MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview with Janet Reno, Attorney General of the United States on INS issues

Date: December 16, 2003

Special Access Issues: none

Prepared by: Janice Kephart-Roberts

Team Number: 5

Location: K Street

Participants - Non-Commission: Janet Reno

Participants - Commission:
Philip Zelikow, Executive Director
Dan Marcus, General Counsel
Christine Healey
Len Hawley
Barbara Grewe
Janice Kephart-Roberts, counsel

Documents received: none (of interest to T5)

NOTES: PZ asked questions for Team 5 from questions provided below, with the
exception of questions 2 and 7, which were asked by JKR.

TEAM 5 INS-RELATED QUESTIONS

FOR THE HONORABLE JANET RENO
December 16,2003

1. VIEW OF INS ROLE IN COUNTERTERRORISM. From the mid 1990s to the end of the Clinton
Administration, there was a significant increase in the DOJ's legal and financial resources dedicated to
counterterrorism, due to both the President (PDDS 39 and 62 of note) and Congress. The FBI, US
Attorneys Offices, Office of Justice Programs, all received a large increase in funding. The FBI,
Customs, and Secret Service heads, among other sub-cabinet agencies are included in the FDD
distribution, but not the INS Commissioner.

• What was your view of the INS role in counterterrorism? (DOJ documents from
the 1990s reflect priorities for the INS in securing the SW border, Border Patrol,
counternarcotics, and countering illegal migration and alien smuggling, punctuated
by the Haitian and Cuban crises. Excluding and removing terrorists, and tracing
students, is not reflected.)
• What was your view of the INS ability to address counterterrorism?
• Do you think enough was done at the White House level to support the INS role
in counterterrorism?
 Question asked instead: Whether or when the AG saw a connection between the INS and
CT issues?
Answer: I saw the connection from the beginning. I remember Hal Rogers wanting to
know why the INS couldn 't catch overstays and the fear about the numbers of people
getting in the US. I'll never forget my fall 1993 trip to San Diego. Meissner not yet on
board, and I saw hoards just waiting for us to leave so they could cross the border.
Every time, it was clear to me that if drug cartels could do it, so could terrorists. And
then I reviewed the northern border, and I shuddered looking at this long, barren border,
and wondered, how do I stop that? That's when we developed the Gatekeeper Initiative,
where what we ended up doing was pushing people out to the desert and then keeping
them alive.
2. INTELLIGENCE AND SENIOR BORDER MANAGERS. When you became aware of UBL and
other significant foreign terrorists as a threat to US interests, did you then or later ensure that this
information was shared with Commissioner Meissner? I never asked for her to be briefed on UBL, or
asked her what she knew of his activities. I assumed she was getting the intelligence she needed..

3. EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN TERRORISTS. FDD 39 in June 1995 directed the Attorney General
to use "all legal means available" to exclude or otherwise remove from the U.S. aliens who pose a
terrorist threat. Most of the individuals about whom you were briefed in connection with terrorism
prosecutions were aliens using the legal immigration system to enter the U.S. illegally.
• What did you do to follow up? Not asked.
• Did you use all legal means (ATRC, secret evidence, immigration laws as
pretext)? If not, why not? Not asked.
Did you consider asking Commissioner Meissner for a counterterrorism plan? If
not, why not? (There were CT plans that drifted at INS in the late 90s, but apparently she
never saw them nor asked for them.)
When the drugs were coming up, and the Texas problem large, and the same info was
coming in about crossings over the northern border, I said to Doris, we need to do
something, but we knew we didn 't have the money for the borders or the airports, and the
need for detention was great. Congress passed three laws that changed the immigration
arena greatly. And trying to get anything done was frustrating, because Congress had no
faith. I wanted to balance the Border Patrol with inspectors, determine effective
detention, but when we asked for IT support, instead we got more Border Patrol, and
never got the good balance. At one point, I did ask Doris for a northern border initiative,
but don't recall when.

4. STUDENT TRACKING. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Law and FDD 62 in
1998 directed that the Justice Department (FBI and INS), and the State and the Education
Departments develop a strategy to track students from terrorism list countries, limit the duration of
their stay in the U.S., and know when they depart.
• What were your views of the value of a student tracking system?
• Why did you not require INS to implement it?
/ recall discussing how students were overstays, and how apprehending violators seemed
an impossible task, but I don't recall the specifics of the program or whether there was
money to do it. Will check on it for you.

5. ENTRY-EXIT. Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996 directed the AG to develop an automated entry and exit program to collect records every alien
arriving and departing the US. The June 2000 Data Management Improvement Act directed
 integration of DOJ/DOS electronic arrival and departure information, beginning in 2003. The Visa
Waiver Pilot Act of 2000 required collected entry/exit information from aliens provided a waiver by
the Act.
• What were your views of the value of an entry-exit program?
• Why did you not require INS to implement it?
/ don't recall how the funding came down and used, but trying to get the capacity to deal
with overstays, we simply didn 't have the resources to do it. Don't recall the budgetary
specifics, but will check on it. I recall Rogers taking Doris and I to the woodshed on the
issue, but I don't recall the funding issue.

6. USE OF IMMIGRATION LAW IN COUNTERING TERRORISM.

• What did you see as the value of the use of immigration law in excluding and
removing foreign terrorists? Not asked.
• What did you see as the issues in the use of secret evidence to remove an individual
associated with terrorist activity? Not asked.
• What value did you see in the Alien Terrorist Removal Court? Was it an acceptable
outcome to you that this court, with all its judges and procedures in place, was never
used despite the extensive review of cases that took place since its inception in 1996?
The FBI would come to us and say, we 've got these people, but can't deport them because we 'II
have to say we need to deport them. The ATRC was to hear these cases and consider these issues
in camera. Often these same aliens were overstays and we 'djust take care of them through the
immigration courts. Problem we had was with secret evidence—the FBI would say they had an
ironclad case and it would fall apart in court.

7. CONSOLIDATION OF BORDER AGENCIES. Documents indicate you did not favor a

consolidation of border agencies under the Department of the Treasury proposed in the early 1990's.
What was your view of whether and how the INS should be restructured to make it a more efficient
and accountable agency capable of meeting our nation's border security, economic, and humanitarian
requirements?
We tried to address this with Rogers. I agreed with a split between enforcement and
services with a common leadership at the top. We can restructure until the cows come
home, but with only four political slots at INS, it was very hard to make change in that
institution.

8. CONTEXT. What were the most significant events and developments on immigration and border
issues during your tenure? What were the pressures coming from Congress? From the White House?
Not asked.
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 TEAM 5 INS-RELATED QUESTIONS
FOR THE HONORABLE JANET RENO
December 16,2003

1. VIEW OF INS ROLE IN COUNTERTERRORISM. From the mid 1990s to the end of the Clinton
Administration, there was a significant increase in the DOJ's legal and financial resources dedicated to
counterterrorism, due to both the President (PDDS 39 and 62 of note) and Congress. The FBI, US
Attorneys Offices, Office of Justice Programs, all received a large increase in funding. The FBI,
Customs, and Secret Service heads, among other sub-cabinet agencies are included in the PDD
distribution, but not the INS Commissioner.

• What was your view of the INS role in counterterrorism? (DOJ documents from
the 1990s reflect priorities for the INS in securing the SW border, Border Patrol,
counternarcotics, and countering illegal migration and alien smuggling, punctuated
by the Haitian and Cuban crises. Excluded and removing terrorists, and tracing
students, is not reflected.)
• What was your view of the INS ability to address counterterrorism?
• Do you think enough was done at the White House level to support the INS role
in counterterrorism?

INTELLIGENCE AND SENIOR BORDER MANAGERS. When you became aware of UBL and
other significant foreign terrorists as a threat to US interests, did you then or later ensure that this
information was shared with Commissioner Meissner? A&\f rC«^ -C</*v» ^Xx^rtcJ KM

3. EXCLUSION OF FOREIGN TERRORISTS. PDD 39 in June 1995 directed the Attorney General
to use "all legal means available" to exclude or otherwise remove from the U.S. aliens who pose a
terrorist threat. Most of the individuals about whom you were briefed in connection with terrorism
prosecutions were aliens using the legal immigration system to enter the U.S. illegally.
• What did you do to follow up?
• Did you use all legal means? If not, why not?
• Did you consider asking Commissioner Meissner for a counterterrorism plan?
If not, why not?

4. STUDENT TRACKING. The 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Law and PDD 62 in
1998 directed that the Justice Department (FBI and INS), and the State and the Education
Departments develop a strategy to track students from terrorism list countries, limit the duration of
their stay in the U.S., and know when they depart.
• What were your views of the value of a student tracking system?
• Why did you not require INS to implement it?

5. ENTRY-EXIT. Section 110 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, directed the AG to develop an automated entry and exit program to collect records of arrival
and departure from every alien entering and leaving the US. The June 2000 Data Management
Improvement Act directed integration of DOJ/DOS electronic arrival and departure information,
beginning in 2003. The Visa Waiver Pilot Act of 2000 required collected entry/exit information from
aliens provided a waiver by the Act.
• What were your views of the value of a entry-exit program?
• Why did you not require INS to implement it?
6. Use of immigration law in countering terrorism.
• What did you see as the value of the use of immigration law in excluding and
removing foreign terrorists?
• What did you see as the issues in the use of secret evidence to remove an individual
associated with terrorist activity?
• What value did you see in the Alien Terrorist Removal Court? Was it an acceptable
outcome to you that this court, with all its judges and procedures in place, was never
used despite the extensive review of cases that took place since its inception in 1996?

7. Consolidation of border agencies. Documents indicate you did not favor a consolidation of border
agencies under the Department of the Treasury proposed in the early 1990's. What was your view of
whether and how the INS should be restructured to make it a more efficient and accountable agency
capable of meeting our nation's border security, economic, and humanitarian requirements?

8. CONTEXT. What were the most significant events and developments on immigration and border
issues during your tenure? What were the pressures coming from Congress?

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