TAADA VS.

TUVERA FACTS:

Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties. Consunji vs. Court of Appeals FACTS: At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision. ISSUES:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents, through the Solicitor General would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that the petitioner are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question. Respondent further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of the law where the law themselves provides for their own effectivity dates. ISSUES:

Whether the presidential decrees in question which contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity? RULING:

Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions, RULING: The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmens Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had. Cui vs Arellano University FACTS: Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4th year. During these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of records from Arellano University. The

Publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date, for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the 15th day following its publication, but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose burdens on the people, such as tax revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concern. The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. PEOPLE VS. QUE PO LAY, digested 94 SCRA 641, March 29, 1954 (Constitutional Law Publication of Bank Circulars and Regulations) FACTS: Appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Central Bank Circular No. 20. Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect. ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect. HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.

defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR.

On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38 addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to attract and keep students in a school. ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship grant provided by Arellano University. HELD: The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.

More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named James Chua sometime in 1983". On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash. Issue: Whether or not the criminal cases filed by the German ex-spouse may prosper. Ruling: Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARASALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents. Facts:

The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs and dismissing defendants counterclaim. Minciano vs. Brimo 50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924 Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However, Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provision s of Joseph Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code. Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary disposition. Held: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen , though he declared in his will that Philippine laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance with Article 10 of the Civil Code Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653 Facts: Article 26; On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila. Thereafter, marital discord set in, followed by a separation de facto between them. After about three and a half years of marriage, private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they had been living apart since April 1982. On January 15, 1986, Schoneberg Local Court promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila on January 23, 1983.

Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court. In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioners motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial courts lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge. Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country. Held: Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children. In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent Facts: Rederick, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian Family Court. On 26 June 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a Certificate of Australian Citizenship issued by an Australian government. Subsequently, Recio-Garcia nuptial took place in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City on January 12, 1994. In their marriage application for marriage license, respondent was declared as single and Filipino. Since October 22, 1995 Garcia and Recio lived separately without prior dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 1996, in accordance with their declaration secured in Australia. March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the trial court, on the ground of bigamyrespondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she only learned of Recios marriage to Samson in November 1997. In his answer, Recio averred that as of 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage to an Australian citizen, that it had been validly dissolved by decree of divorce in 1989, making him legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994. Issues:

3. Yes. The burden of proof lies with the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action. Since the divorce was a defense raised by the respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. The Court still stands that compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated. WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantive justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the p arties marriage on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. AMAY BISAYA, respondent Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorneys fees. Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotels former managers birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latters present. At the party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse. Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisayas claim that she invited him to the party. Issue:

1. Whether or not a Filipino, who became a naturalized Australian citizen, is still bound by Philippine Laws. 2. Whether or not the respondent has legal capacity to marry the petitioner after the Australian decree of divorce. 3. Whether or not a former Filipino need not to present any document proving his divorced marriage with a foreigner which he obtained abroad. Held: 1. No. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13, and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. 2. No. In this case, respondent failed to prove his legal capacity to remarry even if he showed the Australian divorce decree, which he said was a public document, a written official act of an Australian family court, and thus needs no further proof of authenticity and due execution. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The Court ruled that presentation solely of the divorce decree, which is what the respondent did, is insufficient.

Whether or not petitioner Lims conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for damages caused to plaintiff. Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are

hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED. Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondent Facts: This is a petition for review filed by petitioners regarding the February 1, 2000 Decision and the April 10, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals where the decision of the trial court is set aside, the complaint against MERALCO is dismissed, and plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay defendant-appellant the differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of used but unregistered electrical consumption. Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing, plaintiffsappellees in this case, are the owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City which they bought from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. On March 3, 1995, around 9am, defendant-appellants inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlina were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house owned by the spouses. The inspectors performed their standard operating procedure by first asking permission from the secretary of the couple before they proceed to the inspection of the house. Later, the inspectors found out that there were few illegal markings on the meter which made defendant-appellant temporarily disconnect electrical services that will only be restored unless the couple will pay P178, 875 representing the differential bill. However, at around 2pm, the electric service was reconnected as instructed by defendantappellants officer. Plaintiff-appellees filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

their secret marriage; however, she continued living with her parents than eloping with her husband. Pastor went to Manila, leaving his wife in Cebu. Vicenta later went to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. On 24 June 1950, she applied for a passport where it is indicated the she is single. After approval of the application, she left for the United States and there, on August 1950, filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor on the ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character; marriage was decreed divorced as final and absolute in Nevada on October 1950. She then sought papal dispensation for her marriage to Tenchavez. In 1954, Vicenta married an American and begotten children. She acquired American citizenship in 1958. Herein petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta Escao and her parents, whom he alleged to have influenced her from living with him.

Issue: Whether or not parents-defendants shall pay petitioner for damages.

Held: No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved. Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows; (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escao; (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees. Neither party to recover costs. GASHEEM SHOKAT BAKSH vs. COURT OF APPEALS Facts: Private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the trial court a complaint against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement of marriage. Respondent alleged that she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community. Petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges. Before August 20, 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her. She accepted his love on the condition that they would get married. Petitioner then visited the respondents parents in Banaga, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage. Sometime on August

Issue: Whether or not the act of the defendant-appellants inspectors in immediately disconnecting the electrical service of MERALCO constituted a violation of rights of the plaintiffsappellees, making the respondent liable to pay damages to petitioner.

Held: Yes. Respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners electrical supply without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Public utilities have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing differential of P193, 322.96; while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, and P50,000 as attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED. PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees Facts: Out of their love affair, Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married on 24 February 1948 before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. Their marriage was duly registered in the local civil registrar. Later in their marriage, Vicentas parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, found out of

20, 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartment. She was a virgin before she began living with him.A week before the filing of the complaint, petitioners attitude towards her started to change. He maltreated her and threatened to kill her, and as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries. During a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living inBacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount not less than P45,000, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600, attorneys fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as maybe just and equitable, which then rendered decision by court in favor of private respondent. Issue: Whether or not damages is recoverable for breach of promise to marry. Held: The Supreme Court held that when a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in the sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Art. 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE CIVIL LAW Salvador Abunado et al. V. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 159218, 30 March 2004, First Division, (YnaresSantiago, J.) The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no hearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required fro the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted Thus, under the law, a marriage even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab ignition, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Salvador Abunado married Zenaida Bias on December 24, 1955. In 1966, Salvador separated from Zenaida. On September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arcea. Several years later in 1988, Narcisa left the country to work in Japan. On January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second marriage with Zenaida. When Narcisa returned in 1992, she discovered that Salvador left their conjugal home and now has an extramarital affair with a certain Fe Corazon Palto. Narcisa also learned of Salvadors marriage to Zenaida in 1989. On January 19, 1995, Salvador filed an annulment case against Narcisa. That same year, on May 18, 1995, Narcisa filed a complaint for bigamy against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador, however, claimed he cannot be liable for bigamy since Narcisa has consented to his marriage with Zenaida. Salvador moreover, argued that his petition for annulment was a prejudicial question hence, proceedings in the bigamy case should first be suspended to give way to the civil case for annulment. ISSUE: Whether or not the subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial to the case

HELD: First Issue: Subsequent Judicial Declaration Of the Nullity Of the First Marriage Was Immaterial Salvador cannot invoke the benefit of a prejudicial question nor the order of the trial court annulling his marriage with Narcisa since the offense had already been consummated even before he instituted the civil case for annulment which preceded Narcisas complaint for bigamy. A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled. Salvadors conviction is affirmed