DECS vs. San Diego G.R. No.

89572 December 21, 1989 Facts: Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the three-flunkrule. He then filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition. Issue: Whether or not the NMAT three-flunk-rule order is valid and constitutional. Ruling: Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed.

AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ [64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR 1937] Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government. Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion. Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious denomination.

They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila, being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance. Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the Government.

Senate of the Phils. vs. Ermita G.R.No. 169777 20April2006 FACTS OF THE CASE: On September 23, 2005, the committee of the senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the executive department and Military officials for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail Project, and on the issues of Gloriagate, Wire-tapping of the President, Electoral fraud, as was shown in the respective privileged speeches of the Senators. On September 27 & 28 2005, after being invited most of those resource persons were not able to make it due to prior commitments (i.e. military officials), while on 27 September then Senate President Drilon, received a letter from Executive Secretary Ermita requesting a postponement of the hearing (re: Northrail). On September 28, 2005 the president issued E.O 464, and Ermita sent a letter to the Senate President, informing him of the E.O. and that the resource persons from the executive dept would not be able to attend w/o the consent of the president. With regard to the hearing on the wire-tapping of the President, Col. Balutan and Gen. Gudani were relieved from their military posts and faced court martial proceedings for testifying w/o the presidents approval.

ISSUES OF THE CASE: IS E.O. 464 VALID? - The congress has the power of inquiry that is expressly recognized by ART 6.21 of the Constitution, where congress may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation - Since congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be inconsistent to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most familiar with and informed on the executive operations, although there are exemptions to the power of inquiry which exemptions fall under the rubric of executive privilege (the power of the government to withhold info from the public, the courts, the congress) it is only recognized in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character, and it is inclined heavily against secrecy and in favor of disclosure. - The power of congress to compel the appearance of exec officials under sec 21 and the lack of it under sec 22 find their basis in the principle of Separation of Powers. While the exec branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of congress to legislate by refusing to comply w/ its demands for info. - Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch, whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefore and why it must be respected.

HELD: PETITIONS ARE PARTLY GRANTED, Sec(s) 2(b) &3 of E.O. 464 ARE DECLARED VOID. Sec(s) 1&2(a) ARE HOWEVER, VALID.

Facts: The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes, which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. Issues: 1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress; 2. Whether or E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and 3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Held: 1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution. This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. 3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is exempt from the need for publication.

SANIDAD vs. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976) Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendumplebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum- Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution.

As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L- 44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5 October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming ReferendumPlebiscite of October 16. Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election." Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be

proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973 Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

TANADA, ET.AL VS. ANGARA, ET.ALGR NO.118295 MAY 2, 1997 FACTS: S e n . W i g ber to T a n a d a , to g et h er w i t h o t h e r l a w ma ke r s , t a x pa y er s , a n d various NGOs , as petitioners, filed a petition before the Supreme Court, to decide the validity of the action of the President of the Philippines, Fidel V. Ramos, and the Senate in ratifying the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement and its three (3)annexes, due to grave abuse of discretion on the part therein. The petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to the Filipino First policy. ISSUES: 1. Does the petition present a justiciable controversy? Otherwise stated, does t h e p e t i t i o n i n v o l v e d a p o l i t i c a l q u e s t i o n o v e r w h i c h t h e c o u r t h a s n o jurisdiction? 2. Do the provisions of the WTO agreement and i t s t h r e e ( 3 ) a n n e x e s contravene section 19, Article II, and sections 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Philippine Constitution? 3 . D o t h e pr o v i s i o n s o f t h e s a i d a g r e em e nt a n d i ts a n n ex e s l i m i t , r es t r i c t , o r impair the exercise of legislative power by congress? 4 . D o s a i d pr o v i s i o ns u n du l y i m pa i r o r i n t er f e r e w i t h t he ex er c i s e o f j u di ci a l power by this court in promulgating rules of evidence? 5 . Wa s t he co n c ur r e n ce o f th e s ena t e i n t he W T O A g r e em e nt a n d i ts a n n ex e s s uf f i c i en t a n d / o r v a l i d , co ns i d er i ng t ha t i t d i d no t i n cl u de t he F i n a l A ct , D e c l a r a t i o n s a n d D e c i s i o n s , a n d t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g o n Commitments in Financial Services?

RULING: 1. The petition raises justiciable controversy in seeking to nullify the act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the constitution. The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. Its the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. 2. The WTO provisions do not contravene with our Constitution. The charter provisions in the Constitution are not self-executing, rather, just declaration of principles which are not ready for enforcement through the courts and only serve as guides by the judiciary in their exercise of judicial review, and as an aid by the legislatures in its enactment of laws. Constitution does not rule out foreign competition. It also favors consumers, and not industries or enterprises. Lastly, Constitution was designed to meet future events and contingencies. 3. International treaties and agreements like this, by their inherent nature really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. Nations by their voluntary act, may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits derived from that treaty or agreement. 4. WTO Agreement provisions in article 34 of TRIPS, does no t contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our judicial system.

ARANETA v. DINGLASAN 84 Phil. 368 (1949) G.R. No. L-2044: J. ANTONIO ARANETA, petitioner, vs. RAFAEL DINGLASAN, Judge of First Instance of Manila, and JOSEP. BENGZON, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondents. G.R. No. L-2756: J. ANTONIO ARANETA and GREGORIO VILLAMOR, petitioners, vs. EUGENIO ANGELES, Fiscal of City of Manila, respondent. G.R. No. L-3054: EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Sr., por si y como Presidente del Partido Nacionalista, recurrente, vs. ELTESORERO DE FILIPINAS, recurrido (eyng?). G.R. No. L-3055: LEON MA. GURRERO, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSIONER OFCUSTOMS and THE ADMINISTRATOR,SUGAR QUOTA OFFICE,DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE ANDINDUSTRY, respondents. G.R. No. L-3056: ANTONIO BARREDO, in his own behalf and on behalf of all tax payers similarly situated, petitioner, vs. THECOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THEAUDITOR GENERAL and THEINSULAR TREASURER OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

Facts: As the issue is of transcendental importance, technicalities or procedure, particularly petitioners personality or sufficiency of interest and the question whether prohibition lies, was brushed aside. Petitions challenge the validity of executive orders of the President issued in virtue of the Emergency Powers Act (CA No. 671) L-2044 and L-2756: Petitioner is under prosecution in the Manila, CFI for violation of provisions of EO No. 62 (regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings) and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition to the judge and the city fiscal.

L-3055: Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to permit the exportation of shoes by the petitioner. Respondents refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by EO No. 192 (aims to control exports from the Philippines) L-3054: Petitioner, as a tax-payer, an elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party, applies for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing E.O. No. 225(appropriates funds for the operation of the Philippine Government during the period from July1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes) L-3056: petitioner, with reference to EO No. 226(appropriates P6M to defray the expenses in connection with, and incidental to, the hold lug of the national elections to be held in Nov. 1949), asks this Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it." As petitioners fail to assailing the constitutionally of Act No. 671 in their oral argument and memorandum (they rest their case chiefly on the proposition that the CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect), constitutionality of said act will be taken for granted. Act No. 671, enacted by the National Assembly, is an act declaring a state of total emergency as a result of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia, which involves the Philippines and authorizing the president to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency, pursuant to Art.VI, sec. 26, of the Constitution. The problem is, CA No. 671 does not in term fix the duration of its effectiveness

Issue: WON CA No. 671 has ceased to have any force and effect Held and Ratio YES. Art. VI of the Constitution provides that any law passed by virtue thereof should be "for a limited period." "Limited period" as used in the Constitution means restrictive in duration. Emergency, in order to justify the delegation of emergency powers, must be temporary or it can not be said to be an emergency. It is to be presumed that CA No. 671 was approved with this limitation in view as the opposite would make the law repugnant to the Constitution, and contrary to the principle that the legislature is deemed to have full knowledge of the constitutional scope of its powers. The assertion that new legislation is needed to repeal the act would not be in harmony with the Constitution either

DE LA LLANA VS. ALBA FACTS: De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking ti enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the Sandigan bayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justify a suit of this character, it being alleged that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded. ISSUES: W/N BP 129 is unconstitutional for impairing the security of tenure of the justices and judges in this case? RULING: It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. The rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith. Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

Pelaez vs Auditor General Political Law Sufficient Standard Test and Completeness Test From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. Pelaez argues, accordingly: If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities? The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC.

HELD: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.