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J1 BRILLANTES vs. YORAC Case Digest BRILLANTES vs.

YORAC 192 SCRA 358, 1990 Facts: The President designated Associate Commissioner Yorac as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections, in place of Chairman Hilario B. Davide, who had been named chairman of the fact-finding commission to investigate the December 1989 coup d etat attempt. Brillantes challenged the act of the President as contrary to the constitutional provision that ensures the independence the Commission on Elections as an independent constitutional body and the specific provision that (I)n no case shall any Member (of the Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Brillantes contends that the choice o f the Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal matter that should be resolved by the members themselves and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines violates their independence. The Solicitor General the designation made by the President of the Philippines should therefore be sustained for reasons of administrative expediency, to prevent disruption of the fun ctions of the COMELEC. Issue: Whether or not the President may designate the Acting Chairman of the COMELEC in the absence of the regular Chairman. Held: NO. The Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional Commissions as independent. They are not under the control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in the exercise of its own discretion. Its decisions, orders and rulings are subject only to review on certiorari by this Court as provided by the Constitution. The choice of a temporary chairman in the absence of the regular chairman comes under that discretion. That discretion cannot be exercised for it, even with its consent, by the President of the Philippines. The lack of a statutory rule covering the situation at bar is no justification for the President of the Philippines to fill the void by extending the temporary designation in favor of the respondent. The situation could have been handled by the members of the Commission on Elections themselves without the participation of the President, however well-meaning. In the choice of the Acting Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the President to make

J3

Borromeo vs. CSC Facts: Jesus N. Borromeo was the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission until his retirement on 1 April 1986. In 1988, he wrote the Commission on Audit requesting an opinion whether the money value of the terminal leave of retired Constitutional Commission members should include the allowances received at the time of retirement. Borromeo requested for the payment of terminal leave differential representing the unpaid Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Representation and Transportation Allownace (RATA) amountingto P111,229.04. The Department of Budget and Management denied the request. Issue:Whether the terminal leave pay of the former CSC Chairman should be computed on the basis of the highest monthly salary plus COLA and RATA, or solely on the basis of highest monthly salary without said allowances. Held: An application for terminal leave is an application for a commutation of leave credits and not a commutation of salary as the officer or employee has already severed his conncection with his employer and is no longer working. The cash value of his accumulated leave credits should not be treated as compensation for services rendered at that time. Inasmuch as terminal leave payments are given not only at teh same time but also for the same policy considerations governing retirement benefits, the payments therefore should include COLA and RATA. Section 286 of the Revised Administrative Code is not applicable. It cannot be construed as limiting the basis of the computation of terminal leave pay to monthly salary only

J4 THELMA P. GAMINDE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT and/or Hon. CELSO D. GANGAN, Hon. RAULC. FLORES and EMMANUEL M. DALMAN respondents. FACTS: On June 11, 1993, the President of the Philippines appointed petitioner Thelma P. Gaminde, ad interim, Commissioner, Civil Service Commission. She assumed office on June 22, 1993, after taking an oath of office. On September 07, 1993, the Commission on Appointment, Congress of the Philippines confirmed the appointment. However, on February 24, 1998, petitioner sought clarification from the Office of the President as to the expiry date of her term of office. In reply to her request, the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel, in a letter dated April 07, 1998 opined that petitioners term of office would expire on February 02, 2000, not on February 02, 1999.Relying on said advisory opinion, petitioner remained in Leon, wrote office after February 02, 1999. On February 04,1999, Chairman Corazon Alma G. de the Commission on Audit requesting opinion on whether or not Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde and her co-terminous staff may be paid their salaries notwithstanding the expiration of their appointments on February 02, 1999. On February 18, 1999, the General Counsel, Commission on Audit, issued an opinion that the term of Commissioner Gaminde has expired on February 02, 1999 as stated in her appointment conformably with the constitutional intent.Consequently, on March 24, 1999, CSC Resident Auditor Flovitas U. Felipe issued notice of disallowance No. 99-002-101 (99), disallowing in audit the salaries and emoluments pertaining to petitioner and her co-terminous staff, effective February 02, 1999. On April 5, 1999, petitioner appealed the disallowance to the Commission on Audit en banc. On June 15, 1999, the Commission on Audit issued Decision dismissing petitioners appeal. The Commission on Audit affirmed the propriety of the disallowance, holding that the issue of petitioners term of office may be properly addressed by mere reference to her appointment paper which set the expiration date on February 02,1999, and that the Commission is bereft of power to recognize an extension of her term, not even with the implied acquiescence of the Office of the President. In time, petitioner moved for reconsideration; however, on August 17, 1999, the Commission on Audit denied the motion. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: The basic issue raised is whether the term of office of Atty. Thelma P. Gaminde, as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, to which she was appointed on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999, as stated in the appointment paper, or on February 02, 2000, as claimed by her. HELD: The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission, under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993, expired on February 02, 1999.However, she served as de facto officer in good faith until February 02, 2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service rendered. Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred indisallowing in audit such salary and other emoluments, including that of her coterminous staff. RATIO: Consequently, the terms of the first Chairmen and Commissioners of the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must start on a common date, irrespective of the variations in the dates of appointments and qualifications of the appointees, in order that the expiration of the first terms of seven, five and three years should lead to the regular recurrence of the twoyear interval between the expiration of the terms. Applying the foregoing conditions to the case at bar, we rule that the appropriate starting point of the terms of office of the first appointees to the Constitutional Commissions under the 1987 Constitution must be on February 02, 1987, the date of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution. In case of a belated appointment or qualification, the interval between the start of the term and the actual qualification of the appointee must be counted against the latter. In the law of public officers, there is a settled distinction between term and tenure. [T]he term of an office must be distinguished from the tenure of the incumbent. The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds the office. The term of office is not affected by the hold-over. The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent.Clearly, the transitory provisions mean that t he incumbent members of the Constitutional Commissions shall continue in office for one year after the ratification of this Constitution under their existing appointments at the discretion of the appointing power, who may cut short their tenure by: (1) their removal from office for cause; (2) their becoming incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, or (3) their appointment to a new term there under, all of which events may occur before the end of the one year period after the effectivity of the Constitution. However, the transitory provisions do not affect the term of office fixed in Article IX, providing for a seven-five-three year rotational interval for the first appointees under this Constitution.

J5 FUNA VS. VILLAR Leave a comment DENNIS A. B. FUNA, PETITIONER, VS. THE CHAIRMAN, COA, REYNALDO A. VILLAR G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012

FACTS: Funa challenges the constitutionality of the appointment of Reynaldo A. Villar as Chairman of the COA. Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was designated as Acting Chairman of COA from February 4, 2008 to April 14, 2008. Subsequently, on April 18, 2008, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. Shortly thereafter, on June 11, 2008, the Commission on Appointments confirmed his appointment. He was to serve as Chairman of COA, as expressly indicated in the appointment papers, until the expiration of the original term of his office as COA Commissioner or on February 2, 2011. Challenged in this recourse, Villar, in an obvious bid to lend color of title to his hold on the chairmanship, insists that his appointment as COA Chairman accorded him a fresh term of 7 years which is yet to lapse. He would argue, in fine, that his term of office, as such chairman, is up to February 2, 2015, or 7 years reckoned from February 2, 2008 when he was appointed to that position. Before the Court could resolve this petition, Villar, via a letter dated February 22, 2011 addressed to President Benigno S. Aquino III, signified his intention to step down from office upon the appointment of his replacement. True to his word, Villar vacated his position when President Benigno Simeon Aquino III named Ma. Gracia Pulido-Tan (Chairman Tan) COA Chairman. This development has rendered this petition and the main issue tendered therein moot and academic. Although deemed moot due to the intervening appointment of Chairman Tan and the resignation of Villar, We consider the instant case as falling within the requirements for review of a moot and academic case, since it asserts at least four exceptions to the mootness rule discussed in David vs Macapagal Arroyo namely: a. There is a grave violation of the Constitution; b. The case involves a situation of exceptional character and is of paramount public interest; c. The constitutional issue raised requires the formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; d. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. The procedural aspect comes down to the question of whether or not the following requisites for the exercise of judicial review of an executive act obtain in this petition, viz: a. There must be an actual case or justiciable controversy before the court b. The question before it must be ripe for adjudication; c. The person challenging the act must be a proper party; and d. The issue of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case

ISSUES: a. WON the petitioner has Locus Standi to bring the case to court b. WON Villars appointment as COA Chairman, while sitting in that body and after having served for four (4) years of his seven (7) year term as COA commissioner, is valid in light of the term limitations imposed under, and the circumscribing concepts tucked in, Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution

HELD: Issue of Locus Standi: This case before us is of transcendental importance, since it obviously has far -reaching implications, and there is a need to promulgate rules that will guide the bench, bar, and the public in future analogous cases. We, thus, assume a liberal stance and allow petitioner to institute the instant petition. In David vs Macapagal Arroyo, the Court laid out the bare minimum norm before the so-called non-traditional suitors may be extended standing to sue, thusly:

a. b.

For taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional; For voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law in question

c. For concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and d. For legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes their prerogatives as legislators.

On the substantive issue: Sec. 1 (2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that: (2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven years, one commissioner for five years, and the other commissioner for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In no case shall any member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity. Petitioner now asseverates the view that Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes reappointment of any kind within the commission, the point being that a second appointment, be it for the same position (commissioner to another position of commissioner) or upgraded position (commissioner to chairperson) is a prohibited reappointment and is a nullity ab initio. The Court finds petitioners position bereft of merit. The flaw lies in regarding the word reappointment as, in context, em bracing any and all species of appointment. The rule is that if a statute or constitutional provision is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. The first sentence is unequivocal enough. The COA Chairman shall be appointed by the President for a term of seven years, and if he has served the full term, then he can no longer be reappointed or extended another appointment. In the same vein, a Commissioner who was appointed for a term of seven years who likewise served the full term is barred from being reappointed. In short, once the Chairman or Commissioner shall have served the full term of seven years, then he can no longer be reappointed to either the position of Chairman or Commissioner. The obvious intent of the framers is to prevent the president from dominating the Commission by allowing him to appoint an additional or two more commissioners. On the other hand, the provision, on its face, does not prohibit a promotional appointment from commissioner to chairman as long as the commissioner has not served the full term of seven years, further qualified by the third sentence of Sec. 1(2), Article IX (D) that the appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor. In addition, such pr omotional appointment to the position of Chairman must conform to the rotational plan or the staggering of terms in the commission membership such that the aggregate of the service of the Commissioner in said position and the term to which he will be appointed to the position of Chairman must not exceed seven years so as not to disrupt the rotational system in the commission prescribed by Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). In conclusion, there is nothing in Sec. 1(2), Article IX(D) that explicitly precludes a promotional appointment from Commissioner to Chairman, provided it is made under the aforestated circumstances or conditions. The Court is likewise unable to sustain Villars proposition that his promotional appointment as COA Chairman gave him a completely fresh 7- year termfrom February 2008 to February 2015 given his four (4)-year tenure as COA commissioner devalues all the past pronouncements made by this Court. While there had been divergence of opinion as to the import of the word reappointment, there has been unanimity on the dictum that in no case can one be a COA member, either as chairman or commissioner, or a mix of both positions, for an aggregate term of more than 7 years. A contrary view would allow a circumvention of the aggregate 7-year service limitation and would be constitutionally offensive as it would wreak havoc to the spirit of the rotational system of succession.

In net effect, then President Macapagal-Arroyo could not have had, under any circumstance, validly appointed Villar as COA Chairman, for a full 7- year appointment, as the Constitution decrees, was not legally feasible in light of the 7-year aggregate rule. Villar had already served 4 years of his 7-year term as COA Commissioner. A shorter term, however, to comply with said rule would also be invalid as the corresponding appointment would effectively breach the clear purpose of the Constitution of giving to every appointee so appointed subsequent to the first set of commissioners, a fixed term of office of 7 years. To recapitulate, a COA commissioner like respondent Villar who serves for a period less than seven (7) years cannot be appointed as chairman when such position became vacant as a result of the expiration of the 7-year term of the predecessor (Carague). Such appointment to a full term is not valid and constitutional, as the appointee will be allowed to serve more than seven (7) years under the constitutional ban. To sum up, the Court restates its ruling on Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution, viz: 1. The appointment of members of any of the three constitutional commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of seven (7) years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and unconstitutional. The appointing authority cannot validly shorten the full term of seven (7) years in case of the expiration of the term as this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed by the Constitution. 2. Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death, resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the unexpired portion of the term of the predecessor, but such appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will likewise disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D). 3. Members of the Commission, e.g. COA, COMELEC or CSC, who were appointed for a full term of seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from reappointment to any position in the Commission. Corollarily, the first appointees in the Commission under the Constitution are also covered by the prohibition against reappointment. 4. A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or removal by impeachment. The Court clarifies that reappointment found in Sec. 1(2), Art. IX(D) means a movement to one and the same office (Commissioner to Commissioner or Chairman to Chairman). On the other hand, an appointment involving a movement to a different position or office (Commissioner to Chairman) would constitute a new appointment and, hence, not, in the strict legal sense, a reappointment barred under the Constitution. 5. Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

J6 MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC G.R. No. 157013, July 10 2003 FACTS: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution. (2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress. (3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution. HELD: (1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia. Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months immediately preceding an election. However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189. Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress itself was conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date of the elections. Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent of the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective. (2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for Senators and Party-list Reps. (3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

J7 CSC vs DBM Case Digest

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION v. DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT 482 SCRA 233 (2005), EN BANC (Carpio Morales, J.) Automatic release of approved annual appropriations to Civil Service Commission, a constitutional commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. FACTS: The total funds appropriated by General Appropriations Act of 2002 (GAA) for Civil Service Commission (CSC) was P285,660,790.44. CSC complains that the total funds released by Department of Budget and Management (DBM) was only P279,853,398.14, thereby leaving an unreleased balance of P5,807,392.30. CSC contends that the funds were intentionally withheld by DBM on the ground of th eir no report, no release policy. Hence, CSC filed a petition for mandamus seeking to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for fiscal year 2002. At the same time, it seeks a determination by this Court of the extent of the constitutional concept of fiscal autonomy. ISSUE: Whether or not DBMs policy, no report, no release is constitutional HELD: DBMs act of withholding the subject funds from CSC due to revenue shortfall is hereby declared unconstitutional. The no report, no release policy may not be validly enforced against offices vested with fiscal autonomy is not disputed. Indeed, such policy cannot be enforced against offices possessing fiscal autonomy without violating Article IX (A), Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides that the Commission shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and that their approved appropriations shall be automatically and regularly released. The Court held in the case of, Batangas v. Romulo, automatic release in Section 6, Article X of the Constitution is defined as an automatic manner; without thought or conscious intention. Being automatic, thus, connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and perfunctory. As such the LGUs are not required to perform any act to receive the just share accruing to them from the national coffers. By parity of construction, automatic release of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional commission w hich is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to fund releases to it may be imposed. This conclusion is consistent with the Resolution of this Court which effectively prohibited the enforcement of a no report, no release policy against the Judiciary which has also been granted fiscal autonomy by the Constitution. Furthermore, the Constitution grants the enjoyment of fiscal autonomy only to the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, of which petitioner is one, and the Ombudsman. To hold that the CSC may be subjected to withholding or reduction of funds in the event of a revenue shortfall would, to that extent, place CSC and the other entities vested with fiscal autonomy on equal footing with all others which are not granted the same autonomy, thereby reducing to naught the distinction established by the Constitution.

J.1.3 Delos Santos v. Mallare G.R. No. L-3881 August 31, 1950 Tuason, J. Facts: Eduardo de los Santos, the petitioner, was appointed City Engineer of Baguio on July 16, 1946, by the President, appointment which was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments on August 6, and on the 23rd of that month, he qualified for and began to exercise the duties and functions of the position. On June 1, 1950, Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same position, after which, on June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. Santos refused to vacate the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings. Issue: whether or not the removal of the petitioner from his present position for assignment to another position violates Section 4, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law." Held: Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service, except as those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination." Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified service," and went on to say that "The classified service embraces all not expressly declared to be in the unclassified service." Then section 671 described persons in the unclassified service as "officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus or offices, appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone." Three specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. None of these exceptions obtain in the present case. The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. A confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of the Revised Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in which "highly technical" is employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower than that of a city engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men possessing executive ability.