CHAPTER III ORIGINAL REGISTRATION 1. APPLICATION Ong v. Republic of the Philippines G.R. No.

175746, March 21, 2008 Facts: (Nagparegister sa yuta pero nireklamo ang SG kay wa cla right to the land) This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing Decision of the Court of Appeals (against the petitioner), which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court (favorable to the petitioner). Petitioner Charles L. Ong (petitioner) in his behalf and as duly authorized representative of his brothers, namely, Roberto, Alberto and Cesar, filed an Application for Registration of Title over Lot 15911 (subject lot) situated in Barangay Anolid, Mangaldan, Pangasinan alleging that they are the co-owners of the subject lot; that the subject lot is their exclusive property, that the subject lot is presently unoccupied; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous and peaceful possession of the subject lot in the concept of owners for more than thirty (30) years. Only respondent Republic of the Philippines (respondent), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application for registration of title asserting that neither applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier as required by Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1073; that applicants failed to adduce any monument of title to prove their claims; that the tax declaration appended to the application does not appear genuine and merely shows pretended possession of recent vintage; that the application was filed beyond the period allowed under P.D. No. 892; and that the subject lot is part of the public domain which cannot be the subject of private appropriation. Issue: 1. Whether or not petitioner have registrable ownership over the real property 2. Whether or not the CA conclusion that the subject real property is a public land is correct Held: (Wa jud silay ryt! Wa ma meet and 2nd reqt. Concept of who may apply and possession and occupation) 1. Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree), as amended, provides SEC. 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998, who in turn purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16, 1997. The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979. The earliest tax declaration which was submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No. 25606 issued in 1971 in the names of spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Baustista thus not meeting the second requirement. 2. The subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain based on the Report of the Bureau of Lands and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (DENR-CENRO) and the blue print Copy of the plan covering the subject lot. Petitioner failed to prove that he or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot since June 12, 1945 or earlier. Neither he nor his brothers actually occupied the subject lot. No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to visit the lot on several occasions. Petitioners evidence failed to establish specific acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law. Possession alone is not sufficient to acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession and occupation. The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction. Actual possession of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a party would naturally exercise over his own property. The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the land is of the nature and duration required by law. Decision: Petition is Denied. Canete v. Genuino Ice Company January 22, 2008 Facts: (Ganahan ipacancel ang title ni Genuino nya ipadeclare cla na bona fide occupants {dili owners}) This petition for review on certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioners "Second Amended Complaint". Petitioner alleged that respondents titles of the subject land (under Piedad Estate) are spurious, fictitious and were issued "under mysterious circumstances," considering that the holders thereof including their predecessors-in-interest were never in actual, adverse and physical possession of the property, rendering them ineligible to acquire title to the said property under the Friar Lands Act. Petitioners also sought to nullify Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 614 from which the foregoing titles sought to be cancelled originated or were derived. Petitioners filed a "Second Amended Complaint" (SCA) which sought to annul, in addition to the titles already alleged in the original complaint more titles. (Contents of SCA among others alleged causes of action {fictitious, spurious, null and void ang OCT No. 614} and their remedies)

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The trial court denied respondents motion to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint. Its motion for reconsideration was likewise denied hence respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari and dismissed petitioners Second Amended Complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property despite their alleged adverse possession but only to be adjudged as the "bona fide occupants" thereof. In other words, petitioners concede the States ownership of the property. The Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may institute such suit. Even if the said title were cancelled or amended, the ownership of the land embraced therein, or of the portion thereof affected by the amendment, would revert to the public domain. Thus, if there is any person or entity to relief, it can only be the government. In the case at bar, the plaintiffs own averments negate the existence of such right, for it would appear therefrom that whatever right might have been violated by the defendant belonged to the government, not to the plaintiff. Under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, a real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. If petitioners are to be believed, they would possess a mere inchoate interest in the properties covered by the subject titles, a mere expectancy conditioned upon the fact that if the questioned titles are cancelled and the property is reverted to the State, they would probably or possibly be given preferential treatment as qualified buyers or lessees of the property under the Friar Lands Act. But this certainly is not the "interest" required by law that grants them license or the personality to prosecute their case. Only to the State does the privilege belong. They dont even have the right to pursue administrative remedies. Decision: Petition is Denied. 2. JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT OR INCOMPLETE TITLES Susi v. Razon 48 Phil 424 Facts: (Nireklamo si Susi kay gibaligya sa Director of Lands ang iyang yuta to Razon) On September 5, 1899, Valentin Susi bought the subject property for the sum of P12. Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land, wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the. Having failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914, Susi opposed however, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to Angela Razon. Armed with certificate of title, Razon required Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to real property. Valentin Susi then brought this action. Issue: 1. Whether or not the Director of Lands rightfully sold the land to Razon Held: (Dili. Private property naman to ni Susi. Wala nay right mubaligya ang Director of Lands. Pwede irecover ni Susi)

Issue: 1. Whether or not CA erred in declaring that petitioners complaint has no valid cause of action 2. Whether or not CA erred in declaring that the petitioners are not real parties in interest Held: (Sakto ang CA. Puro ra conclusions of law ang petitioners, di cla real parties in interest, only the Government has the right to seek relief) 1. One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought by the Government of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government" were given preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the settlement and occupation of persons before the government acquired the lands. OCT 614 did legally exist and was previously issued in the name of the Philippine Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496. The Piedad Estate has been placed under the Torrens system of land registration, which means that all lots therein are titled. One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest, may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time immemorial, which means that petitioners claimed actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the subject property is really of no moment unless it is shown that their predecessors-in-interest were actual settlers and occupants at the time said lands were acquired by the Government, and whose rights were not disregarded even though they were in occupation of the same before the government acquired the land; yet, no period of time in relation to adverse possession is alleged. It is replete with sweeping generalizations and inferences derived from facts that are not found therein. In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. The petitioners allegations are not statements of ultimate facts but are mere conclusions of law. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as distinguished from mere conclusions of fact, or conclusions of law. General allegations that a contract is valid or legal, or is just, fair and reasonable, are mere conclusions of law. Likewise, allegations that a contract is void, voidable, invalid, illegal, ultra vires, or against public policy, without stating facts showing its invalidity, are mere conclusions of law. The test in such case is whether a court can render a valid judgment on the complaint based upon the facts alleged and pursuant to the prayer therein. 2. It is not stated for how long and since when the petitioners allegedly been in actual, adverse, peaceful and continuous possession of the property. In their second amended complaint, they seek judgment (4) Declaring the plaintiffs as bona fide occupants of the property in litigation pursuant to the provisions of the Friar Lands Act and other existing laws. (Emphasis supplied)

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1. It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient , under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property , at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it. Decision: The decision of the Court of First Instance in favor of Susi is affirmed. REP VS. IAC AND ACME PLYWOOD AND VENEER CO. December 29, 1986 Facts: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe. The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., is a corporation in RP. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., can acquire real property. Subject land was ancestrally acquired from INFIEL, members of Dumagat tribe. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale took place on October 29, 1962; That the possession of the Infiels over the land sold to Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan, passed from generations to generations The possession is already considered from time immemorial. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied

8. 9.

by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain; That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September 18, 1982; The ownership and possession of the land was duly recognized by the government when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon Isabela

The issue the Director of Lands had was only to the applicability of the 1935 constitution. He asserts that, the registration proceedings commenced on July, 1981 or long after the 1973 constitution had gone into effect. Section 11 of 1973 Constitution Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels) The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to. ISSUE: WON the title that the Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect. HELD: YES. The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply. The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate. Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

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That the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged. WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance. REP VS. CA AND NAGUIT G.R. No. 144057, January 17, 2005 FACTS On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land. The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. 5 Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. Argument: The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the governments prior release of the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period.11 ISSUE: whether it is necessary under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start. HELD: Argument: Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues. There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the

applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier. that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. REPUBLIC VS. HERBIETO G.R. No. 156117, May 26, 2005 FACTS: Jeremias and David Herbieto filed on September 23 1998 with the MTC a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No. 8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu. On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed an opposition to the respondents' application for registration arguing that they failed to comply with the period of adverse possession of the lots required by law; their muniments of title were not genuine; and the lots were not subject to private appropriation. On 21 December 1999, the MTC granted the registration and confirmation of the title of the lots with Article 1113 and Article 1137 of the Civil Code as the basis for their judgment. The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the Public Land Act for the prescription and period of possession issue; and the Property Registration Decree for the validity of MTCs jurisdiction towards the case. ISSUE: Whether the MTC was right in promulgating its Judgment ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot No. 8423. DECISION: The Court of Appeals finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed with and hear the application for registration filed by they failed to comply with the publication requirements once in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines as mandated by the Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration court and not with misjoinder as emphasized by the republic. Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting. In regards to the period of possession for acquiring the title to public, the court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve this legal issue because the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration. Therefore, the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02 February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.

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Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs Republic G.R. No. 179987, April 24, 2009 Facts: On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre, situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State. Apart from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino. Upon his death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among themselves. But by 1966, (one of the sons) Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982. While case is pending with CA, Malaban died, hence, it was his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court.

possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act. (b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. 2. In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. (a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. (b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription. Republic vs CA et al., GR No. 155450, August 6, 2008 Facts: On June 2, 1930, then CFI of Cagayan issued Decree No. 381928 in favor of Sps. Carag who were the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents Heirs of Antonio and Victoria Turingan-Carag (private respondents). This decree covered a parcel of land identified as Lot No. 2472, Cad. 151 , which has an area of 7,047,673 square meters ( subject property ). Pursuant to this decree, Register of Deeds of Cagayan issued Original Certificate of Title No. 11585 (OCT No. 11585) in the name of spouses Carag. On July 2, 1952, OCT No. 11585 was cancelled to discharge the encumbrance expressly stated in Decree No. 381928. Two transfer certificates of title were issued: 1. 2. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1277, issued in the name of the Province of Cagayan, covering Lot 2472-B consisting of 100,000 square meters.

Issue: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration? May a parcel of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil Code? May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription? Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names?

Held: Petition is denied. 1. In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession. (a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the

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3.

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1278, issued in the name of the private respondents, covering Lot 2472-A consisting of 6,997,921 square meters.

or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law, during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The law prevailing when Decree No. 381928 was issued in 1930 was Act No. 2874, which provides: SECTION 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into (a) Alienable or disposable (b) Timber and (c) Mineral lands and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their government and disposition. It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have been declared alienable or disposable. However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law. Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8, trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874. In Republic vs CA, the Republic sought to annul the judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, sitting as a land registration court, because when the application for land registration was filed in 1927 the land was alleged to be unclassified forest land. The Republic also alleged that the CFI of Rizal had no jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was forest or agricultural land since the authority to classify lands was then vested in the Director of Lands as provided in Act Nos. 926 and 2874. The Court ruled, to wit: When the land registration court issued a decision for the issuance of a decree which was the basis of an original certificate of title to the land, the court had already made a determination that the land was agricultural and that the applicant had proven that he was in open and exclusive possession of the subject land for the prescribed number of years. It was the land registration court which had the jurisdiction to determine whether the land applied for was agricultural, forest or timber taking into account the proof or evidence in each particular case. As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No. 381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property, including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land. The trial court determined that the land was agricultural and that spouses Carag proved that they were entitled to the decree and a certificate of title. The government, which was a party in the original proceedings in the trial court as required by law, did not appeal the decision of the trial court declaring the subject land as agricultural. Since the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, its decision rendered in 1930, or 78 years ago, is now final and beyond review. The finality of the trial court's decision is further recognized in Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution "subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.". Petition is denied. Case is dismiss for lack of merit.

On May 1994, Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag et al., filed with the Regional Office No. 2 of the DENR a letter-petition requesting the DENR to initiate the filing of an action for the annulment of Decree No. 381928 on the ground that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property which was allegedly still classified as timber land at the time of the issuance of the Decree. The Regional Executive Director of the DENR created an investigating team to conduct ground verification and ocular inspection of the subject property. The team reported that: a. b. Portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151 was found to be still within the timberland area at the time of the issuance of the Decree and O.C.T. and was only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982, as certified by USEC Jose G. Solis of the NAMRIA on May 27, 1994. Petitioner Bienvenida Taguiam Vda. De Dayag and others have possessed and occupied by themselves and thru their predecessors-in-interest the portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151, since time immemorial.

Investigating team then claimed that "a portion of Lot 2472 Cad-151" was "only released as alienable and disposable on February 22, 1982." In a Memorandum dated 9 September 1996, the Legal Division of the Land Management Bureau recommended to the Director of Lands that an action for the cancellation of OCT No. 11585, as well as its derivative titles, be filed with the proper court. The Director of Lands approved the recommendation. On June 10, 1998, or 68 years after the issuance of Decree No. 381928 , petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a complaint for annulment of judgment, cancellation and declaration of nullity of titleson the ground that in 1930 the trial court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate a portion of the subject property, which portion consists of 2,640,000 square meters (disputed portion) which was allegedly still classified as timberland and was not alienable and disposable until 22 February 1982. Issue: 1. 2. WON the then CFI of Cagayan had jusrisdiction to adjudicate a tract of timberland in favor of respondent spouses. WON the fact that the Director of Lands was a party to the original proceedings changed the nature of the land and granted jurisdiction to the then CFI over the land?

2.

Held:

1.

Lack of jurisdiction, as a ground for annulment of judgment, refers to either lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defending party or over the subject matter of the claim. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined by the statute in force at the time of the filing of the action. Under the Spanish regime, all Crown lands were per se alienable. In Aldecoa v. Insular Government: From the language of the foregoing provisions of law, it is deduced that, with the exception of those comprised within the mineral and timber zone, all lands owned by the State or by the sovereign nation are public in character, and per se alienable and, provided they are not destined to the use of the public in general or reserved by the Government in accordance with law, they may be acquired by any private or juridical person x x x Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable. In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as mineral or forest zone,

LAND TITLES CASE DIGESTS ROOM 402