The Last Viceroys of New Spain and Peru: An Appraisal Author(s): Timothy E.

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The Last Viceroysof New Spain and Peru: An Appraisal

TIMOTHY E. ANNA

Spanish AmericanWars of Independence OF THE hasapparently It is also,andthis understate the obvious, vast. to (I8IO-24) is, on therebels, almost entirely onesided.It concentrates notbeenso obvious, andtheir military on theAmerican on their their objectives, aspirations, side, The literature ontheroyalist sideisvery incomplete. andpolitical campaigns. be calledthe Thereare, of course, manyvaluablestudiesin whatmight on to themovements for studies concentrating independence, "background" andontheprogressive decline ofSpain'sworld system, theeighteenth century with perceived itto be and why Americans on whatwas wrong thatsystem Thisbackground gap in tothem. leavesa major material, however, unsuited for,althoughit tells us what Spanish Americans our understanding, as is to be grievances in theimperial it doesnot, system, thought themselves tellus howthatsystem Much collapsed. sometimes automatically assumed, inthe were or their objectives lessdoes ittellus whattheroyalists thinking, thefact as Hugh that, waritself, orthemistakes madeinthewar.Given they ofSpanish outinthecaseofMexico, themajority M. Hamill, Jr.has pointed of independence,l exclusive werenot decidedon the question Americans of theroyalsystem and on on thefundamental weaknesses concentration to it, important thesewere,does nottellthe American though objections It mayexplain, for theroyal "deserved" to system why example, whole story. butitdoes orwhy Americans itto deserve that be overthrown fate, perceived ofmilitary a thousand studies notexplain howitwas overthrown. Similarly, even were wonandlost.One might tellhowbattles go so far only campaigns ofSimonBolivar, Josede San Martin, as to saythata thousand biographies de Iturbide and Agustin tellhow only JoseMariaMorelos, MiguelHidalgo, nothowSpainlost.As C. H. Haring out,Spain's longago pointed they won, bestgovernment, in America maynothavebeentheworld's imperial system for orfulfilled It maynothavemaderoom butitwas nottheworld's worst.2 houseofcards. butit was no mere theaspirations ofAmericans, inthe historians that LatinAmerican It is wellpasttime, specializing then,
THE
BIBLIOGRAPHY

acknowledged. The researchgrantsupportof the Canada Council is gratefully 1 Hugh M. Hamill,Jr., TheHidalgo Independence (Gainesville,1966),151. to Mexican Prelude Revolt: in America (New York, 1947),I 1:3. 2 C. H. Haring, TheSpanish Empire

38

The Last Viceroys ofNew SpainandPeru

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on the royalists. emancipationfocus a proportionate amount of attention not in the eighteenth that focus should be concentrated, Furthermore, century,much less in the sixteenth,not at the time Spain's imperial institutions were created,or even at the momentof theirmost important under the Bourbons,but during the Wars of Indereform institutional pendence.3No matterhow widespread the radical ideas of the French and North Americanphilosophers were, no matterhow corrodedSpain's abilityto govern may have been, the obviousand automaticanswerto what Americanssaw wrongin the empirewas not independence. It would have been, rather, Even whenthe upreform, and compromise. accommodation, risings actuallybegan,as, for example,in thecase oftheHidalgo insurrection, independence was notthelogicalor automatic objective. It was notuntilI813 in Mexico, i8i6 in Rio de la Plata, and I82I in Lima that rebelsformally proclaimedindependence. Something musthave got in the way, something must have acted afteri8io to convert the insurgent cryof "Death to bad " into"'Long live independence.'" government mistakes thehistorian could makein reviewing One ofthe fundamental the royalgovernment theWars ofIndependence wouldbe to think ofit as during the way the law requiredit to. It did not,because it could not. functioning Three centuries of restrictions overthe exerciseofthe Crown's and controls powerby its agentsin Americahad notpreparedthemforthecatastrophe of I8o8. Duringmostofthe Wars of Independence theroyalpowerin America functioned on itsown,because fromi8o8to I814themonarch virtually was a captivein Franceand from I820to 1823 he was a captive oftheliberalSpanish Constitution. Thus, whilein theory major policydecisionscame exclusively fromSpain-and many of them did-in practice throughout this era an amountofmajorpolicywas made by theviceroys, extraordinary and almost in spiteof theirnaturalabsolutistinclinations. This is not to denythatthe intransigence ofpeninsular Spain on thequestionofAmerican also autonomy playeda greatrolein provoking American desires for totalseparation. Butthe focusshould first be on Lima and Mexico City. is thatthe viceroys themselves, unwittingly and withoutrecognizing it, disprovedthe mythsupon whichSpanish imperial absolutism was based. To put it another way, they proved Spanish unsuitedto America.Actual circumstances imperialism and eventsforced them to contradicttheir stated principlesand the principleson which imperialpoliticalinstitutions were grounded. And since thiswas a complex
THE THESIS OF THIS ARTICLE
3See Hugh M. Hamill,Jr.,"Royalist Counterinsurgency in the Mexican War of Independence:The Lessons of i8ii," Hispanic American Historical Review, 53 (1973): 470-89.I would take his statement that excessive concentration on the insurgents "tends to warp our understanding ofwhat actuallyhappened" and applyitequallyto excessive concentration on Spanishgovernment and imperial administrative reforms in thecentury before theoutbreak ofinsurrection, on thegrounds thatsuchconcentration tendsto makeus think we have an explanation forAmerican independence when,in fact, thatremains to be demonstrated by specific application.

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the readerwill be time not suitedto analysisby use of clear-cutextremes, were not presenteda second-and long overdue-thesis: that the viceroys and competent politicians extraordinarily but on the contrary, incompetent, decisionstaken actionsand forceful military leaders. A myriadofforthright to solve actual problemsfacingthemultimately provedto by the viceroys was no longer valid,thatit uncommitted Americans thatSpanishimperialism Mere inactioncould not have accomplishedthat,nor was false authority. clearheaded could mere rebel propaganda,nor could even the remarkably Independencewas more than a coup politicalanalyses of Bolivarhimself. ifthattermbe less than truerevolution d'etat,thoughit was also something It was the revolution. and evenintellectual takento requiresocial,economic, and of a previously politicaltradition of a three-hundred-year-old rejection held identity. Opposition alone could not have produced such a profound mustfirst invalid, have proveditself politicalchange; establishedauthority werethe principalagentsof established authority. and the viceroys role as "alterego," litThe subjectsofthisarticleare themenwho in their of King FerdinandVII, represented in theirpersonsthe erally"vice-king," of Spain in the two chief authority of the sovereignand the imperialism Americancolonies. For New Spain theywere Francisco Xavier Venegas, marquesde la Reunionde Nueva Espaina (I810-13); Felix Maria Calleja del Rey, conde de Calderon (I813-I6); and Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, conde del Venadito (I816-2I). For Peru they were Jose Abascal, marques de la Concordia (i8o6-i6); Joaquin de la Pezuela, marquesde Viluma (I8I6-21); and Jose de la Serna, conde de los Andes (I82 I-24).4 In orderto viewthem thatemotionally we mustremember have long inspired antipathies properly Togetherthey obscured the record of theirremarkableaccomplishments. everhad withthe the strongest leadership the Americankingdoms provided In every senseofthe ofthegreatsixteenth-century founder-viceroys. exception ofpurposeand loyalty help word,theyactuallyruledAmerica.Theirstrength so to achieve and it cannot be took why long explain why independence by assumed to have been inevitable.By definition theywere imperialists, wereresponsible, leadersthey as werethe and as wartime absolutists, training we ofthewars.Havingsaid thisabout them, thedestruction rebelleaders,for It is wereeffective servants oftheir thatthey reaffirmed havemerely sovereign. no morevalid to dismissCalleja fromstudybecause he was viewedby his thanitwouldbe to ignore enemiesas a bloodybutcher Hidalgo because ofthe It no valid to dismiss Abascal as committed atrocities by his followers. is more thatBolivarwas no democrat. than it would be to forget a merereactionary in Latin American historiography And yet, traditionally they have been and unthinking viewedas the blundering, agentsofan outbloody-minded, moded despotismthat, as the cliche about the royal dynastytheyserved This is and neverforgot would have it, neverlearned anything anything.5
and name since some possessed theirtitlewhileviceroy by family to hereafter 4Each will be referred posts. leavingtheir others only after ' The mostsignificant theyhavehardly oftheviceroys; dearthofbiographies markofthisis thestartling A from 1810 to 1824 Americawas governed byautomatons. One wouldthink been endowedwithhumanity.

TheLast Viceroys ofNewSpainandPeru

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to history, forto viewthemas stereotypes a disservice surely is, amongother forindependence and to things,to deny the full impact of the movement lessenthe stature ofthe Liberators who met and defeated themin a contest whose outcomewas by no means preordained.It is to ignorethe political numberofSpanish Americans who did notwant opinionsofthatsignificant weresaviors-it stillremainsto be independence and to whomthe viceroys whether or a majority, forthe victory of demonstrated theywerea minority independence does notconstitute automaticproof. Above all, the traditional viewof the viceroys deniesrationality to Spain's imperialethos. and of theirrole? Each, of How did the viceroys conceiveof themselves course,was very and the frequent different, disagreements amongthemwere one sourceoftheir ultimate failure. Whatunited them thefact was chiefly that in the face of universal theyfacedthe task of revivifying viceregal authority assault fromboth Americaand Spain. All servedthe unworthy Ferdinand failedto reward VII, who never them(each was granted histitle ofnobility on the grounds of service as viceroy) but whose weakness and vacillation The extentof theirlove forFerdinand seriouslyundercuttheirauthority. himself is impossible to discover and not important anyway, as it was rather to thekingas a symbol wereloyal.Although thatthey each was a professional servant oftheking, and therefore predisposed towardthedefense oftheking's prerogatives, whichwerealso the viceroy's, each was genuinely dedicatedto what theyall conceived ofas theonlypossibleand correct foundation for the state-the absolute monarchyas represented by Ferdinand'sgrandfather Charles III (though to whichreform theydisagreedon the extent within the structure was desirable). More than that,theywere also dedicatedto their definition of Spain and of its role in the world, to Hispanism. Their proclamations referring to the brotherhood ofSpaniardsand theunity ofthe empirewere not emptyrhetoric. They believedthat the brilliantcivilizing mission of Spain in America was still alive. The noble titlesthey were
on theviceroys summary bibliography themselves is difficult because muchofthemostuseful information is treated indirectly. For an assessmentof Venegas, see, for example, Hamill, "Royalist Counterinsurgency." For a treatment of the reactionsto Calleja's policies,see N. M. Farriss,Crown and Clergy in (Colonial Mexico,1759-1821 (Oxford,1968).Lucas Alaman's Semblanzas e ideario (2d ed.; Mexico City, 1939) includes biographiesof the Mexican viceroys. Less usefulis Artemiode Valle-Arizpe'sVirreyes y virretnas de NuevaEspana (2d ed.; Mexico City, 1947).Carlos Maria Bustamante's Campahas delGeneral D. FelixMaria CallejadelRey(Mexico City, 1828)is a standard.It is interesting thatthereis a biography of Calleja's wife, who was an American:see Jose de Nuiiez y Dominguez,La virreina mexicana: Doha Maria Francisca de la Gandara de Calleja (Mexico City, 1950). The lateststatement on Calleja is Carol Ferguson, "The Spanish Tamerlaine?: Felix Maria Calleja, Viceroy of New Spain, 1813-18i6"(Ph.D. dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1973).For the Peruvian viceroys thebestoverall biographies are in Manuel de Mendiburu, Diccionario hist6rico biogr4fico delPeru(Lima, 1874-90), in whichtheviceroys are treated in short originalmonographs. The well-known memoirs of Abascal and Pezuela are essential:Jose Fernandode Abascal, Memorias degovierno, ed. VicenteRodriguezCasado and Jose Antonio CalderonQuijano (Seville, 1944),and Joaquin de la Pezuela, Memoria del gobierno, ed. Vicente RodriguezCasado and Guillermo LohmannVillena (Seville, 1947).See also FernandoDiaz Venteo,Las campanzas del Virrey militares Abascal (Seville, 1948),and Jaime Eyzaguirre, La logialautarina y otros estudios sobre la independencia (Buenos Aires, 1973).La Serna and Apodaca in particular havebeen ignored. Originalmaterial and documents to relating the viceroys, however, are widespread, withtheexception ofLa Serna,whosepapersare badlyscattered. A particular problemis that by special dispensation none ofthe six viceroys had a residencia, nor did these viceroys leave instructions to theirsuccessors.

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granted-Concordia,Reunion-oftenreflected thismission.They embodied Spain's imperial ethos-absolutism,the sovereign, and themissionto spread trueChristianity and preserve and truecivilization. The readerwillalreadyhave scoffed, perhaps,wondering on whatgrounds he shall take these viceroys if thiswas genuinely seriously theirconceptof their rolein America.Surelythey could see thatitwas a conceptbelonging to the sixteenth century; surely theycould see the illogicin it. No, in fact, they did not,or onlypartially at anyrate,fortheystillgenuinely believedit. They whoseworldviewincludedbelief in therationality were,after all, imperialists, oftheir nation'shistory and their own actions.Theycould notgraspthepoint ofviewthatBolivarpersonified, theidea thatSpain's mission in America was overand thatthechild had outgrown theparent.At anyrate,to assumethat in i8io, or even in 1820,mostAmericans recognized the invalidity ofSpain's in Americais to anticipate. mission civilizing Its validity was proven, as Spaniardsviewedit,by threehundred yearsofhistory.6 Inertia, time,upbringing, and tradition wereall on theroyalists' side. The rebelsdid notwinunanimous when theydeclared that Spain's hour had passed. It had to be agreement proved,and onlythe chiefagentsof Spain could proveit. thefundamental That is exactly whatthey factor thatwoulddestroy did,for was thatthevaluesupon them,a factor theydid not and could notrecognize, were based were rapidly which theirauthority and the Crown's authority ofcourse,worldevents irrelevant. On a widerspectrum, becoming disproved theNapoleonicwarsshowedthatSpain was no thedivinity ofthemonarchy, longer Europe's foremostpower, and North American independence of its founders. suggestedthat America could function But independently the viceroys within the empireitself eventswereshowing to be, unknown to ofa gloriousirrelevancy. The things defenders themselves, theyclaimedand no longer to whatthey thought they represented corresponded actuallyreprein minds The was a who had overthrown ofAmericans. sented the reality king ofthe timethishad happenedin the history his own father (it was the first unified a war-torn monarchy), Spain eithersubjectedto Napoleonicrule or and formanyAmericans, constitutionalism and absolutism, dividedbetween a veryreal oppression.The Napoleonicconquestof especiallythe nonelite, traditions ofthe nation'sfundamental Spain and thequestioning exemplified or disproved the political ofCadiz together contradicted by the Constitution
6 independence, see MarkJ. powerofHispanismafter theextraordinary staying Forstudiesillustrating toi866 (Berkeley, Its Origin andDevelopment 1959), and, among the mostrecent, Van Aken,Pan-Hispanism: Conservatives and Liberals and TheirRelations with Spanish 1898-1936: Spanish FredrickB. Pike, Hispanismo, in as "an unassailablefaith whichPike succinctly defines America (NotreDame, 1971).The basic emotion, all, very of a transatlantic community or raza (race)" (p. i), is not, after Hispanic family, the existence but its political,social, and principleof the BritishCommonwealth, different fromthe fundamental antimodern, antidemocratic, Since Hispanism is conservative, philosophicalmeaningsare verydifferent. often find it incomprehensible. and sometimes NorthAmericans anticapitalistic, sometimes ultrareligious, SpanishAmerican This does not alterthe factthatit is veryreal and has answeredthe needsofcountless here it was just beginning to be philosophers since independence.In the period under consideration was at its ofthenineteenth theremainder century, Hispanismin SpanishAmerica challenged. Throughout whenSpain was but itrevived after caused bytheWars ofIndependence, 1898 ebb, owingto thebitterness no longera threatto Americansafety.

TheLast Viceroys ofNewSpainandPeru

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values Americans had previously been taughtto believe.The viceroys sensed thiscrisisofconfidence and responded to it in different ways,but they never not in themselves, fully understood it. It was a faultin the system, but they werethe agentsof the system and therefore of its failure. Jost ABASCAL, WHO GOVERNED the Peruvian for tenyears, was the viceroyalty mostabsolutistic in his response to therebellion. Perhapshe bestunderstood theauthority thattheviceroy He was convinced that traditionally personified. standing notmoving firm, an inch,was the bestdefense againstthecriseshe faced on all sides. Indeed rebellionprovokedin him greateradherenceto In a report absolutism. to Spain in18 I5 he accusedeventheLima Inquisition ofweakening his authority him.As a witness by daringto criticize to therevohe "I know lution, testified, thatnothing has so prejudiced theking'scause as the lack of resolution, or the imbecility, of thosewho have held power" in America.In I814 he had a disagreement withhis own audiencia (royalcourt), whichhe accused of beingtoo easy on a rebel sentfortrialfrom Arequipa. When theaudiencia referred to theirdisagreement as a "conflict," theviceroy replied,"I urgeyou nexttimeto avoid usingtheword'conflict' withme,because eitheryou do not understand or you forget its significance, whereI come from "7 I and what represent. To hima conflict between thetwoarmsof royal authority in Peru was a contradiction in terms.This was the tone adoptedby theviceroys who werein office whentheinsurrections brokeout, formaintaining Spain's imperialpowerundiminished was the viceroys' appointedtask. ViceroyFelix Maria Calleja ofMexico was also a genuineabsolutist who, unlikeevery otherviceroy, spokeand wrotewitha stunning frankness about the royalgovernment's troubles. He came closestto understanding whatwas actually happening. Followingthe nullification of the Constitution upon Ferdinand'srestoration in 1814,Calleja wrote a remarkable letter in whichhe explainedto thepeninsulathat"the ancient illusions"oftheAmericans about theauthority oftheCrownand its agentshad received a deathblowfrom the liberalization and confusion ofauthority thattheConstitution entailed.With remarkable politicalperceptiveness he pointedout thatwhatwas important was not so much the defeat of one or another rebel chieftainbut the ofwhat he frankly restoration recognized to be thegreatmyths thathad cementedthe state. The restoration of calm sufficient to allow a return to was also vital,"forevenifthearmsoftherebelsproveunsuccessful normality ... stillmisery, and a growing consumption, willdo thatwhichneither force nor intrigue may be able to effect."8 Abascal and Calleja, then,had the clearestand coldestunderstanding of
7Abascal to secretary oftheIndies,Lima, Mar. 29, i815;Abascal to minister ofgraceand justice,Lima, Aug. 2, 1814, both in Archivo Generalde Indias, Seville(hereafter AGI), Lima 749,748. 8 Calleja to minister ofgraceand justice,Mexico City,Aug. i8, 1814, AGI, Mexico 1482; thetranslation is from HenryGeorgeWard, Mexico in 1827 (London, 1828), 1: 512-22.

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whichis power.Almostas a directadjunct, and its employment, authority In of the viceroys in fighting the insurrection. theywere the mostsuccessful spreading from the insurrection to prevent Peru, Abascal was able virtually while he raised moneyand dispatchedtroopsto itself, into the viceroyalty

appearofPeru, i8o6-i6.The six portraits Fig. i. JoseAbascal, viceroy drawingstaken the articleare late nineteenth-century ing throughout duringhis reign.Each made ofeach viceroy portraits from the official of captain generaland personal decorations. wears the uniform

in Montevideo, Upper Peru,Chile,and Quito. royalgovernments helprestore at thehighpointofrebelfortunes geniuswho tookoffice Calleja, themilitary in Mexico, was able in threeyearsto breakthe rebellion'sback, to capture so that almostall ofthecountry, and to pacify his forces, Morelosand destroy the that his successor, Apodaca, could claim the yearafterCalleja leftoffice rebellionin Mexico was over.9All this was accomplishedeven though,as and propagates the desire for Calleja wrote, "The war strengthens a longing Independence,holdingout a constanthope of our destruction, intoevery all classes,and has penetrated desirewhich. .. is generalamongst victories of his " He recognized thehollowness military ofthekingdom. corner was "to reanimatethe destruction and insistedthatthe onlysalvationfrom of the government."" authority
of war, Mexico City, Oct. 31, i8i6, ArchivoGeneral de la Naci6n, Mexico 'Apodaca to minister AGN), Historia,vol. 152, no. 2. (hereafter ofgraceand justice,Mexico City,Aug. i8, 1814. 11Calleja to minister

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less cynical,but stillundeniably was FranciscoXavier Slightly absolutist, in Mexico. It was he whohad to facetheshock Venegas,Calleja's predecessor of Hidalgo's uprisingin i8io, the bloody first round of the Mexican war. Within days afterhis receptionin the capital in Septemberi8Io, there appeared a pasquinade on the walls ofthe viceregal his perpalace mocking sonal appearance and styleofdress.In typically directfashion, he is said to have orderedan answering nextto the offending pasquinade to be affixed originalwiththe words: My faceis notthatofan Excellency normyclothes ofa Viceroy, but I represent theKing. This simple advice I giveyoufor whatit is worth: The law mustbe thenorth star thatguides myactions. Lookoutfor treacheries donein thiscourt.1' It was Venegas's sagacity,especiallyhis abilityto choose extremely comlike Calleja, who was commander petentofficers of the armyof the center and later military of the capital, that allowed him to resistthe governor ofthe Indian masses underHidalgo and theguerrilla terrifying uprising war underMorelosthatfollowed. In i8i he facedtwo directplotsby dissidents in thecapital to kidnapor assassinatehim.He organizednewmilitia groups, firmly resisted the moreradical requirements ofthe Constitution afterI8I2, opened new sources of revenuein the face of genuinefinancialcrisis,and ended the dangerouslack of direction the government had suffered from since the shocksof i8o8. In i8io and i8i he createda special police force forthe capital cityand special tribunals to deal withtreasonand rebellion the nation. He denied charges by the citycouncil of Mexico throughout that these agencieswere indistinguishable fromthoseof the Frenchtyrant in Spain,"2 and he ignoredordersfrom the Cortesto disband them. The greatest danger,however, to theauthority ofall threeoftheseviceroys came from Spain, notfrom theAmerican insurgents. In I812 theerosion ofthe fundamental principles oftheempire reacheditspeak in thepublication ofthe Constitution written bytheSpanishCortesofCadiz. The Constitution, which theviceroys had to declarein Americaifonlybecause it was the workofthe singlecommonly acceptedlegitimate government, lowered theviceroys to the statusof"superior political chiefs" oftheir kingdoms, created elected provincial to sharepowerwithviceroys, deputations reducedaudiencias to merecourts of law, and establishedelected citygovernments. Most startling, it declared nationalsovereignty vestedin the Cortesrather thantheabsentking, a direct
Quoted inJesusRomeroFlores,Mexico: Historia deuna gran ciudad (Mexico City,1953), . 481 del Ex-Ayuntamiento, 29, i8i 1, Archivo Mexico City, Policia en general, vol. 3629,exp. 176.
12Venegas to Mexico City council,Mexico City,Oct.

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contradiction oftheSpanishstate.For twoyears ofthefundamental principle theConstitution remained in effect untiltherestoration ofFerdinandnullified it,and fortwoyearsViceroy Abascal in Peru and Viceroys Venegasand Calleja in Mexico agonizedoverthedelicatetaskofappearingto executeitspro-

Fig. 2. Francisco JavierVenegas,viceroy ofNew Spain, 1810-13.

visions whileignoring thosethey perceived to be destructive oftheir authority. They were in the altogether extraordinary position-and one whichthe true absolutist would not have expectedto encounter-ofserving a metropolitan government thatspoke forthe kingbut thatwas controlled by a philosophy as theyviewedit,to the trueinterests inimical, ofthe king.In Peru,Abascal nullified the Constitution's provision forthe freedom of the press,paid only nominalattention to the provincial and struggled to neutralize deputations, the revolutionary effects of a freely elected Lima city council, which he thoughtrepresented Creole dissidents.In Mexico, Venegas faced the same problems, nullifying elections that came too close to threatening royal and first prerogatives then the freedom implementing, nullifying, ofthepress. Venegas and Calleja publicly quarreled over what Calleja viewed as the viceroy's hostile attitude insufficiently towardtheConstitution and hisunwillingnessto prosecutethe war militarily. Mexican reactionaries bombarded

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Spain withrequestsfor Venegas'sreplacement by Calleja, and in March I8I3 Calleja tookoffice. Promising to implement theConstitution in his first fully proclamation to the people as viceroy, nonetheless took no actionto Calleja implement thefree from press,evenin thefaceoffierce level complaints every of the moderatefactionin the country. were Charges and countercharges to Spain in bewildering All three dispatched numbers. had occasion viceroys ofengineering to accuse dissidents local elections, whileCreolesand liberals in both countries and illegalacts.'3 chargedthemwithtyranny Viceroy Abascal in Peru could afford to be less heavyhanded in his efforts to neutralize the Constitution, because the kingdom was not itself largely a ofwar exceptin 1814, theater theuprising at Cuzco."4He attempted following insteadto direct theactionsofthevariousconstitutional agenciesby actually givingthe appearance of participation. The Constitution made the viceroy titular head or president ofthecitycouncilofhiscapitaland oftheprovincial deputationof the capital-province, and Abascal actuallyfilled thosechairs, somethinghis Mexican colleagues refusedto do. In this way he could supervisethe actions of the councils. In the provincialdeputation,for example, he personallyappointed the secretary, while a year later he in the electoral intervened junta that was choosinga Cortesdelegatefrom Lima." In I8I3 he disqualified theelector chosenby Lima from participating in the vote to elect the Cortes delegate and provincialdeputationon the groundsthat the man chosen was a magistrate, and yet he was actually thought to be too well disposedtowardthedissidents. In I8I3 he disqualified one ofthemenchosenas a citycouncilor in Lima.16He ordered the Lima city council to inform him wheneverit expectedto discuss a matterof major importance so thathe could presideoverthedebate,and he demandedthatit not writedirectly to thegovernment in Spain without hisapproval, although it firmly refused to obey.'7He evenrefused to let thenewly electedLima city councilforI 8I4 takethetraditional paseothrough thestreets on theday ofits inauguration.'8 Abascal's real objectwas to allow theliberalprovisions ofthe in Constitution to drawdissidents out theopen so they couldbe identified. As early as mid-i8I3, meetings of his junta of war were able to discuss with remarkable accuracythe statusofprominent citizens throughout thecountry
'3Material on theConstitution and itseffects is extensive, itconcentrates although on Mexico.The most usefulrecentmaterialincludes,for Peru,James Larry Odom, "Viceroy Abascal versusthe Cortes of Cadiz" (Ph.D. dissertation, University ofGeorgia, 1968);and, forMexico,NettieLee Benson,ed., Mexico and the Spanish Cortes, i8io-i822: EightEssays(Austin,1966);Benson,La diputaci6n provincial y elfederalismo mexizcano (Mexico City, 1955); Benson, "The Contested Mexican Election of I812," Hispanic American Historical Review,26 (1946): 336-5o; and James F. King, "The Colored Castes and the American Representation in the CortesofCadiz," Hispanic American Historical Review, 33 (1953): 33-64. 14 As J. R. Fisher has shown,however, theConstitution itself and Abascal's refusal to implement itfully werecentralcauses ofthe Cuzco uprising, whichwe name after itsIndian leader,Pumacahua. Government andSociety in Colonial Peru:TheIntendant System, I784-18i4 (London, 1970),227. 15 PedroAlcantaraBrunoto regency, Lima, Mar. 13, 1814; MiguelTenorioand others toCortes,Lima, May 24, 1814, AGI, Lima799. 16 Miguel de Eyzaguirre to regency, Lima, Apr. 3,1813, AGI, Lima 799;Actasdel Cabildo, Lima, bk.43, Mar. 23, 1813, BibliotecaMunicipal de Lima. 17 Abascal to secretary of Ultramar, Lima, May 31, 1813, AGI, Lima 745. 18 Actas del Cabildo, Lima, bk. 43,Jan. i, i814,BibliotecaMunicipal de Lima.

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who in the yearsahead would remainleaders ofthe undergound in favor of Venegas and Calleja were more direct in their opposition to the and consequently Constitution caused fargreater public reaction,but they

Fig. 3. Felix Maria Calleja del Rey, viceroy of New Spain, 1813-16.

viewed their opposition as necessary,for the years of the Constitution withthe highpointof Morelos's campaign.Venegas actually corresponded annulledthe first electionsthattookplace in Mexico Cityon November29, i8I2, claiming they had been improperly conducted.20 The nightof the electionstherewere widespreadpopular demonstrations of supportforthe Constitution in the capital, whichboth Venegas and GeneralCalleja called riotsin theirreports to Spain.2"After allowingthe freepress provision to go intoeffect fortwo months, Venegasannulledit as well,on thegrounds thatit gave coverto rebel propaganda. The factthat in a seriesof electionsin the capital cityhardlyany peninsularSpaniards were everelectedconclusively showedthe direction of popular feeling, and it explainsVenegas's hostility.
20

21 Venegas to minister of state, Mexico City, Dec. 27, 1812; Calleja to minister of grace and justice, Mexico City,June i6, 1813, AGI, Mexico 1322.

19Abascal to secretary of the Indies, Lima, Mar. 27, 1815, AGI, Lima 749. Benson," ContestedMexican Electionof 1812, " 336-50.

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On March 4, I813, in the midstof the constitutional era, Calleja became viceroy.Speaking words of sweet reasonableness,he permitted the longoverdueelections ofMexico City'scounciland provincial but he deputation, delegatedthe reactionary of the provinceto serveas intendant-corregidor ofboth. Promising president he simply to do anything everything, neglected about restoring thefree several direct orders theCortesto from press,ignoring do so. He, too, was able to draw out dissidentsby pretending to permit constitutional provisions. The elections wereperfectly suitedto thatpurpose. At one point he even negotiated withthe famousunderground rebel group called the Guadalupes as a means of discovering the loyalties ofprominent of the capital. The rebelsof the Guadalupes wrote-to residents Morelos the day after ofoffice and paid himthesupreme Calleja's assumption compliment ofwarning thattheviceroy was their greatest opponent, for, they said, "he is a greatpolitician."22 Calleja now commenceda military, political,and propagandacampaign againsttheinsurgents thatclearly defines himas thefiercest, mostcompetent, mostruthless, and, from theroyalists' pointofview,bestviceroy oftheera.He publicly promised "to dedicatemyself exclusively to thedestruction ofMorelos."23In I814 he sworeto thekingthathe would notlet Mexico go whilehe remainedin power even if he had to marchat the head of the whole army across the country, layingit waste withfire and sworduntilevery rebelwas destroyed.24 Special courts-martial ofthemostdubiouslegality weresetup in the provincesto deal with treason,and they were orderedto ignorethe ofclericsfrom immunity civilprosecution and to executerebelpriests without ado. ByJune 1814,evenbefore he had heardoftheking'snullification ofthe Constitution, Calleja was sufficiently powerful to exult in a public decree, "Nothing can now stand in the way of the executionof my ideas."25He reacted "with unspeakablejoy," as he wrotehimself, upon hearingof the king'srestoration.26 With icy hauteurhe commandedthe dissolution of the variousconstitutional bodies as orderafter orderarrived from Spain. When theconstitutional citycouncilofMexico wrotehimwhathe considered to be an insufficiently warm letter ofthanksgiving following announcement ofthe restoration, he ordered it to writehimagain within four hoursmaking itclear "whether or not you are disposedto guard,obey,and executeon yourpart everything touchedon by His Majestyin his decree. . . annulling theCortes "27 Several months later the king wrote Calleja and the Constitution. approvingof all his previousactions, includinghis refusalto obey the
22 Los Guadalupes to Morelos,Mexico City,Mar. 5, 1813,AGI, Mexico 1482.On the Guadalupes,see Wilbert H. Timmons,"Los Guadalupes: A SecretSocietyin the Mexican Revolution forIndependence," Hispanic American Historical Review, 30 (1950): 453-99,and Timmons,Morelos: Priest, Soldier, Statesman of Mexico(El Paso, 1963). 23 Proclamation ofJune 22, 1814, quoted in Bustamante, Campaias delGeneral Calleja,supp., p. Io. 24 Calleja to minister of grace and justice, Mexico City,Aug. 18, 1814. 2 Proclamation ofJune 22, 1814. 26 Calleja to minister ofgrace and justice,Mexico City,Aug. i8, 1814. 27 Calleja to Mexico Citycouncil,Aug. 22, 1814,Archivo del Ex-Ayuntamiento, Historia en general, vol.

2254.

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to measuresnecessary him to take whatever and authorizing Constitution, completelist of secrettraitors Having now a fairly stop the insurrection.28 among the upper classes of Mexico City,throughout i8I5 Calleja ordereda citycouncilors, noblesand gentlemen, ofprominent seriesofarrests lawyers, in the capital. fifth column the rebel destroyed whichvirtually and priests, his MeanwhileMoreloswas capturedand executed.Calleja was triumphant; called himthe "Reconqueror,"the "Second Cortes." admirers
THE CONSTITUTION WAS GONE. But both Abascal and Calleja knewthat its or even their were far more widespreadthan theircontemporaries, effects The damage lay not successorsPezuela, La Serna, and Apodaca, suspected. notin the had achieved, advantagetheCreolesor dissidents in anytemporary confusionand chaos that had reigned,not in the furyof liberals and of laws fora government moderatesalike who had seen theiropportunity men. The chiefdamage lay in what the by self-willed trampledunderfoot upon whichviceregaland royal had done to the foundations Constitution audiencia called it a loss of Spain's "moral The Mexican rested. authority that the force."29 In a letter dated August i8, I8I4, Calleja affirmed he had from theviceroy ofauthority had removed every vestige Constitution "The never recovered. it could be of and the use outside force, plain possessed is now so deeply impressedand rootedin the heartof every insurrection " he wrote, "that nothingbut the most energeticmeasures, American, had can evereradicateit." The Constitution force, by an imposing supported their to ridicule. "They have lost and magistrates exposed the ministers of It was nowtoo late; themeredefeat respectability." and eventheir prestige, he said, would not end the rebellion.This was so because the insurgents, continuedwarfare"acts against us in two ways: by open force,and by thesecondwillreduceus willalwaysbe repelled, thefirst distress; increasing Calleja, the Second Cortes,themostastuteand graduallyto death's door."30 for theonlyway thathe was trapped, recognized ruthless ofthe last viceroys, he knew,was counterproductive. and force, to retainpowerwas to use force, it had, themorepowerthe supporters The morebattlesSpain won thefewer remainedto the agentsofSpain. amassed the less trueauthority viceroys in a remarkable This replacementof authority by force was manifest exchange of lettersbetweenCalleja and the liberal bishop of Puebla, Dr. Antonio Joaqufn Perez. The bishop wrote the viceroy in April i8i6, ofthe of royaltroopsand the destructiveness about the cruelty camplaining and his army's war in general,and Calleja repliedjustifying government's them butjustified actions.Calleja did notdenytheexcessesoftheroyaltroops of those and factories by citingthe excessesof the rebels. Perez said farms
desde 1867 (Madrid, 1871), 1: 271. Mejico i808 hasta de Paula de Arrangoiz y BerzAbal, See Francisco ini827, 1: 497-509. 3,quotedin Ward,Mexico to Cortes,Mexico City,Nov. 1 8, 181 Mexicanaudiencia 30 Calleja to minister ofthe ofgraceand justice,Mexico City,Aug. i8, 1814.For a modernrestatement Men Rebel(Princeton, see Ted Robert Gurr, Why principlethat Calleja clearlyunderstood, theoretical
28

29

1970), 232.

TheLast Viceroys ofNew SpainandPeru

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suspectedoftreasonwere destroyed needlessly; Calleja said the government had been too soft. Perez accused royal troops of demanding excessive supplies; Calleja replied it was the duty of the countryside to supply a marching army.Perez complained thatthearmywas guilty ofcapriciousand unwarranted whencapturing rebeltowns;Calleja replied thathe bloodletting could notrestrain successful the of and victorious laws war troops, permitted excess.Perezallegedtheroyalgovernment had published every falseaccounts ofbattles;Calleja said falsifying newsfrom thebattlefields wasjustified on the grounds of political expediency.3'In all the historyof colonial Spanish America there is hardlyanotherinstance,outside of the initial conquest phase, ofso unashameda dependenceon nakedforce. Calleja knewthatany other defenseof his actions would be hypocritical. Indeed, to him even was hypocritical.32 compromise In Peru,meanwhile, the agingAbascal also sensedtheturning pointin the war had arrived. Whiletheworldwitnessed royalarmiessweeptriumphantly across the entirecontinent, so thatby i8i6 all of South Americaexceptthe Rio de la Plata was again reducedto royalcontrol, he sensedthatsheerforce was the onlythingleft, forauthority had evaporated. Whether he recognized it clearlyor not, it was only a matterof time before simpleforcecould no longersustainthe regime.The viceroy beggedSpain to let himretire, while Spanish ministrieswere flooded with complaints against him and his use of power.33 arbitrary Most of the Peruvian wereunaware complainants thatit was onlyAbascal and hisarbitrary use ofpowerthathad stanched the floodof rebellion. Simultaneously, however, the practicalproblemsof the royalgovernment werebecoming acute. Contrary to itssilver-inspired popularimage,Peruhad always been poor, and its cost of livinghad forcenturies been one of the in theworld-the result, highest ofcourse, ofan excessofsilver and a shortage ofeverything else. Now bread was sellingforfifty centsa loafand wouldrise to a dollar by I82 I, while the government staggered underan unbearable cumulative of 12,000,000 pesos and a yearly deficit deficit by 18I4 of I,500,000 pesos, and 150,000 artisanswere out of work.34 Spanish economicprecepts wererapidlybeingdisproved as well. No exertion, no force, no intransigence on the viceroy's part could rescuePeru from this inexorable plungetoward as longas rebellion existedanywhere bankruptcy on thecontinent. But Peru could not defeatthe insurrection everywhere. Its resourceswere becoming and its populationcould not bear such exertions overstrained, much longer.
31 "Cuaderno de contestaciones entreel Vireyde Nueva Espafiay el Obispo de Puebla," copiedJuly12, 8i6, AGI, Estado 31. 32 Gurrexplains:"Regimes facing armedrebellion usuallyregardcompromise as evidenceofweakness and devoteadditionalresources to military retaliation."Why Men Rebel, 232. 33 DomingoSanchez Revata to Infante D. Carlos Maria, Lima, July29, i8i6; Mariano Tramarriato king,Lima, May i, 1816;AntonioArroniz to king,Lima,June 28, 1815;minutes ofcouncilofthe Indies, Feb.-Nov. i8i6, AGI, Lima 773,1017. The mostextreme chargewas thatAbascal was prolonging thewar forhis own glory and personalbenefit. " ReportofAbascal toJuntade Arbitrios, Lima, Apr. 28, I815; LAzarode Riberato Pedrode Macanaz, Lima, Feb. 3, 1815, AGI, Lima 741,773.A Peruvian silver peso was equal to theUnitedStatesdollarin i8io.

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Timothy E. Anna

existed prior to the finalrush to indeAnd all these financialdifficulties pendenceof Peru's neighbors. from exileinJamaicain writing then, thatBolivar, had therebellion I8I5 at the nadirofhis career,could declare thatalthough "success willcrownour efforts, in America, been crushedalmosteverywhere decided; the tie that because the destinyof America has been irrevocably thattieand Only a conceptmaintained boundherto Spain has been severed. That which formerly together. kept the parts of that immensemonarchy bound them now dividesthem." The tie that bound consisted,in his own ofunderstanding, ofinterest, words,of"the habitofobedience;a community of religion;mutual goodwill;a tenderregardforthe birthplaceand good thattie was Spanish The conceptthatmaintained name ofour forefathers." All thathad disappeared,and Spain was nowreducedto "an aged authority. its venomous rage."" bentonly on satisfying serpent, by later read and remembered quotationofthe Liberator, This well-known was certainly part and pride, with the most intenseaffection generations The of what was soon to be manifest. But it was also a foresight prophecy. cause was broken, was predicting thatthe back ofthe royalist and Liberator that royalpowerseemedmostascendant.How can this at the verymoment thatthe posbe explained?Simplyby remembering apparentcontradiction in a civilwar,is notthesame thing as especially by armies, sessionofterritory the forterritory, In factthereweretwowarsgoingon: one a struggle loyalty. the second was important, formen'sminds.Whilethe first second a struggle but losingthe second. was decisive.The Spaniards were winningthe first of both Abascal that the authoritarianism Bolivarknew,if onlyintuitively, fundamental refusal to conform to the empire's and their and Calleja cynical depended boththechainofaffection uponwhichloyalty law code had broken ofroyalpower.The very and the habit ofobediencethatwas the foundation had been alteredbytheviceroys' was conceived groundrulesbywhichloyalty the delicate strands of loyaltyinto converting responsesto insurrection, operations hatred. This is more than saying simply that royal military wereconductedby men who in the hatred.That those operations provoked in the law as set forth name of loyaltyrefusedto obey the fundamental into This converted absolutism was the factthatwas so critical. Constitution a difference had alwaysrecognized truetyranny. philosophy Spanishpolitical on on the one hand,and tyranny and firm betweenabsolutism government, the his decree of VII in May 4, I814, annulling himself, theother.Ferdinand could declare that he and his predecessorshad neverbeen Constitution, he because by definition the kingcould notbe a tyrant By definition tyrants. ofhis ofthewishesand aspirations Culmination and was theultimate reflected was now collapsing, for this people. But in America that definition Is IT
REALLY ANY WONDER, comp. Vicente Lecuna, ed. Writings ofBolivar, Jamaica," in Selected 35 Sim6n Bolivar,'Letter from Jr.,tr. Lewis Bertrand(New York, 1951),1: 103-22. Harold A. Bierck,

TheLast Viceroys ofNew SpainandPeru

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was not working, whichmade it "bad government," government and it did not adhere to the law, which made it tyranny. Even the most apathetic was boundto noticethiscontradiction SpanishAmerican between theory and practice because Spain and SpanishAmerica had alwaysworshiped thelaw. Why werethe royalauthorities unable to build a new affection, a new or revived habit ofobedience,on the basis oftheirmilitary victories? The chief reasonis thatonce Calleja and Abascal had made unalterable and immovable authoritarianism the foundation of royalpower,authoritarianism had to be maintained. Any attempt by theirsuccessors to diversify of the foundations stood littlechance of success. Once the ironfist loyalty was uncovered, any attemptto gloveit would appear to be eitherhypocrisy or weakness;both would encouragefurther resistance. once corroded, can neverbe Authority, re-established by force.It might, however, be maintainedforan indefinite period of timeby force,36 but that forcemustbe constantand unremitting, and such force would requireresources Spain no longerhad at its disposal. Over and over again the next viceroys appealed to Spain fortroopsand warships.One need only read the diary of Pezuela in Peru, as he daily assessedthechancesofthisor thatexpedition beinggathered and making itto Lima, to witness an unparalleled exercise in frustration. And besides, peninsularSpanish intransigence toward any reform in the years I8I6-2I paralyzedthe severalviceregalinitiatives towardcompromise that were attempted.37 Americanreform was stillpossible in this periodifonlybecause Spain once again controlledmost of the territory of America. But if the liberalswho wrotethe Constitution and governed Spain amid the chaos of I808-14 were unwillingto accept the reforms in trade, taxation, and government proposedby theirsupposedly equal American colleaguesin the Cortes,thecouncilors ofthe Indieswho replacedthemin I814 werecertainly even less well disposed. After1820, whenreform was once again feasibleon Spain's part,it was too late on America's.Independence became thelogical answerbecause either Spain refused to consider reform or heragentsinAmerica made a mockery ofit.38 BothAbascal and Calleja retired from their American viceroyalties in i8I6, hailed as saviors, officially positively adoredbyconservatives, butdespisedby radical and moderateAmericansalike. Calleja privately urged Spain to maintainthe terror in Mexico, forit was the only means of completing the destruction oftherebels,39 and in letter after letter written in retirement Abascal urgedmaintenance ofevery aspect ofthe absolutism in Peru.But thenew viceroys neverreceivedthis advice directly from theirpredecessors (neither Abascal norCalleja left theusual detailedinstructions totheir successors that
38 See Carl J. Friedrich, Tradition andAuthority (New York, 1972), 12I. The definition ofauthority used throughout is Friedrich's. 37 For a resume of the way in which peninsular intransigence counteracted Morillo's attemptsin Venezuelaeither to reform theregime or to crushtherebelsutterly, see StephenK. Stoan,PabloMorillo and 18I5-1820 (Columbus, 1974). Venezuela, 38Gurr explainsthat "inflexible, repressive responsesintensify the hostility of dissidents and reduce theirhopes ofobtainingreform exceptthrough revolutionary transformation." Men Rebel, Why 236. 39Calleja to marques de Campo Sagrado, Mexico City,Sept. 6, 1816,AGI, Mexico 1322.

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E. Anna Timothy

earlier viceroyswrote), and besides, as witnessesto the post-i8o8Spain, to take it. There was a would have been inclined neither of the new viceroys certain "time-lag" factorat work here in regard to successiveviceroys' paradoxes towardmajorpoliticalquestions.One ofthefundamental attitudes durwho governed and Calleja, is that Abascal ofthe Wars ofIndependence in assignments Spain to takeup foreign era,had left constitutional ingthefirst had begunto collapse.Reform ofabsolutism thetraditions the periodbefore in thetimeofthe who governed But theviceroys was to theminconceivable. the absolutism-Pezuela and Apodaca-had experienced pOst-1814 restored when Spain formative yearsof theircareersduringthe Napoleonic struggle indeeda became a way of life, changedat such a dizzyingrate that reform predecessors, They werenot,unliketheir for defeatofthe usurper. necessity seek it.40Both"generations" even iftheydid not actively ofreform, terrified were thus somewhatout of step with the politicsthey were requiredto enforce. Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, a naval commander,former ofCuba, pursueda policy captaingeneral ambassadorto London,and former of amnestiesto former and widespreadgranting activity of limitedmilitary gainsofhis use ofthemilitary rebels.He hopedto rebuildMexico bymaking Europe itwas notedthatApodaca's policywas Even in northern predecessor. ratherthan one of government one of trying to regain Americanaffection Calleja forhis "firefear.4' On severaloccasions Apodaca criticized through specialwar taxes.Betweeni8i6 and and-sword" policyand hisextraordinary taxes Calleja had createdto meetthecost fundamental I820 he repealedfour a forced based on incomes, contribution ofthe war-a property tax, a forced when first lottery (all three had been new and nearly revolutionary and a group of taxes on horsesand carriages.Based on the introduced), Apodaca's that Calleja had brokenthe back of rebelresistance, assumption to ingratiate himself to the Mexicans. But was a consciousattempt program for, by sheer contrastit helped to weaken the public image of the regime, he had not aspect ofthe insurrection, while Calleja had ended the military and great It was a timeofhighintensity independence. quashed thedesirefor would have it-for it would historiography drama-no lull at all, as existing the gains won by relentless a policyof reason could solidify show whether to govern. it would show whether Spain stillhad a right force, ofthe armyin Upper commander In Peru,Joaquin de la Pezuela, former and army use ofthemilitia He, too,made onlylimited Peru,became viceroy. and to the he was close even built had troops very though his predecessor up,
IN NEW SPAIN,
40 For example, and trial, a fair Constitution to givetherestored bothPezuela and Apodaca werewilling withtherebels.Pezuela, to enter negotiations grudgingly, however both,particularly Pezuela,werewilling, a trialrun,but La Serna also gave the Constitution reform. as we will see, activelysoughtcommercial withthe in theSierra.He entered negotiations implemented fully it was never because ofthecircumstances to by eitherrebelactionor royalcommand. rebelswhenforced 41 343. (London, i817), America in Spanish Revolution ofthe Manuel Palacio Fajardo, Outline

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defended theirrights in every staunchly way, as forinstancein his policyof giving them preferencein civil employment.42 He, too, criticized his in thiscase for predecessor and privately, Abascal's authoritarianism publicly and his refusal to permit traders to land on Peruvian shores.He, too, foreign was more flexible, more concernedwithestablishing popular supportthan withmaintaining theironfist. As in Mexico,itwas too late.Confidence could not be restored,and flexibility appeared to be weakness, encouraging dedicatedrebelsto hold out foranother day,whiletheextreme Rightchafed at what appeared to be viceregal Both Pezuela and Apodaca got inactivity. caughtin thistrap,and withidenticalresults. When the historian on thechief focuses agentsofSpain rather thanon the leadingrebelsor on the rebellion one factor itself, notpreviously notedabout the Wars of Independence beginsto suggestitself. It may well be that i8i6 was thetrueturning pointin themovement, thepointat whichSpain's power had faltered beyondthe ability ofitsagentsto restore it.This was chiefly because thoseagents,and indeedmostofthe rebels,did notrecognize thatthe loyaltiesof Americanscould not necessarily be measuredby whicharmy controlled whichterritories. In i8i6 royalarmieswereeverywhere victorious. It mayhave been,therefore, a lull in therebels'fortunes, but itwas nota lull in the story ofthe deterioration ofSpain's power,because thosevictories had come at an excessive price.To reconquer Americahad required destroying its haciendas,communications, factories, and even some of its cities.It led, on the one hand, to such privation that,as Calleja had predicted, the imperial system's to feedand houseAmericans ability was destroyed, and on theother, to a loss of confidencethat the mere presentation by the rebels of an alternative to royalgovernment could neverhave accomplished. As Bolivar said, Spain was reduced to an object of hatred, and its very victories accomplished that.The viceroys who tookpowerin i8i6 did not understand this, just as their predecessors had notrealized thatthey themselves weredoing it. To oversimplify, the equation would be this: in the years i8io-i6, when Americamighthave been saved forSpain by compromise and flexibility, it was governed by force and absolutismcontrary to the fundamental laws; in the yearsI8I6-2I, whenforceand absolutism had becomethe onlysourceof Americawas governed strength, by men who soughtalternatives. It maybe protested thatwell overhalfthe story has yetto be considered. What about the resurgence ofthe rebels,the victory of San Martinin Chile, the heroicgathering together of Bolivar'sforces and the magnificent tale of their struggles, and the reappearance of rebellionin Mexico under the leadershipof Iturbide?The replyis that,of course,that is the second and greater halfofthestory ofhowtherebelswon,but itmayperhapsbe no more thanthedenouement, although witha fewsurprises, ofhowtheSpanishlost. Precipitating agents were still requiredto begin the finalprocess in each country, and they werenotlongin coming.In Peruitwas economic confusion and disintegration, whilein Mexico it was Doliticalconfusion.
42

Pezuela to secretary of Hacienda, Lima, Nov. 30, 1818, AGI, Lima 761.

56
PEZUELA'S FINAL CRISIS

Timothy E. Anna ofPeru's resources oftheoverextension was theresult

began withthe The countdown that was alreadyacute whenhe tookoffice. final loss of Chile in I8I8 at the battle of Maypu. Pezuela's major was his attemptto open Peru to freetrade with thereafter preoccupation that lost him the supportof Europe, NorthAmerica,and Asia, an attempt letter the soldiers,and the homeland.A remarkable Peruvianmerchants, the clarifies of the Cuzco audiencia, minister fromManuel Vidaurre,former economic catastrophethat was sweeping Peru and that made Pezuela's in I8I 7, Vidaurretoldtheking,quite Writing necessary. reforms commercial in Peru was of the royal commanders that the excessiveharshness simply, driving the population to prefer death. Endless oppression led to or inabilityto workthe land, and so to hunger.In Cuzco unwillingness at La Paz it pesos thefanega, for twenty-seven wheatwas thenselling province he said. In Moquegua war pesos. Entiretownshad died ofhunger, was forty brandy,had quadrupledits price; in La Paz war product, taxes on its chief coca, had quadrupleditsprice;in Lima war taxes product, taxes on itschief whiletheloss ofthe on bread and grainsand real estatehad thesame effect; thecapital to dependon itsown poor Chilean wheatsupplyafterI8I7 forced "When a man has nothing,"concluded Viand unpopulatedcountryside. daurre, "then he becomes a rebel, because in order to surviveno other recourseremainsto him but a resortto arms."43In May I8I8, Pezuela He to find newsourcesofrevenue. individuals a junta ofprominent convoked for urgent neededan additional200,000 pesos immediately toldthemthatthey This month to coverdeficits." expensesand an additionalI I 7,000pesos every no domestic since sources remained, from to come trade, had foreign money trade taxesfrom and indirect and so suddenan increasein customsrevenues Lima open to every passingvesselno bythrowing could onlybe accomplished what its nationality. matter to That was the rub, foreverytime Pezuela asked Spain forpermission that ofLima merchants allow freetrade,the Consulado, thechiefmonopoly As earlyas i8I 7 Pezuela as did Spain itself. controlled trade,resisted, foreign shipsto foreign was makingoccasional requeststo Spain to allow individual of trade,even land at Lima. By I8I9 he made a requestfortotal freedom proposing regulationsby which it would be controlled,and in 1820 he In opposition,the Consulado claimed that foreign repeated the request.45 whilea and economy, Peru'sindustry would destroy trade,especiallyBritish, Abascal in Spain concurred, reminding viceroy drafted by the former report in once theygained a foothold the kingthat the English neverwithdrew On foreign ports and that theirpresencewas always "verydangerous."46
1568. Vidaurrehad been heldin great M3 Manuel Vidaurreto king,Lima, Apr. 2, 1817, AGI, Indiferente because he had a habitof speakinghis mind. suspicionby Abascal, partly of Hacienda, Lima,June i6, i8i8, AGI, Lima 1550. 44 Pezuela to secretary ofwar, ofHacienda to minister ofUltramar, Lima, May 3, 1817;memorandum 45 Consulado to minister 29, 1820, AGI, Indiferente Madrid,July Madrid,Dec. 25, 1819; FranciscoXavierde Olarria to government, 313, Lima 1550, 1022. of Hacienda, Madrid,June 29, 1819, 46Consulado to king,Lima, Feb. 13, 1819; Abascal to secretary AGI, Lima 1550,1505.

The Last Viceroys ofNew SpainandPeru

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another occasionAbascal had declaredthatfree trade"would be tantamount the separation to decreeing of [America]from themother country since,once directtrade withforeigners littleto was established. .. Spain would matter of them."47The demandfor free trade,indeed,had longbeen a chief objective

.~

~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

1. of Peru, 1816-2 Fig. 4. Joaquin de la Pezuela, viceroy

therebels.The Consulado promised to makeup thetreasury deficits outofits own funds, but failedto make good itspromise.In I820 theCrownpromised to appointa commission to studythe matter, Pezuela allowed but meantime itscargo almostevery itself to enterand discharge foreign shipthatpresented at Callao and even at the lesserports.48 werepresented oftherepreThus Peruvians withtheextraordinary picture ofrejecting the thenecessity sentative ofroyalauthority publiclyproclaiming ofSpanish exclusiveness thathad been thefundamental commercial principle of the Creoles,while a former Americaneconomicsand a major grievance and the chiefmerchants viceroy opposed it. We cannotresisttheconclusion
andSociety, Abascal to secretary of war, Lima, May 23, 1812, quoted in Fisher,Government i54. Pezuela to secretary of Hacienda, Lima, Apr. 26, i8I7; Pezuela to Hacienda, Lima, Dec. i6, i817; AGI, Lima 756, Madrid, May lo, 1819, Pezuela to Hacienda, Lima, Nov. 3, i8i8; palace memorandum, (which is actually a 758, 759, 1550. Pezuela talks about this question at great lengthin his Memoria withthe Consulado. Memoria, 295,passim. diario)and makes clear his disappointment
47

48

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E. Anna Timothy

that Pezuela was right, but the nation'sgreatest economicpowersput their own interestsfirst.The Old Regime could not survivewhen the very corporations upon whichroyalpowerdependedperceived their interests to be opposed by the royal power. In the economicsphere,too, the royal system

of Peru, 182 1-24. Fig. 5. Jos6 de la Serna,viceroy

was disproving itself. ByJuly i 81i9the royaltroopsin Lima wereon halfsalary, and by mid-i820 Pezuela knew that San Marti'n and the Chilean had an expedition of twenty-eight government ships and fourthousandmen readyto embarkforan assault against Peru's coasts. The net effect ofthiseconomiccrisiswas that,evenbefore theSan Marti'n He wrotethe expeditionlanded in Peru, Pezuela could predictits success., was little confidence in theroyalgovernment left, peninsulain i8i8 thatthere Betweenthe especiallyamong the lower classes and troopsof the militia.4" rebel victoryat Maypu and the arrival of San Marti'n's expeditionin was thoroughly discredited,and September 1820, Pezuela's government the as a whole. from Perulaterreported to the it, through royalregime Agents was that Peru was being peninsula that "the personal opinionof everyone lack of means ofdefense, not through ofthe the superiority lost,notthrough the wrongsystemand lack of skill of joaqui'n de la enemy,but through
49

Pezuela to secretary of state,Lima, Nov. 12, i8M8, AGI, Estado 74,doc. 3!.

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Pezuela."50 The veteran royal army remained intact, however, and wantedto confront desperately theChileanexpedition after it landedat Pisco. In the faceofwhatthearmyinterpreted as Pezuela's refusal to strike against the rebels,nineteen of the chief officers near Lima forced him to garrisoned resignin January182I. The officers chose Field Marshal Jose de la Serna, generalin chief of thearmies,to becomenew viceroy.5' La Serna's regimecould do nothingbut depend on military force.The subtle and complexquestionof a people rejecting incomparably theirpast heritageand choosinga new formof government was now reducedto the arbitrary questionofwhicharmywould win at battle.IfSan Martin'sforces had been stronger in 182I, La Sernawouldhavebeen defeated InJuly quickly. 1821 theviceroy and the royalarmyabandoned Lima and fellback upon the ancientsourceofPeru's strength, the Andes.The weaknessand confusion of the independent republicestablished at Lima guaranteed severalmoreyears of life to the royal power in the highlands.52 La Serna claimed on many occasionsthathis abandonment of Lima saved the restofPeru and thatthe nation surelywould have been lost ifPezuela had remainedin command.53 But an armyon themarchwas notthesame thing as a royalgovernment, and despitethe valorand skillof La Serna and his commanders, the royalforces weredefeated in battleby Bolivar'sforces in i824, completing the processof independence. The La Serna administration, then,shouldbestbe viewedas merelya "last ditch stand," even thoughthe combinationof the rebels' military weaknessand La Serna's inaccessibility in the highmountains permitted it to continue forfour years.He might havebeen able to establishan enclave, but to retake the coast would have requiredthe aid of massive reinforcements ofpeninsular and there-establishment troops ofSpanishnaval control ofthe Pacific, both impossible, and would simply have constituted a military conquestanyhow.
IN MEXICO, VICEROY APODACA took officein i8i6. He was the most administratively skilledofthelastviceroys, themostpersonable, and themost genuinely popular in his capital city, thoughas usual residents ofotherparts ofthenationnever saw him.He frequently spokeofhiswifeand five children, one of whom was blind. As a former ambassador he was attunedto the importance ofcommunication and sentmonthly summary reports on thestate of the kingdom to Spain. The indexalone of his letters and reports in office runsto sixty volumes.54 Undoubtedly his moststriking characteristic was his and his beliefthatthe righteousness optimism and truth of the royalcause
821, AGI, Indiferente 313; see also an anonymous letter, Lima, Apr. 30, i821, AGI, Indiferente 1570. 51 La Serna to secretary ofwar,Lima, Feb. 9, 1821, AGI, Indiferente 313. Hispanic American HistoricalReview,54 (1974): 657-81.
5

50Marqu6s de Valleumbrosoand AntonioSeoane to conde de Casaflores,Rio de Janeiro, June 29,

52 For a

fuller description, see TimothyE. Anna,"Economic Causes ofSan Martin'sFailurein Lima,"

54 The

La Serna to minister of grace and justice,Cuzco, Mar. 15, 1824, AGI, Lima 762. manuscript indexesare in the Real Academia de la Historia,Madrid.

6o

E. Anna Timothy

of would prevailoverthe leaderlessbanditswho now made up the remnants He never foresaw the possibilitythat his the radical revolutionaries. not by the Leftbut by the Right. be destroyed would ultimately government ofhis was thenaturalresult forhisoptimism naivete, This was notnecessarily where underground, therebellion successat driving Calleja's very predecessor to lesseasyto combat,and morelikely itwas moresubtle, notbeingapparent, quarter,since its earlierloci had been later froma different itself manifest in I820 Apodaca appeared was reinstated When the Constitution disrupted. to implement it. In a sense he had no choice in the to make a genuineeffort untilitwas too late,to he did notattempt, his predecessors but unlike matter, system. Elections oftheconstitutional theoperations in and control intervene ofthepresswas whilefreedom intervention, and without wereheld regularly implementedfor one full year, until afterthe Iturbide uprisingbegan. of the Apodaca reportedto the Cortes that he thoughtthe reimposition in Mexico.55 had caused no unrestwhatsoever Constitution in fact,that ultimately Spanish destroyed But it was the Constitution, as is sometimes a counterrevolution, in Mexico, not by provoking authority oftheimperial ethos.The to Mexicans the invalidity alleged,but by proving VII apologizedto stunning royaldecreeofApril i i, I820, in whichFerdinand in 18I4 and in annulling hiserror theConstitution for theAmerican kingdoms to dissidents was wrongwhilebegging declaredthatthe ancientabsolutism gave the finallie to that "errors[injudgment]are notcrimes,"56 remember the Spanish system and to function the "tribal myths"that had permitted of If his anchored restoration royal power. the around which Calleja had thronewas not sacred, if it could give in so easily to internalrevoltand law to replaceit withwhatin I820 was Europe's the fundamental overthrow then nothingreally stood in the way of an most radical government, This is exactly and philosophicalacceptance of independence. intellectual thecouncilor to thepeninsulafrom report what was impliedin a remarkable of the audiencia, Jose Hipolito Odoardo, in October I820. Odoardo reported the powerof the directed at restricting thatthe Cortes's radical legislation theempirehad in only and the aristocracy throughout Church,the military, ofMexicans,so thathe could redirected theloyalties sevenmonths completely was imminent, thoughhe could not foresee predictthat some new uprising fromwhich directionit would come, and that it would be successfulin himself receiveda similarpreThe viceroy the royalregime.57 overthrowing diction fromthe city councilor Francisco Manuel Sanchez de Tagle in came overt threat to royaldominion finally JanuaryI82 .58 The longexpected who in early I82 I royal officer, from Agustin Iturbide, a disaffected a compromise of the proclaimedan uprisingthat, because it represented
17, 1820, AGN, Reales cedulas,vol. 224, no. 93. vol. 43. Apr. i i, 1820, AGN, Impresosoficiales, ofthe kingto the overseasinhabitants, Proclamation 57Fiscal Jose Hip6lito Odoardo to minister of grace and justice, Mexico, Oct. 24, 1820, quoted in i808 hastai867, 2: 12-16. Arrangoiz, Mejicodesde pierdecada dia muchode constitucional 58 FranciscoManuel Sanchez de Tagle, "Sobre que el sistema vol. 178. su valory eficacia,"AGN, Ayuntamientos,
`5 Noticeofreceipt by Apodaca, Madrid, Oct. ofreport
56

The Last Viceroys ofNewSpainand Peru

gainedthesupport ofthe wishesofbothupperand middleclass, immediately eliteand amnestied rebelsalike. In a mostunusualtwist ofSpanishAmerican reform now represented whilethe insurgents represented history, theviceroy thatthreatened no one's statusorwealthbut a muchmoremoderate program

-II,
of New Spain, 1816-21. Fig. 6. Juan Ruiz de Apodaca, viceroy

and in thefaceofit he had no Apodaca had neverdreamtofsuch a threat, to Spain he admitted defenses whatsoever. When he announcedthe uprising that"this unexpectedeventhas filledthe capital withas muchsurprise and as it has me." He warnedthat Iturbidewas verydangerous consternation and the Creole elite and because of his long associationwithchiefofficers ofindependence-thePlan ofIguala-would inevitably because his program to genuine "seduce" many of the wealthy,while it was equally attractive to Iturbide's treason rebels.6" It is almostincredible thatApodaca's onlyreply of himamnesty. By May I82I Apodaca reported thata majority was to offer
59

entire kingdom? . . . Any country is freethat wants to be free."59

achieved national self-determination. Iturbideknew that a simultaneously could not confused thathad contradicted itsown principles royalgovernment He toldtheviceroy, survive. "Is thereanyonewhocan undotheopinionofan

60

Iturbide to Apodaca, Iguala, Feb. 24, 1821, AGI, Mexico i68o. ofUltramar, Apodaca to minister Mexico,Mar. 7, 1821, and May 29, 1821,AGI, Mexico i68o.

62

Timothy E. Anna

and thatthekingdom was the troopsand manyofficers had alreadydeserted had been defunct since on the vergeofbeinglost.As in Peru,royalauthority to get his orders i8i6 and the viceroy'sapparent paralysisand inability armyofficers to viewhim as disobeyedled the minority ofdie-hardveteran pensable. Consequently, in an almostexact replayofthe Peruvianincident, on July5, I821, Apodaca was forced byhis officers and was replaced to resign ofthe nationwas by a fieldmarshal,FranciscoNovella.8'Iturbide'scontrol on some interior too far advanced, however, to permitNovella to retrench location as La Serna did in Peru, and independencetriumphed only two months later.It was natural, forIturbide genuinely embodiedat thatmoment words, thegenuine authority. thewishesofthenation;he possessed, in other In a poignantletter after he fledto Cuba, Apodaca describing theseevents "I had a feeling in themiddleof wrote, ofpresentiment about thismisfortune last year, I820, but not about the termsin whichit would come about or the meansbywhichitwouldbe effected, are so extraordinary thatit becausethey This was his confession that was not possiblefor anyoneto imaginethem."62 he had sensed the loss of authority that we have traced here but had not thatanyother graspeditssignificance or understood it.Thereis no indication as early royalist everdid either, exceptperhapsAbascal, who had recognized as i8o8 that therewas some indefinable core, some not quite explicableor thatwas in dangerofbeinglostifhe gavetheslightest demonstrable principle hintofweakening his gripoverall aspectsofhiscountry, and Calleja, whoby Once i8i6 knewit was alreadylost. That principlewas Spanish authority. the politicaland social weakened,no amountof effort could have preserved institutions thatwerebased on it. that Spain's authorityin America had for theformer continued to characterize royalmagistrates years disintegrated in afterward. They neverquite acceptedthefactthatan eventso unthinkable i8io had come to pass only a decade later. This lack of acceptanceis part of the reason for Spain's unnecessarily long refusalto recognizethe incolonies. Spain continuedto imaginethat some dependenceof its former two former was possible. Significantly, sortof restoration viceroys, Venegas in was that of council of state 1828 members the Spanish and Apodaca, were still debating methods by which to "pacify" the "rebellious American Indeed Spain as a whole never quite grasped what had provinces."03 and phishocksof I898 made its intellectuals happeneduntilthe unforeseen thatnotonlydid theynot losophers aware,withgreatpain be it remembered, but they possessa greatempire, possessedno empire.For a nationto havethe
THE
INABILITY TO RECOGNIZE of Ultramar, Guanabacoa, Cuba, Nov. 17, i821,AGI, Mexico i68o. For more 61Apodacato secretary see because he had no royal confirmation, detail on Novella, who should not be considereda viceroy TimothyE. Anna, "Francisco Novella and the Last Stand of the Royal Armyin New Spain," Hispanic 51 (1971): 92-I II. Review, American Historical 62 Apodaca to secretary ofUltramar, Guanabacoa, Cuba, Nov. 17,182 1. 1564. 6'Council ofstate,Madrid,May 29, 1828,AGI, Indiferente

The Last Viceroys ofNewSpainandPeru

63

believesprovedto be irrelevant, thingsin whichit genuinely at least to the it thought outsiders Before it was convincing, is a terrible we scorn discovery. Spain forits Quijotismo in this regard(and this is also a part of the Black thatevery other Legend about Spain) we shouldremember imperialist power has suffered the same delusion. The verythingsthat make imperialism possible-the combination of a once undeniably functionaleconomic, and philosophicalsystemwiththe missionary zeal and selfgovernmental, righteousness thatderive from delusions ofdivine that inspiration-guarantee imperialists will neverunderstand why subjectpeoples rejecttheirpolitical dominion. The greatest in the disintegration loss involved ofthe Spanishauthority in America,however,was that the independent states had no unanimously accepted authority to take its place. This was owingto the factthat when Spanish America found royal authorityirrelevant-notjust wrong or misguided but actuallyirrelevant, no longersuitedto itsconditions-thenit also foundthe tradition upon whichthat authority was based irrelevant, at least insofaras it directly involved the politicalinstitutions. That part, at least, Spain had predicted.When the Cortes sent peace commissioners to South Americain I822 to negotiate trucesand perhapsevensettlements with in Peru,Rio de la Plata, and New Granada,thecommissioners theinsurgents carrieda set of secretinstructions reminding them to tell Americans that independence wouldmean chaos, factionalism, politicaldiscord, and theloss of individualfreedoms whichthe Cortes said its own Constitution would guarantee.The chiefproblemAmericanow faced,the commissioners were informed, was an absence ofauthority, for authority had been replacedby "a forpower, thirst whichis whatconstitutes theoverseasinsurrection thusfar." In all thenewly independent or almostindependent states, Madridpromised, the lack ofauthority "has to produceterrifying evils."64 It was a fit lastword ofpaternaladvice,thoughno one listened. Spain lostAmericabecause itlostitsability toproveitsright to sovereignty, its ability to convince. In politics, economics, and religionit became irrelevant. The Crown,the king,his agents,and Spaniardsthemselves were no longer perceivedto be necessary.The decadence of Charles IV and FerdinandVII, the father's forced abdication, the son's detention in France, the Napoleonic conquest, the emergenceof self-made in the government regency and Cortes,and theConstitution, all thesedid moretoweakenSpanish authority, to make it-or prove it-false, than did all the rebels in America,fortheseeventscontradicted and disproved thevalues upon which thestatewas built.The forces arrayed againsttheSpanishEmpirein America weremighty, but the mostdecisive ofthoseforces werethosethatcame from not from within, without. At thecenter ofthisdilemmawerethewartime viceroys, themenwho bore the obligation ofpreserving Spanish powerevenas Spain changedso rapidly
64'Prevenciones muyreservadas que S. M. hace a los Comisionados,"Madrid, 1822, AGI, Indiferente 1570.

64

E. Anna Timothy

upon which they attemptedto anchor that power that the foundations disappeared.In the onlyresponsetheycould conceiveof to the undeniable Abascal in Peru and Venegas threatposed by the outbreakof insurrection, theirarmies, and and especiallyCalleja in Mexico gearedtheir governments, by betweenabsolutism,untouched theirsupporters to a do-or-diestruggle ofthe possibility ofreform, and rebellion. But this any seriousconsideration occurredat the verymoment that Spain claimedto be viceregaldespotism This authoritarianism converted the delicatestrands of dedicatedto reform. and sense ofbrotherhood ofall Spaniardsinto faithin themonarch, loyalty, overAmericans. It enhancedthe desire by foreigners tyrannical government for independence.Then Apodaca in Mexico and Pezuela in Peru, not lost the military gains of recognizing theywere now the agentsof tyranny, confusion and a well-intentioned to diverattempt theirpredecessors through of a systemthat had become dependentupon military the foundations sify in Peru, La Serna's government that was no government force.Ultimately held out in the mountains, until I824 by the disorganization of its protected could onlyoperateon the understandings ofpolitics enemies.The viceroys thattheypossessed,ofcourse.But sincetheyweretheliving and sovereignty symbolsof the dominionand majestyof Spain, theywere also the living the agentsby whichit proveditself and, therefore, symbolsof its confusion to America. irrelevant American criesagainstthetyranny ofSpain,whichin i8io weretheproduct and propagandistic ofa lack ofrestraint becametrueand deeply enthusiasm, a system thatwas merely converted felt aged and by I820 becausetheviceroys What is perhaps in rare instancesactually decrepitinto genuinetyranny. to Americansthe worse,havingdone so theycould not sustainit, proving oftheirpossessionof power. invalidity thoughit mayappear, is thatthewarMy contention, then,contradictory time viceroyswere one of the active forcesthat led Americansto reject their ancient imperial heritage,while at the same time they are the ofthatrejection. At thevery leasttheywerenotthe victims historiographical At ofmuchofSpanishAmerican historiography. bloody-minded nonpersons ofAmerica.No one the most,theycame close to preserving Spain's control can read Calleja's candid lettersto Spain and fail to recognizein him a with a disintegrating genius desperatelystruggling political and military situation.No one can read Pezuela's diarioand fail to notice his genuine concernforPeru or the personalagonies he enduredwhen he learnedthe news of Maypu, or heard of the loss of his son aboard the Maria Isabel Mariano Oscapturedby the Chileannavy,or ofthe deathofhis son-in-law to explainthe orio in Cuba on his wayhome to Spain in a desperate attempt on Abascal's munChile. We havetoo longconcentrated to reconquer failure dane accomplishments-theLima surgicalcollege,the royal cemetery-at of Peru in the face of the expense of his greatestone-the preservation revolution from all sides. We have onlyrecently begunto treatofVenegas in and studiesofHidalgo. We have nevercredited Apodaca withtherationality

The Last Viceroys ofNew SpainandPeru

65

administrative skillthat his contemporaries withsighsof relief. greeted La Serna was theman who forfour so heroically yearsfought thathis conqueror Antonio Josede Sucretreatedhimwithgenuinerespect and felt real sadness at hispersonalhumiliation at Ayacucho.Havingrecognized theviceroys to be well worthstudy,we can beginto become aware ofthe complexity of their impacton independence.