SAFETY AND MULTIPLE REDUNDANCY SYSTEM

Redundancy: Systems--- generally designed to function normallyeven after failure of single instrument or control Redundant control or redundant component --- one which are strictly necessary, but included if in case another similar component fails Degree of redundancy --- depends upon hazards involved & potential for economic losses

 Risk assessment: Includes accident identification, & its consequence analysis Different methods of RiskAssessment: 1. Event TreeAnalysis (ETA): Begins with initiating event & works towards final result Provides information on how a failure can occur & probability of occurrence For any accident, many safety systems exist --- to prevent accident from propagating These safety systems either fail or succeed

 ETA approach includes---effects of an event initiation followed by impact of safety systems Steps involved in ETA: 1. Identify an initiating event of interest (i.e. incident which may initiate further risk) 2. Identify safety functions designed to deal with initiating event 3. Construct event tree 4. Describe the resulting accident event sequences It is written from LHS to RHS

Continue operation

Shut down
Run away

Initiating event

2. Fault TreeAnalysis (FTA): For simplest plant, FTAcan be much large Involve thousands of process events Identifies ways in which hazard can lead to accidents Approach starts with well defined accident (or top event) & works backward towards various reasons that can cause accident Reverse of ETA Event here are not only hardware failure, but can be software failure also, as well human errors & environmental factors too Steps involved are-

1. Define precisely top event (e.g. high reactor T, or explosion of reactor or fire in process, etc) 2. Define existing event (i.e. which conditions are sure to be present when top event occurs) 3. Define events which are not allowed (i.e. events which are not under consideration at present, e.g. wiring failure, lightning, tornadoes, etc.) 4. Define physical bounds of process (i.e. which components should be considered in FTA?) 5. Define equipment configuration (like any valve open or closed, what are liquid levels, etc.)

6.Define level of resolution (i.e. whether analysis will consider valve only or is it necessary to consider valve components also?)
3. Quantitative RiskAnalysis (QRA): Determines actual risk of process or plant Most commonly used technique in industry Frequency of release is determined using combination of ETA& FTA Identifies where operation, management or engineering systems can be modified to reduce risk

 Complexity of QRA---depends upon objectives of study & available information Should be performed in beginning of project Steps involved are 1. Define potential event sequences & potential incidents 2. Evaluate incident consequences 3. Estimating potential incident frequencies using event & fault trees 4. Estimating incident impacts on people, environment & property 5. Estimating risks by combining impacts & frequencies

6.Recording risk using graph of consequence v/s frequencies

4. Layer of ProtectionAnalysis (LOPA): One kind of semi quantitative technique to assess risk Various layers of protections are added to process to lower the frequencies of undesired consequences These protection layers may include --- safer concepts, basic control systems for process, safety instrumented functions, passive devices such as blast walls, active devices such as relief valves, human intervention, etc.

 Combined effects of protection layers & consequences are compared against some risk tolerance criteria Effects & all consequences are first approximated by categories, frequencies are then estimated & effectiveness of protection layers is also approximated Finally approximate values & categories are selected to provide conservative results Criteria to establish boundary between acceptable & non-acceptable risk may include, frequency of fatalities, frequency of fires, maximum frequency of specific category of consequence & required protection layers, etc.

 Steps involved are: 1. Identifying single consequence (effect/result) 2. Identifying accident scenario & cause associated with consequence (assumed or suggested sequence of accident) 3. Identifying initiating event for particular scenario & estimating its frequency 4. Identifying protection layers available for particular consequence & estimating probability of failure on demand for each protection layer 5. Combining initiating event frequency with probabilities of failure on demand for independent protection layer to estimate less severe consequence frequency for this initiating event

6. Plotting consequence v/s its frequency to estimate risk 7. Evaluating risk for acceptability & if it is not acceptable then add additional layer of protection SafetyAudits: Carried out to achieve objectives like--1. Carry out systematic, critical assessment of all potential hazards involving personnel, plant, services & operation method 2. To ensure that safety & hazard system fully satisfy legal requirements & companies' written safety policies, objectives & progress

 Safety Instrumentation: Instruments used for protection of personnel, plant & environment 1. Analyzer: to analyze reactor content, surroundings, for understanding problems 2. Bounding & Grouping: to reduce voltage difference between 2 conductive materials to zero 3. Calorimeters: to analyze run away reactions 4. Masks: protect from inhalation hazards 5. Respirators: mouth & nose dust masks, chemical cartridges, full face mask with self contained breathing

6.Personal protection devices: hard hats, safety glasses, safety shoes, aprons, PVC coated gloves 7. Ventilation hoods 8. Sprinkler system