TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY.

ABAO

GILCHRIST v. CUDDY (Jon) INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS FACTS: Cuddy was the owner of the film Zilgamar and that on April 24 he rented it to Gilchrist for a week in the sum of P 125. It was supposed to be delivered on May 26, but a week prior to delivery, Cuddy returned the money and said that he had made other arrangements with the film. The arrangement Cuddy mentioned was with Espejo in the amount of P 350 for a week. Gilchrist filed an injunction to prevent the showing of the film in Espejos theater. In the trial for permanent injunction it seems that Espejo was advised by his agents not to acquire the film since he would need to wait 6 weeks before he could acquire it. But Espejo went to Cuddy to offer him personally the amount of P 350 for the film. Cuddy was found guilty of breach of contract, but Espejo in his defense contended that he was free to compete with Gilchrist for the film since there was no contract between Cuddy and Gilchrist. ISSUE/S: 1. Whether Injunction was a proper action? 2. Whether Espejo is guilty of Tortious Interference? HELD: YES to both. 1. The feature film is depended upon to secure a larger attendance than if the place were filled by other films of mediocre quality. Hence Gilchrist was face with the immediate prospect of diminished profits by reason of the fact that if Espejo would be allowed to exhibit the film in Iloilo then it would be useless for him to show it again, as the desire of the public to witness the production would have been satisfied. 2. In the case at bar the only motive for interference with the Gilchrist-Cuddy contract was the desire of Espejo to make a profit from exhibiting the film in their theater. There was no 3B 08-09

malice beyond this desire, but this fact does not relieve them of legal liability for interference with that contract causing its breach.

DAYWALT v LA CORPORACION AGUSTINOS RECOLETOS (from Torts Reviewer) (Pau)

DE

LOS

PADRES

Facts: in 1902, Teodorica Endencia executed a contract whereby she obligated herself to convey to Geo W. Daywalt a 452-hectare parcel of land for P 4000. They agreed that a deed should be executed as soon as Endencias title to the land was perfected in the Court of Land Registration and a Torrens title issued in her name. When the Torrens title was issued, Endencia found out that the property measured 1248 hectares instead of 452 hectares, as she initially believed. Because of this, she became reluctant to transfer the whole tract to Daywalt, claiming that she never intended to sell so large an amount and that she had been misinformed as to its area. Daywalt filed an action for specific performance. The SC ordered Endencia to convey the entire tract to Daywalt. Meanwhile, La Corporacion de los Padres Agustinos Recoletos (Recoletos), was a religious corp., w/c owned an estate immediately adjacent to the property sold by Endencia to Daywalt. It also happened that Fr. Sanz, the representative of the Recoletos, exerted some influence and ascendancy over Endencia, who was a woman of little force and easily subject to the influence of other people. Fr. Sanz knew of the existence of the contracts with Daywalt and discouraged her from conveying the entire tract.

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

Daywalt filed an action for damages against the Recoletos on the ground that it unlawfully induced Endencia to refrain from the performance of her contract for the sale of the land in question and to withhold delivery of the Torrens title. Daywalts claim for damages against the Recoletos was for the huge sum of P 500000 [in the year 1919], since he claims that because of the interference of the Recoletos, he failed to consummate a contract with another person for the sale of the property and its conversion into a sugar mill. Issue: whether Recoletos is liable to Daywalt? Held: No, it is not liable. The stranger who interferes in a contract between other parties cannot become more extensively liable in damages for the non-performance of the contract than the party in whose behalf he intermediates. Hence, in order to determine the liability of the Recoletos, there is first a need to consider the liability of Endencia to Daywalt. The damages claimed by Daywalt from Endencia cannot be recovered from her, first, because these are special damages w/c were not w/in the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and secondly, these damages are too remote to be the subject of recovery. Since Endencia is not liable for damages to Daywalt, neither can the Recoletos be held liable. As already suggested, by advising Endencia not to perform the contract, the Recoletos could in no event render itself more extensively liable than the principal in the contract. RUBIO v COURT OF APPEALS (Grip) (interference in contractual relations) (other respondents: ROBERT O. PHILLIPS & SONS, INC., MAGDALENA YSMAEL PHILLIPS, MANUFACTURERS BANK & TRUST COMPANY, INC., HACIENDA BENITO, INC., VICTORIA 3B 08-09

VALLEY DEVELOPMENT PHILLIPS)

CORPORATION

and

ROBERT

O.

Facts: The petitioner seeks to reverse the decision of the CA, which ordered respondents to pay petitioner 4.25M, but ordered petitioner to pay respondents 4.4M and 7M in actual damages. The case arose from a 1966 case filed by respondents Robert O. Phillips & Sons, Inc. (ROPSI) against petitioner, asking for a TRO to stop Rubio from unlawfully and willfully interfering in the transaction between the company and the Yuchengco regarding the sale of the stocks in Hacienda Benito, Inc. Rubio had shares of stock in Hacienda Benito, and they sold these shares to ROPSI for 5.5M payable in installments. Meanwhile, Robert O. Phillips, on behalf of his wife and ROPSI, entered into negotiations with Yuchengco for the sale of shares in the Hacienda. The spouses Rubio, through their lawyer, reminded ROPSI of their unpaid obligation. ROPSI then told Rubio not to interfere with the negotiations. Rubio declined, so ROPSI asked the above mentioned TRO. Rubio filed a certiorari case in the SC, wherein the SC lifted the TRO. (The respondent bank foreclosed on certain properties of the Hacienda, and the SC also allowed this, against the objections of Rubio. Rubio alleged that it was a ploy of ROPSI to hide properties of the Hacienda from him.) After trial on the merits, the above stated decision was rendered. Hence this petition. Issue: Whether or not petitioner unlawfully interfered in the transactions which made the award of damages proper? Held: No Taking into consideration, all the details of the negotiations in the sale of the shares of stock of Hacienda

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

Benito, Inc. from ROPSI to Mr. Yuchengco, there is no factual or legal basis for the appellate court's conclusion that the petitioner unlawfully and inofficiously interfered with the negotiations. We fail to see any reason why the petitioner should be accused of unlawful interference in maintaining his stand regarding the sale of shares of stock The petitioner never pretended that he still had full control of the shares of stock which he sold to ROPSI. He in fact admitted that the shares of stock were already transferred to the corporation and that he did not have a recorded lien therein. He merely made of record his right to rescind under the original contract of sale. The details pertaining to the earlier transaction governing the sale of the shares of stock between the petitioner and Phillips and Sons were in fact, all known to Yuchengco. And, more important, it is obvious from the records that the petitioner's interest was only in the payment of the P4,250,000.00 balance due him from ROPSI. The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that the petitioner is not liable for any form of damages in favor of ROPSI and the Phillips spouses. (the award of damages in favor of the bank was also removed and set aside.) SO PING BUN v CA (Irah) Facts: Tek Hua Trading (Trading) entered into agreements with Dee C. Chua & Sons Inc. (DCCSI) for the lease of several premises which Trading used to store its textiles. The successor of Trading, Tek Hua Enterprising (Enterprising), allowed So Ping Bun, the grandson of the managing partner of Trading, to use the premises to store his own textiles. Later, Manuel Tiong, one of the members of Enterprising, asked So Ping Bun via a letter to vacate the premises within 14 days since he needed it for his textile business. So Ping Bun refused to vacate. Instead, So Ping Bun entered into lease contracts 3B 08-09

with DCCSI over the same premises. Enterprising and Manuel Tiong filed an action to nullify the contracts between So Ping Bun and DCCSI and also claimed damages against So Ping Bun for unlawful interference in the lease contracts between DCCSI and Enterprising. Issue/s: Did So Ping Bun commit unlawful interference? (YES) Is So Ping Bun liable for damages? (NO) Held: The elements of tort interference are: a) existence of a valid contract; b) knowledge on the part of the third person of the existence of the contract; and c) interference of the third person is without legal justification or excuse In this case, Trendsetter Marketing (So Ping Bun's company) asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in its favor, and as a result, it was able to deprive Enterprising of its property rights. The three elements of tort interference are present since So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his enterprise at the expense of Enterprising. However, So Ping Bun still cannot be held liable for damages. Though he took interest in the property of Enterprising and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice on him. The business desire is there to make some gain to the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve So Ping Bun of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. Thus, the appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the contracts between DCCSI and Trendsetter, without awarding damages. LAGON v CA (Ysan)

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

Facts: Lapuz claimed that he entered into a contract of lease with the late Bai Tonina Sepi over three parcels of land in Sultan Kudarat beginning 1964. One of the provisions agreed upon was for Lapuz to put up commercial buildings which would, in turn, be leased to new tenants. The rentals to be paid by those tenants would answer for the rent Lapuz was obligated to pay Bai Tonina Sepi for the lease of the land. In 1974, the lease contract ended but since the construction of the commercial buildings had yet to be completed, the lease contract was allegedly renewed. When Bai Tonina Sepi died, Lapuz started remitting his rent to the court-appointed administrator of her estate. But when the administrator advised him to stop collecting rentals from the tenants of the buildings he constructed, he discovered that Lagon, representing himself as the new owner of the property, had been collecting rentals from the tenants. He thus filed a complaint against the latter, accusing Lagon of inducing the heirs of Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him, thereby violating his leasehold rights over it. Issue: Whether the purchase by Lagon of the subject property, during the supposed existence of Lapuzs lease contract with the late Bai Tonina Sepi, constituted tortuous interference for which Lagon should be held liable for damages Held: No. In our view, Lagons purchase of the subject property was merely an advancement of his financial or economic interests, absent any proof that he was enthused by improper motives. In the very early case of Gilchrist v. Cuddy, the Court declared that a person is not a malicious interferer if his conduct is impelled by a proper business interest. In other words, a 3B 08-09

financial or profit motivation will not necessarily make a person an officious interferer liable for damages as long as there is no malice or bad faith involved. In sum, the Court ruled that, inasmuch as not all three elements to hold Lagon liable for tortuous interference are present, he cannot be made to answer for Lapuzs losses. This case is one of damnun absque injuria or damage without injury. Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury. Indeed, lack of malice in the conduct complained of precludes recovery of damages.

BANEZ v. VALDEVILLA (Vince) Bebiano Banez was the sales operations manager of private respondent Oro Marketing, Inc. (ORO). In 1993, ORO indefinitely suspended Banez and the latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC in Iligan City. The Labor Arbiter found that Banez had been illegally dismissed and ordered the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and of backwages and attorneys fees. The decision was appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the same for having been filed out of time. In 1995, ORO filed a complaint for damages before the RTC of Misamis Oriental against Banez for lost profit and earnings due to the abandonment or neglect of his duties as sales manager. Banez opposes this and claims that the action for damages, having arisen from an employer-employee relationship, was squarely under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

NLRC under the Labor Code and is barred by final judgment in the labor case. RTC Judge Valdevilla dismissed Banez motion to dismiss and hence, this appeal. Issue: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction in the claim for damages filed by ORO. Held: NO. There is no mistaking the fact that OROs claim against petitioner for actual damages arose from a prior employeremployee relationship. Article 217(a) of the Labor Code, as amended, clearly bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations in other words, the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not only the reliefs provided by labor laws, but also damages governed by the Civil Code. This is, of course, to distinguish from cases of action for damages where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action proceeds from a different source of obligation. The jurisdiction of the regular courts was upheld in such cases. Thus, it is obvious that OROs remedy is not in the filing of the separate action for damages, but in properly perfecting an appeal from the Labor Arbiters decision. Having lost the right to appeal, the labor case stands a final judgment on the merits. DMPI EMPLOYEES v VELEZ (Krisette) FACTS: 3B 08-09

An information for estafa was filed against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to Eriberta Villegas the amount of about P600K. Villegas entrusted this amount to Mandawe, an employee of DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of DMPI-ECCI. Subsequently, Villegas filed with the RTC a complaint against Mandawe and DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. DMPI-ECCI filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that there was already a pending criminal case arising from the same facts, and that the complaint failed to contain a certification against forum shopping. TC dismissed the case, but later upon motion for reconsideration of Villegas, it reversed itself and recalled the dismissal of the case.

ISSUE: Whether the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa. HELD: YES. The civil case can proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa. Under Rule 111, Sec.1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on Dec.1, 2000, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Sec.2 of the same rule provides that after the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action. However, only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code. The reservation only refers to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged [under Art.100 of the RPC]. This does not include the recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation. Thus, the civil case instituted by Villegas, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed against him under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.

action should be filed where the criminal action is filed, and vice versa, provided that the court where the civil action or the criminal action is first filed, shall acquire jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Two of the defendants opposed. The RTC ruled against the opposition and consolidated the cases. The CA reversed. ISSUE: May a criminal case for libel and an independent civil action for damages arising therefrom be consolidated for joint trial pursuant to Art. 33 of Civil Code? HELD: Yes. It is common knowledge that both the civil and criminal case involve common or identical issues, and that they would have the same witnesses. Also, the Cojungco spouses are correct in invoking Art. 360 of RPC. The Rules of Court also also allows that an independent civil action based on Arts. 32, 33, 34, or 2176 of the Civil Code filed before the insitution of the criminal case may be instituted with the latter, subjecto the condition that no final judgment has been made in the criminal case. Therefore, the decision of the CA should be reversed. The feared chaos or confusion of the CA in procedure is at best speculative and the possible difficulty the judge may face in light of the different tests of sufficiency of proof in each case unfounded for it fails to consider the instances when the civil aspect is impliedly instituted with the criminal action. ANDAMO V. IAC (Kristel) 191 SCRA 195 Facts: Petitioner spouses Emmanuel and Natividad Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Biga (Biluso) Silang, Cavite which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation.

COJUANGCO, JR. v CA (Alpe) FACTS: In the 14 June 1972 issue of the Graphic, a weekly magazine in the Philippines, under the column social climbing, an item appeared. Claming that the item alludes to them, the Cojuanco spouses, and that the item was false, malicious and constitutes a vicious attack on the wifes honor and accuses her of the immoral acts of following up a loan, as well as adultery and prostitution, they filed a civil action for damages based on libel in the CFI against Graphic Magazine and the writers on 11 July 1972. On December 1972, the fiscal of the court mentioned filed a criminal case for libel against the Graphic writers. The Cojuangco spouses filed a separate motions to consolidate the criminal case with the civil case, saying that time and efforts of the court and the parties would be saved by such consolidation. Art. 360 of the RPC also provides that the civil 3B 08-09

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

Issue:

Within the land of respondent corporation, waterpaths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed starting from the middle-right portion thereof leading to a big hole or opening which serves as the exit-point of the floodwater coming from the land of defendant, and at the same time, the entrance-point of the same floodwater to the land of plaintiffs, year after year, during rainy or stormy seasons and which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioners and their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. The Andamos instituted a criminal action against the officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction by means of inundation under Article 324 of the Revised Penal Code. Subsequently, they filed another action against respondent corporation, this time a civil case for damages with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction before the same court. The civil case was suspended until after judgment of the criminal case. The trial court then dismissed the civil case stating under section 3 (a), Rule III of the Rules of Court which provides that "criminal and civil actions arising from the same offense may be instituted separately, but after the criminal action has been commenced the civil action cannot be instituted until final judgment has been rendered in the criminal action." Petitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court erred in dismissing civil case since it is predicated on a quasi-delict.

Whether or not the lower courts erred in dismissing the civil case

Held: YES. A careful examination of the complaint shows that the civil action is one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasidelict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. In the case of Castillo vs. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court held that a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extracontractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the event of an acquittal where the court has declared that the fact from which the civil action arose did not exist, in which case the extinction of the criminal liability would carry with it the extinction of the civil liability.

3B 08-09

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

In Azucena vs. Potenciano, 16 the Court declared that in quasi-delicts, "(t)he civil action is entirely independent of the criminal case according to Articles 33 and 2177 of the Civil Code. There can be no logical conclusion than this, for to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the result of the criminal prosecution whether it be conviction or acquittal would render meaningless the independent character of the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31, that his action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter." The ruling of the lower court is reversed and set aside.

JOSE S. CANCIO, JR. vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP (Mayco) An independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution and which require no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-shopping will not operate to bar the same. Facts: Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and three cases of Estafa, against respondent for allegedly issuing the following checks without sufficient funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check No. 25001151 in the amount of P80,000.00; 2) Interbank Check No. 25001152 in the amount of P 80,000.00; and 3) Interbank Check No. 25001157 in the amount of P30,000.00. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Criminal Case No. 13356, for Violation of B.P. No. 22 covering check no. 25001151 on the ground that the check was deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of the check. The two other cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22 (Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filed with and 3B 08-09

subsequently dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1, on the ground of failure to prosecute. Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, after failing to present its second witness, the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right to file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases. On the same date, the trial court granted the motions of the prosecution and the cases were dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect of the cases. Petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of money, seeking to recover the amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint contending that petitioners action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent further prayed that petitioner should be held in contempt of court for forum-shopping. Issues: 1) whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases 2) whether the filing of said civil action violated the antiforum-shopping rule. Held: 1.) No. One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case, it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

2) No. The filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent did not amount to forumshopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. PADILLA, et al. v COURT OF APPEALS (Edz) 129 SCRA 558 Acquittal Facts: Padilla (P), et al. were found guilty of grave coercion for unlawfully preventing, by means of threat, force and violence, Vergara (V) and his family from closing their stall at a public market and for forcibly opening the door of the stall, demolishing and destroying it and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise. Accused allegedly took advantage of their positions: P was the incumbent municipal mayor, while the rest were policemen except for one civilian. P, et al. appealed to the CA, claiming that P had the power to order removal of the stall, which was deemed a nuisance per se under a municipal ordinance. The CA acquitted the accused on ground of reasonable doubt, but still held them liable for actual damages (P9,600). 3B 08-09

Issue: Did the acquittal based on reasonable doubt as to the criminal liability result in the extinction of the civil liability? Held: NO. P, et al. were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them. They were acquitted because their acts were denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief. (Crime of coercion requires that the violence be employed against the person, not against property) The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability ex delicto under Art. 100, RPC. The civil liability must have arisen from the act as a crime. The same punishable act or omission can create 2 kinds of civil liabilities against the accused: that arising from the act as a crime and that arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either of these 2 may be enforced against the accused. However, the offended party cannot recover under both types of liability. Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature; and where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted. There are no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed sincce the facts to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. The accused themselves do not deny that they caused the destruction of Vs market stall and had its contents carted away.

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

home to the appellate court the fundamental unfairness of considering the decision in the criminal case conclusive on the civil case. HEIRS OF GUARING v. CA (Jon) EFFECTS OF AQCUITTAL SAPIERA v CA (From Torts reviewer) (Pau) FACTS: The case arose from a vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987 along the North Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Teodoro Guaring was driving a Mitsubishi Lancer who died as a result of the accident. The heirs of Guaring contended that the Philippine Rabit Bus, tried to overtake the car of Guaring by passing to the right, but the bus hit the rear of the car, due to the impact the car swerved to the opposite lane and hit the Toyota Cressida. The respondents countered that it was Guaring who was negligent while trying to overtake the buss he went to the opposite lane which caused him to crash to the Toyota Cressida. The RTC in its decision found the Bus Company and its driver at fault. The CA reveresd the Decision of the RTC on the strength of the Decision on the criminal case filed against the driver, the case being dismissed. The Court rationalized that since the action was based on negligence, the acquittal of the driver in the case of Reckless Imprudence made the case for quasi-delict untenable. ISSUE: Whether the dismissal of the criminal case of the driver who committed the tort, also removed the civil liability? HELD: NO The damages sought on the basis of crime and not quasi-delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable doubt. It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part therein. Thus the witnesses presented on behalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecution should have brought 3B 08-09 Facts: Sapiera bought merchandise from Sua and paid for them using 2 checks issued by Arturo de Guzman and signed at the back by Sapiera. The checks were dishonoured. Sapiera was charged w/ 4 counts of Estafa and de Guzman was charged w/ 2 violations of BP 22. the RTC acquitted Sapiera of all the charges of estafa but did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to Ramon Sua. De Guzman was convicted. Sua appealed on the civil aspect and prayed that the court order Sapiera to pay the aggregate value of the checks indorsed be her plus interest, etc. The CA denied the appeal, but on MR, held that Sapiera was liable for P 335k minus P 125k that de Guzman had already paid. Issue: Whether Sapieras acquittal extinguished her liability for damages? Held: No, Sapiera could still be and was properly held liable for damages. The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration that the fact from w/c the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where: a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; b) where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only civil and nature, and c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of w/c the accused is acquitted. In this case, Sapieras acquittal was due to the fact that conspiracy was not proved before the trial court. However, despite the absence of conspiracy, she did

10

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

sign the back of the checks and became an indorser thereon and obliged herself to pay the amount of the checks to the holder. MACCAY v NOBELA (civil liability arising from crime) Facts: The petition for review seeks to reverse the decision of the CA dismissing the complaint filed by petitioner Maccay against the spouses Nobela for falsification of public documents. A certain Adelaida Potenciano was looking for buyers of two parcels of land of Maccay. She eventually got to talk to the spouses Nobela. She introduced herself as the wife of Maccay (who had a different name, Barba). Maccay, who met the spouses in his police uniform (he was a colonel), impressed the spouses, and a good relationship flourished. Potenciano was treated like a queen in the Nobelas residence, where she bathed, got a massage, was fed and even allowed to use their vehicle. The sale of one of the properties was eventually completed for a price of 300k. The relationship started to sour, due to the fact that Potenciano faked her relationship and connections with the Polymedic hospital, and asked the spouses to engage in a fake appliance business. One day, Potenciano filed a complaint in the Eastern Police District against the spouses for allegedly stealing her title to the land and some appliances in her business. The spouses were subpoenaed by the Fiscals office. Mrs. Nobela found out that the real estate agent they asked to register the deed of sale, dela Vega, forged the document and made it a sale in favor of them. Petitioner Maccay filed the criminal complaint against respondent spouses for Estafa through Falsification of Public Document before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of 3B 08-09

Rizal. After trial, the trial court found respondent spouses innocent and ordered petitioners to reimburse respondent spouses P300,000 and to pay damages and attorneys fees. The trial court found out that it was the petitioners who swindled respondents. Petitioners appealed the civil aspect of the case to the CA. The appellate court denied petitioners appeal and affirmed the trial courts Decision. Issue: Can the trial court rule on the civil liability of the COMPLAINANT in the criminal case where the civil action was not reserved or filed separately? Held: No A court trying a criminal case cannot award damages in favor of the accused. The task of the trial court is limited to determining the guilt of the accused and if proper, to determine his civil liability. A criminal case is not the proper proceedings to determine the private complainants civil liability, if any. The trial court erred in ordering complainant petitioner Maccay and prosecution witness Potenciano, as part of the judgment in the criminal case, to reimburse the P300,000 and pay damages to the accused respondent spouses. This Court ruled in Cabaero v. Hon. Cantos[7] that a court trying a criminal case should limit itself to the criminal and civil liability of the accused, thus: [Thus,] the trial court should confine itself to the criminal aspect and the possible civil liability of the accused arising out of the crime. The counterclaim (and cross-claim or third-party complaint, if any) should be set aside or refused cognizance without prejudice to their filing in separate proceedings at the proper time.

BUNAG v CA (Irah) Facts:

11

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

Bunag and Cirilo were former sweethearts. Allegedly, Bunag forcibly abducted Cirilo, brought her to a motel and raped her. He then brought her to her grandmother's house where they lived together for 21 days. Bunag promised to marry her, but suddenly disappeared. A criminal action for forcible abduction was filed against Bunag, but this was dismissed by the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. Cirilo then filed a civil action for damages against Bunag on account of the forcible abduction. The trial court awarded Cirilo damages. Bunag claims that the dismissal of the criminal action should have extinguished his civil liability. Issue/s: Does the extinction of the criminal action against Bunag during the preliminary stage also extinguish the civil liability for damages? (NO) Is Bunag liable for damages? (YES) Held: Extinction of the criminal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. In this case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. The reasons why, in general, the dismissal of the criminal action does not carry with it the dismissal of the civil action are: a) the two proceedings do not involve the same parties (in criminal action, the State is the plaintiff; in civil action, the person affected is the petitioner); and b) the two proceedings have different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence requried (in criminal action, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required; in civil action, only preponderance of evidence is 3B 08-09

needed). With regard to the liability for damages, although generally, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where expenses for the wedding preparations have been incurred, Article 21 of the Civil Code nevertheless provides that "any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage." In this case, the act of Bunag in forcibly abducting and raping Cirilo, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to renege on such promise after 21 days of co-habitation, constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. Hence, the award for moral [and exemplary] damages is warranted. APA v FERNANDEZ (Ysan) Facts: A criminal case was file alleging that: on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Lapulapu City, Apa et. al. took advantage of the absence or tolerance of Tigol by occupying or possessing a portion of her real property, whereon they constructed their respective residential houses against the will of Rosita Tigol, which acts deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land, to her damage and prejudice. Apa et. al. moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a prejudicial question pending resolution in another case which concerns the ownership of lot in question. Issue: Whether the question of ownership of the lot in issue, which was pending in a civil case, is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case against Apa et. al.

12

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

Held: Yes. In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but to Tigol against the latter's will. Now the ownership of the land in question is the issue in the civil case now pending. The resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of Apa et. al.s criminal liability for squatting. BELTRAN v. PEOPLE (Vince) Meynardo Beltran and Charmaine Felix were married on June 16, 1973. In 1997, after 24 years of marriage and 4 children, Beltran filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Art. 36 of the Family Code. In her answer, Felix alleged that it was Beltran who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Felix subsequently filed a complaint for concubinage against Beltran and Salting. Beltran, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant of arrest, argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Issue: Whether the civil case poses a prejudicial question against the criminal case. Held: NO. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the 3B 08-09

resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The pendency of the case for the declaration of nullity is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. The accused in a case for concubinage need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void. A subsequent pronouncement that the accuseds marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense in a charge for concubinage he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. Petition dismissed. MARBELLA-BOBIS v BOBIS (Krisette) PEOPLE v. CONSING (Alpe) FACTS: On February 1997, Consing and his mother represented to Plus Builders, Inc. (PBI) that they are the true and lawful owners of 4.2 HA lot in Imus, Cavite. They also said that they acquired the lot from Tang Teng and Yu. Relying on these representations, PBI purchased the lot.. On April 1999, PBI discovered that Consing and his mother did not have a valid title over the land. PBI came to know that Tan Teng and Yu never sold the lot to Consing, and that TCT where Consings TCT was based was not filed in the Register of Deeds. On August 1999, PBI was ousted from possession of the disputed land by Tan Teng and Yu. Despite written and oral

13

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

demands, Consing and his mother refused to return the amount paid to them. On 22 July 1999, Consing filed for an action of injuctive relief against PBI. Consing wanted to be declared as an agent of his mother, and therefore was not under any obligation to PBI. On 13 October 1999, PBI filed against Consing and his mother a complaint for damages and attachment. Consing filed a motion to dismiss on ground of forum shopping because the action for injunctive relief and for damages and attachment were still pending. On 21 January 2000, a criminal case for estafa through falsification of a public document was filed against Rafael Consing and his mother. On April 2000, Consing filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground of prejudicial question. The TC denied this motion. The CA reversed and enjoined the TC from proceeding with the arraignment and trial until the civil cases for injunctive relief and damages and attachment are resolved. ISSUE: Are the the civil cases for injunctive relief and damages and attachment prejudicial questions justifying the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa? HELD: No. A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final 3B 08-09

resolution of the civil action, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal In the case at bar, we find no prejudicial question that would justify the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case. The issue in the Civil Case for Injunctive Relief is whether or not respondent merely acted as an agent of his mother, Cecilia de la Cruz; while in the Civil Case for Damages and Attachment, the question is whether respondent and his mother are liable to pay damages and to return the amount paid by PBI for the purchase of the disputed lot. Even if respondent is declared merely an agent of his mother in the transaction involving the sale of the questioned lot, he cannot be adjudged free from criminal liability. An agent or any person may be held liable for conspiring to falsify public documents. Hence, the determination of the issue involved in the Civil Case for Injunctive Relief is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the respondent in the criminal case for estafa through falsification of public document. Likewise, the resolution of PBI's right to be paid damages and the purchase price of the lot in question will not be determinative of the culpability of the respondent in the criminal case for even if PBI is held entitled to the return of the purchase price plus damages, it does not ipso facto follow that respondent should be held guilty of estafa through falsification of public document. Stated differently, a ruling of the court in the civil case that PBI should not be paid the purchase price plus damages will not necessarily absolve respondent of

14

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

liability in the criminal case where his guilt may still be established under penal laws as determined by other evidence.

Whether or not notice and hearing are necessary before there is an execution against the employers for subsidiary liability

Held: YES. YONAHA V. CA (Kristel) 255 SCRA 397 Facts: On April 14, 1990, at or about 11:45 A.M. in Basak, Lapulapu City, Elmer Ouano was driving a Toyota Tamaraw duly registered in the name of Raul Cabahug and owned by EK SEA Products He bumped and hit Hector Caete, which caused the latter's instantaneous death, due to the multiple severe traumatic injuries at different parts of his body. He was charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and after a plea of guilty, a penalty of imprisonment of 1 year and 1 day to 1 year and 8 months and payment of P50,000.00 for the death of the victim; P30,000.00 for actual damages incurred in connection with the burial and the nightly prayer of the deceased victim and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees. He manifested inability to pay so that the trial court issued a subsidiary writ of execution against his employer. Petitioner filed a motion to stay and to recall the subsidiary writ of execution principally anchored on the lack of prior notice to her and on the fact that the employer's liability had yet to be established. Issue: 3B 08-09 The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has since sanctioned the enforcement of this subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceedings in which the employee is adjudged guilty, on the thesis that it really is a part of, and merely an incident in, the execution process of the judgment. But, execution against the employer must not issue as just a matter of course, and it behooves the court, as a measure of due process to the employer, to determine and resolve a priori, in a hearing set for the purpose, the legal applicability and propriety of the employer's liability. The requirement is mandatory even when it appears prima facie that execution against the convicted employee cannot be satisfied. The court must convince itself that the convicted employee is in truth in the employ of the employer; that the latter is engaged in an industry of some kind; that the employee has committed the crime to which civil liability attaches while in the performance of his duties as such; and that execution against the employee is unsuccessful by reason of insolvency. The subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code requires (a) the existence of an employer-employee relationship; (b) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; (c) that the employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of

15

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

his duties (not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties); and (d) that said employee is insolvent. The judgment of conviction of the employee, of course, concludes the employer 8 and the subsidiary liability may be enforced in the same criminal case, but to afford the employer due process, the court should hear and decide that liability on the basis of the conditions required therefor by law. CATACUTAN vs. HEIRS OF NORMAN KADUSALE, et al. (Mayco) The employer is, in substance and in effect, a party to the criminal case against his employee, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. Facts: Petitioner Aureliana Catacutan is the registered owner and operator of a jeepney, driven by the accused Porferio Vendiola, which bumped a tricycle in Banilad, Bacong, Negros Oriental, thereby causing the death of its driver, Norman Kadusale, and its passenger, Lito Amancio, and serious physical injuries to another passenger, respondent Gil B. Izon. Respondents thus filed a criminal case against Porferio Vendiola, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Double Homicide with Physical Injuries and Damages to Property before the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental. The trial court rendered judgment that accused is guilty of negligence and imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code in the collision which occurred in Banilad, Bacong, Negros Accused Vendiola did not appeal the judgment of conviction. Instead, he applied for probation. Meanwhile, when the judgment became final and executory, respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution and the corresponding writ was issued by the trial court. However, per the Sheriff's 3B 08-09

Return of Service, the writ was unsatisfied as the accused had "nothing to pay off the damages in the decision." Respondents filed a Motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution before the trial court, praying that such writ be issued against petitioner Aureliana Catacutan as registered owner and operator of the jeepney driven by the accused when the collision occurred. Petitioner Aureliana Catacutan filed her Opposition thereto, arguing that she was never a party to the case and that to proceed against her would be in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also argued that the subsidiary liability of the employer is not determined in the criminal case against the employee. Issue: Whether or not a subsidiary writ of execution may issue against the employers of an accused, against whom a judgment of conviction had been entered, even when said employers never took part in the criminal proceedings where the accused was charged, tried and convicted. Held: Yes. As stated in Martinez v. Barredo: "The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence

16

TORTS AND DAMAGES ATTY. ABAO

Issue: Whether EMETC can rightfully invoke diligence as defense CONNEL BROS. COMPANY, ET AL. v ADUNA, ET AL. (Edz) 91 Phil 79 Subsidiary Liability: Diligence not a defense Facts: Aduna (A), while driving the passenger bus owned by the ExMeralco Employees Transportation Company (EMETC), in a careless and negligent manner, w/o taking necessary precautions to avoid accident to persons and damage to property, bumped and hit an oldsmobile car owned by Connel Bros Company (CBC). The car fell into a canal, and its passengers, Boomer (B) and Nichol (N) were injured and hospitalized. A was convicted of damage to property and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. CBC, B and N reserved their right ot file the corresponding civil suit for damages. EMETC: they have been following the same practices and procedure employed by Meralco in exercising due diligence in hiring and supervising its employees, esp. the drivers and conductors of the transpo buses; the company had scrutinized As previous records as a driver, esp. during his employment in Meralco for 5 years, which was a prerequisite condition to his employment by EMETC; company has been carefully supervising the work of its employees in the field, esp. its drivers and conductors, and that the accident is the first collision in which a bus or an employee of EMETC has been involved. EMETC is invoking Art. 1903 of the Civil Code which states that subsidiary liability will not apply if the person being held liable exercised all the diligence of a good father of the family to prevent the damage. But the trial court held that Arts. 102 and 103 of the RPC which provides for the subsidiary liability of the employer should apply. 3B 08-09 Held: NO. Barredo v. Garcia and Almario: The offended party seeking damages has the right to choose between a criminal action and a civil suit. In this case, the plaintiffs have chosen to rely on the provisions of the RPC and have based their action on the result of the crim case against A. No evidence to show the negligence of A was submitted except his conviction in the criminal case. Furthermore, both A and EMETC were sued. However, EMETC should be held merely subsidiarily liable.

17