Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 15 NO. 15 7 AUGUST 2013

Contents Analytical Articles UZBEKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN: COMPETITORS, STRATEGIC PARTNERS OR ETERNAL FRIENDS? Farkhod Tolipov AFGHANISTANS CHALLENGES AS NATIONAL ELECTIONS APPROACH Richard Weitz GEORGIAS NATO MEMBERSHIP WILL BRING REGIONAL STABILITY Mamuka Tsereteli COSSACKS IN NORTH CAUCASUS DEMAND INCREASED SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW Valeriy Dzutsev Field Reports TURKMENISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN SIGN AGREEMENT OVER TAPI GAS PIPELINE Tavus Rejepova BISHKEK COURT RULES TO RELEASE THREE OPPOSITION LAWMAKERS Arslan Sabyrbekov GEORGIAS ECONOMY STOPS GROWING Eka Janashia MOLDOVAN OMBUDSMAN UNDER FIRE AFTER CONTROVERSIAL SPEECH IN ARMENIA Mina Muradova

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 THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted articles first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies." Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local peoples future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue. Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words. Those interested in joining The Analysts pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: <scornell@jhu.edu> and suggest some topics on which you would like to write. Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

UZBEKISTAN AND KAZAKHSTAN: COMPETITORS, STRATEGIC PARTNERS OR ETERNAL FRIENDS?

Kazakhstans president Nursultan Nazarbayev made an official visit to Tashkent on June 13, 2013, which was expected to be a breakthrough in Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan relations. During the visit, the two states signed a Treaty on Strategic Partnership. This event can indeed be considered a breakthrough in bilateral relations between the two states, which have until recently been perceived as competitors for regional leadership in Central Asia. While Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan signed an unprecedented Treaty On Eternal Friendship in the late 1990s, the Uzbek-Kazakh friendship has always been fragile and hardly eternal. Will the new Treaty change the status-quo in Central Asia?

Farkhod Tolipov

BACKGROUND: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are two key countries in Central Asia and their bilateral relations to a great extent predetermine the regional status-quo. Both are ruled by strong authoritarian leaders Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan and Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan who, since gaining independence in 1991, have permanently remained in power in their respective countries. Regional affairs in Central Asia and bilateral relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan depend to a great extent on personal will and the ambitions of the two presidents who have often combined personal competition and mistrust with declaratory calls for regional cooperation.

any other agreement on strategic partnership with any other great power. The Treaty underlined that the three countries are fraternal and friendly states. The Treatys article 2 states that the signatories will develop cooperation by supporting each other above all in preventing threats to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Article 3 mentions joint defense measures against a military invasion of one of the parties. Article 4 asserts that the signatories will coordinate their positions on regional and global issues. By and large, the spirit and letter of the Treaty On Eternal Friendship in fact describes a strategic partnership, an alliance, and a strategy for integration. In 2005 Nazarbayev even stated that In January 1997, the presidents of this Treaty could serve as a solid base Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and for future regional unification. Uzbekistan signed a Treaty with the Yet, Central Asias post-independence unprecedented title On Eternal history has implied divergence rather Friendship. This document in than convergence of the regional and principle signified much more than international policies of the two

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 position regarding the water problems in Central Asia and Kyrgyzstans and Tajikistans respective construction of hydropower dams on the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya rivers. The gap between Kazakhstans multi- vector policy and Uzbekistans adherence to bilateralism in their foreign policy concepts has been another factor impeding their capacity for regional leadership. This discrepancy finally led to a situation in which the two key Central Asian countries diminished their special responsibility for regional affairs. In the end, the Central Asian Cooperation Organization (CACO) a unique structure for regional integration ceased to exist in 2005 on the initiative of Astana and Tashkent. IMPLICATIONS: The newly established Uzbekistan-Kazakhstan strategic partnership is therefore a significant development. The very signing of such a document is a strong message reflecting a turning point in regional affairs. Indeed, implicit and explicit friction between Astana and Tashkent has constantly impeded real progress not only in bilateral but also regional relations. In order to make relations between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan genuinely strategic, they should be made comprehensive and embrace all important spheres. The strategic partnership should be forged in various directions: diplomatic, economic, military, cultural, and so on.

Central Asian pivots, illustrating that they failed to become real leaders of the region. Indeed, most observers of the overall regional developments in Central Asia and Kazakhstans and Uzbekistans foreign policy trends have argued that they compete for leadership and prestige rather than take responsibility for unification efforts.

Allegations about this competition peaked in March 2010, prompting Nazarbayev and Karimov to bring more clarity regarding the myth of competition. Nazarbayev then stated during a visit to Tashkent: There are no contradictions between our countries No clashes, no primacy all these are just invented We have enough will and political understanding to prevent this. Yet, some analysts interpreted the rapprochement between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan as a temporary strategic exchange: Uzbekistan agreed that Kazakhstan the then OSCE Chairman would hold an OSCE From this viewpoint, on the one hand, summit in Astana, and Kazakhstan the annual trade turnover between the expressed its support for Uzbekistans two countries has reached an impressive level of over US$ 2 billion.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 pressure on them to prevent the construction of dams on the Syr-Darya and Amu-Darya rivers. Rather it should use this highest level of cooperation for engaging with those small upstream countries to find a common solution to the dam problem. Taking into account the Treaty On Eternal Friendship and the previous assets of regional cooperation between and among all Central Asian countries accumulated since 1991 (the date of independence) until 2005 (the date of CACOs closure), the Strategic Partnership Agreement could actually have been adopted between all of them, not only Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, post-2005 developments in the region have revealed new divisions: between two upstream and three downstream countries, between stronger and weaker countries, etc. In these circumstances, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan manifest themselves as the most stable, strongest and key countries of Central Asia. Moreover, they are the most conservative ones. Their two leaders - Nazarbayev and Karimov led the regional process to a deadlock in 2005 when they decided to merge CACO with EAEC (Euro-Asian Economic Community). Hence, Astana and Tashkent should take on a new responsibility for restoring CACO and re-initiate the regional integration process.

Currently, hundreds of joint Kazakh- Uzbek companies exist and function in the territories of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, on the other hand, the foreign policies of the two states are based on contradictory principles. Astana adheres to a so- called multi-vector policy and has proclaimed a path to Europe strategy. Tashkent instead adheres to a bilateral policy. Kazakhstan is a member of the CSTO, which Uzbekistan abandoned in December last year. Nazarbayevs position regarding post-2014 Afghanistan, according to his recent statements, is relatively calm and he seems unalarmed regarding the possibility of an exacerbated situation in the region after the ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan. Karimov, to the contrary, is extremely concerned about the possibility of spillover of extremist and terrorist activity from Afghanistans territory to Central Asia after 2014.

By-and-large, a strategic partnership must manifest itself above all when it comes to the regional affairs in Central Asia. Only the existence of a clear-cut regional dimension can be a real litmus test for a strategic partnership between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Each of these Central Asian states established strategic relations with the U.S., Russia and other great powers, but their own common strategic partnership must be focused on Central Asia as a priority. CONCLUSIONS: Lifting the level of For instance, Uzbekistan should not bilateral relations between Kazakhstan seek to make Kazakhstan a strategic and Uzbekistan to a strategic partner against upstream Kyrgyzstan partnership format will be a serious and Tajikistan in order to exert challenge and a great opportunity for

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 Strategic partnership will inevitably require that Astana and Tashkent reconsider their foreign policy principles and doctrinal provisions, since states aspiring to be strategic partners essentially need common international positions. Their foreign policies should reflect something different than what Lord Palmerston once articulated, namely that a country has no eternal friends and no eternal enemies but has only eternal interests. Through their newly established strategic partnership, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are expected to demonstrate that they will never be enemies, that their interests are correlated, and that their friendship is based on a common identity and hence eternal. AUTHORS BIO: Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Education and Research Institution Bilim Karvoni in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

both countries. At the same time, this new trend will inevitably have profound implications for the entire Central Asia. From now on the overall relations between two key Central Asian countries Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are doomed to fluctuate within a triangle: competition; strategic partnership; and eternal friendship. Which trend will prevail will depend on how these two states define their national interests and their identity in the region and in the world. National interests defined on the basis of absolute sovereignty, as has been the case so far, will revive competition for leadership in Central Asia. National interests originating in the long-term vision of advantages of coordinated policy, especially in the sphere of security, will stipulate a strategic partnership perspective. National interests defined on the basis of recognition of common values and identity will reclaim the Eternal Friendship Treaty as the main driver of relations.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

AFGHANISTANS CHALLENGES AS NATIONAL ELECTIONS APPROACH

Given all the obstacles to a genuine peace agreement between the Taliban and the government in Afghanistan, the focus of international attention during the next year should be on ensuring Afghanistans continued economic development, strengthening the Afghan security forces, and holding free and fair elections on April 5 to ensure that a legitimate Afghan government has the authority to mobilize the Afghan nation against the Taliban and that foreign countries continue to provide the Afghan government with critical economic and security support. A failed presidential election would pose a significant obstacle to the continuation of such assistance.

Richard Weitz

BACKGROUND: As Afghanistan completes its Decade of Transition and heads into its Decade of Transformation, it is important not to lose sight of what already has been accomplished. During the past dozen years, the country has achieved major gains in the fields of education, gender equality, social mobility, health care, and one of the most vibrant and free media landscapes in Central Asia. A new generation of young people has arisen who presume more individual rights and respect and demand a brighter future than their parents. According to a recent RAND Corporation study of 20 major post- Cold War civil-military interventions, Afghanistan recorded the greatest improvement in its Human Development Index score (a composite measure of health, education, and income by the UN Development Program), the second greatest cumulative growth in per capita gross domestic product (based on International Monetary Fund data), and the third best improvement in its

government effectiveness score (measured by the World Bank). But the impending U.S. and NATO military withdrawals could inflict severe short-term pain on the national economy, sharply curtailing the countrys rapid GDP growth rate if not actually shrinking it. Not only are local contracts and jobs associated with the foreign military presence declining, but both foreign and Afghan investment capital is leaving the country for safer havens due to fears that security will worsen after the withdrawals. The national currency has also been losing value relative to foreign currencies. Drug trafficking is still pervasive even as Afghanistans legal economy remains heavily dependent on a level of foreign assistance that is not anticipated to endure at such high levels in future years. At present, Afghanistan typically ranks as one of the largest aid recipients of those countries that have troops fighting there. After their troops leave, the aid levels will likely be reduced.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 assistance for Afghanistan in 2013, making the country again the largest recipient of U.S. government foreign aid. These funds will cover a wide range of Afghan expenses including subsidizing the costs of holding the national elections and mitigating the reduced local contracts and jobs caused by the U.S. military withdrawal. But the Afghan government needs to make more progress in meeting its Tokyo Mutual Accountability commitments. In addition to free elections, these include improving governance, upholding human (especially women) rights, fighting corruption, and transitioning from a donor- and service-driven economy to one that emphasizes private sector-led growth. In return, the U.S. and other countries are seeking to raise the proportion of direct assistance going to Afghan government institutions rather than foreign ones in order to augment the Afghan governments civilian capacity and promote the countrys sustainable development. IMPLICATIONS: On July 3, the U.S. wisely announced the creation of a new two-year US$ 175 million bilateral incentive program to support Afghan government projects that would make specific and concrete progress toward the Tokyo goals. The administration has also said it would consolidate U.S. economic programming, end U.S.-funded stabilization programs, decrease new infrastructure spending, and focus on building Afghan government capacity to maintain prior U.S. investments.

Afghanistans long-term future rests on the countrys degree of integration with the rest of Central and South Asia, but it also needs a more benign regulatory and security environment to entice foreign entities to provide the capital and technologies to exploit its vast potential mineral wealth and transport these riches to foreign markets. Although the countrys mineral wealth is estimated at trillions of dollars, Afghanistans uncertain security and regulatory environment is preventing the much hoped construction of infrastructure for mining and resource transportation. The Afghan parliament is still debating a mineral law that meets international standards of transparency. Many signed contracts with potential foreign investors will expire soon unless appropriate legislation is enacted. The Afghan government desperately needs the revenue to pay for the war and critical public services. One important task for next years NATO summit will be to determine how to sustain the large ANSF constructed by ISAF, whose costs vastly exceed the entire Afghan governments budget, with additional foreign funding. The Obama administration has proposed US$ 3.4 billion in civilian

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 In June, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) assumed primary responsibility for ensuring security throughout the country. The NATO forces still in the country have now formally transitioned entirely to a support role. In his January 2013 State of the Union address, President Obama announced that 34,000 U.S. troops will depart Afghanistan within a year. That will bring U.S. forces down to around 32,000 by early 2014, with further decreases likely delayed until after the April 2014 presidential elections. Other foreign military contingents are following a comparable steep downward glide path. A major complication with the ground war is that the Obama administration has yet to announce how many U.S. troops it would like to keep in Afghanistan after 2014. At a recent congressional hearing, Peter Lavoy, Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that the Pentagon was considering such factors as progress in developing the Afghan National Security Forces, defeating al-Qaeda in the region, convening national elections in April 2014, advancing the peace process between the Afghan government and the Taliban, establishing a favorable regional security environment, and negotiating bilateral security agreements with the United States and NATO. The alliance must await the U.S. decision before determining its own force levels for its new post-2014 train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan.

The Afghan economy remains vulnerable to political setbacks. The all-important presidential ballot, scheduled for April 5, 2014, should see the first transfer of power from one freely elected Afghan government to another. The Afghan constitution endows the president with the power to appoint most national and even local officials, including provincial and district governors and police chiefs. The hope was that the countrys traditional political system, based on dialogue and consensus building, would counterbalance the dominant formal powers of the Afghan presidency. But critics accuse Karzai of making a show of consulting a wide range of stakeholders but then appointing his allies and other elites whose support he needs to dominate key institutions, including the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission and the Afghan High Peace Council, which is supposed to negotiate peace terms with the Taliban. Although we are less than one year away from the scheduled national elections, Afghanistan has yet to see the emergence of a strong presidential contender or electoral coalitions that have the potential to attract much support overall or across the countrys major ethnic groups. Meanwhile, European-sponsored national law and justice development programs are lagging behind, explaining why some Afghans in rural areas turn to the Taliban for legal judgments and enforcement.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 in U.S. aid to Islamabad, this source of cooperation will weaken. CONCLUSION: A failed presidential election would make a zero troop option more likely. The Obama administration should appoint a senior diplomat whose primary responsibility would be to ensure that Afghanistan will hold free and fair national elections on April 5. U.S. support for Afghan governance and security needs to focus more on law and justice issues. The White House should also announce soon at least a minimum post-2014 figure above zero while simultaneously declaring its willingness to renegotiate the figure with the next Afghan government, reflecting the reality that Karzais successor could repudiate any deal negotiated by his predecessor. AUTHORS BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute.

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The administrations lengthy decision- making process regarding U.S. troop levels after 2014 risks creating serious problems. In particular, the uncertainty is reinforcing the widespread abandonment narrative that the West was now prepared to again, as after the Cold War, to wash its hands of Afghanistan after a decent interval. In addition to dispiriting Washingtons Afghan allies and emboldening its adversaries, the uncertainty over the continued U.S. military presence is encouraging third parties such as Pakistani actors to hedge against a possible complete withdrawal by maintaining supportive ties with the Taliban. The Pakistan-U.S. relationship is held together by common interests rather than a genuine sense of partnership or shared values. The war in Afghanistan has been a source of tension between them but also helped hold them together. With the U.S. military withdrawal, and the resulting decline

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

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GEORGIAS NATO MEMBERSHIP WILL BRING REGIONAL STABILITY

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is the only reliable security umbrella for the Georgian state. Georgia made the political decision to join NATO in 2002. At the Bucharest Summit in 2008 NATO promised Georgia membership, and since 2011 allies refer to Georgia as an aspirant partner country. But Russia opposes Georgias NATO membership and some Western European countries see Georgias membership as a source of potential conflict with Russia. The alliance needs to provide real mechanisms for membership to Georgia that could bring much needed stability to the entire Caucasus region. BACKGROUND: NATO-Georgia Partnership Action Plan program. The cooperation started in 1992, when announcement came against the Georgia became a member of the backdrop of ongoing Russian military North Atlantic Cooperation Council operations in the Republic of (NACC). Georgia joined the Chechnya, a part of the Russian Partnership for Peace (PFP) program Federation bordering Georgia, and on March 23, 1994, and has since been Russian demands to use Georgian an active participant in every political territory for military operations and peacekeeping initiative open to against Chechen rebels. Russia also non-member states. On May 1, 1997, accused Georgia of harboring Chechen the Parliament of Georgia ratified the rebels in the Pankisi Gorge. In the face Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) of strong political pressure from between the States Parties to the Russia, punctuated by occasional North Atlantic Treaty and the other bombings of Georgian territory by states participating in the Partnership Russias air force, Georgia managed to for Peace program, and in March 1999, avoid war with Russia and to initiate Georgia joined the Planning and policies that brought Georgia closer to Review Process (PARP) of the the West. The Georgian government Partnership for Peace Program, supported the U.S. sponsored global helping to achieve interoperability of war on terror for the purpose of Georgian forces with other partners protecting its borders from and allowing Georgia more active penetration by radical Islamist groups participation in NATO activities. and expelling militant Chechen At the NATO Summit in Prague on insurgents from Georgian territory. November 21-22, 2002, Georgia Under the Train and Equip program, declared its aspiration to NATO the U.S. funded and trained Georgian membership and expressed its desire troops in managing antiterrorism to take part in the new Individual operations. This was the first instance of combat training for Georgian troops

Mamuka Tsereteli

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

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non-NATO-member contribution to ISAF and serving in one of the most dangerous areas, the Helmand province. Georgian casualties in Afghanistan include 29 dead and a larger number of severely wounded soldiers. In June, Georgia suffered its largest loss since the start of operations when 7 soldiers died in a suicide car explosion at the entrance of under NATO standards, and it has had Georgias military base in Helmand. significant political implications for the A great majority of the Georgian modernization of Georgias armed population supports Georgias NATO forces. membership as documented by On October 29, 2004, NATOs North plebiscite and multiple polls. On March Atlantic Council approved an 7, 2013, the newly elected Parliament Individual Partnership Action Plan for of Georgia passed a bipartisan Georgia, thus further advancing resolution on foreign policy, re- Georgias integration process with the confirming Georgias NATO and EU Alliance. Reflecting on Georgias membership aspirations, as well as a progress, NATO stated at the commitment to non-use of force in the Bucharest Summit in 2008 that process of restoring its territorial Georgia will become a member of integrity. NATO, but fell short of granting Georgia a Membership Action Plan. This decision was subsequently reconfirmed at successive NATO summits. After the five-day war with Russian September 2008, NATO and Georgia established the NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), an instrument that allows more intense high-level communication between NATO and Georgia. Since 2011, NATO documents refer to Georgia as an aspirant partner country. Georgia was an active part of the NATO peacekeeping operation in Kosovo, and had more than 2,000 troops in Iraq before the war with Russia. Georgia currently has almost 1,600 servicemen in Afghanistan, constituting the largest IMPLICATIONS: Three major implications can be observed in the process of Georgias aspiration for transatlantic integration and NATO membership. Firstly, the process is bringing Georgia closer to an advanced political, economic, technological, educational and cultural space, and thus contributes to the countrys progress. The European and Euro- Atlantic vector of Georgias foreign policy will remain dominant, but Georgia envisions a Euro-Atlantic future together with its South Caucasian neighbors, Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as Turkey. Yet, if Europe does not firmly support Georgias aspirations, there is little incentive for others to follow the same

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

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path, especially in the face of likely stand on the issue of NATO Russian repercussions. enlargement. In Europe, while Central Secondly, Georgias Euro-Atlantic and Eastern European states are aspiration irritates the Russian supporting further enlargement of the Federation. Russias leadership Alliance and Georgian membership, portrays Georgias desire to join NATO some of the Western European and integrate with the EU as a threat to countries are highly ambiguous: on the Russian national interests. In reality, one hand they signed the 2008 Georgias NATO membership will Bucharest declaration, and they strengthen the security of Russias officially term Georgia a membership southern border and help stabilize the aspirant country. On the other hand, North Caucasus. Unfortunately, Russia they are avoiding both political has not learned its lesson from the confrontation with Russia and 1990s when it supported the spending political capital in convincing separatist war in Abkhazia against Russia that NATO enlargement does not constitute a threat, but would Georgian central government, which helped destabilizing and radicalizing rather lead to stability, security and the region. Chechen fighters, who prosperity at its borders, ultimately fought against the Georgian strengthening Russia. NATO and its government, soon turned their arms European members should be honest against Russia. The same pattern can regarding the real reasons behind their be observed in the North Caucasus resistance to Georgias NATO after Russias aggression against membership and elaborate on an Georgia in 2008 and the stationing of adequate strategy to resolve the issue. Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The security environment in the North Caucasus has deteriorated since the 2008 war. Yet, Russia remains firm in its anti-Western and anti-NATO rhetoric, using this sentiment for domestic political purposes and playing a dangerous great-power nationalistic game. In reality, NATO is no threat to Russia, quite the contrary, and it is the job of Europeans, as well as the U.S., to explain the benefits of a Russian partnership with NATO. The third major implication of Georgias NATO aspiration is the uncertainty of European strategies. The U.S. has taken a much clearer Georgia needs a NATO integration process as a driver for its internal political and military reforms. The country has made substantial progress on its path toward NATO integration. According to certain indicators, Georgia is even ahead of some existing NATO members. Georgia has a military that is a provider of security in the most difficult areas of Afghanistan. There is still significant work ahead to get closer to NATO standards, but Georgia has already reached the point when it can be awarded with a clear plan for membership with a timeline. The sacrifices made by the Georgian people should be adequately recognized. Georgia has all the

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 from adjusting its policies and accepting Georgias NATO membership. This is an argument that Europeans need to make to Russia. Sooner or later Russia will recognize that strategically, NATO provides security to Russia, dealing with threats that Russia shares as well. If Russia changes its position, the issue of the conflict areas in Abkhazia and South Ossetia can be resolved in direct negotiations between Abkhaz and Georgians, and Ossetians and Georgians, where the international community can serve as a guarantor of agreements between the parties. AUTHORS BIO: Mamuka Tsereteli is Director of Research at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.

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elements of cooperation with NATO that can lead to membership, but some members avoid formalizing the process and calling it a Membership Action Plan. CONCLUSIONS: As history has shown since the 19th century, stability in the North Caucasus can only be achieved if there is stability and security in the South Caucasus. NATO can bring much needed security and stability to Georgia, and thus contribute to greater stability in the North Caucasus. NATO is no threat to Russia. Conversely, Russias security will benefit from NATOs presence at its southern border, just like it has benefited from NATOs presence in Afghanistan. Thus, instead of targeting Georgia and manipulating its security environment, Russia could benefit

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

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COSSACKS IN NORTH CAUCASUS DEMAND INCREASED SUPPORT FROM MOSCOW

Valeriy Dzutsev

BACKGROUND: At a rally of several thousand Terek Cossacks in the Stavropol region on July 8, the participants passed an unusually strongly worded resolution addressed to Russias president Vladimir Putin. In the document, the Terek Cossacks demanded that the government hand over to them highly valuable assets in the North Caucasus to support the process of the rebirth of the Cossacks and to strengthen Russias southern frontier. The list included a famous brandy factory in the city of Kizlyar, Dagestan; 100,000 hectares of arable land; quotas for fishing on the Caspian Sea, famous for its sturgeon and black caviar; control over recreational infrastructure in the regions resort areas; and a number of other benefits. In addition, the petitioners asked the government to finance Cossack centers in the North Caucasian republics and the Stavropol region. The list included nearly all high liquidity assets of the region.

Terek Cossacks in the North Caucasus have laid out surprisingly bold claims to the authorities in Moscow, attempting to carve out large chunks of property and resources in the region. The Cossacks outburst clashes with the interests of North Caucasians and contribute to the rising tensions between ethnic Russians and ethnic North Caucasians. While Moscow and regional authorities in the ethnic Russian-majority provinces have repeatedly played the Cossack card against the North Caucasians, the government also apparently loathes giving the Cossacks excessive prominence, fearing they might eventually grow into an independent force and challenge the central government.
Even staunch supporters of the Cossacks were astonished by the boldness of these property claims. Some observers called the Terek Cossacks resolution an ultimatum to Moscow. Mikhail Markelov a member of the Russian parliament that oversaw domestic political affairs including the Cossack issue in the recent past, called the Cossacks demands speculative and opportunistic. On July 10, the authorities indicted one of the Cossack leaders in a fraud case that can be perceived as raising a red flag by Moscow to moderate the aspirations of Cossack leaders. Also in July an information campaign ensued in the Russian media, following allegations of a rape of a Cossack man by a man of Dagestani ethnicity in the Stavropol region. The media constantly portrays ethnic Russians as being on the defensive on their own territory. Russian observers and authorities rarely criticize the Cossacks in the North Caucasus, also referred to as Terek Cossacks after the Terek River

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 North Caucasians technically have the same rights as Russian citizens and therefore both have a nominal right to settle wherever they want on Russian territory. In light of these legal constraints, the Cossacks came in handily to bypass them and seek to contain and reverse the demographic pressure from the North Caucasus. In August 2012, the governor of the Krasnodar region, Alexander Tkachyov unveiled a scandalous plan to use the Cossacks to thwart the influx of ethnic North Caucasians into the region. Tkachyov explained the mechanism of using the Cossacks as a militia, financed by the state and directly instructed to target and harass certain individuals on an ethnic basis. Unlike the police, the Cossacks could conduct ethnic profiling and therefore put pressure on the non-Russian citizens of Russia to prevent their settlement in Krasnodar region. IMPLICATIONS: The empowerment of the Cossacks by the government opened up a can of worms in the already tense, ethnically heterogeneous region of the North Caucasus. Moscows tacit or open endorsement of Cossacks and regular complaints about a decreasing ethnic Russian share of the population in the North Caucasus ostensibly divide Russias population into more and less desirable citizens. Cossacks may eventually pose a challenge to Moscow itself, if they acquire political weight. This is probably the strongest factor that still holds back efforts by the Russian

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that crosses a large part of the region from Kabardino-Balkaria in the west to Dagestan in the east. Normally, Russian government officials emphasize the important role of the Cossacks in preserving a Russian presence in this volatile and separatist-minded region. The North Caucasian republics have witnessed a persistent trend of migratory outflow of ethnic Russians and a rapid increase in the share of the indigenous population across the region since the 1970s. Moreover, North Caucasians started to encroach on the nearby Russian- majority regions of Stavropol and Krasnodar. Russian analysts and statesmen consider the eastern areas of the Stavropol region, bordering Dagestan and Chechnya, as a territory particularly vulnerable to the large- scale inflow of North Caucasians. Hence, regional and central authorities have long favored employing Cossacks to protect what is considered to be the land of Russia proper. Russian laws designed to prop up the Cossacks started to appear in 1990s. The problem of protecting ethnic Russian regions from the North Caucasians has been that both ethnic Russians and

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

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government to promote Cossacks as the defenders of the Russian state in the North Caucasus and border areas. In January 2013, governor Tkachyov announced that he decided to grant Cossack patrols the right to carry assault weapons. Thus, Krasnodars governor acquired his own little army. In Stavropol region, the Cossacks replaced the police as the guards of the regional governments buildings.

Caucasian Federal District. Russian nationalists demanded from the government to install migration controls to thwart uncontrolled migration from the North Caucasus to the region. Interestingly, Cossacks were divided over the issue; some Cossacks that are close to the government spoke against the Russian nationalists, but many were apparently quite supportive of the Apparently, as the Russian nationalists cause. government becomes more dependent Since the Russian government openly on the Cossacks to defend what they sides with the Cossacks over many regard as Russias national interests, important issues, republican the Cossacks predictably increase their governments in the North Caucasian demands and their political clout. republics will inevitably mirror the Russias national interests in such a same behavior. As the governors of the setting increasingly resemble the Stavropol and Krasnodar regions have interests of ethnic Russians. The expressed their support for Cossacks central governments reliance on the claims, nationalism is bound to grow in Cossacks may naturally translate into the North Caucasian republics too. conflicts between the indigenous Hence, the situation in the North population of the North Caucasus and Caucasus is gradually drifting to the Cossacks. square one, the start of 1990s, when Street clashes between Cossack patrols ethnic groups became powerful and North Caucasians have become political actors in the region. Yet, there very common in the Stavropol region. is a major difference between the One such clash in December 2012 current situation in the North resulted in the killing of a Cossack by Caucasus and the 1990s. Unlike ethnic an ethnic Chechen in the city of conflicts among North Caucasians at Nevinnomyssk in the Stavropol region. the time, the current ethnic tension in It took the authorities weeks and the the region is dominated by the divide detention of dozens of protesters to between ethnic Russian regions on the suppress an uprising of ethnic one side and ethnic North Caucasian Russians in the city. Ethnic Russians of regions on the other. Russian the Stavropol region set up a separatism in the 2010s may prove to movement to separate their region be a far greater threat to Moscows from the North Caucasian Federal rule in the North Caucasus than the District of which it is a part. Stavropol Chechen separatism of 1990s. is the only predominantly ethnic CONCLUSIONS: The prominence of Russian region that is part of the North the Cossack issue, and the Russian

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 Russians or remove mutual suspicions and hostilities between the different ethnic groups that make up the country. The Soviet era slogans of peoples friendship are no longer applicable, while no similar ideology for holding the country together has been introduced. AUTHORS BIO: Valeriy Dzutsev is a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at Jamestown Foundation and Doctoral Student in Political Science at Arizona State University.

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governments concerns about changes in the ethnic makeup of the countrys south, signify the failure of building a civic Russian nation. Ironically, having fought two bloody wars against separatists in Chechnya, Moscow is now either promoting the dividing lines between the North Caucasus and the rest of the Russian Federation or is unable to resist popular pressure from ethnic Russians. Having overpowered the small Chechen people, Moscow has appeared so far to be unable to contain the demographic pressure of the North Caucasian peoples, improve demographic indicators among ethnic

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

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On July 9, the Chairman of Turkmenistans State company Turkmengaz and the Chairman of Afghanistans Gas Corporation signed a gas sale-purchase agreement (GSPA) on the sidelines of the 17th meeting of the Steering Committee over the construction of the Turkmenistan- Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project in Ashgabat.

TURKMENISTAN AND AFGHANISTAN SIGN AGREEMENT OVER TAPI GAS PIPELINE Tavus Rejepova
It is not clear whether all four sides have been able to strike a gas price deal yet. Before such a deal is signed, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan operate on a Memorandum of Understanding only. According to estimates by energy experts, Afghanistan will earn about US$ 500 million per year in transit fees through the pipeline. It is expected that the gas exported from Turkmenistan will mainly be used to generate power for homes and industry facilities along the villages in Herat and Kandahar provinces in Afghanistan. Afghan officials claim that ethnic Turkmens and Afghan people living in villages along the pipeline will help protect the pipeline in the future as they will generate electricity directly out of the Turkmen gas. As a result of the consultations of the TAPI Steering Committee members in Ashgabat, all participants have agreed to establish a consortium or a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) called TAPI Ltd., which is expected to include the national gas companies of the member countries. The sides agreed to prepare the constituent documents to register TAPI Ltd. by the end of 2013. The TAPI members have also agreed to sign an agreement with ADB as the TAPI Transaction Advisor, which is expected to generate over US$ 7.5 billion to finance the project in the near future. Some energy analysts claim that the

Key energy officials from TAPI member countries attended meeting and the signing of the Turkmen-Afghan GSPA ceremony, including Wahidullah Shahrani, Afghanistans Petroleum and Mines Minister, Jam Kamal Khan, Pakistans Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister and Veerappa Moily, Indias Minister of Oil and Natural Gas who were also received by President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov during their visit to Turkmenistan. Representatives of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), which is leading the project and helping to seek funding among international financial institutions and oil and gas companies, also took part in the Steering Committee meeting. As per the Turkmen-Afghan gas deal, once the TAPI is completed, Afghanistan will purchase 500 million cubic meters of Turkmen gas in the first ten years, and 1 billion and 1.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) in the following second and third decades respectively.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

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true cost of the pipeline construction is GSPA with Afghanistan is considered between US$ 10 and US$ 12 billion. an essential step in this direction. Turkmenistans government maintains that there is no funding problem for the pipelines construction. Energy experts claim that it will be next to impossible to implement such a complex project without attracting major international oil and gas companies (IOCs) and that these IOCs are very reluctant to participate unless Turkmenistan agrees to some type of upstream concessions. Turkmen media reported that companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, BG Group, BP, Petronas and many other companies are interested and are preparing their individual proposals to the government of Turkmenistan. After the signing the Turkmen-Afghan gas deal, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India have now become the official buyers of Turkmen gas. In May 2012, the Pakistani company Inter State Gas System Limited and the Indian company GAIL Limited signed the relevant GSPA agreements with Turkmengaz. As it is currently facing a huge energy deficit, Pakistan needs the Turkmen gas more than any of the other TAPI member countries. Concurrently with TAPI, Pakistan is also planning to import over seven bcm from Iran through the Iran- Pakistan (IP) gas pipeline starting from 2014. At a meeting with President Berdimuhamedov, Pakistans Petroleum and Natural Resources Minister and his Indian counterpart particularly discussed the possibilities for speeding up the construction of TAPI. The signing of However, the instability in neighboring Afghanistan still remains an impediment to TAPIs construction. Afghanistans Petroleum and Mines Minister told journalists on July 17 that Afghanistan will ensure the security of the project by deploying 9,000-12,000 police for this purpose. Afghan press reported that Afghanistan will cover all expenses associated with deploying the police. The Taliban insurgent groups fighting in Afghanistan have not yet released any statement on the TAPI project. 735 kilometers the pipelines total 1,735 kilometers will cross through the territory of Afghanistan, 200 kilometers through Turkmenistan and 800 kilometers through Pakistan before it reaches the border town of Fazilka in India. Representatives of the Asian Development Bank say that the project is of crucial economic and political importance to the region. Besides bringing electricity to many Afghan families, the construction of the project is expected to create thousands of jobs along the route. If everything goes as planned by the Steering Committee, the design and construction of the pipeline should be completed within four to five years.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

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On June 17, 2013, the second level court in Bishkek acquitted and released Kamchybek Tashiev, Sadyr Japarov and Talant Mamytov, three opposition lawmakers previously convicted of attempting to stage a coup dtat in the country.

BISHKEK COURT RULES TO RELEASE THREE OPPOSITION LAWMAKERS Arslan Sabyrbekov

countrys most lucrative asset and the largest source of tax revenue owned for the most part by the Canadian Company Centerra Gold. During the demonstrations, Tashiev allegedly called to overthrow and replace the government and occupy the White House. Along with his supporters, he climbed over the White House fence. Later, Tashiev claimed he was just trying to get to his work.

The ruling of the Bishkek court to release three Kyrgyz opposition leaders convicted previously for attempting to violently overthrow the countrys legitimate authorities has sparked public discussions at all possible levels. Only several minutes after the announcement was made, social media platforms were full of varying comments ranging from welcoming the decision to accusing political leaders of bribing the judges and their supporters of pressuring and intimidating the Kyrgyz judiciary. The Kyrgyz Prosecutor Generals office brought the case to the countrys Supreme Court, which on August 6, 2013, sentenced the defendants to 1.5 years in prison but due to the fact that they were previously held in detention, this prison term has already expired. According to Kyrgyz law, one day in a detention facility constitutes two days in regular prison. On October 3, 2012 Tashiev, the leader of Ata-Jurt party, and two of his party members were arrested after organizing and leading a demonstration outside of the parliament to demand the nationalization of Kumtor, the

The Court proceedings lasted for almost nine months, with some circles claiming that this prolongation turned the politicians into martyrs, with their supporters even willing and intending to establish a monument in their honor. According to Kyrgyz political analyst Marat Kazakpayev, Tashiev can now use his prison experience to strengthen his opposition credentials and become the major political force against the president. He also noted that due to the arrest, Tashievs electorate grew in numbers and the ruling elite did not win anything from the process. There is no single opinion among the countrys political elite and experts to link the recent court decision to release the opposition leaders to the riots that broke out last month again over the fate of the gold mining company resulting in a number of injuries. The government managed to appease the demonstrators by promising them to invest more into their local infrastructure and to

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 demonstrations remains unclear, with the countrys president still making claims in front of Tashiev supporters that he had no control over the courts verdict. Meanwhile, during the first press conference after his release, Tashiev extended his gratitude to President Atambayev for his support and for ensuring the rule of law in the country. Local experts and analysts are also divided in their opinions over the expected changes in the countrys political environment due to this release. Some expect increased stability while others anticipate another season of political turmoil. One thing remains clear; the urgent need to achieve political consensus by all the parties involved in order to prevent further destabilization, which this time could put the question of statehood into jeopardy. This consensus will depend on the civic responsibility of the political forces.

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improve ordinary peoples lives. The unrest escalated and quickly spread into the Southern part of the country as well, where the Ata-Jurt Party enjoys significant support. On May 31, Ata-Jurt Party supporters were even able to seize the local Jalal-Abad main administration building and appointed their own so called peoples governor, who was later arrested and released due to a blockage of the road connecting the southern and northern parts of the Kyrgyz Republic. Kenjebek Bokoyev, a member of parliament from the Republic party, firmly believes that the recent court decision was politically motivated. He noted that the decision was taken in light of the demonstrations and with the objective of ensuring stability in the country. Some perceive this decision to be a sign of the weakness of the ruling elite, which from the beginning did not have a clear idea of how to handle the case. How much the central authorities had to fear these

On June 28, the Georgian state statistics office (Geostat) announced a 0 percent growth of the countrys real GDP in May. The economic slowdown started in 2012 Q4, accounting for a 2.9 percent increase in January, 2.1 percent in February and 0.2 percent in March of 2013. Prior to Geostats report, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the International

GEORGIAS ECONOMY STOPS GROWING Eka Janashia

Monetary fund (IMF) downgraded their 2013 growth forecasts for Georgias economy from 5 percent to 3 percent and from 6 percent to 4 percent, respectively. In its latest Regional Economic Prospects report, EBRD suggested that the lack of investment flows plus post- election political uncertainty led to a slowdown of the economy since the

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 dollarization policy and enlargement of the financial system through advancing the pension funds. The report signals an urgent necessity in lowering the current account deficit which remains one of the highest in the region, averaging 11.5 percent of GDP from 2010 to 2012. Unless it is limited to 6.5 percent, the countrys vulnerability to speculative capital or external exchange rate shocks will be extremely high, given the fact that Georgias gross external debt has reached 80 percent of GDP, the document says.

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end of 2012. The report assessed the restoration of Georgian-Russian trade optimistically, assuming that the move would contribute to an augmentation of Georgias exports over time. The IMF missions report examines the reasons and implications of the deceleration at a more fundamental level. It says that from 2010 to the first half of 2012, the economy has been growing rapidly at an average rate of 7 percent but started to slow in 2012 Q3, reducing the GDP growth to 4 percent in 2013, but could recover to around 6 percent from next year onwards. The report explains that uneasy procurement procedures and financial difficulties in the construction sector have reduced government spending and public consumption reflected in a consequent decline of the inflation rate, domestic demand as well as food and energy prices. As a result, in 2013 the revenue has been reduced by almost 1 percent of GDP and is now in need of a consistent monetary and fiscal policy plus improved clarity over economic policies to revert the economic recovery prospects.

In addition, the mission criticizes several steps taken by the new government led by Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. Among them are the premature announcements of some policy initiatives such as the newly adopted Labor Code and the reduction of electricity tariffs that lowered the profits of electricity distribution companies and increased public uncertainty over the terms of agreement reached with them. The IMF mission assumes that the shift may trigger concerns among potential IMF supports the National Bank of investors and prevent their entry into Georgias (NBG) initiative to issue the energy sector. government treasury bills and Further, the report indirectly deposits to encourage long term Lari questions the viability of various lending by banks and make it easier investment funds, such as the for them to access NBG funding. Agricultural Development Fund and However, at the same time, the report the Private Equity Fund, initiated by suggests a reduction of the real the government. While the intention interest rate to stimulate credit growth seems good, the potential size of these that has fallen from 30 percent in 2011 funds, uncertainty over their scope, to 12 percent in 2013. The other and possible preferential treatment measures proposed by the IMF could, inadvertently, discourage mission include a prudent de-

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 transfers reaches more than US$ 1 billion annually. This could be a reason for Georgias inability over the last decade to translate its economic growth into increased employment. Officially, the unemployment rate reaches 13-15 percent. However, according to polls conducted by local and foreign NGOs, 70 percent of the respondents consider themselves to be unemployed. In fact, due to their insufficient income, self-employed persons who constitute around 60 percent of the labor force do not deem themselves employed. Moreover, although 54 percent of the labor force works in the agrarian sector, it contributes only 8 percent of GDP. Thus, a large cash injection into the economy will not in itself guarantee economic growth. Instead, Georgia needs to conduct a proficient diagnosis of its scanty production capacity and develop a more precise vision for how to develop sectors where it has a comparative advantage. Such an approach, combined with a cautious fiscal and monetary policy, is needed if the announced large-scale investment is to yield tangible results for Georgias economy, and if it is really intended to produce commercial rather than political profits.

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investment by others, the report says. President Mikheil Saakashvili insisted in a televised statement on June 29 that the economic growth figures from May depicted a disastrous state of Georgias economy and blamed the government for failed social-economic policies. Now it is time for [PM Ivanishvili] to make a large-scale investment of his own money into Georgias economy, he said. In response Ivanishvili declared on July 3 that the capital of a co- investment fund would start operating in a few months, which could amount to US$ 6 billion including a contribution of US$ 1 billion from the PM personally. There will not be any problems with money ... the main obstacle is the lack of projects, he said Whereas a large flow of investment is instrumental in realizing Georgias economic potential, the countrys economy displays some peculiar features. The major driver of Georgias economy has been rising consumption rather than growing production capacity. The total amount of private and public consumption reaches 90 percent of Georgias GDP. In turn, the growth of consumption has mostly been encouraged through private reimbursement provided by emigrants. The amount of such

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013

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MOLDOVAN OMBUDSMAN UNDER FIRE AFTER CONTROVERSIAL SPEECH IN ARMENIA Mina Muradova
A diplomatic scandal has evolved around a comment made by Moldovas Ombudsman at an international conference in Yerevan, accusing Armenia of committing an act of genocide against Azeris during the Nagorno-Karabakh war. The fact that the charges were put forward in Armenias National Assembly was considered disrespectful to the host country and caused calls for the Ombudsmans resignation. Moldovas Ombudsman Aurelia Grigoriu arrived in Yerevan to participate in the Pan-European Conference on European standards of the rule of law and limits of the authorities discretion in the member- states of the Council of Europe. In her speech on respect for human rights in areas of frozen conflicts on July 4, she called Armenia an aggressor that occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijans territory and carried out an ethnic purge towards the Azerbaijani population in both Armenia and the occupied territories, followed by a genocide act in the Azerbaijani town of Khojaly in February, 1992. Grigorius speech, re-published by Day.az on July 8 from her Facebook page, reads that the aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan became the biggest impediment to development in the South Caucasus region and its integration to Europe. Moldovan parliament Igor Korman told journalists in Chisinau that the statement of Aurelia Grigoriu is an inadmissible, serious mistake. By no means can a parliamentarian advocate allow such a statement that damages the image of Moldova. He stressed that Grigorius statement does not reflect the official position of Chisinau and that Moldova needs to build constructive relations with both Armenian and Azerbaijan. At a news conference upon her return to Moldova, Grigoriu stated that her speech was based on the resolutions of the UN Security Council related to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and that she did not want to hurt anyones feelings my aim was to draw attention to violations of human rights in conflict zones to prevent similar events in the future.

Armenian politicians provided the story with a new dimension by claiming that Grigoriu was serving the interests of Azerbaijan. To be realistic, we can say that she has been bribed, Kiro Manoyan, a representative of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation from the Dashnaktsutyun Party, told Aysor.am on July 9. In an interview with Panorama.am on July 5, the Vice- Speaker of Armenias National Assembly Ermine Nagdalyan said the idea of the Moldovan Ombudsmans speech was actually interesting as Such a diplomatic mistake could cost Armenians sitting in the parliament Grigoriu her post. The speaker of the either had to bring a counterblow and

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 workers of the hotel ensured my safety. According to Grigoriu, the Armenian authorities demanded that she apologize publicly for her speech, but she refused to do so. She left the hotel accompanied by representatives of the Embassies of Georgia and Romania. The scandal was picked up by Azerbaijani officials who generally praised the brave statement of the Moldovan representative. Elnur Aslanov, Chief of the Presidential Administrations Political Analysis and Information Provision Department, said that The reaction of the Armenian side to the fair statement of the Moldovan Parliamentary Advocate on the Khojaly genocide, the persecution and pressure on Aurelia Grigoriu in Yerevan showed the Armenian governments terrorism policy, according to Azerbaijans APA agency. Aslanov called on European institutions to express their positions on the issue: If any citizens rights are violated in another country, members of the European Parliament should respond to the issue. The European Parliament should demonstrate its support for the protection of human rights and not pursue a policy of double standards. The Executive Secretary of the ruling Yeni Azerbaijan Party Ali Ahmadov called Grigorius speech a very brave step. First of all, it is a moral victory for Grigoriu. It is a victory of courage and justice. The act of the Moldovan Ombudsman should be an example for representatives of international

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look intolerant and undemocratic in front of the international community or they had to keep silent, leaving absolutely dirty condemnations without response. In both cases, the authors of the idea could feel satisfied. Immediately after Grigorius speech in parliament, Nagdalyan retorted by saying that she believed Grigoriu arrived in Armenia with a deliberate purpose and stressed that her speech was given according to an order and, moreover, it was paid. Grigoriu also condemned Nagdalyan as the issue escalated. In an interview to 1news.az, Grigoriu said that The vice- speaker of the Armenian parliament actually triggered this whole scandal at the international conference and started the tantrum first ... If Armenia claims that it is a country, a developing democracy, and welcomes the freedom of speech and expression, the officials of this country should not have escalated the situation. Grigoriu denied all allegations that she would have been bribed by Azerbaijan: This is a lie. Such actions of Armenia are nothing but a cheap PR maneuver. Grigoriu said she was not allowed by Armenian authorities to go to the airport together with the rest of the Moldovan delegation: 40 minutes before the flight, the driver of the car, sent by the organizers of the conference, said that he would not allow me in I stayed in the hotel and began to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova every 30 minutes Some people were attempting to get to me, but the hotel staff restricted the access the

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 7 August 2013 resignation before her parliamentary mandate formally expires in three months, but the Moldovan Parliaments Commission on Human Rights did not come to this conclusion after discussing the issue.

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organizations, who are used to voice statements in Baku that would be favored by Azerbaijanis and speak the language of Armenians in Yerevan. We must stop this practice, which complicates the process of settlement [of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict], Ahmadov said. He added the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs in particular should follow Grigorius example.

The issue did not affect Armenian President Serzh Sargsyans visit to Chisinau on July 11, when the sides stressed the importance of closer Meanwhile, the Armenian Diaspora in cooperation and signed two Moldova demanded Grigorius intergovernmental agreements.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 15 NO. 16 AUGUST 21 2013

Contents Analytical Articles NORTH CAUCASIAN FIGHTERS JOIN SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 3 Emil Souleimanov RUSSIA PRESSURES ARMENIA TO JOIN CUSTOMS UNION 6 Stephen Blank SHOULD KYRGYZSTAN SEARCH FOR INVESTORS AT HOME? 10 Rafis Abazov and Talaibek Koichumanov THE DOHA PROCESS AND AFGHANISTANS FUTURE 13 Naveed Ahmad Field Reports TURKMENISTAN AND TURKEY LAUNCH CONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL PORT 17 Tavus Rejepova KAZAKHSTAN BOOSTS ANTITERRORIST POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO GROWING THREATS 19 Georgiy Voloshin ARMENIA FACES TOUGH DECISION OVER ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT 20 Haroutin Khachatrian GIRL TRAVEL BAN PASSED IN KYRGYZSTAN 22 Aigul Kasymova

THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted articles first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central AsiaCaucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines:
Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local peoples future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue. Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words. Those interested in joining The Analysts pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: <scornell@jhu.edu> and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell
Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013

NORTH CAUCASIAN FIGHTERS JOIN SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Emil Souleimanov
In mid-July, the Chechen Republics President Ramzan Kadyrov admitted that Chechens have taken part in the Syria civil war on the side of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), allegations that he categorically denied one year ago. Simultaneously, the formal leader of the Caucasus Emirate Doku Umarov reversed his stance on the participation of Chechens in Syria. Umarov has earlier appealed to Chechen and North Caucasian youth to refrain from joining the Syria jihad and instead fight the infidels in their native land, but has now expressed his support for North Caucasian jihadists going to Syria, with the ultimate goal for them to return and join the insurgency upon their return from the Middle East. BACKGROUND: The statements of both rival leaders suggest that the participation of Chechens, as well as other North Caucasians, in the Syrian civil war has gained momentum in recent months, a fact that many foreign observers have increasingly pointed out. According to some estimates, hundreds of North Caucasians along with natives of Central Asian republics, particularly Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, and to a lesser extent the Volga-Ural region and Azerbaijan have been fighting on Syrian battlefields, with Chechens and Dagestanis in the numerical lead. Recently, Andrei Konin, the head of the FSBs regional branch, admitted that about 200 residents of Dagestan are currently in Syria, most of which are fighting alongside the rebels. The actual number of Chechens is likely even higher. The majority of post-Soviet Muslims recruited to the Syrian jihad come from their respective native countries. However, due to strict surveillance and a threat of collective punishment for insurgents and their family members imposed by the proMoscow Chechen authorities as part of the highly controversial counterinsurgency policy within the republic, the majority of Chechen fighters stem either from among the ethnic Chechen community in northern Georgia, Chechen diaspora groups in Europe (particularly Norway, France, Austria, and Poland), or Chechen students of Islamic theology in the Middle Eastern countries. The increasing numbers of North Caucasian fighters have been paralleled by a growing inflow into Syria of mujahedeen from across the Islamic world, not least from Arab countries and Turkey. This illustrates the increasing appeal of the Syria jihad, whilst multiplying reports of inhuman treatment of innocent people at the hands of the Assad forces and pro-regime militia has caught the imagination of pious Sunni Muslims from Morocco to Indonesia. Accordingly, anger toward the Putin regimes blatant support of the Assadites along with the brutal counterinsurgency practices in the North Caucasus seems to play a leading role among the North Caucasian volunteers

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 operation. In this regard, a Russian media outlet has recently alleged that Salman Bulgar, also known as Ayrat Vahitov, an ethnic Tatar originally from Naberezhnie Chelny in Tatarstan who is himself a Salafi with military experience from the Afghanistan war, is considered one of the recruitment officers in charge of headhunting through internet resources, running a Facebook profile and several other virtual resources as a sort of recruitment department. Yet sources believe that some sort of recommendation is still needed for the application to be taken seriously by the recruitment officers. In order to prevent Russian agents from infiltrating the recruitment process as well as fraud, the potential recruits usually need some previous experience with membership in Salafi communities and thus a recommendation from the leaders of those communities. However, other sources assert that such activities cannot take place without at least surveillance by the Russian secret services. Indeed, at the time being, the Russian authorities appear to avoid impeding the process of recruitment, although according to some sources, they routinely monitor the activities of the Salafi activists in the Internet and elsewhere. It seems that their major aim is to allow for would-be Jihadists to travel from Russia in relatively large numbers to ensure they do not join the ongoing insurgency in the North Caucasus or the Volga-Ural area, which would aggravate the security of the forthcoming Olympics in Sochi. Albeit enabling the transfer of young Russia-based Jihadists to Syria possibly suits Moscows interests in the short term, this will potentially create a serious

who decide to join the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Post-Soviet insurgents usually form distinct groups fighting on their own with leaders stemming from their native areas, and the extent of cooperation with the FSA varies significantly from group to group. As a rule, North Caucasian volunteers are inclined to acting on their own, showing relatively little subordination to the FSAs divided leadership, even some of their units have recently started to merge with the FSAs unified battalions. This is the case of the recently formed Jaish al-Muhajireen corps, which is composed of the mostly Arab Hattab and Jaish brigades and the mostly Chechen Muhajireen Brigade. On average, the North Caucasian fighters are regarded as more professional, experienced and well-equipped than Syrian fighters. They have earned a reputation as fierce warriors and hence enjoy respect among the international network of jihadi fighters, even though their involvement has sometimes sparked controversy among the local population. IMPLICATIONS: According to some local sources, a quite effective network of Salafi activists has recently been established in Russia with the aim of coordinating the recruitment of North Caucasian, Central Asian, and Tatar fighters to Syrian battlefields. They are increasingly adopting a virtual mode of

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 infuriated the sheikhs who have become eager to provide solid support for the North Caucasus insurgency, centered on logistical issues. Salafi activists obtain financial resources from Gulf countries, most notably Saudi Arabia and Qatar, that enable the fighters to travel to Turkey and then cross the Turkish-Syrian border to join the ranks the FSA. Money is usually transported from Istanbul to Moscow, Rostov-na-Donu, Kazan and some other Russian cities through a network of agents, some of whom pose as Turkish or Russian businessmen. Given the deterioration of relations between certain Gulf countries and Russia, the forces of the Caucasus Emirate might in the foreseeable future enjoy solid financial support and possibly also a safe haven from the sheikhs. Along with the hundreds of experienced fighters that will soon seek to return to the North Caucasus, this might pose a serious threat to Moscows interests in the region in general, and Russias internal security in particular. AUTHORS BIO: Emil Souleimanov is Associate Professor with the Department of Russian and East European Studies, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic. He is the author of Understanding Ethnopolitical Conflict: Karabakh, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia Wars Reconsidered (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2013) and An Endless War: The Russian-Chechen Conflict in Perspective (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2007).

problem for Russian authorities after the civil war in Syria is over and the jihadists, trained in guerilla warfare, will seek to return to their homeland in Russias predominantly Muslim areas with the ultimate aim of continuing the jihad. It will hence be crucial for Russian authorities to either prevent their return to Russia or imprison them on arrival. On the other hand, a part of the jihadists are likely to die on Syrian battlefields, which could be another explanation for Moscows relaxed attitude towards the engagement of North Caucasians in the conflict. Russian authorities have seemingly concluded that the outmigration of jihadists from the country will reduce the vitality of the domestic insurgency. Some sources claim that experienced jihadists are likely to travel also to areas like Afghanistan and Iraq in an effort to carry out Jihad. This could help destabilizing West-supported regimes in both countries and constitute a relative blow to U.S. interests, which might also suit Moscows agenda of weakening U.S. positions in those key areas. The fact that the Russian secret services routinely record the identities of Russian citizens traveling abroad is crucial for effectively hampering their return to Russia. CONCLUSIONS: The involvement of North Caucasian fighters in the Syrian war is also sponsored by Persian Gulf countries. Moscows concerted efforts to disable international support for the Sunni insurgents, its material support for the Assad regime, and the growing number of Iran-backed and Moscowapproved Shia fighters in the war have

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013

RUSSIA PRESSURES ARMENIA TO JOIN CUSTOMS UNION

Stephen Blank
The centerpiece of current Russian foreign policy is integrating as many postSoviet states as possible in what will ultimately be a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The first step of this process is to join a Customs Union and Russia is bringing enormous pressure to bear upon Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, and now Armenia to join. It is being made clear to these states that if they join the EEU or what Moscow calls EURASEC, they will not be able to join other trade organizations, e.g. those inherent in the EUs Eastern Partnership. While most publicity has focused on Ukraine, recent Russian policy towards Armenia is no less revealing of Moscows tactics and goals. BACKGROUND: Armenia has recently announced that drawing closer to the EU and signing an Association Agreement with Brussels are its main priorities. Once Armenia made that announcement Moscow drew up its heavy artillery. Even though EU Commissioner for Enlargement and the European Neighborhood, Stefan Fule, stated that this Association Agreement would not affect Armenias deep cooperation with Russia who has a military base and extensive military deployment in Armenia and controls its energy policy, Moscow announced its opposition to that integration with Europe. Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Russias former Ambassador to Armenia, warned that Armenia would get few tangible benefits from the agreement with the EU while risking alienating Russia because the Association Agreement would preclude Armenias entry into the Eurasian Economic Community and its Customs Union. Signing the agreement with Brussels would place boundaries between Russia and Armenia and lead to the withering of the current allied relations. Meanwhile Gazprom simultaneously announced its intention to acquire all the shares in the majority-owned Armenian natural gas distribution company rather than simply retain its 80 percent holding of those shares as is presently the case and extinguish any leverage that Armenia might have as a result. As part of its demands for Armenian entry into the Customs Union, Moscow announced plans for a 60 percent gas price rise. It settled for an 18 percent rise but even that might become excessively onerous for Armenia which almost totally depends on Russian energy. Yet, Russias support is crucial if Armenia wants to hold onto NagornoKarabakh, where Russia has also, through arms sales to both Armenia and Azerbaijan, demonstrated that it plays both sides against the middle to perpetuate that conflict and its ensuing leverage in the Caucasus. Not surprisingly, Armenias political opposition has strongly denounced Russias pressure on Armenia and the potential giveaway of Armenias remaining stake in its gas distribution network. It should also be clear to

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 of Georgias territorial integrity and sovereignty upon Tbilisi, it is projecting its power against Azerbaijan as well even if Azerbaijan has announced on June 28 that Azerbaijani gas will go to Europe through the Trans-Adriatic pipeline and not through Gazprom.

outside observers that Moscow has sought to bring similar pressures upon Kyiv to give up control of its distribution network to Russia in return for membership in the Customs Union. Such a deal, even if it briefly led to lower gas prices (and experience shows that this does not, in fact, happen) would also mean the effective renunciation of Ukraines (and Armenias) independence. Such tactics clearly explain these states resistance to Russia and Gazprom, albeit with varying degrees of success. These tactics also show the similarity across geography of Moscows tactical use of energy to blackmail states it believes should be in its thrall. IMPLICATIONS: Moscows two abiding goals are to integrate the entire post-Soviet space under its domination and as part of that larger multidimensional process, ensure that it is the only security manager in the Caucasus. Not only is it now using energy blackmail against Armenia; it has consistently tried to maintain the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict at a simmering level by providing large-scale military assistance to both Armenia and Azerbaijan to ensure its domination of any processes connected with conflict resolution there. But Russias Caucasus games do not end there. Leaving aside its determination to enforce an amputation

Despite Bakus June 28 announcement, apparently fearing Russian intervention in the October 2013 presidential elections, Azerbaijan made unbelievable promises to Rosneft about having it explore for oil in Azerbaijan, on land and in the Caspian Sea. When Moscow hosted a summit for countries exporting gas and did not invite Baku it thus sent an unmistakable signal that was understood along with its ability and past willingness to interfere in Azerbaijans domestic politics at a sensitive time. Bakus moves show the power residing in Russian energy firms that goes beyond the Russian Federations borders. But it also reflects the Azerbaijani reaction to Moscows more or less unveiled fist displayed in the Caucasus. Although the EU has stated its support for Armenias efforts to broaden its foreign policy, something more is needed if Armenia is to be able to stand up to Russian pressure. We must understand what will ensue if Yerevan cannot do so. Becoming ever more dependent upon Russia, Armenia will then be unable to move on its own accord either to break the impasse on Nagorno-Karabakh peacefully with Azerbaijan or to effectuate much needed domestic democratizing economic and political reforms. This means continued backwardness, authoritarian governance, and dependence upon Russia as both a protector and model. At the same time

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 CONCLUSIONS: Until now, the United States and Europe have essentially pursued a policy of neglect in the Caucasus, all of whose implications are malign as we can see from local trends in the security of the South Caucasus. More recently, in her confirmation testimony to be Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia, Victoria Nuland inveighed against the policy of doing nothing to resolve the frozen conflicts not just Nagorno-Karabakh that continue around the Black Sea to include Georgias conflicts and Moldova. One hopes that these remarks are not just rhetoric and actually betoken an American realization that allowing Russian domination of the Caucasus and taking a hands off policy towards the areas conflicts a policy that is really two sides of the same coin undermines regional security, makes conflict all the more likely, impedes democratization as well as the integration of local governments into Europe and thus contradicts the national interests not only of these states but also of the U.S. In this regard, Russias unceasing employment of the tactics of energy blackmail and its attempt to force all of its neighbors into an economic and ultimately political union neither benefits them, nor the West. Worse yet Moscows tactics would force all of its neighbors into accepting long-term backwardness and dependence upon a criminalized an increasingly economically incapable Russia. The practical question is whether the West will step up and expose Russian economic and political machinations for what they are and thus counter them or let another opportunity slip. As the

the state of high tension around NagornoKarabakh with both sides rearming and constant skirmishes occurring will continue. And further conflict could then break out, especially if there is no movement towards resolution. Only Russia benefits from both this tension and the potential of actual conflict. Neither Azerbaijan nor Armenia gains anything from it. If anything, their economic-political development and freely chosen integration into Europe is impeded by such trends. In domestic politics, the preservation of Putin-like regimes throughout may be seen as a boon to Russia but actually this represents a major and ongoing threat to peace for everyone, including those regimes. The Caucasus then becomes not just a hotbed of potential regional conflicts and of stagnant regimes that could easily give rise to major domestic upheavals given the widespread demonstrations against governments in Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Syria, and potentially other nearby countries. It also remains one of the most militarized areas of the world because of the very large and continuing Russian buildup here since 2008 which has not enhanced security but rather Russian domination. Indeed, Russian domination of any region in the CIS immediately lowers the level of security enjoyed by the local governments there, hardly a situation that any of them could want. In view of the repercussions of the Georgian-Russian war of 2008 that spread far beyond Georgia, the prospect of renewed strife and instability in the Caucasus is not one that should be viewed with complacency and/or equanimity.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 AUTHORS BIO: Stephen Blank is Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. The views expressed here do not represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.

history of the CIS over the last few years should remind us, opportunities to bolster the standing of the new post-Soviet states, once surrendered or lost, cannot be regained and then both they and the West pay the price for that malign neglect.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013

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SHOULD KYRGYZSTAN SEARCH FOR INVESTORS AT HOME?

Rafis Abazov and Talaibek Koichumanov
The Kyrgyz government has announced new initiatives aiming to attract foreign direct investments (FDIs) into the Kyrgyz national economy. The country needs significant resources to deal with chronic mass unemployment especially high among rural youth as well as widespread poverty and an aging manufacturing infrastructure. Yet, the experience of some developing countries, such as Bangladesh, India and China, suggests that help might be much closer than politicians think: in the so-called Bamboo Capitalism, diaspora-sponsored business development. According to various estimates, the rapidly growing Kyrgyz diaspora and domestic Kyrgyz businesses keep between US$ 1 and US$ 3 billion in foreign accounts, properties, businesses and equities. Can Kyrgyzstan utilize this unique opportunity to revive its national economy? BACKGROUND: Kyrgyz government officials have announced a number of measures to attract FDIs into its struggling economy. For the last 35 years the national economy has been experiencing very tough times due to the impact of the global financial crisis and increasing competition in the region for investments. The impact has been felt in such diverse sectors as tourism and the garment industry. The country experienced an almost 20 percent decline in FDIs from US$ 438 million in 2010 to US$ 391 in 2011 (World Bank est.). It needs to at least double the inflow of investments and technologies in order to achieve the necessary level of economic growth to create jobs for its growing population and to meet the demand for spending on national programs. The budget situation is so tight that government officials in Bishkek have been discussing the possibility of shutting down several ministries. The economic difficulties and dim prospect of positive economic change are putting a huge pressure on the population to migrate. Indeed Kyrgyzstan has emerged as one of the top migrantsending countries in the CIS zone along with neighboring Tajikistan. Estimates vary but experts put the numbers anywhere between 300,000 and one million people; an additional 80,000 to 120,000 people are involved each year in seasonal migration. In fact an entire generation of school and university graduates sees their future outside of their own country, regularly filling foreign-language schools across a linguistic spectrum ranging from Russian and English to Korean and Japanese and often citing a future career abroad as their first choice in school essays. Migration is a very controversial topic in Kyrgyzstan. On the one hand, a significant number of educated and highly-skilled young professionals have left or are leaving the country. On the other hand, these migrants have begun contributing to the economic development of Kyrgyzstan in a very different way by sending home remittances. According to World Bank estimates, remittances in Kyrgyzstan reached US$ 1379.3 million or 28 percent of the countrys GDP in 2010, up from US$ 112.7 million in 2003.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 At the center of these activities are vigorous private, family-funded small entrepreneurs what some economists call Bamboo Capitalists because like bamboo they are small, flexible and numerous. However, a careful economic analysis would reveal that most of the economic activities are limited to consumption and consumption-servicing sectors and are financed almost entirely by the inflow of remittances. Much of the construction work is funded by private individuals and is limited largely to housing, including luxury housing. The retail sector in the country is also experiencing a mini-boom, with prices in the major stores such as Tsum and BetaMall catching up with prices in energyrich capitals such as Astana, Baku and Moscow. Businessmen and women complain that they have no choice but to invest in short-term consumer markets, as they are not sure about the security of long-term investments in manufacturing and agriculture. Experts inside and outside the country hotly debate the impact of all these remittances on the economic development of Kyrgyzstan. Some argue that the large-scale remittances have a significant distorting effect on receiving countries as they exclusively stimulate consumption. Others argue that there is also a significant positive impact on the economic dynamics through stimulating domestic consumption as well as contributing to the growth of the service sector and creating jobs. CONCLUSIONS: Extended-family Bamboo businesses, funded by relatives through remittances, have been

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Migrants began sending remittances home during the 1990s, but over the last few years the country has experienced a steep rise in remittances through both legal banking transfers and informal channels similar to havala informal money transfer services popular in South Asia and the Middle East. IMPLICATIONS: Already for several years the government of Kyrgyzstan has been struggling to keep budget and financial stimulus tools balanced. Many developing countries use a variety of public policy and economic tools to increase their competitiveness and stimulate economic activities to jumpstart national economies. Unfortunately Kyrgyzstan is still at the bottom of the Global Competitiveness Index, remaining in 126th place (out of 142) in 20112012. And yet a visitor would be surprised to see that the country is seemingly booming. The capital Bishkek and several large urban centers are experiencing construction and consumer booms. Construction companies are completing new business offices, apartment buildings, private houses and large country residences (dachas), and the streets are full of expensive cars including large SUVs and limousines imported directly from the U.S.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 countries, but fail to work systematically on business and investment issues with them. The government also needs to develop the national strategy to support and stimulate the development of the SME sector and family businesses, and to find financial and other stimuli to direct remittances from pure consumption to investment inflow reaching SMEs and bringing know-how from successful diaspora businesses in foreign countries. AUTHORS BIO: Rafis Abazov, PhD, is a visiting professor at Al Farabi Kazakh National University and a director of Global Classroom Program. He also teaches at SIPA, Columbia University, NY. He is author most recently of The Role of Think Tanks in the Policy-Making Process in Kazakhstan (2011). Talaibek Koichumanov, PhD, is Head of the Secretariat of Investment council under the Kyrgyz government. He is author of ten books on economic development in Kyrgyzstan, including Kyrgyzstan: The Path Forward (2005). He is a former Minister of Economy and Minister of Finance of Kyrgyzstan.

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increasingly talking about the deterioration of the business environment and increasing risks and red tape. For example, Kyrgyzstan declined from 41st position in 2010 to 69th position in 2013 in the World Banks Doing Business Ranking. Some businesses have been closed or have downsized their activities and even started investing in other countries. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Kyrgyz entrepreneurs have begun investing in neighboring Kazakhstan, Russia and even such distant places as the Baltic States and the Czech Republic. The classic case of sustainable economic development for developing and leastdeveloped countries is about using the right combination of financial and policy tools to stimulate a positive and dynamic business environment. The government of Kyrgyzstan should prioritize core sectors and provide legal protection and more transparent taxation initiatives for diaspora investors and treat them as foreign investors. It should also consider a greater use of free economic zones, not only to attract foreign direct investments but also investments from the Kyrgyz diaspora. Representatives of the Kyrgyz government do maintain contacts with the Kyrgyz community in various

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013

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THE DOHA PROCESS AND AFGHANISTANS FUTURE

Naveed Ahmad
The Taliban finally have an address, far from their power base in Afghanistan. The place, commonly referred to as the Taliban Embassy by Doha taxi drivers, is receiving mixed reactions. After its opening on June 18, Pakistan welcomed the decision; India expressed caution that the office may confer legitimacy to the terrorist group while China found the development as encouraging and positive progress. Afghan President Hamid Karzai continues to stall the tripartite talks besides putting on hold a fourth round of negotiations on the status-of-forces agreement (SOFA) with the U.S. BACKGROUND: Not every commander and foot soldier of the Taliban militia is ready to accept negotiations with the U.S. or its allied Karzai regime, although this may change whenever the negotiations begin and more information trickles down the ranks of the Taliban. The first formal round of negotiations among the U.S., Afghanistans High Peace Council and the Taliban may not result in a breakthrough. The Talibans interest in a negotiated settlement can be gauged from the fact that its Supreme Commander Mulla Omar has appointed none other than his brother-in-law and spokesman Mulla Mohammad Omar Tayyab Agha as top negotiator in the Qatari capital. The militias former ambassador in Saudi Arabia Maulvi Shahabuddin Dilawar, alongside some key commanders, forms a multi-faceted negotiation team. The entourage has been in Qatar since January 3, 2012, holding several rounds of talks with U.S. delegations, without any major breakthrough. Meanwhile, their wives have enjoyed the time in cosmopolitan Doha malls and restaurants while their children attended modern schools and colleges. Since U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton coined the term good Taliban, negotiators and diplomats have had scores of rollercoaster rides. For the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, the primary goal was to defeat and disable the militia, a disastrous failure across the country including the Afghan capital. U.S. commanders then requested troop reinforcements in the so-called surge and zoned the countrys troubled regions based on insurgent groups. This did win partial success but at a slow speed and a high price. Exhausting all other options, the U.S. chose to do the right thing. The Taliban are now recognized as legitimate stakeholders. By actively engaging Pakistans Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry could gain what Clinton failed to achieve owing to a catastrophic decline in relations between Islamabad and Washington. A confident Taliban team has now added leverage particularly after Afghan President Karzais outbursts against the U.S. administration, NATO and Pakistan. Mulla Omars men have already tested

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 Peace Council (HPC), led by Salahuddin Rabbani, has proven functional despite the brutal murder of its chairman, Burhanuddin Rabbani. While the U.S., the Taliban and the HPC are set to engage with more contentious issues, President Hamid Karzai is getting increasingly isolated. With his second and final presidential term ending next year, Karzai has been desperate to preserve the political office in his vicinity. Intensive negotiations with likely but temporary hiccups imply an uncertain future for Hamid Karzai, who has no supporters in Islamabad a much bigger problem for Washington than for New Delhi. On the negotiating table, the U.S. will push the Taliban to reject al-Qaeda, accept an effective ceasefire in the wake of a security handover, and to respect and participate in the political process. The Taliban, on the other hand, find the existing political, bureaucratic and military setup discriminatory against the majority Pashtun population. The militia will push for a greater role for the marginalized ethnic segment. The Taliban are eager to have five Guantanamo prisoners released, i.e. Mulla Fazal Akhund, Khairullah Khairkhwa Noorullah Noori, Abdul Haq Waseeq and Mohammad Nabi in exchange for U.S. soldier Bowe Bergdahl who has been in their custody since 2009. In a symbolic move, U.S. President Obama has re-initiated the process for closing Guantanamo. Pakistani media reports that Islamabad has also facilitated low profile interaction between the nonPashtun Northern Alliance and the Taliban to strengthen the trust of all stakeholders including the U.S.

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the patience of U.S. and Qatar by hoisting their white flag and branding the office as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The symbols were removed on the request of Qatars government. The Taliban may be following the outline of a draft reconciliation agreement prepared in 1996 during Benazir Bhuttos government in Pakistan. Islamabad was a go-between then as well but short-sighted U.S. policies underestimated the militias resilience besides miscalculating the strength of warlords allied with Washington. The content of the negotiations reveals that the Taliban had limited connection with al-Qaeda while Osama bin Laden was invited to Kabul from Khartoum by none other than President Burhanuddin Rabbani. The Taliban supreme leader had even agreed to hand over bin Laden to any neutral Muslim country such as Turkey. The talks broke down as the U.S. refused the offer and later opted to fruitlessly fire cruise missiles. The angered Taliban embraced Shaikh Osama bin Laden and adopted a hard line posture. Engaging the Taliban, again with the help of Pakistan, the U.S. demands are no different from what the militia was offering 16 years ago. IMPLICATIONS: The softening position vis--vis the Taliban can game-changer, even more so Pakistan onboard. The Afghan U.S. be a with High

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 The sooner the Taliban categorically distances itself from al-Qaeda, denounces global terrorism and announces a ceasefire, the greater the prospects for an Afghan-led transition. The U.S. may have to be patient in the wake of hardline guerrilla attacks against its soldiers and material for some time. The reconciliation process has yet to take roots and Pakistan, Afghanistan, the U.S. and the Taliban must be watchful of any provocations. The SOFA will surely test the maturity of the reconciliation process as other stakeholders will not accept agreements between President Karzai and the U.S. and its allies. The likely presence of troops in post-2014 Afghanistan is set to become a tricky and divisive question in the Doha talks. CONCLUSIONS: The stalled Doha process must be speeded up to end the 12-year-old Afghan war by late 2014. A prolonged delay in resuming the Doha process is bound to have serious ramifications for NATOs withdrawal plans. The U.S. Secretary of State has already had talks with Afghanistan, India and Pakistan on this issue. Washington knows well that a suspension of talks is advantageous to the Taliban. President Karzai, however, has been trying to find leverage over the issue ahead of the April 2014 presidential elections. Afghanistan may confront a chaotic post-2014 future unless stakeholders avoid hardline posturing. AUTHORS BIO: Naveed Ahmad is an investigative journalist and academic, focusing on security, diplomacy and governance. He is founder of the Afghanistan 2014 project. He can be

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Once a serious bone of contention, the Talibans Haqqani chapter is no longer an irritant in Pakistan-U.S. relations but a partner in the Doha peace talks, a development that annoys President Hamid Karzai as well as his ally New Delhi. Pakistan will have to release more Taliban prisoners on Afghanistans request of as gesture of goodwill. Islamabad has already freed 26 Afghan prisoners belonging to the militia. The opening of a Taliban office followed by initial statements from both sides has already started to benefit Pakistan. Islamabad experiences reduced pressure to carry out a military operation in the restive semi-autonomous Waziristan region. Instead, its army chief General Kiani has called upon the internally displaced persons to return home. With the financial assistance of the United Arab Emirates, a 50 kilometer road linking its the regions two key cities, Wana and Angoor Adda, has been inaugurated while other healthcare and education projects near completion. Moreover, a smooth transition of power in Afghanistan will help Pakistan tackle its extremist problem in the tribal areas, where Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has safe havens and sympathizers. The table is set for negotiations but the real task of hammering out a powersharing formula has yet to be worked out. Afghan President Karzai seems the most uncertain variable, owing to his insecurity with regard to a possible role for Mulla Omar or his rival Abdullah Abdullah. With Saudi Arabia and Qatar being guarantors of the negotiations, Pakistan and the Taliban have little incentive to derail the process.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 and

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reached at ideas@ideas360.org; Twitter @naveed360.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013

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TURKMENISTAN AND TURKEY LAUNCH CONSTRUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL PORT

Tavus Rejepova
On August 15, the Turkeys Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan paid a one-day visit to Turkmenistan to promote Turkmen-Turkish cooperation and development of the trade and tourism industry. Alongside the visit, Prime Minister Erdogan and President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov participated in a symbolic groundbreaking ceremony of the construction of the new international port of Turkmenbashi on Turkmenistans Caspian Sea coast. A government delegation consisting of Turkeys Economy Minister Zafer Caglayan, Minister of Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz, as well as representatives of major Turkish businesses accompanied the Prime Minister during the visit. Prior to his arrival in Ankara, Erdogan was quoted as saying that the volume of projects carried out by Turkish companies in Turkmenistan has reached US$ 35 billion in total. Turkeys Gap Insaat Company, owned by Calik Group, was announced as the general contractor for the design and construction of the new international port in Turkmenbashi. Ahmet Calik, owner of Calik Group presented the sketches and video slides of the estimated US$ 2 billion international port to President Berdimuhamedov and Prime Minister Erdogan. Turkmen media reported that Gap Insaat was selected out of six other major companies bidding for the project. The new international port includes a construction of ferry, passenger and container terminals. In addition, the port complex will have a general loading terminal and a bulk cargo terminal, as well as a ship building and repair facility in accordance with International Association Classification Societies regulations. The total area of the seaport is over 1.2 million square meters. The new ports territory will also include several coastal lines for transportation services, such as 2,200-meter long highways and 5,300-meter long railway lines. The passenger terminal is going to have a port hotel, trade and entertainment centers as well as the local offices of state migration and passport control services. In order to protect the environment of the Caspian Sea, biotreatment equipment will be installed in each terminal as per the so-called Green port international standards and requirements. The project is expected to be completed by the end of 2017 and its implementation is in line with President Berdimuhamedovs general development plan of the Turkmenbashi international seaport and national merchant marine fleet by 2020. Once completed, the annual freight turnover at the port is expected to grow to 25 million tons by 2020, compared to the current estimated 10 million tons. Gap Insaat is planning to train the local specialists and operators in how to manage and operate the new port by international standards. President Berdimuhamedov authorized the State Service of Maritime and River Transport of Turkmenistan to sign a separate

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 company in Turkmenistan signed a US$ 2.2 billion contract in early 2013 to build a new modern airport in the capital city Ashgabat and it is also building a three phase, US$ 5 billion Olympic sports complex in Ashgabat to be completed before the 2017 Asian Indoor and Martial Art Games. Currently, over 600 Turkish companies are registered in Turkmenistan and the trade turnover between two countries in 2011 reached over US$ 3.5 billion. Turkish companies also hope that the Turkmen government will let them participate in other major projects such as the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan railway. Following the official ceremony over the seaport, Berdimuhamedov and Erdogan gave long speeches stressing that the new Turkmenbashi seaport on the Caspian Sea will become an important transportation link fostering economic and commercial ties between Asia and Europe. However, while this project may seem to be a major investment into the countrys transportation sector, it will be difficult to turn it into a busy transportation hub in the future unless there a sustainable service infrastructure is developed on the ground.

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contract with a German company Inros Lackner AG for overseeing the progress of work on the conceptual design and construction of the Turkmenbashi seaport. Prime Minister Erdogans visit follows Turkish President Abdullah Guls trip to Turkmenistan on May 29-31 when the two countries signed 12 bilateral agreements in the fields of energy, agriculture, sports and tourism. We show much interest in modernizing the Turkmenbashi seaport, Abdullah Gul was quoted as saying during this visit in May. Turkey and Turkmenistan had then struck deals to deliver Turkmen gas to Europe via Turkey, and also to export 600 million kW/h of Turkmen electricity to Turkey through Iran annually starting from July 1, 2013 to July 1, 2016. Granting such a major project to a Turkish company is also connected with President Berdimuhamedovs last visit to Turkey in August 2012 when he got closely acquainted with the Turkish portconstruction know-how and service infrastructure during tours of the ports in Istanbul and Izmir. Turkmenistan remains a leading market for Turkish companies abroad in many areas including the oil and gas sector, transport and communications, power generation, textile industry and construction of apartment buildings, plants, roads, bridges and resort areas. Polimeks, Turkeys leading construction

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013

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KAZAKHSTAN BOOSTS ANTITERORIST POLICIES IN RESPONSE TO GROWING THREATS

Georgiy Voloshin
On August 14, President Nazarbayev adopted new procedures regarding the notification of terrorist threats and the coordination of antiterrorist activities by competent state bodies. According to these rules, threats are now divided into three distinct categories each having its own color: yellow for potential security risks identified by law enforcement authorities, orange for confirmed risks and red for perpetrated terrorist attacks or the possibility of repeated attacks. In an interview to local media, the secretary of the ruling party NurOtan, Erlan Karin, said that Kazakhstans leadership had previously acknowledged serious gaps in the management of security risks, including terrorist and extremist activities. On the same day, an Astana court sentenced a group of five persons accused of terrorism to different prison terms ranging from five to ten years. As the prosecution reported, they had planned to stage bomb attacks directed against the countrys key political figures at the inauguration of Astanas new Opera and Ballet Theater which opened its doors to the public in late June. Furthermore, the Palace of Peace and Concord and the headquarters of the National Security Committee (NSC) in the capital could also have become possible targets. The final goal of the terrorist group was the destruction of the current political system and the establishment of an Islamic state in Kazakhstan. Earlier in August, Kazakhstans Prosecutor Generals Office reported that at least 75 members of the extremist organization Tablighi Jamaat had been identified in the country since the start of the year. While the list of terrorist organizations forbidden by Kazakhstani authorities includes 15 structures, Tablighi Jamaat has been mostly absent from the criminal records in recent years but remains a serious challenge to the stability of Kazakhstans southern neighbors, including Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Despite repeated attempts to set up regular security cooperation among the Central Asian republics, each of the five states mostly prefer to stick to national measures. While the forthcoming summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization scheduled for mid-September is expected to further boost the regional dimension, Kazakhstan is already close to finalizing its national antiterrorist strategy up to 2017. According to the preliminary version of this strategic document presented in May 2013 by the General Prosecutors Office, over US$ 1.3 billion would be spent from both national and regional budgets for the financing of antiterrorist policies including measures aimed to prevent the spread of religious radicalism. This strategy is in response to the worsening statistics in recent years in terms of combating terrorism and extremist ideologies. Thus, the number of persons sentenced to prison terms for their participation in clandestine terrorist

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 While the Kazakhstani government is increasingly focused on hard security measures, the eradication of radicalism also requires a strong social component in order to tackle the very sources of insecurity, such as chronic unemployment or everyday injustices. The Ministry of Regional Development established in September 2012 is officially in charge of spreading the benefits of Kazakhstans economic growth powered by oil and gas exports across the country. However, the recent economic troubles caused by the decreasing global demand for some of the raw materials and diminished tax revenues have only aggravated wealth disparities among Kazakhstani provinces. Likewise, President Nazarbayevs succession remains a major source of uncertainty as far as Kazakhstans shortand medium-term political prospects are concerned. The potential loss of control by the center over the regions dominated by local elites and interest groups could thus lead to more instability, since the states capacity to cope effectively with terrorist risks necessitates a strong vertical of power and centralized governance.

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organizations increased from 27 in 2008 to 171 last year, whereas those preaching religious extremism were only 56 in 2008 and almost 170 in 2012. The government also plans to modernize the equipment used by law enforcement officers, spending over 30 percent of the allotted funds on the purchase of new technological and physical protection solutions. Furthermore, Nazarbayev decreed on June 24 the establishment of a new antiterrorist center which thus replaced a similar structure created back in 1999 for the purpose of coordinating Kazakhstans response to terrorism under the authority of the NSC. Henceforth, the antiterrorist center will conduct its working meetings on a regular basis with the participation of the heads of 23 ministries and agencies as well as regional governors and the mayors of Astana and Almaty. The first such meeting already took place on July 10 and was chaired by the NSC head, Nurtay Abykayev. The operation of this refurbished coordination body will also be complemented by regional antiterrorist commissions accountable to the governors and tasked with the implementation of the national strategy and its specific action plans.

ARMENIA FACES TOUGH DECISION OVER ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT

Haroutiun Khachatrian
A peculiar situation has occurred in Armenia as the opposition and many non-politicians speak about external threats that the country may face in the near future. The issue under discussion is the EUs Eastern Partnership program. Armenia is a participant in that program and talks with EU representatives on an Association Agreement were successfully concluded on July 24. This

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 Firstly, Armenias strategic ally Russia has recently sold weapons to Azerbaijan worth over US$ 1 billion. Explanations that the trade was strictly business, or that the weapons will not shift the current regional balance which is in Armenias favor, are mostly ignored. Secondly, some Russian officials, including President Putin, state that Russia will introduce stricter migration rules the end of 2015. This will greatly affect Armenia, whose population gets over one third of its income from Russia. The fact that Armenians constitute a minor part of migrant workers in Russia, and that this move should hence not be considered as anti-Armenian is, again, largely ignored. Thirdly, President Putin recently visited Baku, while it is yet unknown whether he will visit Yerevan. Fourthly, Russian TV correspondents frequently repeat that Hrachya Harutyunyan is a citizen of Armenia. Harutyunyan is suspected of causing a serious car accident in Russia on July 13 in which 18 people were killed. Armenian speakers were especially upset by the fact that Harutyunyan was brought to the courtroom dressed in slippers and a womans robe. Some see worsening Armenian-Russian relations also in this fact. Fifthly, the exact content of the Association Agreement is still unknown, and it is frequently demanded that it is published, although experts maintain that a document cannot be publicized before it is initialized. Sixthly, according to the critics, the adoption in June of the Armenian law On the equal rights and equal opportunities of men and women is a precondition of the Association Agreement. According to them, the EU thus opens the door to alien practices that

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means that Armenia can initial its Association Agreement at the Eastern Partnership Vilnius summit in November. Along with Armenia, Georgia and Moldova can also initial their agreements, while Ukraine expects to sign its agreement at Vilnius. Belarus and Azerbaijan were not involved in talks at this stage. In parallel, a customs agreement drafted by Russia was presented to Armenia. Previous signatories to this agreement include Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, who are set to establish the Eurasian Union by 2015. According to former Russian Ambassador to Armenia Vyacheslav Kovalenko, Armenias membership in the Customs Union excludes any Association Agreement with the EU. Armenia has rejected its membership in the Customs Union saying that it has no common borders with its current members. Simultaneously, a public movement has gained momentum in Armenia, claiming that an agreement with the EU would provoke Russia, Armenias most important ally. Many Russian media outlets publish articles claiming that Armenia must not initiate an agreement with the EU (even a largely economic one), but there is not a single Russian official among the authors of these publications. Even Kovalenko was no longer Ambassador and occupied the post of deputy director of the Institute of Caspian Cooperation at the time of the interview. To fill this gap, discussion participants in Armenia, both politicians and analysts, present other facts that they believe to be indirect indications of worsening Armenian-Russian relations.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 opponents, including the Heritage party, former foreign minister and current parliament deputy Alexander Arzumanian, and former Deputy Defense Minister Vahan Ishkhanian. The arguments of the Agreements supporters can be summarized as follows: it is an economic document that will allow Armenia to improve its production in accordance with European standards and hence open European markets for Armenia and vice versa. Armenia will have the chance to achieve an additional growth of 2.3 percentage points of its GDP. This will not affect its cooperation with Russia and the CIS in the political, military and economic spheres. According to the latest statements, Armenia also hopes that the Agreement will create new incentives for opening of the Turkish-Armenian border and for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

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will lead to a breakdown of the traditional family, such as gay-parades and same-sex marriages. Such a position may also harm the Armenian military service, the critics say, and call on the government not to initial the document in Vilnius in order to maintain a distance to the EU. Due to the scarcity of news scoops during summer, this sort of criticism is being disseminated by almost every newspaper and has a certain influence on public opinion, making it more antiEuropean. The governing Republican Party itself seems to have few concerns about the agreement. Apart from the partys leader, President Serzh Sargsyan, who presented his position as early as in March, the Republican parliament deputy Samvel Nikoyan also spoke about this matter on July 25. The position of the authorities in favor of the Association Agreement is shared by a number of their

GIRL TRAVEL BAN PASSED IN KYRGYZSTAN

Aigul Kasymova
On June 12, 2013, the Kyrgyz Parliament passed legislation restricting girls under the age of 22 from travelling abroad. In total, 59 MPs voted in favor of the legislation and 2 against it. Social Democratic Party MP Yrgal Kadyralieva was the initiator of the legislation. According to Kadyralieva, the legislation is designed to protect young Kyrgyz girls from becoming prostitutes and working in brothels abroad, a problem that has increased in recent years. The regulation restricting free movement of girls under the age of 22 resulted in a widespread public disapproval in the capital of Bishkek despite Kadyralievas intensions, as stated in various public appearances, to protect the so-called moral welfare of the Kyrgyz nation. According to the decree, Kyrgyz girls under the age of 22 will require parental permission to travel abroad. The restriction, however, does not apply to girls who go abroad to study, get medical treatment, or employment as long as they have the necessary supporting documents. In an interview to kloop.kg, Kadyralieva defended her initiative by

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013 womens rights argue that this legislation will not change the problems migrant women face abroad. The legislation proposed by Kadyralieva, designed to protect the dignity of Kyrgyz girls and keep them from becoming sex slaves raised public debate on the issue. Following the proposal of the regulation, activists and youth began voicing their opinions through social media outlets. Certain activists argued that this bill violates not only Kyrgyzstans Constitution but is also human rights. Kyrgyzstans Ombudsman Tursunbek Akun spoke against the resolution and criticized the MPs decision to pass it. Others agreed with the proposed legislation by drawing on their own personal experiences (this mainly came from individuals who worked as migrant workers in Russia) and stating that the reality of young Kyrgyz girls engaging in so-called immoral activities abroad is not only awful but also brings shame to the nation. Other supporters of the legislation used social media to voice their support for Kadyralieva and her attempt to preserve the innocence of young girls and protect them from any abuse they might encounter abroad. The dispute over Kadyralievas legislation also sparked debate on gender equality in Kyrgyzstan and the right to free movement. Certain activists began raising the question of whether womens safety should come before womens right to freedom, including freedom of movement. The fact that the legislation was passed in Parliament does raise serious questions about the extent of the states interference in the private lives of its

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stating that she wants to fight human trafficking and sexual slavery. The MP noted that the legislation does not violate the Constitution but is designed to keep young Kyrgyz girls from travelling to foreign countries and becoming prostitutes, since according to Kadyralieva, being a prostitute is immoral. While according to Kyrgyz Constitution, everyone has the right to free movement, the MP went on to note the Constitutions article 20, which states that to protect the health, safety and morals of citizens their freedom of movement may be restricted. The MP stressed that the legislation does not prohibit young girls from travelling, but simply asks the parents to take full responsibility for their daughters actions or decision to go abroad and for any activities they might engage in. If the parental permission is granted, no prohibition can apply. In case of parental absence, a girl will then need written consent from her relatives. Kadyralieva concluded by saying that all she wants to have is a piece of legislation that will protect the national, social and moral security of the Kyrgyz nation. Kadyralieva is calling the resolution Sapargul. Sapargul was the name of a young female migrant who was brutally attacked by the so called Patriot movement in Russia. The Patriot movement was comprised of Kyrgyz migrant men who interrogated their female compatriots for allegedly having sexual encounters or relations with foreign men. Although the MP defends her legislation by stating that she has the interest of her people at heart, especially young girls, critics and activists for

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 21 August 2013

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citizens and reflects the general attitude towards women in Kyrgyz society.