I. Mala Prohibita / Mala in Se GR No. 4963 The United States vs.

Go Chico September 15, 1909 Gibbs and Gale for appellant Moreland, J. (Arellano, C. J., Torres, and Carson, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1) Appellant Go Chico is charged in violation of Sec. 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission that on August 4, 1908, in the City of Manila, the appellant displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store, No. 89 Calle Rosario, a number of medallions in the form of a small button depicting the image of Emilio Aguinaldo, and a flag or banner used during the Philippine insurrection against the United States. 2) Appellant is sentenced to pay a fine of P500 and subsidiary imprisonment until such time the fine should be paid. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the appellant is guilty of violating Sec. 1 Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission 2) Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted based on two propositions he has presented - The appellant insists his acquittal upon two propositions: a) That before conviction must be done, a criminal intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt; b) That the prohibition of the law is against the use of identical banners actually used during the insurrection RULING: 1) Yes, appellant Go Chico is guilty of violating the statute by displaying the medallions depicting the image of Emilio Aguinaldo and the flag used during the insurrection the act itself (of displaying these prohibited items), constitute the crime. 2) a) The Supreme Court held that it is not necessary for the appellant to have acted with intent to have committed a crime, as the case at bar is an example of malum prohibitum - the act alone (of displaying the medallions), irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime. Since Sec. 1 of Act 1696 was a statute, establishing criminal intent is immaterial. Statutory offenses committed against a statute prohibiting the perpetration of certain acts, regardless of intent. b) The statute was plainly worded, and could not have possibly included all the specific details on the prohibited items. The statute clearly forbids the display A flag related to the insurrection (any type of flag related to the insurrection), not just THE flag. - The Act means what it says. Nothing is left to the interpretation. - When the statute plainly forbids an act to be done, and it is done by some person, the law implies conclusively the guilty intent, although the offender was honestly mistaken as to the meaning of the law he violates. - The accused did not consciously intend to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and the act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself intent and all. The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable. The act is the crime. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower court.

GR No. 109250 People of the Philippines vs Noriel Lacerna and Marlon Lacerna September 5, 1997 Marlon Lacerna appellant Panganiban, J. (Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Melo, and Francisco, JJ., concur.) FACTS: 1) Appellant Marlon Lacerna is charged in violation of Sec. 4, Article II of RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, in relation to Sec. 21, Article IV as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1675, that on September 12, 1992 in the City of Manila, the said accused, not being authorized by law to sell, deliver, or give away to another or distribute any prohibited drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and jointly sell, deliver or give away to another 18 blocks (about 18.235 kilos) of marijuana, which is a prohibited drug. 2) Judgment by the trial court states that: I. The guilt of the accused Marlon Lacerna having been established beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of violation of Section 4 of RA 6425, as amended, he is found guilty of the same, sentencing him to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000. With costs. II. The guilt for the crime charged of accused Noriel Lacerna not having been established beyond reasonable doubt he is hereby ACQUITTED. The warden of the Manila City Jail is ordered to release his person, unless held on other charges. 3) The trial court ruled that appellant could not be convicted of delivering prohibited drugs because the Information did not allege that he knowingly delivered marijuana. Neither could he be convicted of transporting or dispatching in transit such prohibited drugs because these acts were not alleged in the Information. The trial court mused further that appellant could not be convicted of selling marijuana because the elements constituting this crime were not proven. However, the information charged appellant with the act of giving away to another prohibited drugs that, constituted the act as akin to transporting prohibited drugs, which is a malum prohibitum under the specified RA 6425. 4) Since appellant did not deny that he did give away the bag containing the prohibited drug to co-accused Noriel Lacerna who was seated at the back of taxi from which they were located, the trial court found the appellant guilty of violating Sec. 4 RA 6425, as charged for giving away to another the marijuana ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the trial court erred in making a sweeping statement that the act of giving away to another() is not defined under R.A. 6425 specifically requiring knowledge what intent one (sic) is passing is a dangerous drug, as contradistinguished from the term deliver; where knowledge is required. Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellant for the act of giving away to another, since a distinction can be made between the act of delivery (where knowledge is required) and giving away (where the absence of criminal intent or knowledge that said object being given away contains prohibited substances) 2) Whether or not the trial court erred in not giving credence to the assertion of accused-appellant that he had no knowledge that what were inside the plastic bag given to him by his uncle were marijuana leaves. Whether or not the lower court erred in accepting the accuseds statement that he had no knowledge of the contents of the plastic bag.

3) Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the appellant despite failure to establish his intent to violate the statute, or guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 4) * Whether or not the appellants right against warrantless search and seizure was violated. Whether or not the appellant was subjected to a warrantless search and seizure, thereby rendering the evidence derived as inadmissible, based on the fruit of the poisonous tree reasoning. 5) * Whether or not the trial court was correct in convicting the appellant for giving away to another 18 blocks of marijuana. Whether or not the lower court was correct in convicting the appellant based on their interpretation of giving away as stated in the RA. 6) * Whether or not the appellant can be held guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs.

RULING: 1) No, the appellants right against warrantless search and seizure was not violated, as he explicitly gave his approval to be subjected to a physical search when he gave his verbal consent to the policemans request to do a physical search, knowing in his mind that he has nothing to hide (as he also stated in his statement). Nonetheless, we hold that appellant and his baggage were validly searched, not because he was caught in flagrante delicto, but because he freely consented to the search. It was his consent that validated the search, serving as the waiver, which provides an exception to the rule against warrantless searches. 2) No, the trial court was incorrect in convicting the appellant for giving away to another 18 blocks of marijuana, based on their literal interpretation. According to the trial court, the appellant is guilty of giving away to another when he literally handed over the plastic bag to Noriel, who is seated in the backseat. Further, adopting the trial courts interpretation would lead to absurd conclusions. Following the trial courts line of reasoning, Noriel should have been held liable for the same crime when he gave the plastic bag to PO3 Valenzuela for the latters inspection. According to the Supreme Court, giving away to another is to be interpreted as an act short of a sale which involves no consideration, where ownership is transferred. 3) Yes, the appellant can be clearly held guilty of illegal possession of prohibited drugs, under Section 8 of RA 6425. The elements of illegal possession are as follows: (a) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (b) such possession is not authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug. The mere act of possessing the prohibited drug is a criminal violation punishable under RA 6425, as, it is well-settled that criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita. Hence, the Supreme Court modified the decision of the lower court. (Appellant is to be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited drugs under Section 8 or RA 6425, and is sentenced to eight (8) years minimum to twelve (12) years maximum, and is ordered to pay a fine of Php 12,000.)

II. Definition of a Felony Article 3, Revised Penal Code Article 3. Definitions. Felonies (delitos, or serious/criminal offense) are acts and omissions punishable by law. Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo, or fraud), but also by means of fault (culpa, or blame). There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent and there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. The elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault. (People vs Gonzales, GR No. 80762) [READ MORE ON BOOK. ADD MORE INFO HERE]

GR No. 80762 People of the Philippines vs Gonzales March 19, 1990 Custodio Gonzales, Sr. appellant Sarmiento, J. (Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.) FACTS: 1) On October 31, 1984, appellant Custodio Gonzales Sr. and five others are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt under Art 248 of the Revised Penal Code by the RTC of Iloilo Branch 38, for the murder of Lloyd Peacerrada on February 21, 1981. - On February 21, 1981, in the municipality of Ajuy, Iloilo, appellant along with co-accused Augusto Gonzales (son), Fausta Lanida-Gonzales (daughter-in-law), Custodio Gonzales Jr. (son), Nerio Gonzales (son), and Rogelio Lanida (brother of Fausta), armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, inflicted upon the victim multiple wounds on different parts of the body which caused the immediate death of said victim. 2) The lower court sentenced all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida (still at-large), to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of Php40,000, plus moral damages in the sum of Php14,000 and to pay the costs." 3) All accused filed a notice of appeal on the trial courts decision, but before the Court of Appeals could render judgment, all appellants except Custodio Gonzales Sr., withdrew their appeals and chose instead to pursue applications for parole before the Department of Justice. 4) On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on Custodio, Sr.s appeal, modifying the former decision of the RTC from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the heirs in the amount of Php30,000. 5) Upon certification from the Court of Appeals, the case is elevated to the Supreme Court for final review ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the lower court erred in convicting appellant Custodio Gonzales, Sr. by basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone eyewitness, and in not considering his alibi as defense. 2) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in its decision to raise the punishment from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua for the appellant. RULING: 1) Yes, the lower court erred in convicting appellant Custodio Gonzales, Sr. by basis of the eyewitness account of the Jose Huntoria. According to the Supreme Court, with the investigation done by the police authorities were sloppy; the ambiguity of the medical evidence presented by the examining medical officer posing the possibility that the killing could have been done by only one, or by two or more bladed instruments; and the admission of Fausta Gonzales to be solely responsible for the killing, if the lower courts ruling is to be sustained, then the courts will have to heavily rely on eyewitness Huntoria, whose testimony has failed to impute a definite and specific act committed or contributed by the appellant.

2) Yes, the Court of Appeals erred in its decision to raise the punishment from reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. According to the Supreme Court, there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him (accomplice) by inducement, under Paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or (accessory) by indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3. Basing on Huntorias testimony, who cannot for certain assert what specific act the appellant has performed to participate in the murder, the case does not meet the elements of Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code. The victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of the total of sixteen inflicted, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound, which could have or have not been the appellant. The Supreme Court also scrutinized Huntorias credibility as witnesshe only came out to testify after 8 months when all the accused, except Fausta and Augusto Gonzales, were still not named (citing fear for his life when he knew the identity of the killers), and is not a disinterested party (the victim was his landlord). As such, the Supreme Court finds that the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Hence, the Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals, and acquitted the appellant.

III. Power to Define and Punish Crimes GR No. 17584 People of the Philippines vs Gregorio Santiago March 8, 1922 L. Porter Hamilton for appellant Romualdez, J. (Araullo, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1) Appellant Gregorio Santiago is charged with homicide by reckless negligence for running over with the automobile he was driving a 7-year old boy, Porfirio Parondo, who was killed at that instant. Appellant was sentenced to suffer 1 year and 1 day of prison correccional, and pay the costs of the trial. According to the Supreme Court, there is no shade of doubt about these facts, that the appellant while driving his vehicle along a narrow space between a wagon standing on one side and a heap of stones on the other side where the victim Parondo was standing, did not proceed with vigilant care under the circumstances an ordinary prudent man would take in order to avoid possible accidents. 2) Not agreeing with the sentence, the appellant goes to the Supreme Court and presents his appeal, citing four errors committed by the lower court. 2.1. The trial court erred in not taking judicial notice of the fact that the appellant was being prosecuted in conformity with Act No. 2886 of the Philippine Legislature and that the Act is unconstitutional and gave no jurisdiction in this case. 2.2. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint after the presentation of the evidence in the case, if not before, for the reason that said Act No. 2886 is unconstitutional and the proceedings had in the case under the provisions of the Act constitute a prosecution of appellant without due process of law. 2.3. The court a quo erred in not finding that it lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused and over the subject- matter of the complaint. 2.4. The trial court erred in finding the appellant guilty of the crime charged and in sentencing him to one year and one day of prison correccional and to the payment of costs. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Act No. 2886, under which the complaint has been made, is valid and constitutional. 2) Whether or not the lower court lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the complaint. RULING: 1) Yes, Act No. 2886, which amended General Order 58 and under which the decision has been made, is valid and constitutional. According to the Supreme Court, no proof is required to demonstrate that the present Legislature had the power to enact and amend laws. It has the power to legislate on criminal matters which is very evident from the wording of section 7 of the Jones Law. Further, the Supreme Court states that the legislative authority herein provided shall have power, when not inconsistent with this Act, by due enactment to amend, alter, modify, or repeal any law, civil or criminal, continued in force by this Act as it may from time to time see fit. Also, the (US) Congress has tacitly approved Act No. 2886, when it remained silent after the Act has been submitted to amend General Order 58 (silence considered as an act of approval).

2) No, the lower court did not lack jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the complaint, as although the political status of the country is yet undetermined and is in a transitory status, it is undeniable that the present government of the Philippines, created by the Congress of the United States, is autonomous, and that this autonomy also includes the ability to make judicial actions, and the right to prosecute in court in its own name whomsoever violates within its territory the penal laws in force. Furthermore, the Legislature has the power to prescribe the form of the complaint so long that the constitutional rights of the accused are not violatedunder the Constitution of the United States and by like provisions in the constitutions of the various states, the accused is entitled to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, which has been done in the case at bar. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, and the appellant is further sentenced to accessory penalties as prescribed in Article 61 of the Penal Code (to indemnify the family of the deceased with the sum of Php1,000, as well as pay the trial costs.) [The Supreme Court rules that the said Act upon which the complaint does not violate any constitutional provisions, and that the lower court did not commit any of the errors presented by the appellant.]

IV. Bill of Attainder / Ex Post Facto Law Article III, Section 22 (The Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. An ex post facto law (literally, after the fact) is defined as law that operates retroactively to: 1) Make criminal and punishable an innocent act done before the passage of the law, 2) Aggravate a criminal act, or make it greater than when it was committed, 3) Change the punishment and inflict a greater punishment to a criminal act than what the law specified at the time it was committed, 4) Alter the legal rules of evidence and allow different or less testimony than what the law required at the time the criminal act was committed in order to convict the offender, 5) Assume to regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in effect impose penalty or deprivation of a right which was previously lawful, 6) Deprive lawful protection to a person accused of a crime (such as protection of former conviction or acquittal, or proclamation of amnesty). [The first four of the enumeration were provided in Mekin vs. Wolfe, while the last two were added in In re: Kay Villegas Kami, Inc.] In general, criminal laws cannot be given retroactive effect. But if it is favorable to the accused, it should be given retroactive effect. (See Article 22 of Revised Penal Code) Applying the constitutional provision under Article III Section 22 of the 1987 Constitution, Supreme Court of the Philippines has held that the prohibition applies only to criminal legislation that affects the substantial rights of the accused. It also applies to criminal procedural law prejudicial to a person accused of a crime. The prohibition against the passage of an ex post facto law, expressed in the legal maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege (there is no crime, where there is no law punishing it), is embodied in Article 21 of the Revised Penal Code, which states that: "No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission." A bill of attainder is a defined as a legislative act that inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment (penal or otherwise), and the lack of judicial trial. This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to be imposed, is the most essential.

GR No. L-46228 People of the Philippines vs Hon. Rolando R. Villaraza (City Judge of CDO) and Caesar Puerto January 17, 1978 Francisco P. Rabanes, Edgardo Y. Raagas, and Casiano A. Gamotin for petitioners Aquino, J. (Fernando, Barredo, Antonio, and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur) FACTS: 1) Respondent Caesar Puerto is charged with estafa (swindling) on December 3, 1975 under Art 315 of the Revised Penal Code, for issuing two bouncing checks for the total sum of Php4966.63 on October 16, 1974. 2) Respondent City Trial Court Judge Rolando Villaraza, noting that the accused had waived his second stage of preliminary investigation, issued an order dated March 31, 1976 for the elevation of the case to the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan De Oro City Branch 8. 3) The Court of First Instance, upon petition of the prosecution, issued an order dated February 3, 1977 to return the case to the city court. While the case falls within the concurrent jurisdiction of both courts, it was the city court that first took cognizance of the case and should therefore try it. 4) On April 21, 1977, respondent Judge Villaraza, in disagreement with the Court of First Instances ruling, issued another order directing its re-elevation, arguing that the Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction over the case, as it is punishable by prision mayor medium, under Presidential Decree No. 818 which took effect on October 22, 1975 and which amended article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. 5) In response to the Judge Villarazas order, the Office of the City Fiscal of Cagayan De Oro City filed a petition for certiorari dated May 27, 1977 in the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the City Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro has jurisdiction over the estafa case at bar, and should therefore try it. 2) Whether or not City Trial Court Judge Villaraza erred in elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, arguing that the estafa case at bar is punishable with prision mayor medium, by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 818 (which took effect on October 22, 1975) under amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. RULING: 1) Yes, the City Trial Court of Cagayan De Oro has original jurisdiction over the case because the penultimate paragraph or Section 87 of the Judiciary Law, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2613 and 3828, provides that "judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense committed within their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by law does not exceed prision correccional, or imprisonment for not more than six years, or fine not exceeding six thousand pesos or both." 2) Yes, City Trial Court Judge Villaraza erred in the elevating the case to the Court of First Instance, citing Presidential Decree No. 818 which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code thereby increasing the penalty of estafa to prision mayor medium from previous punishment of prision correccional. The accused Caesar Puerto commited the act of estafa (swindling) on October 16, 1974, while the amended law only applies

to similar cases committed on or after October 22, 1975. The Supreme Court explicitly stated that to apply this amended law retroactively, making it an ex post facto law, is prohibited by Articles 21 and 22 of the Revised Penal Code, and section 12, Article IV of the Constitution (1973). [*See NOTES below] Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the order of the Court of First Instance to return the case to the City Trial Court for trial, with the City Trial Court judges orders set aside.

NOTES: Revised Penal Code Title Three - PENALTIES, Chapter One - PENALTIES IN GENERAL Article 21. Penalties that may be imposed. - No felony shall be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission. Article 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal Laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. Constitution of the Philippines (1973) Article IV, Section 12. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

V. Characteristics of Criminal Law A) Prospective GR No. L-41423 People of the Philippines vs Crisanto Tamayo March 19, 1935 Juan Amor and Simeon J. Tolentino for appellant Hull, J. (Avancea, C.J., Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Vickers, Imperial, Butte, Goddard, and Diaz, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1) Appellant Crisanto Tamayo is charged in violation of Section 2 of Municipal Order 5, series of 1932 of the municipality of Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. 2) Upon appeal to the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, appellant was convicted and fined. From that decision the appeal was brought to the Supreme Court. 3) While the appeal was pending, the municipal council repealed Section 2 of Municipal Order 5, as approved by the provincial board, which made the act complained of, instead of being a violation of municipal ordinances, legal in the municipality. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the appellants move for the dismissal of the action against him on account of the repeal is valid. RULING: 1) Yes, the appellants move for dismissal of the action against him on account of the repeal of Section 2 of Municipal Order of the municipality is valid. As per Spanish doctrine, upon which the Supreme Court conforms, when an offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot be had. As the repeal of Section 2 of the Municipal Order was absolute, and not a reenactment and repeal by implication nor was there any saving clause, such conduct formerly denounced is no longer deemed criminal, it would be illogical for the court to attempt to sentence appellant for an offense that no longer exists. Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the proceedings against the appellant. NOTES: Different effects of repeal of penal law: 1) If repeal makes the penalty lighter in the new law, the new law shall be applied, except when the offender is a habitual delinquent or when the new law is made not applicable to pending action or existing causes of action. 2) If the new law imposes a heavier penalty, the law in force at the time of the commission of the offense shall be applied. (Prohibition of ex post facto law) 3) If the new law totally repeals the existing law so that the act, which was penalized under the old law, is no longer punishable, the crime is obliterated.

B. General Republic Act No. 386 June 18, 1949 Civil Code of the Philippines Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations. (8a) [READ MORE ON BOOK. ADD MORE INFO HERE]

GR No. 448 The United States vs Philip K. Sweet April 17, 1903 Theopile B. Steele for appellant Ladd, J. (Arellano, C.J., Torres, Cooper, Willard and Mapa, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1) Appellant Philip K. Sweet is convicted under article 558, No. 1 of the Penal Code, in accordance with General Order No. 58, section 29, for striking complainant Marcelino San Pedro several times with a whip, causing complainant to bleed but not severely injured so as to incapacitate him from working or to necessitate medical assistance. 2) Original complaint was for lesions menos graves under article 418 of the Code, but it was determined that it falls within article 588, No. 1, which punishes as a misdemeanor the infliction of injuries which do not prevent the person injured from devoting himself to his customary labors, and do not require medical attendance. 3) The lower court imposed a sentence of 15 days of arresto and reprension on the appellant. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the lower court was correct in imposing a sentence of 15 days of arresto and reprension on the appellant under article 558, No. 1 of the Penal Code. 2) * Whether or not the appellant is under jurisdiction of the Philippine courts and can be convicted of the offense based on Article 558, No. 1 of the Penal Code. RULING: 1) Yes, the lower court was correct in imposing the sentence of 15 days of arresto and reprension under article 558, No. 1 of the Penal Code on the appellant. According to the Supreme Court, in the application of penalties in cases of misdemeanor, the discretion of the court is not controlled by the rules of the Code as to aggravating and extenuating circumstances. (Art. 605.) In this case, that discretion was properly exercised, the sentence being fifteen days of arresto and reprension, the maximum of the penalty fixed by law for the offense. 2) * Yes, the appellant can be convicted of the offense based on Article 558, No 1. of the Penal Code, as he is under jurisdiction of the Philippine courts, due to his connection with the Police Department in the City of Manila under the Provost-Marshal-General as Chief of Secret Service Bureau. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts decision, and returns the case to the lower court for execution of judgment.

C. Territorial Act No. 3815 December 8, 1930 Revised Penal Code DATE OF EFFECTIVENESS AND APPLICATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THIS CODE Article 2. Application of its provisions. Except as provided in the treaties and laws of preferential application, the provisions of this Code shall be enforced not only within the Philippine Archipelago, including its atmosphere, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also outside of its jurisdiction, against those who: 1. Should commit an offense while on a Philippine ship or airship; 2. Should forge or counterfeit any coin or currency note of the Philippine Islands or obligations and securities issued by the Government of the Philippine Islands; 3. Should be liable for acts connected with the introduction into these islands of the obligations and securities mentioned in the presiding number; 4. While being public officers or employees, should commit an offense in the exercise of their functions; or 5. Should commit any of the crimes against national security and the law of nations, defined in Title One of Book Two of this Code.

VI. Construction of Penal Laws GR No. L-12262 The United States vs Antonio Abad Santos February 10, 1917 Quirino Abad Santos for appellant Moreland, J. (Arellano, C. J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur; Carson and Trent, JJ., dissent) FACTS: 1) The appellant Antonio Abad Santos, owner of a printing establishment, is accused of violating the Internal Revenue Law, and is convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of Php10. 2) Sec. 185 of Act No. 2339 (or section 2727 of the Administrative Code) states that a person who violates any provision of the Internal Revenue Law or any lawful regulation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue made in conformity with the same, for which delinquency no specific penalty is provided by law, shall be punished by a fine of not more than three hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. 3) The appellant, owner of a printing establishment called The Excelsior, required by law to keep a book, violated the provisions of said regulation by failure to make any entry for the 5th day of January, 1915, indicating whether any business was done on that day or not. 4) The appellant employed a bookkeeper who had complete charge of putting entries in the book, and who failed to make the required entry on the specified date, unknown to the appellant. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not the court erred in the conviction of the appellant since the omission punishable by law was committed by the employed bookkeeper and not by appellant, and of which the appellant had no knowledge of the omission thereof. RULING: 1) Yes, the lower court erred in convicting the appellant, as the Supreme Court believes that a person should not be held criminally liable for the acts of another done without the persons knowledge or consent, unless the law clearly so provides. Based on facts, the Supreme Court believes that no connection between the accused and the omission of the bookkeeper is shown or claimed, they believe that the appellant had no knowledge of the omission, and that he did not direct or connive with the bookkeeper in the omission. Courts should not hold one person criminally responsible for the acts of another, committed without his knowledge or consent, unless there is a statute requiring it, written in plain terms. Criminal statutes are to be strictly construed. No person should be brought within terms that are not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by the statute. Hence, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction and ordered the acquittal of the accused.

GR No. 151876 People of the Philippines vs. Fernando L. Dimagiba June 21, 2005 Panganiban, J. (Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, and Garcia, JJ., concur) FACTS: 1) Respondent Fernando Dimagiba is charged in violation of BP 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing to petitioner Susan Go 13 checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates were dishonored for the reason of account closed. 2) Respondent is sentenced by the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court (Cities) or MTCC Branch 4 the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count (13 counts), and indemnification the offended party with the amount of Php1,295,000 with legal interest per annum commencing from 1996, and to pay attorneys fees of P15000, and to pay for the costs of the trial. 3) Respondent filed an appeal, raffled to RTC Branch 4 of Baguio City, who denied the appeal sustained the MTCCs decision. Since no further appeal to the Court of Appeals was issued, on February 1, 2001, the RTC issued a Certificate of Finality of the Decision, and on February 14, 2001, issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba and a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability. 4) Respondent filed for a Motion for Reconsideration for recall of the Order for Arrest and the modification of the final Decision on February 27, 2001, arguing that the penalty imposed should be fine without imprisonment only. Respondent reiterated his arguments in a subsequent Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution on February 28, 2001. On August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motions and ordered the arrest of respondent. 5) On October 9, 2001, the Respondent, now serving time, filed with the RTC a petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus, using the same arguments he raised in the previous Motions. The Petition was raffled to RTC Branch 5 of Baguio City, who had the hearing on October 10, 2001. RTC Branch 5 issued an Order for the immediate release of Respondent from confinement, and required him to pay a fine of Php100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. 6) On October 11, 2001, RTC Branch 5 released a subsequent order justifying their decision by invoking Vaca vs. Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court Admin. Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000. In their interpretation, RTC Branch 5 argued that SC-AC No. 12-2000 allegedly requires only the imposition of a fine instead of imprisonment for BP 22 violations if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. Such rules should be retroactively applied to respondent, since it is favorable for the accused (pro reo). RTC Branch 5 noted that the Respondent was 1) a first time offender, and that his imprisonment would lead to the displacement of at least 200 workers employed under his care; and 2) the civil liability of the case had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties (sale of a Toyota Land Cruiser and two parcels of land). 7) On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Susan Go filed for a Motion for Reconsideration of RTC Branch 5s Orders, which was denied on January 18, 2002. Petitioner filed a subsequent Petition for Review to the Supreme Court, citing Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (pure questions of law).

ISSUES: 1) Whether or not RTC Branch 5 erred in amending the final and conclusive decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence Mittimus, dated September 28, 2001, and in ordering the release of Respondent from confinement in jail for service of his sentence under the final and conclusive judgment. 2) Whether or not the Petition for Habeas Corpus is of merit as Respondent was not entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases, and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000, and whether or not RTC Branch 5 validly granted the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 3) Whether or not RTC Branch 5 erred in imposing the fine of Php100,000 on Respondent, instead of one million and two hundred ninety five thousand pesos (P1,295,000.00) or up to double the said amount (or Php2,590,000), based on its interpretation of SC-AC No. 12-2000. 4) Whether or not RTC Branch 5 Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in hearing and deciding Respondents Petition for Habeas Corpus. RULING: 1) Yes, RTC Branch 5 erred in amending the final and conclusive decision of the MTCC (anchored on the Vaca case and SC-AC No. 12-2000, incorrectly interpreted), and in ordering the release of the Respondent based on his Petition for the Writ of Habeas Corpus (which the Supreme Court further argues should not have been granted in the case at bar). 2) No, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus has no merit, and RTC Branch 5 erred in granting it, as the writ of habeas corpus only applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty, and if availed of as a post-conviction remedy, the following circumstances should have been met: (1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess. The Supreme Court noted that the Respondents Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the (incorrect interpretation) of the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine only, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ. The Supreme Court also noted that the Respondent appears to have gone forum shopping, and has tried (and misused) the habeas corpus argument as a last resort to reopen a case that had already been judged final and executory. 3) Yes, RTC Branch 5 erred in imposing the fine of Php100,000 only in lieu of imprisonment, and not the penalties as originally stated in BP 22. According to the Supreme Court, SC-AC No. 12-2000 is not a penal law, therefore it does not have a retroactive effect and cannot be cited to modify final conviction. SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of preference in imposing penalties for violations of BP 22, and does not delete the other alternative penalties for BP 22, including the penalty of imprisonment. The penalties that can be imposed under BP 22 are as follows: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court.

4) Yes, RTC Branch 5 committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in hearing and deciding Respondents Petition for Habeas Corpus, because, 1) as already explained, SC-AC No. 12-2000 is not a penal law, thus it cannot be applied retroactivelyit merely lays down a rule of preference, or serves only as a guideline for trial courts), in which penalties to impose; and 2) the competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision against the accused (which in this case is MTCC Branch 4). MTCCs decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. According to the Supreme Court, RTC Branch 5 did not have jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment for the sake of granting a writ of habeas corpus, as 1) the penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law; 2) the conviction subsequently sustained by RTC Branch 4 upon Respondents appeal; and 3) the Decision has already attained finality. Hence, the Supreme Court granted the Petition, nullified the Orders of RTC Branch 5, and denied the Respondents petition for writ of Habeas Corpus. Case is remanded to MTCC for arrest of Respondent and completion of sentence.

VII. History of Act No. 3815 GR No. L-9527 The United States vs Jose Tamporong, Et Al. August 23, 1915 Appellants on their own behalf Trent, J. (Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ., Araullo, J., concur) FACTS: 1) Defendants Tamporong et al. were caught violating Baguio City Ordinance No. 35 prohibiting the playing of a game of chance called monte 2) Justice of the Peace of Baguio (gobernadorcillo/ city court) and Court of First Instance both convicted the defendants with the same charge 3) Case was elevated to the Supreme Court because the validity of Ordinance No. 35 was questioned 4) In tackling the question, the history of penal laws in the Philippines was looked into ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Ordinance No. 35 is valid. 2) Whether or not the Supreme Court required is by law to examine the evidence to determine guilt or innocence of the defendants. RULING: 1) Affirmative, as in the case of United States v. Joson 2) No. To explain this, the history of penal laws and criminal procedure in the Philippines was looked into. In execution of the royal order dated December 17, 1887, the Penal Code and Provisional Law of Criminal Procedure used in Spain were applied to the Philippines

Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts decision, and returns the case to the lower court for execution of judgment.