EXECUTIVE CASE 1. SAEZ vs.

MACAPAGAL ARROYO FACTS: On March 6, 2008, the petitioner filed with the Court a petition to be granted the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data with prayers for temporary protection order, inspection of place and production of documents. He likewise prayed for the military to cease from further conducting surveillance and monitoring of his activities and for his name to be excluded from the order of battle and other government records connecting him to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). SC referred the case to the Court of Appeals (CA) for hearing and decision. The CA conducted hearings with an intent to clarify what actually transpired and to determine specific acts which threatened the petitioners right to life, liberty or security. During the hearings, the petitioner narrated that starting April 16, 2007, he noticed that he was always being followed by a certain "Joel," a former colleague at Bayan Muna. "Joel" pretended peddling pandesal in the vicinity of the petitioners store. Three days before the petitioner was apprehended, "Joel" approached and informed him of his marital status and current job as a baker in Calapan, Mindoro Oriental. "Joel" inquired if the petitioner was still involved with ANAKPAWIS. When asked by the CA justices during the hearing if the petitioner had gone home to Calapan after having filed the petition, he answered in the negative explaining that he was afraid of Pvt. Osio who was always at the pier. On July 9, 2008, the CA rendered its Decision, denying on formal and substantial grounds the reliefs prayed for in the petition and dropping former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a respondent. The CA ratiocinated: There was no attempt at all to clarify how petitioner came to know about Zaldy Osios presence at their pier if the former had not gone home since the petition was filed and what Zaldy Osio was doing there to constitute violation or threat to violate petitioners right to life, liberty or security. This Court cannot just grant the privilege of the writs without subs tantial evidence to establish petitioners entitlement thereto. This Court cannot grant the privilege of the writs appl ied for on mere speculation or conjecture. This Court is convinced that the Supreme Court did not intend it to be so when the rules on the writs of Amparo and Habeas Data were adopted. It is the impression of this Court that the privilege of the writs herein prayed for should be considered as extraordinary remedies available to address the specific situations enumerated in the rules and no other. x x x The ruling in David, et al. vs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al. (G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, 489 SCRA 160, 224) is aptly instructive: "Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court litigations while serving as such. Furthermore, it is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully attend to the performance of his official duties and functions. x x x." Ruling on other matters: SC affirmed the decision of the CA regarding non compliance of the petition to the requirements of the Rules on the Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data and no substantial evidence exists to prove the petitioners claims but the petitioner filed for motion for reconsideration. SC partly modified its decision stating the petition for the issuance of the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data is sufficient as to its contents but still no substantial evidence exists to prove the allegations of the petitioner. ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING THE PETITION AND DROPPING GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO AS PARTY RESPONDENT. HELD: The President cannot be automatically dropped as a respondent pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility. In Noriel Rodriguez v. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al.,31 the Court stated: a. Command responsibility of the President Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. We rule in the affirmative. To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof. The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine. On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility in all Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O. 226, a government official may be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. Knowledge of the commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government officials area of jurisdiction; (b) the a cts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office personnel are involved. Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military. Conversely, this presidential privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her tenure. Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. The petitioner, however, is not exempted from the burden of proving by substantial evidence his allegations against the President to make the latter liable for either acts or omissions violative of rights against life, liberty and security. In the instant case, the petitioner merely included the Presidents name as a party respondent without any attempt at all to show the latters actual involvement in, or knowledge of the alleged violations. Further, prior to the filing of the petition , there was no request or demand for any investigation that was brought to the Presidents attention. Thus, while the President cannot be completely dropped as a respondent in a petition for the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data merely on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit, the petitioner in this case failed to establish accountability of the President, as commander-in-chief, under the doctrine of command responsibility. CASE 2: Brillantes vs. Comelec FACTS : On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436 authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections. It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and adopt new electoral forms and printing materials. The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting the votes collected from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). However, the failure of the machines to correctly read a number of automated ballots discontinued its implementation. Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172 on January 24, 2003, allocating the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On February 10, 2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo

issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a further supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the COMELEC. The Supreme Court resolved the COMELEC to maintain the old and manual voting and counting system for the May 10, 2004 elections after contract negations with companies Mega Pacific Consortium (the supplier of the computerized voting/counting machines) were discontinued. Despite this impediment, the COMELEC nevertheless continued the electronic transmission of advanced unofficial results of the 2004 elections for national, provincial and municipal positions, also dubbed as an "unofficial quick count." ARGUMENTS: Petitioner contends that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of Jurisdiction in the issuance of Resolution No. 6712. Respondent COMELEC contends that its advancement in tabulation procedures is allowed within the statutory confines of section 52 (i) of the Omnibus Election Code that: Prescribe(s) the use or adoption of the latest technological and electronic devices, taking into account the situation prevailing in the area and the funds available for the purpose. Provided, That the Commission shall notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such devices. ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 6712 dated April 28, 2004 issued by the COMELEC in authorizing the use of election funds in consolidating the election results for the May 10, 2004 elections should be declared VOID, as it is unconstitutional. HELD: YES. For violating section 4 of Article VII. The said Resolution No. 6712 preempts the sole authority of the Congress to canvass the votes of the election returns for the President and the Vice-President. REASONS: Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the 1987: Resolution Preempts the sole and exclusive authority vested in the Congress to canvass the votes for the election of President and Vice-President. It is a grave error on the part of the respondent to have ignored the misapprehensions addressed by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon to COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos during the 2004 saying that such act would be in violation of the Constitution (section 4 of Article VII): "any quick count to be conducted by the Commission on said positions would in effect constitute a canvass of the votes of the President and Vice-President, which not only would be pre-emptive of the authority of Congress, but would also be lacking of any constitutional authority." The existence of an accredited Citizens arm: Under Section 27 of Rep. Act No. 7166, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8173, and reiterated in Section 18 of Rep. Act No. 8436, the accredited citizens arm - in this case, NAMFREL - is exclusively authorized to use a copy of the election returns in the conduct of an "unofficial" counting of the votes, whether for the national or the local elections. No other entity, including the respondent COMELEC itself, is authorized to use a copy of the election returns for purposes of conducting an "unofficial" count. In addition, the second or third copy of the election returns, while required to be delivered to the COMELEC under the said laws, are not intended for undertaking an "unofficial" count. The said copies are archived and unsealed only when needed by to verify election results in connection with resolving election disputes that may be established. Inapplicability of Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code: The Court contends that Section 52(i) of the Omnibus Election Code, which is cited by the COMELEC as the statutory basis for the assailed resolution, does not cover the use of the latest technological and election devices for "unofficial" tabulations of votes. Moreover, the COMELEC failed to notify the authorized representatives of accredited political parties and all candidates in areas affected by the use or adoption of technological and electronic devices not less than thirty days prior to the effectivity of the use of such

devices, after failing to submit any document proving that it had notified all political parties of the intended adoption of Resolution No. 6712. CASE 3: Estrada vs. Desierto (March 2, 2001) (GR#146710-15) et al. and Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GR#146738) Nature: Petition to question the legitimacy of the assumption as President of the Republic of the Philippines by Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Ponente: Justice Puno Facts: The court looked at the events that occurred prior and immediately after the oath-taking of respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (to be referred to in the rest of the digest as GMA) as president of the Republic of the Philippines (RP). On 11 May 1998, petitioner Joseph E. Estrada (will subsequently be referred to as Erap) was elected as President of RP with GMA as his vice-President. By the late 2000, word spread of Eraps alleged involvement in jueteng and his receiving jueteng money as Jose Pidal. Erap quickly loses popularity among different social groups and public officials, even high ranking members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), started defecting from his agendas. And because of the jueteng scandal, an impeachment proceeding started on 7 December 2000. Upon its resumption in January, however, a vote of 11-10 against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing Erap as Jose Velarde with P3.3billion in secret bank account cut short the impeachment trial as prosecutors walked out and joined the rallying of people in the streets of Manila. Amidst the pressure, Erap proposed snap elections, which he is not to run as candidate, to regain stability in the country but such a move did little to quell the wave against him. Two rounds of negotiations were held between Eraps camp and that of GMA in the early hours of 20 January 2001 and at 12nn of the same day, GMA took her oath as RP president. Both houses of Congress acknowledged her presidency, as well as the international community. Erap, on the other hand, left Malacanang and is now faced with legal action against him by the Office of the Ombudsman among other things. Issues: 1) Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy 2) Whether petitioner Estrada resigned as President 3) If the petitions are justiciable, whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an acting President 4) Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada 5) Whether petioners prosecution should be enjoined on the ground of prejudicial publicity Held: 1) Yes 2) Yes, impliedly 3) No 4) No 5) No Ratio Decidendi: 1) While the 1987 EDSA People Power Movement is considered by the Court as a non-justiciable event, EDSA 2, as it has come to be known, is very much different from the 1987 EDSA People Power Movement (EDSA 1). EDSA 1 is extra-constitutional, hence, there would be no legal basis if such an event was put to the courts. EDSA 2, on the other hand, is intra-constitutional as it is based on the constitutionally protected rights of freedom of speech and assembly. Even in GMAs oath-taking ceremony, she categorically swore to preserve and defend the 1987 Constitution. 2) The Court used a Totality Test as an authoritative window to ascertain petitioner Estradas state of mind on this issue. On reading the then Executive Secretary Angaras diary published in the Philippine Dai ly Inquirer, the Court held that petitioner impliedly resigned because 1) he did not want to be a candidate in the proposed snap elections, 2) he did not object to Senator Pimentels dignified exit proposal, and 3) on Erap saying that he only had 5 days to a week left to stay in the Palace. Also, from what the court eventually calls his resignation letter, Erap 1) acknowledged GMAs oath-taking as President, 2) he did not mention any intent on re-assuming his position as President, and 3) his gratitude in the letter is on a past opportunity he served as President. On his defense, Erap cites sec. 12 of Republic Act 3019 which states that a public officer cannot resign pending legal action, in this case the impeachment trial. A reading of history tells the Court that the intention of Congress in passing such provision is merely to prevent public officials from escaping liability to stop pending investigation. It does not apply to petitioner. 3) The law states that Congress has the sole authority to say whether a President is incapable of performing the duties required of him of his office. Given the resolutions passed by Congress immediately after GMAs oath -taking and the fact that both houses filed bills signed by GMA into law, the Court recognizes that petitioners inability to perform was permanent and

also, the Court would have no jurisdiction to change the decision already done by Congress on his capacity as President. 4) Regarding immunity from suit, history shows us that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not retain the 1973 Constitution provision on executive immunity. Also, the Impeachment court has become functus officio. It is, then, untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. 5) As for a prejudicial publicity, this would not apply to the present case. Case law will tell us that a right to a fair trial and the free press are incompatible. Theyre essentially unrelated. Also, since our justice system does not use the jury system, the judge, who is a learned and legally enlightened individual, cannot be easily manipulated by mere publicity. The Court also said that petitioner did not present enough evidence to show that the publicity given the trial has influenced the judge so as to render the judge unable to perform. Finally, the Court said that the cases against petitioner were still undergoing preliminary investigation, so the publicity of the case would really have no permanent effect on the judge and that the prosecutor should be more concerned with justice and less with prosecutuion. CASE 5: ESTRADA vs. ARROYO G.R. No. 146738, March 2, 2001 FACTS: During the May 1998 election, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent Gloria MacapagalArroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a long time friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose immediately ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signedby 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of theHouse of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name Jose Velarde. The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President Pimentel on the same day. After his fall from the power, the petitioners legal problems appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in motion. Petitioner sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from conducting any further proceedings in any criminal complaint that may be filed in his office, until after the term of petitioner as President is over and only if legally warranted. Erap also filed a Quo Warranto case, praying for judgment confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE: 1. 2. 3. 4. Held: FIRST ISSUE The cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II, and section 8 of Article VII, and the allocation of governmental powers under section II of Article VII. The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down that it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is . . . The Court also distinguished between EDSA People Power I and EDSA People Power II. EDSA I involves the exercise of the people power of revolution which overthrew the whole government. EDSA II is an exercise of people power of freedom of speech and freedom of assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances which only affected the office of the President. EDSA I is extra constitutional and the legitimacy of the new government that resulted from it cannot be the subject of judicial review, but EDSA II is intra constitutional and the resignation of the sitting President that it caused and the succession of the Vice President as President are subject to judicial review. EDSA I presented political question; EDSA II involves legal questions. SECOND ISSUE Using the totality test, the SC held that petitioner resigned as President. a.) The proposal for a snap election for president in May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. b.) The Angara diary shows that the President wanted only five-day period promised by Reyes, as well as to open the second envelop to clear his name. c.) During the negotiations, the resignation of the petitioner was treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties during and after transition period. d.) His resignation was also confirmed by his leaving Malacaang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and he was going to re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioners reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency. The press release was petitioners valedictory, his final act of farewell. His presidency is now in the past tense. THIRD ISSUE The petitioner is permanently unable to act as President. Section 11 of Article VII: Whether or not the cases at bar involve a political question. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President. Whether or not the petitioner Is only temporarily unable to Act as President. Whether or not the petitioner enjoys immunity from suit.

Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions. Both houses of Congress have recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. The House of Representative passed on January 24, 2001 House Resolution No. l75 which states: RESOLUTION EXPRESSING THE SUPPORT OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES TO THE ASSUMPTION INTO OFFICE BY VICE PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO AS PRESIDENT OFTHE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, EXTENDING ITS CONGRATULATIONS AND EXPRESSING ITS SUPPORT FOR HER ADMINISTRATION AS A PARTNER IN THE ATTAINMENT OF THE NATIONS GOALS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. The Senate also passed Senate Resolution No. 82 which states: RESOLUTION CONFIRMING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYOS NOMINATION OF SEN. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. AS VICE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioners claim of inability. Even if petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a coequal branch of government cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court. FOURTH ISSUE The petitioner does not enjoy immunity from suit. The Supreme Court rejected petitioners argument that he cannot be prosecuted for the reason that he must first be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. The impeachment trial of petitioner Estrada was aborted by the walkout of the prosecutors and by the events that led to his loss of the presidency. On February 7, 2001, the Senate passed Senate Resolution No. 83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is Functus Officio. Since the Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is untenable for petitioner to demand that he should first be impeached and then convicted before he can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put a perpetual bar against his prosecution. The debates in the Constitutional Commission make it clear that when impeachment proceedings have become moot due to the resignation of the President, the proper criminal and civil cases may already be filed against him. The SC also ruled in In re: Saturnino Bermudez that incumbent Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their incumbency and tenure but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the presidency, petitioner cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings. Also, petitioner cannot cite any decision of the SC licensing the President to commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from liability. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other trespasser.

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines. Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED CASE 7: Matibag v. Benipayo G.R. No. 149036 April 2, 2002 FACTS: On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec's EID by then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6, 2000, exempting Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of the Omnibus Election Code , COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations.

CASE 6: Marcos Vs. Manglapus 177 SCRA 668G.R. No. 88211September 15, 1989

During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC. ISSUES: Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim appointments issued by the president amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by section 1 (2), Article IX-C of the Constitution. RULING: We find petitioner's argument without a merit. An ad interim appointment is a permanent because it takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the president once the appointee has qualified into office. The Fact that it is subject to confirmation by the commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character. The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. Case 8: PIMENTEL vs. ERMITA GR 164978 October 13, 2005 FACTS: The Senate and the House of Representatives commenced their regular session on 26 July 2004. The Commission on Appointments, composed of Senators and Representatives, was constituted on 25 August 2004. Meanwhile, President Arroyo issued appointments to respondents as acting secretaries of their respective departments. Appointee Department -- Date of Appointment Arthur C. Yap Agriculture 15 August 2004 Alberto G. Romulo Foreign Affairs 23 August 2004 Raul M. Gonzalez Justice 23 August 2004 Florencio B. Abad Education 23 August 2004 Avelino J. Cruz, Jr. National Defense 23 August 2004 Rene C. Villa Agrarian Reform 23 August 2004 Joseph H. Durano Tourism 23 August 2004 Michael T. Defensor Environment and Natural Resources 23 August 2004 Respondents took their oath of office and assumed duties as acting secretaries. On 8 September 2004, Senators Pimentel, Angara, Enrile, Ejercito-Estrada, Estrada, Lacson, Lim, Madrigal, and Osmena filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines, to declare unconstitutional the appointments issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo through Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita. The petition also sought to prohibit Defensor et al. from performing the duties of department secretaries. ISSUE: Whether or not President Arroyos appointment of respondents as acting secretaries without the consent of the Commission on Appointments while Congress is in session is constitutional.

HELD: YES. The essence of an appointment in an acting capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of the President, such as the office of a department secretary, the President must necessarily appoint an alter ego of her choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of her choice could assume office. Congress, through a law, cannot impose on the President the obligation to appoint automatically the undersecretary as her temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether temporary or permanent, holds a position of great trust and confidence. Congress, in the guise of prescribing qualifications to an office, cannot impose on the President who her alter ego should be. The office of a department secretary may become vacant while Congress is in session. Since a department secretary is the alter ego of the President, the acting appointee to the office must necessarily have the Presidents confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the office of a department secretary, the President must appoint in an acting capacity a person of her choice even while Congress is in session. That person may or may not be the permanent appointee, but practical reasons may make it expedient that the acting appointee will also be the permanent appointee. The law expressly allows the President to make such acting appointment. Section 17, Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states that [t]he President may temporarily designate an officer already in the government service or any other competent person to perform the functions of an office in the executive branch. Thus, the President may even appoi nt in an acting capacity a person not yet in the government service, as long as the President deems that person competent. Petitioners assert that Section 17 does not apply to appointments vested in the President by the Constitution, because it only applies to appointments vested in the President by law. Petitioners forget that Congress is not the only source of law. Law refers to the Constitution, statutes or acts of Congress, municipal ordinances, implementing rules issued pursuant to law, and judicial decisions. CASE 9. Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 FACTS: In view of the alarming increase in violent crimes in Metro Manila, like robberies, kidnappings and carnappings, the President, in a verbal directive, ordered the PNP and the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of crime prevention and suppression. The Secretary of National Defense, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of the PNP and the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government were tasked to execute and implement the said order. In compliance with the presidential mandate, the PNP Chief, through Police Chief Superintendent Edgar B. Aglipay, formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 which detailed the manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted. Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila.

Subsequently, the President confirmed his previous directive on the deployment of the Marines in a Memorandum, dated 24 January 2000, addressed to the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the PNP Chief. In the Memorandum, the President expressed his desire to improve the peace and order situation in Metro Manila through a more effective crime prevention program including increased police patrols. The President further stated that to heighten police visibility in the metropolis, augmentation from the AFP is necessary. Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, the President directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless violence. Finally, the President declared that the services of the Marines in the anti- crime campaign are merely temporary in nature and for a reasonable period only, until such time when the situation shall have improved. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed the instant petition to annul LOI 02/2000 and to declare the deployment of the Philippine Marines, null and void and unconstitutional. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not petitioner has legal standing 2. Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces is subject to judicial review 3. Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP. HELD: Petition dismissed. 1. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups and the whole citizenry. Based on the standards above-stated, the IBP has failed to present a specific and substantial interest in the resolution of the case. Its fundamental purpose which, under Section 2, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court, is to elevate the standards of the law profession and to improve the administration of justice is alien to, and cannot be affected by the deployment of the Marines. It should also be noted that the interest of the National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board resolution authorizing him to file the present action. To be sure, members of the BAR, those in the judiciary included, have varying opinions on the issue. Moreover, the IBP, assuming that it has duly authorized the National President to file the petition, has not shown any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the questioned governmental act. Indeed, none of its members, whom the IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of the joint visibility patrols. Neither is it alleged that any of its members has been arrested or that their civil liberties have been violated by the deployment of the Marines. What the IBP projects as injurious is the supposed "militarization" of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institutions and may cause more harm than good in the long run. Not only is the presumed "injury" not personal in character, it is likewise too vague, highly speculative and uncertain to satisfy the requirement of standing. Since petitioner has not successfully established a direct and personal injury as a consequence of the questioned act, it does not possess the personality to assail the validity of the deployment of the Marines. This Court, however, does not categorically rule that the IBP has absolutely no standing to raise constitutional issues now or in the future. The IBP must, by way of allegations and proof, satisfy this Court that it has sufficient stake to obtain judicial resolution of the controversy. THE PRESIDENT DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN CALLING OUT THE MARINES.

When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own. However, this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent to give the President full discretionary power to determine the necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the military. In the performance of this Court's duty of purposeful hesitation" before declaring an act of another branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain. Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of the power to call as compared to the two other powers. On the other hand, the President as Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to gather information, some of which may be classified as highly confidential or affecting the security of the state. In the exercise of the power to call, on-the-spot decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched when we consider the present situation in Mindanao, where the insurgency problem could spill over the other parts of the country. The determination of the necessity for the calling out power if subjected to unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining order every time it is exercised. Thus, it is the unclouded intent of the Constitution to vest upon the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, full discretion to call forth the military when in his judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Unless the petitioner can show that the exercise of such discretion was gravely abused, the President's exercise of judgment deserves to be accorded respect from this Court. 3. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CIVILIAN SUPREMACY CLAUSE NOR DOES IT INFRINGE THE CIVILIAN CHARACTER OF THE POLICE FORCE. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. The limited participation of the Marines is evident in the provisions of the LOI itself, which sufficiently provides the

2.

metes and bounds of the Marines' authority. It is noteworthy that the local police forces are the ones in charge of the visibility patrols at all times, the real authority belonging to the PNP. In fact, the Metro Manila Police Chief is the overall leader of the PNP-Philippine Marines joint visibility patrols. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the soldiers on police patrol procedures. It is their responsibility to direct and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an "insidious incursion" of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section 5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution. CASE 10: PEOPLE v. PATRIARCA FACTS: Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of "Ka Django," "Carlos Narra" and "Ka Jessie," appeals the decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua.Upon arraignment, accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases was conducted considering the substantial identity of the facts and circumstances of the case. Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that the accused, with ten (10) armed companions, requested permission to rest in his house, which was granted. They had with them a person who was hogtied. Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malto's house be extinguished and Malto complied.Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When he looked out, he saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who was hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his companions to carry away the dead man.Nonito Malto learned that the dead man was Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back to his place, together with the military. The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim. The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias "Ka Django", as he told her not to let her son join the military. She, however, replied that they were only seeking employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in attending to their farm and he was a member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their locality. After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio Alcantara that her son was abducted by the New People's Army led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to the military and looked for him. She was informed by the residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking water, and complained that he was being maltreated by the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Walter Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative of hers, notified her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.Nonito Malto likewise informed her of her son's death in the hands of Ka Django. When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she was able to identify them as belonging to her son by reason of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo Arevalo, used to print his name on the waistband of his briefs so that it would not get lost. The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and Francisco Derla who admitted that accused is a member of the NPA operating in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the victims in the three criminal cases filed against him. A decision was rendered convicting the accused. Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 entitled "Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National Amnesty Commission." His application was favorably granted by the National Amnesty Board.

The Office of the Solicitor General requested the National Amnesty Commission for information as to whether or not a motion for reconsideration was filed by any party, and the action, if there was any, taken by the NAC. In his reply, NAC Chairman Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there has been no motion for reconsideration filed by any party. ISSUE: Whether or not accused may be acquitted by virtue of the amnesty granted. HELD: Yes. Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference between pardon and amnesty is given: "Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does 'not work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,' and it 'in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence' (Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense." This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once granted, it is binding and effective. It serves to put an end to the appeal CASE 11: NERI vs. SENATE COMMITTEE GR No. 180643 March 25, 2008 Summary of the case: This case is about the Senate investigation of anomalies concerning the NBN-ZTE project. During the hearings, former NEDA head Romulo Neri refused to answer certain questions involving his conversations with President Arroyo on the ground they are covered by executive privilege. When the Senate cited him in contempt and ordered his arrest, Neri filed a case against the Senate with the Supreme Court. On March 25, 2008, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of Neri and upheld the claim of executive privilege. The SC held that claim for Exec Privilege is valid, and that there was no violation of the right to information, and hence, the contempt order was invalid. FACTS: DOTC and Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE), a corporation owned by the Peoples Republic of China, executed a Contract for the Supply of Equipment and Services for the National Broadband Network Project (NBN-ZTE Contract) worth US$329,481,290.00 (around PhP 16B). The project sought to provide landline, cellular and internet services in government offices nationwide and was to be financed through a loan by China to the Philippines. President Arroyo witnessed the contract signing in China. After its signing, reports of anomalies concerning the project (ex: bribery, overpricing by US$ 130M, kickback commissions involving top government officials, and loss of the contract) prompted the Senate, through the

Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce, and National Defense and Security, to conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation. The inquiry was based on a number of Senate resolutions and in connection with pending bills concerning funding in the procurement of government projects, contracting of loans as development assistance, and Senate concurrence to executive agreements. In one of the hearings held on Sept. 26, 2007, former NEDA Director General Romulo Neri testified that President Arroyo initially gave instructions for the project to be undertaken on a Build-Operate- Transfer (BOT) arrangement so the government would not spend money for it, but eventually the project was awarded to ZTE with a government-to-government loan from China. He also said that then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos, the alleged broker in the project, offered him PhP 200M in exchange for NEDAs approval of the project. Neri testified that when he told President Arroyo of the bribe offer, she told him not to accept it. But Neri refused to answer questions about what he and the President discussed after that, invoking executive privilege since they concerned his conversations with the President. The Senate required him to appear again and testify on November 20, 2007. On November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita wrote the Senate Committees and asked that Neris testimony on November 20, 2007 be dispensed with because he was invoking executive privilege by Order of the President specifically on the following questions: a. Whether the President followed up on the NBN project? b. Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? c. WON the PGMA said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe? When Neri failed to appear on November 20, 2007, the Senate required him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt. Neri explained that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be covered by executive privilege and that should there be new matters to be taken up, he asked that he be informed in advance of what else he needs to clarify so he could prepare himself. On Dec. 7, 2007, Neri questioned the validity of the Senates show cause order before the Supreme Court. On January 30, 2008, the Senate cited Neri in contempt and ordered his arrest for his failure to appear in the Senate hearings. On February 1, 2008, Neri asked the Supreme Court to stop the Senate from implementing its contempt order, which the Court granted on Feb. 5, 2008. The Supreme Court also required the parties to observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the contempt order. Neri filed for petition for certiorari and the Court granted his petition. On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed the present motion for reconsideration. CONTENTION OF NERI: His conversations with the President dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. CONTENTION OF LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE: The orders were done in THE EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE POWER, and not MERELY THEIR OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS. ISSUES: 1. Are the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions covered by executive privilege? YES. 2. Did the Senate Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest? YES. 3. Does the grant of the claim of executive privilege violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern? NO. HELD

1. YES. the Supreme Court said that the communications sought to be elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege, which is one type of executive privilege. Hence, the Senate cannot compel Neri to answer the three questions. The Supreme Court first recognized the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. The Court said that the power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a valid claim of executive privilege. Executive privilege is the right of the President and high-level executive branch officials to withhold information from Congress, the courts and the public. It is a privilege of confidentiality which applies to certain types of information of a sensitive character that would be against the public interest to disclose. Executive privilege is based on the constitution because it relates to the Presidents effective discharge of executive powers. Its ultim ate end is to promote public interest and no other. Executive privilege may still be invoked despite the Presidents revocation of E.O. 464 because it is based on the constitution. The executive privilege, however, is not absolute as any claim of executive privilege must be weighed against other interests recognized by the constitution, like the state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest, the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, the accountability of public officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial power to secure evidence in deciding. There are different types of executive privilege -a. state secrets (regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters) b. identity of government informers c. information related to pending investigations d. presidential communications and deliberative process In the case at bar, the type of executive privilege claimed in this case is the presidential communications privilege, or the privilege that applies to decision-making of the President. It pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain confidential. Unlike the deliberative process privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers final and post-decisional materials as well as pre- deliberative ones. And in order to properly invoke such, the following elements must be met: A. The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power (those functions which form the core of presidential authority such as (1) power as commander-in-chief, (2) power to appoint officials and remove them, (3) the power to grant pardons and reprieves, (4) the power to receive ambassadors, and (5) the power to negotiate treaties and to enter into execute agreements) B. The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or the President himself. The advisor must be in operational proximity with the President. C. The privilege is a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate or compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and that the information sought is unavailable elsewhere by an appropriate investigating agency. The Supreme Court held that the communications elicited by the three questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege because: A. The communications relate to the power of the President to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. B. The communications are received by Neri, who as a Cabinet member can be considered a close advisor of the President. C. The Senate Committees have not adequately shown a compelling need for the answers to the three questions in the enactment of a law and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

2. YES, the Supreme Court said that the Senate Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in citing Neri in contempt. Hence, the Senate order citing Neri in contempt and ordering his arrest was not valid. The Supreme Court in holding that it was wrong for the Senate to cite Neri in contempt and order his arrest because of the following reasons: A. There was a legitimate claim of executive privilege. B. The Senates invitations to Neri did not include the possible needed statute which prompted the inquiry, the subject of inquiry, and the questions to be asked. C. The contempt order lacked the required number of votes. D. The Senates rules of procedure on inquiries in aid of legislation were not duly published. E. The contempt order is arbitrary and precipitate because the Senate did not first rule on the claim of executive privilege and instead dismissed Neris explanation as unsatisfactory. 3. NO, the claim of executive privilege did not violate the right of the people to information on matters of public concern A. Neri appeared before the Senate on Sept. 26, 2007 and was questioned for 11 hours. He also expressed his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, except the three questions. B. The right to information is subject to limitation, such as executive privilege. C. The right of Congress to obtain information in aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to information. Congress cannot claim that every legislative inquiry is an exerc ise of the peoples right to information. Case 12: Clinton v Jones Respondent sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985 and Arkansas law to recover damages from petitioner, the current President of the United States, alleging, inter alia, that while he was Governor of Arkansas, petitioner made "abhorrent" sexual advances to her, and that her rejection of those advances led to punishment by her supervisors in the state job she held at the time. Petitioner promptly advised the Federal District Court that he would file a motion to dismiss on Presidential immunity grounds, and requested that all other pleadings and motions be deferred until the immunity issue was resolved. After the court granted that request, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss without prejudice and to toll any applicable statutes of limitation during his Presidency. The District Judge denied dismissal on immunity grounds and ruled that discovery could go forward, but ordered any trial stayed until petitioner's Presidency ended. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial, but reversed the trial postponement as the "functional equivalent" of a grant of temporary immunity to which petitioner was not constitutionally entitled. The court explained that the President, like other officials, is subject to the same laws that apply to all citizens, that no case had been found in which an official was granted immunity from suit for his unofficial acts, and that the rationale for official immunity is inapposite where only personal, private conduct by a President is at issue. The court also rejected the argument that, unless immunity is available, the threat of judicial interference with the Executive Branch would violate separation of powers. Issues: 1. whether a claim comparable to petitioner's assertion of immunity might succeed in a state tribunal, and 2. whether a court may compel the President's attendance at any specific time or place. Held: Deferral of this litigation until petitioner's Presidency ends is not constitutionally required.

(a) Petitioner's principal submission--that in all but the most exceptional cases, the Constitution affords the President temporary immunity from civil damages litigation arising out of events that occurred before he took office--cannot be sustained on the basis of precedent. The principal rationale for affording Presidents immunity from damages actions based on their official acts--i.e., to enable them to perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a particular decision may give rise to personal liability, see, e.g., Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 , 752, and n. 32-provides no support for an immunity for unofficial conduct. Moreover, immunities for acts clearly within official capacity are grounded in the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 . The Court is also unpersuaded by petitioner's historical evidence, which sheds little light on the question at issue, and is largely canceled by conflicting evidence that is itself consistent with both the doctrine of presidential immunity as set forth in Fitzgerald, and rejection of the immunity claim in this case. (Pp. 9-15.) (b) The separation of powers doctrine does not require federal courts to stay all private actions against the President until he leaves office. Even accepting the unique importance of the Presidency in the constitutional scheme, it does not follow that that doctrine would be violated by allowing this action to proceed. The doctrine provides a self executing safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the three co equal branches of Government at the expense of another. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 . But in this case there is no suggestion that the Federal Judiciary is being asked to perform any function that might in some way be described as "executive." Respondent is merely asking the courts to exercise their core Article III jurisdiction to decide cases and controversies, and, whatever the outcome, there is no possibility that the decision here will curtail the scope of the Executive Branch's official powers. The Court rejects petitioner's contention that this case--as well as the potential additional litigation that an affirmance of the Eighth Circuit's judgment might spawn--may place unacceptable burdens on the President that will hamper the performance of his official duties. That assertion finds little support either in history, as evidenced by the paucity of suits against sitting Presidents for their private actions, or in therelatively narrow compass of the issues raised in this particular case. Of greater significance, it is settled that the Judiciary may severely burden the Executive Branch by reviewing the legality of the President's official conduct, see e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 , and may direct appropriate process to the President himself, see e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 . It must follow that the federal courts have power to determine the legality of the President's unofficial conduct. The reasons for rejecting a categorical rule requiring federal courts to stay private actions during the President's term apply as well to a rule that would, in petitioner's words, require a stay "in all but the most exceptional cases." (Pp. 15-24.) (c) Contrary to the Eighth Circuit's ruling, the District Court's stay order was not the "functional equivalent" of an unconstitutional grant of temporary immunity. Rather, the District Court has broad discretion to stay proceedings as an incident to its power to control its own docket. See, e.g., Landis v. North American Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 . Moreover, the potential burdens on the President posed by this litigation are appropriate matters for that court to evaluate in its management of the case, and the high respect owed the Presidency is a matter that should inform the conduct of the entire proceeding. Nevertheless, the District Court's stay decision was an abuse of discretion because it took no account of the importance of respondent's interest in bringing the case to trial, and because it was premature in that there was nothing in the record to enable a judge to assess whether postponement of trial after the completion of discovery would be warranted. (Pp. 25-27) (d) The Court is not persuaded of the seriousness of the alleged risks that this decision will generate a large volume of politically motivated harassing and frivolous litigation and that national security concerns might prevent the President from explaining a legitimate need for a continuance, and has confidence in the ability of federal judges to deal with both concerns. If Congress deems it appropriate to afford the President stronger protection, it may respond with legislation. (Pp. 27-28.)