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BASBAS v.

SAYSON
G.R. No. 172660, 24 August 2011 Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS On September 2, 1976, respondent Beata Sayson and her husband Roberto Sayson, Sr. filed a Petition for Registration of an agricultural land located in Cagbatang, Balagtas, Matag-ob, Leyte. The said application was opposed by the Republic of the Philippines and herein petitioners Eugenio Basbas, Teofilo Aras and Rufino Aras. On March 22, 1979, the Court of First Instance of Leyte rendered a Decision adjudicating to the spouses Sayson said agricultural land and approving its registration under their names.

The oppositors filed their appeal to the CA. The appellate court affirmed in toto the Decision of the CFI. This CA Decision became final and executory on August 21, 1985 and, accordingly, a Writ of Possession was issued on November 21, 1985, which was never implemented.

The following year or on September 17, 1986, Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 2496 was issued to the spouses Sayson pursuant to the March 22, 1979 CFI Decision. An Alias Writ of Possession was issued on April 6, 1989 but this could also not be implemented in view of the refusal of Eugenio Sr. and his son Eugenio Basbas, Jr. (Eugenio Jr.). Claiming that the land they occupied is not the same land subject of the CFI Decision, they demanded that a relocation survey be conducted.

The RTC approved the Commissioner's Report on the relocation survey and ordered the original oppositors, petitioners Eugenio Sr., Teofilo and Rufino, as well as their co-petitioners herein to vacate the subject property.

This September 13, 1989 Order was, however, not implemented within the five-year period from the time it became final. Hence, respondent Beata and her son Roberto Sayson, Jr.

(Roberto Jr.), as successor-in-interest of the late Roberto Sr., filed on August 18, 1995 a Complaint for Revival of Judgment before the RTC of Ormoc City.

ISSUE Whether or not the respondents are entitled to revival of judgment in the earlier land registration case and recover the subject property.

RULING Yes. While we note that the present action for revival of judgment is not an action for recovery, the September 13, 1989 Order sought to be revived herein ordered the petitioners, among others, to vacate the subject property pursuant to the final and executory judgment of the CA affirming the CFI's adjudication of the same in favor of respondents. This Order was issued after the failure to enforce the writ of execution and alias writ of execution due to petitioners' refusal to vacate the property. To this Court's mind, respondents' purpose in instituting the present action is not only to have the CA Decision in the land registration case finally implemented but ultimately, to recover possession thereof from petitioners. This action is therefore one which Roberto Jr., as co-owner, can bring and prosecute alone, on his own behalf and on behalf of his co-owner, Beata. Hence, a dismissal of the case with respect to Beata pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court will be futile as the case could nevertheless be continued by Roberto Jr. in behalf of the two of them.

DCD CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 179978, 31 August 2011 Villarama, JR., J.:

FACTS On January 19, 2001, petitioner DCD Construction, Inc., through its President and CEO Danilo D. Dira, Jr., filed a verified application for registration of a parcel of land situated in Taytay, Danao City with an area of 4,493 square meters. It was alleged that applicant which acquired the property by purchase, together with its predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous, open, adverse, public, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the property for more than thirty (30) years. Thus, petitioner prayed to have its title judicially confirmed.

Based on petitioners documentary and testimonial evidence, it appears that the approved technical description is allegedly identical to that of another lot consisting of 3,781 square meters. 712 square meters of said lot can be segregated as salvage zone pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 97-05.

On August 22, 2002, the trial court declared that the applicant DCD CONSTRUCTION INC., has a registerable title to subject lot.

On appeal by respondent Republic of the Philippines, the CA reversed the trial court. The CA ruled that the evidence failed to show that the land applied for was alienable and disposable considering that only a notation in the survey plan was presented to show the status of the property. It was further noted that the earliest tax declaration submitted was issued only in 1988. It was also held that petitioner did not prove open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

ISSUE

Whether or not the subject lot is indeed alienable and disposable.

RULING No. Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.

Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable and disposable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Incontrovertible evidence must be presented to establish that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.

In support of its contention the land is alienable and disposable, petitioner contends that the DENR-Lands Management Services itself had approved and adopted the notation made by a certifying officer on the survey plan as its own. Such approval amounts to a positive act of the government indicating that the land applied for is indeed alienable and disposable.

However, the testimony of the officer from DENR-LMS, Rafaela Belleza, did not at all attest to the veracity of the notation made by a certifying officer, Ibaez, on the survey plan regarding the status of the subject land. Hence, no error was committed by the CA in finding that the certification made by DENR-LMS pertained only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the survey plan and not to the nature and character of the property surveyed.

In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that the notation inserted in the survey plan hardly satisfies the incontrovertible proof required by law on the classification of land applied for registration.

The CA likewise correctly held that there was no compliance with the required possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.

The phrase adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in concept of owner, are mere conclusions of law requiring evidentiary support and substantiation. The burden of proof is on the applicant to prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the alleged possession was of the nature and duration required by law. The bare statement of petitioners witness, Andrea Batucan Enriquez, that her family had been in possession of the subject land from the time her father bought it after the Second World War does not suffice.

Moreover, the tax declaration in the name of petitioners father was issued only in 1994, while the other in its own name was issued in 2000. Petitioners predecessors-in-interest were able to submit a tax declaration only for the year 1988, which was long after both spouses Vivencio and Paulina Batucan have died. Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner. And while Andrea Batucan Enriquez claimed knowledge of their familys possession since she was just ten (10) years old although she said she was born in 1932 -there was no clear and convincing evidence of such open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership. She never mentioned any act of occupation, development, cultivation or maintenance over the property throughout the alleged length of possession. There was no account of the circumstances regarding their fathers acquisition of the land, whether their father introduced any improvements or farmed the land, and if they established residence or built any house thereon.

We have held that the bare claim of the applicant that the land applied for had been in the possession of her predecessor-in-interest for 30 years does not constitute the well-nigh inconvertible and conclusive evidence required in land registration.

The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property.

FERNANDO v. ACUNA
G.R. No. 161030, 14 September 2011 Leonardo-De Castro, J.:

FACTS At the heart of this controversy is a parcel of land registered in the names of Jose A. Fernando, married to Lucila Tinio, and Antonia A. Fernando, married to Felipe Galvez, and located in San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. When they died intestate, the property remained undivided. Petitioners herein are the heirs and successors-in-interest of the deceased registered owners. However, petitioners failed to agree on the division of the subject property amongst themselves, even after compulsory conciliation before the Barangay Lupon.

Thus, petitioners, except for the heirs of Germogena Fernando, filed a Complaint for partition on April 17, 1997 against the heirs of Germogena Fernando. In the Complaint, plaintiffs alleged, among others, that they and defendants are common descendants and compulsory heirs of the late spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio, and the late spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez. They further claimed that their predecessors-in-interest died intestate and without instructions as to the disposition of the property left by them. There being no settlement, the heirs are asking for their rightful and lawful share because they wish to build up their homes or set up their business in the respective portions that will be allotted to them. In sum, they prayed that the subject property be partitioned into eight equal parts, corresponding to the hereditary interest of each group of heirs.

However, respondent Leon Acuna intervened in the action averring that in the Decision dated November 29, 1929 of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan, the portion of the property identified as Lot 1303 was already adjudicated to several other persons who are the petitioners predecessor-in-interest. He likewise claimed that in a 1930 Decision of the Cadastral Court, the portion identified as Lot 1302 was also already adjudicated to other people as well.

ISSUE Whether or not a title registered under the Torrens system, as the subject original certificate of title is the best evidence of ownership of land and is a notice against the world.

RULING No. As the records show, in the November 29, 1929 Decision of the Cadastral Court of Baliuag, Bulacan had already been divided and adjudicated to spouses Jose A. Fernando and Lucila Tinio; spouses Antonia A. Fernando and Felipe Galvez; spouses Antonio A. Fernando and Felisa Camacho; spouses Jose Martinez and Gregoria Sison; and spouses Ignacio de la Cruz and Salud Wisco from whom respondent Acuna derived his title.

In the decision, it would appear that petitioners ascendants themselves petitioned for the cadastral court to divide Lot 1303 among the parties to the 1929 case and they were not allocated all the lots. Still, as the trial court noted, the November 29, 1929 Decision was never fully implemented in the sense that the persons named therein merely proceeded to occupy the lots assigned to them without having complied with the other directives of the cadastral court which would have led to the titling of the properties in their names. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that the persons named in the said November 29, 1929 Decision and, subsequently, their heirs and assigns have since been in peaceful and uncontested possession of their respective lots for more than seventy (70) years until the filing of the suit for partition on April 17, 1997 by petitioners which is the subject matter of this case.

Section 47 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, states that *n+o title to registered land in derogat ion of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. Thus, the Court has held that the right to recover possession of registered land is imprescriptible because possession is a mere consequence of ownership.

However, the Court had recognized the jurisprudential thread regarding the exception to the foregoing doctrine that while it is true that a Torrens title is indefeasible and imprescriptible, the registered landowner may lose his right to recover possession of his registered property by reason of laches.

Thus, while a person may not acquire title to the registered property through continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of laches.

In view of respondents decades long possession and/or ownership of their respective lots by virtue of a court judgment and the erstwhile registered owners inaction and neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time in pursuing the recovery of the land, assuming they retained any right to recover the same, it is clear that respondents possession may no longer be disturbed. The right of the registered owners as well as their successors-in-interest to recover possession of the property is already a stale demand and, thus, is barred by laches.

ANGELES v. PASCUAL
G.R. No. 157150, 21 September 2011 Bersamin, J.:

FACTS Neighbors Regidor Pascual and Pedro Angeles were registered owners of adjacent parcels of land located in Cabanatuan City. Pascual owned Lot 4 while Angeles owned Lot 5. Each of them built a house on his respective lot, believing all the while that his respective lot was properly delineated. It was not until Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, as the highest bidder in the foreclosure sale of the adjacent Lot 3, caused the relocation survey of Lot 3 that the geodetic engineer discovered that Pascuals house had encroached on Lot 3. As a consequence, Metrobank successfully ejected Pascual.

In turn, Pascual caused the relocation survey of his own Lot 4 and discovered that Angeles house also encroached on his lot. Of the 318 square meters comprising Lot 4, Angeles occupied 252 square meters, leaving Pascual with only about 66 square meters. Pascual demanded rentals for the use of the encroached area of Lot 4 from Angeles, or the removal of Angeles house. Angeles refused the demand. Accordingly, Pascual sued Angeles for recovery of possession and damages in the Regional Trial Court in Cabanatuan City.

The RTC disposed the case in favour of Pascual. On appeal, The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, but modified the latters ruling.

Accordingly plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to either buy the portion of defendant-appellants house on their Lot No. 4, or to sell to defendant-appellant the portion of their land on which his house stands. If buying the improvement will render the defendant-appellants house useless, then plaintiffs-appellees should sell the encroached portion of their land to defendantappellant. If plaintiffs-appellees choose to sell the land but defendant-appellant is unwilling or unable to buy, then the latter must vacate the subject portion and pay reasonable rent from

the time plaintiffs-appellees made their choice up to the time they actually vacate the premises. But if the value of the land is considerably more than the value of the improvement, then defendant-appellant may elect to lease the land, in which case the parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease.

ISSUE Whether or not Angeles is a builder in good faith.

RULING Yes.

Article 448 of the Civil Code contemplates a person building, or sowing, or planting in good faith on land owned by another. The law presupposes that the land and the building or plants are owned by different persons, like here. The RTC and CA found and declared Angeles to be a builder in good faith. We cannot veer away from their unanimous conclusion, which can easily be drawn from the fact that Angeles insists until now that he built his house entirely on his own lot. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and in his ignorance of a defect or flaw in his title.

With the unassailable finding that Angeles house straddled the lot of Pascual, and that Angeles had built his house in good faith, Article 448 of the Civil Code, which spells out the rights and obligations of the owner of the land as well as of the builder, is unquestionably applicable. Consequently, the land being the principal and the building the accessory, preference is given to Pascual as the owner of the land to make the choice as between appropriating the building or obliging Angeles as the builder to pay the value of the land. Contrary to the insistence of Angeles, therefore, no inconsistency exists between the finding of good faith in his favor and the grant of the reliefs set forth in Article 448 of the Civil Code.

GUSTILO v. GUSTILO
G.R. No. 175497, 19 October 2011 Abad, J.:

FACTS Petitioner Mary Joy Anne Gustilo and respondent Jose Vicente Gustilo III are heirs of their natural father, the late Atty. Armando Gustilo (they have different mothers), who owned several properties and was, prior to his death, the president of A.G. Agro-Industrial Corporation in Cadiz City, Negros Occidental.

On August 31, 1993, following their fathers death, Mary Joy and Jose Vi cente entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, adjudicating between themselves their fathers properties. One of these was Hacienda Imelda which the MOA assigned to Mary Joy. As it happened, however, the haciendas title remained in the name of A.G. Agro. Mary Joy immediately took possession of the land through Mila Barco, her mother and natural guardian, and planted sugarcane on it.

Over three years later or in 1997 Jose Vicente, as president of A.G. Agro, leased Hacienda Imelda and its farm implements to respondent Tita Sy Young for five agricultural crop years from 1997-1998 to 2001-2002. Being financially hard up, Mary Joy and her mother were pained to watch Young take over the land.

When the lease contract was about to expire, however, Mary Joy had her lawyer advise Young to surrender the land to her. But the latter refused to yield possession and continued to cultivate the same for sugarcane. This prompted Mary Joy to file an action against Jose Vicente and Young for recovery of possession of the hacienda, cancellation of the lease contract, and damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cadiz City. Jose Vicente filed a motion to dismiss mainly on the ground that the Cadiz RTC had no jurisdiction to hear and decide intracorporate disputes, the proper forum being a specially designated commercial court.

ISSUE Whether or not Mary Joys action to recover possession presents an intra-corporate dispute that belongs to the jurisdiction of a specially designated commercial court.

RULING It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations in the complaint. It can be gleaned from Mary Joys allegations in her complaint that her case is principally one for recovery of possession. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession, can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he is entitled to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better right .

Here, Jose Vicente and Young mainly argued in their Motion to Dismiss that inasmuch as the subject property is in the name of A.G. Agro, the nature of the claim or controversy is one of intra-corporate. The Court has ruled in the past that an action to recover possession is a plenary action in an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better and legal right to possess, independently of title. But where the parties raise the issue of ownership, as in this case, the courts may pass upon such issue to determine who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication, however, is not final and binding as regards the issue of ownership; it is merely for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession when it is inseparably connected to the issue of ownership. The adjudication on the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action between the same parties involving title to the property. Also, any intra-corporate issues that may be involved in determining the real owner of the property may be threshed out in a separate proceeding in the proper commercial court.

YARED v. TIONGCO
G.R. No. 161360, 19 October 2011 Villarama, JR., J.:

FACTS Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, all surnamed Tiongco, were born to Atanacio and Maria Luis Tiongco. Together they were known as the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco.

The present dispute involves three parcels of land all located in Iloilo City. The lots were registered in the names of Matilde, Jose, Vicente, and Felipe, and in the name of Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco.

While all of the Heirs of Maria Luis de Tiongco have died, they were survived by their children and descendants. Among the legitimate children of Jose were petitioner and Carmelo Tiongco, the father of respondent Jose B. Tiongco.

Sometime in 1965, petitioner built her house on one lot and sustained herself by collecting rentals from the tenants of the other lots. In 1968, petitioner, as one of the heirs of Jose, filed an adverse claim affecting all the rights, interest and participation of her deceased father on the disputed lots, but the adverse claim was annotated only on the certificate of title covering two lots.

In 1983, respondent Jose prohibited petitioner from collecting rentals from the tenants. In December 1983, respondent Jose filed a suit for recovery of possession with preliminary injunction against several tenants wherein he obtained a judgment in his favor. Respondent Jose also filed a case for unlawful detainer with damages against petitioner as she was staying on the first lot. While the RTC, Branch 33, of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses favor, the CA reversed the RTCs decision and ruled in favor of petitioner. As such, respondent Jose never took possession of the properties. However, Jose averred that he has been paying real property

taxes on the said properties for more than ten (10) years and that petitioner collected rentals only because he allowed her.

In 1988, when petitioner inquired at the Office of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City, she discovered that respondent Jose had already executed an Affidavit of Adjudication dated April 17, 1974, declaring that he is the only surviving heir of the registered owners and adjudicating unto himself all three lots. Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Iloilo City issued transfer certificate of titles all in the name of respondent Jose.

Based on the records with the Register of Deeds, it also appears that on May 10, 1974, the same day when the TCTs were issued, respondent Jose sold the said lots to Catalino Torre. Certificates of title were also issued in the name of Catalino Torre. The former then sold the properties to Antonio Doronila, Jr., and back again to Jose.

ISSUE Whether or not petitioner has a better right over the properties.

RULING Yes. The Court agrees with the CAs disquisition that an action for reconveyance can indeed be barred by prescription. In a long line of cases decided by this Court, we ruled that an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

However, there is an exception to this rule. There is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. The exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another.

Prescription does not run against the plaintiff in actual possession of the disputed land because such plaintiff has a right to wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is questioned before initiating an action to vindicate his right. His undisturbed possession gives him the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his title. The Court held that where the plaintiff in an action for reconveyance remains in possession of the subject land, the action for reconveyance becomes in effect an action to quiet title to property, which is not subject to prescription.

In this case, petitioners possession was disturbed in 1983 when respondent Jose filed a case for recovery of possession. The RTC of Iloilo City ruled in respondent Joses favor but the CA on November 28, 1991, during the pendency of the present controversy with the court a quo, ruled in favor of petitioner. Petitioner never lost possession of the said properties, and as such, she is in a position to file the complaint with the court a quo to protect her rights and clear whatever doubts has been cast on her title by the issuance of TCTs in respondent Joses name.

MERCADO v. VALLEY MOUNTAIN MINES EXPLORATION, INC.


G.R. No. 141019 Villarama, JR., J.:

FACTS Several parcels of land situated at Barangay Sungay, Iruhin, Tagaytay City declared under the name Heirs of Narciso Olimpiada and Heirs of Juan Desengao were sold by the City Government of Tagaytay in a public auction held on November 28, 1983, for failure to pay the real property taxes for several years. The subject lots were sold in favor of Valley Mountain Mines Exploration, Inc.

To save their property, the heirs of Narciso Olimpiada, through their attorney-in-fact, Rosa Cabrera Mendoza, executed a Deed of Sale of an Unregistered Parcel of Land With Assignment of Rights and Assumption of Obligations in favor of Jose Teofilo T. Mercado. The heirs of Juan Desengao through their attorney-in-fact Primitivo Mendoza likewise executed a similar deed in favor of Mercado.

On December 7, 1984, Mercado paid the sums of P58,327.82 and P33,841.49 for the five parcels of land. Consequently, a Certificate of Redemption covering the subject properties was issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of Tagaytay City. Said office also returned the purchase price plus interest thereon to VMMEI on December 11, 1984. However, the checks issued by Mercado in payment of the aforesaid sums when presented for payment to the bank, were dishonoured.

On April 14, 1986, VMMEI through its counsel wrote then City Treasurer Concepcion C. Daplas asserting its right to be reinstated as the highest bidder during the public auction sale considering that no effective redemption was made by the delinquent owners.

By virtue of the purchase at the tax delinquency sale conducted by the City Government of Tagaytay, the tax declarations covering the subject properties are now in the name of VMMEI as the present owner.

ISSUE Whether or not VMMEI validly acquired rights over the land in dispute.

RULING Yes. Petitioners cause of action is predicated on the absence of notice to them as alleged coowners. We have previously ruled that it is incumbent upon the city treasurer to send the notice directly to the taxpayer -- the registered owner of the property -- in order to protect the latters interests. Although preceded by proper advertisement and publication, an auction sale is void absent an actual notice to a delinquent taxpayer. As to who is the taxpayer entitled to notice, it is the declared or registered owner as appearing in the tax rolls or property tax record cards of the municipality or city where the property is located. In Talusan v. Tayag, the Court held that for purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of the property is considered the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax sale. As petitioners failed to show they are the declared owners as shown in the tax rolls and tax records of respondent City Government of Tagaytay, the CA did not err in affirming the dismissal of their complaint.

IN RE: PALAGANAS v. ERNESTO PALAGANAS


G.R. No. 169144, 26 January 2011 Abad, J.:

FACTS On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the US.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Rupertas will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Rupertas will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Rupertas will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testators full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Rupertas foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Rupertas U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.

On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order: (a) admitting to probate Rupertas last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c) issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Aggrieved by the RTCs order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time in the Philippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernestos submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision, Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.

ISSUE Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

RULING Yes. Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

URETA v. URETA
G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011 Mendoza, J.:

FACTS In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso, Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonsos children and their descendants.

Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and instead worked on his fathers lands.

Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and his common-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case.

Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.

When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the administrator of his fathers estate. He was later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by her daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to Policronio were

tenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate.

Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands.

On April 19, 1989, Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, which included all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronios eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.

After their fathers death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio. Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition involving Alfonsos estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the Aklan Reporter.

ISSUE Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid.

RULING Yes. It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial

Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary.

In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.

A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it is revoked by the other contracting party.

Therefore, Conrados failure to obtain authority from his co -heirs to sign the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrados co-heirs for having been entered into without their authority.

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