Cases: Restrictions on Capacity Standard oil co.

v Arenas Vicente Villanueva signed a bond as surety for defendant Codina Arenas in favor of plaintiff on Dec. 15, 1908. On April 5, 1909, the plaintiff sued on the bond; Villanueva did not appear, and was declared in default. When judgment against him was about to be executed, his wife appeared and asked that he be relieved from the bond and the judgment because he was insane. It appears that he was declared insane on July 24, 1909, and his wife was appointed as his guardian. The case was reopened and the tried and the evidence showed that Villanueva executed the bond with full understanding of the nature and consequences of the act performed by him, although he was suffering from a monomania of great wealth. He was, therefore, held liable on the bond. Upon appeal, SC affirmed the judgment of the lower court and Held: it would have been necessary to show that such monomania was habitual and constituted a veritable mental perturbation in the patient, that the bond executed was the result of such monomania, and not the effect of any other cause, that is ,that there was not, nor could there have been any other cause for the contract than an ostentation of wealth and this was purely an effect of such monomania of wealth; and that the monomania existed on the necessarily imply that the person is incapable of executing a bond as that in question, in our present knowledge of the state of mental alienations of such certainty has not yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he who suffers from the monomania of great wealth is really insane and that it is to be presumed, in the absence of a judicial declaration that he acts under the influence of a perturbed mind, o that his is deranged when he excuses an onerous contract. Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary is not proved, that is, at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out of his mind, which in the opinion of this court, has not been proved in this case. Mercado v. Espiritu The annulment of a deed of sale was sought on the ground that the 2 of the 4 parties thereto were minors under the CC, 18 and 19 yrs old, respectively, on the date of the instrument was executed. In the deed of sale, however, these minors tated that they were of legal age at the time they executed and signed it; and they made the same manifestation before the notary public when the document was prepared. Held:

The courts have laid down the rule that the sale of real estae, effected by minors who have already passed the ages of puberty and adolescence and are near the adult age, when they pretend to have already reached their majority while in fact they have not, is valid, and they cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek their annulment. This doctrine is entirely in accord with the provisions of our law on estoppel. Young vs. Tecson Held: There is authority to the effect that the misrepresentation of an incapacitated person does not bind him. Misrepresentation made by a party as to his age does not estop him from denying that he was of age or from asserting that he was under age at the time he entered into the contract, for the breach of which an action os brought. Under the principle of estoppel, the liability resulting from misrepresentation has its juridical source in the capacity of the person making the misrepresentation to bind himself. If the person making the misrepresentation cannot bind himself by a contract, he cannot also be bound by any misrepresentation he may have made in connection therewith. A person entering into a contract must see to it that the other party has sufficient capacity to bind himself. Bambalan v. Maramba The plaintiff who was a minor, executed a deed of sale of a piece of land to the defendant. He made no representation as to his age, which was well-known to the defendant, inasmuch as the latter was the one who purchased the plaintiffs first cedula to e used in the acknowledgment of the document before a notary public. Plaintiff now seeks to annul the sale. Held: The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he was a minor at the time of its execution. The doctrine laid down in the case of Mercado is not applicable because the plaintiff did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew him to be a minor. Sia Suan vs. Alcantara The mere fact that one month after the execution of the contract, the minor informed the other contracting party of his minority, does not affect the case; such subsequent information is of no moment, because his previous misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing the contract. Such belated information merely confirms the fact that the other party did not know of the minors true age on the date of the contract, and somewhat emphasizes the latters bad faith in making the misrepresentation.

***De Braganza v. De Villa **** Insanity

FAMILY CODE cases (Tolentino) Cabague v. Auxillo Where the woman and her father promised marriage to the man and his father, provided the latter would improve the formers house and spend for the wedding and other needs of the bride, and the groom and his father, complying with the agreement, made the improvements and spent P700, it was held that the man could sue the woman for damages for breach of the mutual promise to marry, even if the promise was orally made. But the father of the man cannot sue for damages on the oral contract, which as to him is not a mutual promise to marry. It seems to us that the writing is not necessary in an action for damages for breach of a contract to marry. In the first place, where the party who sues for damages has already given the consideration for the promise of the defendant, it is unjust to deny the action on the plea of the Statute of Frauds. In the second place, the Statute should apply when the action is to enforce the contract, but not when it is for damages for breach.

Domalagan vs. Bolifer In that case the plaintiff had paid to the defendant P516 as consideration for the defendants promise to wed his daughter to the plaintiffs son; but the daughter married another man, and so the defendant was ordered to return P516 to the plaintiff. Hermosisima v. CA Can damages be recovered for breach of promises to marry? An action based purely on breach of the contract to marry, will not lie. Thus, if a young man and a young woman agree to marry at some future time, and after awhile the young man changes is mind and breaks the engagement, there being no seduction or abuse of right, the young woman will have no cause of action for damages. There is no legal provision creating a right of action for her. It is rue that

she may siffer from wounded feelings and mental anguish, and there are recognized as elements of moral damages under Art. 2217 of the code, but before such damages can be recovered, there must first be a right of action, and there is no law ranting a right of action purely on breach of contract to marry.