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ABSOLUTORY CAUSES AND OTHER SPECIAL SITUATIONS Absolutory causes are those where the act committed is a crime

but for reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. a. ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION INSTIGATION The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. The law enforcer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. A public officer or a private detective induces an innocent person to commit a crime and would arrest him upon or after the commission of the crime by the latter. The accused must be acquitted.

1.

ENTRAPMENT Ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the execution of his criminal plan The means originate from the mind of the criminal.

Uy Se Teung informed Samson that Lua Chu was one of the owners of the Opium. 2. Lua Chu informed Samson that aside from him, there were co-owners named Tan and another located in Amoy. 3. Lua Chu promised to pay the P6,000 upon delivery of the opium from the warehouse of Uy Se Tieng. 4. A Customs Collector had a conversation before when Samson was on vacation in Europe, with Lua Chu and agreed on the business of shipping the Opium. The following morning Uy Se Tieng and companion, Uy Ay presented papers to Samson & Captain Buencosejo showed up & caught them in the act & arrested the two Chinese. The Constabulary then arrested Lua Chu & confiscated P50K worth of Opium (3,252 tins). Facts of Case: An Appeal was made by Uy Se Tieng & Lua Chu & made 10 assignments of errors made by the TC in its judgment. Appellants Held Point of Defense Juan Samson 1. A public official shall be involved in the induced the crime if: defendants to He induces a person to import the opium. commit a crime for personal gain Does not take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. He obtained the profits in mind even through afterwards does take the necessary steps seize the instrument of the crime & to arrest the offenders. 2. Even though Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drugs, the ff should be noted that held Samson not guilty for the crime: The accused have already planned and actually ordered the opium without the consent or participation of Juan Samson. Did not help the accused to successfully implement there plan rather, Samson assured the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers. Trial judge refusal Not one of the means prescribed in section of exclusion of 342 of the Code of Civil Procedures Juan Samson in the witness stand even though he was already dismissed from the Customs secret service In accepting the 1. The transcript contains certain transcript taken admissions made by the defendants. down by Jumapao 2. Stenographer attested that it was as the true & faithfully taken down. correct 3. Corroborated by statement of Juan conversation Statement in the court. between Juan Samson & Uy Se Tieng Concluding Remarks: Entrapment 1. The practice of entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions 2. It is a scheme or technique ensuring the apprehension of the criminals by being in the actual crime scene. 3. The law officers shall not be guilty to the crime if he have done the following:

A person has planned or is about to commit a crime and ways and means are resorted to by a public officer to trap and catch the criminal. Not a bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.

People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Ting (1931) Facts: Samson was the chief of customs secret service in Cebu and Natividad was the former collector of customs. He was instructed to make sure that the shipment containing opium shall be unloaded in the country. He went along the plan and then he informed the Philippine Constabulary of all that had taken place and they discussed a plan to capture the opium owners. Held: The mere fact that the chief of customs secret service pretended to agree to a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the accused. Samson did not induce nor instigate the accused to import the opium but merely pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs. There is nothing immoral in this or against the public good which should prevent the government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it is simply a trap set to catch a criminal.

PEOPLE v. LUA CHU AND UY SE TIENG [56 Phil. 44 (1931)] Background of Case: On Nov. 1929, Uy Se Tieng, was the consignee of the Shipments of Opium coming from Hongkong, who represented agents of the real Owners of Shipments of Opium containing 3,252 tins. He collaborated w/ Samson & Natividad of the Customs by paying them an amount of P6K for the opium to be released safely from Customs. On Dec. 1929, upon arrival of the Shipment of Opium in the ports of Cebu, Uy Se Tieng informed Samson that the former consult the real owners on how to proceed the payment of P6K & will come over to Samson house on Dec. 17, 1929 to inform the decision of the owners. On the same day Samson informed the Constabulary represented by Captain Buencosejo & the Provincial Fiscal requesting a stenographer to take down the conversation between Samson & Uy Se Teung. On the night of Dec. 17, 1929, Captain Buencosejo and a stenographer named Jumapao from a law firm and hid themselves behind the curtains in the house of Samson to witness the conversation between Samson, Uy Se Teung and Lua Chu. Captain Buencosejo & Jumapao noted the ff. important facts:

a.

He does not induce a person to commit a crime for personal gain or is not involved in the planning of the crime. b. Does take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. Instigation: This is the involvement of a law officer in the crime itself in the following manners: a. He induces a person to commit a crime for personal gain b. Doesnt take the necessary steps to seize the instrument of the crime & to arrest the offenders before he obtained the profits in mind. c. He obtained the profits in mind even through afterwards does take the necessary steps seize the instrument of the crime and to arrest the offenders. PEOPLE v. DORIA [301 SCRA 668 (1999)]

Two civilian informants informed the PNP Narcom that one Jun was engaged in illegal drug activities and the Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest Jun in a buy-bust operation. On the day of entrapment, PO3 Manlangit handed Jun the marked bills and Jun instructed PO3 Manlangit to wait for him while he got the marijuana from his associate. When they met up, Jun gave PO3 something wrapped in plastic upon which PO3 arrested Jun. They frisked Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. Jun revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named neneth They wen to Neneths house. PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dinin table and noticed something wrapped in plastic inside the box. Suspicious, PO3 entered the house and took hold of the box and found that it ha 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneously, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth. The policemen arrested Neneth and took both her and Jun, together with the coz, its contents and the marked bill and turned them over to the investigator at headquarters, Jun was then learned to be Florencio Doria while Neneth is Violata Gaddao. They were both convicted feloniously selling, administering and giving away to another 11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops, in violation of R.A 6425, as amended by RA 7659

Neither could her arrest ne justified under second instance of personal knowledge in Rule 113 as this must be based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds for suspicion. Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged indentification made by her co-accused. PO3 Manlangt, however, declared in his direct examination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his query as to where the marked money was. Doria did not point to Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he lfet the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Gaddao conspired with Doria in pushing drugs, If there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of the acts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable. Furthermore, the fact that the box containing about 6 kilos of marijuana was found in Gaddaos house does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of the crime charged. The prosecution thus had failed to prove that Gaddao conspired with Doria in the sale of the said drug. Thus, Gaddao is acquitted a. EFFECT OF PARDON

RPC, Art. 23. Effect of pardon by the offended party . A pardon of the offended party does not extinguish criminal action except as provided in Article 344 of this Code; but civil liability with regard to the interest of the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.

R.A. No. 8353. Anti-Rape Law of 1997. Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon - The subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty. Provided, That the crime shall be extinguish or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab initio. A pardon by the offended party does not extinguish criminal action because a crime is an offense against the State. In criminal cases, the intervention of the aggrieved parties is limited to being witnesses for the prosecution. Compromise does not extinguish criminal liability. The offended party in crimes of adultery and concubinage cannot institute criminal prosecution, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. - the pardon here may be implied, as continued inaction of the offended party after learning the offense. - both offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. b. ABSOLUTORY CAUSES

Issue: WON Violeta Gaddao is liable Entrapment is recognized as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused & partakes the nature of a confession & avoidance. American federal courts and state courts usually use the subjective or origin of intent test laid down in Sorrells v. U.S. to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accuseds predisposition to commit the offense is charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. Another test is the objective test where the test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agenst was likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense. The objective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly & adequately shown. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validty of the defense of inducement. In the case at bar, Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest uner Sec. 5a of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the TC, there was no occasion at all for Gaddao to flee from the policement to justify her arrest in hot pursuit

Art. 6(3). - There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly or over acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than this own spontaneous desistance. Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. The penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article. Art. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances . Any legally married person who having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual

intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro. If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment. These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents. Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article. Art. 280. Qualified trespass to dwelling . Any private person who shall enter the dwelling of another against the latter's will shall be punished by arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. If the offense be committed by means of violence or intimidation, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos. The provisions of this article shall not be applicable to any person who shall enter another's dwelling for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, nor shall it be applicable to any person who shall enter a dwelling for the purpose of rendering some service to humanity or justice, nor to anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inn and other public houses, while the same are open. Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability . No criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons: 1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line. 2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and 3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sistersin-law, if living together. The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers participating in the commission of the crime. Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse. The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above named persons, as the case may be. In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be applicable to the co-principals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes. d. ACTS NOT COVERED BY LAW AND IN CASE OF EXCESSIVE PUNISHMENT Art. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of excessive penalties. Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the

proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said act should be made the subject of legislation. In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense.

3. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES Mitigating circumstances are those which, if present in the commission of the crime, do not entirely free the actor from criminal liability, but serve only to reduce the penalty. They are based on the diminution of either freedom of action, intelligence or intent or on the lesser perversity of the offender. CLASSES OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES 1. ORDINARY MITIGATING Those mentioned in subsections 1 to 10 of Art. 13. 2. PRIVILEGED MITIGATING

Art. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the offender is a minor under eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraphs next to the last of Article 80 of this Code, the following rules shall be observed: 1. Upon a person under fifteen but over nine years of age, who is not exempted from liability by reason of the court having declared that he acted with discernment, a discretionary penalty shall be imposed, but always lower by two degrees at least than that prescribed by law for the crime which he committed. 2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the proper period. Art. 69. Penalty to be imposed when the crime committed is not wholly excusable. A penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall be imposed if the deed is not wholly excusable by reason of the lack of some of the conditions required to justify the same or to exempt from criminal liability in the several cases mentioned in Article 11 and 12, provided that the majority of such conditions be present. The courts shall impose the penalty in the period which may be deemed proper, in view of the number and nature of the conditions of exemption present or lacking. Privileged mitigating circumstances which are applicable only to particular crimes: 1. Art. 268, par. 3. Voluntary release of the person illegally detained within 3 days without the offender attaining his purpose and before the institution of criminal action. The penalty is one degree lower. 2. Art. 333, par. 3. Abandonment without justification of the spouse who committed adultery. The penalty is one degree lower. ORDINARY MC Susceptible of being offset by any aggravating circumstance If not offset by aggravating circumstance, produces the effect of applying the penalty provided by law for the crime in its min period in case of divisible penalty PRIVILEDGED MC Cannot be offset by aggravating circumstance The effect of imposing upon the offender the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that provided by law for the crime.

3. That the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. 4. That sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party immediately preceded the act. 5. That the act was committed in the immediate vindication of a grave offense to the one committing the felony (delito), his spouse, ascendants, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees. 6. That of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or obfuscation. 7. That the offender had voluntarily surrendered himself to a person in authority or his agents, or that he had voluntarily confessed his guilt before the court prior to the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution; 8. That the offender is deaf and dumb, blind or otherwise suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or comm4unications with his fellow beings. 9. Such illness of the offender as would diminish the exercise of the will-power of the offender without however depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. 10. And, finally, any other circumstances of a similar nature and analogous to those above mentioned. Par. 1- THOSE MENTIONED IN THE PRECEDING CHAPTER, WHEN ALL THE REQUISITES NECESSARY TO JUSTIFY OR TO EXEMPT FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY IN THE RESPECTIVE CASES ARE NOT ATTENDANT. The circumstances of justification or exemption which may give place to mitigation, because not all the requisites necessary to justify the act or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are attendant, are the ff: 1. Self-defense 7. Minority over 9 and 2. Defense of Relatives under 15 years of age 3. Defense of Strangers 8. Causing injury by mere 4. State of necessity accident 5. Performance of duty 9. Uncontrollable fear 6. Obedience to order of superior INCOMPLETE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE 1. Incomplete self-defense, defense defense of stranger of relatives,

In these 3 classes of defense, UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION must always be present. It is an indispensable requisite. Par. 1 of Art. 13 is applicable only when unlawful aggression is present but the other 2 requisites are not present in any of the cases referred to in circumstances number 1, 2 and 3 or Art. 11. Ex. When the one making defense against unlawful aggression used unreasonable means to prevent or repel it, he is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance. 2. Incomplete justifying circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or injury . REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 11: a. That the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; b. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it; c. That there be no other practical and less harmful means of preventing it. Avoidance of greater evil or injury is a justifying circumstance if all the three requisites mentioned in par. 4 of Art. 11 are present. But if any of the last two requisites is lacking, there is only a mitigating circumstance. 3. Incomplete justifying circumstance of performance of duty. REQUISITES under par. 5 of Art. 11: a. That the accused acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and

NOTE: Mitigating circumstances only reduce the penalty but do not change the nature of the crime. Art. 13. Mitigating circumstances . The following are mitigating circumstances; 1. Those mentioned in the preceding chapter, when all the requisites necessary to justify or to exempt from criminal liability in the respective cases are not attendant. 2. That the offender is under eighteen year of age or over seventy years. In the case of the minor, he shall be proceeded against in accordance with the provisions of Art. 80.

b.

That the injury caused or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.

In People v. Oanis, the SC considered one of the 2 requisites as constituting the majority. It seems that there is no ordinary mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 par. 1 when the justifying or exempting circumstance has 2 requisites only. INCOMPLETE EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE 1. Incomplete exempting circumstance minority over 9 and under 15 years of age. of

REQUISITES under par. 3 of Art. 12: a. That the offender is over 9 and under 15 years old; and b. That he does not act with discernment. If the minor over 9 and under 15 years of age acted with discernment, he is entitled only to a mitigating circumstance, because not all the requisites to exempt from criminal liability are present. 2. accident. Incomplete exempting circumstance of

Held/Ratio: No. The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her in a state of legitimate defense which will thus exempt her from criminal liability if, as the only means to protect her honor, she wounds or kills the offender. However, in the present case, there could be no possibility of her being raped. And the means employed by her in defense of her honor, resulting in the death of Amado, was clearly excessive. She cannot be legally declared completely exempt from criminal liability. However three mitigating circumstances such as: provocation producing passion/obfuscation, inflicting only one wound intended to punish the offenders hand, and the fact that she immediately surrendered herself to the authorities, will work in her favor to lessen the degree of punishment.

People v. Narvaez
Facts: Mamerto Narvaez has been convicted of murder (qualified by treachery) of David Fleischer and Flaviano Rubia. On August 22, 1968, Narvaez shot Fleischer and Rubia during the time the two were constructing a fence that would prevent Narvaez from getting into his house and rice mill. The defendant was taking a nap when he heard sounds of construction and found fence being made. He addressed the group and asked them to stop destroying his house and asking if they could talk things over. Fleischer responded with "No, gadamit, proceed, go ahead." Defendant lost his "equilibrium," and shot Fleisher with his shotgun. He also shot Rubia who was running towards the jeep where the deceased's gun was placed. Prior to the shooting, Fleischer and Co. (the company of Fleischer's family) was involved in a legal battle with the defendant and other land settlers of Cotabato over certain pieces of property. At the time of the shooting, the civil case was still pending for annulment (settlers wanted granting of property to Fleisher and Co. to be annulled). At time of the shooting, defendant had leased his property from Fleisher (though case pending and ownership uncertain) to avoid trouble. On June 25, defendant received letter terminating contract because he allegedly didn't pay rent. He was given 6 months to remove his house from the land. Shooting was barely 2 months after letter. Defendant claims he killed in defense of his person and property. CFI ruled that Narvaez was guilty. Aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation offset by the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. For both murders, CFI sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs, and to pay for moral damages. Issues: (1) WON the aggression on the property of Narvaez was lawful or unlawful. (2) WON self-defense can be claimed by Narvaez in shooting those who would Held/Ratio: (1) Yes. The assault on the property constituted unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased who had no right to destroy or cause damage to Narvaezs house, nor to close his accessibility to the highway while he was pleading with them to stop and talk things over with him. (2) No. Although aggression is established as the first element in self-defense and there was no provocation on the part of Narvaez (thereby meeting the third element), the second element, being reasonableness of resistance, was not met when, in killing the two victims, such resistance was disproportionate to the attack. Hence, the act of killing the deceased was not justifiable since not all elements for justification are present. Gutierrez, Dissenting: Defense of property can only be invoked when coupled with form of attack on person defending property. In the case at bar, this was not so. Appellant should then be sentenced to prision mayor. However, since he has served more than that, he should be released.

REQUISITES under par. 4 of Art. 12 : a. A person is performing a lawful act; b. With due care; c. He causes an injury to another by mere accident; and d. Without fault or intention of causing it. If the 2nd requisite and 1st part of the 4th requisite are absent, the case will fall under Art. 365 which punishes reckless imprudence. If the 1st requisite and 2nd part of the 4th requisite are absent, it will be an intentional felony. 3. Incomplete uncontrollable fear. exempting circumstance of

REQUISITES under par. 6 of Art. 12: a. That the threat which caused the fear was of an evil greater than, or at least equal to, that which he was required to commit; b. That it promised an evil of such gravity and imminence that an ordinary person would have succumbed to it. If only one of these requisites is present, there is only a mitigating circumstance.

People vs. Jaurigue


Facts: A girl by the name of Avelina was being courted and harassed by one Amado. The young man, whom the girl flatly refused, nevertheless persisted in his endeavors by going to the girls house at midnight, surreptitiously entering her room, putting his hand on her forehead (evidently with the intention of abusing her) and thereby causing the girl to scream for help. Her parents arrived but the father of the girl allowed Amado to go home. Avelina is purported to have received news of Amado falsely boasting of having taken liberties with her person. In church one day, brightly-lit and filled with other people, Amado went to sit with Avelina and without saying a word, placed his hand on the upper right thigh of the girl. Avelina then pulled out her fan knife with the intention of punishing the offenders hand. Amado seized the girls right-hand which held the weapon, however, Avelina was able to quickly grab the knife with her lefthand and at once stabbed Amado once at the base of the left side of the neck, inflicting a mortal wound. When asked by those around her why she did it, she replied by saying that she couldnt take it anymore and that she hoped that she would be taken care of. Issues: WON Avelina can invoke self-defense.

Par. 2 THAT THE OFFENDER IS UNDER 18 YEARS OF AGE OR OVER 70 YEARS. IN THE CASE OF THE MINOR, HE SHALL BE PROCEEDED AGAINST IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF ART. 80. Par. 2 contemplates the ff: 1. An offender over 9 but under 15 of age who acted with discernment. 2. An offender fifteen or over but under 18 years of age. 3. An offender over 70 years old. Art. 80. Suspension of sentence of minor delinquents. Whenever a minor of either sex, under sixteen years of age at the date of the commission of a grave or less grave felony, is accused thereof, the court, after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings, instead of pronouncing judgment of conviction, shall suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such minor to the custody or care of a public or private, benevolent or charitable institution, established under the law of the care, correction or education of orphaned, homeless, defective, and delinquent children, or to the custody or care of any other responsible person in any other place subject to visitation and supervision by the Director of Public Welfare or any of his agents or representatives, if there be any, or otherwise by the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, subject to such conditions as are prescribed herein below until such minor shall have reached his majority age or for such less period as the court may deem proper. The court, in committing said minor as provided above, shall take into consideration the religion of such minor, his parents or next of kin, in order to avoid his commitment to any private institution not under the control and supervision of the religious sect or denomination to which they belong. The Director of Public Welfare or his duly authorized representatives or agents, the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, or the person to whose custody or care the minor has been committed, shall submit to the court every four months and as often as required in special cases, a written report on the good or bad conduct of said minor and the moral and intellectual progress made by him. The suspension of the proceedings against a minor may be extended or shortened by the court on the recommendation of the Director of Public Welfare or his authorized representative or agents, or the superintendent of public schools or his representatives, according as to whether the conduct of such minor has been good or not and whether he has complied with the conditions imposed upon him, or not. The provisions of the first paragraph of this article shall not, however, be affected by those contained herein. If the minor has been committed to the custody or care of any of the institutions mentioned in the first paragraph of this article, with the approval of the Director of Public Welfare and subject to such conditions as this official in accordance with law may deem proper to impose, such minor may be allowed to stay elsewhere under the care of a responsible person. If the minor has behaved properly and has complied with the conditions imposed upon him during his confinement, in accordance with the provisions of this article, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may order his final release. In case the minor fails to behave properly or to comply with the regulations of the institution to which he has been committed or with the conditions imposed upon him when he was committed to the care of a responsible person, or in case he should be found incorrigible or his continued stay in such institution should be inadvisable, he shall be returned to the court in order that the same may render the judgment corresponding to the crime committed by him. The expenses for the maintenance of a minor delinquent confined in the institution to which he has been committed, shall be borne totally or partially by his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him, if they are able to do so, in the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case his parents or relatives or those persons liable to support him have not been ordered to pay said expenses or are found indigent and cannot pay said expenses, the municipality in which the

offense was committed shall pay one-third of said expenses; the province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-third; and the remaining one-third shall be borne by the National Government: Provided, however, That whenever the Secretary of Finance certifies that a municipality is not able to pay its share in the expenses above mentioned, such share which is not paid by said municipality shall be borne by the National Government. Chartered cities shall pay two-thirds of said expenses; and in case a chartered city cannot pay said expenses, the internal revenue allotments which may be due to said city shall be withheld and applied in settlement of said indebtedness in accordance with section five hundred and eighty-eight of the Administrative Code.

LEGAL EFFECTS OF VARIOUS AGES OF OFFENDER: 1. Under 9 years of age, an exempting circumstance. (Art. 12, par. 2) 2. Over 9 and under 15 years of age, also an exempting circumstance, unless he acted with discernment (Art. 12, par. 3) 3. Minor delinquent under 18 years of age, the sentence may be suspended. (Art. 192, PD No. 603 as amended by PD 1179) 4. Under 18 years of age, privileged mitigating circumstance (Art. 68) 5. 18 years or over, full criminal responsibility.

Par. 3 THAT THE OFFENDER HAD NO INTENTION TO COMMIT SO GR A WRONG AS THAT COMMITTED. This circumstance can be taken into account only when the facts proven show that there is a notable and evident disproportion between the means employed to execute the criminal act and its consequences. The intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by the proportion of the means employed by him to the evil produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body. Intention must be judged by considering the weapon used, the injury inflicted and his attitude of the mind when the accused attacked the deceased. This mitigating circumstance is not applicable when the offender employed brute force. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong is not appreciated where the offense committed is characterized by treachery. In crimes against persons who do not die as a result of the assault, the absence of the intent to kill reduces the felony to mere physical injuries, but it does not constitute a mitigating circumstance under Art. 13 par 3. It is not applicable to felonies by negligence because in these kinds of felonies, there is no intent on the part of the offender which may be considered diminished. Par. 3 is only applicable to offense resulting in physical injuries or material harm. It is not applicable to defamation or slander. PEOPLE v. URAL [56 SCRA 138 (1974)] Facts: Ural was convicted of murder by the Zamboanga CFI sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and orderinh im to indemnify the heirs of Felix Napola, in the sum of P12K and to pay the costs. The judgment of conviction was based on the testimony of Brigido Alberto, former detention prisoner who witnessed what happened. Ural, a policeman, boxed the deceased, Felix Napola, a detention prisoner, inside the jail. As a consequence of the fistic blows, the deceased collapsed on the floor. The accused stepped on the prostate body and left. After a while he returned with a bottle poured its contents on the recumbent body of the deceased, ignited it with a match and left the cell again. As a consequence, the victim later on died of the burns. The crime committed by appellant Ural was murder by means of fire (incendio) (Art 248(3), RPC)

Held: The trial court correctly held that the accused took advantage of his public position (Art 14(1), RPC) but it failed to appreciated the mitigating circumstance of "no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed." (Art.13(3), RPC). The intention, as an internal act, is judged not only by the proportion of the means employed by him to the evil produced by his act, but also by the fact that the blow was or was not aimed at a vital part of the body. Thus, it may be deduced from the proven facts that the accused had no intent to kill the victim, his design being only to maltreat him, such that when he realized the fearful consequences of his felonious act, he allowed the victim to secure medical treatment at the municipal dispensary. Lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong offsets the generic aggravating, circumstance of abuse of his official position. The trial court properly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which is the medium period of the penalty for murder (Arts 64(4) and 248, RPC) PEOPLE V. GONZALEZ (2001) Facts: Both of the families of Andres and that of Gonzalez were on their way to the exit of the Loyola Memorial Park. Gonzales was with his grandson and 3 housemaids, while Andres was driving with his pregnant wife, Feliber, his 2yr old son, Kenneth, his nephew Kevin and his sister-in-law. At an intersection, their two vehicles almost collided. Gonzales continued driving while Andres tailed Gonzales vehicle and cut him off when he found the opportunity to do so, then got out of his vehicle and knocked on the appellant's car window. Heated exchange of remarks followed. On his way back to his vehicle, he met Gonzales son, Dino. Andres had a shouting match this time with Dino. Gonzales then alighted from his car and fired a single shot at the last window on the left side of Andres' vehicle at an angle away from Andres. The single bullet fired hit Kenneth, Kevin and Feliber which caused the latters death. Held: The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is not obtaining. Andres' act of shouting at Gonzales son, who was then a nurse and of legal age, is not sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation. Dino was shouting back at Andres. It was not a case wherein Gonzales son appeared helpless and oppressed that Gonzales lost his reason and shot at the vehicle of Andres. The same holds true for Gonzales claim of provocation on the part of Andres. Provocation must be sufficient to excite a person to commit the wrong committed and that the provocation must be commensurate to the crime committed. The sufficiency of provocation varies according to the circumstances of the case. The aggressive behavior of Andres towards Gonzales and his son may be demeaning or humiliating but it is not sufficient provocation to shoot at Gonzales vehicle. Par. 4. THAT SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION OR THREAT ON THE PART OF THE OFFENDED PARTY IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE ACT PROVOCATION - Any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. REQUISITES: a. That the provocation must be sufficient b. That it must originate from the offended party c. That the provocation must be immediate to the act, i.e., to the commission of the crime by the person who is provoked. People v. Pagal (1977) Facts: Pagal and Torcelino, employees of Gau Guan, conspired together to take away from their employer P1,281. When Gau Guan refused to open the kaha de yero, they stabbed him with an icepick and clubbed him with an iron pipe which resulted to his death. The two accused were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. On appeal, they claimed that they are entitled to 2 mitigating circumstances: sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party and having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to produce passion and obfuscation.

Held: First, the provocation and obfuscation arising from one and the same cause should be treated as only one mitigating circumstance. Since the alleged provocation which caused the obfuscation of the appellants arose from the same incident, that is, the alleged maltreatment and/or ill-treatment of the appellants by the deceased, those two mitigating circumstances cannot be considered as two distinct and separate circumstances but should be treated as one. Secondly, the circumstance of passion and obfuscation cannot be mitigating in a crime which is planned and calmly meditated before its execution, as in the case at bar. Third, the maltreatment that appellants claim the victim to have committed against them occurred much earlier than the date of the commission of the crime. Provocation in order to be mitigating must be sufficient and immediately preceding the act. Thus, where the accused killed his wife during a quarrel, because he, who had no work, resented her suggestion to join her brother in the business of cutting logs, the 2 mitigating circumstances of provocation & obfuscation cannot be considering in favor of the accused. Par. 5. THAT THE ACT WAS COMMITTED IN THE IMMEDIATE VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE TO THE ONE COMMITTING THE FELONY (DELITO), HIS SPOUSE, ASCENDANTS, DESCENDANTS, LEGITIMATE, NATURAL OR ADOPTED BROTHERS OR SISTERS, OR RELATIVES BY AFFINITY WITHIN THE SAME DEGREE. REQUISITES: That there be a grave offense done to the one committing the felony, his spouse, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural or adopted brothers or sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degree. That the felony is committed in vindication of such grave offense. A lapse of time is allowed between the vindication and the doing of the grave offense. VINDICATION The grave offense may be committed also against the offenders relatives mentioned in the law. The offended party must have done a grave offense to the offender or his relatives mentioned in the law. The vindication of the grave offense may be proximate, which admits of an interval of time between the grace offense done by the offended party and the commission of the crime.

a.

b.

PROVOCATION It is made directly only to the person committing the offense The cause that brought about the provocation need not be a grave offense. It is necessary that the provocation or threat immediately preceded the act.

Basis to determine the gravity of offense in vindication The question whether or not a certain personal offense is grave must be decided by the court, having in mind the social standing of the person, the place and the time when the insult was made. Vindication of a grave offense and passion or obfuscation cannot be counted separately and independently. Par. 6. THAT OF HAVING ACTED UPON AN IMPULSE SO POWERFUL AS NATURALLY TO HAVE PRODUCED PASSION OR OBFUSCATION. REQUISITES: a. The accused acted upon an impulse. b. The impulse must be so powerful that it naturally produce passion or obfuscation in him. Passion or obfuscation may constitute as a mitigating circumstance only when the same arose from LAWFUL SENTIMENTS. It is not applicable when:

a. The act committed in a spirit of LAWLESSNESS. b. the act is committed in a spirit of REVENGE. The crime committed must be the result of a sudden impulse of natural and uncontrollable fury. The accused who raped a woman is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion just because he finds himself in a secluded place with that young ravishing woman, almost naked and therefore, liable to succumb to the uncontrollable passion of his bestial instinct. The mitigating circumstance of obfuscation arising from jealousy cannot be invoked in favor of the accused whose relationship with the woman was illegitimate. Passion and obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the offender. PASSION OR OBFUSCATION Mitigating circumstance Cannot give rise to an irresistible force because the latter requires physical force Passion or obfuscation is in the offender himself Must arise from lawful sentiments IRRESISTIBLE FORCE Exempting circumstance

perfect right to do. In the present case, however, the impulse was caused by the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him, and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms of another. Judgment: Modified by a finding that the commission of the crime was marked with the extenuating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, penalty is reduced from 14 yrs 8 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 12 yrs and 1 day of reclusion temporal. Par. 7. THAT THE OFFENDER HAD VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED HIMSELF TO A PERSON IN AUTHORITY OR HIS AGENTS, OR THAT HE HAD VOLUNTARILY CONFESSED HIS GUILT BEFORE THE COURT PRIOR TO THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION. 2 MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER THIS PARAGRAPH: 1. Voluntary surrender to a person in authority or his agents; 2. Voluntary confession of guilt before the court prior to the presentation of evidence for the prosecution. REQUISITES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER: a. That the offender had not been actually arrested. b. That the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent. c. That the surrender was voluntary. Merely requesting a policeman to accompany the accused to the police HQ is not equivalent to voluntary surrender. Other examples: a. The warrant of arrest showed that the accused was in fact arrested. b. The accused surrendered only after the warrant of arrest was served. c. The accused went into hiding and surrendered only when they realized that the forces of the law were closing in on them. Surrender must be SPONTANEOUS. He surrendered 1) because he acknowledges his guilty or 2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessarily incurred in his search and capture. The surrender must be by reason of the commission of the crime for which he is prosecuted. PEOPLE v. AMAGUIN [229 SCRA 166 (1994)] Facts: Celso and Gildo Amaguin, together with others, attacked Pacifico and Diosdado Oros. During the fray, Gildo was armed with a knife and an Indian target. And just as they were about to finish off the Oro brothers, Willie, the eldest of the Amaguins, appeared with a revolver and delivered the coup de grace. They invoke the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. Held: SC agrees with the accused-appellants view that voluntary surrender should be appreciated in their favor. While it may have taken both Willie and Gildo a week before turning themselves in, the fact it, they voluntarily surrendered to the police before arrest could be effected. For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following must be present: (a) offender has not been actually arrested; (b) offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. All these requisites appear to have attended their surrender. People vs. De la Cruz (63 Phil., 874), the reason for the existence of said mitigating circumstance is that it reveals to a certain extent an act of repentance, a moral disposition favorable to his reform and submission to the law. The reason for this is that a plea of guilty given after the prosecution has started its evidence is not spontaneous or made with a sincere desire to repent but merely speculative and is

Irresistible force must come from a third person The irresistible force is unlawful

PASSION PROVOCATION Produced by an impulse Comes form the injured party which may be caused by provocation Need not be immediate. It is Must immediately precede the only required that the commission of the crime influence thereof lasts until the moment the crime is committed The effect is the loss of reason and self-control on the part of the offender. US v. HICKS (1909) Facts: For about 5 years, Hicks and Sola lived illicitly in the manner of husband and wife but they separated. A few days later, Sola contracted new relations with another negro named Wallace. Hicks went to Wallaces house and asked the latter to go out. They talked for awhile and then Hicks shot Wallace Held: Even if it is true that the accused acted with obfuscation because of jealousy, the mitigating circumstance cannot be considered in his favor because the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are such which originate from legitimate feelings and not those which arise from vicious, unworthy and immoral passions. The cause of the passion of the accused was his vexation engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a perfect right to do. U.S. v. DELA CRUZ [22 Phil. 429 (1912)] Facts: The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his commonlaw wife upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal communication with a common acquaintance. Held: In this a case, the accused was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation. The facts in this case must be distinguished from the case of U.S. vs. Hicks where it was found that the accused, deliberately and after due reflection resolved to kill the woman who had left him for another man. With a clean and well-prepared weapon, he enetered the house, disguising his intention and calming her by his apparent repose and tranquility, doubtless in order to successfully accomplish his criminal design. In this case, the cause of the alleged passion and obfuscation of the accused was his vexation, disappointment and anger engendered by the refusal of the woman to continue to live in illicit relations with him, which she had a

most likely made on the belief that the trial will result in his conviction (People v. De la Cruz, 63 Phil 874). Par. 8. THAT THE OFFENDER IS DEAF AND DUMB, BLIND OR OTHERWISE SUFFERING FROM SOME PHYSICAL DEFECT WHICH THUS RESTRICTS HIS MEANS OF ACTION, DEFENSE, OR COMMUNICATION WITH HIS FELLOW BEINGS. This paragraph does not distinguish between educated and uneducated deaf-mute or blind persons. Physical defect referred to in this paragraph is such as being armless, cripple, or a stutterer, whereby his means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow beings are limited. Par. 9. SUCH ILLNESS OF THE OFFENDER AS WOULD DIMINISH THE EXERCISE OF THE WILL-POWER OF THE OFFENDER WITHOUT HOWEVER DEPRIVING HIM OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF HIS ACTS. REQUISITES: a. That the illness of the offender must diminish the exercise of his will-power. b. That such illness should not deprive the offender of consciousness of his acts. When the offender completely lost the exercise of will-power, it may be an exempting circumstance. It is said that this paragraph refers only to diseases of pathological state that trouble the conscience or will. Ex. A mother who, under the influence of a puerperal fever, killed her child the day following her delivery.

Held: No. He is not an imbecile. According Dr. Francisco Gomes, although he was feebleminded, he is not an imbecile as he could still distinguish between right & wrong & even feel remorse. In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile w/in the meaning of RPC A12 so as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment & freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. (Note that definition is same as insanity) As to the strange behavior of the accused during his confinement, assuming it was not feigned to stimulate insanity, it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at having killed his wife. A man who could feel the pangs of jealousy & take violent measures to the extent of killing his wife who he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so, he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be regarded as an imbecile. WON the suspicions were justified, is of little or no importance. The fact is that he believed her faithless. Furthermore, in his written statement, he readily admitted that he killed his wife, & at the trial he made no effort to deny of repudiate said written statements, thus saving the government all the trouble & expense of catching him & securing his conviction. But 2 mitigating circumstances are present: passion or obfuscation (having killed his wife in a jealous rage) & feeblemindedness. Judgment: In conclusion, appellant is found guilty of parricide & the lower courts judgment is hereby affirmed w/ the modification that appellant will be credited with half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone (because of the 2 mitigating circumstances) Par. 10. AND FINALLY, ANY OTHER CIRCUMSTANCE OF A SIMILAR NATURE AND ANALOGOUS OF THOSE ABOVEMENTIONED. Over 60 years old with failing sight, similar to over 70 years of age mentioned in paragraph 2. Voluntary restitution of the property stolen by the accused or immediately reimbursing the amount malversed is a mitigating circumstance as analogous to voluntary surrender. Not resisting arrest is not analogous to voluntary surrender. Testifying for the prosecution is analogous to plea of guilty. CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE NEITHER EXEMPTING NOR MITIGATING 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Mistake in the blow or aberratio ictus, for under Art. 48, there is a complex crime committed. The penalty is even higher. Mistake in the identity of the victim, for under Art. 4, par. 1, the accused is criminally liable even if the wrong done is different from that which is intended. Entrapment of the accused. The accused is over 18 years of age. If the offender is over 18 years old, his age is neither exempting nor mitigating. Performance of righteous action.

PEOPLE v. FORMIGONES [87 Phil. 658 (1950)] Nature: Appeal from the decision of the CFI of Camarines Sur finding Abelardo Formigones guilty of parricide & sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2K, and to pay costs. Facts: In the month of Nov. 1946, Abelardo was living on his farm in Camarines Sur w/ his wife, Julia Agricola & their 5 children. From there they transferred in the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones in the same municipality to find employment as harvesters of palay. After a month, Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house when Abelardo, w/o previous quarrel or provocation whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house & stabbed his wife Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the right lung & causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death. Abelardo then took his dead wife & laid her on the floor of the living room & then lay down beside her. In this position, he was found by the people who came in response to the shouts made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones. The motive was admittedly that of jealousy because according to his statement, he used to have quarrels with his wife for reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother, Zacarias; that he suspected the 2 were maintaining illicit relations because he noticed that his wife had become indifferent to him. During the preliminary investigation, the accused pleaded guilty. At the case in the CFI, he also pleaded guilty but didnt testify. His counsel presented the testimony of 2 guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the effect that his conduct was rather strange & that he behaved like an insane person, at times he would remain silent, walk around stark naked, refuse to take a bath & wash his clothes etc... The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an IMBECILE & therefore exempt from criminal liability under RPC A12. Issue: WON Abelardo is an imbecile at the time of the commission of the crime, thus exempted from criminal liability