Hse Improving Health and Safety

Health & Safety Executive
HSE
Improving health and safety in construction Phase 1: Data collection, review and structuring
Prepared by BOMEL Limited on behalf of BOMEL Consortium for the Health and Safety Executive
CONTRACT RESEARCH REPORT
387/2001
Health & Safety Executive
HSE
Improving health and safety in construction Phase 1: Data collection, review and structuring
BOMEL Limited on behalf of BOMEL Consortium Ledger House Forest Green Road Fifield, Maidenhead Berkshire SL6 2NR United Kingdom
This report covers work undertaken by BOMEL Ltd on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), directed towards improving health and safety in construction. The Phase 1 scope has covered two principal activities:
G
Collecting and reviewing data in support of RIDDOR, to help understand causal factors underlying construction accidents; and Structuring the information on accident causation using an Influence Network to provide a basis for quantifying risk and the benefits of improvement measures.
The report concentrates on falls from height as the principal source of construction fatalities and takes account of the campaign Turning concern into Action, the theme of the Construction Summit in February 2001. The report makes recommendations on data collection and analysis, and strategies for improving health and safety. This report and the work it describes was funded by (HSE). Its contents, including any opinions and/or conclusions expressed, are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reflect HSE policy.
HSE BOOKS
Crown copyright 2001 Applications for reproduction should be made in writing to: Copyright Unit, Her Majestys Stationery Office, St Clements House, 2-16 Colegate, Norwich NR3 1BQ First published 2001 ISBN 0 7176 2140 5 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise) without the prior written permission of the copyright owner.
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
CONTENTS Page No EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 2 3 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND DESCRIPTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY HSE REFERENCE DATA 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 4 RIDDOR Reporting Headline Statistics for Construction From RIDDOR Employment Status Inferences From RIDDOR Accident Types in RIDDOR Trends in Recent RIDDOR Statistics 0.5 1.1 2.1 3.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.6 4.1 4.1 4.2 4.10 4.37 4.39 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 6.1 6.1 6.2 7.1 7.1 7.2 7.8
DATA ANALYSIS 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 Background Approach Results Discussion Conclusions
DATA SOURCES OF ACCIDENTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 5.1 5.2 5.3 Categories of Data Influences on Construction Safety Accident Levels and Profiles
CONSTRUCTION RISK PROFILE 6.1 6.2 Data Findings Data Application
INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE A MODEL 7.1 7.2 7.3 Background Influence Network Methodology Adapting the Influence Network for Construction Safety
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
HSE Task Number B\0087
Page 0.1 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
CONTENTS CONTINUED Page No 8 INFLUENCE NETWORK WORKSHOP 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9 9 Focus Attendees, Conduct, Process Customisation and Amplification of Influence Definitions and Influence Rating Relative Weighting of Influences Calculation of Influence Network Index, Uncertainty and Sensitivity Translation of Influence Network Index to Risk Measure Translation of Risk Reduction Targets to Influence Network Index Assessing Risk Control Effectiveness Supporting Information 8.24 8.26 8.27 8.37 9.1 9.1 9.1 9.9 9.12 9.14 10.1 11.1 12.1 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.2 8.16 8.23
INFLUENCE NETWORK APPLICATION CASE STUDIES 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 Preamble BP Sunbury Central London Site Small Builder Summit Action Plans
10 11 12
DISCUSSION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REFERENCES
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.2 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
CONTENTS CONTINUED Page No APPENDIX A INFLUENCE NETWORK BRIEFING NOTE INCLUDING GENERIC INFLUENCE DEFINITIONS APPENDIX B SUMMARY OF INFLUENCE DEFINITIONS, SCALES, WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS AND RATING OF CURRENT PERFORMANCE APPENDIX C BASE CASE CALCULATION OF INFLUENCE NETWORK INDEX APPENDIX D APPLICATION OF THE INFLUENCE NETWORK FOR THE SCENARIO OF SLIPS AND TRIPS OFFSHORE
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.3 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.4 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
IMPROVING HEALTH AND SAFETY IN CONSTRUCTION PHASE 1 DATA COLLECTION, REVIEW AND STRUCTURING
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction and Scope This report covers work undertaken by BOMEL Ltd on behalf of the Health and Safety Executive, directed towards improving health and safety in construction. The Phase 1 scope has covered two principal activities: Collecting and reviewing data in support of RIDDOR, to help understand causal factors underlying construction accidents; and Structuring the information on accident causation using an Influence Network to provide a basis for quantifying risk and the benefits of improvement measures. As the work progressed through late 2000 and early 2001, HSE and industry attentions focused on the Construction Summit and the campaign Turning concern into Action. In addition, preliminary data became available for the current year indicating an upturn of some 60% in the incidence rate of construction fatalities. As a consequence the data analysis activities were focused on understanding the reasons for the trend and falls from height were studied particularly as the principal source of construction fatalities. Work to support HSE and DETR was undertaken to test a series of hypotheses concerning the current crisis and the potential for a related questionnaire was examined. Finally BOMEL undertook an additional exercise to relate the study findings to the action plans outlined at the Summit and, conversely, to comment on the Summit proposals in light of the project conclusions. The Construction Industry It is recognised that construction is a challenging regime in which to manage health and safety. It takes place in an inherently hazardous environment with direct exposure to height, forces, power etc; the conditions are constantly changing both physically and in relation to the parties involved; it embraces an enormous breadth of activities, project types and sizes of enterprise; it suffers a macho culture borne of a rugged history; it runs with low margins and incessant pressure on schedule and cost; and it is already subject to industry wide initiatives to improve productivity etc.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.5 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
The work has confirmed that the UK safety record in construction is considerably better than other European countries but in all cases construction is a high risk sector. Internationally it can be seen that, as in the UK, critical activities are working at height or in proximity to heavy plant. Incident data collected are broadly similar, focusing on factual data (e.g. age) without a clear context (e.g. age profile of workforce) or insight to potential underlying causes (e.g. years of experience in job). The review also showed that the types of fatal accidents occurring over decades in the UK have broadly been similar, albeit with a reducing incidence rate. The statistics, however, do not capture the success of new measures, for example, in relation to high falls which could have had more severe consequences had a personal fall arrest system not been used. On this initial view, it might be argued that the UK construction industry does not suddenly present a particular cause for concern in a wider context. However, almost all construction accidents are foreseeable but are not foreseen by those undertaking the task. It is therefore beholden on a nation with a mature system of health and safety legislation to provide the framework and support systems necessary to bring the sector to the standards more generally accepted for the workforce. This then is the focus of the present study. At the Summit the politicians laid out the challenge to redefine the modern construction industry. Importantly its productivity is being held back to a degree by a skills shortage, not as much to do with training as the inability to attract trainees and undergraduates to the construction sector. The modern world is one which cocoons individuals and develops expectations that the system will care for the individual. In that context a rugged, uncomfortable and hazardous occupation is not attractive or necessary. It may be that the recognition needed to drive health and safety improvements is the same respect for people to secure the industrys economic prosperity. Data Collection and Analysis The data collection exercise identified a number of studies drawing on expert judgement from within the industry and occupational psychology to identify deficiencies which lead to accidents. These studies give a reasonably consistent view of problems in the industry such as inadequate planning, insufficient allowance for safety, undue pressure on schedule (cost), need for more occupational training, uninformed clients etc etc. Few are able to give an indication of the significance of the factors or suggest how things might be improved and, if so, what the impact would be. The collection of data was undertaken to try and elicit underlying causes or areas of specific concern for construction health and safety. The principal data source is the RIDDOR reporting scheme which applies across all UK industry. Its strength is that it provides a balanced national perspective on the types of accidents occurring; its weakness
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.6 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
is it provides little information reflecting a particular industry sector. However, it is quite typical of national schemes in other countries. In order to have a meaningful interpretation of the numbers of accidents recorded, it is essential to have population statistics, particularly for an industry such as construction where the volume and nature of work changes rapidly and the proportions of self-employed and casual labour are significant and ever changing with procurement trends, and taxation and employment legislation. Although RIDDOR data are combined with statistics from the Office of National Statistics for the headline incidence rates, sector and trade specific data are necessary to make a more detailed analysis on the basis of which actions can be targeted. In the present study considerable effort was devoted to translating the accident data into an Access relational database in which conditional queries could be run and to combine this with population data for the construction industry from DETR. The two systems are not directly comparable; some grouping of trades is necessary and there is a mismatch overall in the incidence rate depending whether ONS or DETR reference data are used. The DETR data also lack a breakdown of the self-employed by trade an issue of potentially considerable importance in this sector. Similarly it appears that ONS inferences from the labour force survey in relation to injury reporting levels may be overstating the industrys record, on account of inappropriate reference statistics year on year. Despite these limitations, comparisons on a consistent basis were illuminating and demonstrated the insights to be gained from the existing data. Taking fatal falls from height as the principal example, it could be shown that falls through fragile roofs and falls from scaffold by roofers and scaffolders dominate the risk. For the subset of fatal falls from height it could be seen that the majority of accidents occur on small sites and within small companies. There is no specific association with time of day, age or geographic region. As noted previously, the RIDDOR records give statutory reportable facts and little analytical insight to the causes. HSE inspectors, however, in investigating incidents assign a broad categorisation of cause, such as, failure to control risk, inadequate supervision etc. Some criticism has been levelled that the groupings are too generic to be instructive, but this study has backed off from that view. The approach enables system failings to be compared across accident types whereas a more detailed assessment would become task specific. For example, the predominance of unsafe transient work, and failure to control risk as common causes of fatal falls from height and collapse / over turn accidents, confirms that neither scaffolders nor mobile plant operatives should be targeted in isolation but systemic problems in the way construction work is organised or approached need to be addressed. The HSE investigations, therefore, provide an important data source, again now it has been converted into a modern Access format. The records, however, cover
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.7 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
predominantly fatalities and major injury accidents and will provide little insight to address accident such as slips and trips, which typically have less severe consequences but contribute substantially to lost time accidents. In investigating the RIDDOR data to identify potential factors driving the recent upturn in construction fatalities, no firm evidence was found. Broadly the distribution across activities, accident types, employment status, region, age etc was comparable to previous years. In fact the number of major injury accidents appears to have reduced over the same period (although some lag in the unadjusted preliminary statistics should be allowed for) suggesting that it is the outcome of accidents which has on average been more severe rather than the frequency of occurrence increasing nevertheless an additional 58 deaths projected for the year is no more palatable. Influence Network Strategy Taking the evidence form the RIDDOR data and HSE investigations, together with information from experience and the open literature, an Influence Network approach was used to structure and systematically quantify the inter-relation of the influences. The methodology, described in the report, considers the technical and human activities in construction in the context of the site organisation, the corporate approach of the principal parties, and the wider environmental factors, such as the regulator influencing the industry. The underlying methodology was developed and trialed by BOMEL in work for the Maritime and Coastguard Agency to introduce a risk based approach to regulation in the marine industry. Many of the issues in the marine sector are comparable to construction with a range of stakeholders from individuals to multi national enterprises, and operatives with a significant degree of autonomy. The network comprises a set of generic influences (see Figure O.1) which have been honed based on theory and experience to cover principal aspects of human and organisational behaviour, whilst accounting for hardware and external factors which can contribute to accident causation. Importantly, the technique distinguishes the quality of practice in a particular area (rating) from its significance (weighting) in determining other factors. This is important because, for example, whether 'planning' is done well or not, it will have a strong influence on the 'availability of suitable resources' but can have negligible impact on 'competence'. The true significance of factors depends on the combination of weighting and rating and it is necessary to understand where the deficiencies lie for appropriate action to be taken. In piloting the Influence Network to consider fatal falls from height, a workshop session was held with a small group of industry stakeholders to customise the generic influences in relation to the construction industry and the scenario under consideration in particular. This led to the introduction of two bespoke influences, namely 'contracting strategy' at the
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.8 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
policy level and 'pay and conditions' at the site organisational level both are clearly variables in the construction industry and can have a significant impact on safety. The customisation of the influences involved defining a scale for worst to best practices that could be envisaged in the industry. Against that scale each influence was rated to reflect the current state of the industry in major building construction as it relates to fatal falls from height (see Figure 0.1).
FATAL FALLS FROM HEIGHT

Human
D1
Competence
Hardware
D7 Quality of Comms D8 Availability of Info/ Advice D9 Compliance D10 Availability of Suitable Resources
External
D11 Quality of Inspection & Maintenance D12 Equipment Operability D13 Internal Working Environment D14
Operating Conditions
D2 Motivation /Morale
D3 Team Working
D4 Situational Awareness
D5 Fatigue
D6 Health
8 7
O5
Direct Level Influences

O6 O7 O8
3
O9
3
O10
O1
O2
O3
O4
O11
O12
Recruitment & Selection
3
P1
Training
Procedures
Planning
Information Management & Feedback
Organisational Level Influences

P3 P4 P5
Management/ Supervision
Comms
Safety Culture
Equipment Purchasing
Inspection & Maintenance Policy
Design for safe construction
Pay & Conditions
P2
P6
P7
Contracting Strategy
3
E1
Ownership and Control
Company Culture
Policy Level Influences

E2 E3
Organisational Structure
Safety Management
3
E4
Labour Relations
Company Profitability
Political Influence
Regulatory Influence
Market Influence
Social Influence
Environmental Level Influences
Figure 0.1 Rating of Influences from Workshop On a scale of 1 to 10 the worst aspects with considerable scope for improvement (rated 1) were the workforce recognition of risk, compliance, and design for safe construction. Team working on site to promote safety, the organisation of training and ownership and control of safety in construction from the client were rated at 2. At the opposite pole, the workforce was considered to be relatively fit (healthy) (rated 7) and not particularly subject to fatigue (8). Similarly equipment operability (as it relates to falls from height) and equipment purchasing were rated 8 and 7. The HSEs regulatory influence was also rated at 7, held back principally by its limited resource. The final stage was to weight the influence of each factor, one to another, and a first pass ranking of high (H), medium (M) and low (L) with intermediate H/M and M/L weighting
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.9 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
included. These were subsequently converted to quantitative measures based on alternative H:M:L assumptions 3:2:1 and 9:5:1. Risk Based Network Validation As the report describes, the summation of weighting and rating products through the diagram leads to a top-level index from which a measure of risk can be determined. Based on the most recent full year statistics in which there were 38 fatal falls from height in construction, the network quantification implies a very best practice scenario giving just one fatality per annum whereas very worst practice, without any of the existing controls, would give 615 fatalities per annum (for the same workforce). This is not inconceivable given the occurrence of 1718 falls reported having led to major injuries and 1456 to minor injuries in the same reference period despite the existing measures. This provided some validation of the network but further steps were taken to reinforce the quantification based on Loughborough University research for HSE on contributory factors to construction accidents(19), the findings from a survey conducted by the New Civil Engineer(25), and a series of contrasting site visits(e.g. 37). Given their different bases the mapping of the factors from one study to another was not always complete, nevertheless there was strong endorsement for the ratings assigned in the study and in no case was contradictory evidence obtained. The site visits, which centred on the Influence Network, were also extremely important. For one major London site the meeting reinforced the ratings from the base case workshop. For a site run by BP in which determined efforts had been made to instil a strong safety culture, much better ratings with an improved risk index were demonstrated. The visit highlighted how such improvements can be achieved and the interrelation of measures necessary. Finally a small family building / maintenance firm was examined to reveal the different influences from the domestic client and proprietor through to the workers. The resulting index was less than the major site average, again correlating well with the data and industry experience. Areas for Risk Reduction To this stage the work had demonstrated how the Influence Network can be used systematically to structure and quantify information from disparate sources about construction safety. The model can be adapted and refined to reflect specific scenarios but many of the inter-relations at environmental, policy and even organisational levels are likely to be invariant for many areas of the industry activity. However, the strength of the model is that it now enables the effects of change to be evaluated and the impact of alternative risk control strategies compared. These assessments can be combined in cost-benefit assessments allowing for the cost and time necessary to achieve the degree of change envisaged. In the present work, sensitivity studies were undertaken looking at the effects of change in individual influences across the network where a rating (performance) improvement combined with a strong weighting could have most impact on the (risk) index.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.10 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
The sensitivity studies showed the market to be the over-riding influence, underlining the vulnerability of the industry. Nevertheless important areas with the potential for intervention were safety management by the principal contractor and client contracting strategy; training, supervision, information feedback and design for safe construction in the way work is organised; and competence, communications, situational awareness and compliance at the direct level. Whilst none of these is surprising, it is extremely important that the complex structuring and quantification of the network is delivering results which qualitatively match expectations this provides added confidence in its quantitative application. In considering the scenarios, both the regulatory changes postulated (which cascade through political and regulatory influence to client company culture and contracting policies, to the designer and contractor safety management, safety culture and workforce / management feedback on site as well as penetrating direct aspects of performance) and the measures put in place by BP are shown to translate to risk reduction of the order set out at the Summit (a reduction in fatal and major injury accidents by two-thirds). A key observation from these scenario trials, is that changes at the direct level alone will not deliver the degree of change being sought, nor would the improvement be sustained. To be effective, the way construction is perceived and managed must be altered many of the aspects highlighted can be categorised as cultural change. No attempt was made within the postulated scenarios to map the timescales for improvement. However, it is clear that many of the steps are interdependent and will take time to implement with the accident indicator lagging further behind. This is an important aspect to be addressed for specific cases. Summit Action Plans At the Construction Summit, industry leaders set out their action plans for addressing the targets in relation to major injury accidents, incidents of ill-health, and working days lost across the industry. Time and the nature of the forum meant that presentations focussed on 'areas' for action, rather than specific 'measures'. These areas have been mapped onto the Influence Network within the report and this identifies the breadth and inconsistencies as well as common areas such as training being targeted. It was notable from the Summit, however, that the need for better data and understanding of accident causes was stated repeatedly. In addition, the presentation of the action plans demonstrated no clear link through to the targets and it is suggested that this is essential, both to ensure measures are likely to be effective and to provide a mechanism for setting intermediate milestones and performance monitoring. Bringing together the Summit statements and the work in this study, it is clear that the construction industry recognises the need for cultural change. However, for a massive industry where such a safety culture has not existed there is an enormous challenge to
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.11 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
identify what steps are necessary and what their impact might be, as well as to build the link between current practice and the future vision. Recommendations A principal recommendation from the work is that the Influence Network can provide an important framework to understand the influences on current practice, to identify areas where change can be effective and to evaluate risk control measures sequentially. It is proposed that workshop sessions be established with the industry groups, both to help them in formulating plans and to provide a consistent framework for interactions between the sub-sectors. Important outputs will be more specific measures coupled with understanding of improvement indicators and intermediate targets to be adopted on a consistent basis. In order to do this and provide tangible support to industry, it is also proposed that the detailed dissection of the RIDDOR data is continued now that a flexible data management system has been established. An important aspect of this will be to establish a definitive basis for reference population statistics and profiles. Engagement of the industry groups will be essential to help define industry specific practices, such as the trade related disposition of employed and self-employed workers. To a degree the treatment of past data, particularly with a consistent overall pattern, is not constructive and areas for action are already clear. However, data provide a reference basis and recognition of the numbers of compatriots affected (and how), is more meaningful to the industry groups then nebulous exhortations for safe practice and industry wide statistics. Interpretation at the sub-sector level may lead to appropriate measures for direct influence improvements, alongside the systemic measures envisaged. On this basis the opportunity for the regulator to help industry by providing information is seen to be a positive action. For HSE it will also help ensure a consistent approach is taken across the industry, as inappropriate statistical comparisons as measures are implemented could be seriously damaging and counterproductive. The report recognises the distinction between major construction and small-scale building and maintenance activities and an early priority must be to develop new ways to reach the high risk / small operation end of the market. In many cases the clients are one-off domestic customers or larger companies who now out-source / subcontract to save money. Work is recommended using the data and influence network to consider alternative strategies, for example: Targeting local planning committees and building regulation enforcers to communicate with small-scale clients and traders to emphasise safety
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.12 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Working with local authorities to set an example and even mentor small contractors in its employ, many of whom will also work for other less accessible clients Understanding how drink-driving and firework safety campaigns penetrated the public conscience and how COSHH has been communicated effectively to workers. As the project has clearly shown, the market and commercial concerns dominate even safety related matters. Points raised by attendees at the Summit in informal discussions acknowledged the good intentions expressed but focussed on who would pay for improved safety measures. The BP case study, however, highlighted the productivity improvements for the client and the substantially reduced uncertainty for the sub-contractors resulting from measures to improve safety. Industrys focus on productivity over recent years has spawned a number of research / measurement projects particularly via DETR and PII. These present an ideal opportunity for drawing out safety and productivity themes. It is essential that such benefits are demonstrated clearly to the whole industry cost and schedule are the lifeblood for construction and it is essential that safety messages use a common 'currency'. Although the report focuses primarily on safety, health is a parallel issue for which a trial of the Influence Network was applied. Headline issues related to asbestos etc are well recognised but the difficulty in obtained up to date statistics, and the inherent lag and often inconclusive association with specific work activities, makes this area particularly challenging. A worthwhile evaluation would be to assess the potential spin-off from safety cultural changes addressing the welfare of individuals. It is possible that a more subtle approach, based on a clear performance-monitoring scheme, may be more appropriate than an additional campaign area which may potentially distract or confuse the cultural change. Finally, a repeated theme has been the role of designers and designers themselves acknowledge that more could be done to eliminate hazards. Whilst considerable blame is heaped on designers, it is recommended that work be done to understand the challenges they face in terms of process and timing, and in terms of their knowledge and experience. Rather than an unwillingness to address safety, it is contended that there may be an inability to design for safe construction effectively. The issues need to be defined more clearly to determine whether CPD or prosecutions are more appropriate in encouraging improvement within a just culture. Concluding Summary Overall the project has demonstrated the additional insights that can be gained from data and its effective combination with expert judgement. The Influence Network has been
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001 HSE Task Number B\0087 Page 0.13 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
shown to be a powerful and meaningful tool for structuring information both qualitatively and quantitatively and validated risk measures have been derived. Importantly the technique offers the means to assess health and safety improvement measures and to project their progressive impact giving a reference basis for performance monitoring. The recommendations focus on using these techniques to support the construction industry in achieving substantial change in a stepwise manner, with a meaningful interpretation at different levels within the industry. It also provides a framework for the regulator to project and monitor improvements in a realistic and consistent manner.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 0.14 of 0.14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
This report has been prepared by BOMEL Limited for the Construction Sector of Field Operations Directorate of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) under the Technical Support Framework Agreement. Construction activity presents hazards for the people working in the industry as well as to the public in proximity to sites. The risks in relation to safety, and increasingly health, are well recognised by industry and the authorities. Despite this recognition and different campaigns over decades, the injury rates for the sector remain stubbornly high. Figure 1.1, taken from the latest published statistics(1), shows that in 1999/2000 the fatal injury rate for construction workers was second only to the Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing sector. It also demonstrates a reversal in the trend for improved performance in construction over the previous two years. Furthermore, the fatal accident rate at 4.5 per 100,000 construction workers, compares with an average for all industries in 1999/2000 of 0.8.
Figure 1.1 Fatality Injury Rates for Workers by Industrial Sector 1995/6 (1) 1999/2000 ef
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 1.1 of 1.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
It was against the general background to the UKs Health and Safety statistics that Revitalising Health and Safety RHS(2) was launched by the Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, in June 2000 to inject new impetus to better health and safety in all workplaces. Despite this broad approach, the Foreword to the strategy statement specifically acknowledged that certain areas of work, such as construction, still have a high accident rate . The aims of RHS include: Identifying new approaches to reduce further rates of accidents and ill health caused by work, especially approaches relevant to small firms Ensuring that the approach to health and safety regulations remains relevant for the changing world of work over the next 25 years. The RHS strategy statement has at its heart the first ever targets for Great Britains health and safety system viz: To reduce the number of working days lost per 100,000 workers from work-related injury and ill health by 30% by 2010; To reduce the incidence rate of fatal and major injury accidents by 10% by 2010; To reduce the incidence rate of cases of work-related ill health by 20% by 2010; Achieve half the improvement under each target by 2004.
It was at that stage the present study was commissioned by HSEs construction specialists to help in identifying new approaches to improving health and safety in the sector. Specific objectives were set down: To undertake a data mining and analysis exercise to capture information on construction activities, employment / working patterns, contract arrangements etc to complement RIDDOR(3) To use an influence network technique to asses systematically the factors affecting health and safety in construction as a basis for targeting effective improvements.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 1.2 of 1.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Two further factors impacted the work. Firstly a Construction Summit was announced for February 2001, led by the Deputy Prime Minister to focus on the Revitalising agenda for construction and turning concern into action(3). Leading industry groups were challenged to prepare action plans for securing radical improvements in health and safety standards. The nagging issue all the while was that there was some obvious cause or solution that collectively had been missed. These concerns were magnified when preliminary statistics of fatal injuries in the construction sector for the first six months of 2000/1 were published(5). In comparison with the same period in 1999/2000, fatal injuries had risen from 39 to 62, an increase of 59%. The new half-year total of 62 fatalities compared with 85 for the previous full year; a projected comparison assuming a consistent workforce would show an increase from 85 construction related deaths to 124 by the end of this year a 46% increase. In relation to the BOMEL study, HSE asked that the data mining and influence network activities should focus particularly on the high risk accident areas and, if possible, identify anything that might provide some understanding of this upturn. The severity of the situation was underlined at the summit in February 2001 when provisional nine-month figures recorded 92 fatalities confirming the ongoing trend and full year projections. The prospect of 53 more people being killed due to construction activity this year compared with either of the two years previously, galvanised the focus the project. It will be shown in Section 4, that nothing exceptional could be discerned for the current year from the data analysis undertaken in support of the first objective and in response to current concerns. These observations are clearly limited to the parameters held in the datasets and the extent of analysis undertaken at this stage. In essence, however, this indicated that the frequency of fatal consequences was increasing, with apparently no significant change in accident occurrence or causation. This finding drives attention to the second project objective, namely to strive for a fundamental understanding of factors leading to inherently safer construction. As this report will show, there are innumerable and disparate factors based on statistical evidence, experience or conjecture which are considered to have a bearing on health and safety in construction. Many have been recognised for (6) decades ; some have been tackled and, until very recently, some year on year improvements have been identified. The degree of benefit or link between cause and beneficial effect have been almost impossible to isolate. Similarly, there is no consensus as to the solution to improve construction safety in terms of what should be done or how.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 1.3 of 1.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
At the summit, the industry leaders demonstrated huge commitment to improving health and safety in construction and a panoply of measures was set out to meet the sectors own goals. Regrettably, but perhaps inevitably, in no case was there a quantifiable link between the measures proposed and forecasts of the rate or magnitude of benefit. In no way wishing to deride the serious and determined action plans, there is a degree of faith that the measures will be effective and the targets achieved. At the root of the uncertainty over action plans or their potential effectiveness, is the inherent complexity of the industry, the changing workplace, the many parties and interfaces and the diverse nature of construction activities. This makes it particularly difficult to assess the knock-on effects of any change, either before it is implemented or afterwards to measure its success. In the second part of the present study, an Influence Network technique is introduced which specifically sets out to organise and structure the influences on health and safety performance in construction. The approach is generic, combining distinct aspects of human, hardware and external factors categorised between environmental, policy, organisational and direct level influences. However, the model is customised using data and experience specific to construction, enabling influences to be weighted and performance rated in a systematic and quantitative manner. The approach is particularly well suited to assessing the effects of change and the relative impact of alternative improvement measures. BOMELs application of the methods stems from work for the marine industry to help direct a risk targeted approach to regulation. Current work concerns safety measures for fisherman. The relevance of this is that at the Summit, the Deputy Prime Minister drew parallels between the fishing and construction industries in relation to culture and the human and organisational challenges to be faced. This study provides a pilot demonstration of the method for one of the areas which the data shows to be of particular concern in construction, namely falls from height. The influence network structuring process is demonstrated to show the interaction between data and expert judgement, and the firm grounding in the construction industry context. Of the risk control options emerging, particular emphasis is placed on those where HSE as regulator has the potential to exert influence. The approach is extended to provide a mapping for the action plans put forward by industry at the Summit. This is used as a basis for indicating how the influence network could be used to monitor their success.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 1.4 of 1.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Following this introduction, the report presents a description of the construction industry in Section 2. Whilst this is familiar to those working in the sector, it is important that it is clearly defined to ensure completeness of the network representation. Section 3 takes a broad view of construction health and safety data, to determine the level of information available to understand the causes and consequence of different behaviours. The potential insights provided by the RIDDOR(4, 6) scheme are assessed and the need for supporting information to normalise the statistics is identified. In Section 4 a detailed evaluation of post 95 RIDDOR data concerning falls from height is made. This serves to illustrate the level of information that can be gleaned from RIDDOR, enables potential factors underlying the recent upturn in accident statistics to be investigated, and provides specific data for the influence network structuring. Section 5 presents a comparable perspective on construction accidents and specifically the significance of falls from height revealed by other datasets. This leads to a discussion of the overall data findings and construction risk profile in Section 6. Work to structure the interrelation of the findings begins in Section 7 where the Influence Network methodology is introduced. Section 8 then demonstrates the specific application for the case of fatal falls from height and the evaluation of alternative risk controls with specific examples in Section 9. The report concludes in Section 10 with findings form the study specific to falls from height as well as recommendations in Section 11 for wider application, especially to assess the success of Summit Action Plans.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 1.5 of 1.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Concerns for health and safety associated with workplace activity apply to all industries in the widest sense(2). However the threats to health and threats to safety differ between industry sectors and measures to tackle them need to acknowledge the different practices and attitudes endemic through the domains of influence (Figure 2.1).
Social, Political and Market Context Corporate Policy Influences
Organisation & Management Systems Human and Technical Systems
Figure 2.1 Generic Domains of Influence on Human or Technical Systems In this regard, construction clearly differs from finance and business, for example, but it is important to understand how and why and whether the differences are significant for improving health and safety. The same questions need to be addressed, however, within the sector and the definition of construction encompasses very many activities. It is important first to recognise the significance of construction to UK industry. (4) Recent statistics show it having an annual turnover of 65 billion, contributing 8% to GDP. The industry has 1.4 million workers, with 0.3 million in the associated professions, employed over 160,000 firms and half a million work sites of which around 160,000 are notifiable, by virtue of size and duration, under the (7) Construction (Design and Management) Regulations . Some 19% HSEs Field
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 2.1 of 2.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Operations Division operational resource is devoted to construction making over 20,000 contacts a year, investigating 1,000 accidents and 7,000 complaints. Under CDM(7), construction work involves any of the following activities: Construction Alteration Conversion Fitting out Commissioning Renovation Repair Assembly or disassembly of prefabricated elements Site preparation (clearance, exploration, investigation, excavation, foundations) Upkeep Redecoration Maintenance Decommissioning Demolition Dismantling
in relation to a structure which may be a Building Other steel or reinforced concrete structure Railway line or siding Tramway line Dock Harbour Inland navigation Tunnel Shaft Bridge Viaduct Waterworks Reservoir Pipe / pipeline Cable Aqueduct Sewer Formwork, falsework, scaffold or similar to provide temporary support or access Fixed plant for which installation, commissioning, decommissioning or dismantling involves a risk of falling more than 2 metres.
Sewage works Gas holder Road Airfield Sea defence works River works Drainage works Earthworks Lagoon Dam Wall Caisson Mast Tower Pylon Underground tank Earth retaining structure
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
This listing is reproduced from the regulations, despite its length, because it serves to highlight the spectrum of activity covered, from the self-employed decorator painting the gable end of a dwelling to the international construction giant redeveloping the inner city or building the second Severn crossing, or indeed the small gangs laying trenching for fibre optic cables the length and breadth of the country. Considering the domains of influence in Figure 2.1, it is clear that in the first case the environmental influences bear directly on the decorator but the policy and organisational factors are weak and he is largely autonomous. On large projects, there is the expectation of systems and support and an indirect link between the regulator and worker. The differences are explained below. In a hazard identification exercise, fundamental sources of risk are considered and generally include: Weight Height Electricity Pressure Collision Energy Human factors Energy Heat Noise Hazardous substances.
Many of these are inherent features of construction, often occurring at different stages in a project and affecting variously the parties involved. Construction by its very nature involves change. For the individual that change is being brought about by others, yet this can have a direct impact on his circumstances. These features create an unusual working environment when compared with factories, offices, process plants and even farms. Many primary construction activities are exposed to the elements. It involves
creating something that did not exist previously and therefore involves the movement of materials. It can therefore be a physically demanding workplace, requiring resilience and strength, and has traditionally developed as a male dominated regime with an associated macho culture. The skills necessary to build
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
a structure are many and comprise distinct trades such as bricklayers, steel fixers, scaffolders, crane drivers, through to electrical fit-out contractors with an additional demand for unskilled labour. Skilled workers rarely move between trades and the number of people required on a site can be considerable. The duration on a site can be short, and terms and conditions generally provide for rapid hire and fire to reflect work demands. This creates uncertainty for workers and a pressure to perform well against the primary business driver, schedule (which equates up the chain to cost). The inherent volatility creates a role for casual labour and a willingness to draw in black market (inexperienced, unqualified or unregistered) labour, particularly in times of high demand. Many construction skills are saleable to domestic and small commercial clients, particularly in relation to maintenance, leading to a plethora of private, cash, jobs as favours on rest days. Such clients generally have no knowledge or understanding of construction, can be lead on by cowboy traders and have no concept of hazards or safe methods of work. Indeed for house owners, structural maintenance or an extension is one of the only areas in which they have a need to contract in services. At the other end of the scale are major clients whose reputations and repeated need for construction ensure they understand construction processes and take ownership for ensuring safety. Even so the practice of contracting and necessary subcontracting to bring in the required skills creates a complex communication chain. Increasingly major contractors rely on subcontractors to reduce the overhead of retained staff and cut costs. Similarly in the public sector, which accounts for some 40% of the industry turnover, outsourcing is now the norm. In this sector maintenance activity can be significant where workers have to deal with situations as they are found and often have to determine their own safe systems of work whilst paid on a piece work basis. The developer as client presents another situation where the aim is to convert a piece of land into a high value structure which can be sold for profit. The quicker sale is achieved, the more money is made there is no interest in the intermediate process nor concern about safety related maintenance issues through the life cycle. Despite its complexities, the industry is well represented by trade bodies and associations from the Federation of Master Builders through to the Construction Clients Forum. Most bodies exist on the basis of a levy or fee and therefore by
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 2.4 of 2.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
definition the membership comprise the more responsible parties. Union representation varies but many sites are non-union. Arguably there are so many industry bodies and particularly productivity initiatives, that the demarcations are unclear and the roles confused. Furthermore the bottom end of the trade and the casual users are excluded. The driving force across the industry is schedule, as capital investment cannot be realised until construction is complete. Financing and interest charges accumulate and time is literally money to the ultimate client. The industry is capable of communicating this concern down to the casual unskilled labourer who responds to the financial and schedule pressures. The challenge now is to communicate safety as effectively.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 2.5 of 2.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
3. HSE REFERENCE DATA
3.1
RIDDOR REPORTING
Having identified to whom construction regulations are directed, it is important too to identify how construction performance is measured. This Section describes the RIDDOR regulatory framework for reporting accidents and ill health matters. RIDDOR(6) states clearly that it is an employers responsibility to report death, major or over-3-day injuries or cases of disease of an employee. It is the person in control of premises who is responsible for reporting under RIDDOR where there is a dangerous occurrence or if a self-employed person suffers death, injury or disease. A self-employed person working in premises under his own control, however, is responsible (either himself or via a nominee) for reporting major injury, over-3-day injury or case of disease. Responsibility for reporting the death of a self-employed person working under his own control is unclear. RIDDOR reporting requirements are dictated with prescribed forms. The following fatal information is recorded: For the reporting party: name job title telephone name of organisation organisation address and postcode type of work of organisation
About the accident date time location (on or off organisation premises)
About the injured party name home address home phone number age sex
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 3.1 of 3.7
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
job title employment status (employee, trainee, work experience, employee of someone else, self employed, a member of public) About the injury type of injury (fracture, laceration) part of body or site severity (fatality, major, 3 day, public hospitalised) consequence (unconscious, resuscitation, hospitalised, none)
About the kind of accident Description of what happened, e.g. substances involved machine involved (agent) preceding events role of people.
The forms are submitted to HSE, coded in accordance with the FOCUS database system(22) and entered into the database. The system has a pre-programmed user interface preventing general users from having direct access to the database for analysis. With the cooperation of HSE statisticians, a major activity in the present study was to extract and translate the data into a relational database format for analysis. Similarly HSE investigation reports were translated into a database for analysis.
3.2
HEADLINE STATISTICS FOR CONSTRUCTION FROM RIDDOR

Before analysing the construction data specifically it is appropriate to examine the headline portrayal of industrial accidents and ill-health statistics based on RIDDOR. Key issues concern the nature of construction accidents, the role of employment status and the context for the recent upturn in construction fatalities. The comparison between the injury rate for workers in construction compared with all industry average is summarised in Table 3.1.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 3.2 of 3.7
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Injury Construction Employees Fatal Major Minor 5.3 391.1 902.9 Self-employed 3.2 56.0 53.8 Rate per 100,000 workers All industries Employees 0.7 120.1 561.5 Self-employed 1.7 19.1 21.4
Table 3.1 Injury Rates in Construction 1999/2000 In all cases construction is substantially worse than the industry average. The anomaly is that, for construction, the self-employed fatality rate is less than for employees whereas the reverse is true for industry in general.
3.3
EMPLOYMENT STATUS INFERENCES FROM RIDDOR

RIDDOR
(1)
shows a consistent trend over the past decade with the fatal injury rate
for the self-employed to be of the order of twice that for employees (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Fatal Injury Rates for Employees and the Self-Employed 1990/91 1999/2000 ef(1)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 3.3 of 3.7
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Presented by sector as in Figure 3.2, however, the pattern in construction is perverse. The injury rate for the self-employed (~2-3 per 100,000) is of the order of a quarter to a half that for employees (~4-8 per 100,000) (Note the different vertical scales).
Figure 3.2 Fatal Injury Rates for Employees (top) and the Self-Employed (bottom) by Industrial Sector 1995/6 1000/2000 ef
(1)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 3.4 of 3.7
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
This fact apparently counters concerns that bogus self-employment is detrimental to health and safety(42). Arguably the self-employed face less personal risk. However, this line is, in itself, bogus. It is fallacious to seek a direct correlation between employment status and safety in the construction sector. The pattern of employment varies dramatically by trade and the hazards faced by the different trades in turn vary. These issues fundamentally influence the apparent statistics. The bogus aspect of self-employed construction workers applies to those who work consistently for the same client / employer. They therefore have similar work continuity, particularly when the industry is buoyant, but potentially higher net income than their employee counterparts. Where they may be equipped worse is in relation to training but the distinction from employees in small firms may not be so great. This serves to underline the weakness of high-level statistics and the danger of drawing simple inferences. What are important to identify are the factors which change with employment status and to determine the differences which have the greatest influence on safety. These may provide insight to factors where improvement, irrespective of employment status, could be beneficial to safety. Further concerns arise in relation to labour force survey assessment of underreporting provided as an input to the present study. A table compares the RIDDOR reporting levels across all workers (employees and self-employed) with the labour force estimation of the rate of employee accidents taken to infer the (14) level of under-reporting . With the self-employed comprising a substantial proportion of the construction industry (~36%)(13) the calculation is misleading. Recalculating based on the employee incidents alone suggest reporting may only be at the 32% level as opposed to 49%.
3.4
ACCIDENT TYPES IN RIDDOR

The HSC statistics also provide comparison by injury type across industries. It is notable that for employees and the self-employed in construction falls from height are the single most significant cause of fatal and major injuries accounting for 44% and 36% of the injuries in each category for employees, and 63% and 52% for the self-employed. Although the previous discussion suggests on average that the self-employed face less risk in construction, these figures indicate the opposite in relation to falls from height this may reflect the typical employment status of trades such as roofers working at height. In comparison with other industry sectors, utility and agricultural sectors have the next highest proportion of fatal and major accidents due to falls form height. However the fatal and major injury
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 3.5 of 3.7
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
proportions, at 17% and 18%, are substantially lower than construction, potentially reflecting the reduced exposure to the hazard or better safety controls of work at height. Falls from height are a lesser contribution to minor injuries because of the inherent severity of consequences if a fall from height occurs. Nevertheless with 13% of major injuries to construction employees and 24% for the self-employed still being due to falls from height (compared with a maximum of 8% in other industries) the situation of work at height must be a dominant concern for construction. This, coupled with the direction of HSE initiatives(45), directs the focus of investigation in Section 4.
3.5
TRENDS IN RECENT RIDDOR STATISTICS

The recent rise in fatal accident statistics in construction is of immense concern to the regulators and industry alike. Provisional six month figures for 2000/1 indicated a 46% increase; corresponding nine month figures still project a 44% higher number of fatalities(9). The recent nine-month figure for 2000/1 present a comparison for the principal industry sectors with the same period in 1999/2000. The increase in fatality numbers for construction is the highest for all sectors the overall increase for the comparable nine month period in the previous year is 61% coming from a 41% increase for employees (62 compared with 44), 140% (from 10 to 24) for self-employed and 100% (i.e. doubling from 3 to 6) for members of the public. Without detracting form the severity of the situation, it is relevant to note that the increase is reflected to a degree across all industrial sectors. The nine-month provisional comparisons 2000/1 to 1999/2000 for all sector fatalities show: Construction Manufacturing Extraction and utility supply Agriculture Services +61% to 92 +50% to 51 +40% to 7 +24% to 47 +0% at 387 (includes suicides and railway trespass)
It is important to recognise that incidence rates are a more robust measure than absolute numbers. However, any upturn of employment in each sector will not offset the increased number of fatalities shown. The general trend suggests some
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
environmental influence affecting working practices may be responsible. Nevertheless a thorough investigation of specific factors affecting construction performance is appropriate. The severity of the situation can also be seen in relation to HSC statistics(1) which indicate a general downward trend in fatal injuries to workers over the few prior years, both in absolute and proportionate terms (see Figure 3.3). A projection of the nine month provisional figures described above(9) indicates a 37% higher fatality rate for 2000/1 than in the previous year assuming the population is unchanged. The tentative full year projection of 304 deaths(9) shows the number of worker fatalities to be higher than in any year since 1992/3.
Figure 3.3 Fatal Injuries to Workers 1990/1 1999/2000 ef
(1)
It is also noteworthy that the initiatives to Revitalise Health and Safety was formulated in the context of the gradually falling fatality rate observed up until 1999/2000. The new targets were launched in the first quarter of 2000/1, since when figures have emerged demonstrating the significant deterioration in fatal accident safety.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 3.7 of 3.7
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
4. DATA ANALYSIS
4.1
BACKGROUND
Analysis of accident data from the construction industry has been used as part of this project in order to gain information on factors associated with safety. The accident data used is collected by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) from accident reports which are required under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations, RIDDOR(6). Data is only analysed from 1 April 1996 onwards because different Regulations were in place before this time and so the data is not necessarily comparable. The RIDDOR 95 Regulations define incidents in the workplace which must be reported by law. Accidents are categorised as, fatal, major (such as broken bones, dislocation, and amputation), or minor having led to at least 3 days off work. Data is gathered in relation to a number of factors including accident kind, agent involved in accident and age of injured person. As well as this information, the HSE have provided records from their accident investigations where these have been carried out. These records contain certain details which are not available in RIDDOR, for example, the causes of an accident as established by the HSE Inspector. An important part of accident data analysis is to identify the population at risk when studying particular groups. For example, it is necessary to know the population in different construction trades for a given period in order to be able to place the number of accidents among the trades during this time in context. Population data can be used to normalise accidents across groups in terms of the accident rate and allows comparison of the relative risk level between groups. Population data for the construction industry is readily available from the (47) Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, DETR and where possible is used to normalise accident data in this report. The following sections describe the approach to the data analysis, the results obtained and the conclusions which are drawn relating to safety in construction and, in particular, fatal falls from height.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.1 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
4.2 APPROACH
4.2.1 Overview
There are four main stages to the data analysis methodology. The identification of relevant variables from RIDDOR and HSE investigation records The generation of descriptive statistics from the raw accident data to suggest contributory factors in construction safety The application of DETR population figures to normalise the accident data The use of inferential statistics to supplement the descriptive findings.
4.2.2
Selecting Accident Data Variables
Accident variables which are likely to reveal factors important in construction safety are identified from previous work by BOMEL and parts of the literature on construction safety (including from HSE). BOMEL have studied extracts from the RIDDOR database as part of an HSE project to prevent slips, trips and falls from height offshore. It is known that such accidents are prominent in the construction industry. Analysis of accidents reported to RIDDOR from the offshore industry suggests that the following variables are likely to be relevant in construction accidents: Accident kind Activity at time of accident Process environment Time of incident (hours into shift) Time of year Location Experience Age of injured Employment status of injured.
From these variables, accident kind, time of incident, time of year, age of injured and employment status of injured can be analysed from the construction accident
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.2 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
data. Activity at time of accident is not directly available although this information is largely provided by field agent involved in accident. The agent gives a fairly clear indication as to activity at time of accident, for example, the agent is often cited as a ladder. Several process environments map directly on to an occupation code especially for the finishing trades and it is felt that occupation is more suited to data analysis. This is because in some cases finishing trade occupation codes have been put into inappropriate process environments. For example, plasterers, carpenters and plumbers are to be found in the demolition process environment. This means that analysis of a particular process environment may either not include all the cases it should or encompass cases which should be in another category. For these reasons, an assessment of the reliability of process environment codes has been undertaken and only concrete work and insulation have been included in the analysis. Information on the specific location of a person at the time of an accident can often be gained indirectly from the agent field, for example when the agent is scaffolding. Information about the geographical region in which the accident took place is available and has been analysed. The work experience of the injured person is not available in the construction accident data. From the literature and experience, a wide variety of hazardous activities have been identified which imply that construction trade and the agent involved in the work are important in safety. These include excavations, scaffolding, falsework, structural framework, roofwork, cranes, transport, tunnelling, and work over water (for example, see Davies and Tomasin, 1996). In addition to some of the variables already mentioned, Rowlinson (1997) identified the type of construction as important including building construction and civil engineering construction and suggests that risks may differ depending on the stage of construction, for example, new construction, repair/maintenance and demolition. Rowlinson also suggests that nationality affects construction safety but this variable is not recorded by RIDDOR and so cannot be included in the analysis. The closest RIDDOR field to type of construction is main activity of contractor which places building and civil engineering construction into one category and also includes demolition, construction of roads/highways and construction of water projects. Also included in this category are finishing trades such as roofing, plumbing, plastering, and painting. It is felt that use of the occupation code is
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.3 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
likely to give a more reliable indicator of the number of people in each trade and better differentiate risk factors than main activity of contractor. As a result, more focus is given to occupation whereas main activity of contractor is only commented on briefly. As well as from past experience and from the literature, correspondence with HSE has identified a number of factors as potentially influencing construction safety. Many of these influences are not recorded in accident data such as risk assessment in design and client contracting strategy. However, two of these factors can be assessed to a certain degree from RIDDOR data. The number of people employed by the contractor is recorded which may give an idea as to whether the size of a company is related to the safety of its employees. In addition, the number of people likely to be on a construction site at any one time is recorded which may indicate if the size of a project influences safety. Records from accident investigations provide information on the underlying causes to an accident. It has been possible to link causes from investigations to accident records in RIDDOR and cause constitutes the final variable in the accident data analysis. In summary, the variables analysed are as follows: Trade Accident kind Accident agent Underlying cause Time of year Time of accident Employment status Age of injured Number of people on site Contractors number of Great Britain employees Geographical region
4.2.3
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics can be used to help suggest which factors are the main contributors to accidents in the construction industry. This is done by combining a number of variables at a time and plotting the results. The following paragraphs will describe the strategy for the data analysis and outline its structure.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.4 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
RIDDOR data from 1 April 1996 to 30 September 2000 has been supplied by HSE. This covers four and a half years of accident reporting. In order to standardise the data for comparison it has been necessary to project a final year number of accidents for 2000/01 by multiplying the half-year figure by a factor of two. It should be noted that the figures from 1996/97 to 1998/99 are consolidated whereas the 1999/00 figures are provisional and the 2000/01 half year figures are highly provisional. During the four and a half year period, 65556 accidents have been reported to RIDDOR with 388 of these being fatalities. It is the fatalities which receive most attention in the analysis since one of the key questions facing the construction industry at the moment is why fatalities increased by so much during the first half of 2000/01. In order to guide the data analysis towards the desired objectives of the project, a set of research questions has been developed. These are based on trying to understand the differences which have led to an increase in fatalities in the April to September 2000 period compared with the previous years and are as follows: 1. Are there differences between the periods in the trades where fatalities occur? Are these differences significant when the fatality rate is considered? Where the number of fatalities in trades appears to have risen significantly, are there different risks in terms of accident kind, accident agent or underlying cause? For the trades which appear to account for the recent increase in fatalities, are there any differences in age or employment status of the injured person? 5. 6. Do trends in fatal injury accidents match those in major injury accidents? Are there variables which can be analysed from accident data to give an idea of generic risks in construction?
2. 3.
4.
In broad terms, questions 1 to 5 make up one strand of the data analysis and question 6 makes up another. Research questions 1 to 5 are dealt with in the following steps. Firstly the number of fatalities is plotted by trade for the different years and a subset of trades with the most fatalities are focused on. This is
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.5 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
important due to the large number of occupation categories and allows meaningful assessment of differences in risk. Specific risk factors are worked towards for this group by identifying the following: common accident kinds for these trades common agents in these accidents links between underlying causes, accident kinds and agents
Risk is better quantified by plotting the fatality rate for the selected trades where population data is available. Age and employment status of the injured person are additional variables which are analysed for the most prominent trades in the fatal accident subset. The findings from these analyses are compared across years to identify differences which appear to be significant in terms of the recent increase in fatalities. The analysis covering research questions 1 to 4 has been repeated for major injury accidents in order to answer question 5 i.e. are there differences in trends between fatal and major injury accidents? An assessment of more generic risk in construction accidents makes up the second strand of the analysis and is covered in research question 6. It has been possible to analyse the following variables in order to gain a better understanding of generic risk: Number of people on site Time of year Number of contractors employees in Great Britain Time of accident Geographical region
Data for these variables has only been analysed for fatal accidents and again the results are compared across years to look for differences which might account for the recent increase in fatalities.
4.2.4
Population Data
Two sources of population data for the construction industry are available. The source used by HSE is from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) who provide data on the overall number of employees and self-employed in construction. Data from the Department of Transport, Environment and the Regions (DETR) breaks
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.6 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
down population by trade (employees), size of firm, geographical region and employment status (DETR, 2000). It should be noted that, due to measurement differences, there is a discrepancy between the ONS and DETR population data in that the DETR estimate is consistently around three hundred thousand less than the ONS calculation. Consultation with the DETR has revealed that the trends shown by both sets of data are the same and so either can be used to the same effect. However, the population by trade calculated by the DETR is particularly useful for providing an indication of the relative risk of accidents depending on an individuals work. Therefore, the DETR population data was used for this assessment and for consistency, was used throughout the analysis. A statistician from DETR provided advice on the most suitable population data to use for the calculation of accident rates. Certain assumptions have been made in the use of population data which will now be described. The populations which are used have been taken in the third quarter of each year to represent the population for that calendar year. It should be remembered that there may be fluctuations in population throughout the year which will not be captured by this measure. Accidents are recorded over a year from 1 April to 31 March and as such the population assigned to this period should be regarded as an estimation. To calculate rates for trade and geographical region it has been necessary to align the HSE classifications with the DETR counterparts. For most trades analysed in this study these map directly onto one another. However, for certain trades it has been necessary to bundle a number of HSE codes into one DETR classification to calculate the rate. Builders is the notable exception in that reliable population data could not be determined and so the accident rate for builders has not been calculated. In addition, there is a slight mismatch between some of the geographical regions as coded by HSE compared with DETR and so the fatality rate calculated for regions should be treated as a rough estimate. The mapping exercises for trades and regions are shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 respectively.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.7 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
HSE classification(s) Carpenter / joiner Painter / decorator Plasterer Roofers Floorer Glazier Scaffold / steeple Plant drivers Fork lift driver Crane drivers Drivers mate Other machine/plant Other transport/machine Electric fitter Cable jointer Other electrical Plumber / heating* Occupation Electrical contractors HSE type Occupation Occupation Occupation Occupation Occupation Occupation Occupation Occupation DETR trade Carpenters & joiners Painters Plasterers Roofer Flooring contractors Glaziers Scaffolding specialists Plant hirers
Occupation
Plumbers Heating and ventilation engineers Reinforced concrete specialists
Concrete preparation, moulding, treatment, filling, coating, cutting, placing, drying, spinning, extrusion, forming and calcining Insulation
Process environment
Process environment
Insulating specialists
* The DETR populations for plumbers and heating & ventilation engineers have been added together since these trades are treated as one category by HSE Table 4.1 HSE Occupation Codes Mapped onto DETR Codes
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.8 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
HSE area code 1 Estimation of regions covered by HSE area code Wales, the South West and the West Midlands DETR region(s) used for estimation of population Wales South West West Midlands 2 The South East and East Anglia South East East Anglia Greater London East Midlands Yorkshire & Humberside North North West Scotland
3 4 5 6
Greater London Midlands North East and Yorkshire North West and North
Scotland
Table 4.2 HSE Regions Mapped onto DETR Regions The number of people in different trades is separated into operatives, working proprietors and administrative, professional, technical and clerical (APTC) staff. It is considered that the trades analysed in this study will be covered by operatives and working proprietors since HSE have different codes for those with APTC roles. As such the accident rates calculated for trades does not take into account APTC staff. It should be noted that these rates are for employees only since the self-employed population is not broken down by trade. The accident rate for trades and employment status is calculated for fatal and major accidents. For size of firm and region the rates are calculated for fatalities only. Rates are always calculated by dividing the number of accidents in a period by the population of concern during the same period and are expressed as the number of accidents per 100,000 workers in one year.
4.2.5
Inferential Statistics
Chi square analysis was adopted to provide support to the descriptive findings in relation to the following questions: Are certain trades more prone to some kinds of accidents than others? Are certain trades involved in more serious accidents than others?
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.9 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Is there any association between employment status and trade for those having accidents?
This section provides brief details of the Chi Square rationale and methodology. The basic approach of Chi Square involves comparing the actual number of accidents in particular groups with the number of accidents which would be expected if they occurred by chance in proportion to the size of the groups concerned. In the latter scenario, the hypothesis is that accidents are not associated with any particular groups. Chi square is used because the data available for analysis is categorical. That is to say that all the data is classified into categories that are mutually exclusive. In summary then, Chi Square is looking for significant associations between factors. In essence, the total difference between the observed accident frequencies and those which would be expected by chance is calculated. Chi Square provides a probability value (p) which gives a measure of the significance of this difference. A p value of <0.05 is usually taken as being significant and would indicate an association between the two parameters e.g. between trade and the likelihood of having an accident (for more detail on Chi Square see Cass, 1969). The factors that have been selected for analysis are: 1. 2. 3. trade trade trade x x x accident kind accident severity employment status
The trades that have been selected for analysis are builder, scaffolder, plant operative and roofer. The accident kinds which are highlighted include collapse / overturn, high fall, low fall, struck by object, transport and handling sprains. Categories are chosen if they appear to contain significant increases in fatal accidents in the most recent 6 month accident data.
4.3
RESULTS
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Figure 4.1 shows overall fatality rates for the construction industry from 1996 to 2001 including employees, self-employed and members of the public. The rates have been calculated using DETR population data and population data from the Office for National Statistics (ONS) which are used by HSE. Rates calculated
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
using DETR data are consistently higher because the population figures are consistently lower. It can be seen that the trends are almost identical which shows that similar conclusions can be drawn irrespective of which population data are used.
9.0
8.0
7.0
Fatality rate per 100,000 workers
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0 9697F 9798F 9899F Years

Rate calculated using DETR population data Rate calculated using ONS population data
9900P
0001Projected
NB Rates for 1999/00 are based on provisional accident numbers and projected rates for 2000/01 are based on provisional half year accident numbers multiplied by two. The population in 2000/01 is assumed to have stayed the same as the previous year.
Figure 4.1 Overall fatality rates in construction calculated using DETR and ONS data When the number of fatalities is plotted against trade by year, Figure 4.2 shows the most prominent categories which emerge. It can be seen that roofers and scaffolders have clearly had the most fatalities over the period and perhaps significantly, both these trades would be found working at height. In the most recent data, significant increases in fatalities have come in roofing, scaffolding, building and among plant operatives (shown as plant hirers). In the 6 months in 2000 there have been almost as many deaths in scaffolding and plant operations as there have been in total in these trades over the preceding 3 years.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.11 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
60
40
30
20 10
Trade
0
Years
Builder Carpenters and joiners Reinforced concrete specialists Painters Electrical contractors Flooring contractors
Roofers Scaffolding specialists Other manual Glaziers
Other construction Plant hirers Plumber/heating Plasterers
NB Figures for 1999/00 are provisional and projected figures for 2000/01 are based on provisional half year figures multiplied by two
Figure 4.2 Fatalities by Trade 1996-97 to 2000-01(Projected) The trades in Figure 4.1 are taken to be the group within which meaningful assessment of risk can be made since they are either the largest groups within the construction fatality numbers or they have associated population data from which the accident rate can be calculated. Results are now described from the analysis of accident rate, kind, agent and underlying causes for this group in both fatal and major injury accidents. When the fatality rate for the most prominent trades is plotted using DETR population data (Figure 4.2), it can be seen that scaffolders, roofers and plant operatives, who appear at more risk judging by accident numbers, also have the highest fatality rates. The rate of fatalities in these trades is set to increase sharply if the current trend continues. It should be noted that the fatality rate in these trades had been steadily decreasing until the April/September period in 2000.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Number of fatalities
50
Totals
9697F
9798F
9899F
9900P
0001Projected
Page 4.12 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
The highest peaks in 97/98 and 99/00 are caused by a relatively small number of fatalities among concrete specialists who have a very small population. Unfortunately, reliable population data for builders was not available and so the fatality rate for this group could not be calculated.
80.0
70.0
Fatalities per 100,000 workers
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
96/97
97/98
98/99
99/00
00/01projected
Years
Plumbers/heating eng Roofers Scaffolders Plant hirers Carpenters/joiners Plasterers Concrete specialists Flooring contractors Painters Glaziers Electrical contractors
Figure 4.3 Fatality Rate by Trade 1996-97 to 2000-01(Projected) Figure 4.3 shows the trades which are the most common in major injury accidents. It can be seen that the trades having the most major accidents are different from those at most risk of fatal accidents. Joiners and electrical contractors appear most prone to major accidents while scaffolders, roofers, plant operatives and especially builders have considerably less major accidents. Another feature of Figure 4.3 is that the number of major accidents is not set to increase significantly among these trades between 1999/00 and 2000/01 despite the fact that fatalities are.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.13 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000 500
Trade
0
Years
Carpenters and joiners Painters Plasterers Electrical contractors Plant hirers Builder
Other construction Scaffolding specialists Roofers
Figure 4.4 Major Accidents by Trade 1996-97 to 2000-01(Projected) Figure 4.4 helps to make better judgements as to the risk of major injury for each trade. Joiners have the highest rate of major injuries as well as a high number which strongly suggests they are the group at most risk, although it can be seen that the rate is on the decline since 1998/99. Scaffolders and plant operatives have a relatively high rate of major accidents despite having a lower number. Scaffolding looks to be of significant risk since the rate of major accidents is set to increase and bearing in mind that scaffolding is projected to have the highest fatality rate in 2000/01.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Number of major accidents

Page 4.14 of 4.41
Totals
9697F
9798F
9899F
9900P
00/01(projected)
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
1800 1600
Accident rate per 100,000 people
1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0
96/97
97/98
98/99
99/00
00/01 (projected)
Years
Carpenters and joiners Glaziers Plasterers Concrete specialists Insulating specialists Plumber/heating Electrical contractors Painters Roofers Flooring contractors Plant hirers Scaffolding specialists
Figure 4.5 Major Accident Rate Per 100,000 Workers by Trade 1996-97 to 2000-01(projected) Consideration of fatal and major injury accidents together can be used to give a broad indication of serious accident risk in different trades. It may be that a large decrease in major accidents in a particular trade offsets the overall risk of severe accidents, even though there is an increase in fatalities. Table 4.3 shows that for roofers and plant hirers, the total number of fatal and major accidents is projected to be lower in 2000/01 compared with the previous year while for builders and scaffolders the number has increased. For roofers, the combined number of fatal and major accidents is at its lowest since 1996 while the opposite is true for builders.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.15 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Combined fatal and major accidents by Year Trade Roofers Builder Scaffolding specialists Plant hirers 96/97 153 40 174 129 97/98 151 54 179 160 98/99 173 31 175 192 99/00P 178 50 166 188 00/01Projected 136 66 190 170
Table 4.3 Total Fatalities And Major Injury Accidents For Selected Trades Table 4.3 provides another measure of how the overall risk of a severe injury has changed over the years according to trade. This is based on a ratio used by BOMEL in previous work which is that for every 1 fatal accident there are 10 major (44) accidents . When the accidents are weighted in this way and the score divided by the total number of accidents, this provides an overall indication of accident severity. The higher this number, the greater the chance of a person suffering a more severe injury if they happen to have had an accident in that year. Severity Score by Year Trade Roofers Builder Scaffolding specialists Plant hirers 96/97 0.18 0.12 0.13 0.13 97/98 0.16 0.25 0.12 0.12 98/99 0.16 0.22 0.11 0.11 99/00P 0.14 0.17 0.11 0.10 00/01Projected 0.18 0.29 0.15 0.14
Table 4.4 Risk of Accident Severity by Year for Different Trades Table 4.4 shows that builders are currently projected to be at greatest risk of the most severe accidents and that this has been the case since 1997. It can also be seen that the severity risk has increased in all trades between 1999/00 and 2000/01 and that, with the exception of roofers, this risk is at its highest level over the period. These findings show that the recent increase in fatalities reflects an
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
increased risk of severe accidents despite the number of major accidents decreasing in some trades. Figure 4.6 begins to describe why fatalities have increased in certain trades. The dominant feature is that falls from height have contributed to the vast majority of fatal accidents since 1996. More specifically however, falls from height and accidents where people have been trapped by something collapsing or overturning are set to increase considerably between 1999/00 and 2000/01. Closer inspection of the data reveals that all the fatal accidents to scaffolders and roofers from April to September 2000 were falls from height as were 3 of the 7 building fatalities. The other 4 fatalities to builders were caused by collapse/overturn accidents compared to only one such accident in this trade over the previous 4 years.
140 120 100 80
60 40 20
Accident kind
9697F 9798F 9899F 9900P 0001Projected
0
Total
Years
Struck by Low fall <2m Other kind Volt Machinery Strike/step on
High fall >2m Collapse/overturn Not known
Transport Fall height not known Drowning/asphyxiation
Figure 4.6 Accident Kind in Fatalities 1996-97 to 2000-01(Projected)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.17 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
It is apparent that falls from height are the most significant direct cause of major injury accidents as well as fatalities, as shown by Figure 4.7, although low falls, slips/trips and struck by accidents also account for a considerable proportion of such accidents. As with fatalities, the majority of major accidents experienced by scaffolders and builders are caused by falls from height. Figure 4.7 also shows that unlike in fatalities, falls from height and collapse/overturn accidents are not set to increase in major injury accidents.
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
Accident kind
0001Projected 9900P 9899F 9798F 9697F Totals
Years
Slip/trip Machinery Exposure/hot substance Struck by Fall height not known Collapse/overturn
High fall >2m Handling sprains Volt
Low fall <2m Strike/step on Transport
Figure 4.7 Accident Kind in Major Accidents 1996-97 to 2000-01(Projected)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Number of major accidents

Page 4.18 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 4.8 shows the common agents in fatal high falls since 1996. Agents usually relate to the hardware involved in the accident and give an indication as to the activity at the time of the accident. It can be seen that falls through fragile roofs have been the greatest contributor to falls from height since 1996. Falls through roofs have already increased in the 6 months in 2000 compared to the previous year and a continuation of this trend will see a marked increase. Perhaps not surprisingly, four of the five accidents where the injured person has fallen through a fragile roof have involved roofers. Falls from scaffold and from tower scaffold have both increased over the period of interest which appears consistent with the finding that fatalities among scaffolders have increased. However, scaffold is not the agent in any of the five fatalities to scaffolders in 2000/01 half year. Those falling from scaffolding include a painter, a builder and a roofer. In the 6 months in 2000 there have been three access falls which is as many as there have been over the three preceding years. Two of these access falls have involved scaffolders. Collapse of part of a building has been the agent in five of the ten fatal accidents where a person has been trapped by something collapsing or overturning. Builders have been involved in four of the five cases when part of a building has collapsed. There appear to be no significant agents when those involved in transport accidents are assessed. In major accidents, falls from mobile ladders account for the vast majority of injuries. None of the agents associated with the recent increase in fatalities are set to become more prominent in major accidents.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.19 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
30
20
15
10
Agents
98/99 97/98 96/97 Total
00/01 Projection
Fall through fragile roof Access fall
99/00
Years
Fall from mobile ladder Fall from scaffold
Fall from roof edge Fall from tower scaffold
Figure 4.8 Common Agents in High Fall Fatalities 1996-97 to 2000-01(Provisional) Underlying causes in a cross section of accidents are identified in HSE accident investigations and have been analysed for high falls since these make up the biggest group of accidents in the construction industry. Unfortunately, this data is only available up until 31 March 2000 and so it has not been possible to determine if there are different causes from April to September 2000 which may be significant in terms of the increase in fatalities.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.20 of 4.41
Number of fatal high falls
25
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 4.9 shows underlying causes in high fall fatalities from 1996 to 2000. It can be seen that unsafe transient work and failure to control risk have been associated with the greatest number of high fall fatalities over the period. Other common causes are perhaps more specific and include unsafe procedures, precautions not available, unsafe maintenance and inadequate supervision.
20
16 14 12 10 8 6 4
Underlying causes
9697F Totals
2 0
9900P
Unsafe transient work Unsafe procedure
9899F
9798F
Years
Failure to control risk Unsafe maintenance Precautions not available Inadequate supervision
NB Figures for 1999/00 are based on provisional accident numbers
Figure 4.9 Underlying Causes From HSE Investigated Fatal High Falls 1996-97 to 1999-00 The common causes in fatal high falls are also found when investigations into collapse/overturn accidents are analysed. Again, unsafe transient work and failure to control risk are the dominant causes with inadequate supervision and unsafe procedures also being cited. A different pattern emerges when the causes in transport accidents are assessed. In these accidents, inadequate design, ineffective policy, operator error and no PPE are all identified as primary causes with operator error being particularly dominant. It has been identified that unsafe transient work and failure to control risk are found to be the most common underlying causes in major accident high falls as well as fatal high falls. Additional causes in major high falls include not following instructions, poor access/egress, operator error and unsafe transient work.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.21 of 4.41
Number of fatal high falls
18
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Analysis of age and employment status has been undertaken for all fatal accidents to gain a broader picture of factors which might impact upon construction safety. Figure 4.10 shows fatalities plotted according to age group. It can be observed that the projected increase in fatalities in the most recent data is set to occur to some extent across most age groups. It is noticeable that there are less fatalities in the age groups at either end of the age spectrum i.e. the 16 to 19 age group and those 55 and over. In the younger age group, a large proportion of the general population are likely to still be in the education system. In the older age groups, many are likely to have retired. This being the case, age does not seem to be an important factor in construction fatalities. This is confirmed to some extent by Table 4.5 which shows the average age of fatalities by trade since 1996. No age group stands out as being at particular risk either within or between trades.
70 60 50 40
16-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44
30 20 10
55-59
Age groups
45-49 50-54
0
9899F
65-69
0001Projected
9900P
Years
16-19 50-54
20-24 55-59
25-29 60-64
30-34 65-69
35-39
9798F
40-44
9697F
45-49
Figure 4.10 Age in Fatalities 1996-97 to 2000-01(Projected)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Totals
60-64
Page 4.22 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Average Age of Deceased Person by Year (number of fatalities in brackets) Trade Roofers Scaffolding specialists Carpenters& joiners Painters Plant hirers Electrical contractors Plumber/heating Flooring contractors Glaziers Plasterers
NB Figures for 1999/00 and 2000/01 are provisional
96/97
97/98
98/99
99/00 35 (7) 22 (1) 57 (2) 52 (4) 19 (1) 46 (6)
00/01 (6 months) 41 (6) 41 (5) 51 (2) 51 (3) 41 (4)
Average 96/01 40 (47) 35 (16) 48 (11) 44 (20) 37 (15) 44 (10) 33 (6)
41 (13) 45 (10) 39 (11) 42 (5) 40 (4) 47 (4) 40 (5) 39 (2) 19 (1) 48 (1) 26 (1) 27 (3) 65 (2) 36 (4) 46 (3) 52 (1) 41 (2) 42 (2) 28 (1) 34 (5) 43 (2) 40 (1) 39 (3)
28 (1)
38 (2) 26 (1) 50 (1) 50 (1)
Table 4.5 Average Age Of Fatalities By Trade 1996/97 To 2000/01 Half Year When age in major injury accidents is compared to age in fatalities (Figure 4.6) there are two features which become apparent. Firstly, major injury accidents are not projected to markedly increase in any age groups in 2000/01. Secondly, the overall age profile is broadly similar with one exception: in fatal accidents, there is a peak in the 50-54 age group which is not evident in major accidents. This could be evidence that this age group are at more risk of fatal injuries if they have an accident.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.23 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0
16-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 Age group 45-49 50-54 55-59
0001Projected
9900P
9899F
9798F
65-69
16-19 50-54
20-24 55-59
25-29 60-64
30-34 65-69
35-39
40-44
9697F
Years 45-49
Figure 4.11 Age In Major Injury Accidents 1996/97 To 2000/01(Projected)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
totals
60-64
Number of major injury accidents
Page 4.24 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 4.12 suggests that employees are at more risk of a fatal accident since this group has around twice as many fatal accidents as the self-employed every year. Closer inspection of the data reveals that the effect of employment status may differ depending on trade. Scaffolders, roofers and plant operatives in fatal accidents are predominantly employees. However, it has been found that selfemployed builders have more fatalities than employed builders over the period and so it may be too much of a generalisation to say that employees are at more risk of fatalities. The recent increase in fatalities has included more fatal accidents in both groups and so employment status is unlikely to help explain the increase.
180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 9697F 9798F 9899F 9900P 0001projected
Employee
Employment status Years

Self employed
Totals
Trainee
Figure 4.12 Employment Status in Fatalities 1996-97 to 2000-01(Projected)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.25 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 4.13 indicates that employees have a consistently higher fatality rate compared with the self-employed but this cannot necessarily be linked to employment status over and above a link with trades which use predominantly employed or self-employed workers. Although under-reporting of injuries to the self-employed is potentially an issue for serious injuries, the mechanism for notification of fatalities means that this is unlikely to affect the statistics significantly. Furthermore, when fatal accidents are investigated it may become apparent that the injured party is essentially an employee in terms of the way work is managed on site, even though income tax may be paid as a self-employed person. In such cases the fatality is likely to be categorised as in the investigation employee. Accident statistics are likely to be linked to the work organisation and population statistics to taxation methods giving an apparently high fatality rate for employees. The trends indicated in Figure 4.13 show that when the fatality rate in 1996/97 was last as high as it is projected to be in 2000/01, the self employed rate was 42% that of the employed rate whereas now the figure works out as a higher proportion i.e. 66%. The risk of a fatal accident for the self-employed is greater than it ever has been since the implementation of RIDDOR 95.
10.0 9.0 8.0
Fatality rate per 100,000 people
7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 1996/1997 1997/1998 1998/1999 Years
Employees Self employed
1999/2000
2000/2001 projected
Figure 4.13 Fatality Rate Per 100,000 People According to Employment Status
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.26 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
When employment status is considered for major injury accidents a similar trend is found to that for fatalities in that the number and rate of major accidents is considerably greater among employees. When this is looked at by trade, employed builders have more major accidents than self employed builders which is contrary to what is found when fatal accidents are assessed in this way. Figure 4.14 shows fatalities according to the maximum number of people under the control of the client who are likely to be on site at any one time. These people may be made up from a number of different contractors. This variable helps to give an idea as to whether the size of the construction project affects the number of accidents. It can be seen that significantly more fatal accidents have occurred on smaller construction sites with the majority of them being on sites with between 1 and 13 people. In the most recent period, fatalities are set to increase across all the smaller work sites. It could be that an increase in the number of small work sites has contributed to a corresponding overall increase in fatalities. Further data on the number of work sites according to their size is required to test this hypothesis. A similar trend is observed when major injury accidents are plotted according to the number of people likely to be on site in that there are more major injury accidents on smaller sites. The main difference is one of magnitude in that lone workers have approaching 3 times as many major accidents compared to the next biggest group.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.27 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20
Maximum number of people on site
10 0
0001projected
9900P
9899F
9798F
9697F
Years
14-24 600-1199 25-34
1 35-59
2-3 60-79
4-7 80-114
8-13 115-299
Figure 4.14 Fatalities According To Maximum Number Of People Likely To Be On Site At Any One Time 1996-97 To 2000-01projected
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Totals
Page 4.28 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 4.15 shows the number of fatalities according to the number of employees in the company of the injured person. It can be seen that fatalities occur most in small companies with those employing one person accounting for the most since 1996. However, fatalities in one employee companies have been steadily reducing over this time. During 2000/01 the most significant increase on the previous year is projected to be in companies with 2 or 3 people although there are also increases among bigger companies, most notably those with 14-24 people and with 80-114 people.
45 40 35 30 25 20 15 Number of people employed by company of injured person 10 5 0

9900P 9899F 9798F 9697F Total
0001projected
Years
8-13 80-114 14-24 115-299
1 25-34 300-599
2-3 35-59 600-1199
4-7 60-79 1200 and over
Figure 4.15 Number Of Fatalities According To Employees In Company Of Injured Person 1996-97 To 2000-01projected More detailed analysis of firm size has shown that the majority of builders, roofers and scaffolders involved in fatal accidents since 1996 are from companies with between one and seven employees. It could be, however, that the majority of companies from these trades happen to be of this size. Probably a related finding is that the majority of fatal high falls during this time have happened to people in companies with between 1 and 13 employees. Precautions not available and
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.29 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
unsafe transient work are found to be common causes in fatal accidents involving people from companies of this size. Figure 4.16 shows the fatality rate according to the size of firm and suggests that risk is not confined to those working for smaller companies. The highest fatality rate is for people working for companies with 80-114 people. This was zero in 1998/99 but has risen sharply since this time. The fatality rate for companies with only one employee is relatively low.
18.0 16.0 14.0 12.0 10.0 8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 9697F 9798F 9899F Years
1 25-34 300-599 2-3 35-59 600-1199 4-7 60-79 1200 and over 8-13 80-114 14-24 115-299
Fatality rate per 100,000 people
9900P
0001Projected
Figure 4.16 Fatality Rate According To Size Of Firm 1996-97 To 200001(Projected) It seems there is more risk of a person being involved in a fatal accident if they work for a small to medium sized company. At the six month point in 2000/01 there have been no fatalities in companies with more than 114 people. The high number of accidents to people in small companies but relatively lower rates suggests that there are many more small companies than larger ones and that the overall population from smaller companies is greater. Such a situation will be exacerbated by more outsourcing and so more subcontractors.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.30 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
There is some evidence that the risk associated with the size of firm a person works for is mediated by the size of the work site on which they happen to be working. On smaller sites (which account for the majority of accidents) people from small and large companies are found to be involved in fatal accidents. On larger sites however, it is people from smaller companies who have had fatal accidents. As an illustration, on sites of over 60 people, no-one from a company with more than 13 employees has been killed since 1996. The results of the analysis of firm and site size must be treated with caution due to the large amount of missing data. Figure 4.17 shows fatalities by geographical region. Greater London has seen the greatest number of construction fatalities since 1996 although the greatest increase between 1999/00 and 2000/01 is set to be in the North East and Yorkshire. Generally speaking, it is projected that there will be small increases in fatalities in all regions. This means that the recent increase in fatalities is not region specific.
120
100
80
60
40
20
Region
0
0001projected
9900P
9899F
Years
East Anglia and SE North East & Yorkshire
Greater London Scotland
Midlands Wales W Midlands & SW
9798F
9697F
North & North West
Figure 4.17 Fatalities By Region 1996-97 To 2000-01(Projected)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Total
Page 4.31 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 4.18 confirms this by showing that the rate of fatalities is also set to increase across all regions except the North and North West. The Midlands is projected to have the highest rate of fatalities.
25.0
20.0
Fatality rate per 100,000 employees
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0 9697F 9798F 9899F Years

East Anglia and SE North East & Yorkshire Greater London Scotland Midlands Wales W Midlands & SW North & North West
9900P
0001Projected
Figure 4.18 Fatality Rate By Region 1996-97 To 2000-01(Projected) Although region does not seem to be significant in the recent increase in fatalities, it is perhaps worth noting that there has been a sharp increase in fatalities in the North East and Yorkshire. It is possible that construction may be in a boom in a particular region which might contribute to such an increase. As such, there may be benefit in HSE monitoring such situations and mounting localised safety campaigns as appropriate.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.32 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
When time of year is analysed in quarters it is found that fatalities and major accidents are spread fairly evenly throughout the year. Figure 4.19 shows that fatalities increase in both quarters in the most recent 6 month data. It can be seen that fatalities have been spread throughout the years since 1996. There is little evidence to suggest that time of year has an important influence on accidents in construction.
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Yearly quarter
Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 0001P (6 months) 9900P 9899F 9798F 9697F Totals exclude 0001P 0
Years
Quarter 1
Quarter 2
Quarter 3
Quarter 4
NB The accident reporting year runs from the beginning of quarter 2 to the end of quarter 1. Accidents for the second half of 2000/01 have not been projected.
Figure 4.19 Fatal Accidents By Yearly Quarter 1996/97 To 2000/01 Half Year Figure 4.19 shows the time of accident for fatalities since 1996. It can be seen that in all years, the time of accident is spread throughout the day with peaks in the morning and in the afternoon. Further analysis shows there are reasonably equal numbers of fatal accidents in the am period compared with the pm period. In 2000/01 there are projected to be increases in fatal accidents in various time slots through the day. When the total accidents from 1996 are assessed it can be seen there is a marked decrease in accidents between 1300 hours and 1359 which is presumably
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.33 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
the time people are having a lunch break. From 1400 hours through to 1800 hours there is a steady decrease in accidents. This could be accounted for by the fact that more and more trades are likely to knock off as the afternoon progresses. This trend is projected to occur in 2000/01 from 1500 hours and fails to support the notion that longer working hours and an increase in fatigue are responsible for the recent increase in fatalities.
60 50
40 30 20 10 0
2300-2359 2200-2259 2100-2159 2000-2059
1900-1959
1800-1859
1700-1759
1600-1659
1500-1559
1400-1459
1300-1359
1200-1259
1100-1159
1000-1059
Totals
0900-0959 0800-0859 0700-0759
9798F
0600-0659 0500-0559 0400-0459 0300-0359
Time of accident by the hour
9900P
0200-0259 0100-0159 0000-0059
Years
Totals
9697F
9798F
9899F
9900P
0001projected
Figure 4.20 Time Of Accident Against Year 1996/97 To 2000/01(Projected)
4.3.2
Inferential Statistics
The results from the Chi Square tests are presented in the tables below. In each cell, the first number (in bold) is the observed number of accidents, the second number (in brackets) is the frequency which would be expected by chance and the third number is the individual Chi Square value, the size of which is proportional to the difference between the observed and expected frequencies.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.34 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
A significance level of p=<0.05 shows that a significant association lies somewhere in the table. In this case, the largest individual Chi Square values suggest the most significant associations. However, it is important to consider the populations of the groups under study before any firm conclusions regarding significance are drawn. Table 4.6 shows accident kind against selected trades in major injury accidents. A p value of 0.0005 was obtained which indicates a strong association exists. Closer inspection of the table shows that more roofers have been involved in falls from height and that more plant hirers have been involved in transport accidents than would be expected by chance. These findings can be regarded as significant since roofers and plant hirers have relatively high accident rates. Given the nature of the major injury accidents which roofers and plant hirers are associated with it might also be expected that they suffer relatively high numbers of fatalities from these accidents. The data supports this by showing that the majority of fatal accidents involving roofers are high falls and half of the fatal accidents involving plant hirers are transport. Such a conclusion would not be reasonable if a trade was strongly associated with handling sprains or low falls for example. Accident kind in major accidents Trade Builder Collapse/ overturn 6 (4.1) 0.91 4 (14.6) 7.65 32 (13.5) 25.1 6 (15.8) 6.1 48 High fall Low fall Struck by 33 (31.2) 0.10 51 (111.6) 32.89 140 (103.9) 12.6 144 (121.3) 4.2 368 Transport Handling sprains 11 (13.5) 0.46 37 (48.2) 2.61 65 (44.9) 9.0 46 (52.4) 0.8 159 Row totals 138
46 (53.6) 1.09 309 (191.6) 71.90 36 (178.4) 113.7 241 (208.3) 5.1 632
31 (30.3) 0.02 90 (108.2) 3.07 143 (100.8) 17.7 93 (117.7) 5.2 357
11 (5.3) 6.26 2 (18.8) 15.01 43 (17.5) 37.1 6 (20.4) 10.2 62
Roofer
493
Plant
459
Scaffolder
536
Column totals
1626
p = 0.0005
Table 4.6 Selected Trades Against Accident Kind In Major Accidents 1996-2000
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Table 4.7 shows selected trades against accident severity. Again a p value of 0.0005 was obtained which indicates that a significant association exists in the table. It can be seen that a relatively high number of fatalities for builders carries the strongest association by a considerable margin. This suggests that, of the trades which have been identified as being at the highest risk of fatalities, builders deserve particular attention. However, it is difficult to decide on the significance of this association since the fatality rate for builders cannot be calculated. It may be that builders make up the largest group of the trades shown in which case the number of fatalities is unlikely to be significant. Accident severity Trade Builder Fatal 25 (6.5) 52.2 Roofer 47 (28.4) 12.1 Plant 15 (35.9) 12.2 Scaffolder 16 (32.1) 8.1 Column totals
p = 0.0005
Major 183 (150.3) 7.1 676 (654.4) 0.7 739 (827.3) 9.4 773 (739.0) 1.6 2371
Minor 206 (257.1) 10.2 1079 (1119.2) 1.4 1524 (1414.8) 8.4 1246 (1263.9) 0.3 4055
Row totals 414
1802
2278
2035
103
6529
Table 4.7 Selected Trades Against Accident Severity 1996-2000
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.36 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Table 4.8 shows trades against employment status and demonstrates a significant association between these variables (p = 0.0005). The strongest association is between self-employed builders and fatalities. Again, it is difficult to comment on the significance of this finding without knowing the accident rates although it reiterates the point that the risk associated with employment status may depend on trade. Trade Employment status Scaffolder Roofer Builder Plant Row totals Employed 13 (8.85) 1.95 Self-employed 2 (6.15) 2.80 Column totals
p = 0.0005
28 (27.73) 0.00 19 (19.27) 0.00 47
4 (13.57) 6.75 19 (9.43) 9.71 23
14 (8.85) 3.00 1 (6.15) 4.31 15
59
41
15
100
Table 4.8 Selected Trades Against Employment Status In Fatal Accidents 19962000
4.4
DISCUSSION
From the accident data analysis it has been possible to establish trades, accident kinds, agents and causes which are associated with accidents in construction. In addition to these it has also been possible to study a number of additional factors which help to describe the accident risk in construction in more generic terms. Despite this, however, there are a number of features of the accident and population data which limit the analysis and make it more difficult to assess exactly why the fatality rate in construction has increased recently. The lack of depth of accident data is one of the most important reasons why it is difficult to establish causes as opposed to describing areas of risk. Certain variables relating to personal factors such as nationality and work experience would be useful to analyse but are not available. A field relating more directly to the specific activity at the time of the accident is likely to provide more detail as to the cause than agent involved in accident.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.37 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
The classification system used by HSE is another feature of the data which does not lend itself to data analysis. The vast number of categories that are used for certain fields such as process environment and accident agent make it difficult to extract which factors are important in terms of risk. Taking agents as an example, there are 79 different agents related to the 338 fatalities in construction since 1996. The way in which agents have been differentiated means that they are spread widely across these accidents. As a result, it is difficult to pick up on any common threads in the accidents (which might be expected given the vast majority are falls from height). Unless categories can be merged together to reflect common areas of risk then data analysis can be meaningless. It can also be argued that information on variables such as process environment and agent is relatively sterile without knowledge regarding the underlying causes of an accident. As a case in point, knowing that several people are killed by falling from scaffolds during house building reveals little about why the accidents happen or how to prevent them. The HSE accident investigation summaries provide an indication of the underlying causes in accidents. However, categories such as failure to control risk and unsafe transient work are far too generic to provide the level of detail required to understand the cause of an accident. Information is required on what made the activity unsafe and why the risk was not controlled. Unfortunately, these categories are cited most often in major and fatal accidents. A further limitation of the data is the mismatch between HSE coding and the classification used by DETR to publish population data for the construction industry. In some cases it has been possible to map codes directly on to one another but in others it is necessary to either combine population data or bundle occupations together. Clearly this will not be as reliable as it would be if the classification systems were the same. In the worst cases it is not possible to identify reliable population data for some HSE occupations either because it does not exist or because the categories used cannot be aligned reliably. Several aspects of the population data itself do not help the calculation of accident rates for construction. One such feature is that self-employed workers are not broken down by trade. In addition, it has been observed that there appear to be inconsistencies within the data itself and between it and the population data which HSE use to calculate accident rates. The source of these inconsistencies is unclear but is likely to come from the way the data is collected and coded. In summary, a standardised system of collecting and presenting population data which takes into account the coding of accident data would be of benefit for calculating accident rates.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.38 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
A reminder of the research questions which were developed to guide the data analysis is provided below. 1. Are there differences between the periods in the trades where fatalities occur? Are these differences significant when the fatality rate is considered? For the trades which appear to account for the recent increase in fatalities, are there different risks in terms of accident kind, accident agent or underlying cause? 4. For the trades which appear to account for the recent increase in fatalities, are there any differences in age or employment status of the injured person? Do trends in fatal injury accidents match those in major injury accidents? Are there variables which can be analysed from accident data to give an idea of generic risk in construction?
2. 3.
5. 6.
Despite the limitations which have been discussed, the data analysis has helped to answer the above questions by providing an insight into areas of accident risk and helping to describe the nature of this risk. In particular, several pointers have been provided as to why the fatality rate may have increased recently although it is not possible to extract categorical evidence from the data. The following are the main conclusions which have been drawn from the data analysis: 1. The trades who appear to have contributed most to the recent increase in fatalities are roofers, scaffolders, builders and plant operatives (hirers). In particular, scaffolders and plant operatives have seen a steep rise in the number and rate of fatal accidents compared with the previous three years. Strong statistical associations have been found between roofers and high falls and between plant hirers and transport accidents. 2. When the fatality rate is calculated for trades, it is found that scaffolders, roofers and plant operatives, who seem to have had the most significant
HSE Task Number B\0087 Page 4.39 of 4.41
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
increase in accidents in 2000, also have the highest fatality rates. These trades can currently be regarded as the highest risk in terms of fatalities in construction. 3. Falls from a height and collapse/overturn accidents are set to increase sharply by the end of the 2000/01 period. All fatalities to roofers and scaffolders during this time have been caused by high falls and several collapse/overturn accidents have involved builders. 4. The agents which are most related to the recent increase in fatalities are falls through fragile roofs, falls from scaffold (specifically tower scaffold) and collapse of part of a building. Roofers have been involved in the majority of accidents where a fragile roof is the agent. Scaffolding has not been the agent in any of the fatal accidents involving scaffolders although two of these accidents have been classed as access falls. Builders have suffered the majority of fatal accidents caused when part of a building collapses. 5. The most common underlying causes in fatal high falls and collapse/overturn accidents which have been identified by HSE between 1996-97 and 1999-00 are unsafe transient work and failure to control risk. Different causes are apparent in transport accidents with operator error being particularly prominent. These causes are likely to be involved in the most recent fatalities but the generic nature of the categories limits the usefulness of the findings. There is very little evidence that age is an important factor in the recent increase in fatalities. Fatalities are projected to increase in most age groups and the average age of fatalities is similar across trades. One finding worthy of note is that the 50 54 age group are perhaps more likely to suffer fatal injuries if they have a serious accident. 7. Statistically, employees are at more risk of fatal accidents than selfemployed workers although the self-employed are projected to have the highest risk of a fatality since 1996. In certain trades such as for builders, the opposite appears to be true. It is concluded, therefore, that the risk associated with employment status is dependent on trade. Employment status in itself does not seem to be important in the recent increase in fatalities.
6.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.40 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
8. Although many of the factors are the same, there is little similarity between the recent trends for fatal injury accidents and those for major injury accidents. Broadly speaking, the increase in fatalities in certain trades is not reflected in major accidents and neither is the increase in certain kinds of fatal accidents. Similarly, the agents which feature more in the recent fatalities do not stand out in major accidents. 9. When fatal and major injury accidents are considered together, the recent increase in fatalities in certain trades is found to have increased the overall risk of a severe accident. This is not masked by a decrease in major accidents in the trades concerned. 10. The majority of fatal accidents occur on relatively small construction sites with between 1 and 13 people likely to be on the site at any one time. However, this factor does not appear to be related to the recent increase in fatalities since there has been an increase across all of the smaller work site categories. 11. Accident numbers suggest that fatalities occur most in smaller companies especially those with only one employee. However, when the accident rate is plotted according to size of firm it can be seen that the risk stretches from small to medium sized companies. Builders, scaffolders and roofers who experience fatal accidents tend to be from smaller companies. However, this could be because of the nature of the work as opposed to the size of the company per se. There is some evidence to suggest that the risks associated with the size of a firm are mediated by the size of the construction site being worked on. Workers from large and small firms have fatal accidents on small sites but on large sites it is workers from small firms who tend to have such accidents. 13. The recent increase in construction fatalities is not specific to any geographical region. The fatality rate is set to increase across all regions except the North and North West where it is projected to stay the same. 14. Time of year and time of accident appear unrelated to construction accidents in general and do not seem to be associated with the increase in construction fatalities in 2000. In particular, fatal accidents have a tendency to decrease as the afternoon progresses which suggests longer working hours and fatigue are not important factors.
12.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 4.41 of 4.41
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
5. DATA SOURCES OF ACCIDENTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
5.1
CATEGORIES OF DATA
From the difficulties which have been found in this study and from previous experience of analysing RIDDOR data, it is known that the information required to draw conclusions as to the causes and prevention of accidents can be either inadequate, missing, or not recorded. In RIDDOR, there is a shortage of data relating to the direct and underlying causes of an accident. Without this information it is difficult to determine how particular accidents might be prevented. Of interest is whether or not RIDDOR has particular shortcomings or if the collection of accident data in general has the same fundamental flaws. Is it possible to identify fields which are recorded in other sets of accident data which may be of benefit in RIDDOR? To address these issues, a brief review has been undertaken to assess the limitations of RIDDOR in relation to other sources of accident data. From the literature and from internet searches, it has been possible to identify the fields which are recorded in accident data from several different countries including Hong Kong, United States, Japan, Canada, Australia and Singapore. It has been found that there are a number of fields which are collected in accident data by most countries such as industry, occupation, nature of injury, severity of injury and kind of accident. In addition, there are a variety of variables which only some countries record. These include, time of accident, time injured person started work, experience, height of fall, substance involved, machine involved, average working days per month, salary details, size of business, end use of construction, project type, project costs and number of storeys (of building). Several of the variables identified, while potentially important, only serve to describe areas of risk. Fields such as industry and occupation are of this type. Some variables add detail, for example accident kind and substance involved, and may provide clues as to why the accident happened, albeit at a very direct level. There are other variables which help to describe generic risk such as, size of business, project type and project costs.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 5.1 of 5.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Each variable should be assessed in terms of why it is required and what it adds to the investigative process. For example, some data will be required for legal reasons. An important part of assessing an accident recording system is to determine whether or not there are a set of variables which can be used to establish the underlying cause of the accident. Variables which may lead to identifying the cause of an accident have been found such as experience, time injured person started work and whether a machine was involved or not. If such data provide enough detail, it may be possible to draw conclusions regarding the influence of training, fatigue or design in the accident. However, the variables of this nature that have been found tend to be spread across the accident reporting systems. As such, any one system is lacking in terms of fields which might reveal comprehensive information about underlying causes. Other details such as training record, nationality, familiarity with work site and accident history would be of use when trying to establish factors which contribute to accidents. Fundamentally, not enough information is collected on the direct and underlying causes in an accident. A description of what happened and where it happened is not sufficient to draw conclusions as to why it happened. Only when the latter question is answered is it possible to devise effective measures aimed at preventing such an event from happening again. It should be acknowledged that it may be difficult to establish underlying causes in an accident until after the accident investigation is complete. Particularly if the consequences have been severe there is a fear of blame and prosecution. It is evident that it is extremely difficult for investigations to determine the full and honest picture. More may be learnt from near miss reporting and actions at a site level in the context of a just culture fairly seeking improvement, apportioning blame where appropriate. This being the case, it seems important that such information is fed back into accident databases. It seems that this is not common practice since none of the reporting systems analysed included fields specifically for causes of the accident. It is notable that a new accident investigation model is currently being introduced (55) which takes a modular approach covering factors about the accident, by HSE the events chain, an analysis of the contributory factors (covering human, plant / equipment, training, procedural, and supervision issues), an analysis of management issues and documentation of reasonably practicable precautions. Further analysis across multiple incidents investigated in this way will help identify generic measures and areas for improvement. Recent HSE research underlies
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 5.2 of 5.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
the need for a multilevel approach(56). A complementary analysis of incident records to that reported in Section 4, developed a consistent response model revealing the network of interrelationships between construction accidents and the underlying factors.
5.2
INFLUENCES ON CONSTRUCTION SAFETY

Identification of the factors which influence accidents in construction is of benefit at two main levels. Firstly, knowledge of what influences the chance of an accident can help to provide understanding of the direct causes and prevention of specific types of accident. Secondly, on a broader level, underlying factors which influence accidents indirectly can be established. This may lead to changes which can improve overall safety in construction. It has been found from experience that influence data is distinct from raw accident data and as such must be retrieved from other sources. A literature review has been carried out in order to identify what are perceived to be the main influences on safety in construction. Reports have been obtained from organisations such as HSE and DETR and textbooks on construction, conference proceedings, journals and internet sites have been referred to. It should be pointed out at this stage that the review is not intended to be exhaustive. The purpose of the exercise is to provide an initial indication of the factors which seem to be important and common strands in interpretations. Such an understanding can be used to guide analysis in other areas of this study. Considerable agreement on the factors which influence construction safety has been found across the sources. The role of clients has been identified in most of the sources as having the potential to improve safety on construction sites. If clients build safety into the tendering process then it should encourage contractors to improve their safety performance. Management ownership of safety initiatives and commitment towards them is commonly cited as important in safety. In addition, training to develop safety skills has strong backing as a means to influence safety. Other important influences have been identified as safety culture, risk assessment in design, sharing of best practice and production levels. The common strand in construction safety appears to be the need to foster a culture whereby the major stakeholders such as clients, contractors, designers and managers are motivated to place safety high on their agenda. These themes
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 5.3 of 5.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
have been adopted in the Construction Summit(4). Obstacles to this goal have been suggested by findings from a study at Loughborough University(19) and by the results of a recent survey carried out by New Civil Engineer(24, 25). These studies have shown that different stakeholders have varied opinions regarding the most important influences in construction safety depending on the part they play in the industry. For example, in the Loughborough study, operatives on site were less inclined to think that poor safety culture and unsuitable contractors contribute towards accidents in contrast to senior management views. In addition, there appears to be a tendency for stakeholders to overestimate their own performance in comparison with how others perceive it. This suggests that certain groups are looking to others to play the lead role in improving safety in construction rather than taking more responsibility themselves. When deciding on which influences are important in construction safety, it is worth remembering that there is very little correspondence between raw accident data and the factors which are regarded as influencing these accidents. This means that there is limited scope for testing the validity of perceived influences in relation to accident trends. Other methods of generating and substantiating influences are necessary such as focus groups with industry experts. While this is invaluable, it should be remembered that the results are subjective and may have in-built bias. This situation will remain until accident reporting systems are designed to collect underlying causes in accidents which can be linked directly to perceived influences. The Influence Network technique introduced in Section 7 aims to bring together the data and judgement sources in a logical and structured manner.
5.3
ACCIDENT LEVELS AND PROFILES

The data searches were also used to examine different trends in other countries considering construction in relation to other industries and the profile of accident types within the sector. Some caution is necessary because of different reporting regimes, different definitions of construction, different levels of construction activity, different ethnic cultures and attitudes to risk, and different provisions for health and safety at work. The objective was to identify any areas where performance was substantially better with a view to identifying measures that may be being implemented successfully to reduce unsafe site practices. The information available is extensive but formats vary from providing access to raw data to descriptive summaries. Information was gathered for the USA, countries across Europe (including Ireland) and the Far East notably, Japan,
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 5.4 of 5.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Singapore and Hong Kong. No information was found for Eastern Europe. Of the information that was available, construction was always identified as a high contributor to the national accidents. In some cases, such as Japan, construction fatalities contribute some 30-40% of the overall total, whereas in Great Britain the contribution is about a quarter. In most regimes falls form height is a clearly defined accident category, and across the board it appears to dominate construction fatalities. The pattern of construction injuries in Ireland is similar to the findings from RIDDOR, with around 50% of fatalities in 1999 being attributable to falls from height. A recent European wide survey shows a fatality rate of 5.6 per 100,000 for construction in the UK, compared with rates of 8.6, 20.8, 17.6 and 28.9 in Germany, France, Italy and Spain respectively. In Germany, Italy and Spain, construction fatality rates are about three times those in manufacturing; In the UK the ratio is 4 times and in France 5. It is noted that culture is a significant aspect and countries bordering on the Mediterranean have particular problems with attitudes to risk and compliance. This extensive survey and brief summary of a large volume of information, demonstrates that the UK Construction industry is not missing solutions that other nations have implemented and in fact its safety record appears substantially better than other comparable nations. Falls from height is a major concern for construction internationally.
(53)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 5.5 of 5.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
6. CONSTRUCTION RISK PROFILE
6.1
DATA FINDINGS
Evidence from the data shows a reasonably consistent risk profile across construction year on year. Fatal falls from height dominate but the movement of plant and raising of materials between levels are substantial hazards. The open literature and international data reinforce this picture. With the increase in construction fatalities in the current year data, an increase of ~60%, specific attention was paid to identifying potential reasons for change. The data analysis in Section 4 was extended to include a review of a number of hypotheses proposed by DETR reflecting a range of views within the industries, comprising: Workload Sector Regional
Skills shortages / training More self-employed Poor team working / site organisation / communication / management Less compliance / inadequate enforcement Weather conditions Client pressure / greater emphasis on predictability / cutting corners / bonuses Longer working hours / time of day More people dying from major accidents Foreign workers Density of work area Rogue traders Coverage and collection of data
In summary the hypotheses all identify issues affecting the industry, some with short term implications such as poor weather. Many of the points, though valid to pose, cannot be supported from the data. Based on the data and hypotheses alone it is not possible to fully quantify what impact they might have. Nevertheless no change is so remarkable that a 60% increase in fatalities can sensibly be explained.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 6.1 of 6.2
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
This highlights the difficulty of relating data to a changing risk profile in the absence of a comprehensive quantification of the influences.
6.2
DATA APPLICATION
The discussion thus far has concerned data on construction accidents and the evidence that these provide about factors contributing to their occurrence. It is evident that data have generally been gathered to determine the profile and extent of accidents and data collection has focussed on parameters which are readily quantified and categorised. Accidents, however, are recognised to occur through a combination of circumstances often involving human failures whether it be due to error or violation. For many of the factors quantitative evidence is not available and the interactions and subsidiary influences are complex. HSEs incident investigation reports provide some evidence and the experience of those working in the industry bring complementary insight. The challenge is how these can be combined to give a fuller understanding. The evaluation of the data provides evidence of what has occurred and, by extrapolation, points at which workers are at greatest risk. Far more important, however, is to be able to implement appropriate courses of action to prevent accidents in the future. In order to determine what these might be, it is necessary to be able to structure the disparate sources of evidence to provide a comprehensive model of accidents. In the next section the Influence Network approach to modelling is introduced as a generic technique and is then illustrated by specific application to construction. It is shown how the data described to this point provide essential information to validate the model and to help in determining effective risk controls. Key features of the Influence Network are that it combines human and hardware issues with influences from environmental to direct causal levels in a structured and quantifiable manner.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 6.2 of 6.2
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
7. INFLUENCING PERFORMANCE A MODEL
7.1
BACKGROUND TO INFLUENCE NETWORKS

Influence diagrams (which identify principal factors which influence each other and the outcome of a set of circumstances) have been used as qualitative sociopolitical modelling tools for many years. In the 1980s a particular form of influence diagram, now termed an Influence Network to distinguish its form from the many influence diagram types in existence, was developed to model how human and organisational factors could affect the likelihood of human error leading to accidents in hazardous environments (e.g. nuclear power stations, petrochemical plants, aerospace). In 1995, following a House of Lords review of marine safety, the UK Marine Safety Agency (now the Maritime and Coastguard Agency, MCA) commissioned BOMEL to lead the development of a comprehensive risk based methodology(44) for potential use by the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) as a basis for future improvement of shipping safety. The resulting methodology was adopted by the IMO and is now incorporated into IMO Guidelines for this purpose. One element of BOMEL's work was to carry out a full review of methods to account for human performance within the context of the technical, organisational and wider commercial and social spheres as illustrated in Figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1 Nested hierarchy of influences
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 7.1 of 7.9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
The Influence Network approach for human performance was enhanced by BOMEL to cover human and hardware performance in a single analysis thereby giving a comprehensive approach to understanding the factors which influence the likelihood of human error or hardware failure in the causation of accidents. This approach has rapidly gained wide acknowledgement and has been applied in risk assessment and, perhaps more importantly, in the development of risk reduction strategies for a variety of accident scenarios in a wide range of industrial sectors. It is noteworthy that the MCA and BOMEL are currently using the Influence Network to address fishing safety; at the Construction Summit in February 2001, the Deputy Prime Minister drew analogies between the issues facing the fishing and construction industries in terms of the harsh environment and macho cultures, such that similar and complex issues have to be tackled if improvements in health and safety are to be achieved.
7.2
INFLUENCE NETWORK METHODOLOGY

The Influence Network is developed from consideration of a generic set of influences which are structured in a hierarchy representing the influence domains shown in Figure 7.1. The Generic Influence Network is shown in Figure 7.2 and described overleaf.
POOR SAFETY IN CONSTRUCTION Human Hardware External
Competence
Motivation /Morale
Team Working
Situational Awareness
Tiredness
Health
Quality of Comms
Availability of Info/ Advice
Compliance
Availability of Suitable Resources
Quality of Inspection & Maintenance
Equipment Operability
Internal Working Environment

Recruitment & Selection Incident Management Management/ Supervisory Policy Comms Policy Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection & Maintenance Policy Design Quality
Training
Procedures
Job Design

Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Organisational Structure Company Culture Labour Relations Company Profitability Safety Management

Political Influence Regulatory Influence Market Influence Social Influence
Figure 7.2 Generic Influence Network

BOMEL CONSORTIUM
At the top is the event (i.e. accident or incident type) being considered. This could be at any level from the complete risk profile (e.g. all construction accidents) to a specific accident type in specified circumstances (e.g. plant related accidents in commercial building construction in Central London in adverse weather conditions or falls from roofs by jobbing buildings working on house extensions). Below the top event is the direct causal level which is broken down into three areas: human, hardware and external events. Generally there will be data available from which the direct causes can be determined and the relative importance quantified. Where the data are often unhelpful is in understanding and delineating the underlying influences which nevertheless have a great bearing on the likelihood of an accident occurring and on the outcome or consequences. In order to model these influences, the Influence Network has adopted a hierarchy below the direct causal level as follows: Direct performance influences which directly influence the likelihood of an accident being caused. Organisational influences which influence direct influences and reflect the culture, procedures and behaviour promulgated by the organisation. Policy level influences which reflect the expectations of the decision makers in the employers of those at risk and the organisations they interface with (e.g. clients, suppliers, subcontractors). Environmental level influences which cover the wider political, regulatory, market and social influences which impact the policy influences. At each level categories of influence have been identified as shown in Figure 7.2. The types of influence were determined generically as part of the methodology development(44) based on accepted theories of human factors and safety and risk management. The categorisation has been further expanded and refined through practical application to a range of contrasting cases. Each influence in the generic network is defined together with a defined scale from best to worst practice. This provides a basis for making judgements about the relative importance of each influence (weighting), the current quality of each influence (rating) and the potential effect on both weightings and ratings of introducing any identified risk control measures.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 7.3 of 7.9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
The process of customising the Influence Network approach for application to a specific problem consists of the following stages: 1. Clearly define the problem in terms of the risks being considered, the parties involved (stakeholders), the physical situation and circumstances, the applicable laws, regulations and procedures, the equipment and materials being used, the failure modes being considered and the limits of measurement of both the frequency and consequence components of risk. 2. Collect and analyse all available data to establish a baseline of current and historic performance and the direct causes and failure modes that can be established from this data. 3. Assemble a group of experts in the topic being studied including those with direct experience at the operational level as well as those representing organisational support functions, policy makers and the wider community of influence. 4. Use the experts either in a structured workshop session
(recommended) or in an interactive, iterative questionnaire mode (e.g. Delphi process) to carry out the following steps: 5. Review the generic influence set and the network and define each influence in more detail in relation to the top event being considered. 6. For each influence define the scale from worst to best practice, 1 to 10, both in relation to practice in the industrial sector being considered and in relation to the experts' wider experience in other sectors (see Figure 7.3 and 7.4). 7. For each influence agree, between the experts, its current rating on the best/worst practice scale (see Figure 7.5). 8. For each influence above the environmental level (i.e. at the policy level) agree relative weightings of influence (totalling unity) from the environmental level below (see Figure 7.6). 9. 10. Repeat Step 8 for the organisational level. Repeat Step 8 for the direct level.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
11. 12. Repeat Step 8 for the causal level. The Influence Network can then be quantified to obtain a Network Index which can be directly related to current risk level. In essence this consists of summing the product of the ratings and weightings through the network (see Figure 7.7). There is a mechanism of adjustment at each level if the experts' evaluations at that level are significantly at variance with the summation of the effects of the more remote influences. 13. Use the Influence Network and quantification model to identify critical influences or influence paths through the network in order to concentrate risk controls on the most important influences for which appropriate risk controls can then be defined. 14. Assess the effects of the risk controls defined in Step 13 on the existing influence ratings and weightings. 15. Re-evaluate the Influence Network Index for the revised weightings and ratings from Step 14 to assess the potential effect on overall risk level. A typical workshop session to get through Steps 5 to 15 for a defined top event would normally take two to three working days. The ideal number of participants is around eight to ten experts plus facilitator and recorders. Figure 7.3 to 7.7 illustrate aspects of Steps 6-8 and 12 based on a subset of the generic influence network in Figure 7.2. The whole process has been demonstrated in the course of the present study. Sections 2 and 6 of this report present findings in respect of Steps 1 and 2; the subsequent Steps are covered the remainder of this report.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 7.5 of 7.9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
POOR SAFETY IN CONSTRUCTION
Competence
Motivation /Morale
Team Working
Tiredness
Health
Quality of Comms
Compliance

Recruitment & Selection Incident Management Management/ Supervisory Policy Comms Policy Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection & Maintenance Policy Design Quality
Training
Procedures
Job Design

Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Organisational Structure Company Culture Labour Relations Company Profitability Safety Management

Figure 7.3 Focus of Influence Network Examples in Figure 7.4 to 7.7
0
No safety evaluation

10
POLICY LEVEL INFLUENCES
Inclusion of safety requirements
Political Influence
0
No attention
10 0
Prescriptive / technical
Market Influence
10
High profile
Safety focus / strong inspectorate
ENVIRONMENTAL LEVEL INFLUENCES
Figure 7.4 Defining the Range of Best and Worst Practice
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 7.6 of 7.9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Ownership and Control POLICY LEVEL INFLUENCES
7
Political Influence
0
No attention
6
10
High profile
2
Market Influence
10
Safety focus / strong inspectorate
0
Figure 7.5 Rating Current Practice in Step 7 (Or Improved Practice Reflecting Risk Control Implementation in Step 14)
Ownership and Control 0.5 POLICY LEVEL INFLUENCES
0.3
0.2
Political Influence
Market Influence
Figure 7.6 Weighting of Principal Contributions from Environmental Level on Factors at Policy Level Above
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 7.7 of 7.9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
etc 4.3 = S weighting x rating
Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control 0.5 Policy Level Influences
0.3
0.2
7
Political Influence
0
No attention
6
10
High profile
2
Market Influence
10
Safety focus / strong inspectorate ENVIRONMENTAL
0
LEVEL INFLUENCES
Figure 7.7 Calculating the Influence Network Index based on Rating and Weighting Combinations
7.3
ADAPTING THE INFLUENCE NETWORK FOR CONSTRUCTION SAFETY

Prior to using the Influence Network to explore the factors influencing construction safety performance, BOMEL carried out a review of the Generic Influence Network to test its ability to model the construction industry. One strong feature of the industry is the large number of organisations and individuals involved at various stages in the life cycle of the built environment (from concept through design and construction, operation and possible refurbishment to decommissioning and demolition) as discussed in Section 2. This is perhaps not encountered to the same extent in other hazardous industry sectors where there is a greater tendency for the client for the construction also to be the future operator and overall safety duty holder. In such cases the client has a much stronger interest in effectively managing the construction process both to protect his safety record and to ensure that his operational parameters are met. It has to be said that in all sectors there is still little effective consideration of safety in construction and maintenance by the design teams, which is surprising considering the client interests. However there is still a natural break point when the construction team hands the finished facility over to the operational team and
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 7.8 of 7.9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
therefore feedback into the design and construction process for the next project is rather haphazard. In order to account for the variety of stakeholders within the construction Influence Network, the influence levels have been further defined and an additional influence was introduced at the policy level. The additional influence is Contracting Strategy at the policy level which is intended to capture the effect of different forms of contractual relationship, procurement policy and tender evaluation, particularly in relation to safety. The influence levels in Figure 7.2 can be defined in relation to construction stakeholder groups as follows: Direct Level - applies to site operatives and technicians, i.e. the people actually carrying out the construction work. Organisational Level - applies to the site organisation and local management. Policy Level - applies to both the client and construction company management. Contracting strategy, ownership and control and company culture apply to the client (i.e. the organisation commissioning and paying for the construction activity) the remainder apply to the contractors carrying out the work. Environmental Level - the Political Influence incorporates both national and local government procurement strategy as well as government as guardians of worker and public safety. Otherwise Environmental Level influences are external to the organisations represented at the Policy Level. The Generic Influence Diagram as described above was then used as the basis for a trial workshop to address the particular problem of fatal falls from height as described in Section 8. The case was chosen because of its significant contribution to the large number of recent construction fatalities and its specific inclusion as a priority programme within HSCs strategy 2001-2004(45).
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 7.9 of 7.9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
8. INFLUENCE NETWORK WORKSHOP AND IMPLICATIONS
8.1
FOCUS
From the construction risk profile described in Section 6, high-risk accident types and sectors of the construction industry may be identified. One particular area of concern is that of falls from height resulting in fatalities and it was agreed with the HSE that this would be the topic to be addressed at the trial workshop session to demonstrate the process and fine tune it before general application across the risk profile. Fatal falls from height are encountered both in large and small construction projects. It was agreed to concentrate on large building sites for this first workshop activity. Adaptation of the model for other scenarios is discussed in Section 9.
8.2
ATTENDEES, CONDUCT, PROCESS

An initial presentation of the methods was made to HSE and industry on 16 January 2001 with representatives from HSE divisions, DETR, CIB, Construction Confederation and the TUC. Preparations for the Influence Network structuring proceeded and the session was held at HSEs offices at St Dunstans House, London on 2 February 2001 but unfortunately the short notice and run up to the Construction Summit on 27 February 2001 meant attendance members were limited. Nevertheless the workshop was successful providing the opportunity for good interaction to give a clear definition for the Influence Network in the context of construction. Participants were: Ruth Kennerley Health & Safety Advisor Mohammad Abrar HSE Inspector, Construction Andrew East Helen Bolt Colin Billington John Smith Mike Bradfield HSE Inspector, Construction Project Leader Workshop Facilitator Workshop recorder Construction Federation HSE HSE BOMEL BOMEL BOMEL
Engineering & Construction Manager BOMEL
Prior to the workshop all participants were provided with a briefing document prepared by BOMEL and reproduced here as Appendix A. This summarises the approach and introduces the generic influences under consideration.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.1 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Dr Billington's role as facilitator at the workshop was to take participants through the Influence Network process, to maintain the agenda and pace of the work, to ensure full opportunity for all participants to provide their inputs, and to elicit expert judgements concerning definition, ratings and weightings of influences. Steps 1 to 12 of the process described in Section 7.2, were covered in the workshop session which lasted a full day. Steps 13 to 15 which cover identification and evaluation of risk controls are illustrated in Section 8.8 and will be more rigorously addressed in Phase 2, either with a further workshop session or by structured questionnaire with those who took part.
8.3
CUSTOMISATION AND AMPLIFICATION OF INFLUENCE DEFINITIONS AND INFLUENCE RATING

Approximately half of the available time at the workshop session was devoted to reviewing and discussing the meaning and relevance of each influence in the context of the construction industry in general and falls from height in particular. This activity is extremely important and provides the foundation for a comprehensive and meaningful evaluation. As a basis for the discussion, BOMEL had pre-prepared an initial customised set of influences (BOMEL ref C942\05\002U) which were debated and re-defined as appropriate. The new information collected from this session is provided in tabular form in Appendix B. Each page provides, for a single influence, the generic definition and description of the best / worst practice scale in terms of Poor, Moderate and Excellent scalar points. The session was recorded as bullet points on a flip chart and by direct input to a computer providing more detail of the specific comments. Both sources, which underpin the final agreed influence definitions and scales, are also tabulated on the pages in Appendix B. It is important to note that the work customising the generic influences and scales of practice in relation to construction will provide improved baseline for future applications. The second part of the session was devoted to assigning a quantified rating of current practice in each area in relation to fatal falls from height using the predefined scale as per the steps in Figures 7.4 and 7.5. The salient points of the discussion leading to the agreed influence ratings are summarised below. The tables in Appendix B also give the rating value in the context of the definitions.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.2 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 8.1 essentially reproduces the generic Influence Network but includes a shorthand reference scheme for each influence (e.g. D1, P3, etc.) which is used for convenience in Appendix B and the description below.

Human
D1
Competence
Hardware
D7 Quality of Comms D8 Availability of Info/ Advice D9 Compliance D10 Availability of Suitable Resources
External
D3 Team Working
D4 Situational Awareness
D5 Fatigue
D6 Health

O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11
Training
Procedures
Planning
Comms
Safety Culture

P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
Company Culture
Safety Management
Labour Relations

E1 E2 E3 E4
Political Influence
Market Influence
Social Influence

Figure 8.1 Workshop Influence Network with Shorthand IDs in Red
8.3.1
D1 Competence the skills, knowledge and abilities required to perform particular tasks safely Competence embodies education, training, knowledge and experience equipping the individual to perform the required task(s) to the required quality and efficiency in a safe manner. In relation to safety, competence incorporates understanding of the risks, use of appropriate safety measures, and knowledge or awareness of individual limitations. Competence is degraded by a tradition of unsafe practice, bravado and complacency, by lack of familiarity with the work environment and by poor or inappropriate training. The expert panel rated average competence of personnel exposed to risk of fall from height at 5 (on a scale of 1 to 10). D1 Rating 5
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.3 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
D2 Motivation / Morale the strength and direction of human behaviour The workforce is thought to be generally highly motivated to get the job done by remuneration (bonuses), fear of unemployment, by a shared culture of a strong work ethic and by seeing the physical results of their efforts. There is also a motivation of urgency to finish a job at the end of the day to get away for social activity. Workers are generally personally motivated to be safe. D2 Rating 6
D3 Team Working the extent to which individuals in teams work as cohesive units and look out for each other's interests Positive and negative aspects of camaraderie and peer pressure were considered. The potential for the safety benefits of team working has yet to be realised with team performance not being viewed in relation to safety. Many work alone particularly at height with no other team members to protect the individual from hazards. D3 Rating 2
D4 Situational Awareness the extent to which workers are aware of potential risks There is thought to be a general awareness of the hazards but little concept of individual risk. In relation to falls from height problem areas are security of footing (ladders, scaffolding, fragile roofing) and protective barriers. Variation of risk with internal and external conditions, problems of distractions and ambient noise levels were also cited. D4 Rating 1
D5 Fatigue the degree to which readiness for action is degraded through sleep deprivation, or excessive / insufficient mental or physical activity Fatigue is not a major issue in accident statistics. Fatigue is most likely to occur due to physical activity rather than other causes and would be exacerbated in summer because of longer working hours. Availability of adequate catering and rest facilities is an issue. D5 Rating 8
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.4 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
D6 Health the well being of body and mind There is a general ignorance of health problems (poor food, alcohol), no health checks, and poor access to medical care. Safety has greater immediacy than health. health screening failed to identify a one-eyed banksman or test for epilepsy or poor eyesight among scaffolders. Site management is a high stress occupation. Physical work ensures a level of fitness. D6 Rating 7
D7 Communications the extent to which the frequency, clarity and integrity of communications are appropriate There are several aspects to direct communications related to job activity which need consideration literacy and to an increasing extent language, a presumption of competence leading to inadequate instruction, key communications buried in paper avalanche, tool box talks an inadequate replacement for more frequent communications and close supervision, interface problems between trades, lack of management competence in specific trades, delegation of communication devalues importance and garbles the message. D7 Rating 3
D8 Availability of Information the extent to which people can access information that is accurate, timely and reliable This is linked to D7 Communications. Important information is the method statement and associated health and safety information. Site managers are reluctant to ask for advice / information. The HSE Information Line is not well used because of the perception of a link to inspection / enforcement. Much information is too voluminous and lacks clarity. Appropriateness of available information is a key. Also there needs to be a willingness and recognition of benefit to obtain advice. D8 Rating 4
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.5 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
D9 Compliance the extent to which people comply with or obey procedures or regulations Reality is a long way from written procedures. There is little understanding of the regulatory requirements. There is an urgency to get on with the task and not pause to absorb the work instructions and written procedures. The panel believed that if rules and procedures were followed there would be a significant impact on safety. However many procedures were not practical and therefore ignored. There was little training in the use of procedures. D9 Rating 1
D10 Availability of suitable resources the relationship of supply to demand for suitable resources Many contract prices did not allow for the cost escalation seen over the past two years particularly in labour rates and therefore there is considerable pressure to accept lower quality resources. Quality of site management and supervision was an important influence on effective use of resources. Use of inappropriate resources leads to the bodging culture without proper change control. Nevertheless tradesmen are inherently capable when making do. Selection of resources was often by people unable to define skill deficiencies. Sites were seen to have little influence over quality of equipment including PPE supplied for their use. Problems with harnesses, hand and eye protection were cited. D10 Rating 3
D11 Inspection and Maintenance the extent and frequency with which equipment is inspected and maintained There is no checking culture on site particularly following the disappearance of the clerk of works. There should be a daily inspection of height access equipment scaffolding, lifts, ladders and ladder ties. Where inspectors are used, how is their competence checked? Unserviceable equipment should be quarantined. D11 Rating 3
D12 Equipment Operability the extent to which systems and equipment conform to best practice in meeting the usability needs of the human operator There have been considerable improvements over the past decade with a vast array of equipment being available. Selection is an important issue and selection process seen as remote from the user. PPE is often seen to be an impediment to efficient working but it was believed that many of these problems could be
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
overcome by more careful selection, fitting and supervision. Equipment reliability is good. D12 Rating 8
D13 Internal Work Environment the level of noise, temperature, congestion, light and vibration existing in the place of work Principal problems were consequences of winter weather conditions cold, wetness, ice exacerbated by wind particularly at height leading to loss of grip and slipping. A separate major problem is clutter on scaffolds and more generally untidiness and clutter around the site. Shrouding was seen as principally to protect the public and those below rather than improving the direct working environment. D13 Rating 5
D14 External Working Environment the conditions external to the site which impact on construction activity, e.g. weather, public proximity, external distractions, day light, etc There was a need to distinguish more clearly between D13 and D14 for construction sites which are directly susceptible to the elements and so internal and external could be synonymous. Schedule pressures mean that work goes on irrespective of the conditions. Main external factor should concern the public, particularly in inner city locations D14 Rating 7
Other direct level influences Having addressed all generic direct level influences the workshop considered whether there are other factors at the direct level which had not been captured. The principal factor identified is the personal relationships between workers and groups of workers (e.g. between different trades). There is seen to be a distinct variation in culture between trades with the lower skill levels (and intellect) exhibiting a more aggressive, bullying and grudge orientated approach. Scaffolders were seen to be in this category, whereas mechanical and electrical installation technicians represented the opposite pole. Family firms / traditions can play a part. In the extreme this was manifested by deliberate adverse behaviour, violence and sabotage. In the present analysis this factor is captured within the team working influence D3 (Rating = 2) but it could be defined as a specific additional influence for construction.
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
8.3.2 Organisational Level Influences
O1 Recruitment / Selection the system and procedures that facilitate the employment of personnel that are suited to the job demands Recruitment is impeded by a general absence of job descriptions for site operatives. Safety awareness is not a recruitment criterion. Forgery of qualifications is potentially widespread and little checking (e.g. of scaffolders cards) is carried out. Competence of ageing supplied labour is not tested. There is limited choice or availability in some trades. Selection of new members of existing teams is heavily influenced by the team and their own contacts. This can be beneficial if it results in greater continuity and improved team working but management control is undermined. O1 Rating 3
O2 Training the system that ensures the skills of the workforce are matched to their job demands Many employers see training as having little direct value as lack of continuity of employment is seen as investment for others' benefit and there is little company loyalty. Training of site supervision in health and safety is very poor. Narrow margins severely limit training budgets. Employers paying the CITB levy are more likely to undertake training to get some value back. O2 Rating 2
O3 Procedures the system that ensures that the method of conducting operations is explicit and practical Many procedures are seen as a paperwork exercise and not being useful. In their preparation there is a lack of involvement of, or feedback from, those to whom the procedures apply. The method statement is seen as the principal procedure but safety is often a low priority in this. Where procedures exist there is little effective monitoring. There is a corporate blind eye and those with potential influence and safety knowledge (e.g. the designer or client) do not challenge procedural violation (not their responsibility and wish to avoid confrontation / commercial implications). Procedures were seen as a key area for improvement. O3 Rating 4
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.8 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
O4 Planning the system that designs and structures the work activities of personnel Planning is largely divorced from safety considerations and particularly risk assessment. The Planning Supervisor under CDM should have a key role but is not seen as being in the mainstream of project planning. There is poor change control and the plan is not proactively managed to deal with change. Life cycle planning is poor. O4 Rating 5
O5 Information Management / Feedback the system that ensures high quality information is available for decision making, including the collection, analysis and feedback of incident or near miss data Blame culture and peer pressure prevail resulting in poor reporting and little encouragement to report. Workers are sceptical of the value and rarely receive feedback or see any impact. There is little empowerment of the direct supervision to make or require improvement. No one listens. O5 Rating 3
O6 Management / Supervision the system that ensures human resources are adequately managed and supervised There is seen to be less supervision than ever with the disappearance of the foreman and site overburdened with paperwork and largely invisible. Management of subcontractors is poor with a lack of knowledge of trades in the management team. Site management has a very significant influence on site safety standards and performance varies widely between sites operated by the same company pointing to inconsistent selection and training of managers. Performance measures are not linked to safety. O6 Rating 4
O7 Communications the system that ensures that appropriate information is communicated clearly to its intended recipients The discussion of this influence mirrored that at the direct level (D7). Formal management / assessment of communications and their intended impact is not addressed. Many communications are made because of a contractual significance and perhaps shroud safety issues. Communications dependent on site management competence. Deluge of paper seen to prevent effective communication of appropriate messages. O7
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001 HSE Task Number B\0087
Rating 3
Page 8.9 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
O8 Safety Culture the system of behaviour modification in organisations on site: it consists of assumptions about the way work should be performed; what is and what is not acceptable; what behaviour and action should be encouraged and discouraged The group had some difficulty in agreeing and interpreting the definition in the context of construction sites. Establishing a clear positive safety culture on site was seen as difficult. How is safety culture visible, manifested. Major sites are fragmented. The main contractor may have a positive safety culture but this may not filter down, control not being exercised. It is difficult to change attitudes over the short duration of most projects. More needs to be done to define safety culture and understand how to improve it. O8 Rating 3
O9 Equipment Purchasing the system that ensures that the appropriate range of equipment is available There is a remoteness of purchasing from usage. There is a vast range of good equipment on the market. The challenge is to match equipment to the task. Procurement personnel may not look in sufficient detail at the effect of changing to a cheaper version (e.g. access towers needing different erection skills). Procurement personnel are not H&S aware. O9 Rating 7
O10 Inspection and Maintenance the system that ensures equipment is maintained in good working order This was not seen as distinguishable from the direct level (D11) O10 Rating 3
O11 Design for Safe Construction the system that ensures that safety during construction and future operation has been considered appropriately in design This influence engendered the greatest and most vociferous discussion. Design is seen as divorced from construction and operational safety. Design should include permanent and temporary works (e.g. tower scaffolds could be designed to be erected only one way to be fail safe). HVAC plants are always near the edge of roofs not designed for safe maintenance. Roof lights should be designed for low maintenance and be able to support maintenance personnel without risk. Design should eliminate the need for rework by only fitting one way (e.g. structural
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.10 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
steelwork). Under CDM the Planning Supervisor should coordinate design and construction but this does not work. Design risk assessment does not involve enough practical experience. There is no fee incentive for the designer to produce safe designs. Little attempt to obtain life cycle feedback. O11 Rating 1
Other Considerations Pay and Conditions An additional factor highlighted during site visits and the workshop discussion in the course of the work, was pay and conditions. This reflects the employed / self employed divide, remuneration basis (hourly, piecework), lack of job security etc. as well as the welfare conditions at work such as messing facilities / canteen etc. This is sufficiently variable across the construction industry for it to be considered as an independent influence and is included as O12 in the analysis see Appendix B. It was considered that pay levels etc. and work opportunities were reasonable at the present time but that site conditions could be substantially improved. O12 Rating 4
8.3.3
P1 Contracting Strategy clients contracting strategy in regard to safety This is a key influence and depends on the type of client and their willingness / ability to be involved. Few understand their responsibility. Is safety in construction valued in respect of cost effectiveness or effect on reputation? Will the client be involved in the project management? The client, through the tendering requirements and evaluation, can place emphasis on safety record and future safe performance. There need to be clear evaluation criteria, performance standards and measures. Those preparing the tenders need to be better familiarised with site constraints (site visits) and safety implications of proposed methods. Large clients could set an example. How can safe performance be rewarded? Examples should be recorded to demonstrate the positive link between safety and profitability. P1 Rating 3
P2 Ownership / Control client's commitment to, and control of, the construction process There is a general resistance to having the client on site (preference engineering, frequent requests for changes). Client meddling is seen as detrimental. On the
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
other hand there is a lack of ownership of the process and recognition of the life cycle risks. This depends on the long term interest of the client (owner occupier or developer). P2 Rating 2
P3 Client Company Culture the system of behaviour modification within the client organisation: it consists of assumptions about the way work should be performed; what is and what is not acceptable; what behaviour and action should be encouraged and discouraged Discussion centred on distinction between this and P1 and P2 and involvement of the client in the site management team. Depending on the size and long term interests of the client this influence could be merged with O8 or P1/P2. This aspect is addressed by the relative weightings of influences (see Section 8.4). P3 Rating 3
P4 Organisational Structure demarcation and interfaces between parties involved in the construction process Commercial relationships compromise organisational integration to address safety issues. Alliancing and integration of all parties into a common project team jointly managing the safety issues have not been pursued to the same extent as in other sectors (e.g. offshore) . P4 Rating 5
P5 Safety Management management commitment and leadership, accountability, policies, standards and procedures for each element of the safety management system Commitment by management is key but often is not demonstrated with safety management being a peripheral responsibility isolated from operational management. The link between safety and cost saving is not recognised. H&S managers are not involved in budgeting. H&S is not highly featured in the mainstream education syllabus (civil engineering, building technology). There is a lip service culture. P5 Rating 3
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.12 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
P6 Labour Relations the relationship between the contractors and the workforce and their representatives Representation has been degraded as a result of deunionisation. The Safety Representative model (e.g. offshore) is not widely adopted. Subcontract workforce has little access to site management. The lack of job security discourages safety involvement or incident / near miss reporting. P6 Rating 4
P7 Profitability the extent to which the contractor is driven by profitability Safety is seen to be in direct conflict with profitability as a cost item. Both clients and contractors have this perception and do not see a commercial benefit in improved safety performance (contrast with hazardous industries). There is a strong feeling that any single organisation cannot have a significant impact. Longer term alliancing arrangements between local authorities and large consultants / contractors give more power to these organisations resulting in subcontractors being squeezed resulting in less attention to safety P7 Rating 5
8.3.4
E1 Political the profile and practices within government related to the industry The group felt that government as a client, particularly local government, does not set a good example with its procurement approach or its own employees. With the large public sector funded proportion of construction, government is in a position to give much higher weighting to safety in tender evaluation, contract award and bonuses or alternative rewards (e.g. tax and training incentives). Government could therefore have a more direct influence as a client at the Policy Level. There appears to be political opportunity to bring about change as a result of the increase in construction fatalities, resulting media attention and public concern over safety resulting from high profile accidents. The construction industry is seen to be lagging behind other hazardous industries in its take up of formalised safety management approaches. Furthermore a large proportion of the industry consists of very small organisations who do not have the resources to keep up to date with such developments. The message is not getting through. E1 Rating 4
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.13 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
E2 Regulatory the framework of regulations governing the industry and the actions of the regulator The CDM Regulations in conjunction with the new ACOP and supporting information were thought to be a sound basis. However on top of this there is felt to be too much European regulation which is of a different style and undermines the UK approach. There is inconsistency between the approach of the HSE and the local authorities to Health and Safety monitoring for works outside the scope of CDM. The HSE Construction Inspectorate has only 116 inspectors to cover one of the largest industry sectors. As a result the HSE is low profile. Its information services are not widely used because of the perceived link with enforcement action. Guidance lags behind the regulations. There is insufficient publicity. The group felt that what the HSE does is good but there is not enough of it. There was quite a variation of opinion on the influence rating. E2 Rating 7
E3 Market the commercial and economic context affecting the industry The industry is highly dependent on the economic cycle and the peaks and troughs of activity are exaggerated as the level of capital investment is more affected. As a result tender prices based on current costs can quickly become unprofitable due to wage inflation. In boom times bankruptcies arise due to shortage of workers. The industry operates on very low margins without financial reserves to cope well with the extremes of activity. Margins in civil engineering tend to be higher but the volume in this sector is down due to lack of infrastructure investment. The types of hazards and associated risks in building work are different so labour transferring will be unfamiliar with them. Lottery funding is now a significant source of new construction. E3 Rating 3
E4 Societal aspects of the local community and society at large which bear upon the industry Construction is increasingly seen as an unattractive occupation, low intellect work, poor working conditions and low pay. There has been a deskilling because of technology advancement. The crafts that used to be respected are disappearing. There is a shortage of trainers and trainees no apprentices. Media interest is low. The British position in worldwide construction has diminished reducing the opportunities to travel. With the boom in Ireland a major labour source has dried up to be replaced by Eastern Europeans with associated language and cultural problems. E4
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001 HSE Task Number B\0087
Rating 3
Page 8.14 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 8.2 summarises the final composition of the influence network, on which the rating or quality of each influence, as it currently relates to fatal falls from height, is superimposed. Figure 8.3 provides an alternative representation with influences rated poorly in red and good or invariant quality influences in blue.

Human
D1
Competence
Hardware
D7 Quality of Comms D8 D9 D10
External
D11 D12 D13 D14
D2
D3
D4
D5
D6
Motivation /Morale
Team Working
Fatigue
8 7
O5
Health

O6 O7 O8
Compliance
3
O9
3
O10
O1
O2
O3
O4
O11
O12
3
P1
Training
Procedures
Planning

P3 P4 P5
Comms
Safety Culture
Pay & Conditions
P2
P6
P7
3
E1
Company Culture

E2 E3
Safety Management
3
E4
Labour Relations
Political Influence
Market Influence
Social Influence
Figure 8.2 Rating of Influences from Workshop
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.15 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Rating 1 to 3 Rating 4 to 6 Rating 7 to 9

Human
D3 Team Working D4 Situational Awareness D5 Fatigue D6 Health D7 Quality of Comms D8 Availability of Info/ Advice
Hardware
D9 Compliance D10 Availability of Suitable Resources
External
D1
Competence

O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12
Training
Procedures
Planning
Comms
Safety Culture
Pay & Conditions

P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
Company Culture
Safety Management
Labour Relations

E1 E2 E3 E4
Political Influence
Market Influence
Social Influence
Figure 8.3 Relative Rating of Influences See Key Top Left
8.4
RELATIVE WEIGHTING OF INFLUENCES

Having developed and amplified a group understanding of the influences and their current ratings, the next stage is to consider their relative weightings in relation to influences higher in the network (as per Step 8, Figure 7.6) and their impact on the probability of occurrence of fatal falls from height. The process commenced working from the lowest (most remote), i.e. 'Environmental', influence level in the network towards the most direct influences. It is important to recognise that weighting is assessed independently from the previously assigned ratings. For example, the market influence (E3) has a strong influence on company profitability (P7) irrespective of whether the market is in a good or bad state. The out-turn of this weighting is described below.
8.4.1
Environmental Influences on Policy Level
For each of the seven defined influences in turn at the Policy Level, the relative weighting of the four influences at the Environmental Level were assessed. The sum of these weightings should be unity (see Table 8.1).
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.16 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Policy level influences affected P1 Contracting strategy P2 Ownership and control P3 Company culture P4 Organisational structure P5 Safety management P6 Labour relations P7 Company profitability Active environmental influences E1 Political 0.35 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.30 0.30 E2 Regulatory 0.05 0.25 0.40 0.30 0.55 0.20 0.20 E3 Market 0.60 0.25 0.30 0.60 0.35 0.30 0.50 E4 Social 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.00 0.20 0.00 Total
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
Table 8.1 Weighting of Environmental Level Influences on Influences at the Policy Level For example, for P1 Contracting Strategy, the major influence was considered to be the market (E3) weighted 0.6, political (E1) was weighted 0.35 by virtue of the influence over public sector procurement and current political interest, regulatory (E2) influence was considered to be weak 0.05, and societal (E4) has negligible influence 0. Taking as another example Safety Management Policy (P5), the strongest influence was from the regulator (0.55), then the market (0.35) with relatively weak political and societal influences. Examining the columns of Table 8.1 it can be seen that political influence (E1) was seen to be significant for contracting strategy, ownership and control (of the construction process by clients), labour relations and profitability. Regulatory influence is strong for company culture, (site) organisational structure and safety management and significant for ownership and control, labour relations and profitability. The weakest area for regulatory control is in relation to the contracting strategy adopted by a client. Not surprisingly, the market has a strong influence across all Policy Level Influences. Societal influence was thought to be relatively important for ownership and control, company culture and labour relations but overall is not a strong influence on construction safety.
8.4.2
Policy Influences on Organisational Level
Weightings influencing the Organisational Level are shown in Table 8.2. During the workshop weightings at this and higher levels were generally assessed simply as high (H), medium (M) or low (L) for speed and simplicity, although the group decided also to introduce intermediate high / medium (H/M) and medium / low
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
(M/L) categories. In the subsequent quantification the sensitivity to the weightings was investigated using quantitative ratios of 3:2:1 and 9:5:1 for H:M:L. Significant insight can be gained by comparing these weightings and associated ratings both in terms of the importance of current influences and the areas with greatest potential for improvement. From Table 8.2 it can be seen that contracting strategy (P1) has a high influence on training, management and supervision, equipment purchasing, design for safe construction and pay and conditions. Client ownership and control (P2) is significantly less influential, only having a high influence on design for safe construction whereas client company culture is judged to have a high influence on training, planning and management and supervision. Overall client influence can be seen to be very significant particular in training, management and supervision and design for safe construction. It is also clear from Figure 8.2 that at present few clients are exercising this influence positively with ratings for contracting strategy (at 3), client ownership / control (at 2) and client culture (at 3) demonstrating significant potential for improvement. Moving to the contractor policy area (P4 to P7), organisational structure can be seen to be weighted high for influence on procedures, planning, information management and feedback, and communications. Safety management policy, currently rated low at 3 actually, has a high level of influence over half of the organisational influences including procedures, planning, information management, communications, safety culture and maintenance. Safety management policy has the greatest overall potential at the policy level both in terms of the weight of its influence and scope for improvement. Labour relations has a relatively weak influence on safety with its highest effect in communications and information management. Finally profitability is judged to have the second highest overall weighting with a strong influence on recruitment, training, management and supervision, equipment purchasing and maintenance.
8.4.3
Organisational Influences on Direct Level
Moving to the Direct Level (Table 8.3), a similar approach was taken to weighting. Health and safety competence (D1) is seen to be highly influenced by recruitment, training, and pay and conditions and significantly influenced by information management and management and supervision. Motivation and morale (D2) is seen to be highly influenced by information management and feedback (i.e. seeing action taken on safety issues), management and supervision, safety culture and, of course, pay and conditions. Team working (D3) is similarly influenced, with management / supervision and safety culture both being weighted high. Situational awareness (i.e. risk perception) is highly influenced by procedures, planning and communication of the risks and by pay and conditions.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.18 of 8.43
Active policy influences Organisational level influences affected P1 Contracting strategy O1 Recruitment & selection O2 Training O3 Procedures O4 Planning O5 Information management & feedback O6 Management / supervision O7 Comms O8 Safety culture O9 Equipment purchasing O10 Inspection maintenance policy O11 Design for safe construction O12 Pay and conditions L H M M L H L M H
M/L
P2 Ownership / control L L L L L L L M L L H L
P3 Company culture L H M H M H M M L M M M
P4 Organisational structure M/L M/L H H H

M/L
P5 Safety management L M H H H M H H L H L M
P6 Labour relations M/L L L L H L H

M/L
P7 Company profitability H H L M L H L M H H L H/M
H L L L L L
L L L M
H H
Table 8.2 Weighting of Policy Level Influences at the Organisational Level
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.19 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Active organisational influences Direct level influences affected O1 O2 Recruitment Training & selection H H/M H/M M L L H L M M H M H/M H L L M M M M O5 O6 Information O7 Management / management Comms supervision & feedback H/M H H/M M M M M H M/L L H/M H H M M M H/M H H H/M M M M/L H L L H H M M O8 Safety culture M H H L M M L L H L O9 Equipment purchasing L M M/L L L M L 0 M H/M O10 Inspection maintenance policy L L L L 0 0 L 0 L L O11 O12 Design for Pay and safe conditions construction L L L L L L L L H/M L H H H/M H L M H/M H/M H L
O3 O4 Procedures Planning
D1 Competence D2 Motivation / morale D3 Team working D4 Situational awareness D5 Fatigue D6 Health D7 Quality of comms D8 Availability of info / advice D9 Compliance D10 Availability of suitable resources D11 Quality of inspection & maintenance D12 Equipment operability D13 Internal working environment D14 Operating conditions
M M/L M H H/M H M H H H/M
L L H/M L L L M M L H
L 0 0 0
M 0 M 0
H H/M H L
M H/M H M/L
M/L M H/M L
H/M L H/M L
M/L L M/L L
L L H/M L
L H L 0
H H/M 0 0
L M H M
L 0 0 0
Table 8.3 Weighting of Organisational Influences at the Direct Level

BOMEL CONSORTIUM
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Fatigue (D5) and health (D6) are not seen as important factors with the strongest influence being from procedures. This is not to say of course that health is not an important issue for construction workers but it is not seen as significant in influencing accident causation. Communication at the direct level (D7) is an influence highly impacted by recruitment and organisational communications and can be coupled with availability of information (D8) which is most highly influenced by procedures, information management, supervision, and communications. Compliance (D9) is clearly influenced by the quality of the procedures, management and supervision, safety culture, and pay, particularly where some element of reward is linked to safe performance. Resource availability (D10) is clearly influenced by planning, maintenance (D11) by procedures and its importance within the organisation. A final important observation is the influences of planning and design on the site working environment.
8.4.4
Direct Influences on Accident Causation
Next, Table 8.4 shows the weights for the direct influences on accident causation. It can be seen that the highest weighted influences on the likelihood of human error are competence and situational awareness followed by team working, communications, compliance and site working environment. In contrast the most important influences on hardware failure are, as would be expected, maintenance and equipment operability.
8.4.5
Direct Influences on Fatal Falls from Height
Whereas, in Table 8.4 the accident causation is categorised between human, hardware and external factors, Table 8.5 assesses the weighting of the direct level influences in relation to fatal falls from height in construction without adopting the intermediate classification and weighting of human, hardware and external elements. This alternative was introduced at a late stage in the work to provide a check on the sensitivity of the output to the assumptions, for example, the 70:20:10 ratio for human : hardware : external causes of fatal falls from height. The direct weightings were assigned independently without reference to Table 8.4. Importantly weightings in Table 8.5 are generally closest to the human weightings in Table 8.4 with some change towards the hardware weighting evident. For example, for D1 the human and hardware weightings are H and M respectively and in Table 8.5 H/M was assigned; for D2 the corresponding ratings are M and L with M in Table 8.5. The exercise provides independent validation of the weightings and supports the supposition that human causes dominate over hardware problems whilst external drivers are minimal. It will be shown below that both approaches lead to similar conclusions.
Active direct influences Quality of inspection & maintenance
Availability of suitable resources
Situational awareness
causation Motivation / morale influences affected Competence
Availability of info / advice
Accident
Internal working environment
Equipment operability
Quality of comms
Team working
Compliance
Fatigue
Health
D8
D1
D2
D3
D4
D5
D6
D7
Human Hardware External
H M 0
M L 0
H/M M/L 0
H L 0
M L 0
M/L L 0
H/M M/L M/L
M M M/L
D9
H/M M 0
M M M
M/L H L
M/L H/M L
H/M M/L 0
M/L M H
Table 8.4 Weighting of Direct Influences on Accident Causation

Influence effect on: Fatal Falls D1 H/M D2 M D3 H/M D4 H D5 M D6 L Active direct influences D7 H D8 H/M D9 H D10 M D11 M D12 M/L D13 H/M D14 M/L
Table 8.5 Weighting of Direct Influences on Fatal Falls from Height
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.22 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Operating conditions
D10
D11
D12
D13
D14
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
8.4.6 Summary
The weighting exercise is instructive and serves to underline a strength of the Influence Network methodology. The relative weighting of one influence on another is quite clear cut given the industry context as defined and the experts had little difficulty agreeing on the scores. Importantly, where appropriate, the process leads to completely different weightings for the same influence depending on the area of impact under consideration. Each weighting judgement in itself is not remarkable and reflects a common understanding. However, what the method does is capture the weightings and complex interactions in a consistent and systematic manner enabling the routes and relative strengths of influence to be examined.
8.5
CALCULATION OF INFLUENCE NETWORK INDEX, UNCERTAINTY AND SENSITIVITY

As shown in Figure 7.7, the total strength and effectiveness of influences from a lower level can be determined as the sum of the product of the ratings and weightings. This calculated rating of the higher level influence can then be compared with the direct assessment of the influence determined at the workshop. Where significant differences occur, this indicates either that other influencing factors have not been recognised or that there is a measure of uncertainty. The approach adopted to resolve these differences as a first step is to adopt the average of the sum of the influences from below and the direct evaluation of the rating. This moderated rating value is then used in the calculation at the level above. The difference (i.e. uncertainty) is carried forward in the calculation with the rating to assist in identifying where sensitivity studies should be performed. This process is carried out through the entire network to give an overall index which can be directly related to risk. BOMEL use a spreadsheet program to carry out these calculations which, for the base case, is reproduced in Appendix C. This shows the base case index for the workshop scenario of fatal falls from height in major construction works to be 0.40301. The index alone has no intrinsic meaning. However, were all the ratings of influencing factors to be at 10 (i.e. representing best conceivable practice), the top level index would be 1.0; were performance at its very worst, the index would be 0.0. In this context a relation to risk can be determined by postulating that the difference between overall best and worst possible practice is equivalent to three (44) orders of magnitude of risk . Three orders of magnitude are selected on the 3 basis that individual risks span 10 from the border of tolerability to the level where
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.23 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
society currently places no demand for further risk reduction however low the cost. This approach is confirmed in the literature as the range of risk from the most to least dangerous occupational risk across a range of industries. With a base case of 0.403, it can be seen that there is the potential, through changing influences that have been recognised, to reduce risk perhaps by one and three-quarters orders of magnitude (~60 fold). This would reduce the current fatality rate to less than one per annum from its current level (38 fatal falls from height in 1999/2000(13)) as described below.
8.6
TRANSLATION OF INFLUENCE NETWORK INDEX TO RISK MEASURE

To explain the association with risk in more detail, Figure 8.4 illustrates the case where the change in influence network index from 0 to 1 (very worst to very best practice) gives a reduction in risk by three orders of magnitude. Superimposed on the diagram is the calculated index Io in the present context of 0.403 for which the corresponding risk measure is Ro. If risk control options (rco) are introduced which improve the network index (to Irco) the reduced risk is Rrco.
Base Case 66% Reduction Target
Log(Risk) = n + ....
Log (Ro) Log (Rrco)
Io
Irco
0 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 Influence Network Index
Figure 8.4 Translation of Influence Network Index to a Measure of Risk
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.24 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Based on the proposed framework the algebraic relationship is: Rrco / Ro = 10-3(Irco-Io) (8.1)
It is using this formulation and considering revised indices of 1.0 and 0.0 in the extremes that factors on the 1999/2000 risk exposure (of 38 fatalities due to falls from height) can be determined. The correlation between the influence network index and risk is not intended to be precise at this stage. It is also important to recognise that the workshop involved only a limited group and wider consultation is recommended to help reinforce the definitions and ensure the ratings and weightings are robust. Nevertheless it is appropriate to apply some tests to assess the validity of the emerging findings. With reference to Figure 8.4 and using Equation 8.1 for a baseline for 38 fatal falls from height and an index of 0.403, it can be shown that improvement taking the index to 1.0 would imply less than one death per annum (0.6) assuming the same industry population of working at height. A best case scenario orders of magnitude less than one would not be credible. If the number remained around 10, it would be considered that more could be done to reduce the risk. On that basis a best case risk measure indicating residual fatalities around one seems reasonable. Conversely, taking the index to 0.0 would imply 615 deaths per annum given the inherent hazards, again for the same industry population. In order to place this in (13) context, it is appropriate to consider that the number of falls from height resulting reportable injuries in 1999/2000 was 3212 (of which 38 are the reference fatality statistics, 1718 were major and 1456 over 3-day injuries). If existing measures preventing and mitigating the consequences of falls from height were not present the number of falls would increase and an increase in the proportion that prove fatal would be expected. That the fatality rate could be an order of magnitude worse in the extreme is not inconceivable. Furthermore, given that despite existing measures 1756 falls have fatal or major injury consequences, a worst case of 615 fatalities in the absence of controls is a credible number. The above evaluations are not intended to provide precise projections. However, they do demonstrate that a reasonable interpretation of risk can be made with the index, thus providing confidence in the approach for assessing the potential impact, in terms of reduced risk, of risk control options.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.25 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
8.7 TRANSLATION OF RISK REDUCTION TARGETS TO INFLUENCE NETWORK INDEX
The construction industry has been set and is setting itself targets for improving health and safety. A number of assumptions are made: That the 1999/2000 figures provide an appropriate baseline(13) (38 fatal and 1718 major injury high falls); That the 66% reduction applies equally across all accident types, whereas a greater proportional reduction in falls from height may in fact be desirable and necessary if the overall target is to be achieved (because it is such a substantial contributor, with relatively severe consequence endemic); That the industry workforce remains constant and hence discussion of incident numbers is appropriate (conversion to a risk rate can be made readily but is less meaningful for the reader). It is also implicit that by examining measures to reduce fatal falls from height by 66% here, a commensurate impact on major injury high falls could be achieved. This seems reasonable as the measures are directed largely at preventing fatal falls rather than minimising their consequence. On that basis, referring to Figure 8.4 and Equation 8.1 as before, it can be shown that a 66% reduction in fatalities would be anticipated with an increase in the influence network index from 0.403 to 0.562. If this could be achieved with a commensurate effect on major injury accidents, 25 deaths and 1145 major injuries would be prevented per annum for the 1999/2000 level of construction workers. Again to set this loosely in context, HSE statistics for 1978(46) show 66 fatalities resulting from high falls compared with 38 just over 20 years later. A major limitation of the comparison is that the industry population at that time is not known. It would certainly have been greater than today, with less mechanisation, nevertheless it is not considered by the authors that the difference would fully account for the higher number of fatalities. As a bounding case a 1978 index associated with 66 fatalities for an industry at the size it is today is calculated giving 0.323. This suggests that the degree of improvement achieved over the past two decades (Index change from 0.323 to 0.403) has to be doubled over the next ten years to achieve the targets that have now been set (Index change from
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.26 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
0.403 to 0.562) i.e. the rate of change has to be quadrupled. If the 1978 population were substantially greater, the relative challenge remaining would be even greater. In assessing the effectiveness of potential risk control options and scenarios, the 10 year target of a two-thirds reduction in fatal injuries and major accidents will be considered as a target improvement in Influence Network Index from 0.403 to 0.562.
8.8
ASSESSING RISK CONTROL EFFECTIVENESS

8.8.1 Alternative Approaches
The Influence Network can be used in a number of ways to examine risk control options. Ratings can be adjusted to reflect specific risk control schemes proposed to examine what their impact might be. This can include both the direct impact of a change on a specific influence rating and the indirect effects on ratings at levels above. The effects of change can be examined sequentially or in relation to the final outcome. Areas where the existing rating is poor or the weighting is high may be examined to identify suitable risk controls. A set of improvements may be postulated increasing the rating of each influence by 1. Applying these individually and comparing the resulting indices indicates those areas where improvements may be particularly beneficial. The first pass effectively presumes equal effort to achieve unit rating increment although an adjustment allowing for the cost and timescale to effect the damage is also appropriate. A set of alternative improvements may be postulated such that performance is improved to above average and approaching excellent to deserve a rating of 8. Again applying these individually identifies areas where improvement could be targeted, subject to appropriate cost-benefit considerations. The second approach is difficult to employ rigorously because of the complex interaction of influences; an influence with low rating may be of little consequence if it or the influences it affects, have little weight on the overall outcome. The final
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
two approaches are slightly more rigorous examining the cumulative impact of combing weightings and ratings. Even where risk controls have been identified for the first approach to be adopted, the systematic changing of influences in Cases 3 and 4 offers a useful and objective check to ensure that potentially key areas for improvement have not been overlooked. These approaches are adopted below to investigate areas where safety improvements may be targeted to reduce fatal falls from height in construction. It is to be expected that changes at the direct level will have the greatest impact as the effects of change in more remote influences are dissipated by the repeated weighting up the diagram. However, the hierarchy of influences emerging at a particular level helps identify the areas of importance for specific stakeholders. In addition, once a suite of analyses for different events / accident types is developed, the cumulative impact of the remote influences is likely to be stronger. For example, the company culture emanating from the client at the Policy level may be expected to have an influence over many aspects of construction work, whereas the benefits of improved inspection and maintenance of equipment and facilities relating to work at height would be much more limited. The effects can be aggregated and weighted according to consequence in a full analysis.
8.8.2
Effects of Rating Improvements
In order to start the process of identifying areas for risk control a number of sensitivity studies have been carried out. One approach to this is to adjust the rating of each influence individually to see the effect on the index. Table 8.6 shows the effect on the overall index of improving each influence in turn by 1 for the case with H:M:L weightings in the ratio 3:2:1. Influences are listed in order of greatest to least effect. From this it can be seen that the direct influences generally have greatest effect as expected, although the environmental influence of the market (E3), despite its remoteness, is ranked highest overall. It is also noteworthy that the regulatory influence is joint fifth in the hierarchy of influence. Considering each level of influence in turn, the factors with the strongest impact on the risk index can be identified: Environmental: E3 Market E2 Regulatory Policy P5 Safety Management P1 Contracting Strategy O3 Effective Procedures
Organisational:
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
O6 Management / Supervision Direct: D1 Competence D7 Quality of Communications Although a change at Policy and Organisational levels at first sight appears rather weak, it should be recognised that considering a full risk control measure in these areas would impact on the rating of influences at higher levels. consequential effects are neglected in this initial sensitivity analysis. These
Table 8.7 repeats the exercise of Table 8.6 except with a ratio of 9:5:1 for H:M:L weightings. It can be seen that there is little difference in the ranking or effect if this change is made which demonstrates that the weighting approach adopted is robust. The absolute indices do change, however, as the 9:5:1 baseline index is 0.398, compared with 0.403 for the baseline 3:2:1 H:M:L case. The fact that the Influence Network Indices are so similar also confirms the robustness. As an alternative, Table 8.8 shows the effect of changing each influence rating to 8 from its original value. The purpose of this is to demonstrate how much change there might be if each influence individually could be improved to this level. This might be a realistic objective over a 5-10 year period. The evaluation is influenced not only by the strength of the weighting / rating contribution, but also by the scope for improvement in the performance. For example, although regulatory influence (E2) ranked highly when considering a 1 point increase in rating (Table 8.6), it is close to the bottom of Table 8.8; being rated 7 initially means that improvement to 8 has relatively little impact on the top level index if consequential impacts are not allowed for. Apart from market influence (E3), the only other non-direct influence ranked in the top ten is design for safe construction (O11) ranked in ninth position. Table 8.10 completes the sensitivity studies comparing the effect of changing the rating of each influence to 8 with the H:M:L weightings in the ratio 9:5:1 as opposed to 3:2:1 in Table 8.8. Comparing the tables, it can be seen that generally there is little effect on the hierarchy. The exception is for O11, design for safe construction which drops significantly within the ranking. Table 8.10 gives an alternative presentation of the sensitivity studies highlighting the most and least significant of the influences at each level for the four cases considered in Table 8.6 to 8.9. This serves to underline the consistency between the results when incrementing the rating by 1 irrespective of the weighting ratios. Although some differences are seen when the rating is increased to 8, because
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.29 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
influences with a high rating currently offer little scope for improvement, the results are still reasonably insensitive to the weighting scale, except as noted above.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.30 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Factor Name E3 D1 D7 D10 E2 D14 D4 D8 D9 D13 D3 D11 D12 O3 O6 D2 D5 O5 O4 O7 D6 P5 E1 O8 P1 O2 P3 P7 O12 O11 P4 O1 O9 P6 P2 O10 E4 Market Influence Competence Quality of Communications Availability of Suitable Resources Regulatory Influence Operating Conditions Situational Awareness Availability of Information / Advice Compliance Internal Working Environment Team working Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Equipment Operability Procedures Management/Supervision Motivation / Morale Fatigue New Index 0.40840 0.40734 0.40730 0.40718 0.40710 0.40709 0.40693 0.40693 0.40676 0.40655 0.40655 0.40651 0.40630 0.40597 0.40580 0.40576 0.40576 Factor Name E3 D1 D7 D14 D10 D4 E2 D9 D8 D13 D3 O3 D11 O6 D12 O12 O5 D2 D5 O2 P5 O7 O1 P1 E1 P3 P7 O8 P4 O4 D6 O9 P6 O10 E4 O11 P2 Market Influence Competence Quality of Communications Operating Conditions Availability of Suitable Resources Situational Awareness Regulatory Influence Compliance Availability of Information / Advice Internal Working Environment Team working Procedures Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Management/Supervision Equipment Operability Pay and Conditions New Index 0.40394 0.40341 0.40282 0.40276 0.40275 0.40267 0.40254 0.40251 0.40229 0.40214 0.40214 0.40177 0.40168 0.40168 0.40131 0.40107
Information Management & Feedback 0.40101 Motivation / Morale Fatigue Training Safety Management Communications Recruitment and Selection Contracting Strategy Political Influence Company culture Company Profitability Safety Culture Organisational Structure Planning Health Equipment Purchasing Labour Relations Inspection and Maintenance Policy Social Influence Design for Safe Construction Ownership and Control 0.40087 0.40087 0.40086 0.40086 0.40067 0.40061 0.40061 0.40055 0.40055 0.40051 0.40044 0.40024 0.39999 0.39997 0.39973 0.39972 0.39929 0.39923 0.39919 0.39913
Information Management & Feedback 0.40547 Planning Communications Health Safety Management Political Influence Safety Culture Contracting Strategy Training Company culture Company Profitability Pay and Conditions Design for Safe Construction Organisational Structure Recruitment and Selection Equipment Purchasing Labour Relations Ownership and Control Inspection and Maintenance Policy Social Influence 0.40531 0.40529 0.40518 0.40515 0.40514 0.40507 0.40502 0.40501 0.40501 0.40495 0.40494 0.40493 0.40478 0.40470 0.40454 0.40445 0.40419 0.40406 0.40389
Table 8.6 Revised Index for a 1 Point Increase in the Rating of each Influencing Factor for a H:M:L Weighting Scale 3:2:1 (Baseline 0.40301)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Table 8.7 Revised Index for a 1 Point Increase in the Rating of each Influencing Factor for a H:M:L Weighting Scale 9:5:1 (Baseline 0.39844)
Page 8.31 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Factor Name D4 E3 D9 D7 D3 D10 D11 D8 O11 D1 O5 O2 O3 O7 O6 P5 D13 O8 P1 P3 E1 O1 O12 P2 O4 P7 P6 D2 P4 O10 E4 E2 D14 D6 O9 D12 D5 Situational Awareness Market Influence Compliance Quality of Communications Team working Availability of Suitable Resources Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Availability of Information / Advice Design for Safe Construction Competence New Index 0.43043 0.42998 0.42926 0.42447 0.42426 0.42384 0.42051 0.41868 0.41643 0.41601 Factor Name D4 D9 E3 D3 D7 D10 D11 D8 D1 O2 O3 O6 O5 P5 O7 D13 O1 P1 P3 O12 O8 E1 P7 P4 O11 P6 D2 O4 D14 O10 P2 E2 E4 D6 O9 D12 D5 Situational Awareness Compliance Market Influence Team working Quality of Communications Availability of Suitable Resources Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Availability of Information / Advice Competence Training Procedures Management/Supervision New Index 0.42801 0.42691 0.42594 0.42062 0.42034 0.41997 0.41464 0.41385 0.41334 0.41293 0.41174 0.41140
Information Management & Feedback 0.41533 Training Procedures Communications Management/Supervision Safety Management Internal Working Environment Safety Culture Contracting Strategy Company culture Political Influence Recruitment and Selection Pay and Conditions Ownership and Control Planning Company Profitability Labour Relations Motivation / Morale Organisational Structure Inspection and Maintenance Policy Social Influence Regulatory Influence Operating Conditions Health Equipment Purchasing Equipment Operability Fatigue 0.41504 0.41486 0.41440 0.41417 0.41374 0.41363 0.41333 0.41307 0.41301 0.41153 0.41149 0.41074 0.41011 0.40992 0.40884 0.40876 0.40851 0.40833 0.40828 0.40743 0.40710 0.40709 0.40518 0.40454 0.40301 0.40301
Information Management & Feedback 0.41127 Safety Management Communications Internal Working Environment Recruitment and Selection Contracting Strategy Company culture Pay and Conditions Safety Culture Political Influence Company Profitability Organisational Structure Design for Safe Construction Labour Relations Motivation / Morale Planning Operating Conditions Inspection and Maintenance Policy Ownership and Control Regulatory Influence Social Influence Health Equipment Purchasing Equipment Operability Fatigue 0.41051 0.40957 0.40953 0.40929 0.40926 0.40897 0.40896 0.40841 0.40689 0.40463 0.40383 0.40367 0.40354 0.40330 0.40310 0.40276 0.40268 0.40255 0.40254 0.40238 0.39997 0.39973 0.39844 0.39844
Table 8.8 Revised Index for increasing the Rating of Each Influencing Factor to 0.8 for a H:M:L Weighting Scale 3:2:1 (Baseline 0.40301)
Table 8.9 Revised Index for increasing the Rating of Each Influencing Factor to 0.8 for a H:M:L Weighting Scale 9:5:1 (Baseline 0.39844)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.32 of 8.43
Reference Table
Rating Increment
Weighting H:M:L
Ranking of Influences at Each Level Environmental Max Min 1 4 1 4 4 2 2 4 Max 5 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 Policy Min 6 2 6 2 6 4 6 2 Organisational Max 3 6 3 6 11 5 2 3 Min 9 10 10 11 10 9 10 9 Max 1 7 1 7 4 9 4 9 Direct Min 5 6 5 6 12 5 12 5
8.6 8.7 8.8 8.9
By 1 By 1 To 8 To 8
3:2:1 9:5:1 3:2:1 9:5:1
3 2 3 2 3 1 3 1
E1 Political E2 Regulatory E3 Market E4 Social
Details of influences appearing in table
P1 Contracting strategy P2 Ownership and control P4 Organisational structure P5 Safety management P6 Labour relations
O2 Training O3 Procedures O5 Information management & feedback O6 Management / supervision O9 Equipment purchasing O10 Inspection maintenance policy O11 Design for safe construction
D1 Competence D4 Situational awareness D5 Fatigue D6 Health D7 Quality of comms D9 Compliance D12 Equipment operability
Table 8.10 Influences with the Strongest and Weakest Impact on the Overall Index at Each Level
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.33 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
The base case evaluation adopted a 3:2:1 ratio of H:M:L weightings and considered the direct influences affecting different types of accident causation in accordance with the assumption that human, hardware and external causes contributed to fatal falls from height in the ratio 70:20:10(44) with ratings in Table 8.4. As noted at the end of Section 8.4, a series of cases was also run in which the direct influences on accident causation were considered as in Table 8.5. The purpose of this was to check the sensitivity to the assumptions on accident causation which had to be made in the absence of data and thereby to verify the robustness of the Influence Network output. Based on the weightings in Table 8.5, an index of 0.389 was calculated just 3% less than the value of 0.403 for the original base case. When running sensitivity studies incrementing each rating by 1 point or introducing improvements to give an influence rating of 8, in both cases the hierarchy was very similar whether the weightings from Table 8.4 or 8.5 were used to the extent that 9 of the top 10 influences were common. On this basis it was considered that the base case was sufficiently robust, particularly until further refinement of the weightings and ratings is made with a wider stakeholder group. The absolute change in the index brought about by a performance improvement in an individual influence bears further consideration. As noted above, containing the benefit to the single influence in the sensitivity studies is unconservative. Nevertheless an improvement in situational awareness of working at height amongst construction workers deserving a rating of 8 compared with 1 currently, delivers a 7% increase in the Influence Network Index as shown in Table 8.8. (0.43043 compared with 0.40301 baseline). Translating this to risk using Equation 8.1, demonstrates a 17% reduction in risk. This suggests that HSE could make a significant impact on its target safety improvement by improving the risk perception of construction workers.
8.8.3
Evaluation of Risk Reduction Scenarios
Any significant cultural change has to be brought about first by changing policies and organisational behaviour before significant or lasting improvements at the workface can be secured. Work in support of the offshore industrys Step Change initiative has underlined this(18). In an industry which has already embraced a strong safety culture with effective safety management systems, the focus is now at the direct level of behavioural issues changing minds. The Safety Culture Maturity Model shown here in Figure 8.5 is used to demonstrate the essential sequence from high level through to the workforce.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.34 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 8.5 Safety Culture Maturity Model indicating an appropriate sequence of improvement (18) In order to test the potential for this in construction a further study was carried out to calculate the incremental effect of changing culture by setting the following influences to 8 representing a sequence of measures to fundamentally change the industry: Political influence (E1 - 4) Regulatory influence (E2 - 7) Client contracting strategy (P1 - 3) Client company culture (P3 - 3) Contractor safety management policies (P5 - 3) Contractor safety culture (O8 - 3) Information management / feedback (O5 3) Design for safe construction (O11 - 1).
The influence identifier and original rating are shown in parenthesis. The incremental and cumulative effect of the changes is shown in Figure 8.6. from which it can be seen that this would bring about an improvement in network index of some 20% (from 0.403 to 0.483) which corresponds to a reduction in risk of some 42%.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.35 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
0.50 0.48 0.46

Index
To 0.8 in turn Inc by 0.2 in turn
0.44 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.36 Base case E1 E2 P1 P3 P5 O8 O5 O11 Influence Changed
Figure 8.6 Impact on Influence Network Index from sequential changes in Influence Ratings By addressing safety culture in this way, a beneficial effect on the direct level influences is also to be expected leading to a rating significantly above the presently estimated values (as shown in Figure 8.2). Therefore, as a final step, the calculation was modified to use the newly calculated ratings at the direct level where significant improvements over the original estimates was demonstrated. The affected direct level influences are: Influence D1 Competence D3 Team working D4 Situational awareness D7 Quality of communications D8 Availability of information / advice D9 Compliance D10 Availability of suitable resources D11 Quality of inspection and maintenance D13 Internal working environment New rating 5.18 5.34 5.07 5.10 5.23 5.39 5.21 5.14 5.67 Original Estimate 5 2 1 3 4 1 3 3 5
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.36 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
If only the new ratings are applied at the direct level without the cultural changes, an improved index of 0.481 is determined although it is not clear that such improvements would be sustained without the fundamental cultural changes. However, the index which results from combing the cultural changes and direct level consequences above is 0.560. The postulated scenario involves a substantial improvement in safety culture through policy and organisational aspects of construction. Despite assuming high revised ratings of 8 can be achieved, it is only once the changes penetrate through to the direct level that the degree of risk reduction aspired to is realised. Neither the policy level changes alone nor improvements at the direct level appear to be sufficient to reach the goals. In itself this is perhaps not surprising, however, it does serve to demonstrate that the inferences from the Influence Network are logical providing confidence in its use to identify specific areas for improvement and quantify their risk effectiveness. A contrasting example for the offshore industry to demonstrate the impact of safety culture improvement and the contrasting strategies emerging for tackling residual risks of generally minor injuries from slips and trips is presented in Appendix D.
8.9
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
8.9.1 Preamble
Alternative data sources to supplement the weightings and ratings at the workshop have been investigated. The implications are presented below.
8.9.2
NCE Summary
A further source to corroborate the Influence Network findings, is the survey conducted by the New Civil Engineer Magazine(25) in the run up to the Summit. Around 700 readers responded drawn from different groups as follows: 46% consultants 27% contractors 19% clients 8% other (~322) (~189) (~133) (~56)
The group was self-selecting presumably, with a particular motivation to contribute to the safety debate. Nevertheless the number of respondees in each category is
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.37 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
reasonable to ensure that a range of views is represented. The NCE is sent to all charted civil engineers across all construction subsectors. Questions were generally answerable Yes, No or Not applicable. Figure 8.7
presents a bar chart of the responses indicating a negative impact on safety (e.g. for Question 2, 63% of respondees answered No). The survey results(25) also indicate the distribution of results between the different respondents. In all cases, consultants rate site issues worse than contractors do and vice versa. Similarly clients rate their performance in relation to Questions 1 to 3 more highly than indicated by responses from consultants or contactors. Despite the general trend for blaming others, all questions involve a degree of self-criticism. This is highlighted in Figure 8.7 by superimposing the proportion of respondees in each group. Even though 46% of responses came from consultants, 82% of the total agreed that designers could do more to design out health and safety risks (Question 6). As the bars indicate, this is the second highest concern amongst the issues raised and implies it is not so much a lack of understanding of designer responsibilities (Question 5) as not knowing how or having the processes to reduce construction risks. Other dominant issues from those raised in the survey, were inadequate site supervision (Question 14), time / cost pressures compromising safety (Question 12), workforce involvement (Question 10) and considerations of health and safety performance in contract award (Question 4). All these issues have been reflected in the foregoing Influence Network structuring and performance rating. Table 8.11 lists the influences together with the workshop ratings and alongside identifies relevant questions from the NCE survey and the inferred rating from the responses (e.g. where 75% felt more could be done to consider health and safety in contract award in response to Question 4, a rating of 2-3 was inferred for the policy level influence P1, contracting strategy). The phrasing of some of the questions in terms of circumstances ever having arisen rather than the general situation obviates direct comparison in all cases. Furthermore the questionnaire addressed construction safety in general rather than fatal falls from height in particular. Nevertheless the degree of correlation is considerable adding weight to the ratings assigned at the workshop.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.38 of 8.43
0
1. How well do you understand your safety responsibilities? 2. Do clients understand their safety responsibilities? 3. Does lack of construction experience in clients mean safety is overlooked? 4. Do clients rate health and safety competence high enough when awarding contracts? 5. Do designers understand their safety responsibilities? 6. Could designers do more to design out health and safety risks during construction? 7. Does the planning supervisor improve construction safety? 8. Does top level commitment by contractors to health and safety transfer to adequate resources on site? 9. Is enough being spent by contractors to manage health and safety efficiently on site? 10. Is the workforce included enough in day to day management of health and safety? 11. Do construction workers understand what is good health and safety practice? 12. Is safety compromised to get the job done on time / to cost? 13. Have you ever failed to stop a contractor carrying out unsafe working practices because : (a) you were frightened of retaliation? (b) you knew the job had to be done quickly?
10 3.2
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Vaguely / Not at all No Yes No No Yes No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
19% Clients
63 65 75 46
46% Consultants
82 48 51 70 75 55 78 8 30 23 84 41 % Responding as indicated
27% Contractors
(c) a delay would cost money?
14. Have you been aware of unsafe practices occurring because of lack of supervisory staff Yes on site? 15. Have you experience of productivity based pay encouraging workers to take health and safety risks?
Yes
Figure 8.7 Areas and Strength of Negative Influences on Construction Safety from the NCE Survey(25)
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Influences Environmental E1 Political Influence E2 Regulatory Influence E3 Market Influence E4 Social Influence Policy P1 Contracting Strategy P2 Ownership and Control P3 P4 Company culture Organisational Structure Base Implied Question Rating Rating 4 7 3 3 3 2 3 5
2-3
Q12 Time / cost pressures
2-3 3-4
A4 Rating of H&S in tenders Q2/3 Understanding of safety responsibility / construction experience Q7/8 Role of planning supervisor / contractor commitment to supply resources
4-6
P5 Safety Management P6 Labour Relations P7 Company Profitability Organisational O1 Recruitment and Selection O2 Training O3 Procedures O4 Planning O5 Information Management & Feedback O6 Management/Supervision O7 Communications O8 Safety Culture O9 O10 O11 O12 Direct D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions Competence Motivation / Morale Team working Situational Awareness Fatigue Health Quality of Communications Availability of Information / Advice Compliance Availability of Suitable Resources Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Equipment Operability Internal Working Environment Operating Conditions
3 4 5 3 2 4 5 3 4 3 3 7 3 1 4 5 6 2 1 8 7 3 4 1 3 3 8 5 7
2-3 1-2 3
Q10 Workforce inclusion in day to day H&S on site Q14 Lack of supervisory staff * Q9 Spending by contractors to manage health and safety on site
1-2
Q6 Could designers do more?
4-5 5-6 2-3
Q11 Workforce understanding of H&S Q15 Influence of productivity based pay * Q12 Safety compromised for time / cost
4-5
Q8. Contractor commitment to site resources
* Question asks where this has ever been an issue rather than indicating a general rating
Table 8.11 Ratings Inferred from NCE Survey(25)

BOMEL CONSORTIUM
8.9.3 Loughborough Focus Groups(19)
In a parallel piece of HSE research, Loughborough University have held a series of focus groups to examine factors contributing to accident causation in relation to: Project concept, design and procurement Work organisation and management Task factors Individual factors.
The sessions involved safety specialists, senior managers, operatives from large and small companies, site managers and client teams, in single or mixed discipline groups. The groups rated on a scale of 1 to 5 (from Not al all to To a very large degree) the extent to which various factors contribute towards accident causation. The format of the question prevents direct correlation with the influence network as it implies some combined assessment of weighting (importance) and rating (condition) of different factors as well as some proportionate contribution to the overall total. Neither weighting nor rating comparisons alone are appropriate, although the sensitivity study findings summarised in Table 8.10 are more relevant. The greatest spread in responses for the different groups in the Loughborough surveys related to project concept design and procurement with a maximum range of 2.5, over the scale of 5, as to whether an inexperienced client contributes to accident causation; senior managers and safety specialist suggested this was to a large degree whereas from operatives in small companies the response was the lowest across any factor between to a slight degree and not at all. In itself this is important, underlying the different treatment necessary to capture different sectors of the industry. By contrast the trends across the factors and degree of agreement between the focus groups was more similar in relation to individual, task and work organisation matters. In order to compare with the Influence Network approach, the strongest and weakest contributors to accident causation are extracted. Individual medical problems are the weakest contributor in the Loughborough work. Health had a rating of 7 (Figure 8.2) and a low weighting on the accidents under consideration (Table 8.5) in the BOMEL
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
workshop. The sensitivity studies reported in Table 8.10 show health to be an unimportant factor for risk control. Similarly, monotonous or boredom and tiredness are not identified as a strong contributor in the Loughborough work. In the influence Network the rating is 8 and weighting moderate with a low ranking in the sensitivity studies. Conversely attitude to risk and failure to recognise danger or carelessness on the part of employees are the most significant and consistently viewed contributors to accident causation in the Loughborough focus groups. In the Influence Network sessions, situational awareness was rated at 1 and weighted highly in relation to fatal falls from height. The sensitivity studies place this influence as a principal candidate for improvement. At the organisational and task levels, PPE deficiencies, illogical design of equipment and instruments and poor tools and equipment are low to moderate contributors in the view of the focus groups. Corresponding influences in the network Equipment Purchasing, and Equipment Operability are rated at 7 and 8 and weighted generally low (Table 8.3) and moderate / low (Table 8.5) respectively. In Table 8.10 these elements emerge at the bottom of the sensitivity league. Poor supervision of operations and missing or unclear instructions are relatively important contributors from the Loughborough work. Management and supervision and communications have influence network ratings of 3 or 4 coupled with medium to high weightings and considerable significance within the sensitivity studies. The reinforcement of the Influence Network findings can be seen throughout the above comparison. Other key factors emerging are: The unanimity amongst the focus groups that lack of health and safety training contributes to a large degree to accident causation. The divergence of views regarding compliance with regulations, lack of safe systems and poor health and safety culture with operatives
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.42 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
consistently seeing these as less significant than senior managers, clients or safety specialists.
8.9.4
Conclusion
The comparisons with other information sources are important to confirm the validity of the Influence Network structuring and quantification. The foregoing sections and the case studies which follow in Section 9 provide strong endorsement. It is important at this stage, however, to re-confirm the added value of the Influence Network. As well as representing current practice, it provides a framework for assessing the impact of change in a quantitative manner. A sequence of measures throughout the layers of influence can be examined and each step can be considered clearly in terms of the quality (rating) of an influence and its significance (weighting) on other aspects. The effort necessary to achieve the change and the corresponding timeframe for it to be realised can also be addressed. Alternative strategies can also be compared considering their relative cost / schedule and the expected level of impact, in terms of risk reduction at the top level, as an input to decision making and resource allocation.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 8.43 of 8.43
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
9. INFLUENCE NETWORK APPLICATION CASE STUDIES
9.1
PREAMBLE
In the course of the study a number of contrasting construction sites of different type and size were visited, to inform the rating of current practice and help in defining the influences, their interrelation and relative weighting. The outline structure of the generic influence network was used as a basis for discussion in each case. Following the workshop session at which the network influences were customised and a rating scale defined, the site meeting notes were revisited. In each case the site practices as described were considered against the workshop definitions and a modified rating was assigned where appropriate. A site-specific index was then calculated for comparison with the workshop baseline (0.403). The background to the site visits and the resulting indices are described below. In each case a single pass was made by members of the project team who had been present at all the site meetings and the workshop. No refinement or adjustment was made once the revised index was determined as the assessment was relatively coarse. For example, the workshop network focussed on fatal falls from height whereas the site discussions related to health and safety matters more generally; although many of the influence ratings would be invariant some, particularly at the direct level, should reflect the top level event. In addition, the site meetings although lasting two-three hours were not in depth and a workshop session to specifically address revised ratings (and potentially weightings) would deliver more robust values. Nevertheless it will be seen that the case studies provide some useful indicators.
9.2
BP SUNBURY
9.2.1 Project Description
A press article(37) had alerted BOMEL to the safety emphasis at the Sunbury Redevelopment site and BPs Project Manager kindly agreed to meet with BOMELs study team and involved construction management personnel from Schal, the principal contractor. As an international oil company, BPs fortunes rely on its reputation (social influence E4). Mission statements from the highest level set the company culture requiring No accidents and no harm to people. Safety
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.1 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
management is central to the companys petrochemical operations. Its safety statistics in relation to lost time accidents (LTAs) displayed in all office reception areas, include all contractors as well as employees reflecting strong ownership (P2) of safe business practices. The redevelopment project producing 10 new / refurbished buildings replacing 89 smaller structures from the 60s and 70s is being carried out in phases as surrounding areas of the headquarters site remain operational. In setting about the task, the BP project management team (now 3 personnel) was charged with ensuring that the company culture (P3) became the safety culture on site matching BPs corporate standards not those of the construction industry. The approach in the contracts made this clear (P1) and Schal noted that it had been evident to them from the outset that BP required specific attention to safety and rigorous safety management systems (P5). It was said that the requirements and expectations go far beyond CDM. The tender documents were not just paying lip service to the issue as it was implied is the case on some other contracts. Elements of the contracting strategy include a reimbursable basis for the project management team (P7), a direct relationship between BP and subcontractors and a requirement for a day of site safety induction training (O2) to be allowed for for every worker coming to site. The consequences of this are felt at the direct level with fewer casual changes of personnel. With subsequent phases of work prior safe performance is being weighted more highly in the tender evaluation than price, yet despite this subcontractor prices have remained stable and contractors are reporting benefits of a clear (D13) and well scheduled (O4) work environment. Once on site the Schal Project Leader has had to join the Sunbury HSE Leadership Team for all BPs activities and has full access to BPs policies etc via the intranet (P4). The promulgation of the client ethos through the principal contractor is felt at the organisational level with the induction training as noted above. Planning (O4) was described having a specific objective to sequence different trades in a work area, involving night work if necessary, to avoid interface safety issues wherever possible. BP and Schal managers are actively involved in site monitoring, there is a dedicated HS&E manager, and additional safety personnel have been deployed on site to cover zones and periods of high demand (O6). Communications at the organisational level are such that the directors of subcontractor firms are involved directly in progress / planning meetings, 30% of which are devoted to safety matters (O7). A measure of the shift in safety culture (O8) is the feedback from contractors as they move to other client sites then back to BP and note the fundamental differences. Design for safe construction has involved maximising levels of offsite prefabrication and housing the design team for subsequent phases in open plan office facilities alongside the construction
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.2 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
project management team to maximise opportunities for feedback and improvement (O11). It was noted that there was scope for more explicit consideration of though life maintenance with respect to safety at the design stage. The canteen and washing facilities for the workforce are specifically to a high office standard (O12) to indicate a respect for people to be reciprocated in worker attitudes. At the direct level motivation and morale (D7) is helped by a safety incentive scheme in which safe behaviour is rewarded with eligibility for a draw running at over 100 per week. Intended more specifically to address compliance (D9), the scheme is being extended, with the support of trade contractor directors with a 3 strikes and out rule for unsafe practices. Team work and responsibility for others (D3) have been improved with Stop cards (Figure 9.1). Situational awareness (D4) has been tackled with a Take 5 scheme to encourage worker to take stock and assume personal responsibility (Figure 9.2). Both measures are seen to be direct measures to instil an appropriate safety culture. The quality of communications (D7) is addressed by ensuring workers can understand English and communicate effectively and is to be improved in future phases to specifically tackle literacy problems. Tool box talks are monitored to ensure their content is appropriate. The stop card near miss reporting scheme is actively managed and transparent with unsafe situations rectified within hours. General lessons are distilled and, for example, the frequency of cuts amongst carpet fitters has been matched with site-wide requirements that gloves be worn (D8). A key tenet of safe working practice at the direct level has been attention to site tidiness (D13). A dedicated team is available to clear site areas, with a mechanism for backcharging if the responsible contractor has failed to clear up. Safety walk-throughs and other inspections are conducted regularly and have effectively eliminated much of the hazard and improve productivity. Those walkthroughs are conducted by the BP Project Manager as well as the management contractor demonstrating the priorities and high level commitment to safety. The proximity to office workers and ongoing business activity has also necessitated attention to the operating conditions.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.3 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 9.1 Stop Cards for Near Miss Reporting
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.4 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 9.2 Take 5 Cards Issued to all Workers as a Constant Reminder of Personal Responsibilities
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Many of the measures adopted are atypical for construction but are considered by BP, with some caution, as successful. The measure adopted by BP has been days away for work cases (DAFWC) for which a target of 0.2 DAFWC per 100,000 manhours was adopted at the outset compared with a building industry average of 1.02. Figure 9.3 shows the achievement at Sunbury through 1999 to early 2000(49). With some two million manhours expended, the site is running at its target level whilst the industry average has increased to 1.3. Furthermore neither of the cases included at Sunbury would have been included in the industry figures which take an over three day injury as the base accounting level.
Figure 9.3 Record of Days Away from Work Cases at Sunbury Site
(49)
The success of the project is attributed by BP to the close working relationship of the client and construction manager, encouraging the sharing of best practice and enabling a safety orientated cultural shift in construction site working practice(49). Important elements have been: The setting of long but ultimately achievable targets Firm and clear safety objectives set by the client at the outset and enacted by its personnel A construction manager with established and effective safety
management procedures Financial incentives to workers to raise the profile of safety Stop and Take 5 initiatives to ensure individuals recognise their role and responsibility in achieving safety.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.6 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
9.2.2 Influence Network Evaluation
In the remainder of this section the impact of these changes is assessed using the baseline influence network developed for fatal falls from height. The quantitative evaluation is not precise. The baseline influence network was quantified by a small group and with a specific accident category in view. The meeting and documentation(49) for the BP site were not sufficient to accurately judge the rating on the scale as defined nor would the general measures necessarily map onto the specific scenario in the network. Nevertheless an indicative assessment can be made and is informative. Table 9.1 presents all the influences from the Influence Network and their original ratings from the workshop as per Figure 8.2. Areas where BP and Schal have taken specific measures as indicated in the narrative above are highlighted in the table and a revised rating is assigned. This new rating reflects understanding from the site visit and a recognition of the best to worst scale defined in the workshop. Examining these areas of influence, it is clear that the changes stem from the environmental influences on the client which translate to policy, are then driven into the organisational level, and are implemented at the direct level with specific measures. The influence network is therefore quantified in stages adjusting first the environmental rating change, then adding to these policy level changes from the client and contractor, and so on to include the organisational and direct level impacts. Figure 9.4 shows the sequential impact and compares the resulting index from the Sunbury site of 0.579 with the workshop baseline, 0.403. It must be underlined that the assessment is coarse at this stage and no account of potential differences in the weighting of influences, for example, affecting the client has been made. It does, however, confirm that drawing in cultural learnings from other industries may be beneficial. A clear message, however, is that the differences from conventional sites have been driven by the client although the benefits in terms of safety and efficiency are now recognised across the contracted parties. It also suggests that a strong drive from the client can secure the level of improvement set out in the CONIAC targets. As a footnote it should be remarked that the site team is not complacent and further improvements are sought. In particular it is recognised that health issues have received relatively little attention and the emphasis is to be increased through the next phase. Competence is to be tackled with a more detailed induction and measures to help overcome problems such as literacy.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.7 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Influences Environmental E1 Political Influence E2 Regulatory Influence E3 Market Influence E4 Social Influence Policy P1 Contracting Strategy P2 Ownership and Control P3 Company culture P4 Organisational Structure P5 Safety Management P6 Labour Relations P7 Company Profitability Organisational O1 Recruitment and Selection O2 Training O3 Procedures O4 Planning O5 Information Management & Feedback O6 Management/Supervision O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions Base New Change in influence quantity Rating Rating 4 7 3 3 3 2 3 5 3 4 5 3 2 4 5 3 4 3 3 7 3 1 4
5 8 8 8 7 7 5 7 4 6 8 6 7 5 7
Public focus on oil co client Safety > price. Explicit in contracts Strategy to impose corporate values No accidents, no harm to people Integration of Schal & BP Requirement of management contractor Welfare emphasis from client Site management reimbursable Screening for language Induction for every person Planning to separate trades Trade contractors in weekly meetings BP/Schal active extra safety people Direct comm. to trade contractors Effects of policies
5 7
Site based team maximum prefab Emphasis on welfare / quality of facilities
Direct D1 Competence D2 Motivation / Morale D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 Team working Situational Awareness Fatigue Health Quality of Communications Availability of Information / Advice Compliance Availability of Suitable Resources Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Equipment Operability Internal Working Environment Operating Conditions
5 6 2 1 8 7 3 4 1 3 3 8 5 7
7 6 6
Efficiencies becoming recognised / Rewards STOP Take 5
5 6 5
Monitoring of toolbox talks Feedback from Take 5 Incentive scheme / 3 strikes & out
Housekeeping emphasis
Table 9.1 Revised Ratings for BP Sunbury Site Tentative - Based on site Visit / Documentation etc(49) (No change except where noted) (Index 0.579)
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Incremental improvements 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.38 0.36 Base case
Index
Incremental improvements
P client
P contractor
Influences changed in turn
Figure 9.4 Sequential Analysis of Improvement Measures at BP Sunbury Site in Terms of Influence Network Index
9.3
CENTRAL LONDON SITE

9.3.1 Project Description
A contrasting visit was made to a large central London development involving several sub-sites which had experienced a number of major accidents recently. Discussions were held with the health and safety manager representing the client and main contractor. It was stated that site thinking is dictated by CDM but this was considered onerous and HSWA should be sufficient. Efforts had been made to streamline and standardise the approach with umbrella safety plans for different work packages within the tendering process. A near miss reporting system was in place but the mechanism for feedback to the person who made the report is to be improved. An incentive scheme was being piloted but it was viewed with some scepticism. Safety advisors are allocated to each subsite but the sites have different safety performance and it is seen to be desirable for there to be more interchange across the sites and collaboration of the advisors. The company had made particular efforts to improve the quality of safety professionals employed and now paid substantially higher salaries than the norm to achieve this. Efforts are being made to include safety in the agenda of all site meetings. Every work
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.9 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
pack is tendered separately which does not give good continuity but the safety performance of potential contractors is examined. A strong observation was that designers could have more influence on site safety than they do the example of plant rooms on the edge of roofs was given which creates an inherent hazard for maintenance. It was suggested that ability to design for safe construction should be part of a designers prequalification. Risk assessments have generally been performed by professionals and workers were not trusted. However, maintenance contractors employed directly by the client had recently been involved and were now recognised to be best placed to make the assessments - the same approach has yet to be taken in construction activity, engaging contactors and subcontractors. Housekeeping was acknowledged as a big issue but difficult to pin down, although dedicated clean-up teams were provided. Language problems are a concern and it is intended that non-English speakers are accompanied by an English speaker at all times. Skill shortages, particularly at foreman level was noted. With considerable external work the bad weather was a concern because there had been down time and larger teams have been working to catch up schedule. The provision of PPE, safety arrangements and health monitoring were clearly considered as the responsibility of the individuals employer. Health issues, particularly with riverside working, were recognised but again considered the responsibility of the employer. There was no strict screening of workers arriving at site. A brief safety induction was provided. In reviewing the influence network, BOMEL were asked what was meant by Safety Culture. Incidents that had occurred were considered to be due to people flouting procedures and therefore difficult to control.
9.3.2
Influence Network Evaluation
Considering the site discussions in the context of the influences in Figure 8.2, it is hard to identify areas where a higher rating than the base case values would be appropriate. A number of areas where improvements could be made had been identified, as indicated in Table 9.2, demonstrating an awareness of the issues but these appeared to be considered as items rather than an integrated strategy. The assessment indicates that the baseline influence network is reasonably representative in so far as a coarse evaluation at this level can achieve.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.10 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Influences Environmental E1 Political Influence E2 Regulatory Influence E3 Market Influence E4 Social Influence Policy P1 Contracting Strategy P2 Ownership and Control P3 Company culture P4 Organisational Structure P5 Safety Management P6 Labour Relations P7 Company Profitability Organisational O1 Recruitment and Selection O2 Training O3 Procedures O4 Planning O5 Information Management & Feedback O6 Management/Supervision O7 Communications O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 Direct D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions Competence Motivation / Morale Team working Situational Awareness Fatigue Health Quality of Communications Availability of Information / Advice Compliance Availability of Suitable Resources Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Equipment Operability Internal Working Environment Operating Conditions Base New Influence issues raised Rating Rating 4 7 3 3 3 2 3 5 3 4 5 3 2 4 5 3 4 3 3 7 3 1 4 5 6 2 1 8 7 3 4 1 3 3 8 5 7
Too onerous / HSWA OK
Fragmented Concern about lifecycle maintenance
Umbrella safety plans
Intend to coordinate safety advisors Highly paid safety advisors Aim to have safety on meeting agendas
Serious problem affecting life-cycle maintenance particularly
Incentive scheme but sceptical Maintenance risk assessments now involving workers Contractors responsibility English speakers marking others Near miss reporting see O5 Source of accidents PPE etc contractors responsibility
Housekeeping gangs big issue Impact of bad weather on schedule
Table 9.2 Revised Ratings for Central London Site Tentative - Based on Site Visit (No Significant Rating Change Identified) (Index 0.403)
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
9.4 SMALL BUILDER
9.4.1 Project Type Description
As a third case study the case of a small, originally family, building firm is considered. Based in Maidenhead the firm works on small building works, maintenance etc with a core three man team and an extended group of some 15 casual workers / skill specialists called upon as required. For comparative purposes the discussion centres around the influences in Figure 8.2 in which Policy Level influences (P1-P3) relate to the (often domestic) client, and (P4-P7) the owners of the building firm. Organisational influences relate to the way the work is managed and organised on site and direct level influences are task related. The perception of environmental influences is that they are lower grade than for large sites. The domestic client has a very low rating in terms of ownership or control over the construction process and the corporate structure and safety management practices of the firm are weak. At the organisational level, the absence of formalised procedures and forward plans leads to lower ratings and equipment purchasing is avoided wherever possible for financial reasons. Design of safe construction is somewhat better than on major sites, however, as in many instances the builder has control over design details and hence construction methods. At the direct level, motivation / morale, team working, communications and availability of information and advice benefit from a close established working group. Competence with respect to health and safety is poor and equipment related issues suffer as a consequence of financial constraints at the organisational level. The small builder has limited control over external operating conditions and there may be less protection to and from the weather and third parties.
9.4.2
Influence Network Evaluation
Table 9.3 presents a summary of these factors and adjusted ratings. Again the evaluation is coarse but nevertheless seems reasonable. A further step to investigate the case of small scale construction in more detail would be to reconsider the weightings. However, for comparative purposes the small construction index of 0.323 which results may be compared with the 0.403 baseline. In risk terms the small construction exposure incidence rate is about 75% greater than the base case. Taking account of caveats with regard to weighting etc and recognition that lone workers present a case beyond small
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
firms, the Influence Network index emerging from this case study seems reasonable and consistent with the evidence from the data in Section 4. A series of sensitivity studies was also run, improving ratings to 8 in turn, to indicate areas for developing risk control strategies (paralleling the base case exercise in Table 8.8). Interestingly, whereas the most immediate benefits for the baseline case appear to arise from changes in direct influences such as situational awareness (eight out of the top ten in Table 8.8), in the small construction case strengthening of the regulatory and management issues in relation to the way work is approached came through more strongly. In the small construction case only six of the top ten influences for the sensitivity study were from the direct level, with two environmental influences and one each from organisational and policy levels making up the top ten. The focus on the top ten is of course arbitrary but is nevertheless instructive. Some important influences were common to both scenarios, namely: Market influence Competence Compliance Situational awareness Quality of inspection and maintenance Availability of suitable resources.
However four deficiencies for the base case were not so significant for small construction and by inference are better handled in the latter case: Quality of communications Team working Availability of information / advice Design for safe construction
Conversely the factors emerging in the top ten with the potential to improve safety in small construction but which are relatively better handled in the base case are: Procedures Regulatory influence Equipment operability Safety management.
As discussed in Section 8.8, sustained improvement in the base case can only stem from policy and organisational commitments. Nevertheless the strength of impact in the small construction case emphasises the root of deficiencies in this sector.
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
9.5
SUMMIT ACTION PLANS

9.5.1 Preamble
At the construction summit in February 2001, industry bodies laid out their action plans, or rather areas for action(4, 42 etc) to improve industry performance. Both health and safety targets were of concern(8) but the principal focus was on accidents and in particular fatalities. An attempt has been made to demonstrate how these plans from different sectors and interest groups within the industry map onto the influences identified within the network. At this stage the assessment can only be qualitative as the statements were generally at a high level (given the forum and time available). However, it is instructive to examine the areas identified. It also helps underline the need for specific risk control measures to be defined and for the extent and timing of their potential impact on the industrys rating evaluated The assessment here is subjective and based on notes made in the course of the presentations supplemented by reference to material in the summit pack(4), where available. It is recognised that some of the questions raised may well be addressed already by the groups but time precluded their presentation. It is intended that the questions will help prompt development of the plans to enable quantitative comparisons of proposed measures. The following section summarises the key areas for action raised at the summit and Table 9.4 provides the mapping onto the pre-identified network influences. The final column highlights the influences targeted in the base case influence network evaluation following the project workshop for comparison. In Section 9.5.3 questions and recommendations for further development are put forward.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.14 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Influences Environmental E1 Political Influence E2 Regulatory Influence E3 Market Influence E4 Social Influence Policy P1 Contracting Strategy P2 Ownership and Control P3 Company culture P4 Organisational Structure P5 Safety Management P6 Labour Relations P7 Company Profitability Organisational O1 Recruitment and Selection O2 Training O3 Procedures O4 Planning O5 Information Management & Feedback O6 Management/Supervision O7 Communications O8 Safety Culture O9 O10 O11 O12 Direct D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions Competence Motivation / Morale Team working Situational Awareness Fatigue Health Quality of Communications Availability of Information / Advice Compliance Availability of Suitable Resources Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Equipment Operability Internal Working Environment Operating Conditions Base New Change in influence quantity Rating Rating 4 7 3 3 3 2 3 5 3 4 5 3 2 4 5 3 4 3 3 7 3 1 4 5 6 2 1 8 7 3 4 1 3 3 8 5 7 2 7 5 2 No H&S specific new jobs Good Work together / reliant on each other Concerned about heights 3 3 2 Indifferent HSWA / Regular distant
1 1 1 2 1 5
Clients no interest in H&S Left alone apart from schedule As P1 Informal relationships No direct considerations Good team
1 1 2
No H&S training / policy Developed on the job Day by day
3 2 2 2 3
Not formal Concerned about safety (and lost time if injured) No cash to invest Ad hoc For small works under builders control
5 5
OK no obstacles OK not H&S specific
2 3 5
As required Standard to make do Exposed
Table 9.3 Revised Ratings for Small Building Firm Tentative Note Weighting Model may also need Modification (Index 0.323)
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
9.5.2 Summit Proposals
The areas identified by principal speakers were as follows: Confederation of Construction Clients Key aims addressing culture, organisation and operation are: to develop a culture of continuous improvement to demonstrate a lead and measure themselves apply key performance indicators.
Construction Industry Council From a design perspective recognised need for: higher education and lifelong learning to cover risk recognition improved compliance with CDM feedback and research to understand causes of problems and solutions.
Construction Products Association Focused on need for data and feedback from sites for product development process. UCATT / TUC Principal themes against the backdrop of decaying standards in industry were introduction of roving safety reps with powers to issue improvement notices training partnerships with emphasis on safety client role in requiring safety and a qualified workforce to be government led recognition of occupational health stronger regulator sanctions clarification of legitimate employment an over-riding need for a new culture.
Engineering Construction Industry Association Drawing on relative success in the process industry, plan is to share expertise in relation to: cooperation between employer and employee close cooperation between client and contractors safety passport scheme indicator of H&S competence and risk awareness.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.16 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Constructors Liaison Group Presenting a new health and safety forum emphasis was placed on: dealing with fragmentation involving the workforce learning from statistical data certification of competence.
Construction Industry Employers Council Calling for a cultural change to equate unsafe behaviour with the pariah status of drink driving, principal themes were: fully qualified workforce participation in research into underlying causes gathering ill-health data elimination of black economy through government / VAT.
Major Contractors Group Practical measures and areas of concern included: better planning knowing training / competence of all workers on site publication of health & safety statistics alongside profit and loss
reaching one-off clients, for example funders (such as lottery) requiring safety. Over riding emphasis to create a new culture by changing way business is done. Construction Industry Training Board Training was essential to build awareness and real understanding of risks. For recruitment higher standards have to be set to present a barrier to an unsafe workforce. Training emphasis on occupational schemes and demonstration of best practice. Government Government ministers captured the broad spectrum of integrated measures required. A new attitude on site, not accepting risks and zero tolerance of unsafe behaviour, was called for. Governments role as a principal client was acknowledged, to be exercised through its contracting strategies and cultural emphasis on health and safety. Strengthening of the regulator in terms of resource and powers was identified, with safety representation to help improve site culture and workforce management interactions.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.17 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
9.5.3 Turning Action Plans to Performance
Table 9.4 broadly categorises the areas for action with respect to the network influences. Where many of the suggestions stop is in detailing the sequential impact through the construction system for example from the client level (CCC) to the direct workforce influences. In order to take the initiative forward more detailed measures need to be assessed. For example in its leadership and focus on the client(4), the CCC sets out to promote a team-based non adversarial approach amongst clients, advisers or the supply chain. The could be effected through the clients positive ownership and control of the construction process (P2), but would need a cultural change (P3), and would be manifested in the organisational structure (P4) for the work. To be truly effective the improvement should extend to management and communication of site work (O% - O7) and the workforce (D3, D7, D8). Identifying specific strategies, their sequence and impact would enable changing ratings to be identified through the influence network as a basis for comparing alternative strategies and actively monitoring their effectiveness during implementation. The presentations and action plans were high level and strategic. This means that there will be a need to develop and expand on the action plans as they are rolled out across and within the various sectors of the industry. This process will help clarify the way forward. We would also expect this process to identify gaps, weaknesses and more specific and measurable areas for improvement. The summit pack(4) included pen-pictures of the most recent fatalities and are worthy of re-review in the context of the action plant. All the accidents were foreseeable and generally arise through unsafe actions, flouting of procedures and / or failure to recognise the hazards and potential risks. It is therefore essential that the action plans demonstrate the link through to these direct failings be they errors or violations. The character of accidents is not dissimilar to past events despite clear (52) preventative guidelines drawn from experience and the speakers offered new impetus with a recognition of the need for cultural change and responsibility through the industry. Training needs and competence standards with respect to safety were highlighted repeatedly, but only the CITB appeared to underline the goal of imparting risk / situational awareness to the individual i.e. translating the safety culture into a safety climate for the individual(18). In addition, although perhaps implicit in the cultural extraction as, there was little explicit reference to safety management, procedures or compliance which form the backbone of most strong safety cultures and are therefore central to action plans.
(12)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.18 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Summit Contributor UCATT Influences Base Rating
CCC
Environmental E1 Political Influence E2 Regulatory Influence E3 Market Influence E4 Social Influence Policy P1 Contracting Strategy P2 Ownership and Control P3 Company culture P4 Organisational Structure P5 Safety Management P6 Labour Relations P7 Company Profitability Organisational O1 Recruitment and Selection O2 Training O3 Procedures O4 Planning O5 Information Management & Feedback O6 Management/Supervision O7 Communications O8 Safety Culture O9 Equipment Purchasing O10 Inspection and Maintenance Policy O11 Design for Safe Construction O12 Pay and Conditions Direct D1 Competence D2 Motivation / Morale D3 Team working D4 Situational Awareness D5 Fatigue D6 Health D7 Quality of Communications D8 Availability of Information / Advice D9 Compliance D10 Availability of Suitable Resources D11 Quality of Inspection & Maintenance D12 Equipment Operability D13 Internal Working Environment D14 Operating Conditions Data needs stated? Key: CCC Confederation of Construction Clients CIC Construction Industry Council CPA Construction Products Association UCATT UCATT / TUC
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
4 7 3 3 3 2 3 5 3 4 5 3 2 4 5 3 4 3 3 7 3 1 4 5 6 2 1 8 7 3 4 1 3 3 8 5 7
- D D - D D D - D ECIA Engineering Construction Industry Association CLG Constructors Liaison Group CIEC Construction Industry Employers Council MCG Major Contractors Group CITB Construction Industry Training Board
Page 9.19 of 9.21
8.8 Example
ECIA
CIEC
MCG
CITB
GOV
CPA
CLG
CIC
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Table 9.4 Summary of Mapping of Areas for Action Identified at the Summit onto IN (42) The UCATT paper raises issues as to whether safety representatives should be internal or external. Experience in the agricultural sector is cited but understanding of the Offshore Installations (Safety Representatives and Safety Committees) Regulations, 1989 plus amendments would be worthwhile. In the latter case safety representatives are workers, elected by their peers, with an allowance for safety duties paid by the employer. In recent times experienced safety representatives have been taken on directly by the duty holder to promulgate good practice across different installations. In examining the action plans it is appropriate to look back at key HSE documents. For example, HSG 65(50) sets out clearly the steps for successful health and safety management: Policy development; Organisational development; Planning and implementing; Performance measurement; Reviewing performance; and Ongoing audit
within the ongoing concept to plan, do, check and act. HSG 48(51) sets out clearly the necessary link and commitment from management to the workforce if human causes are to be reduced and provides guidance on essential strands within such action plans. Figure 9.5 indicates the individual, job and organisational associations of the factors within the Influence Network as represented in HSG 48. Figure 9.6 shows the accepted categorisation of human failures between errors and violations. It is noteworthy that in itself the RIDDOR incident data do not provide any insight, however, the HSE investigations adopt a broad categorisation in this regard. Importantly, the workshop group assigned the lowest ratings of 1 to situational awareness and compliance (see Figure 8.2) which arguably are the two primary ingredients leading to errors and violations. This further emphasises the need for cultural changes identified at the summit. The complexity of the systems reflect the size of construction enterprises the principles applicable to the jobbing builder.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.20 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Figure 9.5 Categorisation of Human Factors in Health and Safety in HSG 48(51)
Figure 9.6 Types of Human Failure
(51)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 9.21 of 9.21
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
10. DISCUSSION
This project was established as a Phase 1 activity to collect and structure available data as a basis for improving health and safety in construction. The work covered two aspects, namely the collation and analysis of data and the use of an Influence Network to structure the information. Conclusions are presented below from each activity and these are developed further in light of the Construction Summit, the new targets and industry responses. The construction industry generates a disproportionately large number of accidents compared with other sectors in the UK. It is inherently hazardous and challenging to control. Factors such as the changing work environment, multiple parties, macho culture, broad definition, different skill levels, contrasting clients, market dependence etc are discussed. The incidence rate in other countries is, in many instances, worse. Nevertheless the UK construction industry record is unacceptable to the authorities. It is notable that the incidence rate has been reducing over recent years but the types and description of fatal injury accidents (12, 46, 4) . remain similar The principal source of accident and ill-health statistics is RIDDOR. The system records factual information but little by way of accident analysis or insight to the causes. RIDDOR applies across all industries. It therefore provides a macro view of UK industry with a consistent basis for comparison between sectors e.g. manufacturing, construction etc but no information about issues specific to a sector (e.g. house building, heavy civil engineering etc). Where HSE investigations are conducted, a broad classification of accident causes is made (e.g. failure to control risk, precautions not available etc). In one sense the categories are too broad and it is necessary to know the specific cause for preventative measures to be taken. However, the categorisation is effective in identifying systemic problems. For example, the significant contribution of failure to control risk as the cause of high falls and collapse / overturn accidents underlines the fundamental problems with site safety, irrespective of the activity or parties involved in the task. Accurate statistical data are essential for measuring performance. The variations across the construction industry and fluctuations in activity mean that reference population data are essential to normalise the accident and ill-health numbers. Definitive data are difficult to obtain, the basis of the data is not always clear and the categorisation is not directly compatible with incident data. This therefore
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
degrades its usefulness or the degree to which interpretations are meaningful. It is essential that future incident data gathering is matched by assembling population data from readily accessible sources and that findings are presented on a consistent basis. A specific investigation of the apparent upturn in construction fatalities from 2000 to 2001 found no clear evidence of a specific factor, with the distribution across different categories remaining similar. In fact the increased number of serious accidents with fatal consequences was to a degree countered by a reduction in those resulting in major injuries. In conjunction with DETR, a number of hypotheses were examined but have not fully explained the recent statistics. An area of potential concern arising from the data analysis is the significance of employment status. Whereas an average across all industries indicates that the fatal injury rate for the self-employed is higher than for employees, the present data analysis for construction suggests the opposite. In construction this issue is complex with some 35% of the work force apparently self-employed; it is also tied up with the traditional structure within trades, self-employment for taxation of workers taking instructions as employees, as well as out-sourcing by major contractors and clients. Furthermore it is likely that incident investigations categorise employment status with reference to working practices as they affect safety, whereas reference population statistics will relate to the manner of personal taxation. The large number of self-employed really working as direct labour in the industry is likely to distort the statistics. Clarification in incident investigation summaries might help unravel this issue. However, it is considered, in consultation with HSE, that the effect is due to data recording rather than being a fundamental issue affecting safety stemming from employment status. Related to the above, it seems the labour force survey (LFS) is misleading in its presentation of reporting levels for reportable non fatal injuries. The RIDDOR reporting rate for employees is compared with the LFS data which covers employees and the self-employed. An adjustment to give a like for like comparison shows reporting at 32% not 49% as stated. However, a more accurate assessment of the number of employed / self-employed, accident data and significance of employment status on safety is necessary to make an appropriate interpretation. Just as DETR put forward hypotheses, so the literature examines failings within the industry leading to accidents. Rarely is their significance quantified, partly as a consequence of the absence of data as described above. It is therefore unclear what impact on safety there would be if performance in an area were improved.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 10.2 of 10.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
In the second part of the report an Influence Network technique was introduced to structure the inter-relation of factors influencing accidents from the environmental level of society and regulations through to direct factors, such as, the competence of workers and their attitude to risk. The approach was shown to be systematic leading to a quantitative measure of risk and a basis for comparing alternative risk control options. A base case network was developed in a workshop session involving a limited number of construction industry stakeholders, considering the critical scenario of fatal falls from height. The validity of the network findings was endorsed in comparison with data and expert judgements recorded in other studies in the literature. A number of case studies reflecting contrasting site practices were analysed. These endorsed the baseline ratings and index from the workshop for major construction, demonstrated a doubling of the risk exposure for small companies, and a substantial reduction on a site where specific safety culture measures had been introduced. Sensitivity studies performed using the network showed quantitatively that environmental factors such as the market, policy factors such as contracting strategy and contractor safety management, organisational factors such as training and design for safe construction, and direct influencing factors such as situational (risk) awareness and compliance, are the predominant areas for effective risk control. Importantly these correlate with expert judgements providing confidence that the model gives an accurate representation. The added value from the technique is that it can then be used to consider alternative risk control measures in terms of their effect on influence ratings. By calculating a revised network index, the overall impact on risk reduction can be assessed and used, if appropriate, in cost-benefit comparisons of alternative strategies. The successful application of the approach is demonstrated in the report for a series of postulated measures from the regulator through to the direct level. The impact is compared with the industry set targets for improvements over the next ten years. This shows clearly that to achieve the targets deep seated change in the way construction work is procured and organised is necessary alongside direct changes of individual site practices. Neither system nor individual changes alone will be sufficient and an integrated package of continuous improvement is required. As an addition to the report, the project findings have been re-examined in light of the Construction Summit and conversely the statements from the Summit have been reviewed in relation to the project findings.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 10.3 of 10.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Action Plans set out at the Summit focussed principally on areas for action without demonstrating detailed measures or a clear link to the degree of improvement anticipated. General themes were the need for more data and a recognition that fundamental or cultural change is needed at all levels. The absence of a link between action plans and targets may belie understandable difficulty in interpreting practically the cultural concepts which are new to the industry and reconciling these with the ambitious targets being embraced. It must be concluded that support to the industry is required to distil a consistent and meaningful set of targets and performance monitoring measures applicable at site and organisational levels and across all industry stakeholders. The influence network provides a means to structure and quantify information in a way that is accessible and helpful to a technical community.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 10.4 of 10.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
11. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Arising from the study findings are a series of recommendations. The primary focus has been on the needs of HSE and the industry if it is to make a sustained assault on the improved performance targets. Whilst the paucity of data in certain areas is recognised, it is considered that the overall direction is now clear and efforts should focus on equipping the industry to make the necessary change. Cultural change in other industries The construction industry is not the first to identify the need for cultural change. Other industries, particularly high hazard sectors such as nuclear and offshore, have already made substantial advances. A short report could usefully be prepared with case study examples, describing the approach, measures taken, successes and perhaps challenges faced at different levels through the organisations. The text should be put in relation to the construction industry to ensure that it is accessible. Areas to cover would include safety management, near miss reporting schemes, safety representatives etc. BOMEL have established that there is a strong interest and willingness of the offshore industry to contribute from direct contact with BP and Shell. Importantly there is interest from the operators also to learn from construction, particularly in relation to high frequency low consequence accidents and health related issues. Data analysis At the Summit the industry repeatedly called for better data to understand past failings and to provide a framework for ongoing monitoring. Inconsistencies in current reference schemes have been highlighted. Whilst past data are unlikely to provide ready solutions, a detailed analysis will provide statistics relevant to specific sectors and industry groups. This will help encourage ownership of the accidents and a more focussed recognition of the risks than national statistics. It may also help identify more direct level measures to complement process improvements. Detailed analysis of the RIDDOR data is therefore recommended providing a vehicle for dialogue between HSE and industry groups and ensuring that reference data are adopted on a consistent basis. Inconsistencies may lead to confusion and potentially undermine advances over coming years.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 11.1 of 11.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Reference population statistics Critical to the above is the need for a clear and agreed basis for sector specific population statistics. Some collaboration between HSE statisticians, DETR and ONS is probably appropriate to achieve a clear definition of data sources and the correlation with RIDDOR data. In particular, trade / discipline areas need to be defined consistently for incidence rates to be determined. Any future changes should only bring additional information to ensure like-for-like comparisons can be made historically. Redefinition of targets Arising from the above, it is suggested that there is a need for the high level CONIAC targets to be disaggregated in a way that makes it easier for the various players to measure (and manage) their contribution to the overall targets. For example it is important to develop a meaningful translation of the headline figures and lagging indicators, into terms that can be related to on a continual basis by construction workers and professionals. It is also important to develop surrogate or interim measures which address the practical inter-relation of lost time accidents and performance improvements with a reduction in the major accident rate and fatalities. The influence network can play a key role with this, quantifying the impact of specific and sequential measures at headline and intermediate levels. Influence Network from selecting strategies Use can be made of the influence network at industry and sectoral levels. It is clear that the industry groups need a way to help structure and select from alternative improvement strategies. The network process is effective in engaging stakeholders in the process and provides a logical means to evaluate the complex inter-relation of factors. It is recommended that a series of workshops be held to test out proposed strategies and potentially identify others. In addition to the direct benefits from the sectoral groups, the approach will provide a consistent basis for identifying common themes for which resources may be pooled, with the added benefit of a clear and consistent output for the workforce. For HSE this will give a common framework for looking across the industry to monitor progress, identify any weaknesses, and pull out and disseminate successful practices. At present the combination of lagging statistics and industry liaison groups, although essential, are unlikely to provide this ability to measure and monitor development. The network can also be effective in demonstrating to clients, for example, how crucial their role can be.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 11.2 of 11.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Small firms A particular issue already identified by HSE is the need to reach the small firms and sole traders engaged in small building works and maintenance activities. In many instances small firms will work occasionally as subcontractors to main contractors or for local authorities who have increasingly out-sourced services. In addition, it can be the householder or firms with no direct interest in construction who are the client. Work needs to be done to identify novel ways to raise awareness of construction safety and the need for appropriate measures. Understanding of campaigns in relation to drink-driving or firework safety may be instructive. Similarly the recognition of COSHH regulations has been effectively penetrated through small companies and workers in relation to cleaning contracts. Potential approaches are to target local authorities and major contractors and instil a societal responsibility for ensuring safe practices which subcontractors may absorb and take to other work. Where recent press campaigns have targeted the workforce, local authorities through planning committees and building regulations may have a route to domestic clients and small firms to raise the profile for safety and risk awareness. A similar route may be effective for reaching the occasional client. Design for safe construction A distinct area for scrutiny is design for safe construction which, rather than just dealing with risks present, has the potential to generate an inherently safer working environment. As the NCE survey demonstrated, there is clear recognition by designers that more could be done and it is suggested here that it is process difficulties through design and lack for understanding of construction practices and practical difficulties which impede effective improvements. Before moving to an increased level of prosecution, work to understand the difficulties faced by designers should be undertaken to identify potential CPD routes to bring improvements. Cost, schedule and productivity benefits Over all these recommendations are recognition that there needs to be a clear and early demonstration of the net cost and productivity benefits which can be associated with measures to improve safety. As the influence network study has confirmed, the market is the strongest influence on the industry and denying this and focussing on altruistic safety goals will not lead to acceptance. Already projects have been identified, such as the BP case study, where productivity benefits are perceived from the client through to subcontractors, but work to formally demonstrate the link and disseminate the learnings needs to be undertaken. BOMELs existing PII productivity partners have expressed a
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 11.3 of 11.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
willingness to extend the work into the safety area. A collaborative exercise with HSE / DETR would be beneficial. Health Finally, it must be noted that the recommendations here focus principally on safety. Health issues within the data are poorly represented with a lack of up to date information. Given the concerns about multiple, potentially competing initiatives, it is recommended that attention be paid to the dual health and safety benefits which may arise from alternative intervention strategies. It is considered that many of the cultural changes envisaged to improve safety will create a positive climate in which health issues can be addressed. With the introduction of near miss accident reports an integrated treatment of occupational health data may readily emerge for example, excessive lifting requirements although potentially a musculoskeletal health problem may equally be viewed as a safety issue. An integrated approach could be efficient and clear for the workforce, should lead to meaningful reference statistics, and should be complementary to other respect for people initiatives.
The above recommendations seek to address HSEs role by providing an informed reference base, by supporting and encouraging industry and by ensuring improvement towards the new targets is monitored and realised.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 11.4 of 11.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
12. REFERENCES
1.
Health & Safety Commission. Health and safety statistics 1999/2000, HSE Books, 2000. Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. Revitalising Health and Safety strategy statement June 2000, DETR, July 2000.
2.
3.
Health & Safety Executive. A guide to the reporting of injuries, diseases and dangerous occurrences regulations 1995, HSE Books, 1996. DETR / HSC / HSE. Turning concern into action revitalising construction, Summit pack, February 2001. Health & Safety Executive. Fatal injuries in the construction industry notified to HSE and local authorities, Press Release, 14 November 2001. Health and Safety Executive. The reporting of injuries, diseases and dangerous occurrences regulations 1995, IS No. 3163, HMSO, 1995. Health and Safety The Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 1994, IS 3140, HMSO, 1994. CONIAC. Achieving the revitalising health and safety targets in construction, HSC / WWT flier, February 2001. Health & Safety Executive. Fatalities notified to HSE and local authorities 1/4/00 to 31/12/00 provisional, HSE website, 27 February 2001.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
M4I / Rethinking Construction. A commitment to people Our biggest asset, via DETR website, November 2000.
11.
Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions. Rethinking construction Key performance indicators report for the Minister for Construction, January 2000.
12.
Health & Safety Executive. HMSO, 1982.
Construction health and safety 1981-82,
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 12.1 of 12.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
13. Health & Safety Executive. Key facts injuries in the construction industry 1996/7 to 1999/00 provisional, SASD Internal report, November 2000. Health & Safety Commission / Office of National Statistics Levels and trends in workplace injury: reported injuries and the labour force survey, Undated circa 2000. 15. Entec UK Ltd. Construction health and safety for the new Millennium, HSE Contract Research Report 313/2000, 2000. 16. Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions. Rethinking construction report of the construction Task Force chaired by Sir John Egan, July 1998. HRA Ltd. Research into management, organisational and human factors in the construction industry, HSE Contract Research Report 45/1992, 1992. Step Change. Changing minds a practical guide for behavioural change in the oil and gas industry, Step Change Team, Aberdeen, 2000. Loughborough University. Focus group analysis, Draft report to HSE, October 2000. The Robert Gordon University. Risk perception and safety in the offshore oil and gas industry, HSE Offshore technology Report OTH 94 454, HSE Books, 1996. Gambatese, J A. Safety in a designers hands, ASCE Civil Engineering, June 2000. FOCUS. Field operations, computer systems data handbook, HSE Version 2.0. The Institution of Civil Engineers. culture, ICE website, 2000. Health & Safety Board safety
14.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24. 25.
New Civil Engineer. Neglecting safety at your cost, 23 November 2000. New Civil Engineer. Safety: what you think, 11 January and 22 February 2001.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 12.2 of 12.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
26. Nicholls, C. Drivers behind the recent rise in fatalities some hypotheses, Draft paper, February 2001. ICE. Risk management in civil, mechanical and structural engineering, Ed. M James, February 1995. 28. ECI. Designing for safety and heath, Conference Proceedings, London, June 2000. Stambolouian, J. Zero deaths in construction, Briefing paper for CAP Issues Group, 1999. 30. WWT. Tackling health risks in construction developing an agenda for action, Working Well Together Conference, London, October 2000. 31. 32. 33. Potter, N. Bruce helps Shearwater, North of England, 2000. DTI / Foresight. Construction Associate programme, August 2000. Gibb, A G F, et al. The ECI guide to managing health in construction, Thomas Telford, 1999 UMIST. Improving safety on construction sites by changing personnel behaviour, HSE Contract Research Report 51/1993, 1993. Levitt, R E and Samelson, N M. McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1987. Construction safety management,
27.
29.
34.
35.
36.
Maitra, A. Designers under CDM a discussion with case studies, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineer, 1999. Building. No margin for error, 18 August 2000. Rowlinson, S Hong Kong construction site safety management, Sweet & Maxwell Asia, 1997.
37. 38.
39.
Saarela, K L et al. The effects of an informational safety campaign in the shipbuilding industry, Journal of Occupational Accidents, Elsevier, 1989. Saloniemi A and Oksanen, H. Accidents and fatal accidents some paradoxes, Safety Science, Pergamon, 1998.
40.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 12.3 of 12.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
41. The Structural Engineer. Discussion on: Hazard and risk assessment for constructions: a regulators view, June 1998. UCATT. Construction safety: Building a new culture, February 2001. Davies, R and Elias, P. An analysis of temporal and national variations in reported workplace injury rates, April 2000. 44. MSA Research Project 404 FSA of shipping phase 2 Trial application to HSC full methodology report, Deliverable D6, BOMEL Document Reference C705\24\001R, 1997. 45. Health and Safety Commission. website, January 2001. 46. 47. HSE. Fatal accidents in construction 1978, HSE, 1979. DETR. Construction statistics annual 2000 edition, HMSO, October 2000. HSE. Offshore Division wall chart Key programmes: To reduce slips, trips and falls from height; Reducing manual handling injuries in the offshore sector, 2000. BP. Sunbury Redevelopment Project Knowledge transfer between industries initiatives cultural safety shift at Sunbury, 2000. HSE. Successful health and safety management, HSG 65, HSE Books, 1997. HSE. Reducing error and influencing behaviour, HSG 48, HSE Books, 1999. 52. 53. 54. HSE. Health and safety in construction, HSG 150, HSE Books, 2000. Building. If you think its bad here , 9 February 2001. Hsiao, H and Simeonov, P. Preventing falls from roofs: a critical review, Ergonomics, Vol 44, No 5, 2001. Strategic plan 2001-2004, HSE
42. 43.
48.
49.
50.
51.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 12.4 of 12.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
55. HSE. Accident investigation model. reference C942\04\064i, May 2001. Supplied by email, BOMEL
56.
Suraji, A, Duff, A R and Peckitt, S J. Development of a causal model of construction accident causation, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE (to be published 2001).
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page 12.5 of 12.5
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
APPENDIX A INFLUENCE NETWORK BRIEFING NOTE INCLUDING GENERIC INFLUENCE DEFINITIONS

(BOMEL Ref C942\05\001U Rev O July 2001 9 Pages)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page A.1 of A.1
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
CONSTRUCTION SAFETY INFLUENCE NETWORK WORKSHOP 2 FEBRUARY 2001
BRIEFING DOCUMENT
1.
AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF BRIEFING DOCUMENT

The aim of this briefing document is to provide you with enough background material to prepare you for the Influence Network workshop on Construction Safety to be held at HSE offices at St Dunstans House, 201-211 Borough High Street, London on Friday 2 February 2001, 9.30. This short document describes the foundations of the approach, describes the particular construction safety problem to be used as a case study in the workshop, and provides a customised diagram for consideration prior to and during the workshop.
2.
BACKGROUND
Influence Networks have been used, for example, within the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) methodology developed to inform shipping regulators. The FSA methodology provides a rational and systematic approach for assessing risks associated with a particular activity, and for evaluating the costs and benefits of different ways of reducing those risks. Thus FSA is a tool to assist decisionmakers, and aims to achieve a balance between technical and operational issues, and between safety and costs. Additionally, by recognising the roles of different stakeholders, and by taking account of the human element, the use of FSA should facilitate changes equitable to all affected parties. Within the overall process, it is clearly important not only to assess risk, but to develop an understanding of the factors which influence the level of risk. Attention can then be focused upon strengthening factors which have the greatest influence. Influence Networks fulfil this purpose, since they provide a structured means for identifying and assessing the various factors that bear upon the risk of a particular type of accident. In particular, Influence Networks are structured so as to categorise influences into a hierarchy of factors, some being remote (such as the political and market environment) and some being more direct (such as the suitability of PPE and the competence of operatives). Furthermore, the diagrams allow judgements to be made regarding the relative strength of these different
C942\05\001U Rev O January 2001
Page 1 of 9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
influencing factors, so that significant factors can be identified and addressed, thus improving safety.
3.
CONTEXT
The focus here is on construction safety where, again, many parties are involved in a complex and ever-changing workplace. Human actions are central to construction work and the Influence Network enables behavioural factors to be captured alongside hardware considerations and external elements which all affect safe construction. Construction accidents and ill-health issues are a cause for concern and measures to improve health and safety are being sought. Use of the influence network will structure the thinking, ensuring that a wide range of risk control options is identified and the potential impact assessed. Based on work examining construction hazards and the data for construction accidents, the focus for the first workshop will be on fatal falls from height in construction. Many of the factors influencing these accidents may be common to other construction incidents, however, some will be specific relating to the working locations, the trades involved, and working methods. The workshop purpose is to identify influences on falls from height in construction and will examine possible risk control measures to improve safety.
4.
INFLUENCING DOMAINS
Most accidents are caused by a complex combination of events; they do not happen in isolation, but are part of a wider system of causal factors. This is shown in Figure 1 as a set of nested systems or domains that influence the performance of people and hardware in a hazardous situation. The effect of each domain on the others can be characterised by a set of influences, each having a potential effect on any influence within the enclosed domains. All of these influencing domains interact in the causes of accidents, and are also the areas where error prevention and risk control measures can be introduced.
Page 2 of 9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Environmental, Social, Political Social, and Market Political, etc Context Corporate Policy Influences
Organisation & Management Systems Human and People Technical Systems
Figure 1 Nested System of Influences Effective safety management requires a clear understanding of the various technical, human and organisational factors that affect risk, and of the influence that each of these factors exerts. Influence Networks have been developed to deal with this complexity of factors influencing an accident.
4.
THE INFLUENCE NETWORK

An Influence Network is a model representing the various factors that influence the occurrence of a particular accident. The development of an Influence Network involves the definition of the accident under consideration and the identification of the hierarchy of influences upon the accident. Figure 2 illustrates the typical composition of an Influence Network, and the various domains of influence that can be identified. This diagram has been customised in the course of the study to reflect the potential influences on people working in the construction industry. Within the workshop session, this diagram will be further customised to reflect your expert judgement about critical influences. Within this diagram, there are four levels of influencing factors, reflecting the domains shown in Figure 1: Direct Level, which refers to unsafe acts and/or technical failures immediately related to the accident; Organisational Level, which refers to the underlying organisational factors for each company, contractor, subcontractor etc at the worksite, and the workplace conditions that have an impact on the occurrence of the accident; Policy Level, which comprises the policy factors that determine the organisational processes, stemming from the Client, the overall Project
Page 3 of 9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
Management and the head offices of the individual companies, contractors etc; and Environmental Level, which refers to the regulatory and wider external influences that determine organisational policies and processes.
Within each domain, there are several potential influencing factors. Those adopted for the workshop session are defined in the attached Annex. These definitions will be debated at the workshop, together with appropriate descriptions of best and worst practice. Based on these scales, current practice in each area will be rated in the context of construction work which could lead to fatal falls from height. In the next stage, the relative strength of the influences at one level will be assessed in terms of their impact on specific influences at the level above. A quantitative weighting will be assigned. With these weightings and ratings in place, a risk index can be calculated. The impact of risk control measures to modify the underlying influences can then be assessed in terms of the impact on this risk index. Potential measures will be identified and their implementation discussed.

Competence
Motivation /Morale
Team Working
Fatigue
Health
Quality of Comms
Compliance

Recruitment & Selection Information Management & Feedback Management/ Supervision Equipment Purchasing Inspection & Maintenance Policy Design for safe construction
Training
Procedures
Planning
Comms
Safety Culture

Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company Culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability

Figure 2 Customised Influence Network
Page 4 of 9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
5. THE WORKSHOP SESSION
Within the workshop session the aim is to further customise the Influence Network to reflect the critical influencing factors on fatal falls from height in construction. The quality of each of these factors will be rated and the importance in influencing the event will be weighted. Prior to the workshop it would be useful if you could familiarise yourself with the Influence Network and think about the kind of influences that would have a bearing on falls from height as well as general aspects of construction safety. If you feel that the influences identified do not completely reflect all relevant factors, then this can be explored within the session. No other preparation is required, and the full procedure will be explained on the day. Look forward to seeing you there!
Further information can be obtained from Colin Billington or Helen Bolt at BOMEL Tel: 01628 777707 Fax: 01628 777877 Email: helenbolt@bomelconsult.com.
Page 5 of 9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
ANNEX
DEFINITIONS OF FACTORS

E1 E2 Political Influence Regulatory Influence The profile and practices within central Government related to the industry The framework of regulations and codes governing the industry and the actions of the Regulator The commercial and affecting the industry economic context
E3 E4
Market Influence Social Influence
Aspects of the local community and society at large, which bear upon organisations and workers within the industry

P1 P2 P3 Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company Culture Clients contracting strategy in regard to safety Clients commitment to and control of the construction process The system of behaviour modification in an organisation: it consists of assumptions about the way work should be performed; what is and what is not acceptable; what behaviour and actions should be encouraged and discouraged Demarcation and interfaces between parties involved in the construction process Management commitment and leadership, definition of roles and responsibilities and accountability, and comprehensiveness of policies, standards and procedures for each element of the safety management system The relationship between the contractor and the workforce and their representatives
P4 P5
Organisational Structure Safety Management
P6
Labour Relations
Page 6 of 9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
P7 Company Profitability The extent to which the Contractor is driven by profitability

O1 Recruitment and Selection The system and procedures that facilitate the employment of personnel that are suited to the job demands The system and procedures that ensure the skills of the workforce are matched to their job demands The system that ensures that the method of conducting operations is explicit and practical The system that designs and structures the work activities of personnel
O2
Training
O3 O4 O5
Procedures Planning
Information Management & Feedback The system of information management that ensures high quality information is available for decision-making, including the collection, analysis and feedback of incident and near-miss data Management/Supervision The system that ensures that human resources are adequately managed and supervised The system that ensures that appropriate information is communicated clearly to its intended recipients The system of behaviour modification in an organisation: it consists of assumptions about the way work should be performed; what is and what is not acceptable; what behaviour and actions should be encouraged and discouraged; and the degree to which the organisation addresses safety pro-actively The system that ensures the appropriate range of equipment is available is
O6
O7
Communications
O8
Safety Culture
O9 O10
Inspection and Maintenance Policy The system that ensures equipment maintained in good working order
Page 7 of 9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
O11 Design for Safe Construction The system that ensures that safety during construction and future operation has been considered appropriately in design

D1 D2 D3 Competence Motivation/Morale Team Working The skills, knowledge and abilities required to perform particular tasks The strength behaviour and direction of human
The extent to which individuals in teams work as cohesive units and look out for each others interests The extent to which workers are aware of potential risks The degree to which readiness for action is degraded through sleep deprivation, or excessive/insufficient mental or physical activity The well being of body and mind of the workforce The extent to which the frequency, clarity and integrity of communications are appropriate The extent to which people can access information that is accurate, timely and reliable The extent to which people comply with or obey procedures, rules, standing orders and regulations The relationship of supply to demand for suitable resources
D4 D5
Situational Awareness Fatigue
D6 D7 D8
Health Quality of Communications Availability of Information/Advice
D9
Compliance
D10 D11 D12
Quality of Inspection & Maintenance The extent and frequency with which equipment is inspected and maintained Equipment Operability The extent to which systems and equipment conform to best practice in meeting the usability needs of the human operator The level of noise, temperature, congestion, light and vibration existing in the place of work
D13
Page 8 of 9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
D14 Operating Conditions The conditions external to the site which impact on construction activity e.g. weather, public proximity, external distractions, daylight etc.
Page 9 of 9
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
APPENDIX B SUMMARY OF INFLUENCE DEFINITIONS, SCALES, WORKSHOP DISCUSSIONS AND RATING OF CURRENT PERFORMANCE
(BOMEL Ref C942\05\009U Rev A 37 Pages)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page B.1 of B.1
D1 - H&S Competence The skills, knowledge and abilities required to perform particular tasks safely. Poor Workers cannot perform a task without direct instruction and supervision. They have little or no knowledge of equipment functioning. They have little or no understanding of their job role or responsibilities. Moderate Workers can perform routine tasks with speed and efficiency, but need assistance with complicated or novel task situations. They are able to utilise equipment only in normal operations. They have a basic understanding of their role and responsibilities. Excellent Workers can perform complicated tasks with speed and efficiency and can problemsolve efficiently in novel task situations. They are considered experts in their trade / profession, able to deal with a range of conditions. They are completely familiar with their role and responsibilities as well as those of junior personnel. Flip Chart Commentary Ability to perform safely Operational competence or to do job safely? Level of training Understanding of risk Experience (age) Bravado / complacency Understanding of regulatory requirement Tradition of unsafe working practice Knowledge / awareness of limitations Ability to perform safely Scaffolder has to know his skills associated with work he is doing. Unless people do it safely without risk they are not competent Other industries are ring-fenced - construction is such a wide activity A large section of the industry is not reached by HSE Focus of safety initiatives is on major players meeting with peers who speak same language [in relation to safety] On fringes are DIY / jobs doing favours driven by cost these people are hard to reach - hidden, not formalised work activity May not be one solution for all Data is as far as it goes People will not be 'staff' many subcontractors. Small work is price driven and even though competent technically may be driven to cut corners Competence is knowing what you can and can't do. Knowing your limitations - peer pressure pushes them past. Two scaffolders last year were under 25 Some people work unsafely but would consider themselves to be extremely competent Conflict between operational and H&S competence - for traditional trades. Previously their practices would have been acceptable. Cultural change has not gone into industry. Rating 5 Notes H&S competence for working at height in general 5; Scaffolders at 10
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 1 of 37
D2 - Motivation / Morale The strength and direction of human behaviour. Poor Workers will express negative and pessimistic views about their jobs and conditions; will withhold effort and withdraw their labour by sickness, absenteeism and lateness. Their jobs hold little interest for them due to lack of opportunity for them to use their skills and little discretion over how to perform their job. Moderate Workers will be neutral about their jobs and conditions; will respond to job demands but will tend to problem-solve reactively. They perform their duties with care and attention most of the time because there are aspects of the job which are interesting and varied, and over which they have control. Excellent Workers will be positive and optimistic about their jobs and conditions; will demonstrate proactive problem solving; will demonstrate high levels of commitment to the organisation. They are committed to high quality work, and accident prevention. They derive immense job satisfaction because their job provides variety and autonomy. Flip Chart Commentary Motivation by pay Motivation by fear Hire and fire situation Work ethic to get job done Reward in seeing effects of labours Peer pressure in site team Camaraderie Time pressures / urgency (external getting to pub / home / events etc) Motivation is meeting bonuses - scaffolders paid on lift rate Workers question whether safety measures are of benefit Way reward package is put together is significant for safety Very easy to get yourself removed so people motivated to get on Prospect of no job next week because of industry savings Motivation by fear - if not done correctly no job tomorrow Surprised how motivated people are on site General willingness to do things Workers committed to themselves and gang rather than to company Motivation may not link to health & safety Strong work ethic - shared culture Efforts of labours demonstrated Rating 6 Notes People are generally motivated to be safe
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 2 of 37
D3 - Team Working The extent to which individuals in teams work as cohesive units and look out for each other's interests. Poor People work on individual work fronts in competitive environment. Negative peer pressure (with respect to safety) in teams. Moderate Casual grouping of personnel in teams, accommodating each other and awareness of each other's needs. Excellent Positive interaction within structured teams, with people complementing one another's skills and looking out for safety. Positive peer pressure. Flip Chart Commentary Peer pressure group behaviour Competition / confrontation between groups Local site / trade level of safety culture (e.g. scaffolders) Rating 2 Poor with respect to safety - workers in teams but can include strong negative peer pressure. Key issue for future - see teenagers doing less team sport with self-centred interests Adversity in construction between groups can be positive - workers enjoy cut and thrust
Notes Team working is at 2 because in falls from height, generally workers are alone and not working together Could be good but team strengths not at present directed to safety
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 3 of 37
D4 - Situational Awareness The extent to which workers are aware of potential risks. Poor Disregard of hazards in work place and for use of safety measures. Moderate Acknowledgement of hazards and risks with no specific measures for behaviour modification. Excellent Clear recognition of hazards with appropriate behaviour modification to compensate. Flip Chart Commentary Awareness of hazard but not recognition of individual risk Security of footing Distraction Lack of knowledge of surroundings (e.g. roof fragile) Lack of instruction on hazards Extremities of human nature Recognise hazards but don't see the hazard affects them - don't acknowledge risk won't happen to me Analogy with boxing / smoking People believe they can win lottery but wont get run over Distraction / loss of concentration Two factors: Ability to be aware but distracted and lack of ability to be aware - not knowing roof is fragile People managing job not having means to be aware Risk is quite low in real terms danger is greater at home External risk assessments mean workers do what theyre told without thinking for themselves - method statements remove individual from looking out for himself. Rating 1 Notes Low recognition of risks
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 4 of 37
D5 - Fatigue The degree to which readiness for action is degraded through sleep deprivation, or excessive / insufficient mental or physical activity. Poor People are inactive: drowsy / asleep, drugged or intoxicated; under or over utilised. Moderate People are overactive or erratic as a result of being overloaded. People are weary and in need of rest and relaxation. Excellent People are alert, vigilant and attentive. People are refreshed by rest and ready for work, sufficiently stimulated by demand. Flip Chart Commentary Early in shift / week lack of food Breakfast Accidents investigated, fatigue has never been an issue. Time of day of accidents does not indicate fatigue Would expect worse in summer because of longer hours but not in statistics More likely to affect activities like tunnelling Tea break culture Rating 8 Notes Not a major factor but pretty good compared to other industries Importance of bringing in specific job circumstances
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 5 of 37
D6 Health The well being of body and mind of the workforce. Poor Incapacitated due to sickness (e.g. dermatitis), major injury (e.g. muscoskeletal), or psychiatric complaint (e.g. alcoholism). Moderate Any sickness, injury or psychological condition is minor or transient and may temporarily affect capacity for work, e.g., headache, flu etc. Excellent Absence of sickness, injury, and psychological condition. Capacity for work is at its peak. Flip Chart Commentary Poor food / alcohol No health checks (sight, epilepsy, blood pressure) Poor access to medical care Stress of job Ignore health problems Health is not taken as seriously as safety by workers (work and non-work related) Safety has immediacy Justified to bring a safe environment State of health - roofers/ scaffolders not checked for epilepsy, eye sight, etc One eyed banksman! 75%-80% of construction workers not registered with a GP Stress on site managers to meet schedule etc
Undercurrent from issues is that our assumptions regarding health and safety are not necessarily agreed with by construction industry workers accepting of risk and bravado - element of choosing life style. Acceptance of unhealthy lifestyle like their mates. Rating 7 Notes Fit and not too unhealthy in terms of ability to work at height safely
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 6 of 37
D7 - Communications The extent to which the frequency, clarity, and integrity of communications are appropriate. Poor Communication is unclear, unreliable, too frequent or infrequent and disregards literacy / language issues. Moderate Communication is usually clear, timely, and reliable, but deteriorates occasionally. Excellent Communication is always clear, reliable and timely and appropriate to literacy / language needs. Flip Chart Commentary Audio clarity noise, distance Language Literacy Poor sight Timeliness amount of information briefing Feedback Leaders selected because they shout the loudest - heard and people scared Leader by age / experience but may not be able to read / write London new, different language problem with East Europeans Brief talk to new workers and then expected to know may be easier with two man gang Subcontracting culture presents issues across interfaces Other trades can affect scaffolders Ties in with competence - how much people communicate How much should you tell people - dip paint brush in paint pot. Demolition no detailed method statement. Presumption of competence.
Rating 3
Notes When focussed on workface
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 7 of 37
D8 - Availability of Information The extent to which people can access information that is accurate, timely and reliable. Poor Information is too infrequent, or too frequent, unobtainable, unreliable, or difficult to interpret. Moderate Information is obtainable and reliable, but it may be infrequent or too frequent. Excellent Information is available, accessible, understandable, reliable, and timely. Flip Chart Commentary How much is communicated Supervisor ability to communicate Delegation of tasks Clarity of paper communications Volume of communications wood / trees Quality of method statement Reluctance to seek advice (particularly site managers) Availability of info and advice Another agenda why people are writing stuff Misunderstanding in type of information to be supplied so not used eg method statements not practical Site managers do not ask advice - can't go to H&S dept small and medium sized companies don't have resources or use of corporate 'service' costs them money Won't call HSE info line for fear that enforcer will come down and audit Cultural thing expected to know asking loses face Rating 4 Notes
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 8 of 37
D9 - Compliance The extent to which people comply with or obey procedures or regulations. Poor Rules, regulations and procedures are frequently violated, or not followed at all. Moderate Rules and regulations are followed without consideration of their appropriateness to the context. Excellent Rules and regulations are complied with, but due consideration to circumstances and context is always given. Flip Chart Commentary Paperwork v reality Familiarity with requirements Comply on paper If rules followed agreed would have a significant impact on safety Some accidents are freakish so would still happen Don't comply because not bothering Some situations are very difficult to get right Don't follow method statement Don't see benefit of pausing to read and plan Some don't know what they should be complying with If designers complied there could be less problem at work face Rating 1 Notes
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 9 of 37
D10 Availability of Suitable Resources The relationship of supply to demand for suitable resources. Poor Resources are inadequate or burdened; people and equipment will be stressed and / or fatigued. Moderate Resources are available, but there is incomplete demand for them. People and machines are idle. People will become bored. Excellent Equipment and people have the physical / mental capacity to deal with the task demands. Flip Chart Commentary Lack of site control over resource Time resource Physical site limitations Money Management / supervision Availability of competent people Availability of materials Availability of PPE Use of inappropriate resources (bodging culture) Certification Improvisation / compromise A lot of people on site do not have control over resources - because of pricing - also can still be pressurised to schedule - choices removed before getting to site Plan to do things, programme gets changed so carry on anyway Environment can affect resources eg delay to roofing work same team no additional resource to catch up Money underlies resourcing. Affects: - Management / supervision - Appropriately skilled / competent labour - Availability of materials / supply - PPE If inadequate resources, people try and get by in another way / bodging tradesmen have skills to work round problems No formal change management Certification possible to ensure resources are as good as claimed. Others will still accept unqualified resource to fill gap Lack of recognition of skills needed affects resourcing Workers lack awareness of what they don't know Rating 3 Notes Resourcing problem, particularly recently, but offset to a degree by workers ability to cope
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 10 of 37
D11 - Inspection and Maintenance The extent and frequency with which equipment is inspected and maintained. Poor Equipment is never or rarely inspected, serviced or maintained. Moderate Equipment is frequently inspected, serviced and maintained, but on occasion this is poorly performed. Excellent Equipment is inspected / maintained as directed by the manufacturer and to a high standard consistently. Flip Chart Commentary Harnesses Daily checks ladder ties No clerk of works Self certification Reliance on subcontractors Competence of inspectors Poor fit of PPE Quarantining of u/s equipment Harnesses thrown in back of van Equipment being assigned to individuals - increased risk if just picked up and not adjusted Not checked on a daily basis No culture of checking on site Self certification / no clerk of works / rely on subcontractor Who checks design and build? Can pay to get things checked but party may not be competent to inspect Bad at decommissioning u/s equipment Rating 3 Notes Not given high priority
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 11 of 37
D12 - Equipment Operability The extent to which systems and equipment conform to best practice in meeting the usability needs of the human operator. Poor Equipment and materials are of poor quality/grade, shoddily constructed and difficult to use. Moderate Equipment is made of reasonably high-grade materials; manufacture is quality assured, but quality may not be consistent. Excellent Equipment and materials are of high quality; manufacture is of the highest quality, is consistent and is continuously being improved. The equipment is reliable and performs consistently. Flip Chart Commentary Comfort in use Few product failures Is it cheap enough is the test for selection, ie. - not good enough or safe enough Approved equipment marking? Occasional product failures Belief that PPE gets in way of work More use of harnesses Removal of ties Rating 8 Notes Quite good - not space age - things have come on over last decade
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 12 of 37
D13 - Internal Work Environment The level of noise, temperature, congestion, light and vibration existing in the place of work. Poor Noise levels are damaging, temperature is extreme, workplace is congested, lighting levels are extreme, and motion or vibration is persistent and of high frequency. Moderate Occasionally and transiently one environmental factor is extreme. Excellent All environmental factors are at an optimum level, with infrequent and minor deviations from this level. Flip Chart Commentary Wetness / ice Housekeeping on scaffolds Effect of temp / weather on PPE (harness over coat) Wind (roof work noise) Cold hands grip gloves Rating 5 Notes Icy boards Clutter on scaffold Harness difficult to wear in cold weather because of bulk of coat Noise levels affect communication Wind for work at height / Wet / Cold fingers
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 13 of 37
D14 - External Working Environment The conditions external to the site which impact on construction activity e.g. weather, public proximity, external distractions, etc. Poor Night time; strong winds, poor visibility, heavy rain, muddy conditions, public proximity Moderate Dull conditions, intermittent rain and light wind, occasional site disturbances etc Excellent Day time; dry, light, warm, protected site. Flip Chart Commentary Weather Daylight Public Power lines Public not really an issue Public more of an issue in congested city sites Making up time in poor weather Forced to work when conditions adverse Pressures to get things done because going somewhere else Do job and go - links to motivation external time pressures Rating 7 Notes Can't do much about it
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 14 of 37
ORGANISATIONAL
O1 - Recruitment / Selection The system and procedures that facilitate the employment of personnel that are suited to the job demands. Poor There are no clear guidelines or procedures for acquiring new staff: recruitment is informal, nepotistic and discriminatory; selection is subjective and casual. Moderate Procedures are in place, but they do not conform to best practice and are likely to be subjective, albeit formal: job descriptions and person specifications are not generated therefore candidates are unlikely to be selected on the basis of their match to the job demands. Excellent Procedures and guidelines are clear and up to date. Best practice is conformed to such that candidates are selected objectively and thus on the basis of their ability to perform the job as described in the job description and person specification. Flip Chart Commentary Limited choice / availability No selection for safety awareness Qualifications / certification Peer pressure team selection No job descriptions Scaffolders / skills card Monitoring of training / qualifications no checks Forgery of scaffold cards Competence cards Agency labour competence not tested Rating 3 Not selected on who is going to run safest site. Physically tough Influence of group to retain people continuity good for H&S No job description for site staff Selection processes do not lead you to a person Short term need agency labour readily accepted without checks Will depend on size of organisation Little checking of cards Now introducing anti-fraud measures
Notes Driven by immediate need not strategic assessment
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 15 of 37
O2 - Training The system that ensures the skills of the workforce are matched to their job demands. Poor There is no budget, system or procedure for identifying personnels training needs or assuring competence: e.g. no appraisal or reporting system or manpower planning. There is no investment in the workforce. Moderate There is a system of training personnel that is based on minimum legal requirements, but does not target individual needs. There is minimum investment in the workforce. Excellent There is a system of identifying individuals training needs and resources are made available to ensure that the competence of the workforce is continually assured. There is considerable investment in the workforce. Flip Chart Commentary No value to employers training for others No management or supervision H&S training Refresher training Employee pushes for training No company loyalty results Compliance based - no reason for sending people If a levy payer, the employer will send people to get some value back Absence of training of supervisors and within prime contractors - seen to be improving at middle management level Resource not available for training in construction - very narrow margins Rating 2 Notes Ad hoc and fragmented
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 16 of 37
O3 - Procedures The system that ensures that the method of conducting operations is explicit and practical. Poor There are no procedures in place to guide or inform personnel how to perform the necessary tasks. Any procedures that are in existence do not represent actual tasks or are so poorly presented / inaccessible as to render them ineffective. No consideration is given to the resources requirement. Moderate There are procedures in existence, but they are of inconsistent quality: e.g. they may be well presented but out of date. Excellent Procedures are systematically updated involving personnel whose responsibility it is to perform the tasks. They are well presented, and organised and are effective in guiding operations. Flip Chart Commentary Either nothing or too much Lack of involvement / feedback of people doing work No effective monitoring Corporate blind eye No challenge / audit of compliance Method statements Key thing is that people follow procedures Not there - or too many Ties into communication - how much to leave to initiative Written off site and lack of feedback from people doing work, eg. what to clip harness onto No monitoring - do it because they have to Corporate turning a blind eye - structural engineer or client do nothing about it - temporary works, not their responsibility - building control. Avoid confrontation Rating 4 Notes Procedures do exist but need to be relevant and applied
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 17 of 37
O4 - Planning The system that designs and structures the work activities of personnel Poor Planning is reactive and schedule driven and by contractor with no regard to work segregation or safe methods. Moderate Basic planning for work teams but little regard for cross contractor issues. Excellent Planning is interactive between contractor and subcontractor teams with due regard to interactions between work activities with sufficient people to avoid unsafe work demands and / or congestion or conflict throughout project. Flip Chart Commentary Proactive Risk assessment Challenge to plan Life cycle planning Proactive before the event Change management missing Planning to avoid risk is needed Avoid in first place - risk assessment failure - design engineers - did it this way last time Design could specify structure to last longer and require less maintenance - would it cost more over life cycle? Reduce risk exposure Rating 5 Notes Planning good to start with, not enough thinking about change or how it is put into effect needs mechanism for monitoring. Cross contractor issues.
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 18 of 37
O5 - Information Management / Feedback The system of information management that ensures high quality information is available for decisionmaking, including the collection, analysis and feedback of incident and near-miss data. Poor There is no system of recording or collating information that is required for smooth operations. There is no system or procedures for collecting information about incidents or near misses that can be used to prevent further occurrences. Moderate Information is recorded and collated, but may not reach its intended recipients in time, or may be degraded in quality. Information regarding incidents is collated, but the recording may be distorted due to bias. Excellent Information systems are such that information is recorded and collated in a clear and comprehensible manner; it reaches its intended recipient without having suffered degradation. Incident recording systems are bias free, and enable steps to rectify and prevent further incidences from occurring. Flip Chart Commentary No recording No valuation of feedback Empowerment who takes notice? Sceptical of response Link to planning / risk assessment (Lack of ties of scaffold to building) Handrails missing, ladders not tied Frightened to feedback mistakes Not any encouragement to feed back / no value seen Feedback to designer - OK if big job but not on small sites Empowerment Tried before and no action Resource and desire needed Links back to risk assessment so that it feeds back into planning Ties are a problem for historic buildings etc - no one listens Rating 3 Notes
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 19 of 37
O6 - Management / Supervision The system that ensures human resources are adequately managed and supervised. Poor There are poor management and supervision procedures. Human and hardware resources are often used inappropriately. Moderate There are effective management procedures and supervision of personnel is helpful and appropriate. Excellent Management and supervision systems stimulate personnel and ensure that resources (human and hardware) are used appropriately. Flip Chart Commentary Reducing supervision Impact of admin / paperwork keeps people in office No management of subcontractors Foremen shortages Poor training / competence Highly significant personality of key people Ability of management to make changes Now less supervision on sites than ever Contractors can't afford to pay for it Paperwork keeps supervisors in office - won't have had site exposure No foreman in teams no focus for site management to communicate with Can't cope with paperwork so someone else does it Some are not in right position Nepotism Very significant influence on standards on site - see very different performance on different sites for same major contractor - but could be measured by cost / production. Margins can vary on sites and that can impact. Rating 4 Notes Varies very significantly with sites and managers
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 20 of 37
O7 - Communications The system that ensures that appropriate information is communicated clearly to its intended recipients. Poor There are no systems or procedures for communications between and within the contractor (e.g. toolbox talks). Information is suppressed or does not account for literacy levels and so prevents the information reaching its target. Moderate There are systems and equipment in place for communicating information, but persons who need to communicate/receive the information may not be present at the meeting, or available to receive the communication. Excellent There is a system and structure in place that ensures communication is received and understood as and when it is required, to and by those who need it. Flip Chart Commentary See direct Level D7 also See direct Level D7 also
Timeliness amount of information briefing Feedback Fragmentation of site team Other agenda for putting comms in writing
Brief talk to new workers and then expected to know - may be easier with two man gang Subcontracting culture presents issues across interfaces Other trades can affect scaffolders Site managers competence may not cover all trades Comms issue is knowing how much to communicate Communication delegated - e.g. induction training Who have you communicated with? Paperwork communication a key fax can get buried Inundated by paper so that necessary information does not get communicated. Key is whether communication not coming through
Rating 3
Notes As before, but focused on site communications
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 21 of 37
O8 - Safety Culture The system of behaviour modification in organisations on site: it consists of assumptions about the way work should be performed; what is and what is not acceptable; what behaviour and actions should be encouraged and discouraged. Poor The style of behaviour that is accepted is aggressive or defensive. Management style is either laissez-faire or autocratic. Decision-making is by fiat or is disorganised and confused. Short-term profit policies prevail even to the extent of transgressing the law. Safety has little or no priority. Moderate Behaviour modification is inconsistent and reactive; practices are pursued that have a minimum impact on profits, comply with the law and seek to maintain a clean public image, but fail to prevent problems from occurring. Safety policy only has priority to the extent it maintains public image. Excellent Behaviour modification is consistent and positive. Decision-making is by consultation. Investment is seen as key to securing long-term goals. Prevention is seen as better than cure. Strong emphasis on the value of employees, mutual respect and concerns for safety, with commensurate standards for behaviour and continuing goals for improvement. Flip Chart Commentary Problem with short term presence Site culture v-a-v organisational culture Visibility of safety culture Very difficult to define what culture is On major site fragmented Main contractor may have positive safety culture but may not filter down or exercise sufficient control. Only there for a short time, therefore very different to change Would be not be very apparent on going to site Visibility of safety culture People change all the time and work on many different sites Things mean different things to different people - tied into perception - working safely Is culture separate? Is it the way for the future to define and work on safety culture. Immigrant labour - no evidence that more accident prone yet this could indicate a different culture Rating 3 Notes Difficult to agree definition more needs to be done to define it and explain how to improve it.
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 22 of 37
O9 - Equipment Purchasing The system that ensures that the appropriate range of equipment is available. Poor There is no budget, system or procedure for acquiring and specifying new equipment, tools or machinery. Money that is available facilitates the purchase of the cheapest available equipment that rarely suits the users requirements. Moderate There is a purchasing policy but it is prone to manipulation by equipment manufacturers who desire to sell the most expensive items: equipment may have diverse functionality, but does not necessarily meet user requirements or comply with ergonomic design principles. Off-site personnel dictate specifications. Excellent The policy results in equipment purchases of high specification with appropriate levels of functionality that meet users current requirements, and pre-empt to some extent future requirements. Flip Chart Commentary Remoteness of purchasing from usage Effect of tight margins Good availability of good equipment Understanding of availability and spec Training for specific equipment needed Lack of understanding of effect of changing equipment No H&S training for procurement people Huge possibilities Rating 7 Notes Majority OK Centralised purchasing does not necessarily deliver what you are looking for Demolition Range of equipment available is vast Challenge is to match it to task Purchase / hire no excuse not to get right equipment Need to know how to use it Cheaper but different erection skills required - don't know site implications of change in procurement department Marketing of tools and access equipment
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 23 of 37
O10 - Inspection and Maintenance The system that ensures equipment is maintained in good working order. Poor There is no system of maintenance or inspection. The operational life of equipment is frequently exceeded. Any repairs are aimed at maintaining construction progress but not at preventing further equipment degradation. Procedures if in existence are unplanned and haphazard. Moderate Systems of maintenance and inspection conform to minimum requirements. Equipment is maintained passed its operational life, to avoid new purchases. Procedures are planned, but have no contingencies for unexpected failures. Excellent Systems of maintenance and inspection surpass minimum requirements. Equipment is operated up to its operational life, and then is updated or replaced. Procedures cover long-term planning and contingency management. Flip Chart Commentary See Direct Level D11 As Direct Level D11 Handled at site level beginning / end of job Rating 3 Notes Not very different than direct level similar deficiency at both
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 24 of 37
O11 - Design for Safe Construction The system that ensures that safety during construction and future operation has been considered appropriately in design. Poor Independent action of designers with no explicit recognition of or attention to safe construction methods. Moderate Attempts by designers to address safe construction issues as far as experience allows. Limited interaction with construction team. Excellent Designers of permanent and temporary works take full account of safety matters with interactions with construction team prior to and during construction. Willingness to revise design to improve safety. Full consideration of in-service maintenance / design alternatives. Flip Chart Commentary Design of method of work Design of perm works Fragile roof lights poor design / spec Tower scaffolds fail safe standards should be straight forward Very important area Covers traditional design to those designing method of work CDM has tried to address People at sharp end pick up problems - fragile roof lights Life cycle needs design consideration Tower scaffold erected wrongly - could be prevented from being erected wrongly product / equipment usability design Design to fit only one way eg. steelwork Can eliminate need for re-work - supports for steelwork to sit on Designing in for maintenance Roof protection Air conditioning plants at edge of roofs! Hazards are foreseeable. Fragmentation / compartmentalised - fees low, don't know how it will be built Planning supervisor was to coordinate design and fabrication and it doesn't work Architect or planning supervisor Critical Many of problems are foreseeable - deny that things leak. Justify what is done afterwards, not risk assessment approach - failure to understand why Rating 1 Notes Unanimous
Eliminate need for rework Structure steelwork one way only markings HVAC plants always at edge of roof need lots of maintenance Feedback / risk assessment Compartmentalised
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 25 of 37
O12 Pay and Conditions The remuneration package and benefits in the context of working hours and conditions, messing and welfare facilities. Poor Lower than average rates of pay or piece work payment, long working hours, no catering, limited sanitation facilities, poorly cleaned and maintained site accommodation. Moderate Average pay rates, bonuses linked to productivity, reasonable working hours, some catering, washing and rest facilities Excellent Above average pay rates, bonuses linked to safety performance as well as productivity, good messing and welfare facilities including medicare. Flip Chart Commentary Some organisations are currently paying higher than average rates to attract a better choice of personnel Benefits other than pay (eg pensions, medical insurance, life assurance) are rare Site conditions often poor, dirty sanitary facilities, no catering, messing facilities limited shelter and rest areas Rating 4 Notes Rating would decline with downturn
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 26 of 37
P1 - Contracting Strategy Clients' contracting strategy in regard to safety. Poor No more than legal requirements on safety. No consideration of safety in evaluation criteria. Compliance basis and avoidance of liability. Moderate Written requirement for safety. Safety included in evaluation criteria. Excellent Strong emphasis on safety applicable to all stakeholders including recognition of interface issues and change control. Flip Chart Commentary Tendering and performance No strategy Induction training Design for safe construction Client involvement in management team Form of contract Organisation Workforce representation Client awareness / value of safety Tender evaluation Tender preparation estimators understanding of safety issues and solutions Scaffold big cost for low added value Assessment of access requirements during contract Familiarity with site requirements of site constraints / obstructions Large clients should set example Effect of bonus / penalty Rating 3 Notes Depends on client size and attitude Site induction training to be contract requirement Design for safe construction to be required by client Lump sum / reimbursable / design and build distances client Whether safety valued in construction? Depends on Client's view of responsibility On small domestic client job expects roofer to do job What is price to do job safely? Client attitude key - estimator to think of safety For work at heights this is the most important - access can be major cost element - sequence. Tenderers to look at site etc slopes or overhead lines as part of bidding - can't erect what paid for / planned for Example set by larger clients - public sector and local authority have a role to set an example Method for selecting sub-contractors - safety standards and forms of contract / penalty clauses
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 27 of 37
P2 - Ownership / Control Client's commitment to and control of the construction process Poor Hands off approach. No active involvement. Pressurisation for timely completion. Moderate Involvement, as required, with construction process. No adverse pressure but neutral interest in safety. Excellent Active interest and participation in the construction process, interest in safety matters and active suggestions for continuous improvement. Flip Chart Commentary Resistance to having client on site Client meddling detrimental Contractors don't want client going round site Argument that Contractor has influence and control Meddling can be detrimental in day to day running Disincentive for contractor to encourage Client involvement Lack of ownership and recognition of risks associated with property Different types of client involved attitude depends on profile and objective in procuring construction Rating 2 Notes Low ownership of process
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 28 of 37
P3 - Company Culture (see org level) The system of behaviour modification in the client organisation: it consists of assumptions about the way work should be performed; what is and what is not acceptable; what behaviour and actions should be encouraged and discouraged. Poor The style of behaviour that is accepted is aggressive or defensive. Management style is either laissez-faire or autocratic. Decision-making is by fiat or is disorganised and confused. Short-term profit policies prevail even to the extent of transgressing the law. Safety has little or no priority. Moderate Behaviour modification is inconsistent and reactive; practices are pursued that have a minimum impact on profits, comply with the law and seek to maintain a clean public image, but fail to prevent problems from occurring. Safety policy only has priority to the extent it maintains public image. Excellent Behaviour modification is consistent and positive. Decision-making is by consultation. Investment is seen as key to securing long-term goals. Prevention is seen as better than cure. Strong emphasis on the value of employees, mutual respect and concerns for safety, with commensurate standards for behaviour and continuing goals for improvement. Flip Chart Commentary Client Distinction between large companies and rest Depends on layering of contracts Ownership / recognition / consideration of risk by client Rating 3 Notes Depends on size of client If one off project or part of a series Two levels merge if client is integrated into the site team
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 29 of 37
P4 - Organisational Structure Demarcation and interfaces between parties involved in the construction process emanating from principal contractor Poor Segregation of contractors; no cross-contractor interfaces or risk evaluations; confrontational / competitive relationships. Moderate Clear demarcations at site work face but some management of inter-relations. Excellent Management of contractors as part of a team with careful account of interface issues in planning and communications; no commercial inter-dependencies. Flip Chart Commentary Acceptance of role in monitoring safety Trade interfaces / planning to use same access equipment Interference by single party Employment interface - acceptance of monitoring role or let people get on with it Planning between trades using same access equipment Trades interfering with equipment provided for another trade Hard to abstract commercial interdependencies Rating 5 Notes Organisational structure often similar between contracts so parties adapt
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 30 of 37
P5 - Safety Management Management commitment and leadership for the overall project organisation, definition of roles and responsibilities and accountability, and comprehensiveness of policies, standards and procedures for each element of the safety management system. Poor Policies either do not exist or do not have explicit objectives as to the manner in which operations should be conducted. There is no safety management system, or, the system that does exist is ad hoc and not quality assured. There are no management procedures to define the process or outputs of activity. Moderate Safety Management system exists but is delegated to middle management. It is not actively maintained and is not comprehensive nor up to date in all matters. Excellent Safety Management is evident in all aspects of the principal contractor operations by workers and management at all levels. The system is comprehensive, is audited and reviewed for continuous improvement on an ongoing basis. Flip Chart Commentary Related to size of company Knowledge of regulations Commitment lip service culture Isolated from site management Not part of business Cannot see cost effectiveness Bolt on Not in educational mainstream syllabus H&S managers not in budget loop Size of company - availability of advice and knowledge of directors Commitment is key Lip service or really meant Failure to translate SMS into reality on projects Safety policies in place - but not discussed at board level Compliance not commitment Medium sized companies not part of business - what you have to do to get on a tender list Can't see it saving money Lack of integration - bolt on which easily becomes unbolted Safety not synonymous with good business Speciality - safety managers not in budget loop - what can be afforded by consultancy Cost of accidents can wipe out a firm but not recognised Big cases are big sites Where is line before punishing / deterrence Fines in courts could be put to tax incentives to companies proposing safety measures Is prosecution worthwhile until recently very high cost and low success rate Rating 3 Notes Safety management there just not pushed through
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 31 of 37
P6 - Labour Relations The relationship between the principal contractors, the workforce and their representatives. This influence is concerned with the extent to which there is a harmonious relationship between the management and the work force. It also concerns the extent to which there is the opportunity for workers to affiliate with associations active in defending and promoting their welfare, and the extent to which there is a system in place for pay negotiation. Poor The climate between the workers and management is hostile and conflict prone. Management never consults the workforce. Union affiliation is not permitted and thus no collective bargaining structures exist. There is exploitation of the workforce by the employer with little or no provision for the workforces welfare, health and safety. Moderate A system is in place that facilitates negotiation of pay and conditions. However, it receives minimal commitment from above, and is regarded sceptically by the workers. Workers are able to associate with a very restricted range of union / professional bodies Excellent There is full consultation of the workforce on all matters including safety. Choice of professional / union association is open, and negotiation on pay and conditions is regular, productive, and fair. Flip Chart Commentary Fragmentation subcontractor No access of s/c workforce to site management Union representation not available No consultation representatives Bogus self employment Lack of job security disincentive to involvement / complaint Direct labour workforce Fragmentation - thrown together for six weeks and hope everything will work out fine Subcontract work force no longer has access to person managing site More unionised in the past and this gave a route for communication Construction companies do not have workforce consultation strategy. Bogus self-employment - IR35 Consultation is key issue- not necessarily best through Union Union can be used as a weapon CDM gives a role for communication - no safety rep built in This is route to sorting out consultation If asked people won't feedback Way workforce is paid - lack of job security Why get involved if not still with the company in the future Transiency of labour market moving between cultures mitigates against health and safety Rating 4 Notes Given nature of construction
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 32 of 37
P7 - Profitability The extent to which the Principal Contractor and site organisation is driven by profitability. Poor Diminishing return, squeezed margins or poor market share forcing contractors to reduce unnecessary expenditure and cut corners. Moderate Reasonable and stable returns. Excellent Good returns and growing market (share) with sustained profits enabling investment. Flip Chart Commentary No perception that safety helps profit Seen as cost only Contractors and clients at fault No perception that safety adds to profitability Safety seen as a cost item One company can't go alone Clients need to recognise that safety consideration increases whole life value. Medium companies are seeing work going out on long term contracts to which they are subbed and for lower margins (eg. local authority alliancing) Oil company analogy Demonstration work needed to show link between profitability and safety and hence encourage investment. Rating 5 Notes Neutral position at present.
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 33 of 37
ENVIRONMENTAL E1 - Political The profile and practices within Government related to the industry. Poor Detachment from construction issues; no active measure to influence safety. Moderate Recognition of construction sector' with adequate support resources; passive reference to safety in procurement policy. Excellent Elevated profile for construction; high level resource and empowerment of regulator; fiscal policies supporting prosperity of construction sector; procurement policy emphasising safety. Flip Chart Commentary Example set poor Client Employer Procurement policies safety weighting Public pressure / media attention Political opportunity momentum for change * Tax incentives Training incentives Safety rewards Publish criteria / evaluation * Safety cost? Local authorities (political) Influence on local employment Budgetary controlled Losing control / contract strategy influence through genuine Local authorities do not set good example - With own employees - Procurement policies Politically sound to do something - opportunity now Is it for right reasons? Political rewards for safe behaviour? Training schemes can come back to political will No tax incentives for training No priority for getting on tender list / by having a good safety record Publish criteria for evaluation of tenders Long term tendering packages for convenience affecting cost and safety Less to spend on construction - abdicating responsibility More budgetary control than main government - selling off council houses - losing control over health and safety standards in maintenance work so reducing influence. Is there any genuine momentum for change - different agenda - other departments might say industry is doing well from a productivity point of view - if doubled pay and training would not be beneficial - not everyone is after change Comparison with Europe acts against change Rating 4 Notes
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 34 of 37
E2 - Regulatory The framework of regulations governing the industry, and the profile and actions of the Regulator. Poor Weak regulations which do not impinge on day to day practices for all stakeholders, and under-resourced inspectorate unable to influence performance. Moderate Established regulations for which compliance is checked but with the Regulator underresourced or unwilling to take effective actions. Excellent Effective regulations focusing industry attention with strong and pro-active inspection encouraging improvements and strong enforcement deterring transgressions. Flip Chart Commentary Low profile (not enough inspectors) Access to advice not used Association between enforcement and advice deterrent to seeking advice Consistency of approach Regulations too much from Europe Guidance lag behind regulations / ACOPS EHO Environmental Health Officers offices, shops, restaurants CDM applies or not? Notification regulations Research / advertising of new Rarely seen on site 114 inspectors Major contractor asked for Inspectors to come but no resource available Enforcement vs advice potentially good Seen to be there for prosecution not hugs - inconvenience to have HSE on site Sites chosen for inspection by route to site Inconsistencies in inspector actions Too much regulation from Europe and why should we pay - only country to enforce it HSE info is good but takes time to come out Waiting for construction guidance on PUWE regulations New CDM ACOP but does not really change regulations Can be different at LEA level for H&S monitoring - EHOs visit refurb and refit can be more stringent HSE if CDM, if not EHOs confusion / inconsistency Construction is clear Don't advertise changes coming through Research is not always advertised - occupational health Rating 7 Notes What they do is good - have influence on site 10 - but inadequately resourced. Perceived influence responded to on site - what action should be taken (some felt 6)
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 35 of 37
E3 - Market The commercial and economic context affecting the industry: Poor Conditions, due to work overload or so little work that margins are squeezed, such that corners are cut with respect to safety. Moderate Continued application of safety measures and risk evaluations but inadequate time or margins for renewed investment. Excellent A commercial environment that values safety investment and a balance of workload / availability and return exists to enable investment in safety to be made. Flip Chart Commentary Economic cycle Availability of labour at cost allowed for Lottery funding effect Claims affecting other parties Very low margins in building Economic cycles - go in and out therefore lack of workforce continuity Skill level priced out of market due to high wage inflation recently Bankrupting themselves because of shortage of workers Taking on too much work Lottery money driving construction Civils down 'cos of government investment Type of risk changing with more buildings than civils work Margins in civil engineering based on measurement and higher because more work is by direct labour then in building - more variety and claims Rating 3 Notes Changing tendering structure highly competitive and adversarial mitigates against safety
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 36 of 37
E4 - Societal Aspects of the local community and society at large, which bear upon organisations and workers within the industry. Poor Low public regard for and interest in construction and or concern for welfare of workers. Moderate Neutral attitude to construction workers. Excellent Highly valued industry with respect for skills and societal contribution and concern for workers' welfare. Flip Chart Commentary Disappearance of craftsmen Deskilling no apprentices CITB Unattractive occupation Lack of trainers Media lack of interest Low intellect work Crafts used to be respected Deskilling industry because of technology advancement No apprenticeships so calibre not so good No one to do training Not wanting to go out on site - last industrial activity in UK Worldwide construction companies used to be British Media - lack of interest Irish replaced by Eastern European Rating 3 Notes Uncertain what effect of change is
C942\05\009U Rev A April 2001
Page 37 of 37
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
APPENDIX C BASE CASE CALCULATION OF INFLUENCE NETWORK INDEX

(File C942\05\002U-RevA 1 to 3.xls 7 Pages)
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page C.1 of C.1
Failure Level
INFLUENCE Estimated Weighting (1) % EVENT To: Human Hardware External TOTAL Calculated Rating from Below (2) x10-1 Estimated Rating (3) x10-1 Contribution to Index (4)
70 20 10 100
0.397 0.410 0.431
n/a n/a n/a
0.278 0.082 0.043 0.40301
C942\05\002U-RevA 1 TO 3 Appendix C.xls 30/07/2001
Page 1 of 7
Direct
INFLUENCE Estimated Weighting (1) % 10.00 6.67 8.33 10.00 6.67 5.00 8.33 6.67 8.33 6.67 5.00 5.00 8.33 5.00 100.00 Calculated Direct Estimated Direct Rating from Below Rating (2) (3) x10-1 x10-1 0.371 0.380 0.380 0.373 0.380 0.391 0.378 0.373 0.374 0.395 0.378 0.399 0.369 0.356 0.5 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.7 Contribution to the Causal factors (4) 0.044 0.033 0.024 0.024 0.039 0.027 0.028 0.026 0.020 0.023 0.017 0.030 0.036 0.026 0.397 Rating Difference (5) x10-1 0.129 0.220 -0.180 -0.273 0.420 0.309 -0.078 0.027 -0.274 -0.095 -0.078 0.401 0.131 0.344 UNCERTAINTY Calculated Uncertainty from Below (6) 0.048 0.047 0.045 0.048 0.047 0.049 0.045 0.046 0.050 0.051 0.045 0.070 0.061 0.082 Calculated Uncertainty at this Level (7) 0.011 0.013 0.017 0.030 0.027 0.014 0.009 0.003 0.025 0.009 0.005 0.019 0.009 0.016 0.063
Factor Human D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 TOTAL Hardware D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 TOTAL External D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D11 D12 D13 D14 TOTAL
Contributing Factor From Below
Competence Motivation / Morale Team working Situational Awareness Fatigue Health Quality of Communications Availability of Information / Advice Compliance Availability of Suitable Resources Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Equipment Operability Internal Working Environment Operating Conditions
8.33 4.17 6.25 4.17 4.17 4.17 6.25 8.33 8.33 8.33 12.50 10.42 6.25 8.33 100.00
0.371 0.380 0.380 0.373 0.380 0.391 0.378 0.373 0.374 0.395 0.378 0.399 0.369 0.356
0.5 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.7
0.036 0.020 0.018 0.010 0.025 0.023 0.021 0.032 0.020 0.029 0.042 0.062 0.027 0.044 0.410
0.129 0.220 -0.180 -0.273 0.420 0.309 -0.078 0.027 -0.274 -0.095 -0.078 0.401 0.131 0.344
0.048 0.047 0.045 0.048 0.047 0.049 0.045 0.046 0.050 0.051 0.045 0.070 0.061 0.082
0.009 0.008 0.013 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.007 0.003 0.025 0.011 0.014 0.039 0.007 0.026 0.064
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 15.00 15.00 0.00 20.00 10.00 10.00 0.00 30.00 100.00
0.371 0.380 0.380 0.373 0.380 0.391 0.378 0.373 0.374 0.395 0.378 0.399 0.369 0.356
0.5 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.5 0.7
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.058 0.000 0.069 0.034 0.060 0.000 0.158 0.431
0.129 0.220 -0.180 -0.273 0.420 0.309 -0.078 0.027 -0.274 -0.095 -0.078 0.401 0.131 0.344
0.048 0.047 0.045 0.048 0.047 0.049 0.045 0.046 0.050 0.051 0.045 0.070 0.061 0.082
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.006 0.000 0.026 0.011 0.037 0.000 0.093 0.106
Page 2 of 7
Organisational
INFLUENCE Estimated Weighting (1) % 12.50 12.50 8.33 4.17 10.42 10.42 8.33 8.33 4.17 4.17 4.17 12.50 100.00 Calculated Organisational Rating from Below (2) x10-1 0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402 Estimated Organisational Rating (3) x10-1 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4 Contribution to the Direct Influence Rating (4) x10-1 0.045 0.037 0.034 0.019 0.038 0.042 0.030 0.029 0.023 0.015 0.010 0.050 0.371 Rating Difference (5) x10-1 -0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
UNCERTAINTY Calculated Uncertainty from Below (6) 0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054 Calculated Uncertainty at this Level (7) 0.019 0.029 0.006 0.003 0.017 0.006 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.048
Factor D1 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D2 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D3 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D4 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D5 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D6 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D7 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D8 O1 O2 O3 O4
Contributing Factor From Below Competence Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
Motivation / Morale Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
10.00 8.00 6.00 4.00 12.00 12.00 8.00 12.00 8.00 4.00 4.00 12.00 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.036 0.024 0.024 0.018 0.043 0.048 0.029 0.042 0.044 0.014 0.009 0.048 0.380
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.015 0.019 0.004 0.003 0.020 0.007 0.013 0.017 0.023 0.006 0.013 0.007 0.047
Team working Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
9.80 9.80 7.84 9.80 9.80 11.76 5.88 11.76 5.88 3.92 3.92 9.80 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.035 0.029 0.032 0.045 0.035 0.047 0.021 0.041 0.032 0.014 0.009 0.039 0.380
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.015 0.023 0.005 0.008 0.016 0.006 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.006 0.012 0.005 0.045
Situational Awareness Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
8.70 13.04 13.04 4.35 8.70 8.70 13.04 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 13.04 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.031 0.039 0.053 0.020 0.031 0.035 0.047 0.015 0.024 0.015 0.010 0.052 0.373
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.013 0.030 0.009 0.004 0.014 0.005 0.021 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.048
Fatigue Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
6.45 6.45 16.13 6.45 12.90 12.90 6.45 12.90 6.45 0.00 6.45 6.45 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.023 0.019 0.065 0.029 0.047 0.052 0.023 0.045 0.035 0.000 0.015 0.026 0.380
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.010 0.015 0.011 0.005 0.021 0.007 0.011 0.019 0.018 0.000 0.020 0.004 0.047
Health Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
5.56 5.56 16.67 5.56 11.11 11.11 5.56 11.11 11.11 0.00 5.56 11.11 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.020 0.017 0.067 0.025 0.040 0.044 0.020 0.039 0.061 0.000 0.013 0.045 0.391
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.008 0.013 0.011 0.005 0.018 0.006 0.009 0.016 0.031 0.000 0.017 0.006 0.049
Quality of Communications Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
13.04 8.70 8.70 8.70 8.70 10.87 13.04 4.35 4.35 4.35 4.35 10.87 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.047 0.026 0.035 0.039 0.031 0.043 0.047 0.015 0.024 0.015 0.010 0.044 0.378
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.020 0.020 0.006 0.007 0.014 0.006 0.021 0.006 0.012 0.007 0.014 0.006 0.045
Availability of Information / Advice Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning
4.65 9.30 13.95 9.30
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5
0.017 0.028 0.056 0.042
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063
0.007 0.022 0.010 0.008 Page 3 of 7
Organisational
INFLUENCE Estimated Weighting (1) % 13.95 13.95 13.95 4.65 0.00 0.00 4.65 11.63 100.00 Calculated Organisational Rating from Below (2) x10-1 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402 Estimated Organisational Rating (3) x10-1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4 Contribution to the Direct Influence Rating (4) x10-1 0.050 0.056 0.050 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.047 0.373 Rating Difference (5) x10-1 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
UNCERTAINTY Calculated Uncertainty from Below (6) 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054 Calculated Uncertainty at this Level (7) 0.023 0.008 0.023 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.006 0.046
Factor O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D9 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D10 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D11 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D12 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D13 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL D14 O1 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O7 O8 O9 O10 O11 O12 TOTAL
Contributing Factor From Below Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
Compliance Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
7.69 7.69 11.54 3.85 5.77 11.54 7.69 11.54 7.69 3.85 9.62 11.54 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.028 0.023 0.047 0.017 0.021 0.046 0.028 0.040 0.042 0.014 0.023 0.046 0.374
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.012 0.018 0.008 0.003 0.009 0.006 0.013 0.017 0.022 0.006 0.030 0.006 0.050
Availability of Suitable Resources Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
9.30 9.30 11.63 13.95 4.65 11.63 9.30 4.65 11.63 4.65 4.65 4.65 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.033 0.028 0.047 0.063 0.017 0.046 0.034 0.016 0.064 0.016 0.011 0.019 0.395
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.014 0.022 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.006 0.015 0.007 0.033 0.007 0.015 0.003 0.051
Quality of Inspection & Maintenance Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
4.88 9.76 14.63 9.76 7.32 12.20 7.32 4.88 4.88 14.63 4.88 4.88 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.018 0.029 0.059 0.044 0.026 0.049 0.026 0.017 0.027 0.052 0.012 0.020 0.378
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.007 0.023 0.010 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.012 0.007 0.014 0.023 0.015 0.003 0.045
Equipment Operability Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
0.00 0.00 14.29 14.29 11.43 5.71 5.71 5.71 17.14 14.29 11.43 0.00 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.000 0.000 0.058 0.065 0.041 0.023 0.021 0.020 0.094 0.051 0.027 0.000 0.399
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.000 0.000 0.010 0.012 0.019 0.003 0.009 0.008 0.048 0.022 0.036 0.000 0.070
Internal Working Environment Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
0.00 9.52 14.29 14.29 11.90 11.90 7.14 11.90 4.76 0.00 14.29 0.00 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.000 0.029 0.058 0.065 0.043 0.048 0.026 0.041 0.026 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.369
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.000 0.022 0.010 0.012 0.020 0.007 0.012 0.017 0.013 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.061
Operating Conditions Recruitment and Selection Training Procedures Planning Information Management & Feedback Management/Supervision Communications Safety Culture Equipment Purchasing Inspection and Maintenance Policy Design for Safe Construction Pay and Conditions
0.00 0.00 11.76 17.65 11.76 11.76 11.76 11.76 0.00 0.00 23.53 0.00 100.00
0.419 0.400 0.407 0.408 0.421 0.400 0.421 0.396 0.399 0.409 0.372 0.402
0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.1 0.4
0.000 0.000 0.047 0.080 0.042 0.047 0.042 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.056 0.000 0.356
-0.119 -0.200 -0.007 0.092 -0.121 0.000 -0.121 -0.096 0.301 -0.109 -0.272 -0.002
0.051 0.055 0.065 0.063 0.066 0.055 0.066 0.069 0.046 0.069 0.069 0.054
0.000 0.000 0.008 0.014 0.019 0.006 0.019 0.017 0.000 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.082
Page 4 of 7
Policy
INFLUENCE Factor O1 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O2 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O3 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O4 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O5 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O6 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O7 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O8 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O9 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL Contributing Factor From Below Recruitment and Selection Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 10.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 10.0 15.0 30.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.033 0.031 0.038 0.069 0.042 0.070 0.137 0.419 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.023 0.017 0.011 0.023 0.020 0.027 0.051 Estimated Weighting (1) % Calculated Policy Estimated Policy Contribution to the Rating from Rating Organisational Below (2) (3) Influence Rating x10-1 x10-1 (4) x10-1 Rating Difference (5) x10-1 UNCERTAINTY Calculated Uncertainty from Below (6) Calculated Uncertainty at this Level (7)
Training Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 21.0 6.5 21.0 10.0 14.0 6.5 21.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.069 0.020 0.080 0.046 0.058 0.030 0.096 0.400 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.015 0.035 0.008 0.032 0.008 0.019 0.055
Procedures Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 15.0 8.0 15.0 23.0 23.0 8.0 8.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.049 0.025 0.057 0.106 0.095 0.037 0.036 0.407 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.018 0.025 0.017 0.053 0.010 0.007 0.065
Planning Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 13.0 7.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 7.0 13.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.043 0.022 0.077 0.093 0.083 0.033 0.059 0.408 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.016 0.033 0.015 0.046 0.009 0.012 0.063
Information Management & Feedback Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 7.0 7.0 14.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 7.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.023 0.022 0.055 0.099 0.089 0.100 0.032 0.421 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.016 0.024 0.016 0.049 0.028 0.006 0.066
Management/Supervision Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 21.0 6.5 21.0 10.0 14.0 6.5 21.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.069 0.020 0.080 0.046 0.058 0.030 0.096 0.400 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.015 0.035 0.008 0.032 0.008 0.019 0.055
Communications Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 7.0 7.0 14.5 21.5 21.5 21.5 7.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.023 0.022 0.055 0.099 0.089 0.100 0.032 0.421 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.016 0.024 0.016 0.049 0.028 0.006 0.066
Safety Culture Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 15.0 15.0 15.0 7.0 22.0 11.0 15.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.049 0.047 0.057 0.032 0.091 0.051 0.068 0.396 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.034 0.025 0.005 0.051 0.014 0.014 0.069
Equipment Purchasing Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 27.5 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 27.5 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.090 0.028 0.034 0.042 0.037 0.042 0.125 0.399 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015 0.020 0.015 0.007 0.021 0.012 0.025 0.046
Page 5 of 7
Policy
INFLUENCE Factor Contributing Factor From Below Estimated Weighting (1) % Calculated Policy Estimated Policy Contribution to the Rating from Rating Organisational Below (2) (3) Influence Rating x10-1 x10-1 (4) x10-1 Rating Difference (5) x10-1 UNCERTAINTY Calculated Uncertainty from Below (6) Calculated Uncertainty at this Level (7)
O10 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O11 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL O12 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 TOTAL
Inspection and Maintenance Policy Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 12.0 8.0 16.0 8.0 24.0 8.0 24.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.039 0.025 0.061 0.037 0.100 0.037 0.109 0.409 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.018 0.026 0.006 0.055 0.010 0.022 0.069
Design for Safe Construction Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 25.5 25.5 17.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.084 0.080 0.065 0.037 0.033 0.037 0.036 0.372 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.057 0.028 0.006 0.018 0.010 0.007 0.069
Pay and Conditions Contracting Strategy Ownership and Control Company culture Organisational Structure Safety Management Labour Relations Company Profitability 22.0 7.0 15.0 7.0 15.0 15.0 19.0 100.0 0.355 0.425 0.465 0.425 0.530 0.530 0.410 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.50 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.072 0.022 0.057 0.032 0.062 0.070 0.086 0.402 -0.055 -0.225 -0.165 0.075 -0.230 -0.130 0.090 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.016 0.025 0.005 0.035 0.020 0.017 0.054
Page 6 of 7
Environmental
INFLUENCE Estimated Weighting (1) % Calculated Environmental Rating from Below (2) x10-1 Estimated Environmental Rating (3) x10-1 Contribution to the Policy Influence Rating (4) x10-1
Factor P1 E1 E2 E3 E4 TOTAL P2 E1 E2 E3 E4 TOTAL P3 E1 E2 E3 E4 TOTAL P4 E1 E2 E3 E4 TOTAL P5 E1 E2 E3 E4 TOTAL P6 E1 E2 E3 E4 TOTAL P7 E1 E2 E3 E4 TOTAL
Contributing Factor From Below Contracting trategy Political Influence Regulatory Influence Market Influence Social Influence
35.0 5.0 20.0 40.0 100.0
N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.40 0.70 0.30 0.30
0.140 0.035 0.060 0.120 0.355
Ownership and Control Political Influence Regulatory Influence Market Influence Social Influence 25.0 25.0 10.0 40.0 100.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.40 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.100 0.175 0.030 0.120 0.425
Company culture Political Influence Regulatory Influence Market Influence Social Influence 5.0 40.0 10.0 45.0 100.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.40 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.020 0.280 0.030 0.135 0.465
Organisational Structure Political Influence Regulatory Influence Market Influence Social Influence 5.0 30.0 35.0 30.0 100.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.40 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.020 0.210 0.105 0.090 0.425
Safety Management Political Influence Regulatory Influence Market Influence Social Influence 10.0 55.0 10.0 25.0 100.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.40 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.040 0.385 0.030 0.075 0.530
Labour Relations Political Influence Regulatory Influence Market Influence Social Influence 10.0 55.0 35.0 0.0 100.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.40 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.040 0.385 0.105 0.000 0.530
Company Profitability Political Influence Regulatory Influence Market Influence Social Influence 30.0 20.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 N/A N/A N/A N/A 0.40 0.70 0.30 0.30 0.120 0.140 0.150 0.000 0.410
Page 7 of 7
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
APPENDIX D APPLICATION OF THE INFLUENCE NETWORK FOR THE SCENARIO OF SLIPS AND TRIPS OFFSHORE
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page D.1 of D.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
APPENDIX D APPLICATION OF THE INFLUENCE NETWORK FOR THE SCENARIO OF SLIPS AND TRIPS OFFSHORE
INTRODUCTION
This appendix briefly presents a contrasting example to construction from the offshore industry in which the Influence Network technique is currently being used to address minor injury accidents. The purposes are to demonstrate how the Influence Network methodology distinguishes the performance of different workplace regimes effectively and to show how this provides a different focus for risk control measures.
BACKGROUND
The offshore industry operates in a major hazard environment. Health and safety is regulated in a goal setting regime with each duty holder being responsible for the presentation of a Safety Case. Disasters, such as Piper Alpha in 1988, have occurred killing many people in a single event (128 deaths in the case of Piper Alpha). As a consequence, the industry has a strong focus on safety, with safety management systems forming an integral part of the organisations cultures. In addition, the potential environmental impact of the industrys operations brings its activities under the scrutiny of society at large which has the ultimate sanction of not buying an oil companys petrol at the pumps. The genuine safety concerns and the significance of reputation to business profitability have ensured that health and safety issues have been tackled from the boardroom to the platform. However, the rate of safety improvements over the past decade has slowed and an industry initiative to bring a new Step Change in safety is underway. The HSE has set its own targets too to reduce the number of slips, trips and falls from height offshore and it is as part of that activity, developing a strategy for regulator action, that the Influence Network technique has been applied.
INFLUENCE NETWORK COMPARISONS

Figure D.1 shows the Influence Network for considerations of slips and trips on fixed offshore installations. The exercise was undertaken completely independently from the construction work which is the subject of this main report. The specific customisation of the generic influences, particularly at the direct and organisational levels, reflects the
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001 HSE Task Number B\0087 Page D.2 of D.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
nature of the workplace and the event under consideration. The colour coding of the influences reflects the quality of performance in each area, i.e. the rating. Good performance, on a scale of worst to best conceivable practice is blue, poor performance is red and moderate performance white. Comparison may be made with Figure 8.3 for construction in the main text. Immediately it is apparent that Figure 8.3 is predominantly red whereas Figure D.1 is generally white or blue. Given the different events being considered comparisons at the direct level should be made with caution, whereas at the policy level the ratings are generally invariant with event type. Here it can be seen that, offshore, ownership and control (by the duty holder / client of the work activities), company culture and safety management are all rated highly with respect of minimising accidents, but in construction (Figure 8.3) all three influences are rated low. The influence network is therefore capturing in a quantitative and logical manner the differences between the industries.
Rating 1 to 3 Rating 4 to 6
Slips and Trips on Fixed Installations

Rating 7 to 9
Housekeeping
D1
Inspection/ Maintenance
D2
Quality of Hardware
D3
Quality of PPE
D4
Fatigue
D5
Attentiveness
D6
Physical Fitness
D7
Experience
D8
Weather
D9
Motivation
D10
Risk Perception
D11
Compliance
D12
Availability of suitable human resources

D13
Communication
D14
Visual environment
D15
DIRECT LEVEL INFLUENCES
Work Organisation
O1
Accident/Incident Management Loop O2
Safety Culture
O3
Management
O4
Supervision
O5
Training
O6
Procedures
O7
Equipment purchasing
O8
Inspection & maintenance process

O9
Terms & conditions

O10
ORGANISATIONAL LEVEL INFLUENCES
P1
Ownership & Control

P2
Company Culture
Safety Management
P5
Labour Relations
P6
P3 P4 POLICY LEVEL INFLUENCES
Political Influence
E1
E2
Market Influence
E3
Societal Influence
E4
Figure D.1 Relative Rating of Influences in the Offshore Industry Context with Respect to Slips and Trips see scale top left
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001 HSE Task Number B\0087 Page D.3 of D.4
BOMEL CONSORTIUM
The baseline influence network index for the construction case of falls from height is 0.403 (where 0 is worst conceivable and 1 is best). The corresponding index for the current situation affecting slips and trips offshore is 0.587 based on the ratings underlying Figure D.1 and a customised set of weightings of influences one to another. Of course the absolute risk levels for an individual worker in respect of a fall from height in construction or a slip or trip offshore are quite different. Nevertheless the normalisation of the index with respect to best and worst practice makes some comparison possible. The higher index offshore suggests relative performance is better and with a logarithmic scale of risk this means absolute risk reduction will be more difficult to achieve. As in Section 8.8 of the main report, sensitivity studies for the slip / trip influence network have been undertaken examining the areas where incremental improvements have greatest benefit. The principal direct influences emerging are repeatedly housekeeping, risk perception (recognition of the slip / trip risk), inspection and maintenance (where the cost cutting withdrawal of grating teams is seen to contribute to uneven / ill-fitting walkways) and experience (familiarity with an installation layout). At the more remote levels, despite their high initial rating, safety culture and safety management were shown to be important to bring an appropriate emphasis on such minor consequence accidents.
CONCLUSION
The important lesson from this example is that the influence network is able, qualitatively and quantitatively, to model quite different working environments and provides a systematic tool for identifying areas where performance will be beneficial in the area of concern. The case demonstrates that appropriate risk controls can be isolated, providing confidence in the use of the technique for areas, such as construction, where the options are greater in number and less easily determined by judgement alone. Finally the example provides an instructive contrast where safety culture has taken effect for major hazards and where efforts are now targeting lower consequence but high frequency events. Figure 8.5 in the main text shows a model of safety culture maturity indicating such a sequence of improvements is necessary. It is notable that the construction industry is setting itself challenging targets across the board.
C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001
Page D.4 of D.4
Printed and published by the Health and Safety Executive C30 1/98 Printed and published by the Health and Safety Executive C1 10/01
ISBN 0-7176-2140-5
CRR 387
35.00
9 780717 621408

Hse Improving Health and Safety

Transféré par

Informations du document

Copyright

Formats disponibles

Partager ce document

Partager ou intégrer le document

Options de partage

Avez-vous trouvé ce document utile ?

Ce contenu est-il inapproprié ?

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Hse Improving Health and Safety

Transféré par

Droits d'auteur :

Formats disponibles

Health & Safety Executive

CONTRACT RESEARCH REPORT

Health & Safety Executive

CONSTRUCTION RISK PROFILE 6.1 6.2 Data Findings Data Application

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.1 of 0.14

DISCUSSION CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REFERENCES

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.2 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.3 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.4 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.5 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.6 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.7 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.8 of 0.14

FATAL FALLS FROM HEIGHT

Direct Level Influences

Recruitment & Selection

Information Management & Feedback

Organisational Level Influences

Inspection & Maintenance Policy

Design for safe construction

Pay & Conditions

Ownership and Control

Policy Level Influences

Environmental Level Influences

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.9 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.10 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.11 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.12 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 0.14 of 0.14

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 1.1 of 1.5

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 1.2 of 1.5

C942\04\038R Rev C July 2001

HSE Task Number B\0087

Page 1.3 of 1.5