INTERPOL, Constraint vs.

Demand: Can the International Criminal Police Organization Effectively Bridge the Coordination Gap in International Policing?

INTERPOL, Constraint vs. Demand (Page 2 of 12) The Stockholm International Peace Institute Yearbook identifies a common gap in global security: the present state of affairs is characterized by increasingly diffused powerwithout a similar multiplication and reinforcement of authority. (Bailes, 2005,). Put another way, we see many legitimate international organizations geared toward addressing international security problems, but these organizations often do not have the authority to do what may be necessary to prevent international threats. Unfortunately, the International Criminal Police Organization, (Interpol for short), falls under that broad umbrella of powerful international organizations with limited authoritative impact. This paper will: (1) outline why Interpols current structure and capacity constraints render the organization incapable of meeting increasing demands on global security governance and (2) will make several suggestions for Interpol policy improvement and coordination in order to address the growing threat of transnational crime. A background on Interpol Interpols predecessor, the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), was an informal network established in 1923 by professional police officials and states for facilitating the exchange of information about common criminals escaping across national borders. The ICPC started out as an apolitical organization, outside the purview of states. The ICPC was designed to be flexible, informal and fluid to greater cooperation and effectiveness between police forces. Police officials saw states as obstacles to cooperation, therefore the process for membership was not treaty-based. Instead, police forces from around the world were invited to join. When the ICPC was first created, there was an understanding that while centralization of activities was essential to the ICPCs success, the ICPC delegates wished to avoid this centralization, worrying that states may become concerned over their sovereignty and take an active interest in ICPC activities. The delegates omitted centralization from the ICPC charter a policy decision that would later compromise Interpols ability to address global security governance issues. The delegates involved in the ICPC process rightly predicted that governments claim proprietary rights over criminal information regarding their citizens and a move toward centralization of such information would likely lead to international diplomatic negotiations over the ICPCs power. Although this decision against centralization of information was reached to protect the ICPCs autonomy, the end result was a considerably weaker coordination mechanism. Articles 31 through 33 of Interpols Constitution today indicate the Interpols enforcement power relies entirely on the coordination of separate states through National Central Bureaus: In order to further its aims, the Organization needs the constant and active co-operation of its Members, who should do all within their power which is compatible with the legislations of their countries to participate diligently in its activities (Article 31) The ICPC started out as a policemens club that often acted without transparency, but soon this lack of transparency and public image meant that the ICPC had difficulty raising necessary funds (Barnett & Coleman, 2005, p. 606). During the second World War, the ICPC was briefly lead by Nazi Germany, and at the end of the war, the ICPC badly needed re-branding to gain support from the international community (The Daily Bell, 2011). In 1946 and then again in 1956, the ICPC saw membership and funding growth, changing its title to the International

INTERPOL, Constraint vs. Demand (Page 3 of 12) Criminal Police Organization, or Interpol, but it maintained its organizational culture, relative autonomy and mandate (Barnett & Coleman, 2005, p. 609), all through the general avoidance of any centralization of power and direct involvement with states. At this point, Interpol had expanded its tasks and mandate to include the coordination of international police operations, police training, and professional development (Barnett & Coleman, 2005, p. 595) but it wasnt until the 1980s when Interpol was faced with a real challenge to its mandate. Interpols main vision was the coordination of police forces in the absence of political involvement; this left Interpol generally reluctant to become involved in any counterterrorism efforts. But in the face of mounting pressure from the international community and under threat of becoming irrelevant, Interpol once again expanded its mandate, this time to include coordination between police forces to facilitate counterterrorism activities (Barnett & Coleman, 2005, p. 612). After making this compromise, Interpol was rewarded with substantially increased funding from member countries (Barnett & Coleman, 2005, p. 612). But some argue that the compromise to engage in counterterrorist efforts has distorted Interpols mandate and diverted resources away from transnational crime-fighting efforts. Interpols organizational structure Interpol has no enforcement authority and therefore relies on its network of national police organizations for the apprehension of suspects and the enforcement of arrest warrants. All of Interpols activities are determined by the needs of its member countries. The organization is governed by two bodies: the General Assembly and the Executive Committee. The General Assembly, composed of delegates from each member country, meets once per year to discuss new policies, resource needs, working methods, finances and to plan activities and programs. The Executive Committee is elected by the General Assembly and is responsible for overseeing the implementation of decisions made by the General Assembly. Interpols Office of the General Secretariat is located in Lyon, France and has seven regional offices across the world as well as Special Representatives posted at the United Nations and the European Union. In order to coordinate and facilitate international policing, the General Secretariat provides Member States with several services: a criminal intelligence service through a criminal database; a liaison function facilitating the exchange of information between Member States; training courses designed to assist Member States in improving their communication and investigation infrastructures; and technical support enabling speedy and secure transmission of information (Jytte, 1998, pp. 496-497). These General Secretariat services provide the National Central Bureaus (NCBs) assistance in implementing day-to-day strategic decisions. Each Interpol member country is required to maintain a NCB that links the member countrys national police force with the Interpol global network. Interpol describes the NCBs as the lifeblood of the organization, but it is important to note that Interpol is only as strong as its weakest NCB (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). Differences in member countries police force capacities and the level of coordination between national police forces and member countrys NCBs affect the efficacy of any NCB, and therefore the value of the network as a whole. For example, in a 1982 article, Fijnaut raised the criticism that international police cooperation is largely illusory because the majority of all Interpol activities (>70%) take place between North America and Western Europe and Interpol cannot

INTERPOL, Constraint vs. Demand (Page 4 of 12) ensure effective international cooperation outside these narrow borders (p. 52). Now certainly one would expect that the situation would be different today given the global trend toward greater North-South cooperation in international security efforts, however, there still remains an imbalance between the quality of Western European/North American NCBs and those of other regions (Norman, 2012). Therefore, its not difficult to imagine that North-South and SouthSouth international police cooperation is still lacking: after all, the International Criminal Court still has 11 outstanding arrest warrants for alleged war criminals, all of whom are believed to be in Africa (Amnesty International, 2012). Likewise, it is not difficult to imagine that many member countries, including Somalia, the DRC, Honduras, and Haiti (to name a few), will have a much more limited capacity to create effective communication channels between their national police forces and NCBs. After all, the administration and oversight of NCBs falls on the member states: the member states must ensure the NCB facilities are adequate (Norman, 2012). Additionally, unstable states may have regional police forces made up of rival clans or opposition members that would feel disinclined to share information with NCBs associated with the central government power. While Interpol may rely on its network of NCBs for the lions share of international policy cooperation, the question remains, is this organizational structure working? The gap in global security governance In the face of a globalized world economy, international borders are more porous than ever, global supply chains have tripled in length and, as a result, the global impact of transnational crime has skyrocketed. The scale and scope of international crime in the era of globalization is unprecedented (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). But transnational crime poses a particular problem to the international community: most law enforcement agencies were designed to fight crime within national boundaries, and there exists no global police force designed to fight crimes that cross multiple boundaries. According to Moishes Naim: [D]espite the near-universal recognition that combating international crime requires international action, most anticrime initiatives remain primarily domestic. And although mafia states have transformed international crime into a national security issue, the responsibility for combating it still rests almost exclusively with law enforcement agencies. Indeed, even in developed countries, police departments and other law enforcement bodies rarely coordinate with their national security counterparts, even though transnational crime threatens democratic governance, financial markets, and human rights (2012, p. 6). Naims claim pinpoints the gap in global security governance, namely, that to address increasing levels of transnational crime, policing efforts must move beyond national boundaries. However, any effort to move beyond national boundaries must strike a careful balancing act between addressing transnational crime without trenching on individual state sovereignty. Even local police forces jealously guard their jurisdiction against national forces. Therefore any attempts at an international police force must center around a coordination mechanism. Interpol was designed to be that coordination mechanism.

INTERPOL, Constraint vs. Demand (Page 5 of 12) What should Interpol do to bridge the gap in global security governance? Interpol was specifically designed to bridge a gap in global security governance: in the organizations own words, it seeks to promote international police cooperation through a wide range of initiatives...designed to bridge the gap between national and international policing and help law enforcement agencies make maximum use of the services provided by INTERPOL (INTERPOL, 2013). Interpol purports to be the solution to addressing the national/international policing gap in global security governance, and yet, its critics argue that Interpol falls short of delivering on its mandate. Interpol is the worlds largest law-enforcement agency, but it risks becoming irrelevant if it fails to achieve its primary aim: coordination between member state police forces. In order to ensure its continued relevance, Interpol must be able to actually coordinate the actions of member police forces. This means that Interpol must create a set of standards for all NCBs and must centrally evaluate NCBs to ensure that standards are being met instead of leaving enforcement and evaluation up to the member states. Additionally, the Executive Committee must be tasked with undertaking a study to evaluate the efficacy of NCBs; this would allow Interpol to publicly provide empirical evidence of the level of integration between NCBs and the General Secretariat in order to boost public confidence in the international coordination of police forces. But most importantly, to achieve this level of coordination, Interpol will have to revise its stance against centralization of power. Capacity-building in member states will take time, while transnational crime is expanding rapidly and national responses remain inadequate. At a time when the international community is taking greater steps toward global governance, the environment might be ripe for Interpol to take on a bigger role in bridging the international policing coordination gap. Until Interpol shifts into this new, centralized role, its overreliance on national police forces bars Interpol from effectively fighting transnational crime. Two main reasons why Interpol is an ineffective crime fighter 1) Interpol cannot do what its supposed to do Interpols mission is to prevent and fight crime through enhanced international police cooperation, but Interpol is unable to achieve this mission for several reasons: i. Despite current efforts, cooperation between police forces is weak given low levels of trust between member countries; ii. Interpols membership, despite being vast, is still nonetheless limited because certain territories without state status are excluded from coordination efforts; and iii. Interpol lacks the financial capacity to achieve its goals I. Cooperation between police As mentioned earlier, Interpols constitution (Article 31) states that Interpol relies on cooperation from its member countries in order to achieve its aims. Interpol does not have the central authority to enforce international policing: Interpol does not have cross-border crimefighting SWAT response teams (Pearson, 2011). All Interpol can do is act as a liaison between the law enforcement agencies of its member countries (The Daily Bell, 2011), which is why

INTERPOL, Constraint vs. Demand (Page 6 of 12) Interpol relies so heavily on coordination between international police forces. But member states are reluctant to share information with one another and to coordinate their activities. Collaboration between police forces requires all national forces to share information through Interpols centralized databases, but there is a low-trust problem (Naim, 2012, p.5). Unlike its ICPC policemens club predecessor built on collegiality, inclusiveness, and informality (Barnett & Coleman, 2005, p. 603), the Interpol behemoth now boasts a global membership of 190 countries (INTERPOL, 2013), which means the member states must be willing to sharing policing information and civilian data with a myriad of other states, including enemy states, economic rivals and alleged mafia states that may very well be lead by the very transnational criminals the organization should be targeting. Simply put, coordination requires trust, but it would be imprudent for some governments to trust others. As one U.K. senior official stated: The sad truth is I am not going to share my best, most delicate information with the Russian or Mexican police departments," (Naim, 2012, p.5). But this seems to invite a solution to the coordination problem what if states did not have to share information with one another? What if all information was housed in a central database, but only a central, independent authority had access to that information? This is perhaps a solution worthy of exploration. II. Membership In order for countries to benefit from international policing coordination, they need to actually be members of Interpol. When Interpol was first formed, membership was not limited to states; police forces from around the world were invited to become members, including several territories, rather than countries, such as the aarland, Wu rttemberg, and the Netherlands Antilles (Barnett & Coleman, 2005, p. 603). Now this argument may seem like a moot point: after all, Interpol has 190 members, but it is important to remember that these 190 do not necessarily make distinction between autonomous and semiautonomous regions that may have police forces and transnational security concerns that are separate from other states. A prime example of this issue was Taiwan. Taiwan was not an Interpol member in 2007 when it sought Interpol assistance to have a white-collar fugitive extradited back to Taiwan. Interpol refused to cooperate and Taiwan had to rely on bilateral judicial cooperation pacts for apprehending fugitives (Taipei Times, 2007). The Taiwan case raises concerns for other autonomous regions that claim independence. For example, Somalia is an Interpol member, but Somaliland and Puntland are autonomous and semi-autonomous, respectively, regions within Somalia. Both Somaliland and Puntland have governments and police forces distinct from the Somalia police force found in the capital, Mogadishu. Somaliland and Puntland police forces are likely to face similar, if not greater, barriers to international police assistance as we saw in Taiwan; a worry that is particularly disconcerting given that transnational crime, piracy and terrorist activities are particularly endemic to these two regions. III. Lack of Capacity Finally, there is the concern that despite Interpols attempts at bridging the gap between international and national policing, the organization does not have the capacity to meet these demands. Interpol has an annual budget of about 60 million, which many commentators argue is not enough (Pearson, 2011; Council on Foreign Relations, 2013). Individual governments spend billions of dollars on their own security and on foreign aid, therefore we would expect an international policing mechanism to have similar resources. Just to put this in perspective, the

INTERPOL, Constraint vs. Demand (Page 7 of 12) United tates Federal Bureau of Investigations requested a 2013 budget of $8.2 billion (Mueller, 2012). The International Criminal Court (ICC) has an annual budget in excess of 100 million (Budget and Finance Team for the Coalition for the International Criminal Court, 2012) and yet the ICC requires Interpols assistance in enforcing arrest warrants. International organizations like the ICC and the United Nations ecurity Council rely on Interpols coordination efforts. Furthermore, as transnational crime becomes more complex, wading into the realms of cyber security and medicinal counterfeiting, Interpol will have to keep up with the latest technological advancements all of this requires increased funding. Interpols response to transnational crime is currently ineffective because there are barriers to the organizations ability to encourage international cooperation among police forces, including both situational and monetary barriers. However, this is only part of Interpols problem. An effective international crime fighter is required to pursue justice above all else, but when an international organization starts to perpetrate injustices, it loses its credibility in the international community, and with that loss of credibility, comes loss of support. 2) Interpol does what its not supposed to do Under Article 3 of its Constitution, Interpol is strictly forbidden from undertaking any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character, but a study undertaken by the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists suggests that Interpols use of red notices belies the organizations constitutional commitments (Lewis, 2011). Rather than addressing the gap in global security, Interpols red notices are widening the gap by inadvertently trenching on humanitarian principles widely upheld in the international community, including the rights to political freedom (Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and freedom of expression (Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights). The purpose of a red notices is to bring criminals to justice. Interpol notices are sent to police agencies across the world and sometimes posted on Interpol's public website to assist in the international apprehension of criminals. But many Interpol Red Notices have lately been issued for nations with poor human-rights records and endemic corruption in their legal systems (Lewis, 2011). However, unlike domestic courts, Interpols structure provides little recourse for those people who are unjustly targeted by a red notice (Lewis, 2011). All Interpol members states are equal because Interpol espouses a position of neutrality. However, the International Consortium for Investigative Journalists argue that Interpol is compromising its own values when it treats member states red notices equally: at least 17 countries, including China, Iran, Pakistan and Venezuela, have issued Red Notices to apprehend political opponents, economic targets or environmental activists in the last five years (Lewis, 2011). And while it is not always easy to determine if these notices are politically motivated, the risk to political targets is readily foreseeable and difficult to rectify. According to the International Consortium, only 3 percent of Red Notice cases are provided to lawyers for review but because Interpol is an autonomous organization that is not accountable to any outside court or body, there are few protections available to wrongly accused persons against abuses of process by member states (Lewis, 2011). The consequences of Red Notice abuse can be severe; red notices can result in asset freezes, minimal access to judicial review, and if a suspect is

INTERPOL, Constraint vs. Demand (Page 8 of 12) apprehended, he or she may be sent back to the notice-issuing country (Lewis, 2011), where the person might be held as a political prisoner, may be tortured or may even be subject to extrajudicial killing. Some even argue that when Interpol expanded its mandate to include counterterrorist activities, Interpol wandered into a political realm from which it could no longer escape (Barnett & Coleman, 2005; Lewis, 2011). Arguably, it is easier to label a political dissident a terrorist without any material evidence, than it is to label him a serial murderer or white-collar criminal. But the issue of red notices is not limited to human rights concerns; an abuse of red notices also puts an increased financial burden on an already cash-strapped Interpol. As abuse of red notices increases, so does the need for more review mechanisms and man-power. From 2005 to 2010, the issuance of red notices tripled (Lewis, 2011) and Interpols response was not only paradoxical, but deeply disconcerting. Financial worries essentially compounded legal rights violations. Presumably, in an effort to conserve valuable resources, Interpol lessened the filters on Red Notices. Previously police agencies were required to apply to Interpol for a Red Notice, but as the number of notices started to increase, so did the cost of review. Interpols solution was to allow every Red Notice request to be entered into the Interpol system directly by member police agencies, allowing all 190 member police forces to instantly view a Red Notice before Interpols review. Additionally, police forces can now bypass the Red Notice System through the diffusions process. Diffusions occur when police agencies post an informal notice on Interpols internal communications system; this occurs in an automatic process without Interpol review (Lewis, 2011). We have seen that for several reasons, Interpols current structure, policy commitments and procedural choices prevent Interpol from acting as an effective tool against transnational crime. As one of the worlds largest international organizations and coordinating bodies, Interpol should do better. The final part of this paper will outline several policy and coordination recommendations that should help Interpol achieve its mandate of bridging the global security governance gap between national and international policing and allow Interpol to become a successful opponent in the growing battle against transnational crime. Recommendations for Interpol policy improvement and coordination Policy Improvement This paper started with an exploration of Interpols founding constitutional principles and the organizations overt rejection of pursuing a centralized authority structure. I then briefly mentioned that the international community might now look more favorably upon a centralized police force. This idea warrants revisiting. The problem of low-trust runs rampant when almost 200 different countries attempt to cooperate on such a sensitive issue as policing. We have seen that countries are reluctant to share information that they know can be accessed by enemy states. At the same time, we know that crime is increasingly transcending borders and domestic policing measures are no longer suited to addressing sophisticated transnational crimes. Therefore I propose a potential solution that might rectify the low-trust problem while simultaneously encouraging cooperation. imilarly to Naims suggestion for coalitions of the honest, where reputable law enforcement agencies are entrusted with multilateral anti-crime cooperation (2012, p. 5), I recommend that Interpol consider creating a centralized international law enforcement

INTERPOL, Constraint vs. Demand (Page 9 of 12) agency to monitor the central Interpol database. Instead of countries worrying that they are sharing sensitive information with untrustworthy member states, countries can rest easy knowing that access to information is limited to only one appointed group that can be trusted to act in the best interests of the international community as a whole. A centralized authority would also be more efficient at processing data and creating a coherent strategy. Coordination can still be maintained between this centralized authority and member states because information can be shared on an as-needed basis. This will also mitigate against the problems associated with Red Notice abuses: by limiting individual state access to the central database and monitoring the database through a central authority, Interpol will have more effective review over Red Notices. But Red Notices must also be addressed as a separate policy issue. If Interpol is to remain a credible international organization, it must respect the provisions of its own constitution and its actions must be consistent with the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Fair Trials International (2013) advocates that Interpol undertake immediate reforms to create effective mechanisms for enforcement of rules and reviews of Red Notices. This will require Interpol to create an accessible review mechanism for those persons who believe they have been the targets of improperly used Red Notices and Interpol will have to increase procedural transparency to avoid abuse of process accusations. Some commentators make more extreme arguments, suggesting that Interpol should reconsider its counterterrorism mandate altogether, because counterterrorism efforts will always be political and therefore will always violate Interpols governing constitutional principles. By taking counterterrorism activities out of the Interpol coordination equation, states would have less potential to abuse Red Notices. However, I would still caution against this move, for two reasons: the first reason is substantive, the second, purely utilitarian. The substantive reason why Interpol should continue to engage in counterterrorism activities is because the line between terrorism and transnational crime is blurry at best. Often terrorist groups engage in transnational crimes to fund their ideologically-motivated commitments, likewise, transnational criminal organizations, groups or actors will form ties with terrorist groups to facilitate the exchange of cash, weapons and narcotics. If Interpol draws a distinction between terrorism and transnational crime, it will be unable to adequately bring criminals to justice. The more utilitarian argument focuses around funding. When Interpol expanded its mandate to include counterterrorism, it saw a spike in U.S. NCB funding from $125,000 to $6 million over a 10-year period (Barnett & Colemen, 2005, p. 613). We saw already that Interpol is currently underfunded. Interpol is funded primarily by annual contributions from member countries. The United tates share of the 2006 Interpol budget was approximately 13.3% and the United tates contribution is estimated to rise to 17.4 percent by 2014 (The United States National Central Bureau for Interpol, 2009, p. iii); what would happen if all of a sudden Interpol cuts counterterrorism efforts from its mandate? Wouldnt Interpol become irrelevant in the eyes of its wealthy patrons? On the issue of funding, Interpols Secretary General, Ronald Noble maintains that over the next two decades, Interpols funding must increase to approximately 1 billion per year in order for Interpol to have the coordination capacity necessary to address the rising threats of transnational crime, cyber crime and terrorism (Pearson, 2011). But Noble readily admits that Interpol will have to diversify its funding sources in order to achieve this figure. Ideas include channeling a revenue stream from private users, for example from airlines and banks that routinely scan passports or other important personal documents. Noble believes that private

INTERPOL, Constraint vs. Demand (Page 10 of 12) corporations like airlines, banks and hotels would be incentivized to pay if they could save hundreds of millions of dollars by reducing their vulnerabilities to stolen documents (Pearson, 2011), in essence, a win-win for all. Diversifying funding and membership policies lead the way to a more sustainable and effective future for Interpol. Improved Coordination Finally, a brief note on the issue of improved coordination: if Interpol chooses to take on a more centralized role, it will need to mitigate against redundancies with other international organizations. For example, it is clear that Interpol assists the ICC with its arrest warrants and the UNSC with its notices, but to what extent do the processes of these organizations overlap? Furthermore, to what extent do Interpol and Europol duplicate the others efforts. In the age of globalization, there are so many efforts to address gaps in global security governance, but these efforts must also keep in mind that resources including time and money need to be preserved. Streamlining organizations and processes should be the focus. Coordination should not be limited to coordination between member states, but should also be applied when interacting with other international organizations. Otherwise, we end up right back where we started: increasingly diffused powerwithout a similar multiplication and reinforcement of authority.

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