An Alternative to Kuomintang-Communist Collaboration: Sun Yat-Sen and Hong Kong, January-June 1923 Author(s): F.

Gilbert Chan Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1979), pp. 127-139 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312357 Accessed: 20/11/2009 10:47
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ModernAsianStudies,13, I (X979), pp. 127-I39. Printed in Great Britain.

An Alternative to Kuomintang-Communist Sun Yat-senand Hong Kong, Collaboration:

1923 January-June
F. GILBERT CHAN

Miami University, Oxford,Ohio

SUN Yat-sen arrived in Shanghai in August I922 after suffering a humiliating defeat at the hands of his former ally, Ch'en Chiung-ming. In the next five months, he negotiated with Russian and Chinese Communists for their collaboration with the Kuomintang. His effort was fruitful, On January 26, 1923, he issued a joint manifesto with the Soviet emissary, AdolfJoffe, who assured the Chinese revolutionary leader-in the name of the 'Russian people'-of their 'warmest sympathy for China' and their 'willingness to lend support.'1 With no specific promise of Soviet material assistance, however, the Sun-Joffe Manifesto was mostly symbolic. Russia maintained strong interest in Wu P'ei-fu, a powerful militarist, until after the latter's violent suppression of the February 7 strike in 1923. Moreover, the Soviet Communists continued to negotiate with Peking for diplomatic recognition, in spite of Sun Yat-sen's inauguration in March as Generalissimo of the Canton government.2 Similarly, Sun did not permit his agreement with Moscow to interfere with his endeavors to seek support from other foreign powers. His rapprochement with Hong Kong during the first half of 1923 was illustrative of this attitude.
In a slightly modified form, this paper was presented to the 43rd Annual Meeting of the Ohio Academy of History on April 26, 1975. Acknowledgments are due to Professors C. Martin Wilbur of Columbia University and Lloyd E. Eastman of the University of Illinois at Urbana for their constructive criticisms. I am also appreciative of the valuable suggestions for improvement made by my colleagues in the History Department Faculty Seminar at Miami University. 1 For the complete text of the manifesto, see H. G. W. Woodhead (ed.), The Chinarear Book, I924-5 (Tientsin: Tientsin Press, Ltd, n.d.), p. 863. The evolution of the Kuomintang-Russian alliance is discussed in my article, 'Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Kuomintang Reorganization,' in F. Gilbert Chan and Thomas H. Etzold (eds), Chinain the I92os: Nationalismand Revolution (New York: New View2 Odoric Y. K. Wou, 'Wu P'ei-fu and the Communists' (preliminary report to University Seminar on Modern China, Columbia University, November 28, 1973); and Allen S. Whiting, Soviet Policies in China, I9I7-I924 (New York: Columbia

points, 1976), pp. 15-37.

University Press, 1953), pp. 208-35.

0026-749X/79/0200-0903 $02.00 ?I979

Cambridge University

Press

127

I28

F. GILBERT

CHAN

Probably influenced by historical hindsight, many scholars invest the collaboration with an development of the Kuomintang-Communist aura of inevitability.3 Such analyses fail to take into consideration Sun's reservations about Marxism as an answer to China's problems. They further underrate the opposition of some of his comrades to the alliance with the Communists. By using his courtship with Hong Kong as an example, this paper demonstrates the flexibility of Sun's relations with Russia. It emphasizes the factional rivalries within the Kuomintang; they reflected the bitter dissension among party veterans over the decision to solicit aid from Soviet Communists. The search for an alternative to Sun's pro-Russian policy ended temporarily in June 1923, after Hong Kong's refusal to extend to the Kuomintang the financial support it badly needed. This coincided with the decline of the anti-Communist leaders in the party. Sun and many of his closest comrades were natives of Kwangtung. In the pre-IgII years, the province was an important base for their anti-Manchu movement.4 After his resignation as Provisional President of the new republic in 1912, Sun vowed to turn Kwangtung into a 'model province'. Liao Chung-k'ai, who was then Commissioner of Finance in Canton, endeavored to put into practice Henry George's single-tax theory.5 In 1917, when Sun started his 'constitution protection movement' against the warlords in Peking, he chose Kwangtung as the site for his separatist government. To a considerable extent, Sun's claim to national leadership depended on the support of the southern militarists, whose political leaning was often dictated by self-interest. Lu Jung-t'ing, a formidable ally in Kwangsi, had aspirations for the vice-presidency of the Peking
3 For example, as Chung-gi Kwei (Ch'ung-chi Kuei) insists, it was 'only natural' that Russia should be 'anxious' to align itself with the Kuomintang. See Chung-gi in China,I922-I949 (The Hague: Martinus Kwei, The Kuomintang-Communist Struggle

Nijhoff, 1970), pp. I8 and 20.

4 F.

Gilbert Chan, 'Revolutionary Leadership in Transition: Sun Yat-sen and His

I905-I925' (unpublished paper presented to the 30th International

Comrades,

Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa, Mexico City, August 3, 1976). An expanded version of the paper was delivered at the Ohio East Asian Seminar, November 13, 1976. For a revisionist study of the Chinese revolution in Revolution:The Case of Kwangtung, see Edward J. M. Rhoads, China'sRepublican
Kwangtung, I895-I9I3
5 Min-li

(Cambridge:
June

Harvard University Press, I975).

23, 1912; and June 24, 1912. Sun

pao (Shanghai),

20, 1912; June

endorsed Liao's reform program in a meeting with the provincial leaders in Canton. See ibid., June I5, I912. For Henry George's influence on the Chinese intellectuals, see Harold Z. Schiffrin and Pow-key Sohn, 'Henry George on Two Continents: A Comparative Study in the Diffusion of Ideas,' ComparativeStudies in Society and History,
Vol. II, No. I (October I959), pp. 85-109.

KUOMINTANG

COMMUNIST

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I29

regime.6 As early as December 1917, Sun complained that he had not been 'taken with sufficient seriousness by any of the southern leaders.'7 He was unable to sustain his feeble command of the government in Canton, and he resigned as its Generalissimo in May I918. When Sun returned to Kwangtung in November I920 to revive the regime he had abandoned thirty months before, he relied primarily on Ch'en Chiung-ming's military support. A member of the T'ungmeng-hui, Ch'en had been Sun's 'follower for more than ten years.'8 Nonetheless, the campaign for a federalist government in China attracted Ch'en's attention, and his views on provincialism were 'altogether incompatible' with Sun's constitutionalism. There was a 'fundamental difference in political objectives' between the two leaders. While Ch'en labored for 'the immediate welfare of Kwangtung,' Sun championed 'the cause of the national revolution.'9 Their fragile alliance ended with Sun's expulsion from Canton in June 1922. His political exile in Shanghai notwithstanding, Sun never wavered from his determination to reunite China under his leadership. His entente with Soviet and Chinese Communists represented only a part of his overall strategy against the warlords in Peking. While he was conferring with Russian envoys, he also worked hard for the reorganization of the Kuomintang. Yet his immediate concern was the reconquest of Kwangtung; he regarded this as an important step in the revitalization of his anti-warlord revolution.
6

7 North ChinaHerald (hereafter abbreviated as NCH), December 8, I917, p. 584. See also Li Chien-nung, The Political Historyof China, I840-I928, trans. by Ssu-yu Teng and Jeremy Ingalls (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956), pp. 384-8. 8 Quoted from Sun's letter to his party comrades, September I8, 1922, in Kuomintang Archives (ed.), Kuo-fuch'uan-chi, (Taipei: Chung-hua min-kuo ko-chieh chi-nien kuo-fu pai-nien tan-ch'en ch'ou-pei wei-yuan-hui, 1965), Vol. III, p. IX:544. In spite of Sun's claim, however, his relations with Ch'en were by no means intimate. See Chan, 'Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Kuomintang Reorganization,' p. I6. Indeed, Ch'en's image of a treacherous warlord, as projected by Kuomintang historians, needs reevaluation. See Winston Hsieh, 'The Ideas and Ideals of a Warlord: Ch'en Chiung-ming (1878-1933),' in Papers on China (Harvard University),

Review of the Far East in June 192 I, and later China Weekly Review in June 1923; hereafter cited as CWR), December I, 91 7, p. i.

Department of State, Records Relatingto InternalAffairsof China,I9Io-29 (hereafter cited as USDS), 893.00/2724; and Millard's Reviewof theFar East (renamed Weekly

Paul S. Reinsch to Secretary of State, September

27, I917,

in United

States

Vol. XVI (December

Rise of Chiang Kai-shek,

9 NCH, January 8, 192I, p. 94; and Walter E. Gourlay, 'The Kuomintang and the
I920-1924' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard

1962), pp. 192-252.

University, 1966), p. I6. For the Chinese federalist movement, see Jean Chesneaux, 'The Federalist Movement in China, 1920-3,' in Jack Gray (ed.), ModernChina's Search for a PoliticalForm (London: Oxford University Press, I969), pp. 96-I37.

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Among party members, Liao Chung-k'ai, Hu Han-min, and Wang Ching-wei were perhaps the staunchest advocates of Sun's program for national regeneration. They had been Sun's close associates for at least seventeen years, dating from the founding of the T'ung-meng-hui in I905.10 In the early 1920S they formed the core of the Elders Faction (yuan-lao p'ai) of the Kuomintang, and they supported Sun's plan for the military reunification of China, as well as his alliance with Soviet Russia. On January 28, I923, Liao accompanied AdolfJoffe to Japan to discuss the details of the Kuomintang-Communist rapprochement. He did not return to China until the end of March. Many of Sun's comrades, however, questioned the wisdom of his collaboration with the Communists. In September I922, Chang Chi signified his opposition to the admission of Chinese Communists to the Kuomintang. Ma Ch'ao-chun, who had been active in labor organizations, held eight meetings with Sun after the latter's arrival in Shanghai to voice the serious misgivings of the workers about Marxism. 11 The effort of these leaders did not prevent Sun from reaching an agreement with Joffe in January I923. Meanwhile, there was a small yet significant group of party veterans, with Sun Fo as the central force, who tried to seek an alternative to the policy of Kuomintang-Communist entente. Instead of relying on Soviet Russia, they turned to the West for help. Some of them, notably C. C. Wu (Wu Ch'ao-shu) and Fu P'ing-ch'ang, had intimate family connections in Hong Kong.12 Prior to Ch'en Chiung-ming's coup on June I6, 1922, they had been influential in the municipal administration of
10 While Liao's association with Sun began in I903, Hu met the latter for the first time in I905. See F. Gilbert Chan, 'Liao Chung-k'ai (1878-1925): The Career of a Chinese Revolutionary,' in Essays in Chinese Studies Presented to Professor Lo Hsiang-lin on His Retirementfrom the Chair of Chinese, University of Hong Kong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, I970), p. 325; and Hu Han-min, 'Hu Han-min tzu-chuan,' in Kuomintang Archives (ed.), Ke-ming wen-hsien (Taipei: Chung-yang wen-wu ), Vol. III, p. 386. According to James R. Shirley, Wang kung-ying-she, 1953became acquainted with Sun through Hu's introduction. See Shirley, 'Political Conflict in the Kuomintang: The Career of Wang Ching-wei to 1932' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1962), p. I2. 11 Ma Ch'ao-chun, Ma Ch'ao-chunhsien-shengyen-lun hsuan-chi (Taipei: Chung-kuo lao-kung fu-li ch'u-pan-she, 1967), Vol. II, pp. '93-4; and Ma Ch'ao-chun et al., Chung-kuo lao-kung yun-tung shih (Taipei: Chung-hua ta-tien pien-yin-hui, 1966), Vol. I, pp. 236-7. Cf. Chang Kuo-t'ao, The Rise of the Chinese CommunistParty, I92IVolume One of the Autobiographyof Chang Kuo-t'ao (Lawrence: University Press I927: of Kansas, 1971), p. 267. 12 While C. C. Wu, son of Wu T'ing-fang, graduated from University of London, Fu P'ing-ch'ang was a graduate of University of Hong Kong. Each married a daughter of Ho Kai, the first Chinese knighted in the British colony of Hong Kong. See Gourlay, 'The Kuomintang and the Rise of Chiang Kai-shek,' p. I67.

KUOMINTANG

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I3I

Canton.13 Partly because of this, they tended to be more concerned with the provincial interests of Kwangtung than with national issues, and were less inclined than, say, Liao Chung-k'ai to support Sun Yatsen's military ventures against the Peking government. Known collectively as the Prince Faction (t'ai-tzu p'ai), they often came into conflict with the Kuomintang Elders. In the first months of I923, the struggle between these two cliques centered upon the party policy of befriending Russian and Chinese Communists. Even before the Sun-Joffe discussions, Sun Fo and his Prince Faction had endeavored to press Sun Yat-sen to abandon his Soviet orientation in favor of an alliance with the British government in Hong Kong. According to Fu P'ing-ch'ang, he went to the British colony 'toward the end of 1922' to confer with Governor Reginald E. Stubbs. In their meeting, Stubbs allegedly extended to Sun Yat-sen an official invitation to visit Hong Kong, and further suggested the possibility of cooperation with the Kuomintang.14 This narrative, as reported by Walter E. Fu's role in the attempt to solicit British assistance. Gourlay, exaggerates in it errs factual details. For instance, Sun apparently did not Besides, receive an invitation from the government of Hong Kong until February
I923.

As documents of the Foreign Office in London indicate, Sun had actually taken a more active interest in the negotiations with the British diplomats than Fu intimated. This was hardly surprising, in view of his previous educational experience in Hong Kong. He also had grave doubts about Communism. During his meetings with Serge Dalin in April-June 1922, he had emphasized China's strong opposition to Communist philosophy. The Soviet emissary later complained that Sun had treated him with 'a certain amount of distrust.'15 Moreover,
on January 15, I923, eleven days before the announcement of the Sun-

Joffe agreement, the Kuomintang military allies succeeded in driving Ch'en Chiung-ming out of Canton.16 Sun planned to travel to the
13 Sun Fo, the eldest child of Sun Yat-sen, was Mayor of Canton in I921-22. He left the city after Ch'en Chiung-ming's June i6 coup of 1922. 14 Gourlay, 'The Kuomintang and the Rise of Chiang Kai-shek,' p. I68. Walter Gourlay interviewed Fu P'ing-ch'ang in Taipei on July 27, 1965. 15 Dalin, 'Velikii povorot: Sun Yat-sen v I922g,' in Sun rat-sen, I866-1966, K stoletiiu so dnia rozhdeniia: Sbornik statei, vospominanii i materialov (Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury izdatel'stvo 'Nauka,' I966), p. 269. 16 NCH, January 27, 1923, p. 2 8. See also American Minister in China to Secretary of State, January I8, 1923, in USDS, 893.0o/4823. The military successes did not really surprise Sun Yat-sen. On January 7, he had confidently predicted that he would soon return in triumph to Canton. See the record of his interview in NCH, January 13, I923, p. 73.

I32

F. GILBERT

CHAN

south soon, and a rapprochement with the British government in Hong Kong would strengthen his position in Kwangtung. In the two dispatches submitted to his superiors in Peking in January I923, Sir Sidney Barton, British Consul General in Shanghai, noted that Sun had twice sent Eugene Ch'en to call on him. Ch'en hinted that the Kuomintang leader would welcome a reception by Governor Stubbs of Hong Kong. Since Sir Ronald Macleay, the newly appointed British Minister to China, was then in the colony on his way to Peking, Barton transmitted the information to him.l7 Significantly, Ch'en's two visits on January II and 19 occurred after Fu P'ingch'ang's conference with Stubbs, but preceded Sun's agreement with Adolf Joffe.l8 During the first twelve days of February, Sun sent Eugene Ch'en and C. C. Wu to confer with Macleay in Shanghai. In his February 28 message to Lord Curzon, British Foreign Secretary, Macleay stressed Sun's 'alleged desire to improve his relations with the British authorities' in China and Hong Kong.19 On his way to Canton, Sun landed in Hong Kong on February 17, and stayed there for four days. The warm reception extended to him symbolized an entente between the Kuomintang and the British government in the colony. A day after his arrival, he attended an 'informal' luncheon at Government House as a guest of Governor Stubbs.20 Shortly afterward, he had tea with Sir Robert Ho-tung, a prominent industrialist who was 'believed to be closely associated with the Hong Kong government.'21 The highlight of Sun's visit took place on February 20, when he returned to the University of Hong Kong, his alma mater, to speak to an audience of three hundred professors and students. He described the island as his 'intellectual birthplace'
17 Barton's first dispatch to Peking, January in Great Britain Foreign 17, I923, Office, 'General Correspondence' series, FO 37I/918I/F 649 [F 649/12/10], and his second dispatch, dated January 22, 1923, in ibid., FO 37I/918I/F 946 [F 946/12/IO]. 18 While Joffe had sent an aide to call on Sun in Shanghai as early as August 25, 1922, the Soviet emissary did not come to the city until January 7 of the following year. On January I8, a day prior to Eugene Ch'en's second visit to Barton, Sun entertained Joffe at a dinner. After this meeting, the two leaders conferred repeatedly at Sun's residence in the French Concession. See Chan, 'Sun Yat-sen and the Origins of the Kuomintang Reorganization,' p. 33; and C. Martin Wilbur, Sun Tat-sen: Frustrated Patriot (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. I35. 19 Great Britain Foreign Office, 'Confidential Print,' Vol. 236, Further CorrespondenceRespecting China, F I 107/12/10 (report 462). 20 NCH, February 24, 1923, p. 500; and American Consul in Charge (Canton) to Secretary of State, February 24, 1923, in USDS, 893.oo/4936. Sun Yat-sen later claimed that his meeting with Governor Stubbs 'augured well for future relationships between Hong Kong and Canton.' See South China Morning Post (Hong Kong), February 22, 1923. 21 NCH, February 24, 1923, p. 500; and USDS, 893.00/4936.

KUOMINTANG

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where he had learned his 'revolutionary and modern ideas.' In the midst of 'deafening cheers,' he lauded the British parliamentary system, and urged his audience to 'carry the example of good government to all parts of China.'22 Contemporary pro-British publications in China were generally enthusiastic about Sun's trip to Hong Kong. While he was still in the colony, an influential local newspaper suggested that he might need 'some Hong Kong financial and other help.' It predicted: 'The colony may at no distant date find itself working in close cooperation with the neighboring province, breaking new ground to the great benefit of both.'23 In view of the hostile confrontation between the Kuomintang and Hong Kong during the seamen's strike in 1922, this friendly 'one of gesture was-to quote a weekly periodical in Shanghai-truly the most significant things occurring in South China affairs.'24 Sun, too, was evidently happy with the results of his pro-British overtures. On March I8, he informed a public gathering in Canton of 'the loans now under negotiation,' and vowed to 'bring about the prosperity and development' of Kwangtung 'by means of good understanding and cooperation' with both Hong Kong and Macao.25 In a dispatch to the Secretary of State, R. P. Tenney, an American diplomat in South China, likewise reported on Sun's cordial relations with J. W. Jamieson, British Consul General in Canton. He noted that Sun's attempt to raise funds in Hong Kong 'may be successful.' Apparently, this observation was not groundless. In response to an invitation to tea, the Kuomintang leader had visited Jamieson on the afternoon of March .6. On March 20, two days after Sun's public expression of optimism, Jamieson courteously paid a return call on the Chinese revolutionary.26 Meanwhile, Sun was appreciative of the assistance of the Prince Faction, and he rewarded its leaders with important positions in his newly established government. While his son, Sun Fo, regained the mayoralty of Canton, Fu P'ing-ch'ang became Commissioner of Foreign Affairs and concurrently Superintendent of Customs. Furthermore, on April I5, Sun Yat-sen appointed C. C. Wu as Minister of
22 USDS, 893.00/4936. The university was named Hong Kong College of Medicine for Chinese when Sun was a student there. See W. W. Hornell, The University of Hong Kong: Its Origins and Growth (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, I925), p. I; and Lo Hsiang-lin, Kuo-fu ta-hsueh shih-tai (Taipei: Commercial Press, 1954), esp. pp. 27-65. 23 South China Morning. Post, February 20, 1923. 24 CWR, March 3, 1923, p. I. 25 NCH, March 24, 1923, p. 787. 26 American Consul in Charge (Canton) to Secretary of State, March 13, I923, in USDS, 893.oo/4950; and Wilbur, Sun Tat-sen, p. 337, n. 63.

I34

F. GILBERT

CHAN

Foreign Affairs.27 This ascendancy of the Prince Faction was largely responsible for the temporary eclipse of the Kuomintang Elders. As early as February 28, Sun had dispatched Hu Han-min and Wang Ching-wei to Shanghai to work for the 'peaceful reunification of China.'28 Coupled with Liao Chung-k'ai's stay in Japan, their departure left a power vacuum in Canton, which the Prince Faction eagerly filled. For some time, the Kuomintang rapprochement with Soviet and Chinese Communists seemed to be in jeopardy. At this critical juncture, Liao returned to Canton toward the end of March. When he recounted to Sun the details of his discussions with Adolf Joffe in Japan, he reaffirmed his backing of the program of Kuomintang-Communist collaboration. In the Political Report given to the Second Party Congress in January 1926, Wang Ching-wei verified Liao's faith in the alliance with the Communists, and praised him for having had the courage to resist the severe opposition of his comrades.29 Indeed, Liao's challenge of the pro-British policy aggravated the power struggle between the Elders and the Prince Faction, and adversely affected Sun's entente with Hong Kong. The success of Sun Fo and his clique in winning Sun Yat-sen's confidence resulted mostly from their promise to bring to Canton the financial resources of the Hong Kong merchants and possibly of the British government. Sun Fo's impressive performance in the Canton municipal administration during 1921-22 had gained the admiration of many merchants in the neighboring colony, and he appeared likely to earn their support in I923. His father's pronouncement on March I8 exhibited genuine optimism. Soon afterward, a Hong Kong newspaper declared that the Prince Faction had successfully cemented a coalition with 'the capitalists.'30 Yet, as proved by subsequent events, much of
Lo Chia-lun (ed.), Kuo-fu nien-p'u tseng-ting-pen, with 27USDS, 893.00/4950; additions by Huang Chi-lu (Taipei: Kuomintang Archives, 1969), hereafter cited as KFNP, Vol. II, pp. 958-9 and 963; and Lu-hai-chun ta-yuan-shuai ta-pen-ying kung-pao (Canton; reprinted in 12 volumes in 1969 by the Kuomintang Archives in Taipei), No. i, March 9, I923, in Vol. I, pp. 58-9. 28 KFNP, Vol. II, p. 958; and Lu-hai-chun ta-yuan-shuai ta-pen-ying kung-pao, March 9, 1923, in Vol. I, p. 58. 29Wang Ching-wei, 'Tui Chung-kuo kuo-min-tang ti-erh-tz'u ch'uan-kuo taipiao ta-hui cheng-chih pao-kao,' in Ke-ming wen-hsien, Vol. XX, p. 3856. To emphasize the element of Soviet influence, Lyon Sharman labels Liao 'Joffe's disciple.' See Sharman, Sun rat-sen, His Life and Its Meaning: A Critical Biography (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965), p. 225. For further discussion of Liao's attitude toward the KuomintangCommunist alliance, see F. Gilbert Chan, 'The Death of a Revolutionary: Liao Chung-k'ai's Assassination' (unpublished paper presented to Midwest Regional Seminar on China, May 19, I973). 30 Hua-tzujih-pao (Hong Kong), April 9, 1923.

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the optimism was premature, and the inability of the Prince Faction to fulfill its promise led, in part, to the resurgence of the Kuomintang Elders. In order to secure the support of the non-Cantonese militarists, Sun Yat-sen needed an almost inexhaustible supply of money, and he expected his son to obtain this from the Hong Kong merchants. But, Sun Fo could only deliver the cash if the Kuomintang would agree to surrender its control over Canton finances to the creditors.31 For instance, the merchants of the colony insisted that Sun Yat-sen should designate men of their choice to fill such important government positions as provincial Commissioner of Finance. This was a concession the Elders stubbornly refused to make. Liao Chung-k'ai's appointment to the governorship on May 7 to replace Hsu Shao-chen, a favorite of the Hong Kong merchants, was therefore demonstrative of the victory of the Elders over Sun Fo and his clique in the factional struggle. On March 2, prior to Liao's return from Japan, Sun Yat-sen had named him Minister of Finance of the military government. Upon his arrival in Canton at the end of the month, Liao found the city in grave financial difficulties. The loans that Sun had anticipated from the Hong Kong merchants were not forthcoming, and he had received little help from his erstwhile supporters, the overseas Chinese. Consequently, the government had to depend on gambling and opium traffic for its major income. On one occasion, Sun defended the legalization of gambling as 'a necessity.'32 These expedient measures were financially productive. A contemporary source maintained that the opium traffic alone yielded an average of 800,000 yuan a month.33 Nevertheless, when Ch'en Chiung-ming was in control of Kwangtung, he had tried to eradicate these two vices from the province. The Cantonese were openly critical of their restoration by the Kuomintang government. Hence, these financial policies of Sun and Liao fatally undermined their previous claim to transform Kwangtung into a 'model province'. There were other methods with which the Kuomintang exacted money from the populace, and the merchants were obvious victims of its financial extortions. Besides being obligated to pay taxes regularly in advance, they frequently had to make substantial contributions to
31 See Gourlay's interview with Fu P'ing-ch'ang in 'The Kuomintang and the Rise of Chiang Kai-shek,' pp. 174-6; and Hua-tzujih-pao,March 30, 1923; May I7,

1923;
32

May

I8, 1923;

and May
I923,

I9, 1923.
33

J.CH, March 24,

p. 787.

CWR, May Io,

I924,

p. 396.

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F. GILBERT

CHAN

the Canton government. In addition, the Provincial Bank of Kwangtung, at periodic intervals, placed large amounts of paper notes in circulation without the guarantee of proper security. The merchants had to accept them at their face value. Sun's statements in an interview with Rodney Gilbert a year earlier reflected his views on the subject. According to him, it was 'not essential' either to provide a cash reserve for the currency or to promise to redeem it on demand. He admitted that the paper money would not be 'immediately redeemable', but he contended that the 'security' for the notes 'is the work which we have done with them.'34 The assumption that whatever he did would ultimately benefit the Cantonese, as well as the argument that the end thus justified the means, did not endear the Kuomintang to the business community of Canton. As Minister of Finance in March-May 1923, Liao Chung-k'ai won the notoriety of a villain among the commercial interests in the province. His pro-Russian leanings further alienated the merchants. With him gaining influence in the government, whatever hope Canton might have had to obtain financial assistance from Hong Kong evaporated. As the demand for money became increasingly acute, Sun turned to Liang Shih-yi, a leader of the Communications Clique (Chiao-t'unghsi), for extraparty support. A veteran financier of national reputation, Liang was then in political retirement in Hong Kong. He shared with Sun a common hatred for Wu P'ei-fu and the Chihli militarists who dominated Peking at that time. Earlier in March I923, Sun had endeavored to seek the financier's help to arrange a loan with the consortium of banks.35 When this failed, Sun requested him to serve in the Kuomintang government in an official capacity. Liang declined, yet he offered the aid of his two close associates, Yeh Kung-ch'o and Cheng Hung-nien. To solidify his alliance with the Communications Clique, Sun named Yeh his new Minister of Finance on May 7 to replace the embattled Liao Chung-k'ai, and designated Cheng as Vice Minister.36 A Shanghai periodical commended the appointments which, it argued, would strengthen the Canton government. 37
35See the records of conversation in Hong Kong between Liang Shih-yi and S. F. Mayers of the British and Chinese Corporation, March i6, I923, in Great Britain Foreign Office, 'General Correspondence' series, FO 371/9181/F I520. 36 Ts'en Hsueh-lu, San-shuiLiang Ten-sunhsien-sheng nien-p'u (Taipei: Wen-hsing
34 NCH, May 6, 1922, p. 373.

shu-tien, 1962), Vol. II, p. 255; Lu-hai-chun ta-yuan-shuai ta-pen-ying kung-pao, No. Io, May ii, I923, in Vol. I, pp. 502-3; KFNP, Vol. II, p. 973; and China Review (New York), Vol. IV, No. 6 (June 1923), p. 263. See also CWR, May 19, 1923, p. 426; and May 26, I923, p. 462. 37 CWR, July 7, 1923, P. I88.

KUOMINTANG

COMMUNIST

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I37

Because of deteriorating political and military conditions in Kwangtung, the new team in the treasury never had a chance to reverse the trend of the Kuomintang toward financial bankruptcy. Shen Hungying, a Kwangsi militarist of doubtful loyalty, had been flirting with Wu P'ei-fu since January, when Ch'en Chiung-ming withdrew from Canton in defeat. In March, Sun gave Shen 150,oooyuan, and tried in vain to persuade him to leave the province. In an attempt to undermine further Sun's already fragile authority in South China, the Peking government appointed the Kwangsi militarist on March 21 to take charge of military affairs in Kwangtung. With additional encouragement from Ts'en Ch'un-hsuan of the Political Study Society (Chenghsueh-hui), Shen decided to challenge the Kuomintang rule in Canton. He declared on April 14 that he was 'compelled ... to drive out the oppressors of the people.'38 Two days later, he engineered a military coup, which allegedly enjoyed Wu P'ei-fu's backing. In a protest addressed to the northern government, Sun held Wu responsible for the warfare, and insisted that Peking should dismiss him.39 Nor were the coup and the fighting that followed Sun's sole problems. In the middle of the military crisis, Ch'en Chiung-ming, who had encamped at Waichow since his January defeat, marched west with his troops and threatened Canton on May 30. Sun's effort to repel the attacks of both Shen and Ch'en plunged the provincial treasury into financial catastrophe. During the summer of I923, he had to buy the loyalty of his soldiers with a reported total of 26,oooyuan per day.40 In desperation, the Kuomintang government imposed new and often excessive taxes on the Cantonese populace; it also tried to require every rich merchant to make a special war contribution. It was government policy, too, to arrest all opponents of the tax laws on the charge of 'treason' and to release them afterward upon payment of a 'heavy bail'. Provoked by these abuses, a journalist characterized Sun's regime in Canton as the 'darkest spot in China'.41
38 J\CH, March 24, I923, p. 787; and April 28, 1923, p. 218; CWR, April 7, 1923, p. 216; and KFNP, Vol. II, p. 968. 39China Review, June I923, p. 259. NCH reported the presence in Shen's camp of 'northern troops sent by General Wu P'ei-fu'-'men speaking a northern dialect and wearing a queue' (April 28, 1923, p. 22 I). Without substantiating the NCH account, CWR described Wu's intervention as an attempt 'to- effect a nominal reunification of China by force.' The same publication considered Wu's policy 'extremely unwise,' since it might unite all opposing forces in Kwangtung behind Sun (July 7, I923, p. 12).

CWR, September 8, I923, p. 6o. Ibid., November 3, I923, p. 350. See also September 8, I923, p. 60; September 22, I923, p. I43; and October I3, 1923, p. 235.
40
41

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CHAN

Sun's third endeavor to establish a rival government in the south had, so far, been an exercise in frustration. He was an advocate of social changes, and he had aspired to turn Kwangtung into a 'model province'. In face of political reality, however, he was obliged to compromise his ideological commitment and resort to financial extortions, of which he had often accused the militarists in Peking. Thus, Kwangtung became a pawn in the intricacies of national politics. Unlike Sun Fo and his Prince Faction, Sun Yat-sen and the Kuomintang Elders were willing to sacrifice the interests of the Cantonese, if such sacrifice would contribute to the fulfillment of their dream to reunify China. This seemingly provided the rationale for the tax abuses of their government. Despite the expenses involved, Sun's reliance on the militarists had not been productive, as proved by the coups of Ch'en
Chiung-ming in 1922 and of Shen Hung-ying in 1923. In mid-I923,

the Canton regime evidently needed more help to extricate itself from the quagmire of Kwangtung politics than the Communications Clique could offer. With Hong Kong turning its back on him, Sun's hope to reassert his leadership in a national revolution rested on the support of Soviet Russia. In June 1923, the Chinese Communist Party held its Third Congress in Canton, with Maring as a participant. During his previous trips to
China in 1921 and 1922, the Soviet representative had conferred with

Sun and had since been the latter's principal advocate in Moscow.42 When the two leaders met again in Canton in mid-1923, Sun was busily engaged in combat with Ch'en Chiung-ming. The Kuomintang was in urgent need of assistance, and the Russian government had decided in March to aid its Chinese ally with a sum of approximately two million Mexico dollars.43 Sun conversed with Maring three or four times a week. At the end of their discussions, the Chinese revolutionary agreed that the policy of Soviet orientation would help solve his many problems. Prompted simultaneously by the Elders, Sun cast his dice.44
42 Dov Bing, 'Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP,' in China Quarterly, No. 48 pp. 677-97; and Dov Bing, 'Revolution in China: (October-December I971), Sneevliet Strategy' (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, New Zealand, 1968). Maring was the pseudonym of H. Sneevliet, a Dutch Communist of the Comintern. 43 On May I, the Soviet leaders telegraphed Sun about their 'readiness to render necessary assistance to China.' There is, however, no available record to show Sun's receipt of the telegram. See Wilbur, Sun rat-sen, p. I48; and C. Martin Wilbur, 'Further Reflections on Sun Yat-sen' (preliminary report to University Seminar on Modern China, Columbia University, March 21, I973), p. 42. 44 According to Maring, Liao Chung-k'ai, Hu Han-min, and Chiang Kai-shek supported him 'wholeheartedly' in his effort to guide Sun toward the policy of

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I39

With the backing of Russia, the Kuomintang won a fresh lease on life, and this enabled Sun to make his last bid for national prominence. Sun was a political realist with a genuine commitment to the nationalist revolution in China. He decided to collaborate with the Communists in spite of his ideological differences with Marxism, because Russia was the only foreign country to lend him a helping hand. his own son, Sun Fo-strongly Many of his comrades-including alliance to his with Soviet Russia, and he was keenly aware objected of the damaging effect of party dissension on his revolutionary movement. Hence, even after the promulgation of his joint manifesto with AdolfJoffe, he readily pursued an alternative to his pro-Communist policy. This accounted for his brief flirtation with the British authorities in Hong Kong. Political development in Canton during the first half of I923 revealed the major weaknesses of Sun's campaign against militarism in China. As a revolutionary leader, he commanded the loyalty of but a small group of followers. He lacked a popular base of support, and this necessitated his dependence on the militarists. The excesses of his financial extortions estranged the business community and were partially responsible for the failure of his entente with Hong Kong. Most importantly, his limitations as a revolutionary were attributable to his inability to mobilize the masses. It was only in the last fifteen months of his life that he learned this secret from his Soviet advisers, thus turning a new page in the history of the Chinese revolution.45
collaboration. See H. Sneevliet, 'Met en bij Soen Yat-sen, Kuomintang-Communist enige persoonlijke herinneringen,' Klassenstrijd (Amsterdam), No. 3 (March I926). 45 For an analysis of the subject, see F. Gilbert Chan, 'Liao Chung-k'ai and the Labor Movement in Kwangtung, I924-1925' (preliminary report to University Seminar on Modern China, Columbia University, November 13, 1975). A revised version of the paper was presented to the Annual Meeting of Association for Asian Studies, March 20, 1976.