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1 case from 117, 118 - 121, 1 case from 122

Art. 117 LILIUS, ET AL. vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY p. 517 Yung wife yung si Sonja Maria yung asa book na tinukoy so tungkol lang sa kanya to :)) FACTS: 1.) Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. 2.) Before reaching the crossing in question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his horn for the people to get out of the way. 3.) With his attention thus occupied, he did not see the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRCs train. The locomotive struck the plaintiffs car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and were hospitalized. 4.) Lilius filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it denies each and every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint. The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The 2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning errors on said judgment. ISSUE: W/N the damages awarded to one of the spouses belong exclusively to the injured spouse Held/Ratio: Yes. In case of damages awarded to one of the spouses as a result of physical injuries inflicted by a third party, said damages exclusively belong to the injured spouse. Taking into consideration the fact that the plaintiff Sonja Maria Lilius, wife of the plaintiff Aleko E. Lilius is "young and beautiful and the big scar, which she has on her forehead caused by the lacerated wound received by her from the accident, disfigures her face and that the fracture of her left leg has caused a permanent deformity which renders it very difficult for her to walk", and taking into further consideration her social standing, neither is the sum of P10,000, adjudicated to her by the said trial court by way of indemnity for patrimonial and moral damages, excessive. Moreover, these injuries are personal to her. Art. 118 LORENZO vs NICOLAS- p. 519 Facts: 1.) Magdalena Clemente was the surviving widow of the deceased Gregorio Nicolas. 2.) Manuel Lorenzo, was also a widower of the deceased Carlosa Santamaria. 3.) On January 16, 1910, Magdalena Clemente and Manuel Lorenzo contracted marriage. 4.) Manuel Lorenzo died on January 7, 1929, while Magdalena died on January 31, 1934.

5.) The two had no children. 6.) In his first marriage, however, Manuel Lorenzo left, as heirs, the plaintiffs Agapito and Marcela Lorenzo and Policarpio Lorenzo, deceased, who had been succeeded by his children, the plaintiffs Faustina, Federico, Guillermo and Manuel all surnamed Lorenzo 7.) While Magdalena Clemente, in her first marriage, left as heirs, the deceased Gerardo Nicholas, father of the defendants Florencio, Elena, Felix, Trinidad, Cecilia and Basilisa, all surnamed Nicolas. 8.) They were fighting about the properties. 9.) Property that was mentioned in the book: PARCEL of Land No. 6 This parcel of land which is lot No. 72 of the Friars Land Subdivision in Guiguinto, Bulacan, was purchased in her own name by Magdalena Clemente, for her own exclusive benefit prior to her marriage with Manuel Lorenzo. She had made the downpayment before her marriage with Lorenzo and the remaining balance was payable on installments. The installments were paid for with the conjugal funds of their marriage Issue: W/N that parcel of land no. 6 held to be a paraphernal properties or exclusive property of Magdalena Clemente. Held/Ratio: The petitioner, the heirs of the late Manuel Lorenzo, are not entitled to the parcels of land. But the installments paid during their marriage, would only be entitled to reimbursement. This is because under the Friar Lands Act No. 1120, the equitable and beneficial title to the land passes to the purchaser the moment the first installment is paid and a certificate of sale is issued.

JOVELLANOS vs CA- p. 520

1.) Daniel Jovellanos and Philamlife entered into a lease and conditional sale agreement over a house and lot. At that time, Daniel Jovellanos was married to Leonor Dizon, with whom he had three children, the petitioners. 2.) Leonor Dizon died consequently. Then Daniel married private respondent Annette with whom he begot two children. The daughter from the 1st marriage Mercy Jovellanos married Gil Martinez and at the behest of Daniel Jovellanos, they built a house on the back portion of the premises. 3.) With the lease amounts having been paid, Philamlife executed to Daniel Jovellanos a deed of absolute sale and, on the next day, the latter donated to herein petitioners all his rights, title and interests over the lot and bungalow thereon. In 1985, Daniel died. 4.) Private respondent Annette H. Jovellanos claimed in the lower court that the aforestated property was acquired by her deceased husband while their marriage was still subsisting and which forms part of the conjugal partnership of the second marriage. Petitioners contend that the property, were acquired by their parents during the existence of the first marriage under their lease and conditional sale agreement with Philamlife of September 2, 1955. Issue: W/N the house and lot pertains to the second marriage Held/Ratio: YES

Generally, ownership is transferred upon delivery, but even if delivered, the ownership may still be with the seller until full payment of the price is made, if there is stipulation to this effect. Compliance with the stipulated payments is a suspensive condition. The failure of which prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from acquiring binding force. Daniel consequently acquired ownership thereof only upon full payment of the said amount hence, although he had been in possession of the premises since September 2, 1955, it was only on January 8, 1975 that Philamlife executed the deed of absolute sale thereof in his favor. Daniel Jovellanos did not enjoy the full attributes of ownership until the execution of the deed of sale in his favor. Upon the execution of said deed of absolute sale, full ownership was vested in Daniel Jovellanos. Since as early as 1967, he was already married to Annette H. Jovellanos, this property necessarily belonged to his conjugal partnership with his said second wife. But since it pertained to the second wife, she is still liable to pay the corresponding reimbursements to the petitioners who helped pay for the amortization of the house and lot. Remember Article 118 of the Family Code on property bought on installments, where ownership is vested during the marriage, such property shall belong to the conjugal partnership. Art. 119- WALA EH :) Art. 120 Villanueva vs. IAC- p. 524 FACTS: (hindi ko kaya isimplify eh, sorry. Daming big words :() 1.) Modesto Aranas, husband of Victoria, inherited a land from his father. Dorothea and Teodoro, Modestos illegitimate children, borrowed money from private respondent Jesus Bernas, mortgaging as collateral their fathers property. In the loan agreement, Aranas described themselves as the absolute co -owners. Dorothea and Teodoro failed to pay the loan resulting to extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage and thereafter Bernas acquired the land as the highest bidder. Aftewards, the Aranases executed a deed of extrajudicial partition in 1978, in which they adjudicated the same land unto themselves in equal share pro-indiviso. Bernas then consolidated his ownership over the lot when the mortgagors failed to redeem it withn the reglementary period, and had the title in the name of Modesto cancelled and another TCT issued in his name. 2.) In 1978, petitioner Consolacion Villanueva and Raymundo Aranas filed a complaint against respondents spouses Jesus and Remedios Bernas, for the cancellation of the TCT under the name of the Bernases, and they be declared co-owners of the land. Petitioner alleged that spouses Modesto and Victoria in 1987 and 1958 executed 2 separate wills: first bequeathing to Consolacion and Raymundo and to Dorothea and Teodoro, in equal shares pro diviso, all of said Victorias shares from the conjugal partnership property; and second Modestos interests in his conjugal partnership with Victoria as well as his separate properties bequeathed to Dorothea and Teodoro. Trial court dismissed the complaint, declaring herein respondents as the legal owners of the disputed property. IAC likewise affirmed the lower courts decision. ISSUE: WON Villanueva had a right over the land and the improvements thereon made by Victoria who rendered the lot as conjugal property. HELD/Ratio: The land was not a conjugal partnership property of Victoria and Modesto.

It was Modestos exclusive property since he inherited it from his parents. Moreover, since Victoria died ahead of Modesto, Victoria did not inherit said lot from him and therefore had nothing of the land to bequeath by will of otherwise to Consolacion. Article 158 of the Civil Code says that improvements, whether for utility or adornment made on the separate property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through the industry of either spouse belong to the conjugal partnership, and buildings constructed at the expense of the partnership during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same. There was no proof presented by Villanueva. Such proof is needed at the time of the making or construction of the improvements and the source of the funds used thereof in order to determine the character of the improvements as belonging to the conjugal partnership or to one spouse separately. What is certain is that the land on which the improvements stand was the exclusive property of Modesto and that where the property is registered in the name of one spouse only and there is no showing of when precisely the property was acquired, the presumption is that is belongs exclusively to said spouse. It is not therefore possible to declare the improvements to be conjugal in character.

Maramba vs. Lozano- p. 524 Facts: Pascual Lozano and Nieves Lozano are husband and wife. On June 23, 1959, both were asked by the trial court to compensate for a piece of land where their conjugal dwelling is built upon for 3,500.07 pesos. Nieves Lozano paid a partial satisfaction of the judgment for 2,000 pesos. On October 17, 1960, Lieves Lozano claimed that her spouse died on November 11, 1952 during the pendency of the case held at trial and that she has no need to pay the remaining 1,500.07 pesos. Issues: 1.) Whether or not the judgment was joint; and 2.) Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the properties sold at public auction. Held/Ratio: 1.) YES. The rule is that when the judgment does not order the defendants to pay jointly and severally their liability is merely joint, and none of them may be compelled to satisfy the judgment in full. This is in harmony with Articles 1137 and 1138 of the Civil Code. 2.) NO. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property acquired during the marriage. But in the instant case there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired and hence the fact that the title is in the wife's name alone is determinative. Furthermore, appellant himself admits in his brief that the property in question is paraphernal. Appellant next points out that even if the land levied upon were originally paraphernal, it became conjugal property by virtue of the construction of a house thereon at the expense of the common fund, pursuant to Article 158 paragraph 2 of the Civil Code. However, it has been by this Court that the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of one of the spouses does not automatically make it conjugal. It is true that

meantime the conjugal partnership may use both in the land and the building, but it does so not as owner but in the exercise of the right of usufruct. Art. 121 AYALA INVESTMENTS and DEVELOPMENT CORP. vs CA- p. 528 FACTS: 1.) Philippine Blooming Mills loan from petitioner Ayala Investment. As an added security for the credit line extended to PBM, respondent Alfredo Ching Exec. VP, executed security agreements and making himself jointly and severally answerable with PBMs indebtedness to Ayala Investments. 2.) PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, Ayala Investments filed a case for sum of money against PBM and Alfredo Ching. The lower court issued a writ of execution of pending appeal. Thereafter, deputy sheriff Magsajo caused issuance and service upon respondents-spouses of a notice of sheriff sale on three of their conjugal properties. 3.) Private respondents, spouses Ching, filed a case of injunction against petitioners alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the judgment against conjugal partnership levied on the ground that the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the said conjugal partnership. Upon application of private respondents, the lower court issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Magsajo from proceeding with the enforcement of the writ of execution and with the sale of the said properties at public auction. Issue: Whether or not loan acquired by PBM from Ayala Investments as guaranteed by Alfredo Ching be redounded to the conjugal partnership of the spouses. Ruling: The husband and the wife can engage in any lawful enterprise or profession. While it is but natural for the husband and the wife to consult each other, the law does not make it a requirement that a spouse has to get the prior consent of the other before entering into any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity. The exercise by a spouse of a legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity is always considered to redound to the benefit of the family. But an isolated transaction of a spouse such as being guarantor for a third persons debt is not per se considered as redounding to the benefit of the family. Therefore, to hold the absolute community or the conjugal partnership property liable for any loss resulting from such isolated activity, proofs showing a direct benefit to the family must be presented.

Javier v. Osmena- p. 528 Facts: 1.) In 1890, Petrona Javier (Javier), daughter of FJ and MC, married Florentino Collantes. 2.) Before 1892, Florentino, husband, was employed by his father-in-law, FJ, in a commission business. One of their clients was Osmena who consigned tobacco to them from Cebu. Upon retirement of FJ, Florentino took over the commission business as an independent commission merchant (broker). He also assumed the debt owed by FJ to Osmena. 3.) In 1901, MC, mother of Petrona died. FJ subsequently married one PS. In 1908, however, FJ dies as well, allowing Javier to inherit two properties. For purpose of consolidating full ownership of the properties, Javier secured a loan and then purchased from FJs second wife, PS, the latters usufructory rights. 4.) In 1913, FC, husband of Javier, was ordered by the court to pay his debt to Osmena. The sheriff was thereby ordered to auction rights, title, interests, and shares of the property of FC (including the inherited properties of his

wife and the usufructory rights purchased in 1911.) Notwithstanding protests from Javier, the two properties were sold to the estate of Osmena for P500 each. This included the usufructory rights. 5.) Javier filed a complaint against Osmena alleging that the inherited properties, as well as the usufructory rights were exclusive and not part of conjugal property and thus prayed for the sale to be annulled. 6.) Respondent estate of Osmena, admitting that the properties involved were indeed exclusive, still claimed that the usufructory rights, being purchased from the conjungal funds, should be deemed conjugal in nature. He also claimed that the payment due should come from the fruits of the said properties and thus, a receiver should be appointed to manage such revenues due to the respondent. 7.) CFI annulled the sale and cancelled the registration of property in the name of respondent Osmena. Osmena then appealed to the SC. Issues: 1.) W/N sum owed to Osmena estate can/should be paid from fruits/revenues of the exclusive properties of the wife, PJ 2.) W/N a receiver should be assigned to collect fruits of exclusive properties as prayed for by Osmena estate. Held/Ratio: 1.) Yes. The court delved into the nature of the debt. It stated that there was a presumption in fact that family expenses come from salaries for services rendered. Since debt was incurred by the husband during the marriage (by virtue of him assuming the debt from his father-in-law) and such a debt was for the support of the family 1 fruits and revenues of separate properties, being conjugal in nature, should answer the obligation . These debts are not personal or private debts at all. 2.) No. Art. 1984 of the CC says that the wife has the right to manage her paraphernal property and Art. 1412 says that the husband is the administrator of the conjugal property. Appointment of a receiver shall deprive both the husband and the wife of these rights. There is therefore no need for such an appointment. Art. 122 Spouses Buado vs CA- p. 535 Facts: Mr. and Mrs. Buado filed a civil case against Erlinda Nicol. On April 1987, the trial court rendered a decision ordering Erlinda to pay damages to the petitioners. The personal properties of Erlinda were insufficient to pay the damages. The sheriff levied and auctioned the property of Erlinda. An auction sale was held with the petitioners as the highest bidder. A certificate of sale was issued in favor of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. After almost one year, the husband of Erlinda, Romulo Nicol, filed a complaint for the annulment of certificate of sale and damages with preliminary injunction against petitioners and deputy sheriff. He argued that there was no proper publication and posting for the auction sale. He also claimed that the judgment obligation of Erlinda Nicol amounted to P40,000 only. The spouses Buado obtained the P500,000 worth of property for only P51,685. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the petition of Romulo Nicol.

Art. 1409 of the CC: conjugal property should be made liable for debts and obligations (first paragraph) contracted during the marriage and for the support of the family (fifth paragraph).

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and held that Branch 21 has jurisdiction to act on the complaint filed by the respondent in this case. The petitioners filed a petition where they said that the Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion for reversing the decision given by the RTC.

Issue: W/N the obligation of Erlinda Nicol arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. HELD/Ratio: NO. Erlinda Nicols liability is not chargeable to the conjugal partnership. Unlike in the system of absolute community where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the debtor-spouse. Petitioners argue that the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is chargeable to the conjugal partnership. The Supreme Court does not agree to the contention of Mr. and Mrs. Buado. In Guadalupe v. Tronco, this Court held that the car which was claimed by the third party complainant to be conjugal property was being levied upon to enforce a judgment for support filed by a third person, the third party claim of the wife is proper since the obligation which is personal to the husband is chargeable not on the conjugal property but on his separate property. Hence, the filing of a separate action by Romulo Nicol was proper. The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.