TITLE: PACU VS. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION CITATION: 97 Phil.

806

said act and 3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court. ISSUE:

constitutionally objectionable for being capricious or pain nuisance. Therefore, the court denied the petition for prohibition. 2.

a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a NO. At the time the case was filed the Con-Con has not yet finalized any resolution thatwould

FACTS: Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended by Act no. 3075 and The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities made a petition that Acts No. 2706 otherwise known as the Act making the Inspection and Recognition of private schools and colleges obligatory for the Secretary of Public Instruction and was amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared unconstitutional on the grounds that 1) the act deprives the owner of the school and colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property without due process of Law; 2) it will also deprive the parents of their Natural Rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency and 3) its provisions conferred on the Secretary of Education unlimited powers and discretion to prescribe rules and standards constitute towards unlawful delegation of Legislative powers. Section 1 of Act No. 2706It shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given in the same, The petitioner also complain that securing a permit to the Secretary of Education before opening a school is not originally included in the The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented before the court. It is an established principle that to entitle a private individual immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury and it is not sufficient that he has merely invoke the judicial power to determined the validity of executive and legislative action he must show that he has sustained common interest to all members of the public. Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference. As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies and the authority to pass on the validity of statutes is incident alto the decisions of such cases where conflicting claims under the constitution and under the legislative act assailed as contrary to the constitution but it is legitimate only in the last resort and it must be necessary to determined a real and vital controversy between litigants. Thus, actions like this are brought for a positive purpose to obtain actual positive relief and the court does not sit to adjudicate a mere academic question to satisfy scholarly interest therein. The court however, finds the defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the Petition for declaratory relief as taxpayers an in behalf of the Filipino people. The petitioners seeks for the court to declare that the deliberating Constitutional Convention was "without power, under Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution and Republic Act 6132, to consider, discuss and adopt proposals which seek to revise the present Constitution through the adoption of a form of a government other than the form now outlined in the present Constitution [the Convention being] merely empowered to propose improvements to the present Constitution without altering the general plan laid down therein." ISSUES: 1. 2. RULING: 1. NO. Justice Laurel:"The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validityofa statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such thathe has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. "Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works: validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury, in consequence of its enforcement. Taxpayers only have standing on laws providing for the disbursement of public funds. Expenditure of public funds, byan officerof the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes Whether or not the petitioners has locus standi. Whetherornot the courthas jurisdiction overthe case. RULING: Commonwealth Act no.180 may be declared void and unconstitutional? TITLE: TAN VS. MACAPAGAL CITATION: 43 SCRA 678 FACTS:

radicallyalter the 1935constitution therefore not yet ripe for judicial review. The case becomes ripe when the Con-Con has actually does something already. Then the court may actually inquire into the jurisdiction of the body. Separation of power departments should be left alone to do duties as they see fit. The Executive and the Legislature are not bound to ask for advice in carrying out their duties, judiciary may not interfere so that it may fulfill its duties well. The court may not interfere until the proper time comes ripeness.

TITLE: DUMLAO VS. COMELEC CITATION: 95 SCRA 392

FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received payments of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation. Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, which states that any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact. ISSUE:

original Act 2706. And in support to the first proposition of the petitioners petitioner remedy is to challenge the regulation not to invalidate the law they contended that the Constitution guaranteed the right of a citizen to because it needs no argument to show that abuse by officials own and operate a school and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person could exercise the said right On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhi biting unavoidable necessity of deciding the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the entrusted with the execution of the statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the Department of Education they fail to indicate which of such official documents was

Whether or not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the Constitution and thus and will be declared null and void RULING: In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg. 52 remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the provision is to satisfy the need for new blood in the workplace. In regards to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office. A person filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code). And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet there is "clear and present danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him. Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged, will

thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 which can stand by itself. Wherefore, the first paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is hereby declared valid and that portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.

very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence, it said. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process. While the MOA-AD would not

implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment. R.A. 8371 (the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent (FPIC) of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.

TITLE: NORTH COTABATO VS. REPUBLIC CITATION: G.R. No. 183591. October 14, 2008 FACTS: The Government and the MILF were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the GRPMILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The GRP-MILF agreement is the result of a formal peace talks between the parties in Tripoli, Libya in 2001. The pertinent provisions in the MOAAD provides for the establishment of an associative relationship between the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) and the Central Philippine government as associative, thus implying an international relationship and therefore suggesting an autonomous state. Furthermore, under the MOA-AD, the GRP Peace Panel guarantees that necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. ISSUE: Whether or not the said MOA-AD constitutional? RULING: No. The SC ruled that the MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the

amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under international law, respondents act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-AD fatally defective.

TITLE: KILOSBAYAN vs. MORATO CITATION: G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS: Justice Santiago said, among others, that the MOA-AD contains provisions which are repugnant to the Constitution and which will result in the virtual surrender of part of the Philippines territorial sovereignty. She further said that had the MOA-AD been signed by parties, would have bound the government to the creation of a separate Bangsamoro state having its own territory, government, civil institutions, and armed forces. The sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Philippines would have been compromised. Notes: In this case, The Court explained that the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA 7160, and RA 8371. EO No. 3 is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensusbuilding. R.A. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioners have standing? In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the Contract of Lease. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal standing because they were not parties to the contract

disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been Government. It speaks of the relationship between the BJE and the

its individual nominees) organized with some Filipino investors in March RULING: 1993 a Philippine corporation known as the Philippine Gaming NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the Management Corporation (PGMC), which was intended to be the standing of the petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real medium through which the technical and management services required parties in interest because no constitutional issues were actually for the project would be offered and delivered to PCSO. involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs. Before August 1993, the PCSO formally issued a Request for Proposal Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. of this case. The parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON On 15 August 1993, PGMC submitted its bid to the PCSO. On 21 CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still apply. An issue actually and directly October 1993, the Office of the President announced that it had given passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot again be drawn in the respondent PGMC the go-signal to operate the countrys on-line question in any future action between the same parties involving a lottery system and that the corresponding implementing contract would different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at be submitted not later than 8 November 1993 for final clearance and least when substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the approval by the Chief Executive. second proceeding involves an instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST. On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to President Fidel V. Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Considering the denial by the Office of the President of its protest and the statement of Assistant Executive Secretary Renato Corona that only a court injunction can stop Malacaang, and the imminent implementation of the Contract of Lease in February 1994, KILOSBAYAN, with its co-petitioners, filed on 28 January 1994 this petition.

2.Whether or the Contract of Lease in the light of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, which prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether domestic or foreign. is legal and valid. RULING: We find the instant petition to be of transcendental importance to the public. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect the social, economic, and moral well-being of the people even in the remotest barangays of the country and the counter-productive and retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line lottery system are as staggering as the billions in pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing then of the petitioners deserves recognition and, in the exercise of its sound discretion, this Court hereby brushes aside the procedural barrier which the respondents tried to take advantage of. The language of Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169 is indisputably clear. The PCSO cannot share its franchise with another by way of collaboration, association or joint venture. Neither can it assign, transfer, or lease such franchise. Whether the contract in question is one of lease or whether the PGMC is merely an independent contractor should not be decided on the basis of the title or designation of the contract but by the intent of the parties, which may be gathered from the provisions of the contract itself. Animus hominis est anima scripti. The intention of the party is the

law. This conclusion renders unnecessary further discussion on the other issues raised by the petitioners.

TITLE: JOYA VS. PCGG CITATION: G.R. No. 96541. August 24, 1993 FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines through the PCGG entered into a Consignment Agreement with Christies of New York, selling 82 Old Masters Paintings and antique silverware seized from Malacanang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila alleged to be part of the ill-gotten wealth of the late Pres. Marcos, his relatives and cronies. Prior to the auction sale, COA questioned the Consignment Agreement, there was already opposition to the auction sale. Nevertheless, it proceeded as scheduled and the proceeds of $13,302,604.86 were turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG has jurisdiction and authority to enter into an agreement with Christies of New York for the sale of the artworks RULING: On jurisdiction of the Court to exercise judicial review - The rule is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy; that the question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites. Standing of Petitioners - On the first requisite, we have held that one having no right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in

TITLE: KILOSBAYAN VS. GUINGONA JR. CITATION: 232 SCRA 110 FACTS: Pursuant to Section 1 of the charter of the PCSO (R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42) which grants it the authority to hold and conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries and other similar activities, the PCSO decided to establish an on-line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and diversifying its sources of funds. Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system, the Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company and one of the ten largest public companies in Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and resources to PCSO. As an initial step, Berjaya Group Berhad (through

Petitioner claims that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of soul of the instrument. civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests, nuns, and lay leaders. The rest of the petitioners, except Senators Freddie Webb and Wigberto Taada and Representative Joker P. Arroyo, are suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned citizens. Senators Webb and Taada and Representative Arroyo are suing in their capacities as members of Congress and as taxpayers and concerned citizens of the Philippines. The public respondents, meanwhile allege that the petitioners have no standing to maintain the instant suit, citing the Courts resolution in Valmonte vs. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi Undoubtedly, from the very inception, the PCSO and the PGMC mutually understood that any arrangement between them would necessarily leave to the PGMC the technical, operations, and management aspects of the on-line lottery system while the PSCO would, primarily, provide the franchise. The so-called Contract of Lease is not, therefore, what it purports to be. Woven therein are provisions which negate its title and betray the true intention of the parties to be in or to have a joint venture for a period of eight years in the operation and maintenance of the on-line lottery system. We thus declare that the challenged Contract of Lease violates the exception provided for in paragraph B, Section 1 of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, and is, therefore, invalid for being contrary to

an action. This is premised on Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. "Legal standing" means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The term "interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Moreover, the interest of the party plaintiff must be personal and not one based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third and related party. EXCEPTIONS TO LEGAL STANDING: Mandamus and Taxpayers Suit - There are certain instances however when this Court has allowed exceptions to the rule on legal standing, as when a citizen brings a case for mandamus to procure the enforcement of a public duty for the fulfillment of a public right recognized by the Constitution, and when a taxpayer questions the validity of a governmental act authorizing the disbursement of public funds. Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and protection of the country's artistic Secretary and PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution, particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and R.A. 4846 known as "The Cultural Properties Preservation and Protection Act," governing the preservation and disposition of national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also anchor their case on the premise by them and by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their right to public property without due process of law in violation of the Constitution.

Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. They lack basis in fact and in law. They themselves allege that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts. The foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On this basis, the ownership of these paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof, although the public has been given the opportunity to view and appreciate these paintings when they were placed on exhibit. Similarly, as alleged in the petition, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them. When the Marcos administration was toppled by the revolutionary government, these paintings and silverware were taken from Malacaang and the Metropolitan Museum of Manila and transferred to the Central Bank Museum. The confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of these paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory requirements of due process and just compensation. If these properties were already acquired by the

the 1987 Constitution. What they seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirmed. Moreover, petitioners' claim for the continued enjoyment and appreciation by the public of the artworks is at most a privilege and is unenforceable as a constitutional right in this action for mandamus. When a Taxpayer's Suit may prosper - Neither can this petition be allowed as a taxpayer's suit. Not every action filed by a taxpayer can qualify to challenge the legality of official acts done by the government. A taxpayer's suit can prosper only if the governmental acts being questioned involve disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the state for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer. Obviously, petitioners are not challenging any expenditure involving public funds but the disposition of what they allege to be public properties. It is worthy to note that petitioners admit that the paintings and antique silverware were acquired from private sources and not with public money.

TITLE: CHAVEZ VS. PUBLIC ESTATE AUTHORITY CITATION: G.R. No. 133250. July 9, 2002

FACTS: The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI. ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid. RULING: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be

Actual Controversy - For a court to exercise its power of adjudication, there must be an

transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public domain. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156 hectares of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

government, any constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and actual case of controversy one which involves a conflict of legal their subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper parties rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial the true owners thereof whose authority to recover emanates from their proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the artworks or that the valued pieces have become publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition. Requisites for a Mandamus Suit - Further, although this action is also one of mandamus filed by Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, this Court laid down the rule that to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the state are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. In the case at bar, petitioners are not after the fulfillment of a positive duty required of respondent officials under resolution; the case must not be moot or academic or based on extralegal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. A case becomes moot and academic when its purpose has become stale, such as the case before us. Since the purpose of this petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date 11 January 1991 which is long past, the issues raised in the petition have become moot and academic. At this point, however, we need to emphasize that this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the requirements of an actual case or legal standing when paramount public the petition at bar to warrant the relaxation of the rule.

wealth, they have the legal personality to restrain respondents Executive Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal owners of the

that the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned concerned citizens, it does not fulfill the criteria for a mandamus suit. In

a writ of mandamus may be issued to a citizen only when the public right interest is involved. We find however that there is no such justification in

Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake FACTS: such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or Petitioner Ramon Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such assails the constitutionality of the creation of the citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty- Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries, or industrial uses other than The PCCR was created by Pres. Estrada by virtue of EO 43 in order to the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the and limit of the grant. Constitution, and the manner of implementing them. TITLE: GONZALES VS. NARVASA CITATION: G.R. No. 140835. August 14, 2000

funds have disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, payers action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. In the creation of PCCR, it is apparent that there is no exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power. The PCCR was created by the President by virtue of EO 43 as amended by EO 70. The appropriations for the PCCR were authorized by the President, not by Congress. The funds used for the PCCR were taken from funds intended for the Office of the President, in the exercise of the Chief Executives power to transfer funds pursuant to Sec. 25(5) of Art. VI of the Constitution. As to the creation of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants, the petitioner has not alleged the necessary facts so as to enable the Court to determine if he possesses a taxpayers interest in this particular issue. NO. ISSUE:

what Justice Fernando was saying is that the law was later declared unconstitutional because it violates the nonimpairment of contractual obligations clause in the constitution). PNB claims that this period should be deducted from the prescriptive period since during this time the bank took no legal steps for the recovery of the loan. As such, the action has not yet prescribed.

Whether or not the action is prescribe. RULING:

The general rule is that an unconstitutional act because it The State shall protect the nations marine wealth in its archipelagic ISSUE: waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens. The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to file the case RULING: Agbayani obtained a loan P450 from PNB secured by a REM, which was to mature 5 years later. 15 years later, PNB sought to foreclose the REM. Agbayani filed a complaint claiming that it was barred by TITLE: SERRANO DE AGBAYANI VS. PNB CITATION: 38 SCRA 42 FACTS: suffers from infirmity, cannot be a source of legal rights or duties. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. However, prior to the declaration of nullity of such challenged legislative act must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until after the judiciary, in an appropriate case declares its invalidity, it is entitled to obedience and respect. Such legislative act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all respects. It is now accepted that prior to

resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with In assailing the constitutionality of EO 43, petitioner asserts his interest priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays, as a citizen and taxpayer. and lagoons. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for large- conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, challenged action; and the injury is likely to be addressed by a favorable and other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or in danger of provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall and of the positions of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. promote the development and use of local scientific and technical Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have been or are in resources. The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution. In his capacity as a taxpayer, a taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any penalties or burdens as a result of the issues raised.

prescription. She also claims that she obtained an injunction its being nullified, its existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect the awareness that precisely because the judiciary is against the sheriff. PNB argued that the claim has not yet prescribed if the period from the time of issuance of EO32 to the time when RA 342 was issued should be deducted. E0 32 was issued in 1945 providing for debt moratorium RA 342 was issued in 1948 - extension of the debt moratorium The RA 342 was declared void and since it was an extension of EO 32, EO 32 was likewise nullified. Here, RA 342 (the debt moratorium law) continued EO 32, suspending the payment of debts by war sufferers. However RA 342 could not pass the test of validity. (I think the governmental organ which has the final say on whether a legislative act is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would e to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication. The past cannot always be erased by judicial declaration. (OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE). The existence of a statute prior to its being adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached.

During the 8 year period that EO 32 and RA 342 were in force, prescription did not run. Thus, the prescriptive period was tolled in the meantime prior to such adjudication of invalidity.

1. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is available in this case. 2. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?

benefits and home lots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not. 2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

administrative implementation and enforcement of agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area with which each qualified FWB will be awarded. On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the separate 80.51hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the sale of the 500hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to the FWBs. 4. YES, the date of taking is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLIs SDP.

3. Whether or not the Court order that DARs compulsory acquisition of TITLE: HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP? 4. Whether or not the date of the taking (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI) November 21, 1989, when PARC On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLIs Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government. The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to the right of the original 6,296 qualified farm workers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) to immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names. The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision. ISSUES: 1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case. The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July 5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered commonly-owned by farm workers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that may be awarded per FWB the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases. In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB, and considering that matters involving strictly the approved HLIs SDP? 5. Whether or not the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11, 1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not? 6. THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered? RULING: The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of constitutionality. 3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DARs compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs SDP. Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety

CITATION: G.R. No. 171101. November 22, 2011 FACTS:

For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of taking is November 21, 1989 (the date when PARC approved HLIs SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and

possess the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves 4,915.75 of agricultural lands became subject of the agrarian reform coverage through the stock land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on regards the 4,915.75 of agricultural land. Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA 6657. November 21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARCs revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita to third parties. TITLE: LAUREL VS. GARCIA

when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined; and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply. In the instant case, none of the above elements exists. Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, which is located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparations for damage done by the latter to the former during the war. Petitioner argues that under Philippine Law, the subject property is property of public dominion. As such, it is outside the commerce of men. Therefore, it cannot be alienated. The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on Respondents aver that Japanese Law, and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit that the principle of lex situs applies. ISSUES: 1. 2. RULING: 1. The answer is in the affirmative. Whether or not the subject property cannot be alienated. Whether or not Philippine Law applies to the case at bar. the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be CITATION: G.R. No. 92013. July 25, 1990 transferred or conveyed after 10 years from the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award (CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP. 6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered. The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control over the subject lands]given the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is just 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101 shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85 shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by the FWBs to acquire control over HLI. FACTS:

Under Philippine Law, there can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do. As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It cannot be alienated. 2. The answer is in the affirmative.

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only