PFDebate CriticalConstructive February2013

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 1
INDEX
PRO: Pan Kritik Culture PRO: Pan Kritik Culture & Capabilities PRO: Pan Kritik Democracy PRO: Pan Kritik Democratic Peace/Clash Civilizations PRO: Pan Kritik Economic Rise PRO: Pan Kritik Economic Rise = Military Threat PRO: Pan Kritik Identity & Behavior PRO: Pan Kritik Identity PRO: Pan Kritik Mercantilism PRO: Pan Kritik Realism PRO: Pan Kritik Regions/Ethnicity PRO: Pan Kritik Trade Deficit PRO: Pan Kritik Impact PRO: Pan Kritik Representations PRO: Pan Kritik Answers to Positive Representation of China CON: Schmitt Kritik China CON: China Generic CON: Schmitt Kritik Economics/Morality CON: Schmitt Kritik Friendship CON: Schmitt Kritik War CON: Schmitt Kritik Impact CON: Schmitt Kritik Framework CON: Schmitt Kritik Answers to Kill Enemies CON: Schmitt Kritik Answers to Schmitt was a Nazi CON: Answers to Pan Kritik China Economic Rise CON: Answers to Pan Kritik China/Taiwan Conflict 2 3 4 5 6-12 13-14 15 16 17 18-19 20 21 22-25 26-28 29 30-31 32-35 36 37 38-39 40-46 47 48 49 50 51-59
Pro- Pan K- Culture

Cultural approaches to China treat culture and nationalism as a prerequisite to understanding politics and international relations. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
Relations: a Critique of Western Approaches)
Although there are debates over the nature of Chinese identity and the various ways of conceptualizing culture, this second perspective assumes that China is largely to be explained by its culture.23 This view can be traced back to an earlier generation of China experts. In 1965, John Fairbank, for example, observed that China was coterminous with the culture. Political life was motivated by loyalty to the cultural order, by culturalism, rather than by nationalism.24 It is a view that still has currency today. Lucian Pye suggests that China is not just another nation-state in the family of nations. China is a civilization pretending to be a state.25 More recently, James Watson argues that a shared sense of cultural identity predated the construction of a national identity in China and thus conditioned its national identity. 26 If Chinese culture is the key to Chinas identity, attention to culture is a prerequisite for understanding Chinas recent transformations. In so far as Western impact on China has been an important variable in the process of cultural change, this approach should offer a more nuanced understanding of Sino-Western relations than the capability approach. As Robert Scalapino notes, national identity relates to the way in which a people, and especially a policy-making elite, perceive the essence of their nation in relation to others. It thus influences attitudes and policies alike, being the psychological foundation for the roles and behavior patterns of a country in the international arena.27
Pro- Pan K- Culture & Capabilities

Cultural and capabilities approach to Chinese international relations and politics are not mutually exclusive- they often go hand-in-hand. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
Despite the distinction between capability and culture approaches and the heated debate over containment or engagement towards China, it would be misleading to suggest that there exist two distinctive groups of scholars neatly corresponding to these two positions. It is difficult, for example, to pinpoint those who advocate an outright strategy of either containment or engagement without reservation. In most cases, confronted by the enigma of Chinese identity, China scholars have to take into account both capabilities and cultural and ideological differences in order to arrive at rounded views of China. Frequently, cultural accounts of Chinese identity make reference to material evidence, and proponents of the capability approach need to resort to the analysis of intention and perception arising from Chinese nationalism and strategic culture It is therefore little wonder that the incentive of free trade and the age-old balance of power strategy go hand-in-hand in the discussion of Western China policy. For these reasons, I shall put these approaches together in examining their rather common weakness in the following section.
Capabilities and cultural representations fail to promote a better understanding of Chinese international relations and politics. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
To what extent have the approaches outlined above contributed to better understandings of China and its implications for global politics? In my view, there have been mixed results. On the one hand, the employment of the concept of Chinese identity may help scholars take more comprehensive views of China because the term identity, unlike the conventional billiard-balls approach, implies dynamic, multifaceted processes rather than a static, black-and-white picture of China. On the other hand, for all their sophisticated analyses, these approaches have failed to deliver on their promises. I shall examine why this has been the case and the implications of this failure for practice. Happily, more critical accounts of Chinese identity have now begun to emerge, which may provide us with opportunities to explore alternative ways of understanding China.
Pro- Pan K- Democracy

Focusing on democracy in China is a cultural approach to international relations and politics. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
Pye argues that modernization has created for the Chinese an acute authority crisis, and that the lack of individualism, strong identification with guanxi (social connections) and the dominance of the state over society embedded in Chinas tradition are, among other things, responsible for Chinas resistance to embrace democracy- the new moral order.30 This identity crisis also finds expression in a cleavage between the government and the mass (particularly intellectuals) which culminated in the Tiananmen incident in 1989.31 As Merle Goldman and others observe, a segment of Chinas intellectuals are beginning to identify with the opposition and not the prevailing regime and system . . . Chinese identity had split into at least two or three. This disaggregation of the components of national identity has forced the question of which component is primary, and hence the most deserving object of the intellectuals loyalty.32
Pro- Pan K- Democratic Peace/Clash Civilizations

Democratic peace theory and clash of civilization arguments exemplify the cultural approach to Chinese politics and international relations. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
While analysts debate the degree to which China can resist outside pressures for change, most in the West would probably agree that a trend towards China becoming more like us should be encouraged. Moreover, given that there is a learning process involved in Chinas integration into international society,38 this trend is to some extent already under way. Despite some twists and turns, Chinas experience is well within that of other rapidly modernizing but destabilizing societies; and the characteristics of developed states are overwhelmingly determined by the deep structures and forces of modernization and democratization.39 Furthermore, based on the theory of democratic peace,40 democratic governance in China would be more conducive to the promotion of human rights and peace, and therefore an engagement policy aiming to bring China into the international society is considered necessary. Nevertheless, many still believe that despite the transforming power of the West, the cultural differences will not easily go away; indeed, some even argue that the differences are fundamental, and perhaps immutable. As Pye maintains, in a world of grantedly irrational political systems, Chinas is possibly the most bizarre...China has a political system in which accountability seems to be absent altogether.41 Those confident about Chinas ultimate conversion should n o t be overly-optimistic. As Perry Link puts it, If modern international culture does indeed become the first force in history to dissolve Chinas notion of its moral uniqueness, that process will, at a minimum, take decades or centuries to finish. Before then, the core problem will remain.42 More ominously, a revival of Chinas Sino-centric worldview in line with the rise of Confucianism in East Asia forms part of Samuel Huntingtons alarming prediction, (made in the larger context of a resurgence of non-Western cultures and the decline of Western dominance after the Cold War), of a clash of civilizations.43
Pro- Pan K- Economic Rise

There are no uniquely Chinese businesses- they are part of a global production network. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
As mentioned above, the conventional understanding of the challenge of Chinese businesses as a China threat largely hinges on the assumption of Chinese businesses as something uniquely Chinese. This assumption, however, by obscuring the transnational dimension of Chinese businesses, cannot take us very far in understanding the complex nature of the China challenge. In this context, we need to look at an alternative approach to understanding the identity of Chinese businesses. Focusing on the global production networks, this approach can enable us to simultaneously interrogate the assumed Chineseness of Chinese businesses and reveal their transnational characteristics. But before doing so, a brief discussion of the emergence of global production networks in the world economy and the consequences for the transformation of national economies is in order. Needless to say, the world economy has not always been the way it is today. For much of the past few centuries, it was characterized principally by divisions between national economies. With mercantilism dominating the scene, the world economy was subject 18 strongly to national monopolies and trade restrictions. Indeed, economy was believed to be so closely bound up to the nation that Louis XIVs minister Colbert once said that the might and greatness of a State is measured entirely by the quantity of silver it 19 possesses. Consequently, not only did the size and influence of a national economy come to signify the nations strength and 20 determination, but economic competition was routinely taken as both an embodiment of, and a catalyst to, interstate conflict. In mid-eighteenth century India, for example, the commercial contest between the East India Company and the Compagnie des Indes was overtly backed by the military and naval resources of their respective home country, Britain and France. However, with the increasing globalization of economic activities over the past half a century or so, the category of national economies has begun to appear less relevant and less meaningful. Although mercantilism has lingered on to this day, literature in economic development studies argues that exclusive attention to the nation-state as the conventional unit of analysis is becoming less useful. The argument is that although much of the organization of economic activities may still take place within state 21 boundaries, many changes in the world economy increasingly tend to slice through those boundaries. In his book The Work of Nations, Robert Reich, former Secretary of Labor in the Clinton administration, called into question the continued reference to an American economy. The idea of an American economy is becoming meaningless, he wrote, as most factors of production such as 22 capital, technology, factories, and equipment are no longer constrained within national borders. In a similar vein, Kenichi Ohmae argues that it not only makes little sense today to speak of Italy or Russia or China as a single economic unit, but it is increasingly 23 difficult to attach an accurate national label to the goods and services now produced and traded around the world. The non-alignment between economy and national space may well have been exaggerated. As Peter Dicken notes, the placeless TNC 24 (transnational corporation) remains a myth. Yet, while not suggesting the disappearance of national economies, it is fair to say that national economies, particularly in the regions of North America, Europe, and East Asia, have become increasingly transnationalized. While it would be foolish to argue that Chinese businesses no longer have much to do with China, I argue that the context in which they have emerged and developed cannot be disconnected from such a re-organization of economic activities which increasingly transcends national borders. Much as they continue to retain some Chineseness in various ways, many (clearly not all) Chinese businesses are also deeply affected by transnational activities.

China is part of the global production network- massive foreign direct investment, outsourcing and subcontracting. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
Two interrelated aspects can best illustrate Chinas enmeshment into the global production networks: its connection with foreign direct investment (FDI), and its role as a major destination for outsourcing and subcontracting by TNCs. 33 According to UNCTADs Transnationality Index, FDI flows are closely linked to the transnationality of host countries. Chinas extensive exposure to FDI is therefore illustrative of the transnational characteristics of what are customarily called Chinese businesses. Between 1985 and 2005, annual net FDI inflows into China grew from US$1 billion to US$72 billion. In the same period, China took in more than US$600 billion in FDI, 12 times the total stock of FDI Japan received between 1945 and 2000. Since the early 1990s, FDI inflows have further accelerated in light of Beijings decision to allow a new form of FDI called wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs). By the early 2000s WFOEs accounted for 65% of new FDI in China. Since 1993, China has consistently been the largest recipient of FDI among 34 developing countries. In parallel to the massive inflows of FDI is a growing trend for TNCs to outsource and subcontract production and even services to China. According to the 2006 World Investment Report, China ranked highly as one of the most-favored locations of both the worlds largest TNCs and the largest TNCs from developing countries. To date, corporations from 190 countries and regions, which include 450 of the Fortune global top 500 multinational corporations, have invested in 35 China. By one account, 60,000 foreign-owned factories were opened between 2003 and 2005. What these figures demonstrate is a deepening integration of the Chinese economy into the global production networks. In this process, as Shenkar describes, Chinese manufacturers initially serve as component suppliers to foreign buyers and Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs). As component suppliers, the Chinese companies produce to the specifications of foreign firms who then distribute and sell the product in world markets or embed it in one of their end products. In the next phase, very often entire operations are subcontracted to China, with the foreign firm maintaining oversight, 36 branding, and marketing. Amidst the global shift in production, China is turned into East Asias main producer of final products and final export platform. Take Chinas computer-related products for example: nearly three-quarters of those products are made by Taiwanese companies on the mainland, and those companies in turn rely on OEM contracts with Japanese and US companies. Consequently, a transnational production chain takes shape, a chain which links together the worlds most developed countries such as the US and Japan, semi-periphery economies such as Taiwan, and developing 37 states like China.

The identity of Chinese businesses are changing- they are not uniquely Chinese. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
Just as Chinese businesses are in many ways transformed by FDI inflows and the outsourcing and subcontracting processes, so too is the identity of Chinese businesses. If anything, their Chineseness has been profoundly complicated by their location within the 38 global and regional production networks, where they are interwoven with non-local or non-Chinese businesses. The penetration and dominance of non-Chinese elements in the Chinese economy, taking the form of foreign control over major processes and components of production in China, such as exports, technology, marketing, and profit, calls into question the conventional understanding of Chinese businesses as Chinese businesses. Firstly, in relation to exports, what are commonly labeled as Chinese businesses can in many cases be more suitably described as Chinese subsidiaries of global multinationals and Chinese joint ventures with businesses from the industrialized countries. Those Chinese subsidiaries, or foreign funded enterprises (FFEs), accounted for about two-thirds of the total growth in Chinese exports between 1994 and mid-2003. While exports of industrial machinery from China increased 20-fold in real terms between 1993 and 2003, FFEs share of them jumped from 35% to 79%. Over the same period, exports of computer equipment increased from US$716 million to US$41 billion, with the FFEs share rising from 74% to 92%. This pattern, as Gilboy points out, repeats itself in almost 39 every advanced industrial sector in China. Arriving at a similar conclusion, Yasheng Huang observed that foreign firms had 40 achieved majority controls over foreign investment enterprises in 21 out of 28 Chinese manufacturing industries. In 2001, 11 Chinese enterprises were among the worlds top 500 businesses, but not a single one was from the manufacturing sector. Secondly, the dominant position of non-Chinese businesses in Chinas production and exports is echoed and underpinned by a similar pattern in relation to technology, services, branding and marketing. In China, foreign companies manage virtually all 41 intellectual property and account for 85% of the countrys technology exports. Gavin Heron, managing director of TBWA/Shanghai, said that China is a story of international brands, not local ones . . . As soon as a local brand has any traction, 42 theyre bought out by a multinational. Indeed, based on their technology and branding superiority, many foreign companies have secured their supremacy in Chinas production (such as delivery dates, industry and quality standards, design specifications) without actual ownership over production. For example, through control of industry standardsa phenomenon known as Wintelism Microsoft and Intel retain huge influence over access to the PC market without producing PCs themselves. Similarly, brand-name producers such as Levi-Strauss, the GAP, Reebok and Nike enjoy strong control over a wide range of labor-intensive consumer goods, 43 such as clothing and footwear, which are produced by buyer-driven commodity chains. It is then not surprising that the lack of a domestic technology base has placed Chinese companies in many industries at the mercy of their multinational counterparts, especially in terms of technology access. The transnational alliance that controlled the core DVD technology, for example, initially demanded significant licensing fees from Chinese DVD manufacturers, and only reached agreement 44 on a reasonable fee after several rounds of prolonged negotiations. Or to take another example, after more than a decade as a junior joint venture partner to the global giant Volkswagen, Shanghai Auto still had little capability to compete as an independent car maker. Volkswagen even publicly expressed doubt whether it would continue to need its Shanghai partner after Chinas entry into the WTO. 45 The only strategy left for Shanghai Auto was to start a second joint venture with GM. The situation has not been helped by the 46 Chinese governments decision to abandon the plan of developing a purely indigenous auto industry. Pan Continues

Pan ContinuedNo text deleted More importantly, dominance in the areas of capital, production, export, and technology often translates directly into dominance over value and profit. Of course, this does not mean that Chinese businesses have not benefited from their interactions with global businesses, since there are some Chinese companies doing well from export earnings. Still, US, Japanese and European multinationals continue to maintain the added value and technological lead. It is estimated that between 60% and 80% of the value of all Chinese exports are processed (imported) components. Since the import content of the FFEs is often much higher, their exports from China 47 yield still less value-added for the national economy than the roughly equal value of exports from national firms. Thanks to Wintelism, leading foreign enterprises, through controlling the sales channel and market standards, continue to control the realization of value. For example, Intel earns as much as 10% of its total US$30 billion a year in revenue from selling computer microprocessor 48 chips to China. Given this trend, Japans recent alarm over the fall of its personal computer exports to the United States as opposed to Chinas rise in its PC exports seems to miss the point. For one thing, those trade figures failed to reflect the fact that the computers 49 assembled in China rely on high value-added technology from Japan and elsewhere.

Greater China and their diaspora are not Chinese businesses. There is no cultural coherence, unity, or homogeneity. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
To some observers, the dominance of non-Chinese businesses, instead of signifying a weakening Chineseness of Chinese businesses, seems to disguise the very existence of a more or less coherent Chinese business network on a grander scale. It is argued that many of the so-called non-Chinese businesses in China, upon a closer examination, are overseas Chinese businesses in Greater China or the Chinese diaspora: Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan, and overseas 62 Chinese in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Variably known as the bamboo network and an invisible empire, the Chinese network not only seems to share common Chineseness, but it also indicates the far-flung reach of Chinese businesses in the global economy. In a sense, some forms of Chinese business networks across Greater China do exist. Having said that, their existence cannot be viewed in isolation from the larger global economic networks. Hong Kong, for example, has been a major source of foreign direct investment in China. But this does not mean that the origins of the investment are necessarily based in Hong Kong or even come from China itself (known as round-tripping). Breslin notes that through their subsidiary offices in Hong Kong, some foreign businesses have been able to disguise their involvement in the Chinese economy. For example, it is estimated that about 80% of Japanese FDI in Hong Kong was subsequently reinvested in Chinas Guangdong Province. While it appeared to be Hong Kong investment, it was in effect Japanese investment in 63 China. Similarly, by analyzing the flow of final trade in the East Asian region, Hart-Landsberg and Burkett note that the business network of Greater China, rather than reflecting a growing regional independence and balance, is formed 64 primarily in response to the changing needs of transnational corporate production networks. Thus, even in their Greater China guises, Chinese businesses are not a uniform, self-contained cultural entity, but are underpinned and defined by extensive production networks between greater China and the rest of the world. In other words, the imagined Chinese transnational ethnicity and the implied new economic relationships among Greater China need to 65 be put in the context of the global production networks whose main driving force has been TNCs. The extensive linkage between overseas Chinese businesses and the global production networks means that their Chineseness inevitably lacks the cultural coherence or homogeneity as projected by some popular images of Chinese businesses. Granted that it may be possible to detach overseas Chinese businesses from the wider global networks, their so-called common ethnic and cultural bonds often belie the great variation among the vast Chinese communities. Obviously, the Chinese diaspora, spanning across a diversity of regions and national spaces and made up by different and localized communities and identities, do not owe loyalties to a single center, let alone a political center in Beijing. Taiwans restive quest for a new Taiwanese identity aside, in Singapore, where what Chinese actually means is also subject to fierce debate, ethnic Chinese see themselves as Singaporean first and huaren (ethnic Chinese) second, if ever. 66 It would be a horror to them if one now still calls them overseas Chinese or huaqiao, the sojourners. Pan Continues next page

Pan Continuedno text deleted Naturally, underlying such localized identities and loyalties are often parochial and divergent values and interests among Chinese businesses. In business dealings, the Taiwanese often distrust their Hong Kong or mainland counterparts, 67 whereas Singaporeans are acutely conscious of deep value differences between themselves and the mainland Chinese. In short, the Chinese business networks in Greater China seem to bear more resemblance to a global patchwork of 68 many different enterprises that may have little or no respect or love for one another. The notion of Greater China as a singular, unified business network, once enthusiastically embraced by mainland China, has now lost much of its appeal 69 there. As one mainland Chinese scholar put it, we reject the concept of Greater China ... Overseas Chinese come not 70 because they are patriotic but because of investment benefits. In other words, what draws Chinese businesses together across Cultural China is not so much their shared Chineseness, but a common capitalist desire for wealth and profit.

Chinese businesses are internally divided. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
Against this background, it is not surprising that the internal diversity and fragmentation of Chinese businesses is found not only in Greater China, but also within China proper. Two factors are relevant here. One is Chinas decentralizationoriented reforms. As Peter Nolan notes, with a strong tradition of relatively autonomous local government, Chinas 71 decentralization has only reinforced this autonomy tradition in business. The other relates to the nation-wide hunger for 72 global linkages. Most clearly symbolized by its WTO entry, Chinas integration into the global production networks has been at the expense of the national coherence of Chinese businesses. In a zealous drive to join tracks with international standards (yu guoji jiegui), many Chinese companies have not only developed a dependence on transnational capital and technology, but more remarkably, some have shied away from horizontal collaboration with their domestic counterparts, especially if such collaboration crosses regional or bureaucratic boundaries. As Gilboy points out, Chinas best firms are among the least connected to domestic suppliers: for every $100 that state-owned electronics and telecom firms spend 73 on technology imports, they spend only $1.20 on similar domestic goods. Small wonder that the Chinese economy has 74 been variously described as a cellular economy, federalism, Chinese-style, or de facto federalism. In this context, even if those Chinese businesses share the same national space and are all run by Chinese, they may still be a long way from, if ever, forming a unitary, coherent Chinese economic actor as the popular images such as a fire-breathing dragon would have us believe.
Pro- Pan K- Economic Rise = Military Threat

The argument that Chineses economy increases their military threat and promotes mercantilism rests on the assumption of the Chineseness of Chinas business. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
According to Peter Navarro, the author of The Coming China Wars, Chinas unfair, mercantilist trading practices such as the China price, the going global strategy, and its voracious appetite for energy and resources constitute what he calls weapons of mass production. Testifying before the Congress-mandated USChina Economic and Security Review Commission in early 2007, the University of California business professor charged that these weapons of mass 8 production have been allowing China to conquer one new export market after another. In this context, many security analysts and practitioners agree that the economic challenge will have far-reaching military and foreign policy implications. The Pentagon argues that the performance of Chinas economy is a main driving force 9 behind its domestic defense expenditures, foreign acquisitions, and indigenous defense industrial developments. Indeed, the emergence of Chinese businesses has been seen as a harbinger of the beginning of a historic power transition from the US to China. Like previous power transitions in the international system, it is argued that the rise of China does not bode 10 well for international peace and stability. For Navarro, coordinated centrally by the Chinese government, the mercantilist practices of Chinese businesses do not just help China gain increasing economic and financial advantage over US businesses, but also contribute to Chinas rapid military modernization and lay the groundwork for the coming China 11 wars. At this juncture, what is remarkable about these analyses of Chinese businesses and business practices is not so much their attention to the aspect of economic and military threat. Rather, for the purpose of this essay, it is their grounding of Chinese businesses in an unproblematic, fixed, and more or less coherent actor called China, whereby Chinese businesses acquire their Chineseness. For example, the China price is believed to be produced in the unique stew of Chinas 12 evolving business culture, and the conquest of the global market by Chinese products is often traced back to the Chinese government. In the words of Hornig and Wagner, the desk drawers of party strategists are filled with detailed 13 plans promoting national industries from automaking to biotechnology. Indeed, frequently the assumption of the Chineseness about Chinese businesses goes so far as to conjure up a scenario of a whole country engaged in concerted efforts of building national greatness through sustained economic development and aggressive business strategies. To illustrate this point, it helps to refer to a bill metaphor used by some commentators, with the bill symbolizing the costs incurred by the US as a result of the influx of Chinese cheap imports. On the bill, as the metaphor goes, the costs for America, apart from the big trade deficits with China, also include domestic layoffs, the relocation of entire industries, cutbacks for research and development and the downfall of the once- almighty dollar. And the payee? A population of 14 billions. In other words, what is behind Chinese businesses is nothing short of the whole Chinese nation.
Pro- Pan K- Economic Rise = Military Threat

There is no Chinese nationalist economic threat- they are enmeshed in the global economy. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
The complexities of the identity of Chinese businesses are reflected in both the extensive intermingling of non-local or non-Chinese businesses with their Chinese counterparts and, as a result of such processes, the fragmentation of the apparently homogeneous Chinese businesses. As a consequence, the conventional assumption of their exclusive Chineseness seems no longer able to do justice to these complexities. Relying on the nation-state as the primary unit of analysis, the statecentric assumption is not only prone to a blindness to the transnational dimension of the Chinese 25 economy, but also tends to exaggerate Chinese power in the global political economy, or even mistake China for a model for national economic development. As Hart-Landsberg and Burkett point out, Chinas economic experience cannot be understood in national or even inter-national terms, as if Chinas gains create opportunities for policy makers in other countries to promote their own national restructuring in ways that benefit their respective working-class 26 majorities. In other words, economic development in China, far from being predominantly a national phenomenon, has a distinctively transnational or global dimension. This transnationality is characteristic of many sectors of the Chinese economy, but the main focus here will be on manufacturing, not least because this sector, directly linked to the Made in China phenomenon, has attracted most attention in mainstream media and scholarship. The paper utilizes the global production networks (GPN) framework to examine the transnational characteristics of Chinese manufacturing businesses. Global production networks are a form of contemporary capitalist development that increasingly involves the detailed disaggregation of stages of production and consumption across national boundaries, 27 under the organizational structure of densely networked firms or enterprises. Leading the way of this development are modern multinational companies, whose strategies, as Kenichi Ohmae argues, are no longer shaped and conditioned by reasons of state but, rather, by the desireand the needto serve attractive markets wherever they exist and to tap 28 attractive pools of resources wherever they sit. Not surprisingly, these strategies lead to the continued expansion of the capitalist production networks to a global scale. As a result, the social origins and production of various production materials, labor, capital, information, technology, design, management, marketing, and consumption are no longer rigidly tied to fixed, singular localities or nationalities, thus making it increasingly difficult and problematic, if not impossible, to identify businesses and their practices in exclusively national terms. With its emphasis on production and its transnational processes, the GPN framework allows a better understanding of the intricate linkshorizontal, diagonal, as well as 29 vertical that form multi- dimensional, multi-layered lattices of economic activity.
Pro- Pan K- Identity & Behavior

Traditional Western depictions of Chinese identity and behavior in international relations are positivist and ethnocentric in their assumptions and foreclose alternative, richer understandings of Chinese identity. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
The past decade or so has seen a growing interest in China among academics, policy-makers and the general public. An emerging body of literature in the fields of Chinese studies and international relations has centred on Chinas unsettled, complex identity.2 With the abrupt end of the Cold War, and the new dynamics of world affairs, this is hardly surprising. Central to this questioning process is the concern about what China now is, or more specifically, how China-perhaps the only remaining communist great power-will change, behave, or survive in the decades to come. The aim of this paper is to examine how the Chinese identity question is posed in the recent international relations literature. Beginning with an overview of dominant Western approaches, an appraisal of them suggests that while they offer some insights into the transformations that China is undergoing, at their core they are positivist and ethnocentric in their assumptions, and consequently they foreclose a richer understanding of China. I argue that the issue of Chinese identity in international relations is not an objective problem to be solved within Chinas boundaries, but a challenge to the conventional wisdom and practice that dominate international relations theorising and policy-making.
Pro- Pan K- Identity

Collapse of the Soviet Union and bipolarity turned China into the new Other that structures U.S. identity. Problems with Chinese identity are as much a crisis with the West as it is internal problems with China. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
As Michael Shapiro notes, the making of the Other as something foreign is thus not an innocent exercise in differentiation. It is closely linked to how the self is understood.79 Hegel, Ranke and other Western philosophers of history have long usedChinaasaconstructagainstwhichtomeasureandrevelintheirownmarvellous European progress.80 In this context, it is safe to say that the growing Western interest in Chinese identity has much to do with the looming problem of how to project and construct a Western (American) identity after the end of the Cold War. Huntington puts it bluntly, If being an American means being committed to the principles of liberty, democracy, individualism, and private property, and if there is no evil empire out there threatening those principles, what indeed does it mean to bean American, and what becomes of American national interests?81 Hence the need to replace the former Soviet Union with a new Other in order to distinguish the self. As Bruce Cumings notes, for us, China is still a metaphor. It is a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable renegade state to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weight). China is a metaphor for some conservatives who no longer have a Left worthy of serious attack. It is a metaphor for American idealists in search of themselves, who see it as their defining mission to bring democratic perfection to a flawed and ignorant world. And it is a metaphor for an American polity that imagines itself coterminous with mankind, and is therefore incapable of understanding true difference.82 Chinas identity-crisis is as much a matter of the Wests crisis of identity, as it is about the transformations that are at present occurring in China. The crisis reflects not only the increasing complexities of China, but also the many readjustments facing the West in the absence of the Soviet Other and the all-too-familiar bipolar structure which has for long served as a point of reference in mainstream international theory and practice. More importantly, in response to the uncertainties both in China and at home, some in the West seem content to rekindle another Cold War-style game by advancing the notion of the China threat. This may well offer a form of comfort in the short-term, but the representations of China and the West it trades upon are misleading and potentially dangerous. The recent revelation that the mainstream theories that underpinned a whole generations understanding of the Soviet behaviour in the Cold War were an illusion, should warn us that a similar mistake should not be made in the case of China.83
Pro- Pan K- Mercantilism

Chinese economic nationalism is accomplished through globalization- foreign direct investment, stock exchanges, and multilateral trade organizations. No neomercantilist threat. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
This is not to say that Chinas political and business leaders do not want to construct a coherent national economy. Clearly, the locations of the four original special economic zones have been chosen by the Chinese government with a 75 view to maximizing their attraction to investment from ethnic Chinese living outside China. Also, seen as the main driving force behind Chinese companies going global strategy, Beijing has sought to assemble a national team in global economic competition. Thus, some scholars argue that China is nationalising globalization: pursuing a policy of 76 selective and strategic integration that bends globalization to Chinas long-term nation-building goals. Such a nationalist effort is doubtless present and significant, but in relation to Chinese businesses, thus far the Chinese governments policy has been imbued with ambivalence. While the dream of rebuilding Chinas national greatness through economic development remains at the core of the official discourse, the main path to that dream has been through globalization. As Crane puts it, while there exists a strong impulse to defend the imagined national economy, the official 77 line is that this must be accomplished in concert with global capital. In explaining Chinas policy on foreign investment, for example, Zhang Yansheng, director of the Institute for International Economic Research under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) put it bluntly:
In an effort to introduce outside competitors to further promote the transformation of the market economy, we prefer strategic alliances with foreign investors . . . Despite more wholly foreign-owned companies aiming at preventing technology spillover, we will give more preferential treatment to the multinationals with R&D centers in China.78
Importantly, such strategy has consistently figured in Chinas official discourse of national economic development, first advanced by Deng Xiaoping, and then adhered to by his successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. For example, addressing the APEC CEO Summit in November 2004, President Hu Jintao promised that the Chinese government would create new ways of attracting foreign investment, and push for greater reform in government administrative systems by building 79 a predictable and more transparent management system for sectors open to foreign investment. If anything, this denotes both the development of a sense of international responsibility on the part of Chinese leaders, and the 80 internationalization of the Chinese state more generally. Thus, it should come as no surprise that economic nationalism in contemporary China has taken on some rather odd forms such as the existence of favorable policies to foreign direct investment, the rush to list companies on foreign stock exchanges, and the eagerness to join multilateral trade 81 organizations. All of these, according to Crane, are hardly the actions of a staunchly neomercantilist power.
Pro- Pan K- Realism

Structural realism and neorealism approach to international relations treats identity as fixed and inescapable. Identity is not pre-given but subject to redefinition. Identity is relational- the definition of self and other, threat and interest have a profound effect on national security policy. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
The concept of identity is much in vogue in the social sciences and in the international relations discipline in particular; but identity has always been integral to modern politics and social life.3 The past neglect of identity can be largely attributed to the dominant assumption that identity is a kind of fixed, bounded, identifiable object in the natural world.4 This view is also manifest in mainstream international relations theories, notably, neorealism. From this vantage point, the state can be described in terms of a body ... with a head of state who governs its members according to the dictates of reason or raison detat. The state-as-body is regarded as of a natural kind and an inescapable fact.5 The primordialist assumption of fixed state identity in international relations- often known as a billiard-balls approach-takes it for granted that all states have a limited number of common traits, such as a will to survive and a will to power. Ironically, this limited number of traits is further reduced by structural realism or neorealism. Neorealism brushes aside all attributes of states except their capabilities, and accounts for international politics in terms of the distribution of capabilities and the anarchic relations amongst states.7 However, the inability of the dominant paradigm to explain both the end of the Cold War and subsequent transformations has prompted many international relations scholars to question the notion of a fixed identity and explore the complexities of the inter-subjective domain of international politics. As a result, identity has been reformulated as role-specific understandings and expectations about self in the social world; as the basis of interests, identities, rather than exogenously pre-given, are subject to redefinition.8 This occurs in an interactive context that leads to the mutual construction of people (identities) and societies.9 Identity construction is relational; the notion of identity involves negation or difference- something is something, not somethingelse.10 Understanding identity in international relations in this manner seems to have more explanatory potential than orthodox notions. As Peter Katzenstein notes, Definitions of identity that distinguish between self and other imply definitions of threat and interest that have strong effects on national security policies.11 These alternative approaches to identity and international relations have been increasingly called constructivism.
Pro- Pan K- Realism

Realist framing of Chinas rise is done in terms of balance of power leading to calls for containment of China. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
As perceptions of Chinas power have changed, so has this approachs treatment of China. Long before Chinas rapid economic growth in the past few decades, research interest in China paled beside an overriding concern with more important power relations, first among European states and later between the two superpowers in the Cold War. As George F. Kennan once remarked, China doesnt matter very much. Its not very important. Its never going to be powerful.13 To the extent that mainstream international history was told as the story of the European interstate system and its expansion into the larger world, it is not surprising that, as a tottering imperial power, a sedentary civilisation, and a nascent nation-state, China received relatively little attention from the international relations community. With Chinas dramatic emergence as a powerful political and economy force, there has been a significant shift in interest in China. Nicholas Krist of argues that, The rise of China, if it continues, maybe the most important trend in the world for the next century ... Even in failure China could be hugely important.14 Typical questions asked by realists are: Was China a rising power, and if so, how fast and in what direction?15 Chinas development is accommodated amongst the oldest problems in international relations; ever since the rise of Assyria and Sparta, the perennial question has been how the international community can accommodate the ambitions of newly powerful states. 16 China is thus compared with such emerging powers as Germany and Japan at the turn of the twentieth century, and the question that naturally follows is whether China will seek to become a hegemon or act as a responsible power in the new international settling. 17 The imperative of the self-help international system leads some to argue that the consequence of Chinas rising power is clear-China is so big and so naturally powerful that it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy.18 With the end of the Cold War and the rise of China, the previous balance of power in East Asia has collapsed. In this context, to curb the threat of Chinese ascendancy is to resort to the conventional wisdom of the balance of power strategy. As Gerald Segal warns, Without a balance of power, Southeast Asians are vulnerable.19 Along this line of argument, many have called for a containment policy towards China.
Realist anarchy problematic and balance of power treat China as a unitary actor and are only concerned with Chinas power, not its soul. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
This school of thought stems from realism. Informed by this orthodoxy, scholars who adopt it believe that the nature of international politics is predetermined by anarchy, which, in the absence of central authority in the international realm, necessitates relentless struggle for survival and power among nations. Accordingly, what matters most is the balance of power based on the single important attribute of states- capabilities. These are embodied in a number of tangible factors such as territory, resources, geopolitical importance, economic as well as military power. From this point of view, China is seen primarily as a unitary state actor, and it is mainly material capabilities that matter in analysing Chinese identity. Or as Robert Zoellick puts it, realists have been concerned with Chinas power, not its soul.12
Pro- Pan K- Regions/Ethnicity

Focusing on regionalism, ethnicity, island disputes, and self-determination are examples of the cultural approach to Chinese international relations and politics. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
Others discern a crisis in terms of a regional disparity roughly between south and north (or east and west, littoral and hinterland areas).33 On a variety of counts, differences between the two regions are remarkable. Compared to the latter, the former is considered rich, dynamic, outward-looking, amenable to Western influence, and so on. It is argued that uneven development between the two regions bolsters regionalism, and this trend, according to Segal, soon raises the sensitive question of the integrity of the modern Chinese state.34 Given the apparent superiority of the south, it appears that in the struggle over Chinas future national culture, young Chinese are embracing the southern-oriented open identity and rejecting the new Confucian nationalism.35 Further contradictions are evident between nationalism and globalism,36 and between state nationalism and ethnic nationalism.36 Though the tension between nationalism and globalism is not unique to China, the transition from empire to nation is a relatively recent development for China, especially in comparison with many European nations. It is ironic that just having undergone its culturalism to nationalism metamorphosis, China must immediately face the challenge of globalism. In addition, the growing centrifugal forces emanating from Chinas ethnic minorities, as well as from Taiwan, have added another dimension to the national identity crisis. At stake here is Chinese tradition of great unity(dayitong), a belief undermined by minority groups cries for self-determination or independence.
Pro- Pan K- Trade Deficit

Focus on Chinas trade surplus with the U.S. ignores their deficit with East Asian countries. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
This point is as valid to labor-intensive products as it is to the high-tech sectors. A Barbie doll made in China is sold for US$20 in Western markets, but only about 35 cents is retained by the Chinese. What China got in the past few years is only some pretty figures, said Mei Xinyu of the Commerce Ministrys research institute; American and foreign 50 companies have gotten the real profit. Acutely aware that this uneven distribution of profit in China could be to their advantage, in April 2006 executives from Microsoft, Starbucks, Costco, Weyerhaeuser and Amazon.com went to great lengths to extend a warm welcome to the visiting Chinese president Hu Jintao. Those executives, as one commentator put it, were all eager to show the Chinese leader their appreciation for his efforts in providing American businesses with an 51 ample supply of cheap labor, a stable currency exchange and an affable investment climate. These multinationals understood better than most that thanks to the global economic networks, Chinese business meant not just Chinese business, but their business as well. By now, it should become clearer that products made in China are not necessarily made by China, nor does the bulk of the profits necessarily go Chinas way. All this has important implications for rethinking the identity of Chinese businesses and the China challenge they often come to symbolize. To put it simply, situated in the global production networks, China has served mainly as the manufacturing conduit. Through this conduit, the regional deficit is shifted: even as China runs surpluses with demand countries in North America and Europe, it runs deficits with supplier states 52 in East Asia. Frequently, counted as Chinese exports, the burgeoning sales of non-Chinese manufacturing operations in China to the US, for example, leave an 53 impression of Chinas rapid rise into an economic superpower status. Looked at through the GPN prism, however, this image seems at least exaggerated, if not misleading, given that a large proportion of American imports from China are 54 products made in joint venture or wholly foreign-owned enterprises. As China recorded a US$200 billion trade surplus with the United States in 2005, at the same time it accumulated a US$137 billion trade deficit with the rest of Asia. In 2003, China took in 4050% of Asias exports, accounting for all of Taiwans and the Philippines export growth and over half of each of Japans, Malaysias, South Koreas and Australias. Similarly, while China recorded a US$25 billion surplus with Japan in 2000, this surplus would evaporate if we take into account Japans US$26 billion surplus with Hong Kong, the main port of entry for Japanese goods into southern China. Indeed, more than half of Sino Japanese trade is 55 now conducted among Japanese companies. Therefore, in the global production networks bilateral trade figures between nations seem to distort more than they clarify.
Pro- Pan K- Impact

Capabilities and cultural approaches to international relations and politics are positivist epistemologies that treat China like an object that is knowable through rational deliberation. This leads to bipolar and dichotomous representations of self and other, U.S. and China. When these theories fail scholars resort to the Orientalist enigma that the East is unknowable instead of questioning the theories. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
Relations: a Critique of Western Approaches) In both the capability and culture approaches, identity is regarded as an objective phenomenon knowable through scientific inquiry, (although the latter approach is generally more nuanced). For instance, they claim that national identity is the characteristic collective behavior of the national system as a whole . . . [and] it involves national essence-the core sentiments and symbols of the state.45 For Huntington, the identity of civilisations is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people...Civilizations are the biggest we within which we feel culturally at home as distinguished from all other thems out there.46 Arguments such as these point to a shared epistemology among scholars of both schools of thought, namely, positivism. According to Jim George, positivism insists that there must be an objective reality out there that exists independently of us and has an essential quality that we can know via rational means.47 Whether seen as a black-box (by the capability approach) or a more dynamic complex (by the culture approach), China is a real object whose essential properties are straightforwardly amenable to analysis. This positivistic epistemology leads to dichotomous views of the Sino-Western relations, since the commonsensical features of each form the pre-conditions of scientific enquiry, rather than being themselves called into question; China is totalitarian and a ruthless dictatorship; the West is democratic, and stands for liberal democracy.48 As Benjamin Schwartz notes, despite their enormous semantic perplexities, both culture and modernity are often treated as wholes in the strongest possible ontological sense-almost as two physical objects which cannot occupy the same space.49 Within this bi-polar framework analysts examine how Chinas view of itself will aid the outside world to anticipate Chinas actions,50 thereby allowing the West to form an accurate image of Chinas inside reality. Thus far, however, Western common sense assumptions have generated accounts of the essential properties of Chinese identity that have proved less than satisfactory explanations of developments in China in recent decades. When pushed on this point however, China experts invariably fall back to the stock-in-trade oriental enigma position. Western accounts fail because China, by definition, has, ultimately, an unfathomable history and culture. China itself is the problem, rather than the Western theories that fail to explain it.51
Pro- Pan K- Impact

Positivism doesnt understand China or contemporary international relations because its always structured in terms of a self-other dichotomy. We should critically reassess the framing of China. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
Despite a series of attempts to make sense of China in the new international context, I argue that these approaches do not constitute a departure from mainstream international relations theorising. By continually reducing China and international relations to a set of narrowly defined questions and demarcating fixed self/Other dichotomies between the West and China, their positivist ways of representing Chinese identity are unable to cope with the daunting task of understanding China or the volatile post-Cold War world. What is called for is a critical reassessment of the longstanding tradition of framing and answering the identity question in the international relations discipline and in the China field in particular. There are two reasons that make me optimistic that such a shift might be possible. Firstly the end of the Cold War has opened up numerous possibilities for more diverse enquiries that would have been unimaginable before; secondly, the new era of uncertainty in which we live compels us to think again: the cost of failure will be too high. China is faced with momentous change and identity problems, but the nebulous time-space called China is not only a place where problems old and new accumulate but also a brewing ground for alternatives.84 The creation of alternatives will not be an easy task, but I suggest that our future will depend largely on what sort of China both the Chinese and the rest of the world construct in an increasingly complex two-way relationship. It is a process in which academics in the international relations community will, as always, play an important part.
Pro- Pan K- Impact

The assumption that Chinas economic rise and threat is due to the Chineseness of Chinese businesses is essentialist and conceals the complexity and fluidity of the identity of Chinese business. Chinese businesses are part of a global production network that transnationalizes and fragments Chinas economy. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
At first glance, the logic of identifying a China threat from its rapidly expanding economic power is straightforward. In the face of ubiquitous Chinese products, job losses to Chinese businesses, as well as the growing presence of Chinese firms on the world stage, it would be foolish, if not irresponsible, to call the China challenge otherwise. Upon a closer look, however, such a straightforward logic becomes more complicated as its commonsense rests on an implicit and rarely questioned assumption that takes for granted the Chineseness of Chinese businesses. In other words, Chinese businesses are believed to both operate within, and are inexorably linked to, a coherent, unproblematic actor called China. Given their distinctive Chineseness, what can be said of Chinese businesses, it seems, also can be said largely of China. Conversely, it is argued that the implications of Chinas rise can be decoded at least in part through a gaze at Chinese businesses and their practices. Without doubt, China and Chinese businesses are closely interlocked; the understanding of one cannot be complete without an understanding of the other. Yet, to acknowledge this connection is not the same as saying that Chinese businesses are inherently Chinese, an assumption which, in my view, tends to have rather different implications for dealing with China in the global political economy. Thus, in this paper I want to question the essentialist assumption about the identity of Chinese businesses. Instead of taking the Chineseness of Chinese businesses and their practices as a pre-existing, unequivocal point of departure for making sense of China, I take the assumed Chineseness itself as a question by asking what is Chinese about Chinese businesses? The aim of the paper is to shed some light on the very complexities and fluidity of the identity of Chinese businesses in the contemporary world. By complexities, I mean primarily a duality of both contingent Chineseness and transnationality that is characteristic of an increasing number of Chinese businesses. And by fluidity, I mean that insofar as there exist some elements of Chineseness about Chinese businesses, the meaning of that Chineseness is contested, fragmented and in flux, rather than being a fixed property corresponding to some immutable essence. Specifically, the paper argues that rather than simply being the commercial and economic arm of China, many Chinese businesses are a prime example of transnational or global interconnectedness at work, and that their strength, identity, and characteristics need to be understood in relation to some broader, transnational dynamics in the global economy today. The paper begins with a brief survey of how the apparent strength and success of Chinese businesses has often been cast as a distinctively Chinese phenomenon that often evokes a sense of the China threat. Then, drawing on a global production networks (GPN) approach, the paper questions the assumed Chineseness of Chinese businesses by illustrating how they testify to both the transnationalization and fragmentation of the Chinese economy in the global production networks. The transnationality of Chinese businesses will be underscored mainly through an examination of non-Chinese dominance in production, technology, value and profit in Chinese business sectors, especially in manufacturing. On the other hand, the fragmentation of Chinese businesses will be illustrated through an analysis of their internal diversity and lack of coherence in both Greater China and China proper. Taken together, the attention paid to the transnationalization and fragmentation of Chinese businesses may help us better understand and deal with the complex challenge posed by the economic dynamism in China today.
Pro- Pan K- Impact

China economic threat arguments are homogenizing and make monolithic representations on Chinese businesses. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
Imagined in singular, national and/or cultural terms, little wonder that the rapid development of Chinese businesses has been equated with the rise of China. With the Chinese government seen as the majority owner of many firms, it seems only logical to raise questions about the interrelationship between Chinese business interests and [Chinas] foreign policy 16 objectives. Indeed, given the allegedly homogeneous cultural/ethnic identity embedded in Chinese businesses, the China challenge inevitably takes on a frightening quality. To better capture the essence of the monolithic threat, various reified imageries have flourished and pervaded the press, ranging from China, Inc. and a pirate nation through juggernaut and locomotive to dragon and a cash-rich predator. While some may well be innocuous short-hand expressions, there is much evidence that many such framings of Chinese businesses do not bother to conceal their overtone of looming inter-national rivalry. To quote Navarro once again, Its one thing for America to lose much of its blue collar manufacturing base to China. If the US loses its white collar science and technology base too, it will be 17 Americans living the peasant life rather than the Chinese. Given that what is at stake here is potentially great power conflict, it is important to take the understanding of Chinese businesses and their identity seriously.
Pro- Pan K- Representations

There are no objective realities and representations. Representation is always inter-subjective and embedded in language, culture, institutions, and practices. China is not fixed and objectively identifiable. Our first task should be to question how the dominant representations frame China. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
Positivist perspectives have been challenged by critical theorists who argue, that objective realities... are constituted by intersubjective ideas.52 What positivism fails to acknowledge is that there can be no independent meaning or characteristics inherent in an identity beyond particular, always socially and politically grounded interpretations of it.53 As Edward Said contends, the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation of anything, or whether any and all representations, because they are representations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institutions, and political ambience of the representer. If the latter alternative is the correct one (as I believe it is),then we must be prepared to accept the fact that a representation is eo ipso implicated, intertwined, embedded, interwoven with a great many other things besides the truth, which is itself a representation.54 If identity is representation, then Chinese culture or tradition can no longer be seen as something with fixed, objectively identifiable meanings or properties in the positivist fashion. Instead, understanding China requires questioning how the dominant representations of China were framed in the first place.55 It is almost a truism, for example, that premodern China was characterized by culturalism rather than nationalism. According to Townsend, however, both nationalism and culturalism carry multiple meanings and refer to complex phenomena and the culturalism to nationalism thesis is merely a metaphor for Chinas modern transformation.56 Prasenjit Duara also states that culturalism as such is better understood as a concept, or more appropriately, as a representation of Chinese culture... [and] it obviously occupies an important role in constructing nineteenth-century China as the Other.57

China and the West are social constructions that are fluid and relational, not objective representations. Identity is co-constituted, which means representations of China are conditioned by how the West represents itself, and vice-versa. Problematizing the intellectual power of Orientalist representations of China requires a simultaneous criticism of the construction of Western identity. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
The representation of China is not so much a reflection of Western objective discovery of China as a product of a kind of intellectual power known as Orientalism whose essence is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental inferiority.58 As a result, the way China is represented is always conditioned by the way the West is representing itself and the two representations subsequently reinforce each other. This practice is particularly evident in the discourses about Chinas tradition/modernity dilemma in which Western modernity is constructed, preferred and privileged. Since Western identity too is a representation, it must also be problematised. There is no pre-given, monolithic, objective Western identity. The tradition/modernity framework often highlights democracy and science as the defining features of the Western identity and studies their impact upon China. It should not be forgotten that Western influences on China were multiple-Mussolinis fascism, national socialism, anarchism, socialism, and communism; they are all integral components of Western modernity.59As Schwartz puts it, If fascism and communism were indeed modern phenomena, we cannot allow ourselves to be detached completely from the evils of these modern societies.60 If China and the West are socially constructed, and their identities constituted partly in reference (often an antagonistic reference) to each other, apparent contradictions within each entity must be treated with caution. As Richard Madsen suggests, There is no unitary culture to be penetrated and no unitary culture to do the penetrating.61 The relationship between identities should always be regarded as relational, constructed, and fluid.62 Understood in this way, the problem of Chinese identity is not something essentially out there independent of the West; rather, the West has from the outset been a part and parcel of the problem.

Representation is inevitable and unavoidable. The question of the debate is how you specifically depict China and whether we should problematize those frames that claim to be objective, not representations in general. Representation and language shape practice since they interconnect self and other. Framing China as an enemy creates a self-fulfilling prophecy that Chinese enmity more likely. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
Self-representation and the construction of the Other are unavoidable features of human practice. Representation per se is not the problem. What is problematic, however, is to treat representation as the objective enterprise of discovering identity out there, thereby ignoring the interconnectedness between representation and practice, and thus the relationship between those agents who represent others and those others who are represented. In this sense, the reason why contemporary international relations discourses about China have serious flaws is not due to the inaccuracy of their representations as such, but to their failure to understand theory as practice.63 They did not recognize their own presence in their representations of China. To rethink the question of Chinese identity is to expose the particular ways certain meanings are attributed to that society and to examine how these processes are inextricably intertwined with particular social and political practices. Whatever sort of objectivity we proclaim, the ways that we represent Chinese identity are bound to have some bearing on how we deal with China in practice, and in turn on how the Chinese identity problem will evolve. While many China specialists would accept the notion that Chinese identity is socially constructed, they are reluctant to admit that their presentations are themselves part of the process of identity formation. For example, if China is portrayed as a totalitarian state and a threat for the world, as U.S. House Democratic Leader Richard A. Gephardt perceives it, then he can ask, what have we gained by trafficking with a tyranny that debases the dignity of one-fifth of the human race? What is gained by a policy that sees all the evils and looks the other way? What is gained by constructive engagement with slave labor?64 This is often a selffulfilling prophecy in practice. If China scholars and policy-makers view China as essentially vile and intolerable,65 they engage in a particular kind of interpretative practice that effectively rules out alternative strategies towards China, which in turn makes the representation more likely to become true. Just as the construction of the Soviet threat-a primary frame of reference for U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union emerging shortly after World War II-contributed in part to the creation of the Cold War,66 so Ezra Vogel, one of the authors of the Pentagons East Asian Strategy Report of February 1995, points out, If you treat China as an enemy, China will become an enemy.67
Pro- Pan K- AT: Positive Representation of China

Positive representations of China are still full of ideas about how things should be done in the East. They always focus on issues that effect the West like trade and security. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 99 (Chengxin; Political Science; 51: 135; Understanding Chinese Identity in International
While many negative representations are unfair and even dangerous, some positive representations of Chinese identity also have their problems. Many adherents of the engagement strategy, for example, assume that China, for all its uniqueness, is not essentially different from the West, and that, with time, it will become more like us.71 The underlying problem here, as discussed before, is that the dominant representations of Chinese identity are largely Western-oriented, full of ideas about how things ought to be done in the East,72 often failing to fully appreciate Chinas internal dynamics. Earlier scholarly work on China was structured either in terms of the Western challenge and how this challenge had been met or in terms of the impact of modernity-Western-carried and Western defined-on Chinas traditional culture and society.73Post-ColdWarinternationalrelationsliteratureon China is preoccupied with the question of Chinas potential challenge to the West. This Western concern is largely unaware of how differently the same issues-say, Chinese nationalism-might be viewed from a Chinese perspective. As Yongnian Zheng points out, A Chinese approach to Chinas new nationalism requires discovering Chinas nationalism in China rather than in the West, and digging out Chinese internal forces of nationalism rather than those perceived by many in the West.74 By focusing on such problems as security and trade in which the West has an immediate stake, Western international relations frequently marginalizes or simply ignores a host of important indigenous issues-population, environment, class, poverty, equality, and grass-roots democracy-which bear profoundly upon the lives of hundreds of millions of ordinary Chinese people. It will be these soft issues, I suggest, rather than top-down strategic concerns of the West, that will determine the future course of China and its implications for the world in the decades to come.
Con- Schmitt K- China

Chinese scholars are calling for Schmitts theories of the political, friends and enemies, to promote their transition to democracy. Zheng, PHD Manchester School of Law; 12 (qi; telos; 160; "schmitt in china")
Besides the inspiration for the founding of a new democratic state, Schmitts political theory also concerns the protecting of the political order, which helps us to construct a theoretical framework for dealing with the state of exception when the state is under threat from its enemy. After the founding of a new political order, it is possible for it to be challenged by an enemy who has a different political agenda. It is reasonable for us to assume that, if there is a transition to a democratic system, there will be challenges from those who support the old political form. Schmitt pro- poses a theoretical solution to this situation. Schmitts theoretical framework also contains his understanding of how to preserve ordinary politics. The state of exception presupposes the existence of a constitutional order. Without its existence, it is meaningless to talk about an exception to the constitutional order. And the purpose of the state of exception is to save the constitutional order whose existence is under threat. The politics of founding and protecting moments and ordinary politics constitute the complete horizon of our discussion of the politics of transition. The theoretical model of the politics of transition that I develop from Schmitts political writings constitutes an important reason for his reception in China. The model of Schmitts writings answers the question of how to make a political transition possible, how to protect the new political form in the state of exception, and how to preserve ordinary politics. I do not intend to argue that all of the answers provided by Schmitt are correct. But for those who aim to move from an authoritarian state to a democratic state, Schmitts model is inspiring. Among these different inspirations, the core message focuses on the role of the sovereign people in founding a political order, protecting it, and preserving ordinary politics.
Chinese academics are in love with Schmitt. Lilla, Prof Humanities @ Columbia; 10 (Mark; The New Republic; Reading Strauss in China; Dec 17; http://www.tnr.com/article/magazine/79747/reading-leo-strauss-in-beijing-china-marx?page=0,0)
Students of a more conservative bent actually agree with much of the lefts critique of the new state capitalism and the social dislocations it has caused, though they are mainly concerned with maintaining harmony and have no fantasies (only nightmares) about China going through yet another revolutionary transformation. Their reading of history convinces them that Chinas enduring challenges have always been to maintain territorial unity, keep social peace, and defend national interests against other stateschallenges heightened today by global market forces and a liberal ideology that idealizes individual rights, social pluralism, and international law. Like Schmitt, they cant make up their minds whether liberal ideas are hopelessly nave and dont make sense of the world we live in, or whether they are changing the world in ways that are detrimental to society and international order. These students are particularly interested in Schmitts prescient postwar writings about how globalization would intensify rather than diminish international conflict (this was in 1950) and how terrorism would spread as an effective response to globalization (this was in 1963). Schmitts conclusionthat, given the naturally adversarial nature of politics, we would all be better off with a system of geographical spheres of influence dominated by a few great powerssits particularly well with many of the young Chinese I met.
Con- Schmitt K- China

China is an enemy of the West- they would never defend the cosmopolitan international order. Thorup, PHD Philosophy Univ Aarhus; 06 (Mikkel; In Defense of Enmity- Critiques of Liberal Globalism)
Cosmopolitanism is complicit in the new taming of the borderland. The post-sovereignty discourse is no risk to Western states, who are secure in their statehood and in their sovereignty in a post-sovereign order. In this way too, one can agree with Michael Ignatieff that, cosmopolitanism is the privilege of those who can take a secure nation state for granted (1994: 9). It may not be meant as such, but the unequal distribution of power in the international system makes the new post-sovereign language a political tool of the powerful. The new global borderland is defined as post-political. The political is obsolete. It belongs exclusively to the nation state era. But this kind of language is systematically hiding the return of the political in new in/out, friend/enemy categories; the most prominent being the ones between cosmopolitan or postmodern states on one side and a combination of modern nationalist barbarism and premodern warlord chaos on the other. The post-sovereign discourse is a moral discourse denying (certain) sovereign states their legitimacy. It becomes, therefore, a means of de-legitimization and intervention. The new moral discourse may be directed against state abuse but in a significant way it gives new life to the state in its most statist register: War. Margaret Canovan (1998) asks: Crusaders want to see human rights recognized and protected across the world, and questions of political agency inevitable follow. Seeking to make the Marxist political project effective, Lenin hit on the notion of the powerful Party: what collective actor can (by analogy) bear the project of human rights? It is and remains the state or more precisely, a conglomerate of Western states, well later call the humanitarian sovereign. The collective actor of the world community is the West. One cannot imagine China or Iran proclaiming to be the defender of the international community or humanity and then be recognized as such. This humanist and globalist prerogative is exclusively Western.
Con- China
Leading China expert who compiled over 500 volumes of Chinese publications, including interviews with members of Chinas military, said China views the U.S. as their enemy. King, Wall Street Journal; 05 (Neil; Wall Street Journal; Secret Weapon; 9/8; http://www.taiwandc.org/wsj-2005-06.htm)
Mr. Pillsbury came slowly to what he calls his epiphany on China. Through the Reagan and first Bush administrations, he hopped between jobs at the Pentagon and the Senate, working to enhance military and intelligence cooperation with Beijing. In the 1980s, the U.S. began selling China powerful new torpedoes, upgrades for its jet fighters and advanced electronics for artillery -- arms sales that officials say Mr. Pillsbury helped push. Then in early May 1989, Mr. Pillsbury flew to Beijing for a low-key military mission, arriving just as the Tiananmen protests picked up steam. He was unsettled by the ruthless crackdown that ensued, and also by how Chinese authorities blamed the U.S. for helping foment the dissent. "I was stunned," he says. "Even some friends in the Chinese military that I'd known for years began to describe us as a mortal enemy, an evil force ."Following Tiananmen, Mr. Pillsbury's conclusions on China became notably darker. In one 1993 study, he noted: "China has the advantage that many experts on Chinese affairs...testify soothingly that China today is a satisfied power which deeply desires a peaceful environment in which to develop its economy. They put the burden of proof on others, defying pessimists to prove that China may ever become hypernationalistic or aggressive." An inveterate free-lancer, Mr. Pillsbury has never had to worry about steady employment. He's a member of the Pillsbury flour family, and his wealth has allowed him to pursue his research despite a knack for championing unpopular causes and for landing in political scrapes. Once, while helping funnel weapons to anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan and Angola in the 1980s, he lost and regained his security clearance amid allegations of leaking secret information to the press. Mr. Pillsbury has also avidly collected high-level protectors, counting Utah Sen. Orrin Hatch and retired North Carolina Sen. Jesse Helms among his patrons. His long-time mentor and current employer is the Pentagon's Andrew Marshall, a mercurial figure who at 83 still runs the department's long-term planning shop, the Office of Net Assessment. In early 1995, Mr. Marshall sent Mr. Pillsbury to Beijing to gather Chinese military writings. The Pentagon by then was promoting a new generation of heavily computerized military hardware, and Mr. Marshall wanted to see what the Chinese made of this so-called revolution in military affairs. Mr. Pillsbury interviewed dozens of authors, and returned after several trips with crates of books and journals, more than 500 volumes in all. The haul formed the core of his first two books, both published by the Pentagon's National Defense University.
Con- China
China is our enemy- multiple reasons. Naegle, counsel to U.S. Senates Committee on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, & practices law with his firm Naegele & Associates; 11 (Timothy; 1/13; China is Americas enemy: Make no mistake about that;
http://naegeleblog.wordpress.com/2011/01/13/china-is-americas-enemy-make-no-mistake-about-that/) While it would certainly be nice to think of China as a benign, friendly, democratic nation, if not an ally of the United States which makes the computers and cellphones that Americans use, and provides most of the products sold in Walmart storesthe fact is that China is our enemy, now and in the future. A failure to recognize this fact has serious national security implications for our great nation. Those who cavalierly dismiss this and similar assessments, as nothing more than the rantings of Cold Warriors, may be condemned to repeat and relive the world wars of the past. Does this mean that we will be in a shooting war with China any time soon, or that we should gird for war in the future? No, but it means that we must maintain and strengthen our military might, and do nothing to diminish it. We face deadly challenges elsewhere in the world too: for example, from North Korea, Iran, Russia and terrorists. However, we must never underestimate the threat from China, Americas rising Asian rival globally. Among other things, there is a disconnect between Chinas civilian and military leaderships, which may grow dramaticallyand it does not bode well for the future. As the Wall Street Journal reported: China conducted the first test flight of its stealth fighter just hours before U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates sat down with President Hu Jintao here to mend frayed relations, undermining the meeting and prompting questions over whether Chinas civilian leadership is fully in control of the increasingly powerful armed forces.[2] In early 2001, at the beginning of George W. Bushs presidency, Chinas military tested his metal by forcing down one of our spy planes near the island of Hainan. There were serious questions raised thenas they are being raised nowabout whether Chinas civilian leadership was fully in control of the countrys military. Also, the New York Times had a fine article recently, which stated in part: Older Chinese officers remember a time, before the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 set relations back, when American and Chinese forces made common cause against the Soviet Union. The younger officers have known only an anti-American ideology, which casts the United States as bent on thwarting Chinas rise. Chinese military men, from the soldiers and platoon captains all the way up to the army commanders, were always taught that America would be their enemy.[3] Viewed in its starkest terms, China has threatened a nation-ending EMP Attack against the United States alreadywhich went largely unnoticed by most Americans, even though such an attack might kill all except 30 million of us.[4] In addition to its submarine forces that have been expanded greatly in the past decade, Chinas military is deploying new ballistic missiles that can sink U.S. aircraft carriers, and are potentially game-changing, unprecedented threats to our supercarriers and their carrier battle groups.[5] Also, China is preparing to build an aircraft carrier, which symbolizes the ambition to move far beyond its own shores[6]. Its growing anti-satellite capabilities and quite soon its fifth-generation fighter, not to mention its ongoing Cyberwarfare and economic warfare, are alarming to say the least.
Con- China
The U.S. is enemy no. 1 for Chinas military. Wines, New York Times; 10 (Michael; New York Times; 10/11; U.S. alarmed by harsh tone of Chinas military;
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/12/world/asia/12beijing.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)
The Pentagon is worried that its increasingly tense relationship with the Chinese military owes itself in part to the rising leaders of Commander Caos generation, who, much more than the countrys military elders, view the United States as the enemy. Older Chinese officers remember a time, before the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 set relations back, when American and Chinese forces made common cause against the Soviet Union. The younger officers have known only an anti-American ideology, which casts the United States as bent on thwarting Chinas rise. All militaries need a straw man, a perceived enemy, for solidarity, said Huang Jing, a scholar of Chinas military and leadership at the National University of Singapore. And as a young officer or soldier, you always take the strongest of straw men to maximize the effect. Chinese military men, from the soldiers and platoon captains all the way up to the army commanders, were always taught that America would be their enemy.
Con- China
Chinas free riding in Afghanistan and Iraq prove they are our enemy. A friend fights by your side during a war. Weitz, The Diplomat; 11 (Richard; Huffington Post; 8/15; Is China freeloading of the U.S. militarys work in Afghanistan and
Iraq?; http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/15/china-military-afghanistan-iraq_n_927342.html)
Chinas limited support for the US-led counterinsurgency campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, despite the growing Chinese economic stake in these countries, has provoked some irritation among US observers over Chinas free riding on the back of dead European, American, and Afghan or Iraqi soldiers. S. Frederick Starr, chairman of the Central AsiaCaucasus Institute, caught the mood well when he said some might see it as, We do the heavy liftingAnd they pick the fruit.
China is our enemy- internet censorship. Shieber, Wall Street Journal; 11 (Jonathan; Wall Street Journal; 1/13; Wikileaks founder: our enemy is China;
http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/01/13/wikileaks-founder-our-enemy-is-china/)
Wikileaks may have targeted the US with its ongoing releases of sensitive State Department documents, but China is its real technological enemy, according to founder Julian Assange. In an interview with the left-leaning British weekly magazine the New Statesman, Assange called China the worst offender for its censorship of information online. China has aggressive and sophisticated technology that places itself between every reader inside China and every information source outside China, Assange told the magazine. Weve been fighting a running battle to make sure we can get information through.
Con- Schmitt K- Economics/Morality
Schmitts ostensible purpose for writing The Concept of the Political is to, at long last, provide a positive definition of the political, as against both the contrasting definitions of social scientists and philosophers- playing off the political against the economic, the moral, etc.- and the "unsatisfactory circle" of defining the political in terms of the state, and the state in terms of the political (Schmitt, 1996, p. 20). This "definition of the political," Schmitt tells us, "can only be obtained by discovering and defining the specifically political categories" (1996, p. 25). In short order, Schmitt provides his readers with a definition that meets his criterion: "The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy" (1996, p. 26). Although in no way derived from them, Schmitt notes that the political dichotomy of friend and enemy mirrors the dichotomies that mark off other fields of inquiry: morality's "good and bad", for example, or the "ugly and beautiful" that characterize aesthetics. However, one ought not to make the mistake of believing that there can be any cross-fertilization between such categorically different fields as politics, ethics, aesthetics, or economics. As we will see, the unshakeable belief in the autonomy of political categories is one of the things that sets Schmitt off against other theorists of politics and friendship, such as Aristotle and Plato, who use similar language, but with drastically different intentions and results. Just exactly how it is decided, and by whom, which group(s) qualify as the enemy is a central component of Schmitt's presentation of the concept of the political. The designation of an enemy is no fanciful decision. The consequences and implications of such a decision are of the utmost importance, and Schmitt does not expect that this decision be taken lightly. He declares, in fact, that, "[the distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation" (1996, p. 26). In keeping with Schmitt's refusal to let non-political categories shade over, unnoticed, into the political, it is made clear what the enemy need not necessarily be; the enemy need not be on the objectionable side of moral, ethical, aesthetic, or economic antipodes. Indeed, the enemy is "the other, the stranger; and it is sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specifically intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in the extreme case conflicts with him are possible" (Schmitt, 1996, p. 27). But, what of the nature of these conflicts?
Con- Schmitt K- Friendship

The attempt to construct new friends creates new enemies. Rasch; 03 (Cultural Critique; 54; "Human Rights as Geopolitics: Carl Schmitt and the Legal Form of American Supremacy")
Yes, this passage attests to the antiliberal prejudices of an unregenerate Eurocentric conservative with a pronounced affect for the counterrevolutionary and Catholic South of EuropeI.t seems to resonate with the apologetic mid-twentieth century Spanish reception of Vitoria that wishes to justify the Spanish civilizing mission in the Americas.8 But the contrast between-Christianity and humanism is not just prejudice; it is also instructive, because with it, Schmitt tries to grasp something both disturbing and elusive about the modem world-namely, the apparent fact that the liberal and humanitarian attempt to construct a world of universal friendship produces, as if by internal necessity, ever new enemies.
Con- Schmitt K- War

Conflict is inevitable- all adjudications of disputes are simultaneously new declarations of war. Rasch; 2k (Theory, Culture, & Society; 17: 6; "Conflict as a Vocation: Carl Schmitt and the Possibility of Politics")
Such a structure of discrete, precise and insurmountable disagreement has been traced in a succinct and quasi-logical form by Lyotard, for, as we know, Lyotard's vision of modernity is based on the necessity of difference, and thus on the necessity of conflict. In the face of the irremediable differentiation of modem society into incommensurable value spheres, language games or social systems, Lyotard does not ask how a functional equivalent for unity can be achieved in order to proceed politically - as Habermas does -but rather, how to proceed politically in the face of the impossibility, even undesirability, of any re-established harmony. In his 'Preface' to The Differend, Lyotard presupposes two features of our present predicament: '1) the impossibility of avoiding conflicts (the impossibility of indifference) and 2) the absence of a universal genre of discourse to regulate them (or, if you prefer, the inevitable partiality of the judge)' (1988: xii). Lyotard's juridical definition of a differend follows from these presuppositions. 'A case of differend between two parties', he writes, 'takes place when the ''regulation" of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom' (1988: 7). Not all conflicts result in a differend, but conflicts between incommensurable idioms between competing values, between operationally closed or autonomous social systems -necessarily exclude the conciliatory third term, the reconciliation of opposites magnanimously offered by the superior neutrality of a universal discourse. 'The idea', according to Lyotard:
...that a supreme genre encompassing everything that's at stake could supply a supreme answer to the key questions of the
various genres founders upon Russell's aporia. Either this genre is part of the set of genres, and what is at stake in it is but one among others, and therefore its answer is not supreme. Or else, it is not part of the set of genres, and it does not therefore encompass all that is at stake, since it excepts what is at stake in itself. . . . The principle of an absolute victory of one genre over the others has no sense. (1988: 138) Thus, consciousness of a differend necessitates the view that the third term merely becomes the first term of a new conflict, a new opposition or irreconcilable difference. It cannot remain immune from antagonism under the pretense of a meta-level and thereby superior neutrality. Whether desirable or not, conflict is inevitable, and resolution of conflict is a matter of decision, not a matter of sublation. All adjudications of disputes are simultaneously declarations of a new war.
Con- Schmitt K- War

Schmitts relevance to international relations is obvious- states that claim to abolish war appeal to humanity to justify police operations against outlaw regimes. Balakrishnan, Prof Law @ U-Chicago; 2000 (The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt; P. 265-266)
Scmitts relevance to commentary on international relations should be even more readily apparent. Here we leave behind the world of the rule of law and enter the state of nature- that is, a zone where the fictions of legality can be particularly pernicious. More effectively than anyone else he called into question the stability of an international order in which all states are subject to incipient forms of international government, but only to widely varying and often unspecified degrees: his polemics capture the Kafkaesque ring of jargon which declares war between states to be abolished, and invokes the highest [265] ideals of humanity to justify police operations and sanction regimes against outlaw governments.
Con- Schmitt K- Impact
If the concept of the political is defined, as Carl Schmitt does, in terms of the Enemy-Friend opposition, the world we find ourselves in today is one from which the political may have already disappeared, or at least has mutated into some strange new shape. A world not anchored by the "us" and "them" binarisms that flourished as recently as the Cold War is one subject to radical instability, both subjectively and politically, as Jacques Derrida points out in The Politics of Friendship: The effects of this destructuration would be countless: the 'subject' in question would be looking for new reconstitutive enmities; it would multiply 'little wars' between nation-states; it would sustain at any price so-called ethnic or genocidal struggles; it would seek to pose itself, to find repose, through opposing still identifiable adversaries - China, Islam? Enemies without which ... it would lose its political being ... without an enemy, and therefore without friends, where does one then find oneself, qua a self? (PF 77) If one accepts Schmitt's account of the political, the disappearance of the enemy results in something like global psychosis: since the mirroring relationship between Us and Them provides a form of stablility, albeit one based on projective identifications and repudiations, the loss of the enemy threatens to destroy what Lacan calls the "imaginary tripod" that props up the psychotic with a sort of pseudo-subjectivity, until something causes it to collapse, resulting in full-blown delusions, hallucinations, and paranoia. Hence, for Schmitt, a world without enemies is much more dangerous than one where one is surrounded by enemies; as Derrida writes, the disappearance of the enemy opens the door for "an unheard-of violence, the evil of a malice knowing neither measure nor ground, an unleashing incommensurable in its unprecedented - therefore monstrous -forms; a violence in the face of which what is called hostility, war, conflict, enmity, cruelty, even hatred, would regain reassuring and ultimately appeasing contours, because they would be identifiable" (PF83).

The friend/enemy distinction is the ultimate capacity for instilling meaning in life. Vander Valk; 02 (Rockefeller College Review; 1:2; Decisions, Decisions: Carl Schmitt on Friends and Political Will;
www.albany.edu/rockefeller/rockreview/issue2/Paper4.pdf)
Schmitt uses the language of friendship to describe the political as that which is capable of providing the ultimate existential experience and nourishment. Friendship involves choice, and choice requires decision. By placing a decision about friends and enemies at the heart of the political, Schmitt imbues the political sphere with a capacity to create meaning in one's life. This capacity to create meaning and sustain the values by which individuals conduct their lives has traditionally belonged to the realms of the moral, the religious or the aesthetic. In Schmitt's depiction of the centrality of the friend-enemy distinction, the ultimate capacity for instilling meaning in life, for generating and instilling certain values over others, rests with the political. It will be shown how the moment of decision regarding membership within one's group of friends creates two relationships, one between friends and enemies, and one between friends, that is to say, between citizens, and their sovereign.

Schmitt's world of real enemies has been succeeded by total war against absolute enemies that criminalize those outside the universal moral order. In total war nuclear war becomes possible to entirely eliminate the adversarial camp. Laclau; 05 (CR: New Centennial Review; 5:l; "On 'Real' and 'Absolute' Enemies")
A central point of Schmitt's argument is that the hostility of the partisan war recognized a series of limitations. These came, on the one hand, from the presence of what he calls the "interested third," the Friend that makes possible the connection between the regular and the irregular. This is a political limitation, e,g., the recognition, in the Spanish case, of the political character of the struggle of the "Empecinado" by the regular army and by England. In the same way, the telluric character of the partisans' war gives their struggle a mainly defensive character. But the absolutization of the political nature of the opposition friend-enemy leads to an equally necessary absolutization of the conflict. Clausewitz had already spoken of' "absolute war" but had never put into question the regularity of an existing State. With Lenin, however, the civil war struggle of a party of professional revolutionaries tums the real enemy into an absolute one. The Party becomes the incarnation of an absolute hostility. In the same way, the development of nuclear arms in the present age opens the possibility of a type of conflict that declares the whole adversarial camp a criminal one, which has to be entirely eliminated. The limits to the criminalization of the adversary that had been achieved in the ius publicum europeum have been succeeded by a total war that transforms the real enemy into an absolute one.

The exception or emergency is key to democracy- keeps it alive and in motion. Balakrishnan, Prof Law @ U- Chicago; 2000 (The Enemy: An Intellectual Portrait of Carl Schmitt; P. 263-264)
The shrewdest insights into democracy are not always made by friends of the people. The truth in Schmitt's polar opposition of liberalism and democracy is historically variable: in others, one term can be seen as the negation of the other. Fratelli, coltelli. To the extent that neoliberalism is a liberal doctrine, the relationship between these two terms today is probably about ass complex and antagonistic as it was during the Weimar Republic. Mainstream political discourse has not acknowledged this because, in the meantime, democracy has shed much of its original, ancient meaning as a political system in which all power is in the hands of an assembled people. The standard justification for this semantic corruption is that ancient forms of direct democracy cannot be resurrected in a 'modern context of a complex division of labour and private liberties. But the significance of Schmitt's conception of democracy is that it elides this sharp ancientmodern dichotomy of direct versus representative government. Even if it is impossible to establish a political system in which a permanently assembled people govern itself, Schmitt suggested that a political system is authentically democratic to the extent that it is open to periodic 'emergencies' in which the people can swing into action as an independent semilegislative power. Demonstrations, gigantic rallies and general strikes are events which keep alive, and in motion, the original constituent power of the people. Democracy takes on its real meaning in the exceptional situation. Although Schmitt was no friend of the council democracy which sprang up in the aftermath of military defeat, the memory and institutional residues of this revolutionary episode continued to inform his understanding of democracy until the end of the Weimar era, even as he attempted to give it a more plebiscitarian form. Schmitt, following Machiavelli, recognized the role of the class struggle in catalyzing popular government. From this [263] perspective it is arguable that the relentless of these forms of popular power over the last two decades- and the related decline of belief in the efficacy of public power of any kind- is a ruinous development for democracy.
Con- Schmitt- Impact
Recognition of the friend-enemy distinction and the resulting ontological priority of violence is the precondition to the possibility of dissent and treating those who disagree as human beings and thus legitimate political opponents. Rasch; Spring 05 (South Atlantic Quarterly; 104: 2; "Lines in the Sand: Enmity as a Structuring Principle")
Schmitt, then, starts from the premise of imperfection and acknowledges an ontological priority of violence. If, he reasons, one starts with the rather biblical notions of sin and guilt, not natural innocence, then homogeneity, being contingent, historical, and not the least natural, must be predicated on heterogeneity. That is, citizenship or participation or community must be constructed. not assumed. and can only be local, circumscribed, not global. One recognizes one's own in the face of the other and knows the comfort of inclusion only as the necessary result of exclusion-though in modem, functionally differentiated society, those inclusions and exclusions may be multiple. Contradictory, and not necessarily tied to place. "An absolute human equality," Schmitt writes in his Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, "would be an equality without the necessary correlate of inequality and as a result conceptually and practically meaningless, an indifferent equality. . . . Substantive inequalities would in no way disappear from the world and the state; they would shift into another sphere, perhaps separated from the political and concentrated in the economic, leaving this area to take on a new, disproportionately decisive importance." 6 This, Schmitt's, is not a popular sentiment, even if it echoes somewhat the Marxist distinction between a political and a social democracy, between a formal and substantial equality. But if one acknowlede.es that at least within modernity all inclusion requires exclusion, that inclusions and exclusions in addition to being unavoidable are also contingent and malleable, then rather than react with dismay, one might see in this "logical fact," if fact it is, both the condition for the possibility of dissent and the condition for the possibility of recognizing in the one who resists and disagrees a fellow human being and thus legitimate political opponent, not a Lyon or Tyger or other Savage Beast.

Theres no value to life in a world without enemies. Manzoor, Stockholm Univ; 04 (Parvez; www.algonet.se/~pmanzoor/CarlSchmitt.htm)
In the final analysis, the political, inasmuch as it is sovereign, cannot be evaluated and measured by norms that are external to it; nor can it be avoided. The political is the fundamental fact of existence, the basic characteristic of human life from which man cannot escape; or, expressed differently, man would cease to be man by ceasing to be political. From the inevitability of the political, it also follows that pacifism is a lost cause and conciliatory visions of a universal humanity are nothing but pious delusions: The political entity presupposes the real existence of an enemy and therefore coexistence with another political entity. As long as a state exists, there will always be in the world more than just one state. A world state that embraces the entire globe and all of humanity cannot exist. The political world is a pluriverse, not a universe.' (53). It is hardly surprising that Schmitt's concept of the political has been understood as a strongly polemical text that exposes the hypocrisy of liberal humanism. Liberalism, with its predilection for vacuous abstractions, its burdensome legal formalism, its vacillation between military pacifism and moral crusading, its sham universalism of rights and its real espousal of inequality, remains for him the ultimate enemy of the political man. As for liberalism's moral claim to universal humanism, Schmitt is mercilessly candid: 'The concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological instrument of imperial expansion, and in its ethical- humanitarian form it is a specific vehicle of economic imperialism.
Con- Schmitt K- Framework

The terrain of the political is the domain of ontology. The ontological concerns the very way in which society is constituted. Mouffe, Prof Pol Theory @ Westminster; 05 (Chantal; On the Political; P. 8-9)
This chapter will delineate the theoretical framework which informs my critique of the current 'post-political' Zeitgeist. Its main tenets have been developed in several of my previous works' and here I will limit myself to the aspects which are relevant for the argument presented in this book. The most important concerns the distinction I propose to make between 'politics' and 'the political'. To be sure, in ordinary language, it is not very common to speak of 'the political' but I think that such a distinction opens important new paths for reflection and many political theorists are making it. The difficulty, though, is that no agreement exists among them concerning the meaning attributed to the respective terms and that may cause a certain confusion. Commonalities exist however which can provide some points of orientation. For instance to make this distinction suggests a difference between two types of approach: political science which deals with the empirical field of politics, and political theory which is the domain of philosophers who enquire not about facts of politics but about the essence of the political. If we wanted to express such a distinction in a philosophical way, we could borrowing the vocabulary of Heidegger, say that politics refers to the ontic level while the political has to do with the ontological one. This means that the ontic has to do with the manifold practices of conventional politics, while the ontological concerns the very way in which society is instituted.
Con- Schmitt K- AT: Kill Enemies

Schmitt's enemy is not meant to be destroyed. He values it on the same level as himself and views it as a prerequisite for self identity. Slomp, Prof of International Relations @ St. Andrews University, 2003 (Gabriella, "Carl Schmitt and Thomas
Hobbes on Violence and Identity", Presented at the 53rd Conference of the Political Studies Organization)
This is not the place for even a cursory analysis of the friend/enemy antithesis in Carl Schmitts theory, of why it plays a fundamental role in his construct, etc. I merely wish to underline that the concept of friend-enemy is crucial for Carl Schmitt's definition of identity. Some brief quotations will suffice to illustrate this point: The enemy is not something that for some reason we should do away with or destroy as if it had no value [] The enemy places himself on mv own level. On this ground I must engage with the opposing enemy, in order to establish the very measure of myself, my own boundaries, my own Gestalt. (Carl Schmitt. Theorie des Partisanen, Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1962)
Con- Schmitt K- AT: Schmitt was a Nazi

Refusing to read Schmitt because he was a Nazi is the definition of elevating morality over political relations. All of our impacts are offense against this argument. Mouffe, Prof Pol Theory @ Westminster; 05 (Chantal; On the political; P. 4-5)
Because of the rationalism prevalent in liberal political discourse, it is often among conservative theories that I have found critical insights for an adequate understanding of the political. They can better shake our dogmatic assumptions than liberal apologists. This is why I have chosen to conduct my critique of liberal thought under the aegis of such a controversial thinker as Carl Schmitt. I am convinced that there is much we can learn from him, as one of the most brilliant and intransigent opponents of liberalism. I am perfectly aware that, because Schmitts compromise with Nazism, such a choice might arouse hostility. Many people will find it rather perverse if not outright outrageous. Yet, I believe that it is the intellectual force of theorists, not their moral qualities, that should be the decisive criteria in deciding whether we need to establish a dialogue with their work. I see the refusal of many democratic theorists to engage with Schmitts thought on moral grounds as typical of the moralistic tendency which is characteristic of the post-political Zeitgeist. In fact, the critique of such tendency is at the core of my reflection. A central thesis of this book is that, contrary to what post-political theorists want us to believe, what we are currently witnessing is not the disappearance of the political in its adversarial dimension but something different. What is happening is that nowadays the political is played out in the moral register. In other words, it still consists in a we/they discrimination, but the we/they, instead of being defined with political categories, is not established in moral terms. In place of a struggle between right and left we are faced with a struggle between right and wrong.
Con- AT: Pan K- China Economic Rise

Pan concedes that the global production network creates uneven resources, distribution of power, and unstable identities. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 09 (Chengxin; Journal of Contemporary China; 18:58; What is Chinese about Chinese Businesses? Locating the rise of China in global production networks)
In doing so, the GPN framework adopted here does not endorse a neoliberal rosy picture of globalization as a worldwide process of economic and cultural convergence. Quite the contrary, it allows greater sensitivity to the uneven distribution of value and power across nations, regions, and classes in global production processes. As far as the organization of economic activities is concerned, national boundary, ethnicity, and domestic political governance are far from disappearing or becoming totally irrelevant. It is just that the whole spectrum of economic activities is becoming less neatly confined to those traditional boundaries. To the extent that power and production (particularly in its conventional sense of manufacturing) often do not coincide or converge on the same geographical space, separate national categories are no longer so useful in the face of the multiple, unstable identities of businesses and economies.
Con-AT: Pan K- China/Taiwan Conflict

U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan independence is increasingly likely. This is the nightmare scenario for Australian security and foreign policy. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 06 (Chengxin; The Pacific Review; 19: 4; Neoconservatism, US-China conflict, and
Australias great and powerful friends dilemma)
Australias contemporary international relations face numerous challenges, ranging from the influx of refugees and illegal immigrants, political instability in the South Pacific, to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as the threat of terrorism. Yet, ironically, as Canberra seeks to build ever-closer relations with Washington and Beijing, it is the task of maintaining a delicate balance between these two giants that seems to be the most challenging of all. Even as Australian foreign policy was preoccupied largely with the war on terror, some analysts already pointed out that its overarching interest in a stable, cooperative, prosperous future for Asia is threatened by the possibility that America and China might drift into animosity or even war in coming years (Aldo Borgu, quoted in Zhang 2007: 108). Indeed, given the vital importance of both relationships for Australia, a USChina conflict could be the nightmare scenario for Australias foreign relations. Aware of the volatility and profound implications of USChina relations for Australia, the 2003 Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper noted, though without much deliberation, that Australia has strong interests and a supportive role to play in helping both sides manage these tensions and their relationship more broadly (DFAT 2003: 80). Such a strategic positioning is timely, but then another pressing question ensues: how to help manage US China relations from Australias point of view? To this end, it is necessary to understand the possible causes of a potential USChina conflict. Thus far, one of the most commonly identified causes has been the flashpoint of Taiwan, an issue which has become even more intractable since the coming to power of the pro-independence leader Chen Shui-bian. Contrary to his earlier promises, the Taiwanese president has repeatedly vowed to revise Taiwans constitution during his second term, a move seen by Beijing as a dangerous step towards formal independence. Consequently, China responded with the passage of an anti-secession law in March 2005, and vowed to stop Taiwans independence at any cost (McDonald 2005: 19). Yet, in the event of a Chinese military attack on the island, it is widely interpreted that America would be obliged by the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act to come to Taiwans defence. As a result, the Taiwan flashpoint could drag the United States and China into a direct military confrontation, a danger which has been vividly illustrated by the 199596 Taiwan Strait missile crisis. Should this scenario materialize, Australia would no doubt be placed in a difficult position of having to choose between its military ally and its new powerful friend in Asia. Thus, as Taiwan appears to be the single most prickly issue between the United States and China, some scholars suggest that how to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait should become a key concern for Australias foreign policy (Cook and Meer 2005).

Neoconservatives in the U.S. could trigger or provoke a conflict with China over Taiwan that would collapse U.S.-China relations. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 06 (Chengxin; The Pacific Review; 19: 4; Neoconservatism, US-China conflict, and
I focus on neoconservatism for two main reasons. Firstly, as will be illustrated below, USChina conflict and Australias dilemma associated with it are most likely to be triggered by a neoconservative-oriented China policy. Secondly, the neocons attitude towards allies in general and Australia in particular would make this dilemma particularly acute. Often looking at the rest of the world through a prism of either with us or against us, they have made no secret of their high expectations of Australias help in the event of a USChina clash. Consequently, unless we shed light on the influence of neoconservatism in US foreign policy in general and US China policy in particular, the challenge that faces Australias great and powerful friends diplomacy would not be adequately understood, let alone effectively managed. Certainly, the relevance of neoconservatism has not escaped attention in the Australian context. Hugh White (2004: 6) notes that how Sino-American relations take shape will depend partly on how America defines its greatness. In an apparent reference to the neocons, he points to the danger of a political or ideological element in the US foreign policy establishment, which sees Chinas government as inherently illegitimate (White 2004, 2005a). Such insights are significant, but overall they have been little more than a footnote to the current Australian debate, a debate which not only largely fails to link the United States and particularly its neoconservative elements to Australias foreign policy predicament but also tends to view America as an overwhelmingly positive force for regional security. In September 2005, John Howard spoke for many observers when he pro- claimed that strong global leadership by the United States is crucial to Asias future stability and prosperity (Lewis 2005). Yet, precisely because of this largely benign view of the United States within Australias foreign policy community, I suggest that it is time to examine how the factor of American neoconservatism might provoke USChina conflict and, in so doing, contribute to Australias foreign policy dilemma. Neoconservatism is a cluster of ideas that defies simple definitions. For the purpose of this article, it refers to a particular way of thinking about world politics and Americas place within it. The origins of neoconservatism can be traced back at least to the 1960s, and in the 1980s it exerted enormous influence on Ronald Reagans foreign policy. Broadly speaking, neoconservatism believes in the pursuit of liberal goals by realist means. As such, it is a unique school of thought that does not fit readily into either the realist or the liberal camp. Indeed, neoconservatism considers as too narrow the realist conception of US national interests in terms of power, and believes that Americas interests should also include a world order defined by democracy and freedom (Muravchik 2003). While its urge to promote democracy has much in common with liberal internationalism, unlike liberal internationalists, the proponents of neoconservatism show a strong disdain for relying on diplomacy and international institutions (such as the United Nations) in conducting foreign relations. Rather, for them, it is Americas military might that should play a central role. As one neoconservative commentator puts it, for a great power, and especially for the worlds leading power, there is no escape from the responsibility its position imposes (Kagan 2000: 362). Consequently, for the neocons, US foreign policy should be informed by both moral clarity and military strength. This policy, clearly modelled on Reagans aggressive policy towards the former Soviet Union in the waning years of the Cold War, is aptly named a neo-Reaganite foreign policy by the neoconservative flag-carriers William Kristol and Robert Kagan. At the core of this foreign policy is a more elevated vision of Americas international role in terms of benevolent global hegemony (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 20). As a benevolent hegemon, the United States, they argue, should base its foreign policy on a clear moral purpose, and at the same time seek to preserve its military supremacy as far into the future as possible (Kristol and Kagan 1996: 23). Such is the gist of a neoconservative foreign policy for the United States. In the next section, I want to examine in more detail how this policy could negatively impact upon USChina relations.

Neoconservatives overreact to Chinas rise creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that makes war more likely. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 06 (Chengxin; The Pacific Review; 19: 4; Neoconservatism, US-China conflict, and
Neoconservatism, particularly in the guise of a neo-Reaganite foreign policy, is relevant to USChina relations in two major respects. Firstly, through a neoconservative prism, the neocons are especially susceptible to an extremely alarmist view of China in world affairs, a view that sees China as both a growing military threat and an ongoing moral challenge to the United States. Secondly, I argue that, based on these alarmist China threat perceptions, the neocons are capable of both shaping US China policy and constructing USChina relations in a dangerous, self-fulfilling manner. As a result, by exacerbating the security dilemma between the two great powers, a neoconservative China policy would be more likely to stir up military confrontation. More specifically, to the extent that neoconservative foreign policy is informed by the dual principle of military strength and moral clarity, it seems that no other country is better qualified as Americas prime threat than a rapidly rising communist China. On the one hand, Chinas rise, for the neocons and realist hardliners in general, poses a clear threat to Americas military supremacy. On the other hand, the continued reign of the Chinese communist regime represents a direct challenge to Americas moral commitment to promoting democracy worldwide. Taken together, in the eyes of the neocons, China clearly emerges as the most dreadful threat. This neoconservative image of China came to the fore shortly after the collapse of Americas Cold War archrival, the Soviet Union. In a Time magazine article in 1995, the neoconservative commentator Charles Krauthammer warned that China was on the way to becoming late 19th century Germany, a country growing too big and too strong for the continent it finds itself on (Krauthammer 1995: 72). In a similar vein, Paul Wolfowitz, a quintessential neocon, wrote in 1997 that there was the ominous element of Chinas out- sider status. To hark back to the last turning of a century, he wrote, the obvious and disturbing analogy is the position of Germany, a country that felt it had been denied its place in the sun, that believed it had been mistreated by the other powers, and that was determined to achieve its rightful place by nationalistic assertiveness (Wolfowitz 1997: 7). In 1999, Princeton University professor Aaron Friedberg, a founding member of the neoconservative think tank the Project for the New American Century (PNAC), also argued that as long as China is ruled by Communist autocrats, it can never truly be a friend or a trusted partner of the United States. To the contrary, with the Soviet Union gone from the scene, China is obviously the state most likely to mount a serious, longterm challenge to American power (Friedberg 1999: 33). To be sure, the 11 September terrorist attacks have since turned Americas attention to the threat of terrorism and the war on terror. Nevertheless, the China threat as envisaged by the neocons has not disappeared altogether. This view has continued to figure prominently, for example, in the annual reports by the USChina Economic and Security Review Com- mission (USCC), a Congress-mandated bipartisan body that has been dominated largely by neoconservative appointees. The 2005 USCC annual report claims that Chinas military modernization presents a growing threat to U.S. security interests in the Pacific (USCC 2005: 8). Michael Ledeen, vice chairman of the USCC between 2001 and 2003 and the Freedom Chair at the neoconservative stronghold American Enterprise Institute (AEI), once told the media that if push comes to shove, China is perfectly happy to fight a war against us (quoted in Perkins 2002: A17). And nearly ten years after his Why we must contain China piece, Krauthammer, in his 2004 Irving Kristol Lecture at the AEI, again identified the inexorable rise of China as one of the major problems facing the United States (Krauthammer 2004: 17). At this juncture, it must be said that the neocons fixation on the China threat is not just out of intellectual curiosity but is always aimed at actively shaping US foreign policy towards China. Thus, it is not surprising that even before 11 September, neoconservative ideas had already left significant marks on US foreign policy, particularly after George W. Bushs election victory in 2000. Despite the new administrations initial qualms about the neoconservative agenda of nation-building, Bush himself noted that his administration borrowed twenty of the AEIs best people for state service in Americas hour of need (Parmar 2005: 12). Among the first twelve com- missioners appointed by Congress to the USCC in early 2001, no fewer than four (Michael A. Ledeen, Roger W. Robinson Jr, Arthur Waldron, and Larry M. Wortzel) came from the largely neoconservative think tanks such as the AEI and the Washington-based Center for Security Policy. As soon as the neocons took up some key positions in the Bush administration, their political ideas began to translate into foreign policy. A clear example is the designation of China as a strategic competitor by the Bush administration. During the 2000 presidential campaign, it was Wolfowitz who first publicized this phrase when he argued that China was becoming . . . the major strategic competitor and potential threat to the United States and its allies in the first half of the next century (cited in Talbott 2003: 7). As Wolfowitz became the Deputy Secretary of Defense, this notion of strategic competitor also gained popularity in the new administration. This is manifested in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, for which Wolfowitz was the point man. Though not directly naming China, the report clearly had China in its sights when it warned the emergence of a military competitor with a formidable resource base in Asia (US DoD 2001: 4).

U.S. strategy of hedging against China causes counter-hedging, a mirror imaging relationship that makes escalation and an arms race probable. Deterrence wont stop a Chinese attack against Taiwan, which could quickly escalate to a nuclear war. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 06 (Chengxin; The Pacific Review; 19: 4; Neoconservatism, US-China conflict, and
Still, for some analysts, even if those policies have some neoconservative roots, they may be better seen as part of a hedging strategy, which in any case appears to be more prudent than the neocons strategies of pre-emption and regime change in the Middle East. While a hedging strategy does not appear to be as radical as the neoconservative plans on Iraq, I argue that it could still have serious implications for USChina relations and regional stability. Their neo-Reaganite policy, if pursued in earnest by Washington, could play into the hands of nationalist hardliners in China, escalate the security dilemma between the two powers, and set off an arms race that could only make military conflict more likely. Indeed, for all the good intention of the hedging strategy, it could also provoke a counter-hedging strategy from Beijing. In this way, the neoconservative image of a China threat might well turn out to be a self-fulfilling prophecy. Such a vicious cycle between the United States and China has been evident, for example, in relation to a neoconservative policy on Taiwan. As the neocons push hard for abandoning the one China policy and recognizing a democratic Taiwan as an independent state, the Taiwanese authorities, knowing that US support is always forthcoming, feel they can keep pushing the envelope in pursuit of de jure independence with impunity. As Ackerman (2005: 15) notes, events such as the Defense Summit between the United States and Taiwan in March 2002 encouraged Taiwanese President Chen Shuibian to issue his statement in August 2002 that there exists one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait. Such provocation in turn has been viewed with great alarm by the Chinese government, which, as a measure of deterrence, has been increasing the number of missiles deployed opposite Taiwan. This move in turn has drawn the attention of American hardliners. Apparently oblivious to the fact that USTaiwan military ties had strengthened over the years, a puzzled Defense Secretary Rumsfeld asked since no one threatens China, one must wonder why it is building up its military (Rumsfeld 2005). Such messages were rarely lost on Taiwan, as within days of Rumsfelds remarks Chen Shui-bian was quick to reiterate the importance of boosting the islands self-defence capability (Mitton 2005), which then sent further alarms to Beijing. As such interaction continues, it is not unimaginable that the Taiwan issue could indeed come to a dangerous point when not even the most explicit US deterrence posture is likely to deter a concerted Chinese military campaign against Taiwan (Pinsker 2003: 357). In the context of the neo-Reaganite policy on China, what is equally worrying is that the build-up of mutual hostility has already led hardliners in both countries to contemplate nuclear options against the other. An obvious example is the Chinese general Zhu Chenghu, who remarked that China should consider nuclear weapons if the United States intervenes in Taiwan (Kahn 2005). Disturbing as his remarks are, Zhu is no more than a mirror image of his American hardline counterparts (including Under Secretary of State Robert Joseph) who, instrumental in drafting the radical 2002 Nuclear Posture Review, have long been calling for developing a new generation of usable lower-yield nuclear weapons, unleashing Japan by giving it nuclear weapons, and expanding the nuclear hit-list and the set of scenarios in which nuclear weapons may be used (Krauthammer 2003; Lobe 2005a; Rai-mondo 2003). One might think that these are all fantasies and are unlikely to materialize. However, citing US Middle East policy, Jim Lobe (2005b) notes that when the historical record of what the Bush administration has actually done in the region is compared with PNACs recommendations, the correspondence can only be described as stunning.

Yes a China-Taiwan conflict is not inevitable- but most wars do not occur because they were inevitable. The best way to prevent war is to remain vigilant against the risk. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 06 (Chengxin; The Pacific Review; 19: 4; Neoconservatism, US-China conflict, and
True, a USChina conflict is not inevitable, and neither Beijing nor Washington intentionally seeks a war with the other. And yet most international conflicts occurred not because they were inevitable but because they were possible, and not enough was done to prevent them from happening. This is also true with a potential USChina conflict. Will Hutton (2005) notes that The best way of avoiding war is not to dismiss its possibility as outlandish; it is to recognize how easily it could happen and vigilantly guard against the risk.

Shared beliefs between China and Taiwan overwhelm differences. The two countries shared belief in the centrality of Westphalian sovereignty is the single largest obstacle to peace. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 10 (Chengxin; Journal of Chinese Political Science; 15; Westphalia and the Taiwan
Conundrum: A Case against the Exclusionist Construction of Chinese Sovereignty and Identity)
Cross-strait difference is indeed integral to much of the Taiwan conundrum. This point is not in dispute. My concern here, however, is that the Taiwan conundrum cannot be fully explained by difference alone. Although conflict is less likely in the absence of difference, difference is not the sole source of conflict. By the same token, while cooperation and peace are often associated with sameness and commonality, sameness and commonality are not always a sure recipe for peace and harmony. In fact, as Confucius maintains, for the superior man, there can be harmony among differences, whereas for the inferior man, there exists discord in spite of, or even because of, sameness [10]. Thus, in understanding the source of the Taiwan conflict, it is necessary to pay attention to commonality as well as difference. While divided by the Taiwan Strait and a raft of differences, the Chinese mainland and Taiwan do share much in common: culture, language, ancestry, and trade, to name but a few. But among their many similarities, this article focuses on a particular common ground between the two sides, namely, their shared belief in the centrality of Westphalian sovereignty in international relations. Drawing implicitly on a valuable body of literature on the normative and constitutive roles of the concept of sovereignty [1118], the article will, following Stephen Krasners call for problematizing sovereignty, ask how existing institutional arrangements, rules, and principles associated with the concept of sovereignty constitute an obstacle to peace and stability in the Taiwan context ([19], 1). Of course, scholars are well aware of the centrality of the issue of sovereignty to the Taiwan dispute [2022]. While surveying sovereignty in the Asian historical context, Michel Oksenberg illustrated how cross-strait relations have been confined by the concept of sovereignty and its associated ideas. Yet, despite his acknowledgement that both sides of the Taiwan Strait cherish the ideal of sovereignty, his focus remained on the factor of difference rather than commonality. The major constraints on the Taiwan question, as he put it, are deep distrust and animosity between the two and their different understandings of the meaning of sovereignty ([22], 98100, emphasis added). Although several articles published in a special issue of China Perspectives do point out that the rigid notion of absolute sovereignty shared by both Beijing and Taipei is at the core of the Taiwan dispute, their main concern is with practical, legal, and institutional solutions to the stalemate rather than with the theoretical linkage between the shared norm of Westphalian sovereignty and the Taiwan conflict [9, 23, 24]. Yet, unless this linkage is more thoroughly examined and exposed, Westphalian sovereignty is likely to continue to inform cross-strait interaction, thereby hindering the emergence of effective, meaningful and innovative solutions.

The pursuit of sovereignty creates common meaning between China and Taiwan that prevents cooperation and makes war more likely. It creates a 0-sum struggle for authority. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 10 (Chengxin; Journal of Chinese Political Science; 15; Westphalia and the Taiwan
If the Chinese mainland and Taiwan share the common normative ground of Westphalian sovereignty, the ensuing question is: How does this normative convergence contribute to the intractability of the Taiwan issue? Conventional wisdom has it that conflict arises from difference, while cooperation rests on convergence, as democratic peace theory would have us believe. But this is true only to a certain point. Very often, commonality as well as difference is at the core of social conflict. For instance, a fundamental aspect of the conflict between Christianity and Islam could be traced back to their commonly-held monotheism as well as their myriad differences. Indeed, it is not despite, but because of, their shared belief in the existence of only one God that their clash has been so irreconcilable. Similarly, it may be argued that many European conflicts in the colonial era were animated as much by their shared belief in social Darwinism as by their differing colonial interests. Thus Otto Klineberg observes that the opinions and attitudes of two contending sides may be mirror images of each other ([54], 94). Ashis Nandy [55] calls this phenomenon the 5 intimate enemy, whereas Raymond Aron refers to it as the enemy partners. This may sound odd, but that is because, as Charles Taylor points out, people have conflated common meaning with consensus. While the latter is conducive to cooperation, the former is not necessarily the case. As Taylor ([56], 39) explains: We could... say that common meanings are quite other than consensus, for they can subsist with a high degree of cleavage; this is what happens when a common meaning comes to be lived and understood differently by different groups in a society. It remains a common meaning, because there is the reference point which is the common purpose, aspiration, celebration.... But this common meaning is differently articulated by different groups. This is the basis of the bitterest fights in a society.... Perhaps one might say that a common meaning is very often the cause of the most bitter lack of consensus. In cross-strait relations, Westphalian sovereignty is precisely such a common meaning, which can similarly explain the very lack of consensus between Beijing and Taipei. It is in this sense that I argue that the link between Westphalian sovereignty and conflict needs to be more fully understood. As many scholars have noted, sovereign states and war often go hand in hand. For Charles Tilly, war made the state and the state made war ([30], 42). In a similar vein, Michael Howard argues that no Nation, in the true sense of the word, could be born without war ([57], 102, emphasis in original). By the true sense of the word, there is little doubt that Howard means the Westphalian sovereign state. The irony here is that while the Westphalian state is defined by its ability to monopolize the legitimate use of violence, the process in which to acquire that monopoly is frequently fraught with violence ([58], 59). Admittedly, the Westphalian model of sovereignty is not meant to incite war or violence. Quite the opposite, Bodins idea of sovereignty was designed to find a cure to the scourge of religious conflict that had ravaged France at the time. For Thomas Hobbes, the main political purpose of the sovereign state (the Leviathan) was to maintain internal order. Similarly, through a clear demarcation of sovereignty on the basis of territory and the reciprocal recognition of sovereignty, the Treaty of Westphalia was aimed primarily to settle Europes prolonged religious disputes. That said, while Westphalia helps regulate violence by restricting the monopoly of violence and war-making to territorial states only, it does not quite succeed in stopping war or violence per se. As Susan Strange observed, internally it did nothing to stop conflicts over the major sources of revenue and wealth for the state ([59], 347). Indeed, in his study of the relationship between identity and violence in Bosnia, David Campbell goes so far as to argue that the conventional understanding of sovereignty and territorial identity was largely responsible for both ethnic cleansing and slow international intervention in the Balkans [60]. Even as the sovereign state manages to establish order domestically, it can be argued that human violence is merely displaced from within the territory of the state into the realm of interstate relations ([61], 440). The reason why Westphalian sovereignty is intimately linked to conflict is straightforward. To begin with, Westphalian sovereignty, understood as final authority, does not allow for compromise where sovereignty is believed to be at stake. A struggle for final authority is by definition a mutually exclusive, zero-sum game. Hobbes observes that If any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies ([62], 184). Thanks to the diffusion of the Westphalian norm, sovereign authority is precisely such a commonly desired thing and cannot be jointly enjoyed. As such, its exclusive ownership often needs to be settled by the victory of one side over the other, a victory that makes the one sovereign and the other subject ([1], 98). In international relations, there are numerous examples of this type of zero-sum struggle for sovereignty. Take the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians for instance, the indivisible characteristic of sovereignty was likened by a former Tel Aviv lawyer to a woman, who cannot be shared ([63], 66). This analogy, while rather crude, does strike at the heart of the Israeli-Palestinian problem, a problem which, according to Anthony Burke, has much to do with the conceptual foundations Israel shares with other stateswith the modern [Westphalian] ontology of the secure nation-state ([63], 701).

China and Taiwan have a 0-sum struggle for exclusive sovereignty- 3 reasons. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 10 (Chengxin; Journal of Chinese Political Science; 15; Westphalia and the Taiwan
Conundrum: A Case against the Exclusionist Construction of Chinese Sovereignty and Identity) Such a zero-sum struggle for exclusive sovereignty is also manifested in the contentious and potentially explosive Taiwan issue. During much of the Cold War period, the two sides, informed by the Westphalian idea of exclusive sovereign authority, pretended that the other did not even exist as a political entity, let alone as an equal. The KMT government in Taiwan viewed the Peoples Republic as a bunch of Communist bandits (gongfei) and pursued a policy of three nos vis--vis the mainland: no official contacts, no negotiations, and no compromise. Likewise, Beijing regarded Taiwan as little more than a renegade province. In the fight over the seat in the United Nations in the early 1970s, mainland China insisted that it would not join unless Taipei was expelled (Taipei buchu, Beijing buru). The Taiwan authorities, after losing the UN votes, decided to withdraw from the UN rather than accepting a proposal of dual representation, on the ground that There is no room for patriots and traitors to live together (Han zei bu liangli) ([81], 108). With final authority believed to be at stake, compromise has thus been routinely ruled out by both sides as a sign of weakness or even surrender. In a 1997 interview with Asian Affairs, then Chinese President Jiang Zemin made this point clear: You have here a case where the fundamental interests of a nation lie. On such a question involving state sovereignty, a government has no room for any compromise [64]. Echoing this stance, a group of scholars at an influential think tank in Beijing argued that we are not willing to see the loss of the principle of single sovereigntythe inseparability of sovereignty.... If any compromises are made with regard to Taiwan, they will not be made over the question of sovereignty and the one China principle, which is the key to the problem ([38], 134). Likewise, in reference to Beijings one country, two systems proposal, the Taiwan authorities made an uncompromising, mirror-image response: the purpose of one country, two systems is to demand the ROCs complete surrender to the Chinese Communists.... Therefore, this piece of proposal from the Chinese Communists is in fact impractical in the objective sense, and absolutely unacceptable to us in the subjective sense [65]. Thus, this unwillingness to make compromise, which in large degree accounts for the Taiwan impasse, is clearly derived from the Westphalian notion of exclusionary sovereignty. Second, also complicating this zero-sum standoff is the aforementioned Westphalian nexus between sovereignty and territory. If the struggle over sovereignty already precludes compromise, then the Westphalian territorialization of sovereignty makes such a struggle even more diametrically Manichaean: either a state possesses sovereignty over a particular piece of territory, or it doesnt ([61], 439). Just as there is no room for compromise over final authority, so there is no space for territorial ambiguity; sovereignty, in the Westphalian sense of the word, has to be clearly demarcated along a geographical boundary that separates self from Other. This helps us understand not only why territorial integrity has been at the core of the one China principle, but also why, despite everincreasing economic links, solutions to many territorial disputes in Asia still remain elusive ([16], 121). Third, given that the Westphalian ideal entails the convergence between the state and the nation, not only is the struggle over sovereignty concerned with territory, but it is also about national identity. As noted before, a central part of the modern narrative of state sovereignty has been about popular sovereignty, in which final authority is allegedly invested with the nation. To the extent that Westphalian sovereignty implies that the nations identity and survival hinges on territorial sovereignty, a struggle for the latter then becomes a matter of life and death for the former. As the argument goes, if A stateless person in the statecentric world is a nonperson ([66], 245). then a stateless nation in the Westphalian state system would be no nation at all. To compromise on sovereignty and territorial integrity thus amounts to nothing short of treason or national suicide. In this sense, it is not difficult to understand why the struggle for the olive trees on the banks of the river Jordan, emblematic of a fight over peoples sense of home and identity, has been so venomous ([67], 27). Equally, it is also easy to understand why the territorial status of Taiwan has taken on such monumental significance for both sides. An influential book on Taiwan independence, The Four-Hundred-Year History of the Taiwanese by Shih Ming, argues that unless the Taiwanese establish their own country, the future of the nation will remain wretched and uncertain ([68], 150). Without doubt, such a direct appeal to national identity and survival has contributed a great deal to the further hardening of the resolve of many Taiwanese for national self-determination. Indeed, it was precisely on the basis of the democratic right to national self-determination that the Taiwan authorities under Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian were able to strenuously refuse to negotiate with Beijing on the prospects of reunification.

China and Taiwan frame their dispute in an us-them, self-other manner that creates a vicious cycle of distrust and hostility. Pan, Prof IR @ Deakin Univ; 10 (Chengxin; Journal of Chinese Political Science; 15; Westphalia and the Taiwan
What makes this contest between different versions of popular sovereignty particularly dangerous is that the invocation of national identity is almost inevitably predicated on the construction of self and Other, with each seen as the negation of the other. Once this dichotomy is conjured up, any means to eliminate the Other could then be safely justified. To the extent that both sides treat each other in this way, it is not difficult to imagine the dire consequences. Although Chinese leaders have stated that Chinese do not fight Chinese, they have not hesitated to label those who agitate for Taiwans independence the nations enemy, to be stopped by military force if necessary. And to make such a threat credible as well as legitimate, China has deployed hundreds of short-range missiles in its Fujian province opposite Taiwan, and enshrined its right to use non-peaceful means in the 2005 Anti- Secession Law. This tough stance in turn has more often than not backfired, resulting in a further hardening of attitudes in Taiwan. Hence a vicious cycle of mutual distrust and hostility. In short, integral to international conflict in general and the Taiwan issue in particular is a particular modern ontological vision of world politics that is Westphalian sovereignty. This is not to suggest that every international conflict is a result of this normative convergence or that any two entities who share the idea of Westphalian sovereignty will necessarily clash. In any case, the role of ideas should not be exaggerated to the point of determinism. Bearing this in mind, I wish to qualify that the linkage between Westphalian normative convergence and conflict is valid only if the two actors selfclaimed sovereign boundaries overlap, and either or both sides regard their overlapped territory as vital to their national interest. For instance, if two countries, both subscribing to the notion of Westphalian sovereignty, do not have overlapping sovereignty claims, their normative convergence in this regard need not lead them to conflict. Indeed, it may even create sympathy between them when ones sovereignty is infringed upon by a third party, as in the case of Chinas tacit support for Yugoslavia during the NATO-led intervention over Kosovo in 1999. At the same time, the frictions between China and the American-led NATO alliance were caused by their normative divergence over sovereignty and human rights. Furthermore, even if two countries sovereignty claims do overlap, while this may create bilateral tensions, such tensions could remain manageable so long as the perceived cost of such a conflict is seen by both sides as outweighing the benefit, or if the interest involved in the dispute is outweighed by broader interest derived from cooperation on other issues of mutual concern. The Sino-Russian border dispute is a case in point here. In the Taiwan context, however, while many recognize the high cost associated with a cross-strait conflict, the fact that both sides regard Taiwan as vital to their identity and political survival means that so long as they both insist on a Westphalian model of sovereignty, this standoff is unlikely to have an effective solution in sight. Thus, in order to better comprehend the root cause of the Taiwan conundrum and identify a solution, it is necessary to highlight the issue of normative convergence of Westphalian sovereignty across the Taiwan Strait.

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February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 15

Pro- Pan K- Identity & Behavior

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 16

Pro- Pan K- Identity

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 17

Pro- Pan K- Mercantilism

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 18

Pro- Pan K- Realism

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 19

Pro- Pan K- Realism

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 20

Pro- Pan K- Regions/Ethnicity

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 21

Pro- Pan K- Trade Deficit

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 22

Pro- Pan K- Impact

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 23

Pro- Pan K- Impact

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 24

Pro- Pan K- Impact

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 25

Pro- Pan K- Impact

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 26

Pro- Pan K- Representations

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 27

Pro- Pan K- Representations

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 28

Pro- Pan K- Representations

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 29

Pro- Pan K- AT: Positive Representation of China

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 30

Con- Schmitt K- China

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 31

Con- Schmitt K- China

February: Chinas Rise Critical Constructive Page 32