2.5 - Masolo, D.A. - Kwame Nkrumah. Socialism For Liberation (En)

KwameNkrumah:SocialismforLiberation
KwameNkrumah:SocialismforLiberation
byD.A.Masolo

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Source: PRAXISInternational(PRAXISInternational),issue:2/1986,pages:175189,onwww.ceeol.com.
KWAME NKRUMAH: SOCIALISM FOR LIBERATION

D. A. Masolo
I. Introduction. Kwame Nkrumah is a name that does not need much preliminary introduction. He is much more fondly remembered for his fight for African freedom, than for his intellectualism. Yet his power, both of mind (rhetoric) and practical planning are due essentially to his efforts and attempts at combining intellectualism and political practice or practical politics. But the manner in which he tried to combine these two earned him much criticism. First, the clarity with which he saw his ideal world or ideal society drove him into the haste of achieving it in the shortest time possible and for everybody, thus creating the self-image of an infallible Osagyefo in the minds of many of his political foes. The second type of criticism against Nkrumah arises out of his choice for a theory to give him the needed rhetoric as a backing for his fight for Africas political, cultural, and economic disentanglement from the webs of Western colonialism and imperialism. For this he chose marxism as the only philosophy that proves to be an instrument of practical social change. In this lay Nkrumahs philosophical troubles. No single philosophical theory or doctrine has been exploited as much as marxism. Different people, politicians as well as purely intellectual theorists, have interpreted the original theory of Marx in such diverse ways as the social, political, cultural, and economic circumstances can allow. Marxs philosophy lit its fire at the outset of two great world events at the beginning of contemporary society: one was the rise of modern industry and emergence of capitalism; and the other was the emergence of colonialism, often viewed historically as the consequence of the former. Both fall squarely within Marxs theory of human freedom. It is not surprising, therefore, that Marxs libertarian theory has been used now and again to expose the structures and values of colonialism and its aftermath. Nkrumah singles out dialectical materialism as the theory of the world which is connected with a humanist organisation by virtue of its being monistic and its referring all natural processes to matter and its laws. Like many other marxists of this brand, he also believed that materialism is the only metaphysics that analyses nature in its integrity, and inspires an egalitarian organisation of society. As he says, The unity and fundamental identity of nature suggests the unity and fundamental identity of man in society. Idealism favours an oligarchy, materialism favours an egalitarianism.1 In other words, Nkrumah asserts the deducibility of historical materialism from dialectical materialism. He follows Plekhanov and
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Lenin in this. A closer look at the separate concepts of dialectical materialism and historical materialism, however, reveal no deductive connection between the two. Whether acceptable or not, the materialist tones in Nkrumahs thought make his works a source for a continued discussion of marxism and the theory of praxis. In this paper I have limited myself to pointing out the philosophical importance of Nkrumahs work not only to African philosophy in particular, but also to marxist theory in general. II. The interaction between the philosophical and the social. The understanding of the concept socialism is a highly dynamic and functional phenomenon in Eastern Africa. Every social strata has a definite definition of this concept instilled in it according to the national ideological and practical objectives in which it is found. In Africa such national ideological and practical objectives can be largely grouped as being either capitalist-oriented or socialist-oriented. (A) To the highest echelons of political and business cum financial power in a capitalist-oriented country, the concept socialism necessarily entails loss of privilege and authority, subjugation of nobles to paupers, as well as plunder and eradication of individual possessions. To the middle class in this category socialism entails poor and respectless jobs with poor salaries, lack of well-earned self-pride, lack of luxurious recreational and living facilities and goods, etc. And the common man popularly known in Swahili as mwananchi, a term designating a class of people considered as ordinary because they do not have any outstanding (political and/or financial or administrative) powers and privileges in public or private sectors is made to understand that socialism is a huge demon that drags all forms of poverty behind it including lack of good (because stratified) education, food shortages, lack of freedom, lack of diversified (and competitive) commercial commodities and confiscation of individual and family land, etc. (B) In a socialist-oriented environment, leaders (officially) conceive socialism to be an instrument of liberation from well defined inhuman obstacles; to them it constitutes a process of action within well defined lines aimed at the achievement of well conceived values ideal for the best human expression within a state. To the middle class in this category socialism carries both positive as well as negative expectations: positively it implies there is no gruelling authority and power, everyone has some measure of authority and responsibility over his own allotted duties that is, lack of supervision; negatively socialism to him means levelling of social standings and loss of privileges (in kinds of jobs, salaries, etc.) for the educated. To the common man in this category, socialism is made to mean equal opportunities for all, provision of necessities without discrimination; negatively it also implies an abstraction of the concept state where state responsibility is measured in inverse proportion to individual initiative and participation that is, the state is to be responsible for all, individual struggle is no longer necessary since competition is eradicated with the elimination of capitalism.
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In both cases, the concepts of socialism and capitalism (which, in countries of category A, carries with it an essentially decorative outlook or reality rather than intellectual framework to be analysed and defined) are injected with functional roles aimed at maintaining the structural status quo and strengthening the positions of the classes in power. In both cases too, there are those who are the theorizers or justifiers of the status quo to be sustained, and the expectants of the fruits. But since the kind of ideology followed in category A urges the definition of development as equitable with a state (of affairs) where mere delivery of consumer goods and opportunities for individual progress and accumulation are at best, it requires little theorization other than those that defend and promote diversified and therefore competitive purchasing and investing policies as prerequisites for progress. It is a utilitarian and non-futurological state. The ideals and objectives in category B, though utilitarian in structure and composition, are painted in highly historical or futurological terms that make a highly theoretical explanation, clarification of justification equally necessary. In it theory must precede practice, and politics must come before policies. It is here that a discourse on the relationship between theory and practice or, as we have preferred to frame it, between the philosophical and the social, is meaningfully possible, however biased this may sound. For practical purposes, the (ideological) argument is premised on the historical specificity of post-colonial societies, a specificity which arises from structural changes brought about by the colonial experience and alignments of classes and by the superstructures of political and administrative institutions which were established in that context ...2 Both the expectants and the ideologues have, however, in the context of their philosophies, ignored some of the major problems, both practical and human, which are involved in the transition or continuity process as envisaged by them respectively. One side of the problem lies in the fact that in the post-colonial state, the ideologues became also the leaders of government or heads of state, thus increasing the fragility of the relationship between the expectants and the theorizers. As leaders in these positions, the theorizers are often expected by the majority of the people to produce and implement theories and policies which bring immediate practical changes in the lives of the people. But due to the historical circumstances within which they arise, and further fortified by the rhetoric of the leaders, these expectations deeply affect the psychology of the people without regard to, or in total ignorance of, the forces involved in the implementation of the theories and policies due to new and untraditional structures. The leaders, on the other hand, often dont pay attention to this psychological element. First and foremost their works have the objective of providing alternative Weltanschauungs to the ones envisaged as historically constituting problems when compared to their respective conceptions of man, history, morality, etc., without letting these boil down to a psychological study of the causes of different beliefs and expectations. In these circumstances, the psychology of want becomes relatively easier to satisfy than the psychology of understanding. In other words, the theorizers of African
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socialism have hardly given serious consideration to the impact of the new structures in the post-colonial state. The result has been, therefore, that despite the noble objectives that these philosophical world views put forward, they have also significantly created a state of doubt and suspicion among the masses who, as Machiavelli once said, do not truly believe in anything new until they have had actual experience of it.3 This often makes the socio-political philosophies look like mere rhetoric. But the question is: can we judge the plausibility of a philosophical idea, doctrine or theory merely on the basis of whether or not they are immediately practicable? Of course it must be pointed out here that however the case is taken, fortunately or unfortunately, the thinkers we are dealing with here are or have been in public positions of leadership, and that any philosophical absolution is not enough to remove them from the dock where they have been placed by the many hungry and starving subjects to answer for their failure to provide what was expected of them in respect to those positions. But, nevertheless, it would seemingly be a mistake to refute a philosophical theory or argument where this concerns a value judgement only on the ground of its impracticability. We contend that philosophical theories and doctrines must be distinguished from development plans and programmes even where the latter may be based on a philosophical model of the best state constitution and role. Philosophical problems involve general fundamental ideas about man and about his reality, about the meaning, truth and logical relations of some basic beliefs, assumptions or concepts, and often emerged when certain principles or beliefs conflict with one another. In other words, philosophy consists of the elucidation and critical discussion of fundamental concepts, whether in everyday use or characteristically used in some special field of human thought or human activity. What philosophers are trying to do in such investigations is to dig into the presupposition of our thinking: to investigate, and bring to light, and make clear to us, what the buried assumptions are which lie hidden in our basic terms, and also in the way we use these basic terms, and which thereby get smuggled into our conclusions and that means into our beliefs and our actions.4 So too, Nkrumah, Nyerere, Lumumba, Cabral, Sekou Tour, Senghor, etc., all have formed theories of the state and state systems in accordance with some basic principles, meanings and truths about certain key concepts such as man, freedom, history, development, etc. And, to the philosopher, their thoughts can be judged in respect to their basic meanings or definitions when viewed against or compared with other related issues and (historical) facts to which they may be applicable. Philosophical theories do not derive their validity from their degree of their applicability. The actual attainment of true freedom, autonomy or self-determination may be difficult or even impossible in our present world political, economic and social structures, but that does not imply that any philosophical thesis which regards the same values as cardinal for human dignity and therefore worthy of striving for is virtually wrong. Because philosophical problems are seldom straightforwardly empirical, they must be considered independently of empirical observation, even if the latter are always relevant to philosophical arguments. The same is true also of such ideals as logical consistency or clarity
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which are universally upheld, though only intermittently attained without losing their validity. We do not uphold the validity of such ideals variably according to the frequency of their application or violation. In other words, as M. B. Woodhouse says in his A Preface to Philosophy, though our philosophical arguments always contain at least one empirical premise or assumption, the aim of the conclusion is never to prove or disprove the truth value of such a premise. Actually we have been trying to argue here that one may rightly assert the impracticability of the theories advanced in the philosophical theses on African socialism without disproving the philosophical plausibility of the theses in themselves. These authors have tried to tackle problems and questions with deep philosophical implications without disregard for designs of the practical consequences or benefits to be drawn therefrom. Theirs have been designs of ideal states as based on an understanding of the nature of man and of certain values that would generate his happiness and self-realization. When considering the social positions of the authors in question, however, this question becomes double-sided, and one is probably tempted to think that they (the authors) were led to write these works as mere justifications for their practical political designs. This may be true, just as one may be tempted to believe the same of Nietzsches Uebermensch in his Will to Power or of Hegels civil society in his Philosophy of Right. In all the three cases, that is, in Hegel, Nietzsche, and African socio-political authors, the aim has been the same that of designing an ideal state of man. In all the three cases too, the motivation of this undertaking is the same the fall of confidence. As Hegel tried to synthesize the real with the rational, religious faith with faith in progress in nineteenth-century Europe, so followed the fragmentation and downfall of this synthesis at the hands of Marx, Kierkegaard, and the Young Hegelians, culminating in Nietzsches complete rejection of faith and historical optimism. In the African socio-political situation too, a loss of confidence in the Western economic, religious and political intrusion is remarkable. The discovery of the true evil nature of the slogans of galit, fraternit and libert and the mission to educate and civilize quickly led to the (corrective) theorization of the real (ideal) nature and state of man, how he ought to be and to be treated, what ought to be his relations with other people, etc. The African thinkers, however, are different from their Western counterparts in one way: that while their Western counterparts, by the virtue of their professions, were thinkers whose findings or failures could not have any direct or immediate impact on the life of the common citizen, the African thinkers at the same time held public positions that gave them the responsibility to attend to the expectations of the people. They had the duty to transform the society and to make true the promises of their campaigns. Those who approached their campaigns from the point of view of the ideal values embodied within their more complete and elaborate theories were now faced with the task of demonstrating the realism of their thoughts. And those who did not develop any specific socio-political theory had nothing to compare their successes or failures to a fact which seems to work to their gain because by evading the
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theoretical framework of their activities they also evade constant reviews and criticisms; and when these come, they are easily suppressed as anti-stability, subversive, anti-national interests, etc. Both to such leaders and to their citizens, ignorance is the road to happiness and stability. The problem with most of our hard-thinking leaders, if I may use Basil Davidsons phrase, is that they have tended to see the future far more clearly than they understand the present, a fact which often widens the gap between the clarity of a philosophical view of a socio-historical value and the blind drive towards material accumulation. As Engels puts it in a paragraph cited by Davidson, The worst thing that can befall a leader of an extreme party, is to be compelled to take over the government in an epoch when the movement is not yet ripe for the domination of the class which he represents, and for the realization of the measures which that domination would imply. What he can do, continues Davidson, depends not upon himself but upon the socio-economic stage of development in which he has to work; what he ought to do, according to his own understanding and conviction, cannot be achieved. He is compelled to act within the present while acting as though the present were the future.5 Yet a true thinker must stand by his truth, however difficult it may be to convert it into practice, and failure to do the latter does not falsify the theory. Central to the understanding of any political or social philosopher is the primary intention to express value judgements on existing forms of society, affirm beliefs in the possibility and desirability or otherwise of a new kind of society and hence stimulate and guide political activity. However, the crucial question of the originality of African socialism in regard to this progressive kind of thinking arises inescapably for every historian of African modern thought. What is vital to reiterate here is the central theme of this paper that African philosophy must take account of socio-historical changes in Africa and express its answers to the issues emanating therefrom in a universal manner that reflects a critical appraisal however historically motivated by specific socio-historical conditions. However, it must also be said that even the very empirical manner in which various African governments and regimes have conducted themselves, managed their affairs and ruled their peoples has raised much philosophical discussion on either the meaning of the values they seem to cherish or a review of the fundamental social and human values they are seen to be violating. We have the unwavering conviction that this kind of reflection is deeply philosophical, and that it is going on in Africa today.6 III. Nkrumah and Revolution. Like the early Nyerere of the pre-Arusha Declaration, Nkrumah argued that the idea of socialism had its precedent in the communitaristic attitude of mind of the African, manifested in his traditional everyday life, and that therefore the introduction of this social system into the continent does not require a revolution as a means of achieving it. This is the Nkrumah of the first edition of Consciencism (1964). In this period the general theme of
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Nkrumah is that of a peaceful reformation. The passage from the traditional communalism to socialism is also viewed as a re-affirmation of the former by the latter in contemporary language of the principles underlying communalism. It becomes a mere linguistic or semantic ritual. This communalism is based on the Tempelian ontology whose laws regulate the existential dialectics in a community as opposed to an alliance. While a sociological alliance is a creation of choice, the community, African commumty, is an ontologically given phenomenon. It does not possess sentiments, but rather rests on the unconscious. Neither does it need to result from a conviction, because it is self evident.7 In the Bantu community, for Tempels, man never appears as an isolated individual or independent substance. Every man and every individual constitutes a ring in the chain of vital forces ... Among the Bantu, the individual is necessarily a clanical individual, a fact which does not regard only a judicial or juridicial dependence, or that of kinship, but rather requires to be understood in the sense of real ontological interdependence.8 February 1966 was an important turning point in Nkrumahs life. Indeed, in the period after February 1966, Nkrumahs language becomes revolutionary, and the theme becomes class and armed struggle as opposed to his earlier positions of non-violent positive action in the model of Gandhis Satyaghraha. He now adopted the Fanonian lines of revolutionary violence as the necessary tool of the people (or peasants as Fanon himself prefers) for routing colonialism. It is the call for this revolutionary violence that forms the characteristic theme of the Handbook of Revolutionary Warfare, Class Struggle in Africa, Revolutionary Path, as well as the logical conclusion of the Panaf revised edition of Consciencism (1970). Another point also marks this second period in Nkrumahs thought. His view of the characteristics of traditional African socio-political structure now took a more critical outlook. While recognizing the presence of communalist and egalitarian aspects, he also realised that this same system equally hosted slavery, feudalism, social cleavages (such as chieftaincy, royalty, peasantry, etc.), and even exploitative practices. The logical outcome of these developments was the conclusion that the implementation of a socialist programme in Africa therefore needs more than mere reformation. The presence of socio-economic cleavages and the opposition between their respective interests require replacement by a sharper method than a ritual. Revolution is thus an indispensable avenue to socialism, where the antecedent social-political structure is animated by principles which are a negation of those of socialism.9 In the eyes of Nkrumah, what was happening in the post-February 1968 Ghana was indeed what was happening in a large part of the rest of Africa. By the end of July 1966, fifteen coups dtat had deposed civilian governments in Africa, and by the end of January 1970, a little more than two years before Nkhrumah died, the statistic figures had risen to twenty-five coups in eighteen states. To Nkrumah, all these constituted counter-revolutionary activities and betrayal of the struggle of the peoples of Africa to be free by the
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traitors among the Army and Police (at least in Ghana), inspired and aided by local reactionaries, imperialists and neocolonialists.10 He further noted that apart from these coups, many other states in the continent still under civilian leadership were little less than puppet-states of Western imperialism and neocolonialism. These enemies of true African growth and integrity had dug deep into the African soil, and as it became clear to Nkrumah by the end of 1966 that it was not possible to dislodge the reactionary government of NLC except by a counter-coup, so it also become increasingly evident to him that the only way to dislodge the enemy from Africa in general was by no means other than the Revolutionary Path in the form of guerilla warfare. What was needed in Ghana was a paradigm of what was required for the whole of Africa. The coup in Ghana, he said, was a reactionary move to sabotage not only the progress in Ghana towards a just society, but the continental drive towards total liberation and unification,11 We have passed from constitutional non-violent Positive Action to Positive Action by force and armed struggle.12 He went as far as calling his own former tactics a fallacy.13 IV. Remarks. (a) Thought and Practice. We have given a general outline of Kwame Nkrumahs works and thought. We have also given along with it a general statement of the role and purpose of philosophy in regard to a social, political, economic, and cultural environment within which it may arise. We have contended in this statement that a philosophical theory or doctrine should not be evaluated by considering the successes or failures that may arise or that may have arisen from the practical application of its tenets and axioms. Nkrumah would have accepted such a statement with reservations until he understood that it does not aim at separating philosophy from practical life, knowledge from practice, or knowing from doing. The strength of Consciencism lies in the very heart of these dichotomies. With Nkrumah, theory and practice went side-by-side, and he was quick to transform all new knowledge and conditions into action. Like Fanon before him, he believed in the diagnosis of a situation, exposition of its anomalies, and the making of carefully designed suggestions which took their nature from the advance and proper understanding of the strength of the forces involved. Constant revision of the tactics was therefore the central strategy. Like the other great materialist socialists, Nkrumah believed in the dependence of knowledge on social practice, that is, the dependence of knowledge on production methods and class struggle. Mans knowledge depends mainly on his activity in material production, through which he comes gradually to understand the phenomena, the properties and the laws of nature, and the relations between himself and nature; and through his activity in production he also gradually comes to understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between man and man.14 Maos little book contains most of what is essential and central to
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Nkrumahs entire endeavour. Marxists hold that in human society, Mao writes, activity in production develops step by step from a lower to a higher level, that is, from the shallower to the deeper, from the one-sided to the many-sided.15 The concepts of materialism and class struggle are equally central to Nkrumahs philosophy. For him as well, matter is the basis of all reality, and materialism is the basis of consciencism, of serious and objective knowledge of facts, both natural and social.16 It is also the basis of all other activities. Thought without practice is empty, and philosophical consciencism constantly exhibits areas of practical significance ... If philosophical consciencism initially affirms the absolute and independent existence of matter, and holds matter to be endowed with Its pristine objective laws, then philosophical consciencism builds itself by becoming a reflection of the objectivity, in conceptual terms, of the unfolding of matter. When a philosophy so restricts itself to the reflection of the objective unfolding of matter (dialectical materialism), it also establishes a direct connection between knowledge and action.17 Nkrumah defines philosophical consciencism as that philosophical standpoint which, taking its start from the present content of (the African) conscience, indicates the way In which progress Is forged out of the conflict in that conscience.18 This consciencism is based on the material reality and condition that regulate all human (political, social and cultural) activities. But how is this knowledge derivable from this materialism? To this question Nkrumah simply repeats the same old doctrine of the evolution of kinds categorical conversion from the primary reality of matter.19 However, in regard to this social aspect of the theory, let us have recourse again to Mao, if only to show the similarity between the two trends. In his exposition of the dialectical materialist theory of the process of development of knowledge, Mao tells us that As social practice continues, things that give rise to mans sense perceptions and impressions in the course of his practice are repeated many times; then a sudden change (leap) takes place in the brain in the process of cognition, and concepts are formed. Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations of things; they grasp the essence, the totality and the Internal relations of things (facts).20 The message Nkrumah intends to drive home is clear from this last passage from Mao. A concept is derived from the observation (perception) of phenomena. But, as different from the single phenomena which it reflects, it puts them together taking Into account only their essential elements. Knowledge therefore arises only when man compares the former facts with the present essence of things. It leads him to a judgement. This is the logical knowledge as opposed to perceptual knowledge which pertains to the separate aspects of reality. In other words, true knowledge is monocriterianistic as is characteristic of Marxist epistemology. It reaches the internal relations of things and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrouading world. If Mao called this logical knowledge, Nkrumah named it philosophical consciencism. Materialism must overthrow idealism (as a form of knowledge) and thus open the way for an objective knowledge of the processes of the world. And
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this knowledge must lead to a political intervention which pushes the wheel of social evolution moving.21 In Nkrumah, therefore, consciencism essentially means a doctrine of (objective) material knowledge. Consciencialization, as an activity to which revolutionary political activism belongs, is the process by which man gradually becomes (or is made) aware (conscious) of the contradictory material relations and structures within which he lives and to enhance his political action as is logically required by that awareness or consciousness in the form of knowledge. Hence political action itself, when based upon the knowledge of the laws of social development, and aimed at speeding up social evolution, is of the nature of a catalyst toward the removal of the contradictions and the establishment of socialism. And if we may allow ourselves to conjure Nkrumahs meaning of socialism from his scattered indications of this term-value, it may be said to mean a state of social relations characterized by fairness in the distribution of wealth and enjoyment of positive freedom and action for internal development and happiness within a state or a number of states. Knowledge is power, and this power has significance only when it is directed towards the transformation of reality In the objective or scientific sense (Francis Bacon). (b) Nkrumahs Originality. Sometimes the African diversity on a number of issues facing the continent has been stressed at the expense of the need for its unity for a particular historical (and humanistic) objective. In an attempt to stress on this diversity, Arnold Rivkin in his Nation-Building in Africa, Problems and Prospects has laid much importance in the 1964 Nyerere-Nkrumah exchange at the Cairo Conference over the issue of continental unity as the only means of achieving rapid and lasting independence for the entire African continent. At that time Nyerere was vehemently opposed to Nkrumahs call for the African unification here and now and accused this view as a cover for doing some of the most unbrotherly things in Africa.22 It may not be clear what Nyerere meant by unbrotherly things in 1964, but in the stretch of time from that period, Nyereres Tanzania has grown to be the haven of co-ordination and training for revolutionary activists preparing to fight and oust undesirable systems and regimes in the continent. The independence of Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe owe their success partly to the central role played by Nyereres Tanzania in this respect. When Nyerere helped overthrow dictator Idi Amin in Uganda in 1979, it was not a mere unbrotherly affair but a duty to stamp out the enemy of progress, freedom and humanism. Nyerere can no longer deny that his commitment to the struggles still going on in Southern Africa are due to the identification of a common enemy, and that this commitment is in the form of a policy placed within an ideological framework that embraces the promotion and use of violence. Neither would Nyerere deny the probability of the struggle being won more decisively if backed by a more widespread unity both in the understanding of the nature of the situation and in the required ideological framework. These are the same lines along which Nkrumahs political thought moved.
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It is the new experience Africa is undergoing that now matters and which needs an appropriate philosophical statement. In this sense, though Nkrumah adopts the Marxist materialist conception of history, he leaves the question as to whether it is compatible with African traditional heritage as a matter of no immediate concern. He does not return to it in any significant way. Nyerere also loosely and briefly engaged in this debate at the onset of his systematic thinking, but he had to abandon it for practical reasons. It cannot therefore be true that it was as a way of providing an answer to the classic objection as to whether or not Africa, by adhering to socialism, was falling prey of an imported ideology and also betraying its original civilization, that Nkrumah undertook to write Consciencism,23 so as to demonstrate that rather than a betrayal, there was intact continuity (except for change of language according to the demands of time) from African traditional social principles into socialism. Of course Hountondji is right in observing that Nkrumah was soon to find that it was futile and fruitless to merely engage in those takenfor-granted assumptions. The question as to whether or not Nkrumah was original in the general exposition of the basic philosophy that underlies his goals, ideals and programmes or policies cannot be put to him in isolation. The interpretation, elaboration and modification of the ideas of Karl Marx has been a task undertaken by many scholars and political leaders alike, often with disagreements, thus forming families of such interpretations and diverse ways of adopting the theory into the shaping of concrete particular situations and systems. Within this limitless field of controversy and discussion we are to find both originality or creativity and continuity or fidelism and orthodoxy all mingled together in regard to the original Marxist theory. This alone reflects the strength of marxism both as a political philosophy and as a quasi-mythical message of salvation to the many oppressed classes (within nations) and nations (as classified wholes). Thus the worth or appeal of marxism is both political as well as historical. It has been said many times that although Marx wrote at a remote time in comparison to ours, and to a particular social, historical and economic time and circumstances, his theory of the materialist conception of history has not ceased to be directly relevant to our understanding of economic history and the operation of economic structures. And it is only in these terms that Marxs theory of human freedom can be understood since it underlies the criticism of the capitalist economic system. In view of this, it would be unjustifiable to hold Nkrumah as being original from the point of view of the general ideological framework within which its thought has been expressed and along which it has developed. Many of the precepts and concepts on which his general political theory is based such as the idea of freedom, revolution, economic analysis of social relations (the materialistic conception of reality), etc. are all ideas central to the classical Marxist system. The Marxist analysis of all these elements, concepts and facts was made because it was conceived to be the most fruitful way of obtaining knowledge about the world, and in so doing to aid the realization in social practice of his conception of human freedom. In fact it has been suggested
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that the immense importance and excitement that the theory of Marx has generated in the last century is mainly due to this liberational dimension.24 Charles Taylor distinguishes three different aspects of this liberation in Marx. The first two deal with mans direct relations with the immediate natural and material worlds. He liberates himself from the former by means of his invention of tools (technological modernization) for self-superimposition over nature, and from the latter by strict and careful control over his own creation (tools as a means of production) and limiting this to a reasonable level that is compatible with mans self-expression as a transformer of reality in his labour. The third and most popular aspect of the liberational dimension of marxism is the political and economic liberation of the dominated lot in any class-divided society. It is this aspect of marxism that has had the spellbinding appeal in the colonized world from the late 1950s due to its claim to the ability to answer that deep hunger for a new age, a new era, of freedom, of fulfilment, and of a new quality of life. Many countries in the developing world have adopted this messianic dimension of marxism and mixed (it) up with other elements, especially nationalistic elements, so that we have African socialism, say, or Arab socialism, both of which owe something to Marxism but try to make it part of a broader mix. In all these cases you can see an attempt to achieve the same kind of thing: a global view which saves the tradition from which people come and yet can claim, somehow, to radically new, a new beginning, quintessentially modern, founded on the most solid establishment of modern civilization, namely science.25 Science is here defined as a disciplined or systematic intellectual search for knowledge, for the general laws that explain, at all times, the social behaviour of men and the values at which, when wrongly perceived or improperly controlled, result in conflicts that we often observe in society. Therefore, when judged from the point of view of the circumstances from which it arose, and from the language of its expression and exposition, that is, method of analysis, Nkrumahs thought and writings cannot be said to be wholly original. However, when Nkrumah began his systematic literary work, it was with the specific social, political, economic, and cultural effects of the presence of foreign capitalism in Africa that he was mostly concerned, and this shaped his conception of history into the Marxist-materialist model. It emphasizes the importance of the mode of production and the operation of economic structures in the colonies. This helps us to understand Nkrumahs marxist argument that men are free to the extent that they consciously master and control both nature and their social conditions of existence in accordance with their historically developing needs, both material and intellectual. This is the area of positive action as one that is increasingly directed toward the total liberation of a state. At best, Nkrumah remarks, this philosophy of decolonization should not abandon the original humanistic values of Africa.26 The choice of the humanistic values is here implied to be a careful one, that is, of only those values that will be fitting into the new way or outlook of things, including the sustenance of the revolutionary earned freedom and a well-defined (scientific) socialism, rather than a blind return to the
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communalistic attitude of mind as was suggested at the earlier stages of the development of this thought. Another question that could be asked in relation to Nkrumahs originality is that concerning his philosophical ability. Philosophical interpretation is, in many aspects, the making of philosophy itself. This activity is usually seen to be the duty or action area of the professional philosopher who is able to place under theoretical analysis, for purposes of fixing the meaning and direction (value and relevance) of any given literary work. But just how much a philosophical interpretation reads into a work or treatise that was originally non-philosophical is many times hard to tell. Yet any scholarly work that endeavours to give an interpretation of the world, of history and of man in whatever form this interpretation may be expressed, and for whatever motivation it was formulated always had a philosophical significance, even where the author may not be a professionally trained philosopher. Many students of philosophy have felt that submitting works of non-professional philosophers to rigorous philosophical appraisal and interpretation may not be fair play, as these may have been written without intended philosophical sophistication. With this they wish to call for caution and leniency when treating works like those of Nkrumah, Nyerere, Fanon, Tour, and many of those African nationalists and writers whose works and ideas may justify rigorous philosophical examination when studying modern African social and political thought. Thus the question: are such works really philosophical, and are we being fair in subjecting them to rigorous philosophical critique and interpretation? Asked whether people like Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse Tung can be credited with real philosophical ability, Charles Taylor gave this answer. No. Not philosophical thinking. Lenin was a great political strategist and a very clear thinker in that domain; about Stalin, the less said the better; Maos works are not philosophically interesting, but it would be too much to expect that such men should also be philosophers.27 The same could probably be said of all the names we have mentioned under modern African socio-political thought, not to discredit them as philosophers or the content of their works as being both political and philosophical, but rather that like Lenin or Mao, their philosophical significance arises from the attempt to adapt the Marxist philosophy to the new exigencies of their time liberation and independence. As different from Plato, Rousseau, Hegel and Marx before them, their thoughts are not embodied in any explanatory philosophical doctrine (except for the Consciencism of Nkrumah) about the individual, society or cosmos, but directly concern the analysis and evaluation of specific social and political issues. Their immediate concerns are popular rather than theoretical. At best, they can be called politologists. But if we are to agree that specific orientational (as different from methodical) characteristics of philosophy sometimes take shape from the direct conditions of man such as intellectual atmosphere, popular culture, social, political and economic conditions, then it will be extremely difficult to conceive of any authentic African philosophy which does not, in one way or the other, reflect the human condition in its concrete situation that is, its social, political and cultural situation. Every
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now and then a serious philosophy sweeps belatedly into intellectual fashion, usually as a result of particular set of social or historical circumstances. And, to agree with Hountondji, this is already what is happening in Africa, not only in the area of the quasi-traditional controversy of definition, but also in the area of projections and reflections on our contemporary social, political and cultural questions and problems. It all adds up to a formidable and interesting philosophy which, we have the hope, will soon make a breakthrough towards the serious study of the contents and implications in the abundant work of the new political, social, cultural and literary scholars and commentators. Colonialism placed the whole of the African continent under a homogeneous situation of foreign domination (politically) and exploitation (economically), and eventually planting in the minds and ambitions of the Africans, a similarly homogeneous feeling of the necessity and urgency for liberation from this domination and the re-establishment of freedom. But while this objective became and remained the same for all in its general or most obvious forms, its detailed nature, specific definition of the values involved and implied, as well as the formulation and articulation of some ideas and goals that were in the air at the time, differed from one leader to another, and from one corner of the same continent to the next. This alone indeed led to the emergence of the variety of nationalist ideologies that characterize African politics today. Another factor attributed to this ideological diversity is the specificity of the colonizer, as well as the ethnic nature, history and geographical conditions specific to every colony. What we have said of Nkrumah, therefore, is not representative of what was a general African feeling. Nkrumah thought, spoke, and wrote both as an individual intellectual, and as a politician whose ideals were greatly influenced by the economic and historical backgrounds of Ghana and the neighbouring colonies.
NOTES
1. Nkrumah, K., Consciencism, Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation and Development with Particular Reference to the African Revolution (London, 1970), p. 75. 2. Alavi, H., The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh, in Goulbourne, H., (Ed), Politics and State in the Third World, (London, 1979), p. 38. 3. Machiavelli, N., The Prince (New York, 1952), p. 55. 4. Men of Ideas: Some Creators of Contemporary Philosophy B.B.C., (London, 1978), pp. 2728. 5. Davidson, B., Black Star: A view of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah (London, 1973), p. 216. The inner quotation is taken from Engels, F., The Peasant War in Germany, (London 1927), pp. 135-136. 6. Just indicatively, we immediately think here of Prof. H. Odera Orukas Punishment and Terrorism in Africa (Problems in the Philosophy and Practice of Punishment) (Nairobi, 1978). 7. VanderLeeuw,G.,Lareligiondanssonessenseetsesmanifestations.Phnomenologiedelareligion Ed. (Paris, 1948), p. 238. 8. Tempels, R., La philosophie bantoue, Presence Africaine, (Paris, 1965), pp. 73-74. 9. Nkrumah, K., Consciencism (1970), p. 74. 10. From Nkrumah, K., Voice from Conakry (London, 1967) here taken from quotation in Panaf Great Lives: Kwame Nkrumah, 1974, p. 223. 11. Panaf Great Lives: Kwame Nkrumah, op. cit., p. 225.
12. Nkrumah, K., The Struggle Continues (London, 1973), p. 31.
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13. Nkrumah, K., Challenge of the Congo (London, 1969), Authors Note, p. ix. 14. Mao, T. T., On Practice, Foreign Languages Press (Peking, 1966), p. 1. 15. Ibid., p. 2. 16. Nkrumah, K., Consciencism, op. cit., p. 20. 17. Ibid., p. 92. 18. Ibid., p. 79. 19. Ibid., pp. 25-26. 20. Mao, T. T., op. cit., p. 4. 21. Cf. Nkrumah, K., Consciencism, pp. 103-104, and Mao, T. T., op. cit., p. 13. 22. Cf. Rivkin, A., Nation-Building in Africa, Problems and Prospects (New Brunswick, N. J., 1969), p. 20. 23. This view is held by P. Hountondji in his Sur la philosophie africaine, Franois Marpero (Paris, 1977), pp. 198-199. 24. Vide Charles Taylor in Men of Ideas, op. cit., p. 45. 25. Ibid., p. 56. 26. Nkrumah, K., Consciencism, op. cit., (1970), p. 70. 27. Cf., Men of Ideas, op. cit., p. 58.

2.5 - Masolo, D.A. - Kwame Nkrumah. Socialism For Liberation (En)

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12. Nkrumah, K., The Struggle Continues (London, 1973), p. 31.

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