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[Unclassified]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Telephonic Interview with Louis Nardi

Type of event: Telephone Interview
Date: April 1,2004
Special Access Issues: N/A
Prepared by: Walter T. Hempel
Team Number: 5
Location: Telephone
Participants - Louis Nardi, Former Deputy Director of the INS National Security Unit
Participants - Commission: Walter T. Hempel, Staff

Background
Lou Nardi was Deputy Director of the INS National Security Unit (NSU) from to .
During that time the Alien Absconder Initiative (AAI) Phase 1 was initiated. The AAI was run •
out of the NSU in HQ and they had the responsibility to report the results, through channels, to
DOJ.

Nardi did not know how the initial 6,000 non-citizens were extracted from the pool of 314,000
that INS Commissioner Ziglar had announced as absconders. Nardi believed that the 314,000
were a computer search of the Deportable Alien Control System (DACS) which maintains
information on aliens that are in the deportation process, in INS custody, or who have been
deported from the United States. The DACS system, like all INS information systems, was well
known to have unreliable data. With at least eight "stovepipe" computer data bases, DACS
frequently would reflect that the alien was deportable when in fact there was a benefit
application under consideration. Also some deportable aliens in DACS had been granted
permanent residence or had been naturalized. INS often created multiple "A" files that were not
consolidated. This was because of poor recordkeeping, the use of names instead of biometrics to
open new files and the incompatibility of the various recordkeeping systems.

The AAI project was considered a critical task at NSU. This was at a time when over 50% of the
2,000 INS Special Agents in the field had been assigned to the FBI for post 9-11 investigations.
The NSU did not have the personnel to handle the initial 6,000 target files. It was necessary to
bring in intelligence officers from the Office of Intelligence and assign them to reviewing the
files. This was at a time when there was an increased demand for products from the Office of
Intelligence. Many Special Agents from the field were detailed for extended periods of time to
work on the mechanics of the AAI project. The Law Enforcement Support Center (LESC) was
tasked with entering the AAI cases into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). The
LESC is the only 24/7 computer link between law enforcement agencies and INS for criminal
alien record checks. After 9-11, the number of daily record check queries increased greatly as
the nation's law enforcement agencies tried to prevent another terrorist attack.

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The initial 6,000 non-citizens were selected based on three criteria:

1. Males
2. Final orders of deportation
3. Place of birth or citizenship was in al Qaeda supporting countries

The list of non-citizens was run through the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force (FTTTF).
There numerous databases were checked for information. The FTTF also diverted some cases f
out of the AAI project and provided them directly to the FBI. This process and other data TF
searches conducted by the NSU and the LESC resulted in a final target population of W ,—.
approximately 5,000 to 5,200 non-citizens. rfVjV** .

The NSU took these files and determined the last address of record. A work file was then sent to K\0' >f »,
the INS Investigations Office having jurisdiction over the last known address. Each District ,. » |V
office had a Supervisory Special Agent as a POC. The file was then checked again against **\4,» ' o
national and local databases. (Note: Many local databases such as public utility records, parking \\AY
violations, welfare records, etc. could not be searched from HQ). This required considerable *
effort at the local office when the services of every INS office were severely taxed. The work
file was then usually assigned to a Special Agent (some were handled by SA's assigned to the
Joint Terrorist Task Forces, JTTF). There was a thirty (30) day call up on all assigned cases.
Thirty day extensions were only given when there were other open leads that had been developed
locally or there was a probability that the case could be closed by an arrest within the next thirty
days. All extensions had to be approved by NSU. The targeted population was not distributed
evenly throughout the United States. Some cities like Detroit and New York had a large number
of assigned AAI cases and did not have enough Special Agents to work them. In many cases, the
location of the deportable alien was determined to be in another city. The work file would have
to be completed, returned to NSU and reassigned to another office.

Copies of significant documents in the "A" file were made and sent to the LESC. The LESC
would review the data and enter accepted cases into the NCIC wanted person file. However the
majority of the AAI cases were not entered into the NCIC because the "A" files did not contain
the required fingerprint card, photograph, or other data. These were needed to meet the NCIC
standard for "hit" confirmation.

Nardi stated that most of the selected cases were not criminal aliens. Some of the cases were
quite old and had few local leads. He did not remember any that had terrorist identifiers and to
the best of his knowledge, none of these cases resulted in terrorist prosecutions.

Lessons Learned

The AAI project was a costly, time consuming and labor intensive project. INS was not prepared
to undertake a nationwide investigation of this size.

Intelligence officers, who were critically needed to evaluate information in the Office of
Intelligence, were instead detailed to NSU to do clerk level data checks.

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NSU, which had the lead in INS' counter terrorism efforts, was forced to divert many of their
Special Agents and administrative staff from more critical counter terrorism investigations to the
AAI.

Many Special Agents were detailed to the HQ NSU in Washington, DC from throughout the
nation. This reduced the availability of local INS investigations offices to assist in the many
demands for their services after 9-11. It also reduced the number of SA's available to conduct
the local AAI investigations.

There was no available computer program available to handle this type of stand up project. NSU
had to create a stand alone computer data system that did not interface with the existing INS
systems. This was time intensive and required daily maintenance.

All INS "A" files are paper files. Only a small amount of the information is in a database. None
of the INS databases contained electronic copies of the required documents for the work files.
The result was that the handling of the 5,000 or so AAI files was done by hand. Handling and
storing the files was a problem as there was no dedicated office space for a project of this size.

Many of the tasks that had to be done with each file, should have been done with contract
employees. Using contract employees to do the data searches, data input, copying and filing
would have eliminated the need to detail intelligence officers, special agents and other skilled
officers. This would have resulted in a much better use of very limited investigative personnel.
It would also have been mush more cost effective.

INS needs to prepare in advance for this type of a situation even if it is not terrorist related.

[Classification]

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