Republic Act 7941 An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the PartyList System, and

d Appropriating Funds Therefor Sec. 1. Title.-- This Act shall be known as the "Party-List System Act." Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy.-- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack welldefined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interest in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.-- (a) The party list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). component parties or organizations of coalition may participate independently provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system. (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. It is a national party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the regions. It is a regional party when its constituency is spread over the geographical territory of at least a majority of the cities and provinces comprising the region. (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. (e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of citizens or a coalition of group of citizens who share similar physical attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. (f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for political and/or election purposes. Sec. 4. Manifestation to Participate in the Party-List System.-- Any party, organization, or coalition already registered with the Commission need not register anew. However, such party, organization, or coalition shall file with the Commission, not later than ninety (90) days before the election, a manifestation of its desire to participate in the party-list system. Sec. 5. Registration.-- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and other

relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sector shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers of general circulation. The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within fifteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not later than sixty (60) days before the election. Sec. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration.-- The COMELEC may, motu proprio, or upon verified complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds: (1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes; (2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal; (3) It is a foreign party or organization; (4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or though any of its officers or member or indirectly though third parties for partisan election purposes. (5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections; (6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition; (7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or (8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two percentum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. Sec. 7. Certified List of Registered Parties.-- The COMELEC shall, not later than sixty (60) days before election, prepare a certified list of national, regional, or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions which have applied or who have manifested their desire to participate under the party-list system and distribute copies thereof to all precints for posting in the polling places on election day. The names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list. Sec. 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.-- Each registered party, organization, or coalition shall submit to the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains the required number of votes. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be named in the list. The list shall not include any candidate for any elective office or a person who has lost his bid for an elective office in the immediately preceding election. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination, becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed in the list. Incumbent sectoral representatives in the House of Representatives who are nominated in the party-list system shall not be considered resigned. Sec. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees.-- No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at

least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must be at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term. Sec. 10. Manner of Voting.-- Every voter shall be entitled to two (2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of Representatives in his legislative district; and the second, a vote for the party, organization, or coalition he wants represented in the House of Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted: Provided finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall be held in May 1998. The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the party-list system. Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.-- The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty percentum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the party-list. For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party list system. In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed: (a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party , organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. Sec. 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List Representatives.-- The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each party, organization, or coalition as against the total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system. Sec. 13. How Party-List Representatives Are Chosen.-- Party-list representatives shall be proclaimed by the COMELEC based on the list of names submitted by the respective parties, organizations, or coalitions to the COMELEC according to their ranking in said list. Sec. 14. Term of Office.-- Party-list representatives shall be elected for a term of three (3) years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election. No party-list representatives shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Sec. 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect.-- Any elected party-list representative who changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list representative under his new party or organization. Sec. 16. Vacancy.-- In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by the next representative from the list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the party, organization, or coalition concerned shall submit additional nominees. Sec. 17. Rights of Party-List Representatives.-- Party-list representatives shall be entitled to the same salaries and emoluments as regular members of the House of Representatives. Sec. 18. Rules and Regulations.-- The COMELEC shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act. Sec. 19. Appropriations.-- The amount necessary for the implementation of this Act shall be provided in the regular appropriations for the Commission on Elections starting fiscal year 1996 under the General Appropriations Act. Starting 1995, the COMELEC is hereby authorized to utilize savings and other available funds for purposes of its information campaign on the party-list system. Sec. 20. Separability Clause.-- If any part of this Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other parts or provisions thereof shall remain valid and effective. Sec. 21. Repealing Clause.-- All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed. Sec. 22. Effectivity.-- This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation. Approved, March 3, 1995. Rosales, et.al. v COMELEC, GR No. 177314, May 4, 2007

Dimaporo v. Mitra, 202 SCRA 779 (October 15, 1991) F: Petitioner Mohammad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the 2nd Legislative District of Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. In Jan., 1990, petitioner filed with the COMELEC a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Upon being informed of such development by the COMELEC, respondents Speaker and Secretary of the House of Reps. excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of the House of Reps. pursuant to Sec. 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) Having lost in the elections, petitioner then tried but failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress. Hence, this petition. He maintains that he did not lose his seat as congressman because Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not

operative under the present Constitution, being contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress. ISSUE: Whether Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is operative under the present Constitution HELD: YES. Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads: "Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy." Petitioner failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office and thereby cutting short their tenure by making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position. This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents. In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. "The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by the legislature, but the period during which an officer actually holds the office (tenure), may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said officer. These situations will not change the duration of the term of office." Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a cert. of candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion. The fact that the ground cited in Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of the members of Congress does not preclude its application to present members of Congress. Sec. 2, Art. IX of the Constitution provides that "xxx All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law, but not by impeachment." Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the 4 grounds found in Art. VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are NOT exclusive. Moreover, as the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Sec. 67, Art. IX of B.P. Blg. 881, which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Sec. 7, par. 2 of Art. VI of the Constitution. RA 6645 An Act prescribing the manner of filling a vacancy in the congress of the Philippines The law that governs and lays down the details concerning the special congressional elections is Rep. Act No. 6645 (December 28, 1987). Under the law, no special election will be called if the vacancy occurs (i) less than 18 months before the next regular election in the case of the Senate, or (ii) less than 1 year before the next regular election in the case of the House; in these cases, we will just have to wait for the next regular election, for practical reasons.

When the vacancy occurs during the period when special elections are allowed to be conducted (18 or 12 months or more before the next regular election), the particular House of Congress must pass either a resolution by the House concerned, if Congress is in session, or a certification by the Senate President or the Speaker of the House, if Congress is not in session, (a) declaring the existence of the vacancy and (b) calling for a special election to be held within 45 to 90 days from the date of calling of the special election (that is, from the date of the resolution or certification). But the Senator or Member of the House thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired portion of the term.(Art. VI, Sec. 9) Funds certified by the COMELEC as necessary to defray the expenses for holding regular and special elections, plebiscites, initiatives, referenda, and recalls, shall be provided in the regular or special appropriations and, once approved, shall be released automatically upon certification by the Chairman of the COMELEC. (Art. IX-C, Sec. 11) Sec. 1. In case a vacancy arises in the Senate at least eighteen (18) months or in the House of Representatives at least one (1) year before the next regular election for Members of Congress, the Commission on Elections, upon receipt of a resolution of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, certifying to the existence of such vacancy and calling for a special election, shall hold a special election to fill such vacancy. If Congress is in recess, an official communication on the existence of the vacancy and call for a special election by the President of the Senate or by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, shall be sufficient for such purpose. The Senator or Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall serve only for the unexpired term. Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall fix the date of the special election, which shall not be earlier than forty-five (45) days nor later than ninety (90) days from the date of such resolution or communication, stating among other things the office or offices to be voted for: Provided, however, That if within the said period a general election is scheduled to be held, the special election shall be held simultaneously with such general election. Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections shall send copies of the resolution, in number sufficient for due distribution and publication, to the Provincial or City Treasurer of each province or city concerned, who in turn shall publish it in their respective localities by posting at least three copies thereof in as many conspicuous places in each of their election precints, and a copy in each of the polling places and public markets, and in the municipal buildings. Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two newspapers of general circulation. Approved, December 28, 1987. Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337 (1983) In Lozada vs COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337, a petition to compel the COMELEC to call special elections to fill twelve vacancies in the interim Batasang Pambansa was dismissed on the ground inter alia that the

petitioners were not proper parties as they had only what the Supreme Court called a "generalized interest" shared with the rest of the people. F: This is a pet. for mandamus filed by Lozada and Igot as representative suit for and in behalf of those who wish to participate in the election irrespective of party affiliation, to compel the resp. COMELEC to call a special election to fill up existing vacancies numbering 12 in the Interim BP. The pet. is based on Sec. 5 (2), Art. VIII of the 1973 Consti. w/c reads: "In case a vacancy arises in the BP 18 months or more before a regular election, the COMELEC shall call a special election to be held w/in 60 days after the vacancy occurs to elect the Member to serve the unexpired term." Petitioner Lozada claims that he is a TP and a bona fide elector of Cebu City and a transient voter of QC, MM, who desires to run for the position in the BP; while petitioner Igot alleges that, as TP, he has standing to petition by mandamus the calling of a special election as mandated by the 1973 Consti. HELD: I. a. As taxypayers, petitioners may not file the instant petition, for nowhere therein is it alleged that tax money is being illegally spent. xxx b. As voters, neither have petitioners the requisite interest or personality to qualify them to maintain and prosecute the present petition. Petitioners' standing to sue may not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here, w/c is held in common by all members of the public bec. of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury supposedly shared by all citizens. II. a. The SC's jurisdiction over the COMELEC is only to review by certiorari the latter's decision, orders or rulings. xxx There is in this case no decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC w/c is sought to be reviewed by this Court under its certiorari jurisdiction xxx. b. Mandamus does not lie. There is total absence that COMELEC has unlawfully neglected the performance of a ministerial duty or has refused on being demanded, to discharge such a duty. xxx [T]he holding of special elections in several regional districts where vacancies exist, would entail huge expenditure of money. Only the BP can make the necessary appropriation for the purpose, and this power of the BP may neither be subject to mandamus by the courts much less may COMELEC compel BP to exercise its power of appropriation. III. Perhaps the strongest reason why the said provision is not intended to apply to the Interim National Assembly is the fact that as passed by the Con Con, the Interim NA was to be composed by the delegates to the Con Con, as well as the then incumbent Pres. and VP, and the members of the Senate and House of Rep. of Congress under the 1935 Consti. W/ such number of representatives representing each congressional district, or a province, not to mention the Senators, there was felt absolutely no need for filling up vacancies occurring in the Interim NA, considering the uncertainty of the duration of its existence. PhilConsa v Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966) F: PHILCONSA has filed in this Court a suit against the Auditor General of the Phils., and the Auditor of the Congress, seeking to permanently enjoin the aforesaid officials from authorizing or passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 (approved 6/10/64) to the Speaker and

members of the HRep before 12/30/69. Sec. 1, par. 1 of RA 4134 provided, inter alia, that the annual salary of the Senate Pres. and of the Speaker of the HRep shall be P40,000 each; that of the Senators and members of the HRep, P32,000 each (thereby increasing their present compensation of P16T and P7,200 pa for the Presiding officers and members respectively.) The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the HRep set by RA 4134. The petitioners contend that such implementation is violative of Art VI, Sec. 14 of the 1935 Consti, w/c provided that: "xxx No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. xxx" The reason given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA 4134, will expire only on 12/30/69; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of the said Act expired on 12/30/65. HELD: The Court agrees w/ petitioners that the increased compensation provided is not operative until 12/30/69, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it will have expired. Purpose of the provision.-- The reason for the this rule, the Court said, is to place a "legal bar to the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to increase their salaries. Not that the power to provide for higher compensation is lacking, but with the length of time that has to elapse before an increase becomes effective, there is a deterrent factor to any such measure unless the need for it is clearly felt." Significantly, in establishing what might be termed a waiting period, the constitutional provision refers to "all members of the Senate and of the House or Rep." in the same sentence, as a single unit, w/o distinction or separation bet. them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the "expiration of the full term" xxx using the singular form, and not the plural, despite the difference in the terms of office, xxx thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word "term" in the singular, when combined w/ the following phrase "all the members of the Senate and of the House," underscores that in the application of said provision, the fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative. Term of all the members of the Congress, instead of all the members of the Senate and of the House." This is a distinction w/o a difference, since the Senate and the House together constitute the Congress. The use of the phrase "of the Senate and of the House" when it could have employed the shorter expression "of the Senate and the House" is grammatically correct. To speak of "members of the Senate and the House" would imply that the members of the Senate also held membership in the House. Ligot v Mathay, 56 SCRA 823 (1974) F: Petitioner served as a member of the HRep of Congress for 3 consecutive 4-yr terms covering a 12-yr span from 12/30/57 to 12/30/69. During his 2nd term in office, RA 4134 was enacted into law. Petitioner was reelected to a 3rd term (12/30/65 to 12/30/69) but was held not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000 during such third term by virtue of this Court's unanimous decision in Philconsa v. Mathay. Petitioner lost his bid for a consecutive 4th term in the 1969 elections and his term having

expired on 12/31/69, filed a claim for retirement under CA 186, Sec. 12 (c), as amended. The HRep thus issued a treasury warrant in petitioner's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000 p.a. Resp. Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant pending resolution by the Auditor Gen. of a similar claim filed by Cong Singson. When the Auditor Gen.'s adverse decision on Singson's claim came out, resp Auditor requested petitioner to return the warrant for recomputation. Petitioner's request for recon having been denied by the Auditor Gen. he filed the present petition for review. HELD: 1. [T]he "rate of pay as provided by law" for members of Congress retiring on 12/30/69, such as petitioner, must necessarily be P7,200 p.a., the compensation they received "as provided by law" and the Consti during their term of office. 2. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on 12/30/69 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000 p.a. would be to pay them prohibited emoluments w/c in effect increase the salary beyond that w/c they were permitted by the Consti. to receive during their incumbency. This would be a subtle way of going around the constitutional prohibition and increasing in effect their compensation during their term of office and of doing indirectly what could not be done directly. 3. Petitioners' contention that since the increased salary of P32T p.a. was already operative when his retirement took effect on 12/30/69, his retirement gratuity should be based on such increased salary cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement or benefit is a form of compensation w/in the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and "other emoluments" to their salary as provided by law. Martinez v. Morfe, 44 SCRA 22 (1972) F: Both petitioners are facing criminal prosecution, the information filed against petitioner Martinez for falsification of a public document (punishable by prision mayor) and 2 informations against petitioner Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code (penalty imposable for each offense charged is not higher than prision mayor). Petitioners, as delegates of the Con Con (1973 Consti.) would invoke what they consider to be the protection of the constitution (granting immunity from arrest to senators and representatives during their attendance at the sessions of Congress) if considered in connection w/ Art 145, RPC penalizing a public officer who shall, during the sessions of Congress, "arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has committed a crime punishable under (such) code by a penalty higher than prision mayor." For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative. What is sought by petitioners is that the respective warrants of arrest issued against them be quashed on the claim that by virtue of the parliamentary immunity they enjoy as delegates, xxx they are immune from arrest. HELD: Certiorari does not lie to quash the warrants issued against petitioners. Their reliance on the constitutional provision w/c for them should be supplemented by what was provided for in the RPC is futile. There is no justification for granting their respective pleas. Under Art. IV, Sec. 15 of the 1935 Consti., the immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of the

peace. Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and comfort. A felony is an act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the RPC or any special statute. xxx [F]rom the explicit language of the Consti., xxx petitioners cannot justify their claim to immunity. Nor does Art. 145, RPC come to their rescue. Such a provision that took effect in 1932 could not survive after the Consti. became operative on 10/15/35. xxx In the language of the Consti. then that portion of Art. 145, RPC penalizing a public official or employee who shall while the Congress is in regular or special session arrest or search any member thereof except in case he has committed a crime punishable under the RPC by a penalty higher than prision mayor is declared inoperative. The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered and fortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the ConCon, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of their conscience. xxx The utmost latitude in free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, w/o justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely no dissent from the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well, w/o the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Jimenez v Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 F: This is an ordinary civil action for the recovery by plaintiffs Jimenez, et al., of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang. An open letter of the President, published in several news- papers of general circulation saying that certain members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had been preparing for a coup and working for the candidacy of the Secretary of Defense for the Presidency. Upon being summoned, the Cabangbang moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if it were, said letter is a privileged communication. ISSUES: Whether the publication in question is a privileged communication; and, if not, (2) whether it is libelous or not. (1) The determination of the first issue depends on w/n the publication falls w/in the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein"-- that is to say, in Congress-- used in this provision. Scope of Parliamentary Freedom of Speech and Debate.-- "Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the performance of the acts in question."

The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the Pres. dated 11/14/58, when Congress presumably was not in session, and def. caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of gen. circ. in the Phils., on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress of as officer or any Committee thereof. (2) Letter was not libelous.-- The letter was not libelous bec. it mentions that herein appellants as possibly "unwitting tools of a plan of which they have absolutely no knowledge." In other words, the very document upon w/c pltffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operation plans, and that they may be unwitting tools of the planners. The statement is not derogatory to plaintiffs. to the point of entitling them to recover damages. Osmea v Pendatun, 109 Phil 863 Thus, in the case of Osmena v Pendatun, the President himself who had been vilified by the petitioner could not file any civil or criminal action against him because of this immunity. Nonetheless, the majority of the members of the House of Representatives in which the questioned speech was delivered were not precluded from demonstrating their loyalty to the chief executive by declaring Osmena guilty of disorderly behavior and suspending him in the exercise of their disciplinary power [now Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)]. F: In 1960, Cong. Osmena delivered a privilege speech in Congress entitled "A Message to Garcia," maliciously denouncing and charging the administration of Pres. Garcia. As a result of this, the HRep through House Resolution No. 59 created a special committee to investigate the veracity of the charges and for him to show cause why he should not be punished by the House if he failed to substantiate his charges. On his side, Osmena contended in his petition that: (1) the Consti. gave him complete parliamentary immunity, and so, for words spoken in the House, he ought not to be questioned; (2) that his speech constituted no disorderly behavior for w/c he could be punished; (3) supposing he could be questioned and disciplined therefor, the House had lost the power to do so bec. it had taken up other business before approving House Resolution No. 59; (4) that the House has no power, under the Consti., to suspend one of its members. Resolution No. 175 found Osmena guilty of serious disorderly behavior. He was suspended for 15 months. HELD: 1. Sec. 15, Art. VI of the 1935 Consti. provides that "for any speech or debate" in Congress, the Senators or Members of the HRep "shall not be questioned in any other place." Observe that "they shall not be questioned in any other place" than Congress. But they may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress itself. Furthermore, the Rules of the House w/c petitioner himself has invoked recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate." The provision guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression w/o fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof. For unparliamentary conduct,

members xxx of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to prison, suspended, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues. 2. On the third point of petitioner that the House may no longer take action against him, bec. after his speech and before approving the Resolution No. 59, it had taken up other business. xxx [C]ourts have declared that "the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body appointing them." And it has been said that "Parliamentary rules are merely procedural and w/ their observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body." 3. On the question w/n delivery of speeches attacking the Pres. constitutes disorderly conduct for w/c Osmena may be disciplined, we believe that the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behavior, not only bec. the Consti. has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also bec. the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of w/c the House knows best but w/c can not be depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. Compared w/ Alejandrino v. Quezon: It is true that in Alejandrino an obiter dictum that "suspension deprives the electoral district of representation w/o that district being afforded any means by w/c to fill that vacancy." But the remark should be understood to refer particularly to the appointive senator who was then the affected party and who was then the affected party and who was by the same Jones Law charged w/ the duty to represent the 12th District xxx. It must be observed, however, that at that time the Legislature had only those powers w/ were granted to it by the Jones Law; whereas now the Congress has the full legislative powers and prerogatives of a sovereign nation, except as restricted by the Consti. xxx Now, the Congress has the inherent legislative prerogative of suspension w/c the Consti. did not impair. "The Legislative power of Congress is plenary, subject only to such limitations as are found in the Consti. So that any power deemed to be legislative by usage or tradition, is necessarily possessed by the Congress, unless the Consti. provides otherwise." (Vera v. Avelino, 77 P 192.) Adaza v. Pacana Jr., 135 SCRA 431 (1985) F: Petitioner Homobono Adaza was elected governor of Misamis Oriental in the 1/30/80 elections. Elected vice-gov. for said province in the same elections was resp. Fernando Pacana, Jr. Both qualified and assumed their respective offices. Both Adaza and Pacana filed their certificates of candidacy for the 5/14/84 BP elections. In the said elections, petitioner won while respondents lost. On 7/23/84, resp. took his oath of office as gov. of Mis. Or. and started to perform the duties of governor. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the governor's office, petitioner has brought this petition to exclude resp. therefrom. He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of 6 yrs., that he remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on 3/23/86 as provided by law, and that w/in the context of the parliamentary system, a local elective official can hold the position to w/c he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member of Parliament. HELD: 1. The constitutional prohibition against a member of the BP from holding any other office of employment in the govt during his tenure is clear and unambiguous. Sec. 10, Art. VIII of the 1973 Consti. provides that: "Sec. 10. A member of the National Assembly shall not hold any other office or

employment in the government xxx except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet. xxx xxx It is of no avail to petitioner that the system of govt in other states allows a local elective official to act as an elected member of the parliament at the same time. The dictate of the people in whom legal sovereignty lies is explicit. xxx [T]he incompatibility herein present is one created by no less than the constitution itself. 2. The second proposition advanced by petitioner is that resp. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner's election to the BP. He maintains that resp. should be considered as having abandoned or resigned from the vice- governorship when he filed his cert. of candidacy. The point pressed runs afoul of BP 697, Sec. 13 (2) of w/c provides that governors, mayors, members of the various sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a cert. of candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office." Resp falls w/in the coverage of this provision considering that he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Puyat v. De Guzman Jr., 113 SCRA 32 (1982) F: On 5/14/79, an election for the 11 Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corp. (IPI) was held. There were two groups, the Puyat Group and the Acero Group. The Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI. On 5/25/79, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto proc. questioning the 5/14/79 election. The said group claimed that the votes were not properly counted. May 25-31, 1979, the Puyat Group claims that at the conferences of the parties w/ resp. SEC Commissioner, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim BP, orally entered his appearance as counsel for resp. Acero to w/c the Puyat Group objected on Constitutional grounds. Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the 1973 Consti. provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before xxx any administrative body," and SEC was an administrative body. xxx On 7/17/79, the SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of ten shares. It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition w/ Prel. Inj. xxx On 9/4/79, the Court en banc issued a TRO enjoining resp SEC Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of resp. Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC case. HELD: The intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC case falls w/in the ambit of the prohibition contained in the Consti. There has been an indirect "appearance as counsel before xxx an administrative body." Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion of Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the pvt resps. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation. However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman F. in the SEC case. He had acquired a mere P200 worth of stocks in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact," that is, on 5/30/79, after the contested election of Directors on 5/14/79, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on 5/25/79 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on 5/31/79. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for resp.

Acero, but w/c was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 Phil 17 (1949) In Avelino v Cuenco, supra., the ruling then was: The quorum was computed on the number of Senators over whom the Senate has jurisdiction at the time of session. F: Jose Avelino was Senate President in 1949. On 2/21/49, Senators Tanada and Sanidad filed a resolution (Resolution 68) against Avelino calling for an investigation. During the session, Avelino and 6 others walked out leaving 12 senators behind. The 12 senators continued the session and passed resolution no. 67 declaring the Senate Pres. seat vacate. Sen. Cuenco was eventually elected as the acting Pres. of the Senate. By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioner asks the Court to declare him the rightful President of the Phil. Senate and oust resp., Sen. Cuenco. ISSUES: a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter? b. It if has, were resolutions Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved? c. Should the petition be granted? HELD: a. To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own pres., w/c power should not be interfered w/, nor taken over, by the judiciary. xxx b. The second question depends upon these sub-questions: (1) Was the session of the so-called rump Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled w/ 22 Senators (2 were absent-- one was abroad; the other was confined in a Manila hospital) in the morning of 2/21/49? (2) Was there a quorom in that session? (1) Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under Sen. Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of 10 senators may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other 12 senators from passing a resolution that met w/ their unanimous resolution. (2) If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was for the following reasons: (i) the minutes say so, (ii) at the beginning of such session there were at least 14 senators including Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and (iii) in view of the absence from the country of Senator Confessor, 12 senators constitute a majority of the Senate of 23 senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute a quorom, "the House" does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute the "House." There is a difference bet. a majority of "all the members of the House" and a majority of "the House," the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore, an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23) constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of the quorom. J. Pablo believes further that even if the 12 did not constitute a quorom, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members Alejandrino v Quezon, 46 Phil 83 (1924) The history behind the 60-day limitation on the period of suspension could be traced to the early case of Alejandrino v Quezon, infra. In a dictum, the SC said that it was not within the power of the legislature

to suspend its member, since suspension deprived the constituents of the member suspended of the right to be represented by a representative that they really had. In effect, suspension punished the constituents. In the case of expulsion, the constituents could at least elect someone else to substitute the member represented. If the only disciplinary measures were limited to expulsion and censure, however, there might not be a penalty appropriate enough for a disorderly behavior that merited something more than censure but less than expulsion. It was this dilemma, that the Court precisely faced in Osmena v Pendatun, which made it upheld the suspension of 15 months despite the Alejandrino ruling. Thus, the 1973 Constitution devised a system of allowing suspension as a penalty but limited its period to 60 days [Art. VII, Sec. 7(3)]. This was carried over in the 1987 Constitution. [Art. VI, Sec. 16(3)] F: The petitioner in this orig. pet. for mandamus and injunction is Jose Alejandrino, a Senator appointed by the Gov-Gen. to represent the 12th Senatorial District. The casus belli is a resolution adopted by the Phil. Senate composed of the resp. Senators, on 2/5/24, depriving Alejandrino of all the prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office for the period of 1 yr from 1/24 having been declared guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant viol. of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Sen. de Vera on the occasion of certain phrases being uttered by the latter in the course of the debate regarding the credentials of Mr. Alejandrino. The burden of petitioner's complaint is that the resolution is unconstitutional and entirely of no effect. HELD: 1. Mandamus (M). The gen. rule is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the govt to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. M will not lie against the legislative body, its members, or its officers, to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in their character w/c therefore pertains to their legislative functions and over w/c they have exclusive control. 2. On the merits of the controversy, the Organic Act authorizes the Gov-Gen. to appoint 2 senators and 9 representatives to represent the non-Christian regions in the Legislature. These senators and representatives "hold office until removed by the Gov.-Gen." They may not be removed by the Leg. However, to the Senate and the HRep., respectively, is granted the power to "punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, w/ the concurrence of 2/3, expel an elective member." xxx. The Consti. has purposely withheld from the 2 Houses of the Leg. and the Gov- Gen. alike the power to suspend an appointive member. The reason is obvious. Punishment by way of reprimand or fine vindicates the outraged dignity of the House w/o depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the honor of the legislative body while giving to the constituency an opportunity to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation w/o that district being afforded any means by w/c to fill the vacancy. By suspension, the seat remains filled but the occupant is silenced. Suspension for 1 yr. is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. However, the writ prayed for cannot issue, for the reason that the SC does not possess the power of coercion to make the Phil. Senate take any particular action. Mabanag v Lopez Vito, 78 Phil 1 (1947)

F: Three of the pltff. senators and 8 of the pltff. representatives had been proclaimed by a majority vote of the COMELEC as having been elected senators and representatives in the elections held on 4/23/46. The 3 senators were suspended by the Senate shortly after the opening of the first session following the elections, on account of alleged irregularities in their election. The 8 representatives since their election had not been allowed to sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of Speaker, for the same reason, although they had not been formally suspended. xxx As a consequence, these 3 senators and 8 reprs. did not take part in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned in the computation of the necessary 3/4 vote w/c is required in proposing an amendment to the Consti. (the Parity Rights Amendment.) If these members had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary 3/4 vote in either branch of Congress. HELD: 1. Jurisdiction.-- Both notions of jurisdiction and conclusiveness of legislative enactment are synonymous in that both are founded upon the regard w/c the judiciary accords a co-equal, coordinate, and independent branch of Govt. If a political question conclusively binds the judges out of respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or resolution also binds the judges under the "enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. xxx 2. Enrolled Bill Theory.-- The respondent's other chief reliance is on the contention that a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the courts. xxx Sec. 313 of the old Code of Civ. Proc., as amended, provides: "Official documents may be proved as follows: ***(2) the proceedings of the xxx Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk or secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, that in the case of Acts of xxx the Phil. Leg., when there is an existence of a copy signed by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof." Reasons in support of enrollment: Sec. 150. Reasons for Conclusiveness.-- xxx [T]he rule against going behind the enrolled bill is required by the respect due to a co-equal and independent dept of govt, and it would be an inquisition into the conduct of the members of the legislature, a very delicate power, the frequent exercise of w/c must lead to endless confusion in the admin. of the law. The rule is also one of convenience, bec. courts could not rely on the published session laws, but would be required to look beyond these to the journals of the legislature and often to any printed bills and amendments w/c might be found after the adjournment of the legislature. (Am. Jur.) 3. Compared w/ US v. Pons.-- The Court looked into the journals in US v. Pons bec., in all probability, those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in existence or was placed bef. the Court; and it has not been shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the law. Casco Chemical Co. v Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963)

F: Pursuant to the provisions of RA 2609 (For-Ex Margin Fee Law), the CB issued Circular No. 95, fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on for-ex transactions. xxx Several times in Nov. and Dec. 1959, petitioner Casco, w/c is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues xxx, bought for-ex for the importation of urea and formaldehyde-- w/c are the main RM in the production of said glues and paid the corresponding margin fee. Petitioner had sought the refund claiming that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Although the CB issued the vouchers for the refund, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers upon the ground that the exemption granted by the MB for petitioner's separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord w/ the provisions of sec. 2, par. XVIII of RA 2609. Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in the provision should be construed as "urea and formaldehyde" and that the resps herein have erred in holding otherwise. xxx "Urea formaldehyde" is a finished product, w/c is patently distinct and different from "urea" and "formaldehyde," as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde." Petitioner contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" bet. the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde" and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue xxx citing the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the bill bef. the House xxx. HELD: Said individual statements do not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the HRep. Further, the enrolled bill-- w/c uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde,"-- is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and adopted by the Pres. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill bef. it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Pres., the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation. Morales v Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969) In Morales v Subido, infra., the SC, in upholding the enrolled bill, explained that its basis is the separation of powers, so that the remedy of an aggrieved party is not a judicial decree but a legislative amendment or curative legislation. In this case, the phrase, "who has served the police department of city or " was omitted from the engrossed copy of the Police Act of 1966, thereby changing the qualifications required by the law of a chief of a city police agency. It was clear from the records and journal that the omission took place not any stage of the legislative proceedings, but only during its enrollment. It was further clear that the change was made not by Congress, but only by an employee. And yet the SC refused to go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened, because of the respect due the other departments. F: The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision (Sec. 10 of the Police Act of 1966), as amended at the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on 3rd reading, and that when the bill emerged from the conference committee, the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police w/ exemplary record." In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the various changes made. It is unmistakable that the phrase "who has served

the police dept of a city or," was still part of the provision, but according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire provision and substituted what is now Sec. 10 of the Act w/c did not carry such phrase. It would thus appear that the omission of the phrase "who has served the police dept of a city of", was made not at any stage of the legislative proceedings but only in the course of engrossment of the bill, more specifically in the proofreading thereof; that the change was not made by Congress but only by an employee thereof xxx. HELD: The petitioner wholly misconceives the function of the judiciary under our system of govt. [T]he enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the Pres. of the Phils. shows that sec. 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of Printing. We cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened. The respect due to the other branches of Govt demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise, we would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the labyrinth of law-making, w/ consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process. The investigation w/c the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in Congress. [W]e are not to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield to the enrolled bill. To be sure, there are certain matters w/c the Const. expressly requires must be entered on the journal of each house. xxx [W]ith respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy. Astorga v Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974) The case was different in Astorga v Villegas, infra., because here, upon being informed that the enrolled bill did not contain the amendment proposed by Senator Tolentino (regarding the powers of the ViceMayor of Manila) when the house bill was raised to the Senate, the Senate President, withdrew his signature and notified the President of the mistake, who then likewise withdrew his signature. There was no occasion, then, to apply the enrolled bill theory. In the Astorga v Villegas case, the SC, by way of obiter, indicated that the journal might really prevail over the enrolled bill, since a journal is required by the Constitution while the enrollment of a bill is just a legislative practice that is not even mentioned in the Constitution. Further, enrollment does not add to the validity of the bill, for what makes it valid are the votes of the members. F: House Bill No. 9266, w/c was filed in the HRep., passed on 3rd reading w/o amendments. It was sent to the Senate for concurrence. It was referred to the appropriate Senate Committee, w/c recommended approval w/ a minor amendment recommended by Sen. Roxas. When the bill was discussed on the Senate floor, substantial amendments to Sec. 1 were introduced by Sen. Tolentino, w/c amendments were approved in toto by the Senate. xxx On 5/21/54, the Sec. of the Senate sent a letter to HRep that the House bill had been passed by the Senate w/ amendments. Attached was a certification of the amendment, w/c was the one recommended by Sen. Roxas, and not the Tolentino amendments w/c were the ones actually approved by the Senate. The HRep signified approval as sent back to it. The printed copies were then certified and attested to by the Secretaries of the Senate and of

the HRep, the Speaker of the HRep, and the Senate Pres. It was later made public by Sen. Tolentino that the enrolled copy of House bill no. 9266 signed into law by the Pres. was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate and approved on the Senate floor. The Senate Pres. admitted this mistake in a letter to the Pres. As a result, the Pres. sent a message to the presiding officers of both Houses informing them that in view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his signature on House Bill no. 9266. Upon the foregoing facts, the Mayor of Mla. issued circulars ordering the disregard of the provisions of RA 4605. He also issued an order recalling 5 members of the city police force who had been assigned to the Vice-Mayor presumably under authority of RA 4065. Reacting to these steps, the then V-Mayor Astorga, filed a pet. w/ this Court for "Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition w/ Prel Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction" to compel compliance w/ the provisions of RA 4065. Respondents' position is that RA 4065 never became law since it was not the bill actually passed by the Senate, and that the entries in the journal of that body and not the enrolled bill itself should be decisive in the resolution of the issue. HELD: 1. Petitioner's argument that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is conclusive proof of a bill's due enactment, required, it is said, by the respect due to a co-equal dept of the govt, is neutralized in this case by the fact that the Senate Pres. declared his signature on the bill to be invalid and issued a subsequent clarification that the invalidation of his signature meant that the bill he had signed had never been approved by the Senate. Obviously this declaration should be accorded even greater respect than the attestation it invalidated, w/c it did for a reason that is undisputed in fact and indisputable in logic. As far as Congress itself is concerned, there is nothing sacrosanct in the certification made by the presiding officers. It is merely a mode of authentification. It is the approval by Congress and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. 2. Petitioner agrees that the attestation in the bill is not mandatory but argues that the disclaimer thereof by the Senate Pres., granting it to have been validly made, would only mean that there was no attestation at all, but would not affect the validity of the statute. xxx This arguments begs the question. It would limit the court's inquiry to the presence or absence of the attestation and to the effect of its absence upon the validity of the statute. The inquiry, however, goes farther. Absent such attestation as a result of the disclaimer, and consequently there being no enrolled bill to speak of, what evidence is there to determine w/n the bill had been duly enacted? In such a case, the entry in the journal should be consulted. Marshall Field & Co. v Clark, 143 US 649 (1891) It also contradicts the ratio in Marshall Field & Co. v Clark, 143 US 649 (1891) that the parties were not competent to show from the journal that the bill in the custody of the Secretary of State was against the contents of the journal, because journals are just kept by clerks who could be mistaken, while the certified bill is made by the highest officer of the chamber. It is not competent for the appellant to show from the Journals that the enrolled bill contained a section that does not appear in the enrolled Act in the custody of the State Department.

F: In accordance w/ the Tariff Act of Oct. 1, 1890, duties were assessed and collected on woollen dress goods, woollen wearing apparel, and silk embroideries imported by Field & Co.; on silk and cotton laces imported by Sutton & Co.; and on colored cotton cloths imported by Sternbach & Co. The importers severally protested against the assessment upon the ground that the Act was not a law of the US. It was contended, among others, that the Tariff Act was a nullity bec. "it is shown by congressional records of proceedings, reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by authority of Congress, and having reference to House Bill 9416, that a section of the bill as it finally passed, was not in the bill authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the respective houses of Congress, and approved by the Pres." HELD: The signing by the House Speaker and by the Senate Pres. of an enrolled bill is an official attestation by the two Houses that such bill is the one that has passed Congress. It is a declaration by the 2 houses, through their presiding officers, to the Pres. that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the govt, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills w/c pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when the bill thus attested is signed by the Pres. and deposited in the archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. US v Pons, 34 Phil 729 (1916) The journal is conclusive on the courts as to its contents, so the SC ruled in US V Pons, 34 Phil. 729 (1916). Pons, in this case was prosecuted under a criminal statute. He contended, however, that the statute was passed past the midnight after February 28, 1914, the last day of session of the legislative body, but that the members stopped the clock at mid-night, to pass the law. The SC rejected this claim, ruling that the probative value of the journal could not be questioned, otherwise proof of legislative action would be uncertain and would now have to depend on the imperfect memory of men. F: Juan Pons was accused of violating Act 2381 w/c prohibits the illegal importation of opium. In his motion for the reversal of his conviction, counsel contented that the last day of the special sessions of the Leg. for 1914 was 2/28; that Act 2381, under w/c Pons must be punished if found guilty, was not passed or approved on 2/28 but on 3/1 of that yr; and that, therefore, the same is null and void. The validity of the Act is not otherwise disputed. As it is admitted that the last day of the special session was, under the Gov- Gen's proclamation, 2/28 and that the appellant is charged w/ having violated Act 2381, the vital question is the date of the adjournment of the Leg., and this reduces itself to 2 others, namely, (1) how that is to be proved, whether by the legislative journals or extraneous evidence, and (2) whether the court can take judicial notice of the journals. HELD: A. While there are no adjudicated cases in this jurisdiction upon the exact question w/n the courts may take judicial notice of the legislative journals, it is well settled in the US that such journals may be noticed by courts in determining the question w/n a particular bill became a law or not. And these journals show, w/ absolute certainty, that the Leg. adjourned sine die at 12 o'clock on 2/28/14. B. We will inquire w/n the courts may go behind the legislative journals for the purpose of determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit. Counsel for appellant, in order to

establish his contention, must necessarily depend upon the memory or recollection of witnesses, while the legislative journals are the acts of the Govt or the sovereign itself. From their very nature and object the records of the Leg are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Leg., when they are clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter and spirit of the organic laws by w/c the Phil. Govt was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent dept of the Govt, and to interfere w/ the legitimate powers and functions of the Leg. xxx If the clock, was, in fact stopped, as here suggested, "the resultant evil might be slight as compared w/ that of altering the probative force and character of legislative records, and making the proof of legislative action depend upon uncertain oral evidence, liable to loss by death or absence, and so imperfect on account of the treachery of memory Bondoc v Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, Sept. 1991 In the case Bondoc vs Pineda, 201 SCRA 792, the question raised was whether the House of Representatives could, at the request of the dominant political party therein, change its representative in the HRET, presumably to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the Tribunal. While acknowledging the independence of the Tribunal as the "sole judge" of election contests involving the members of the House of Representatives, the SC assumed jurisdiction, precisely to protect that independence. The SC held that the independence of the HRET would become a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives of the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the judicial) component of the HRET, to serve the interests of the party in power. The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the HRET for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the NP's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the HRET to be the sole judge of the election contest between Bondoc and Pineda. To sanction such interference by the House of Representative in the work of the HRET would reduce the Tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power which the three SC justices and the lone minority member would be powerless to stop. A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the Tribunal. As judges, the members of the HRET must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality and independence -- even independence from the political party to which they belong. F: Pineda (LDP) and Bondoc (NP) both ran as congressional reps for the 4th district of Pampanga. Pineda won but Bondoc filed a protest in the House of Reps Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom are SC justices, and the remaining 6 are members of the House chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties & the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The HRET decided in favor of Bondoc. Cong. Camasura, an LDP, voted in favor of Bondoc. Before Bondoc could be proclaimed, the LDP expelled Camasura as member of the party. The 3 justices who also voted for Bondoc asked to be relieved from their assignment in the HRET because the withdrawal of Camasura as HRET rep of LDP in effect was a way of

aborting the proclamation of Bondoc (NP). [Request of Justices Melencio Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano to be relieved as members of the HRET (Res. March 19,1991)] ISSUES: 1. May the House of Reps at the request of the dominant political party therein, change the party's representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending therein? 2. May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House? HELD: (as to Issue #1): 1. No. The use of the word "SOLE" in both Sec. 17 of Art. VI of the 1987 Consti & Sec. 11 of Art. VI of the 1935 Consti underscores the EXCLUSIVE jurisdiction of the HRET as judge of contests relating to the ELECTION, RETURNS & QUALIFICATIONS of the members of the House (Robles v. HRET, GR 88647,1990). The tribunal was created to function as a NON- PARTISAN court although 2/3 of its members are politicians. It is a NON-POLITICAL body in a sea of politicians x x x. To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the HRET must be INDEPENDENT. Its jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not shared by it with the Legislature nor with the courts. 2. As judges, the members of the tribunal must be NON-PARTISAN. They must discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, & independence- even independence from the political party to which they belong. Hence, DISLOYALTY TO PARTY & BREACH OF PARTY DISCIPLINE are NOT VALID grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Cong. Camasura from the HRET for having cast a "conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the examination & appreciation of the ballots & the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the house committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Camasura is null & void. As to issue #2: Yes. The power & duty of the courts to nullify, in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive & legislative branches of the Govt., does not mean that the courts are superior to the President & the legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk the "irksome task" of inquiring into the constitutionality & legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this case. It is "a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power to hear and dispose of a case or controversu properly brogue before the court, to the determination of which must be brought the test & measure of the law (Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192). Co v Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, July 1991 F: Co, Balinquit & Ong ran for representative of the 2nd legislative district of Northern Samar in the May 11, 1987 elections. Ong won but pets (Co & Balanquit) protested Ong's election on the ground of noncitizenship. The HRET found for Ong. HELD: 1. Judgments of electoral tribunal are beyond judicial interference save only in the exercise of the Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, x x x upon a determination that the tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a

denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such grave abuse of discretion that there has to be a remedy for such abuse. 2. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, the Court cannot exercise its corrective power. Coseteng v Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 F: During the 1987 Congressional elections, Coseteng was the only candidate elected under the KAIBA party. Of the 12 elected to the Commission on Appointments, Roque Ablan of the KBL, repre- sented the Coalesced Minority. When the LDP was organized a year later, the House Committees including the House representation in the Commission on Appointments had to be reorganized. Coseteng requested Mitra that she be appointed a member of the CA as a representative of KAIBA. Ablan was however retained as the 12th member representing the House minority. Coseteng filed a petition to declare null and void the appointment of the members of the CA on the theory that their election to the CA violated the constitutional mandate of proportional representation. HELD : The petition should be dismissed not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but because the revision of the House representation in the CA is based on proportional representation of the political parties therein. The issue is justiciable. The legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the CA, is justiciable. Even if it were a political question, such would still come within judicial review on the issue of whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. The composition was based on proportional representation of the political parties therein. The other minority parties are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposi- tion party, its lone member represents only .4% of the House, thus she is not entitled to one of the 12 seats. The other representatives to the CA were duly elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Art. VI, Sec. 18. The validity of their election to the CA - eleven from the Coalesced Majority and one from the Coalesced Minority - is unassailable. Guingona v Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 F: As a result of the 1992 Senatorial elections, the LDP was entitled to 7.5 seats in the CA, the NPC to 2.5, the LAKAS-NUCD to 1.5 and the LP-PDP-LABAN to .5. The problem arose as to what to with the 1/2 to which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority converted a fractional half-membership to a whole membership (7.5 + .5) to be able to elect Senator Romulo. In so doing, one other party's fractional representation in the CA was reduced. This is clearly a violation of Sec. 18, Art. VI because it is no longer based on proportional representation of the political parties. Senator Tanada claimed that he has a right to be elected as member of the CA because of the physical impossibility of dividing a person (need to round off .5 to one senator) and because as the sole representative of his party, his party is entitled to representation.

HELD: The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under such rule. Section 18 also assures representation in the CA of any political party who succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of senators so elected enables it to put a representative in the CA. Therefore, in the Senate, a political party must at least have 2 duly elected senators for every seat in the CA. The SC does not agree that it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the CA. What the Constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire membership. The Constitu- tion does not require the election and presence of 12 senators and 12 members of the House in order that the Commission may function. The election of Senator Romulo and Tanada as members of the CA was clearly a violation of Art. VI, Sec. 18. Demetria v Alba, 148 SCRA 208 In Demetria v Alba, supra, it was held that Sec. 44 of the Budget Act of 1977 (BP 1177) granting the President the blanket authority to transfer funds from one department to another, with or without savings, is unconstitutional. Budget Law, Authorizing the Transfer of Items Appropriated for One Government Office to Another is Unconstitutional. F: Petitioners, as concerned citizens, and members of the BP, filed a petition for prohibition, contesting the validity of PD 1177, Sec. 44, authorizing the President of the Phils. "to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department... to any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or office...." HELD: Par. 1 of Sec. 44 of PD 1177 unduly extends the privilege granted under Art. VIII, Sec. 16 (5) of the 1973 Constitution. It empowers the Pres. to indiscriminately transfer funds from one dept. bureau, office or agency of the Executive Dept. to any program, project or activity of any dept. bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, w/o regard as to w/n the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the item from w/c the same are to be taken, or w/n the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to w/c said transfer is to be made. It does not completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void. Pelaez v Auditor General, 15 SCRA 569 At issue here was the validity of Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code empowering the President of the Philippines to create, merge, divide, abolish or otherwise alter the boundaries of municipal corporations. Pelaez contended that it was an invalid delegation of legislative power. The govt. argued that it was not, invoking the earlier case of Cardona vs Binangonan, 36 Phil 547, where the power of the

governor-general to transfer territory from one municipality to another was sustained. The SC upheld Pelaez. It ruled that the completeness test and the sufficient standard test must be applied together or concurrently. The SC declared that the Cardona case involved not the creation of a new municipality but merely the transfer of territory from one municipality to another. The power to fix such boundaries of existing municipalities may partake of an administrative nature but the creation of municipal corporations is strictly legislative in nature. Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Govt. the power to fill details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself -- it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate -- and (b) to fix a standard -- the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable-- to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, which is the essence of every law, and without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. Sec. 68 of the RAC does not meet these well settled requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise to avoid the evil effects of undue delegation. FACTS: The then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal created 33 new municipalities. He purportedly acted in accordance to Section 8 of Revised Administrative Code. Vice President questioned the power of the President, contending that creation of municipality is within the power of the Legislature. HELD: Creation of municipalities is a purely a legislative act. Only the Legislature can create concepts. - The President can only execute an existing law. - There was undue delegation of legislative power in this case because the law wherein the President based his action was not complete. It didnt provide for standard and policy. Cardona v Binangonan, 36 Phil 547

Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil 29 In Arnault v Nazareno. 87 Phil 29 (1950). Arnault was cited for contempt for persistently refusing, after taking the stand, to reveal the name of the person to whom gave the P440,000. In connection with the legislative investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong Real Estates whereby a certain Bert was able to sell the land to the government and realized P1.5 million. The second case of Arnault v Balagtas, 97 Phil 350 (1955) arose when he persisted in not giving information, this time about an affidavit which purportedly gave the details sur- rounding the acquisitions of the estates by Bert and the supposed circumstances under which he gave the amount to a Jess Santos. The Court in both cases, upheld the authority of the Senate to cite him in contempt, and thus dismissed the habeas corpus petitions.

When so held in contempt, since the Senate is a continuing body, the contempt seems to be effective even beyond the session during which the contempt was made, held the SC in Arnault, overruling the case of Lopez v de los Reyes, 55 Phil 170 (1930), where the Court held that the contempt lasted only for the session and could not be revived in the next session by a mere reapproval of the previous contempt.

Bengzon v Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767 In this case, the petitioners sought to restrain the respondent from investigating their participation in the alleged misuse of govt. funds and the illicit acquisition of properties being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The SC granted the petition, holding that the petitioners are impleaded as defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondent Committee, and that no legislation was apparently being contemplated in connection with the said investigation. However, the decision failed to consider that the proceeding before the Sandiganbayan was criminal in nature and that the purpose of the legislative investigation was to ascertain the disposition of funds and properties claimed to be public in nature. Its findings on this matter could be the subject of legislation although it may not have been expressly stated that such was the purpose of the inquiry. As observed in the earlier case of Arnault vs Nazareno, 87 Phil 29, the SC is bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it was capable of being so construed, and it has no right to assume that the contrary was intended. Facts: - Petition for prohibition to review the decision of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee - 7/30/1987: RP, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed w/ the Sandiganbayan. -The complaint alleges that defendants Benjamin and Juliette Romualdez took advantage of their relationship w/ Defendants Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos to engage in schemes to enrich themselves at the expense of the Plaintiff and the Filipino People, among others: -obtaining control over Meralco, Benguet Mining Co., Shell, PCI Bank, etc., selling interests to PNI Holdings, Inc. (corporators, Bengzon Law Offices), the concealment of the assets subject to the complaint from the PCGG under the veil of corporate identity, etc. 8/2-6/1988: reports circulate of the sale of the Romualdez companies for 5M (far below market value) without PCGG approval to the Ricardo Lopa Group, owned by Pres. Aquinos brother-in-law, Ricardo Lopa

Sen. Enrile called upon the Senate to investigate a possible violation of S5 of RA 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act w/c prohibits any relative of the President by affinity or consanguinity up to the 3rd civil degree, to intervene in any transaction w/ the government -the matter was referred to the Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee) -the Committee subpoenaed the petitioners and Ricardo Lopa to testify what they know about the Romualdez corporations -at the hearing, Lopa and Bengzon declined to testify, the former invoking the due process clause, and both averring that such testimonies would unduly prejudice the defendants of the civil case -petitioners thus filed the present petition for prohibition, praying for a temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, claiming that the Committee acted in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose -the Committee claims that the Court cannot enjoin the Congress or its committees from making inquiries in aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers (quoting Angara v. Comelec) -the Court finds this contention untenable and is of the view that it has the jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries and determine the scope and extent of the power of the Blue Ribbon Committee Issue: 1. WON the Blue Ribbon Committees inquiry is in aid of legislation: 2. WON Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government 3. WON the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process Held/Ratio: -No, Blue ribbon committees inquiry is not in aid of legislation - Sen. Enriles inquiry merely intended to find out WON Ricardo Lopa had any part in the alleged sale of the Romualdez corporationsthere was no intended legislation as required by A6 S21 of the constitution. As held in Jean L. Arnault v. Leon Nazareno et al., the inquiry must be material or necessary to the exercise of a power vested in the Committee by the Constitution. In Watkins v. US it was held that Congress power of inquiry is limited, that is, it may not pry into private affairs if such actions are not in furtherance of a legitimate task of congress no inquiry is an end in itself. 2. YES Congress is encroaching on the exclusive domain of another branch of government - Since the issue had been pre-empted by the Sandiganbayan, any further investigation by Congress would only serve to complicate matters and produce conflicting opinionsas held in Baremblatt v. US, Congress cannot inquire into matters w/c are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary.

3. Yes, the inquiry violates the petitioners right to due process - It has been hled that a congressional committees right to inquire is subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on government action including the Bill of rights. As held in Hutcheson v US, it cant be assumed that legislative purpose is always justified by public need; Congress cannot tread on private rights. The doctrine in Cabal v. Kapunan states that the Constitutional right against selfincrimination extends to all proceedings sanctioned by law and in cases in w/c the witness is an accused. Disposition the petitioners may not be compelled by the Committee to appear, testify, and produce evidence before it because such inquiries would not be in aid of legislation and if pursued, would be violative of the principle separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments, as ordained by the Constitution. The petition is GRANTED. RA 7166 an act providing for synchronized national and local elections and for electoral reforms

Sarmiento v Mison, 156 SCRA 549 In Sarmiento vs Mison, 156 SCRA 549, the Commissioner of Customs was held not to be subject to confirmation, being of the rank of the bureau director, who was purposely deleted from the listing of those whose appointments had to be approved by the Commission on Appointments. It was the clear and express intent of the framers of the Constitution to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the CA, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in Art. VII, Sec. 16. The power to appoint is already vested in the President, without need of confirmation by the CA. F: Petitioners brought this suit for prohibition in their capacity as taxpayers, members of the Bar and law professors, to enjoin respondent Commissioner of Customs from performing his functions on the ground that his appointment, w/o confirmation by the CA, is unconstitutional. HELD: Art. VII, Sec. 16, as orginally proposed by the Committe on Executive Power of the 1986 Con Com read: Sec. 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments. However, on motion of Comm. Foz, 2 changes were approved in the text of the provision. The first was to delete the phrase "and bureaus," and the second was to place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitute the phrase "and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." The first amendment was intended to exempt the appointment of bureau directors from the requirement of confirmation on the ground that this position is low and to require confirmation would subject bureau directors to

political influence. On the other hand, the 2nd amendment was intended to subject to confirmation only those mentioned in the frist sentence, namely: The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Consti, i.e., (1) Regular members of the Judicial and Bar Council [Art. VIII, Sec. 8(2)] (2) Chairman and Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission [Art. IX-B, Sec. 1 (2)]; (3) Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC [Art. IX-C, Sec. 1 (2)]; (4) Chairman and Commissioners of the COA [Art. IX-D, Sec. 1 (2)]; (5) Members of the regional consultative commission (Art. X, Sec. 18.) The rest of the appointments mentioned in sec. 16 are not subject to confirmation. These are: (1) all other officers of the Govt whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; (2) those whom the Pres. may be authorized by law to appoint; and (3) officers lower in rank whose appointments Congress may by law vest in the Pres. alone. Lecaroz v Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324 In Lecaroz vs Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 324, the SC said that the broad power of the Constitution vests the respondent court with jurisdiction over public officers and employees, including those in GOOCs. There are exceptions, however, like the constitutional officers, particularly those declared to be removable by impeachment. In their case, the Constitution proscribes removal from office by any other method; otherwise, to allow a public officer who may be removed solely by impeachment to be charged criminally while holding his office with an offense that carries the penalty of removal from office, would be violative of the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in accordance with law. The effect of impeachment is limited to the loss of position and disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit under the Republic of the Philippines. The party thus convicted may be proceeded against, tried and thereafter punished in accordance with law. The clear implication is, the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of a criminal action in accordance with law may not prosper. Constitutional officers are not entitled to immunity from liability for possible criminal acts. But there is a fundamental procedural requirement that must be observed before such liability may be determined and enforced. They must first be removed from office via the constitutional route of impeachment (Art. XI, Secs. 2 and 3). Should they be impeached, they may then be held to answer either criminally or administratively for any wrong or misbehavior that may be proven against them in appropriate proceedings. Therefore a fiscal or prosecuting officer should forthwith and motu proprio dismiss any charges brought against constitutional officers. The remedy of a person with a legitimate grievance is to file impeachment proceedings.

Facts: On Oct. 21, 1980, the petitioner was charged with the crime of grave coercion Using his authority and his position as mayor, he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took over the control of a gas station belonging to Pedro Par, ordering the policemen who were with him to sell gasoline, issuing invoices and some pieces of yellow pad paper, and to padlock a dispensing pump effectively depriving Pedro Par of the exercise of his occupation. Used threat force and/or violence to prevent him from doing something that was not against the law. Petitioners contentions: 1) respondent court lacks jurisdiction. Should be filed with the ordinary court in Marinduque where the alleged crime took place. 2) the offense he was charged with is not related to his office as mayor 3) assuming the respondent has jurisdiction, it committedgrave abuse of discretion by denying the transfer to the Court of First Instance in Marinduque ( all witnesses are from that island) Courts response : 1) The respondent has concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. The rule is that once a court acquires jurisdiction, it must continue exercising it. (mar 23 1983, PD 1861 transfers juridisdiction of cases of the same penalty grade to the regular courts, however, sec 2 of the same PD states that pending cases will remain under the jurisdiction of the courts they are already in) 2) if petitioner was not the mayor he would not have been able to compel the policemen to do the said acts because they would not obey him in the first place. 3) same response as number 1 IN RELATION TO THE SYLLABUS- POWER OF IMPEACHMENT*** Some officials can only be removed by impeachment ( President, VP, members of the consti commission under sec 2, art XIII 1973 Consti ). It would follow that charging such people with crimes that carry the penalty of removal from office would be going against the clear mandate of the fundamental law. Judgement in cases of impeachment will only entail removal from office of the accused, he/she will still be liable for any other criminal charges. ( the party convicted in the impeachment proceeding shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law; and that if the same does not result in a conviction and the official is not thereby removed, the filing of criminal action in accordance with the law will not prosper. ) PETITION DISMISSED Dela Cruz v Paras, 123 SCRA 572 In Cruz v Paras, infra. the SC referred to the title of the bill to fix the meaning of the text or the substantive portion of the bill. The title provided for the "regulation" of nightclubs and other places for entertainment, while the text, as amended, gave local governments the authority to "prohibit" these places altogether. The Court ruled that Bocaue, could not, under this law, prohibit these places but only regulate them, first because the title was controlling over the text (VV: the Court stood the principle on its head), and second, because the nightclubs were not nuisances per se that could be summarily evicted. To construe the amendatory act as granting municipal corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

F: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue from enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance halls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate them. The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari. HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of nightclubs and the like. While it is true that On 5/21/54, the law was ameded by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun. corporations the power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment. Certiorari granted. Guingona v Carague, 196 SCRA 221 F: Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget. HELD: While it is true that under Sec. 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is mandated to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives. In this case, the budget for education has tripled and the compensation for teachers has doubled. This is a clear compliance with the constitutional mandate giving highest priority to education. Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of our country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. If in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share allocated to education, the SC finds that such appropriation is constitutional. It was also argued that the Presidential Decrees authorizing automatic appropriation is violative of Sec. 29(1) : No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty, and exactness in an appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the debt service. The SC was not persuaded by such arguments. The transitory provisions provide that all existing laws not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. In this case, the automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management policies.

It was argued that the PDs did not meet the requirement that all appropriations authorizing increase of debt must be passed by Congress and approved by the President (VI, 24 and 27). This refers only to appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. In this case, the PDs have been considered as passed. As to whether there was undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that in this case, the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein. In this case, the legislative intention is clear and that is the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the country to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other charges when they shall become due without the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. Although the amounts are not stated specifically, such amounts are limited to the principal, interest, taxes and other charges. Gonzales v Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452 In Gonzales vs Macaraig, 191 SCRA 452, the President of the Philippines vetoed a provision in the 1989 General Appropriations Bill and later a similar provision in the 1990 General Appropriations Bill [providing for a prohibition against the restoration or increase of recommended appropriations disapproved and/or reduced by Congress]. In her veto message, Pres. Aquino said that such provision violates Art. VI Sec. 25(5) and that it nullifies her power and that of the Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations, even in cases of calamity or in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services. In rejecting the challenge to the veto, the SC declared that the restrictive interpretation urged by the petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operate to the appropriation to which it relates [Art. VI, Sec. 25(5).] In other words, a provision in an appropriation bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill. In this case, the challenged provisions do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Also, such provisions are more of an expression of Congressional policy rather than a budgetary appropriation. They should be treated as items for the purpose of the President's veto power. FACTS: Petitioners are assailing Pres. Aquinos veto of Section 55 and 16 of the General Appropriations Bill of 1989 and 1990, respectively. Both provisions prohibit the restoration of appropriations that are disapproved by Congress. Pres. Aquino vetoed said provisions because it will prevent her from augmenting appropriations in cases of calamity, urgency and dire need. Petitioner contends that Sec 55 and 16 are provisions, not items, and thus outside the veto power of the Pres.

RULING: Veto is constitutional. Although the 1987 Consti eliminated provisions, the extent of Pres veto power is unchanged. Provisions are distinct and severable, and may be separately vetoed. A provision relates to some particular appropriation in the bill, and not to the entire bill. Sec 55 and 16 are inappropriate provisions because they apply generally to all items. They are more of an expression of congressional policy, hence, they are to be treated as items and may be vetoed. The Pres is granted statutory authority to augment appropriations within the Exec branch (PD 1177 and GAA 1989) Bengzon v Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992) F: The issue here is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the 1992 General Appropriations Act relating to the payment of adjusted pensions to retired justices of the SC and the CA. According to Pres. Aquino, the payment of such adjusted pensions (adjusted with respect to the peso purchasing power) would erode the govt's collective effort to enforce the policy of standardization of compensation and that govt. should not grant distinct privileges to select groups of officials over those of the vast majority of civil service servants. The retired justices asserted that such subject veto is not an item veto. HELD: The veto power of the President is not absolute. The Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. However when it comes to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of govt. and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. This is the reason for the item veto power. The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. The terms "item" and "provision" are different. An item refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts of the bill. It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose. An item obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of money, and not some general provision of law. In this case, the President did not veto an item. She vetoed the methods or systems placed by Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials will be paid when they fall due. In this case, the vetoed portions are not items but are provisions. The augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by transferring savings from other items of appropriations is a provision and not an item. It gives the SC Chief Justice the power to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of money involved. Neither may the veto power be exercised as a means of repealing existing laws. This is arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. Taada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 According to the ruling upon reconsideration in Tanada v Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 (1985), in addition to the date fixed either by the effectivity clause of the statute, or, in its absence, by Art. 2 of the Civil (15 days

after its publication), there must first be a publication of the law either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation [EO 200]. Otherwise, there is a violation of due process. F: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC. HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual 15-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed w/ altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Senate v Executive Secretary Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006) Senate (petitioner) claims that EO 464 has prevented the exercise of the power of the Senate to perform investigations in aid of legislation; North Rail Project (Enrile privilege speech); election fraud, Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan, wiretapping (Pimentel jr, Estrada, Biazon privilege speeches, Madrigal, Biazon resolutions); fertilizer fund scam (Blue Ribbon Committee)

Bayan Muna (petitioner) claims EO 464 infringes on rights of members of Congress (Senate plus House of Representatives) to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws COURAGE (petitioner) claims implementation of EO464 threatens tenure of members of public office, should they be summoned by Congress CODAL (petitioner) claims right to information is threatened by imposition of EO 464 Chavez (petitioner) claims constitutional rights as taxpayer, citizen, and law practitioner claims constitutional rights are violated ALG (petitioner) claims right to information of the public is denied by EO 464 PDP-LABAN (petitioner) claims that EO 464 hampers the legislative agenda of its members in Congress, particularly in the conduct of investigations in aid of legislation IBP (petitioner) claims right to information of the public is denied by EO 464 Ermita (respondent) prays court for dismissal of petitions for lack of merit Issue: 1. Whether EO 464 contravenes the power of inquiry of Congress (investigations in aid of legislation) 2. Whether EO 464 violates right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern 3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion by implementing EO 464 prior to publication Held: 1. Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 are unconstitutional (void) because it infringes on the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation 2. Sections 2(b) and 3 of EO 464 are unconstitutional (void) because it infringes on the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, and since investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, and matters under investigation in aid of legislation are presumed to be a matter of public concern, it thus infringes on the right of the people to information 2. EO 464 is covered by the requirement that the order must have been published before implemented. Ratio: 1. Sections 2(b) and 3 are invalid because claim of executive privilege is implied, not asserted -- no precise or certain reasons given to support claim of executive privilege (respect for co-equal branch of government); Sections 1 and 2(a) valid under Art VI, Sec 22, on the provision on appearances on the question hour (appearance is discretionary then), but this validity cannot be applied on inquiries in aid of legislation (appearance is mandatory unless a valid claim of privilege is made by the President or the Executive Secretary)

3. See above. 4. Since EO 464 has a direct effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, it is a matter of public interest, and due process requires that the people be informed of the issuance of the order prior to its implementation. Neri v Senate, GR No. 180643, March 25, 2008 Facts: April 21, 2007 DOTC entered into a contract with Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290 (P16 billion). The project was to be financed by China. In connection with the NBN Project, several resolutions were introduced in the Senate 1. Pimentel- circumstances leading to the approval of the NBN deal with ZTE, the role played by the officials in able for the deal to be consummated 2. Roxas urging the President to cancel the ZTE Contract 3. Lacson national defense implications 4. Santiago economic justification of the NBN project Investigation was claimed to be relevant to 3 pending bills 1. Roxas subjecting treaties, international or executive agreements involving funding in the procurement of infrastructure projects 2. Roxas safeguards in contracting loans classified as Official Development Assistance 3. Santiago concurrence to international agreements and executive agreements September 18 Jose de Venecia III testifies to several high executive officials and power brokers using their influence to push the NBN project. It was formerly a BOT project but the NEDA acquiesced to convert it to a government to government project. September 26 attended hearing, deliberated for 11 hours but refused to answer 3 questions, and by invoking executive privilege. i. Whether the president followed up the NBN project? ii. Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE? iii. Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being told about the alleged bribe? Committees issued a subpoena ad testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and testify on November 20. November 15 Ermita requested respondent committees to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege

November 20 Petitioner did not appear November 22 show cause letter sent November 29 Neri sends letter: 1) non-appearance order by the President, 2) conversation with president involved sensitive national security and diplomatic matters, 3) consent to attend new Senate hearing provided that he be furnished questions in advance. December 7 petitioner files the present petition assailing the show cause letter dated November 22, 2007. January 1 Neri declared by committees in contempt of court (Neri files reconsideration order) February 1 Neri files supplemental petition for certiorari with urgent application for TRO and preliminary injunction, seeking to restrain the said contempt order. March 17, 2008 SolGen filed a motion for leave to intervene and to admit attached memorandum - Conversation covered by executive privilege - Petitioner not summoned in accordance with inquiries in aid of legislation (Sec 21) Art VI and Senate v. Ermita - There was an abuse of discretion for alleged non-compliance with subpoena dated November 13, 2007. Neri invoked executive privilege in refusing to answer the three questions; alleged that his nonappearance at the hearing was upon Presidents order; and his conversations with the president on NBN project were covered by the privilege being about national security and diplomatic matters Issue: 1. Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject 3 questions are covered by executive privilege? YES. 2. Whether or not respondent Committee committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order? Yes Ruling/doctrine: - laid down the three elements of presidential communications privilege: 1. protected communication must be quintessential and non-delegable presidential power 2. communication must be authored or solicited and received by an advisor in operational proximity with the president 3. presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and unavailability of the information elsewhere - claim of executive privilege is properly invoked by Neri applying the three elements in the case: 1. authority of the President to enter into executive agreement is recognized in Phil. Jurisprudence 2. Neri is considered a close advisor, being a member of the Presidents cabinet

3. No adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of information BANAT v COMELEC (re: Computation of the number of seats for party-list representatives in the House of Representatives)