as a means of peaceful search for
compromises with the old regime.
Ill. Electoral breakthrough and the new government
Parliamentary elections in Poland may be perceived as an earthquake that
destroyed the old Communist myth of the oppositionless state. For the first time
in the history of the soviet-type systems the right to the legal existence of the
opposition has been acknowledged and even formally recognized by the Communist
party. The way leading to the Round Table compromise has been stormy and
extremely long if one takes into consideration its beginnings in August 1980 and
the drama of martial law.
Not one but four extraordinary things happened in Poland in June 1989. First,
the ruling coalition parties lost an election but they did not lose power because
they still had the army, police, bureaucratic apparatus and the formal majority
of 65 per cent of seats in the lower house (Sejm) guaranteed by the Round Table
agreement. Everyday opinion saw that the real loser however was the authoritarian
and monopoly power system rather than the candidates nominated by the three
coalition parties (the Polish United Workers Party, United Peasant Party,
Democratic Party).
Secondly, it was not a political party that won but rather a broad conglomerate
of social forces artificially unified by the symbols and memories of a strong trade
union movement. It would have been strange enough if it were the trade union
that wins a parliamentary election. But what actually happened was more unusual
than that: it was the symbolic value of the Solidarity trade union that won the election
because the real strength of this trade union today is as small as 15-20 per cent
of its previous glory. Solidarity has had approximately 1.5 million members in
industrial and urban population and about 1 million members in the countryside.
Thirdly, the opposition unified by the Citizens Committee deprived the
Communist party of all legitimacy, but not the opportunity for political control.
Those who had a full right to govern were not in a position to take over the govern-
ment and those who had no right to govern stayed in most powerful positions.
That resulted in a new contradiction: there was power without authority confronted
with authority without power. It made less efficient the efforts at the formation
of the new government that was supposed to be strong enough to be able to combat
the structural crisis of the economy. That explains why the leaders of the Commu-
nists tried to persuade the opposition to join the government. They proposed a
broad coalition government and the leaders of the opposition were very reluctant
to accept this proposal.
Fourthly, the losing Communists for the fITst time did not falsify the fmal outcome
of elections. They openly acknowledged that a democratic opposition won. This
was a sort of miracle and perhaps a genuine breakthrough in the postwar political
culture. In spite of some dirty tricks during the campaign the Communists were
totally defeated and admitted the fact of their political failure. In the first round
70 Praxis International
the coalition candidates won no single seat in the new upper house (Senate), while
Solidarity won 92 out of 100 seats. In the second round on June 18 the opposition
won seven seats more and the only seat in the Senate not taken by the opposition
was won by an independent candidate, an extremely rich businessman who was
supported by neither the coalition nor the opposition. None of the coalition candi-
dates for the Senate was able to win in a free competition.
Elections to the lower house were not fully free. According to the Round Table
agreement 65 %out of 460 seats were granted to the coalition parties; the Polish
United Workers Party got 33 %, United Peasant Party 15 %, Democratic Party 7%
and three small Catholic or Christian associations loyal to the Communists got
5%. Only 35 % of the seats were distributed according to the majority of votes
and it was only for these seats that the independents were allowed to stand.
The opposition was allowed to win 35 %of seats and 160 seats (out of 161) were
won in the first round by the average majority of 65-70% of the turn out. The
coalition won only 3 seats out of 297 in the first round. The uncontested' 'national
list" comprising 33 notables from the coalition failed almost completely. All but
two candidates were crossed out by the majority of voters; among those who lost
were Politbureau members, Prime Minister Rakowski, and leaders of both smaller
parties. This happened in spite of the appeal by Solidarity leader Lech
who tried to help his Round Table partners get into the parliament. What voters
enjoyed most was just crossing out' 'the reds" even if they were known as pragmatic
reformers.
The turnout was relatively low: just over 62 %in the first round and only 25 %
in the second round. The first round was more interesting to the voters because
there was an open or semi-open competition between the two blocks of candidates.
Most of the Solidarity candidates were elected in the first round. No wonder that
297 lower house members from the coalition got altogether 9. 7 million votes while
the 161 opposition members have won 16.55 million votes. The above mentioned
statistics consider only those members of parliament who were elected in local
constituencies; the two successful runners for the' 'national list' , tickets are not
included. The average support for the actually elected opposition candidate was
as high as 102,148 votes while for the average coalition representative only 32,696
eligible voters voted. These figures show that the legitimacy that came from the
ballot box was distributed in a very unequal way.
The importance of the second round is to be seen in that even among establish-
ment party members the pragmatic reformers won and the hardline conservatives
lost. The defeat of party functionaries was remarkable.
Abstention of more than 38%of voters in the first round is dangerously high.
There are many reasons for that turnout; it was the lowest in the postwar history
of parliamentary elections in Poland. Perhaps a few people - no more than 5% -
followed radical appeals to boycott even these semi-free elections. The second
group of abstentions was probably composed of those Communist and other coalition
party supporters who felt so disgusted with their own parties that they stayed at
home. Some of the eligible voters are totally alienated from politics for many various
reasons (alcoholism, drugs abuse, illiteracy etc.). But it is obvious that the main
reason was a deep tiredness and total disbelief in the capacity of any political force
- establishment or opposition - to cure the country malaise and reverse the country<t s
Praxis International
71
desperate material decline. There was indeed no enthusiasm either during the
campaign or after the unexpected victory of the opposition which had had only
5 weeks to get ready for elections. The shock of victory may easily turn into the
shock of the economic disaster.
IV. Dilemmas of the transition and threats to uncertain democracy
The risk of an angry rebellion is higher because the decision-making procedures
actually adopted may put into question the democratic identity of the former
opposition. The ruling elite prefers to negotiate with a small elite of Solidarity
leaders and intellectuals rather than to allow open debate and a secret vote based
on the majority principle. While dealing with problems behind the closed doors
the two elites may lose touch with reality and decide by consensus something hardly
acceptable to the population as a whole.
That particular mixture of corporatist top secret negotiations and a parliamentary
procedure based on the principle of majority rule is unstable per se and for that
reason it may willy-nilly contribute to overall instability.
Even the choice of the President - the new office introduced in order to stabilize
the transitory structure - was hazardous to both sides. The Communist party was
afraid of the failure of its candidate, and the opposition was afraid to support him
because it might endanger its independence and moral integrity. General Jaruzelski
was elected after two tricks. First he resigned in order to persuade his own party
top officials that they have no better candidate for the presidency than Jaruzelski
himself. The second trick was made by the opposition during the voting in the
National Assembly.
Jaruzelski "won" by 1 vote, the narrowest possible margin. His victory was
artificially produced by the opposition and not by his own three-party coalition.
When the opposition leaders found out that many deputies from the Peasant Party
and from the Democratic Party were going to vote against Jaruzelski, they decided
to help him in an indirect way: 11 members of the opposition failed to come to
the parliament on that day, 18 persons abstained from voting, and 7 members of
Solidarity consciously made their votes invalid. As a result, none of the opposi-
tion members openly supported the candidacy of Jaruzelski but 36 members
consciously refrained from the genuine opposition to him.
This particular case showed one more time that the neocorporatist deals made
behind the scene were interfering with the principle of majority rule so essential
to parliamentary rule. If this peculiar mixture of corporatist negotiations and the
majority principle is going to be continued, the disillusioned voters and frustrated
consumers may get an impression they are cheated and manipulated by both the
old and the new political elite. The elite is obviously more interested in corporatist
decision-making than are the leaders of the opposition. That approach is more
convenient to the Communist party because it is based on top secret negotiations
through which both sides decide by consensus and not by the decision of a majority.
They may try to alienate the opposition leaders from their own constituencies.
The old political elite may expect that the hopes pinned on Solidarity can be reduced
by the close cooperation of the two elites. They know pretty well that the dualism
of two elites is perhaps better than the monopoly of one elite, but most of the critical
72
Praxis International
voters are not willing to accept secret discourse. The voters who supported
opposition candidates expected that open debate and the procedure of secret voting
would replace the old ways based on secret debate between elites and on the obedient
mechanical followers. Critical voters demand that political decision-making be
made transparent to the public.
As W offerred a new coalition government in August 1989 he wanted to
break the dominant position of the Communist party. His idea was very simple
and radical - he proposed a coalition government led by himself that would eliminate
the PUWP and strengthen both the Peasant Party and Democratic Party. His idea
was expressed in an arbitrary way and without the previous acceptance of the
Solidarity parliamentary faction.
Tadeusz Mazowieckiwas invited by W to become deputy prime minister.
Yet W was persuaded by his closest advisers that his original idea of
government without Communists would constitute a trap for Solidarity. Because
of his natural flexibility he gave up his plan to become prime minister himself
and quickly suggested that Tadeusz Mazowiecki would be the best prime minister
in a broad coalition dominated by Solidarity ministers. Exclusion of the PUWP
was avoided and the strategic superiority of Solidarity established when President
Jaruzelski nominated Mazowiecki and accepted the idea of a government in which
most important economic positions were to be given to "Solidarity" politicians.
In that paradoxical way the private move of greatly contributed to a
democratic breakthrough in Polish postwar politics: not only the monopoly position
of the Communists but their dominant role within the coalition government was
broken. These dilemmas (parliamentary procedure vs. neocorporatist bargaining,
the arbitrary will of a leader vs. trust in democratic institutions and processes)
if not solved may lead exclusively to corporatist rule.
The reemerging political parties (about 60 in January 1990) do not help very
much because most of them are unable to represent actual and future social and
political interests. They do not know their future constituencies and have no
experience in political mobilization. The weakness of the new parties has many
reasons:
1. Symbolic representation: parties do not represent interests but appeal to the
collective memory of political traditions and symbols of the past that may
mobilize emotion-based support;
2. Resentment-driven policy options: parties do not provide fresh and innovative
solutions to the present problems but rather express negative emotions. Negative
propaganda is usually directed against persons of other political figures or against
other political organizations.
3. Searching for the "bad guys" leads to emotional and negative articulation and
the lack of positive alternatives that might challenge and mobilize the present
governemnt.
4. The personalization of the political arena and an overly personal style in policy-
making has roots in the unstructured interests of reemerging civil society. Polish
society is a moving configuration of forces in flux rather than any kind of
cohesive and well-ordered structure. Thus, the lack of confidence in public
institutions (like banks, enterprises, local authorities, schools) is compensated
Praxis International
73
for by trust in symbolic persons: prime minister Mazowiecki and other national
leaders are perceived by many as the only Hoffnungstrager. Another explana-
tion for this is perhaps the fact that liberal-democratic institutions and styles
of leadership have never firmly taken root in Polish political culture.
Citizens' trust may be undermined by the unclear division of functions and rules
in the ever-changing mosaic of the new political order. This in turn leads to a
troublesome situation in which everybody does everything they can, or at least
they feel like they are doing everything they can, but no one is really responsible
for anything. Faith in great personalities is a substitute for the trust in institutional
frameworks and in the new and democratic rules of the game. himself
is perceived as a charismatic-populist type of leader who claims the discretionary
authority of unlimited interference.
The legitimacy of the new authorities is not based just on elections and parlia-
mentary procedures but also on everyday, national and Roman Catholic traditions,
and on shared beliefs on the validity of symbols (like the eagle with the crown).
Obedience is based: (a) on the passive adjustment of citizens to the new rules of
the game, Cb) shared negative emotions against the Soviet-dominated past, and
(c) unclear hopes that a better future must come because a nation which suffered
so much must deserve it.
If loyalty to specific political figures proves stronger than experience-based trust
in institutional networks and in the rule of law and impersonal market competition
some negative scenarios may threaten the transition to a stable democracy. Among
the political and domestic threats to uncertain democracy the following seem to
be of primary importance:
1. A corporatist-style discourse between different groups of the ruling elite that
may alienate citizens from public life or provoke their dissent;
2. a populist rebellion fuelled by the marketization of the unbalanced economy
and fostered by the old-regime-supporters hoping for destabilization of the
emerging democracy through strikes and/or demonstrations;
3. indifference and demobilization of voters who may abstain from political par-
ticipation and thus may leave the space of public freedom unfilled with their
energy;
4. unrestrained pluralism of many relatively small and "sentimental" political
parties being hardly able to form a stable coalition government and to safeguard
the peaceful course of the transition to stable democracy;
5. a growing risk of self-protective nationalism (reinforced by German unification
and by Lithuanian and Ukrainian nationalisms) combined with paternalist and
authoritarian temptations.
In order to avoid s\lch scenarios all economic recovery and the growing influence
of a democratic mainstream (of christian-, liberal- and socialdemocrats) are badly
needed. Political cooperation of Western democracies and truly democratic forces
in the East, including the present Soviet Union, is one of the basic conditions for
the successful transition from an uncertain to a stable Polish democracy.
ELITES AND SYSTEMATIC CHANGE
IN HUNGARY
Erzsebet Szalai
Radical political changes have been launched essentially by a new elite which
emerged out of the Kadarist institutions in Hungary. They are the famous beat
generation, the "great generation" - mostly those who are in their forties today
- who already occupied the lower and medium levels of the different (state, party
and enterprise) bureaucracies before May 1988. After May 1988 they swiftly
invaded the power positions in politics and economics. Important decision-making
positions had already been in their hands; many of them already occupied significant
bureaucratic, banking, financial and managerial positions. They have completed
the process of taking power by the removal of the old elite, the advocates of order.
Let us call them subsequently traditional new elites.
The traditional new elites are characterized by liberalism, especially by an
attraction to the market, but their need for democracy does not go much beyond
the support of the freedom of entrepreneurs and managers. Yet as a result of their
socialization during the Kadar era, the ability of informal bargaining has been
internalized by them and it significantly weakens or at least may weaken the strength
of their market orientation. In this respect the members of the traditional new elite
are heroes of dual linkages.
I. Struggle and movement
The traditional new elite can be regarded as the starter engine of the radical
political movements in Hungary. Yet at the same time still other political elites
have emerged from the "great generation", primarily through the mediation of
the new parties, and they also demand their share of power.
Those members of the traditional new elite who are in spectacular power position
for the time being have been mostly in their post for a short time. They are not
significantly responsible for the present economic crisis. Yet probably part of them
will have to leave their post now after the recent elections. This is the direction
of the effect of the power aspirations and victory of the new political elite, and
also of the sharpening struggle inside the traditional new elite whereby a scapegoat
is sought because of growing economic tensions.
The old party bureaucracy has disintegrated, and there have been significant
changes of personnel within the state bureaucracy. The exact direction of the
movement of "cadres" will only be possible to examine with precise empirical
research. My suspicion now however is that the individuals quitting the old party
and state bureaucracy orient themselves primarily towards the 'business sphere",
and overwhelmingly towards the growing banking sphere within it. Though the
Praxis International 10:1/2 April & July 1990 0260-8448 $2. 00