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Arceta vs.

Mangrobang [GR 152895, 15 June 2004] Necessity of

with the Supreme Court invoking its power of judicial review to have the said law voided for Constitutional infirmity.

1stlegislative district comprises of Cotabato City and 8 other municipalities. A law (RA 9054) was passed amending ARMMs Organic Act and vesting it with power to create provinces, municipalities, cities and barangays. Pursuant to this law, the ARMM Regional Assembly created Shariff Kabunsuan (Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act 201) which comprised of the municipalities of the 1st district of Maguindanao with the exception of Cotabato City. For the purposes of the 2007 elections, COMELEC initially stated that the 1st district is now only made of Cotabato City (because of MMA 201). But it later amended this stating that status quo should be retained however just for the purposes of the elections, the first district should be called Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City this is also while awaiting a decisive declaration from Congress as to Cotabatos status as a legislative district (or part of any). Sema was a congressional candidate for the legislative district of S. Kabunsuan with Cotabato (1st district). Later, Sema was contending that Cotabato City should be a separate legislative district and that votes therefrom should be excluded in the voting (probably because her rival Dilangalen was from there and D was winning in fact he won). She contended that under the Constitution, upon creation of a province (S. Kabunsuan), that province automatically gains legislative representation and since S. Kabunsuan excludes Cotabato City so in effect Cotabato is being deprived of a representative in the HOR. COMELEC maintained that the legislative district is still there and that regardless of S. Kabunsuan being created, the legislative district is not affected and so is its representation. SEMA v. Comelec composition, qualification and term of office ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs. HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local

deciding constitutional question.

Issue: Whether the Court should render BP22 unconstitutional due Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Navotas, Metro Manila charged Ofelia V. Arceta with violating Batas Pambansa 22 in an Information (Criminal Case 1599-CR), alleging in an Information that on or about 16 September 1998, Arceta issued a Regional Bank check worth P740,000 (postdated 21 December 1998) to Oscar R. Castro payable in CASH, well-knowing that at the time of issue she did have sufficient funds or credit with the drawee bank for the payment, and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, Arceta failed to pay said payee with the face amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment thereof within 5 banking days after receiving notice. Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or the Information quashed on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. She reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such a move would be an exercise in futility for it was highly unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and thus go against prevailing jurisprudence. On 21 October 2002, Arceta was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge. However, she manifested that her arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition or to any other actions she would take to suspend proceedings in the trial court. Arceta [GR 152895] then filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for a temporary restraining order, assailing the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22). On the other hand, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge sheet against Gloria S. Dy for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law (MeTC of Caloocan City, Criminal Case 212183), alleging in the Information that on or about the month of January 2000, Dy issued Prudential Bank Check 0000329230 in the amount of P2,500,000.00 dated 19 January 2000 in favor of Anita Chua well knowing at the time of issue that she has no sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment which check was subsequently dishonored for the reason ACCOUNT CLOSED and with intent to defraud failed and still fails to pay the said complainant the amount of P2,500,000.00 despite receipt of notice from the drawee bank that said check has been dishonored and had not been paid. Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground that BP 22 was unconstitutional. Dy likewise believed that any move on her part to quash the indictment or to dismiss the charges on said ground would fail in view of the Lozano ruling. Instead, she filed a petition The Province of Maguindanao is part of ARMM. Cotabato City is part of the province of Maguindanao but it is not part or ARMM because Cotabato City voted against its inclusion in a plebiscite held in 1989. Maguindanao has two legislative districts. The When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsels spirited advocacy in both cases, the Court was unable to agree that the said requisites have been adequately met. Nor does the Court find the constitutional question raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. The Court examined the contentions of Arceta and Dy carefully; but they still have to persuade us that BP 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. Even the thesis of Dy that the present economic and financial crisis should be a basis to declare the Bouncing Checks Law constitutionally infirm deserves but scant consideration. As stressed in Lozano, it is precisely during trying times that there exists a most compelling reason to strengthen faith and confidence in the financial system and any practice tending to destroy confidence in checks as currency substitutes should be deterred, to prevent havoc in the trading and financial communities. Further, while indeed the metropolitan trial courts may be burdened immensely by bouncing checks cases now, that fact is immaterial to the alleged invalidity of the law being assailed. The solution to the clogging of dockets in lower courts lies elsewhere. to the present economic and financial crisis, else due to the undue burden made upon the MeTC by bouncing checks cases.

Held:

government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the

Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province. Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Semas contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces. MACIAS VS COMELEC, digested FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of a law (Republic Act 3040) that apportions representative districts in this country on the ground that it is unconstitutional and void because it apportioned districts without regard to the number of inhabitants of the several provinces. Respondents aver they were merely complying with their duties under the statute, which they presume and allege to be constitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not an apportionment law that is disproportion in representation is unconstitutional. HELD: Yes, a law giving provinces with less number of inhabitants more representative districts than those with bigger population is invalid because it violates the principle of proportional representation prescribed by the Constitution. Such law is arbitrary and capricious and against the vital principle of equality. TAN vs. COMELEC - composition, qualification and term of office Facts: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province). Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite. The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC. Issue: WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected? NO. Held: Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province). Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit: when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to

be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger. The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners. SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. Veterans Fed Party v, Comelec - , qualification and term of office FACTS: On May 11, 1998, the first election for the party-list scheme was held simultaneously with the national elections. One hundred and twenty-three parties, organizations and coalitions participated. On June 26, 1998, the COMELEC en banc proclaimed thirteen party-list representatives from twelve parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Thirty-eight defeated parties and organizations promptly filed suit in the COMELEC, pleading for their own proclamations. Hence, COMELEC ordered the proclamation of the 38 parties. Such move filled up the 52 seats allotted for the party-list reps. Aggrieved, the proclaimed parties asked the SC to annul the COMELEC action and instead to proclaim additional seats, so that each of them would have three party-list reps. HELD: 1. Is the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? SC: The 20% allocation is only a ceiling and not mandatory. 2. Are the 2% threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? SC: Yes. Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the mechanics of the party-list system. 3. How then should the additional seats of a qualified party be determined? SC: As to the method of allocating additional seats, the first step is to rank all the participating parties according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of Representatives. Thereafter, those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes. The formula for additional seats of other qualified parties is: no.of

votes of concerned party divided by no.of votes of first party multiplied by no. of additional seats allocated to the first party. As for the first party, just take it at face value. Bagong Bayani v. Comelec - composition, qualification and term of office Facts: Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petitionunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by theCOMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the none-marginalized or over represented. Issues: a.Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections b.Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized andunderrepresented sectors and organizations. Held: The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELECwhich will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties andorganizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of theConstitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC to refrainproclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after theCOMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance. a.Yes b.No. Rationale: a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot bedisqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of

registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered under the party-list system. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered national, regional andsectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3 expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties." b. That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- maydo so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be consistentwith the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. The provision on the party-listsystem is not selfexecutory. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "inaccordance with law" or "as may be provided by law"; it was thus up to Congress tosculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. Aquino vs. Comelec - composition, qualification and term of office Facts: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy. Cembo, MakatiCity, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which, under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.

immediately preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district. Hisbirth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract may be indicative of petitioners intention to reside inMakati City, it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue. ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v COMELEC - composition, qualification and term of office FACTS: The petitioner, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, applied as a candidate to contest elections to the House of Representatives in the district of Leyte. The incumbent representative of the constituency of Leyte, Cirilo Roy Montejo (a candidate for the same position) applied to Commission on Elections [COMELEC] to have Imelda Romualdez-Marcoss application rejected on the grounds that it did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The constitutional requirement for residency for election purposes stated that in order to contest a position, the candidate must have resided in the location for which they are standing for a period of one year or more. The purpose of the provision was to prevent the

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residencequalification as a candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution

Held: In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of choice. Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years

possibility of strangers or newcomers who were unacquainted with the needs of a community standing for office. In her original application form, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos had stated that she had resided in Leyte for seven months. In response to the complaint fled by Cirilo Roy Montejo she amended the time of residency in her application from seven months to since

childhood. She claimed that the entry of the word seven in her original Certifcate of Candidacy was the result of an honest misinterpretation, which she now sought to rectify. She further stated that she had always maintained Tacloban (in the district of Leyte) as her domicile or residence. COMELEC, after considering the petition of Cirilo Roy Montejo to have the candidacy of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos rejected, found the claim meritorious and refused the petitioners original application for candidacy and her amended version. COMELEC rejected the petitioners application for candidacy on the basis that her conduct revealed that she did not intend to make Tacloban her domicile, that she had registered as a voter in different places, and on several occasions had declared that she was a resident of Manila. COMELEC stated that although she spent her school days in Tacloban she had abandoned residency when she chose to stay and reside in other places. Imelda Romualdez-Marcos subsequently appealed to the Supreme Court requesting a declaration that she had been a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time she applied to contest the 1995 elections. She argued that the meaning of residency in the Constitution, which designated the requirements for candidacy for election purposes, was that of domicile. She argued that she had domicile in Leyte because that was her place of original domicile and she had not acted to replace that domicile with another. She also argued that her marriage and changes of residency alongside her husband when he changed residency did not result in a change in her place of domicile. In support of that argument she claimed that section 69 of the Family Code 1988, which gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile, illustrates the intent of the Philippines Parliament to recognize the rights of women. She claimed therefore that since she had domicile in Leyte she automatically fulfilled the requirements for a one-year residency for election purposes. The respondents argued the meaning of residency in Article 110 of the Civil Code 1950 was the meaning that should be applied to the constitutional requirement for a one-year residency prior to qualifying for candidacy for the elections. Imelda RomualdezMarcos, they argued, had changed her residency to that of her husband upon her marriage and at the same time automatically

gained her husbands domicile. After returning to Leyte she had resided there for only seven months and she therefore did not satisfy the one year requirement for candidacy. HELD: The majority of the Supreme Court (eight judges in favor, four against) held that Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for election purposes, and therefore possessed the necessary residence qualifications to run in Leyte as a candidate for a seat in the House of Representatives. The Court held that the term residence in the context of qualifying for certain elected positions is synonymous with the term domicile. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which one intends to return after an absence. A person can only have a single domicile, although they can abandon one domicile in favor of another. To successfully change domicile, one must demonstrate three (3) requirements: an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and one must act in accordance with that intent. Only with clear and positive evidence that all three requirements have been met will the residence of origin be lost, otherwise residency will be deemed to continue. The Court held that the meaning of residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code, which states that the husband shall fix the residence of the family, is different therefore to the meaning of residence in the Constitution. The term residence may have one meaning in civil law (as under the Civil Code) and another different meaning in political law as represented in the election requirements identified in the Constitution. Residency is satisfied under the Civil Code if a person establishes that they intend to leave a place when the purpose for which they have taken up their abode ends. The purpose of residency might be for pleasure, business, or health and a person may have different residences in various places. However, residency in the Constitution as opposed to the Civil Code means domicile and therefore the key issue is to determine the domicile of the petitioner, Imelda RomualdezMarcos. The Court held that Article 110 does not create a

presumption that a wife automatically gains a husbands domicile upon marriage. When the petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos in 1954, she was obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husbands actual place of residence as fixed by him. The right of the husband to fix the residence was in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family. It recognised the fact that the husband and wife bring into the marriage different domiciles and if the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may live together. However, the term residence in Article 110 of the Civil Code does not mean domicile and therefore it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. The Court also held that it would be illogical for the Court to assume that a wife cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband, if she has not positively selected a new one during the subsistence of the marriage itself. The Court held that the new Family Code, which was introduced to replace the Civil Code, confirmed the petitioners argument that marriage does not automatically change a wifes domicile to that of her husband. The Family Code replaced the term residence (used in the Civil Code) with the term domicile. Article 69 of the Family Code gives a husband and wife the right to jointly fix the family domicile. The provision recognised revolutionary changes in the concept of womens rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. The provision recognised the right of women to choose their own domicile and removed the automatic transfer of a husbands domicile to his wife.

Torayno vs. Comelec - composition, qualification and term of office FACTS: This case involves a petition for quo warranto filed against the respondent on the ground that he was not able to fulfill the

requirement of residency of 1-yr in Cagayan de Oro City when he ran for mayor. Respondent previously served as governor of Misamis Oriental for 3 consecutive terms before he registered as a voter in Cagayan de Oro City and subsequently ran for mayor. HELD: Respondent was able to fulfill the residency requirement needed for him to qualify as a mayoralty candidate. He bought a house in Cagayan de Oro City in 1973. He actually resided there before he registered as a voter in that city in 1997.

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