EDUCATIONAL THEORY Fall 1980, Vol. 30, No.

4 @ 1980 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

The Foundations of Ivan Illich's Social Thought*

By Timothy Reagan
I.

Ivan Illich, throughout his prolific writings and activities, has maintained a consistent and identifiable theoretical conception of what he considers to be the "just society." This conception seems to be grounded, to a considerable extent, not in the libertarian or radical perspectives from which he draws his critique of contemporary society (both capitalist and hierarchical socialist),' but rather in the medieval ideal of human society. The medieval ideal of human society stresses the cooperative nature of human endeavor, as well as the ties of the individual both t o the social community and to nature. The partial dichotomy which emerges here between the individual and the community is based on a clear acceptance of the independent existence and ontological significance of the individual - a point to which I will refer shortly. Further, this ideal carries with it a number of other cogent tenets which have major socio-economic, political, and religious implications. Among these are the notion of the dignity of poverty (most clearly exemplified in the medieval view of the mendicant), the concept of legitimate or "just" authority (which, although related to both the notion o f the "Great Chain of Being" and that of Divine Right, is not dependent o n either), and the conception of the central role t o be played by religion (or, more accurately, by religious faith) in both social and individual life. It is important, I think, to clearly distinguish and explicate the ways in which this concept differs from contemporary mainstream ideology in the West (i.e., New Liberalism), which has been one of the frequent, if generally unarticulated, targets of Illich's work. While there are, in fact, some surface similarities, these two conceptions of society are, I would suggest, basically incompatible. The notion of community is a good example of this theoretical incompatibility. While both the New Liberal society and Illich's ideal stress the cooperative nature of the social community, and while both seem to accept a transcendental view of community, the two conceptions are nonetheless far from parallel. The New Liberal conception views the individualicommunity dichotomy as a false one, since, it is asserted, an individual is socially constituted and, hence, has no meaningful indeTimothy Reagan is a Ph.D. candidate, Department of Educational Policy Studies, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. A shorter version of this paper appeared in the Journal of the Midwest History of Education Society 9 (1981). I am grateful to Patricia Amburgy, James Anderson, Gloria Cordon de Bunker, Ruth Burnham. Clarence Karier, Gabrielle Lakomski, Mary Leach, Timothy O'Hanlon, Ralph Page, Philip Steedman, Rudolph Troike, and Paul Violas for their help and support. 1. lllich has been described as a libertarian, a revolutionary, a radical, a participatory socialist, a supporter of entrepreneurial capitalism, and probably everything in between. For examples of this broad range of perceptions, see Robin Barrow, Radical Education (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978); Herbert Gintis, "Toward a Political Economy of Education: A Radical Critique of Ivan Illich's Deschooling Society," in Ivan lllich et al., After Deschooling, What? (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973); Carl G. Hedman, "The 'Deschooling' Controversy Revisited: A Defense of Illich's 'Participatory Socialism','' Educational Theory 29, 2 (Spring 1979); Hugh G. Petrie, "Review of Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society," Educational Theory 22, 4 (Fall 1972); Joaquin Saenz y Arriaga, Cuernavaca y e l progresimo religioso en Mexico (Mexico: 1967); and Madan Sarup. Marxism and Education (London: Routledge 8 Kegan Paul, 1978).

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pendent existence apart from the community.2 Further, this perspective sees the end of the community as the maintenance and continuity of the community itself. Sharing the New Liberal rejection of the individuallcommunity dichotomy to some extent, the medieval conception of the "just society" is less able to make this rejection a universal one. This is so for a number of reasons. First, while arguing that in the ideal, the dichotomy between the individual and the community ought to be minimal, this perspective does recognize the unlikelihood of this fortuitous development, and therefore, the need to plan for dissonance which need not be blamed on the individual. This demonstrates a fundamental distinction between the two social ideologies: New Liberalism perceives any conflict between the individual and the community as dysfunctional, and symptomatic of a problem of adjustment in the individual, while the medieval notion sees some conflict as a positive and functional social force (e.g., the role played by saints and, in an earlier age, by the Prophets), and also as potentially (though not necessarily) demonstrative of social, rather than individual, ills. Second, t h e medieval ideal's rejection of the individuallcommunity dichotomy is less total due to its basic acceptance of the notion of independent and free individuality, as noted earlier. While stressing the need for and desirability of social cooperation, this ideal also emphasizes the individual's personal responsibility - for example, for ethical decision-making in accord with Moral Law (especially as manifested in informed individual conscience), thus limiting the extent to which the community can legitimately supersede the individual. Related to this idea of individual responsibility is a notion of the end of the community which is very different from that of the New Liberal conception of social ends. The community, as understood in medieval social theory, has what Dante, writing at the start of the fourteenth ~ e n t u r y referred ,~ to as duo ultirna -two final goals. The first, religious regeneration leading to salvation, is to be achieved through membership in the religious community - but nevertheless on an essentially individual, rather than communal, basis. The second goal is happiness in the present world, which is achieved through the civil community, and which will be more, if not completely, communal in orientation. These duo ultima can be reached, it is believed, only together, as two parts of a greater whole. The distinction between the New Liberal and medieval conceptions of social ends, then, is related to the rote to be played by the individual in the community, as well as to the issue of whether the central concern of the just social order is the community or the individuals which compose the community. Although typical of the differences between the medieval and New Liberal conceptions of society, the notion of community is but one of several very good examples which might be presented here. Other possibilities would include the role of nature in both individual and social life, the nature, origin, and limitations of legitimate authority, the question of alienation, the nature of and problems with social institutions, the goal of human life, the role of religious faith (both personally and socially), and so on. In each of these cases, I believe that a good argument
2. This is, of course, a grossly over-simptified analysis of New Liberal thought. I do not mean to suggest that New Liberalism is entirely consistent internally, nor that all of its manifestations will totally ignore the separate existence of the individual. I do think, however, that a reasonably valid case might be made (emphasizing George Herbert Mead, for example) which would support the general contention that the individualicommunity dichotomy is, for New Liberalism, a problematic one. Another approach to this issue is to stress the difference between the articulation and the effects of an ideology. In the case of New Liberalism, I suspect that it could be shown that these two concepts are, despite some apparent inconsistencies, fundamentally in accord on most issues, and that if the rhetoric of ideological articulation is carefully examined, rather than simpty taken at face value, it can in fact be shown to support a variety of very undesirable (and, I think, immoral) social developments. 3. See Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 17.

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could be presented to suggest that the two ideological perspectives will result not only in different, but in incompatible, analyses and social policies. In the next section of this paper, Ivan Illichs treatment of schooling in contemporary society will be examined, and an attempt will be made to relate this treatment to what I believe is the underlying, essentially medieval, social theory. It will then be suggested, though in less detail, that the same sort of analysis would be applicable to Illichs treatment of other components of modern society - energy, medicine, and religion being the most obvious cases in point.

II.
Illichs critique of schooling, like his critiques of other social institutions, is essentially dialectical, first stressing the flaws and problems with the current situation, and second, offering an alternative model of what might be. His insights visa-vis problems in contemporary schooling are both acute and profound, and his model of the deschooled society is a creative and intriguing one. What he fails to provide - as do so many other educational critics - is a reasonable description of how, if we so desired, we might get from what is to what ought t o be. This problem, which I believe to be common t o all of Illichs institutional critiques, leaves one with the fear that, as the old Vermont farmer once observed with regard to another problem, You cant get there from here. This is, however, a problem of a nature quite different from that with which most of this section will be concerned, and one which is, I think, far more easily resolved than those which might be derived from the analysis which follows. The dialectical stance which lllich adopts for his critique of schooling can be seen clearly in the distinction he draws between the concept of schooling and that of education. This distinction, which is founded on differences in function and consequence, is central to Illichs argument. Schooling is a compulsory, age-specific institutional process, carried out by and in schools, for the good of the society (or, more accurately, the good of the elite in the society), and includes such functions as custodial care, sorting and tracking, indoctrination and socialization, and, to a limited extent, education. Education refers to an individual process, and is tied up with rather vague notions of the voluntary acquisition by the individual of the common moral, cultural, and aesthetic values which together constitute our social capital- the right to which is, for Illich, a natural The negative side of Illichs dialectic is schooling, the positive side, education. It is worthwhile to reiterate and explicate the functions of modern schooling as lllich -quite rightly, I think - perceives them. The first function of schooling is that of providing custodial care: As much as anything else, schooling implies custodial care for persons who are declared undesirable elsewhere by the simple fact that a school has been built to serve them. The schooU is supposed to take the excess population from the street, the family or the labor force.5 This custodial function of schooling, incidentally, is no less applicable to senior citizens who are encouraged to return to the classroom than it is to ten-year-olds removed from the home, or sixteen-year-olds from the work force. The second function of schooling is the process of social-role selection, which takes place as a consequence of the deliberate, planned sorting and tracking which occurs in the school in a variety of ways. This sorting is based, primarily, o n that is, on a belief in the meritocratic what lllich terms the ideology of merit ideal. This ideal is reinforced by the school in its role as certifying agency, which

4. Michael Macklin, When Schools are Gone: A Projection of the Thought of /van lllich (St. Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland Press, 1976), p. 46. 5. Ivan Illich, The Futility of Schooling in Latin America, Saturday Review 51 (20 April 1968): 58, quoted in Macklin, p. 25.

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ensures the continuity of faith in the efficacy of schooling. This is not to say, of course, that schools, any more than contemporary society as a whole, actually are meritocratic. lllich is well aware of the social class, racial, ethnic, sexual, and other variables which prevent the development of a true meritocratic order. His critique extends, however, even to the perfect meritocracy:
A perfect meritocracy, in which there would be n o excuses, is not yet upon us, and I believe it can be avoided. It must be avoided, since a perfect meritocracy would not only be hellish, it would be

The third function performed by schooling is the socialization, or indoctrination, of the young into the social order - a social order which lllich sees as fundamentally unjust, based on an acceptance of social conformity, consumerism, and the "ideology of merit" which together serve t o perpetuate social ills. This is accomplished, in large part, through the "hidden curriculum" of the school, which one of Illich's supporters has identified as the "main thrust" of his critique of contemporary ~ c h o o l i n g . ~ The fourth function of schooling, which only rarely occurs, lllich implies, is education. From his discussion of this aspect of schooling, it is clear that lllich views such a result as happening in spite of, rather than because of, schooling. In fact, lllich asserts that "the school has an anti-educational effect on society"a as well as on the individual. A central feature of Illich's paradigm for the examination of social institutions is the nature of the institution itself. Institutions, lllich believes, fall along a spectrum, ranging from left to right in terms of the extent to which they are, respectively, "convivial" or "manipulative." The former are the ideal desired by Illich, and are distinguished by spontaneous, voluntary use, though use marked by some degree of regulation. The latter, which lllich argues are the dominant type in modern society, are coercive in nature, tend to be socially and/or psychologically "addictive," are very complex, and entail production processes which result in convincing consumers of their need for the goods or services offered by the i n s t i t ~ t i o n Schools, .~ of course, are institutions of the "manipulative" sort: they are compulsory state institutions, they breed in their clientele an ever-expanding desire for more of their services, they are incredibly complex, and certainly they convince their clients (both successes and failures) of the need for the services provided by the school. As will be discussed in detail later, Illich's alternative to this state of affairs is the development of "convivial" institutions to encourage the process of education. Within the institution of schooling, one of the major components which requires greater examination is the role of the teacher. The teacher in the modern school has, in Illich's view, become an impediment, rather than an aid, to the process of education.1 This has come about as a result of the triple role the teacher is expected to play: as custodian, moralist, and therapist." As lllich comments,
Children are protected by neither the First nor the Fifth Amendment when they stand before the secular priest, the teacher. The child must confront a man who wears an invisible triple crown, like the papal tiara, the symbol of triple authority combined in one person. For the child, the teacher pontificates as pastor, prophet, and priest - he is at once guide, teacher, and administrator of a sacred ritual.'* 6. Ivan Illich, Ceiebration of Awareness (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1969), p. 182. 7. Macklin, When Schools are Gone, p. 25. 8. Ivan Illich, Deschooling Society (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), p. 11. 9. See Illich, Deschooling Society, Chapter 4. 10. Ivan Illich, "Critica a la liturgia de la enseiianza," in Paulo Freire et al., Educacion para el cambio social (Buenos Aires: Tierra Nueva, 1974+), p. 103. 11. Illich, Deschooling Society, pp. 44-46. 12. Ibid., p. 46.

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Finally, the school as a manipulative institution must be understood to be a universal phenomenon - one no longer grounded in any particular ideology. lllich argues that: It does not matter whether the curriculum is designed to teach the principles
of Fascism, liberalism, Catholicism, socialism or liberation, as long as the institution claims the authority to define which activities are legitimate

"education."l Further, in drawing attention to the fact that the ritual of schooling itself constitutes an important aspect of the "hidden c u r r i ~ u l u m , " lllich ~ ~ notes:
In all nations, the educated use the same ritual to seduce and obligate others to accept their faith [in schooIing].l5

An important facet of Illich's attack on contemporary schooling is his critique of the epistemological foundations upon which modern schooling is based. lllich asserts that knowledge has become objectified. As a consequence, schools are seen as factories which produce "knowledge-as-commodity," rather than as aiding the individual to subjectively come to "know." The distinction here is that of knowledge and knowing - the former being a thing which can be possessed, the latter an individual process which cannot be reified. This distinction is related, I believe, to what lllich calls the "functional shift of institutions."i6 This shift involves the transition from "frameworks of action" to "factories of goods," and can be seen in the linguistic shift which accompanies it. For example, "educating children" has become "giving children an education," just as "housing oneself" has become "buying a house." Further, the distinction between knowledge and knowing is demonstrated with great clarity in Illich's refusal to allow competence and curriculum (i.e., certification) to be collapsed into a single concept,17 as is generally the case in modern society. The preceding discussion constitutes what might be termed the negative side of the dialectic which lllich establishes for his examination of "education" in its conventional, institutional form in contemporary society. The positive side of the dialectic, which lllich calls the "deschooled society," presents us with a very different image of how the process of education might be institutionally undertaken by society. A number of introductory and reiterative comments about the contrasts between the "schooled" and "deschooled" societies are appropriate here. The ends of each are distinct, if not actually in diametric opposition. The end of the "schooled" society is the trained (i.e., indoctrinated) person, while that of the deschooled society is the educated human being. In short, the former may be said to school, the latter to educate - processes which are, I think, quite different. Further, these processes are carried out in social insitutions of similarly distinct natures. Schools, as conceptualized in modern society, are manipulative institutions, while "learning webs" and educational vouchers are convivial ones. Finally, as noted earlier, the view of knowledge found in the two sorts of societies are fundamentally incompatible. The "schooled" society in which we live sees knowledge as a good or commodity which is quantitatively disseminated in specific social institutions (schools), and whose differential possession serves to explain and justify social inequities. The deschooled society, on the other hand, perceives
13. Ivan Illich, The Alternative to Schooling, p. 3, quoted in Macklin, When Schools are Gone, p. 27. 14. Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 48. 15. Illich, "Critica a la liturgia de la ensehanza," p. 102. 16. Ivan lllich and Etienne Verne, imprisoned in the Global Classroom (London: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative, 1976). p. 27. 17. Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 17.

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knowledge more in terms of the process of k n o w i n g - a notion not amenable to easy quantification. This process of knowing can be facilitated by interaction with others, but is not - and cannot be - distributed in manipulative institutions like so many bowls of watered-down soup. Illich's conception of the deschooled society, which he believes to have already begun to evolve,18 will entail four interrelated developments. The first of these developments is quite simply the disestablishment of schools. As schools are disestablished, three sets of convivial institutions must be set up. The first of these would be a systematic method of providing equal access to whatever educational resources individuals might desire. To perform this function, lllich proposes as a tentative alternative some sort of educational voucher system. The second and third convivial institutions to be established are networks of educational "tools" and people, which will together comprise a virtually unlimited series of "learning webs." These convivial educational institutions share three core concerns. The first of these concerns is an emphasis on inculcating care for others as individuals, rather than for self or for the transcendental society as a whole.1g The second is that the central aim of educational institutions must be the provision of "access to reality," which is a step toward a "celebration of awareness."z0 Finally, the third concern is that the right to education is a "natural right" possessed by each individual by virtue of the individual's humanity. These core concerns are manifested in the criteria which lllich argues must be met by alternatives to contemporary schooling for them to be acceptable. Among these criteria are such considerations as ensuring that education be open to all persons in the society, that it be available when people need or desire it, that it avoid institutionalizing (in a manipulative sense) either the subject matter or the pedagogical methodology, and that it reject a conception of "knowledge-as-commodity.'' Deschooling, lllich believes, meets all of these criteria. Illich's critique of contemporary schooling, while both valid and useful, is neither as unique nor as original as it is sometimes suggested. The critique is primarily a description of modern industrial-bureaucratic schooling, stressing a variety of problems which were common knowledge long before Illich. As Maxine Greene has noted, Presenting not the slightest evidence that he has read the literature of education, lllich picks out the very problems with which educational researchers and philosophers have been concerned for at least fifty years and displays them before our (presumably horrified) eyes.. . . I find it difficult to understand how people who are familiar with the literature can react to Illich's reports upon the schools as if he were bringing the news that God is dead." While I think that Greene has failed t o recognize some important distinctions between Illich's message and the educational research and discussion which preceded him - not the least of which is Illich's successful role in aiding the popularization of both knowledge of and concern about educational problems I would maintain that it is the critique of contemporary schooling which is the least controversial component of Illich's work. It is, rather, I think, with his description of the deschooled society that lllich presents a creative and distinctive alternative to that which precedes his arrival on the pedagogic scene. And, it is in his conception of the deschooled society that Illich's essentially medieval social theory is manifested. Illich's deschooled society is, in short, basically a description of education as it emerges in medieval social thought.

18. lllich and Verne, lmprisoned in the Global Classroom, pp. 15-16. 19. Macklin, When Schools are Gone, pp. 55-56. 20. See Illich, "A Call to Celebration," in Celebration of Awareness, pp. 13-18. 21. Maxine Greene, "And It Still Is News," in Ivan lllich et al., After Deschooling, What?, p. 129. FALL 1980

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Central t o an adequate understanding of the concept of deschooling is the nature of the convivial institution. lllich emphasizes that one of the central features of such an institution is to encourage the development in each person of a concern for others as individuals, rather than being either egocentric or poliscentric (where the polis, or community, is viewed as a whole rather than as a grouping of individual parts). This concern is quite like that of the medieval conception of the "good community," in which the biblical injunction t o "love thy neighbor as thyself" is effected. It is just such a community that is posited by St. Thomas Aquinas in Chapter 13 of On the Perfection of the Spiritual Life.22 A second feature of the convivial institution is that it provides "access to reality" which plays a role in the development of the "celebration of awareness." Both of these ideas are grounded in what is a predominantly theocentric view of the world. The former entails a rejection of the current relativistic conception of social reality - as exhibited in such movements as the rise of situational ethics, the shift in philosophy of science from the positivism of Popper to the near-anarchism of Feyerabend, the increasingly common "suit yourself" brand of individualism, and so forth. The latter idea, most clearly enunciated in Illich's " A Call to C e l e b r a t i ~ n , " is ~ cen~ tered o n the desirability o f "living change" rather than on relying on planned or engineered illusions. Ultimately, it seems to me, this ideal is a religious one, aimed at increasing - through both social and spiritual activity - mankind's humanity, dignity, and " j o y f ~ l n e s s . " ~ ~ Finally, the reliance of Illich's defense of the convivial institution on the notion of innate "natural rights" is an interesting one. It appears to me that this concept, in Illich's case, is embedded in an acceptance of the /ex naturalis - not, as one might suppose, in the conception of natural rights which emerged during the period of the Enlightenment. The distinction between these two perspectives is an important one: the former presupposes a metaphysical foundation for the law (hence, emphasis on /ex), while the latter is a rational, nontheistic construct (hence, emphasis on Illich's description of "learning webs," which play a major role in his conception of the deschooled society, calls manorial life t o mind. On first reading, of course, lllich sounds considerably more egalitarian than would make such a connection reasonable. However, it is important to bear in mind that lllich does accept an authority structure, recognizes the need for both social rules and individual discipline, and does not call for any sort of egalitarian revolution. Further, lllich is consistently vague o n all of these issues. I tend to agree with Neil Postman, when he argues that, lllich is not only a mystic and a utopian but an authoritarian as well., . . Illich's eye is firmly fixed on the goal, which fixation is the essence of authoritarianism.26 One is further reminded of medieval society o n a number of other points. Illich's rejection of certification in favor of competence is clearly much more compatible with medieval conceptions of society than with modern ones. So, indeed, are his conception of knowledge, his non-age specific educational schema,27 and his non-compulsory conception of social order. Last, running consistently through22. See Vernon J. Bourke (ed.),The Pocket Aquinas (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 19601, pp. 258-59. 23. lllich, Celebration of Awareness, pp. 13-18. 24. Ibid., p. 15. 25. See A. P. d'Entreves, Natural Law (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1970), Chapters 3 and 4. 26. Neil Postman, "My lllich Problem," in lllich et al., After Deschooling, What?, pp. 143-44. 27. Philippe Aries' masterful work, Centuries of Childhood (New York: Random House, 1962), comes to mind here.

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out Illichs writing, both on education and other issues, is a view of poverty which is quite alien to the modern world, and just as feasible in the medieval. lllich sees poverty as granting a special sort of dignity, and potentially offering a conception of social reality which could be envied by those in more prosperous settings.28 In the thirteenth century, lacopone da Todi wrote: He that has Poverty for Love Has for dominion peace.. High Wisdom is in Poverty, For nothing holds her thrall.. . A mystic heaven is Poverty, To earth-dim eyes concealed . . . That man is poor who, having naught, From will to have is free.zs Ivan lllich would, I think, agree with such sentiments.
111.

His critique of contemporary schooling is but one side of a many-faceted assault mounted against modern society by Ivan Illich. It was chosen for more indepth treatment here for two major reasons. First, lllich is perhaps best known for his educational writings, especially Deschooling Society. The second reason that Illichs educational thought was singled out was that it is the most prolific part of the corpus of his work, and hence the most complete theoretical construction. This is not meant to imply, however, that Illichs treatment of other social institutions is in any significant way different from his treatment of schooling. It is not, a claim I hope to make good below for each of the major social institutions which lllich critiques. Illichs perspective on energy, most specifically on the current energy crisis, is based, as was his perspective on schooling, on a dialectical view of the situation. His critique is based on the notion that the rhetoric surrounding the energy crisis conceals a contradiction and consecrates an i l l ~ s i o n . ~ The contradiction to which this refers is that between social equity (and, for Illich, social justice) and continued industrial growth. This contradiction is often emphasized in Illichs work. In terms of schools, for example, lllich often notes that as increasing amounts are spent o n schooling (especially in Latin America), the result is increasingly divisive and rigid social class ~ t r a t i f i c a t i o n . ~ The illusion which is being consecrated by the rhetoric of the energy crisis, according t o Illich, is that machine power can, virtually indefinitely, take the place of manpower. This combination of contradiction and illusion leads to a reliance o n bureaucratic, expert elites in both overindustrialized nations such as the United States, and underequipped nations such as those of Latin America. In both cases, the loser is human freedom: Underequipment keeps people enslaved to primordial nature and limits their freedom. Overindustrialization does not admit of differences in production and political style. It imposes its technical characteristics on social relations.3 28. Illich, Celebration of Awareness, p. 173. See also lllich and Verne, lmprisoned in the Global Classroom, pp. 20-21; and Illich. Critica a la liturgia enseiianza, p. 114. 29. Quoted in Walter Shewring, Rich and Poor in Christian Tradition (London: Burns Oates 8 Washbourne, 1948), pp. 145-50. 30. Ivan Illich, Energy and Equity (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1974), p. 3. 31. See, for example, Illich, Celebration of Awareness, pp. 105-35. 32. Illich, Energy and Equity, p. 74.

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Illichs solution to this unpleasant state of affairs is founded primarily on the return of decision-making power to the sound judgement of the common rnan.S3 His faith in this sound judgement is, alas, no more clear or reassuring than are the two roads to technical maturity which he proposes, liberation from affluence and liberation from d e p e n d e n ~ e At .~~ the admitted risk of over-simplifying Illichs argument with respect t o energy, it seems t o me that his whole perspective is summed up in the quote with which his Energy and Equity begins: El socialismo From ~ ~ this, it is a short step indeed to the medieval puede llegar solo en b i ~ i c l e t a . conception of society. The theme of Illichs most recent work, Medical Nemesis, is that the ability of man to cope with pain, impairment, and death - all integral parts of human life has been systematically expropriated by a maintenance service (the medical profession) which serves not the needs of the individual, but rather those of the corporate industrial society. The consequence of this development has been what lllich terms the medicalization of life, a political process which serves to ensure continued reliance on both modern technology and the industrial mode of production which underlies it.36 A central feature of this process of medicalization is iatrogenesis, which refers to the diseases, illnesses, and side-effects which are p h y s i c i a n - i n d ~ c e d . ~ ~ This concept, coupled with an analysis which seeks t o demonstrate the impotence of most contemporary medical care, is the foundation of Illichs call (here as elsewhere) for the re-establishment of the autonomy of the individual, and the end of bureaucratically-managed and supported health care. The alternative proposed by lllich is that society must adopt an extreme discipline grounded in an acceptance of a new imperative, which he sums up as:
Act so that the effect of your action is compatible with the permanence of genuine human life.38

This new imperative, which is tied up in an unspecified way with an ethical awakeni t ~ g , will ~~ mean, in practice, that People will limit medical therapies because they will want to conserve their opportunity and power to heal Better health care will not depend on some new therapeutic standard, but on the level of willingness and competence to engage in s e l f - ~ a r e . ~ ~ The post-Vatican II era has witnessed the emergence of a theologically sophisticated, socially active minority in the Church. This minority, generally referred to as either radical Catholics or the Catholic left, has called for major changes in both the structure and orientation of the Church. Among the suggestions offered by this group for the regeneration of the Church are a married clergy, a greater role for social activism within and by the Church, rejection of celibacy, the ordination of women, the disestablishment of the episcopal structure of the Church, and a re-examination of the permanence of ordination to the priesthood. Often this group has been at the forefront of the liturgical reform in the Church, has been very active in seeking solutions to social problems (poverty, the war in Vietnam, etc.), and has 33. Ibid., p. 75. 34. Ibid., pp. 75-76. 35. Jose Antonio Viera-Gallo, Assistant Secretary of Justice in the Government of Salvador Allende, quoted in Illich, Energy and Equity, p. 1. 36. Ivan Illich, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health (London: Calder & Boyars, 1975), p. 11. 37. Ibid., pp. 21-25. 38. Ibid., p. 163. 39. Ibid., p. 164. 40. Ibid., p. 165.

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been the most active contingent of the Church in the opening of the MarxistChristian dialogue. It would be easy t o place Illich in this camp. Many of his religious views, his problems with the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith (which led to his resignation from the p r i e ~ t h o o d ) , ~ and ' his close affiliation with the progressive Bishop of Cuernavaca, Mendez Arceo, would all provide evidence for a left-wing religious orientation. Just such a position is argued by Joaquin Saenz y Arriaga,42 representing the ultra-conservative elements in the Mexican Church. However, lllich is no more radical vis-a-vis the Church than he is with respect to education, energy, or medicine. In fact, lllich himself comments that such radical alternatives in the Church are "neither sufficiently revolutionary to be worth while ( s i c ) . . . nor sufficiently faithful to fundamental traditional position^."^^ Rather, lllich asserts that:
Great changes must take place in the structure of the Catholic Church if it is to survive. I believe that such changes will come about and, moreover, that they can now be visualized in terms consistent with the most radically traditional theology.44

lllich has discussed a number of these "great changes" in the Church in some detail. For example, he suggests that the problems faced by the Church today with respect t o the role and nature of the priesthood might be solved by reconceptualizing the diaconate in such a way as to allow for the ordination of both married and secularly employed men.45 In fact, lllich asserts that "the ordination of secularly employed men may be one of the Church's great advances."46 lllich proffers such a projection of the nature of the priesthood in the future as a result of two related beliefs. The first of these beliefs concerns Illich's conception of the ideal social role or function of the priest in modern society. Rather than seeing the priest as community leader, counselor, moral guardian, religious educator, and so on, lllich argues that the only role a priest should play as priest is that of presiding over the celebration of the sacraments. For the priest to perform other functions as priest is to "feign competence" where it does not really exist, and where others are better able to serve.47 The second cornerstone of Illich's critique of the nature of contemporary Catholicism (the Church as "It," rather than as "She")48 is the belief that the bureaucratic aspects of the Church are in fact dysfunctional, as, perhaps, might well be efficiency. The bureaucratic maze that comprises most of the visible Church today, in Illich's view, actually impedes the maintenance and spread of the Christian life in the world. Further, lllich sees the corporate structure of the Church as unacceptable for the achievement of what ought to be its aims:
Principles of corporate government are not applicable to the Body of Christ. It is even less appropriate to see His Vicar as the chief executive of a corporation than as a Byzantine king. Clerical technocracy is even further from the Gospel than priestly a r i s t o ~ r a c y . ~ ~ 41. See Ocampo V. Tarsicio (comp.), Mexico "Entredicho" del Vatican0 a CIDOC, 7966-69 (Cuernavaca: CIDOC, 1969), No. 37, for a complete description of this conflict. See also Francine d u Plessix Gray, Divine Disobedience: Profiles in Catholic Radicalism (New York: Random House, 1970), pp. 306-14. 42. Joaquin Saenz y Arriaga, Cuernavaca y e l progresmo religioso en Mexico. 43. Illich, Celebration o f Awareness, p. 70. 44. Ibid., p. 69. 45. Ibid., pp. 78, 82. 46. Ivan Illich, The Church, Change a n d Development (Chicago: Herder and Herder, 1970), p. 66. 47. Ibid., pp. 72-73; also, Illich, Celebration of Awareness, pp. 84-85. 48. d u Plessix Gray, Divine Disobedience, p. 289. 49. Illich, Celebration of Awareness, p. 75.

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A final note with respect to Illichs view of the contemporary Church concerns the different perspective on the social initiative of the Church as a religious institution, and its role in effecting social change. lllich suggests that innovative social action must be the responsibility of groups committed to radical humanism rather than to gospel authority, as the Church must be.50This is so because:
If the Church uses the power basis she h a s . . . then she perpetuates her inability to witness to that which is specific in her mission.51

Illichs ideal conception of the role of the church in human society is, in a way, the hardest to reconcile with medieval notions of society. This is due, I think, to the role actually played by the Church in feudal Europe - a role which we recall as one of far greater complexity and range than that envisioned for the Church by lllich. However, it nevertheless seems to me that Illichs ideal is considerably more compatible and consistent with medieval social theory than was the actual medieval practice. It should be recalled that one of the major problems confronted by medieval social thinkers was reconciling the role played by the Church, both at the local and the international levels, with the spiritual ideal it was in theory obligated (and indeed in practice claimed) to uphold.52 What I have tried to demonstrate thus far is that the connection between Illichs ideal educational structures and medieval social theory is not unusual or out of place in Illichs more general social thought. It appears that with every social institution with which lllich grapples - whether it be energy, medicine, or religion his ideal of what ought to be is either derived from, or at least very compatible with, medieval notions of the just society.
IV.

The centrality of Roman Catholicism to Ivan Illichs social thought has been much commented upon, and I suspect that few would doubt its impact on his views. It is important to stress, at this point, that the religious aspects of Illichs social thought are not simply parallel to other equally relevant concerns, but rather are, in themselves, fundamental to his conception of social reality. Further, it is also important to note that within the general rubric of Catholicism there are a vast range of very different social constructions of reality. lllich is Catholic, I think, in a sense quite different from both mainstream Catholicism and that Catholicism which takes as a central tenet of its faith the theology of liberation. His faith is, as are his social and political attitudes, far more medieval than modern. At this point, I would like to build upon the description of Illichs social thought vis-a-vis religion, as enunciated in the preceding section, to suggest the origins and emphases of Illichs metaphysical leanings. To point out that he was trained as a priest would, although true, be far from an adequate description of what that means in Illichs case. lllich earned masters degrees in both theology and philosophy at the Gregorian University in Rome (not training to be scoffed at), before obtaining a Ph.D. in history at the University of Salzburg where he wrote a dissertation on Toynbee. Due to his outstanding academic record, lllich was encouraged by the Holy See to enter the Collegio d i Nobili
50. Ibid., p. 102.

51. Ibid. 52. This tension between the ideal of Christian universalism and papal secularism in the face of the rising authority of national monarchs is reflected in Boniface Vllls papal bull, Unam Sancturn, as well as in his earlier Clericis Laicos, Ineffabilis Amor, Etside Statu, and Ausculta Filii. See Maurice Keen, The Pelican History of Medieval Europe (Harmondswoflh, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 207-22, The Political Thought of the Fourteenth-Century Civilians, in Beryl Smalley (ed.), Trends in Medieval Political Thought (New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1965); Walter Ullman, A History of Political Thought: The Middle Ages (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), pp. 110-13.

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Ecclesiastici, where the most talented in the Churchs ranks are trained for careers in the Vaticans diplomatic corps. Instead, he moved to New York in 1951, where he served as assistant pastor in an Irish-Puerto Rican parish until 1956. He then served as vice-rector of the Catholic University of Puerto Rico. He co-founded the Centro Intercultural de Documentacion in Cuernavaca, with which he has been affiliated since 1960. Before resigning from the priesthood i n 1969, lllich had achieved the rank of Monsignor. In short, lllich is an exceptionally well-trained, bright, committed Roman Catholic, whose resignation from the priesthood was voluntary, and aimed at preventing further embarrassment t o the Church as a consequence of the publicity which had come to surround him, in large part as a result of his interrogation in Rome. lllich explains his reasons for resigning, arguing that:
It is canonically correct for a clergyman to divest himself of his faculties as soon as he becomes n o t o r i o ~ s . ~ ~

Despite his resignation, however, lllich was granted, at his request, the right to maintain both his vow of celibacy and his daily obligation to say the breviary. These are hardly the signs of a man undergoing a crisis of faith. Rather, they demonstrate a remarkable perseverance of faith in the face of great adversity. Illichs conception of the true nature of Catholicism provides the basis for much of his social theory, while at the same time mirroring that social theory in many important respects. The Church as an ideal, for Illich, functions i n much the same way as would any other convivial institution, save that lllich clearly expects it to play a primary and central role in the individuals social relations, self-conception, and behavior. Insofar as we understand his notion of the role of the Church, we have also understood, in a broader and more complete way than is otherwise possible, Illichs view of the just society. This understanding further supports the view posited here that Illichs social theory is basically in accord with that of the medieval period. In both his religious thought and his social theory, lllich rejects several elements of the status quo. First, in every social institution, including religious ones, lllich forcibly rejects the use of coercion and of coercive institutions and institutional arrangements. Second, as already noted, lllich argues that bureaucracy, which is undesirable in any social institution, is especially so in the Church,54 and must be eliminated. Third, he rejects ritual qua ritual everywhere, no less in the Church than in the school. This is not, of course, the same as rejecting liturgical forms of worship - quite the contrary. It is only by making the liturgy relevant and accessible that one makes it real. The distinction between the Church as She and the Church as It is an important one in Illichs thought. This distinction, which can be seen as representing the dialectic which lllich applied to other social institutions, is not dissimilar to the more common division between Mystical Body and temporal institution. The Jesuit sociologist, Joseph Fitzpatrick, has expanded on Illichs distinction:
The Church-as-She is the mystery of Gods presence among us. The Churchas-It is the scandal of incarnation, Gods presence i n human forms. One must use all the human power one has to expose the scandal in order that the presence of the Word can be perceived. Illichs function as a priest is the scrupulous criticism of the Church-as-It for the sake of the C h u r ~ h - a s - S h e . ~ ~

Illich, despite his relegation of both the Church and her priests t o an exclusively spiritual sphere,56 nonetheless sees the Church - that is, the Mystical Body of Christ-as providing the basic force for social cohesion in the good human
53. Quoted in du Plessix Gray, Divine Disobedience, p. 312. 54. See quote 48 in text. 55. Quoted in du Plessix Gray, Divine Disobedience, pp. 289-90. 56. See p. 302 above.

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community. Rather than by either visible or invisible coercion, the community is to be united and maintained by faith. The nature of Illich's ideal conception of the Church is perhaps closest to the rather ahistorical view of the primitive Christian church which is common today among certain Protestant sects. Illich's call, as manifested in "The Vanishing Clergyman,"57 is essentially a
demand for a return to an early-style Christianity untainted by pomp and secular power [which] is similar in message to the romantic longings of the Underground

This is, as was noted earlier, far closer to the religious ideal which can be logically derived from medieval notions of society than was the religious reality of feudal Europe. An interesting, and highly visible, side of Ivan Illich's faith is his frequent, colorful, and generally entertaining use of religious metaphors to strengthen his arguments, provide illustrations of points, and so on. His institutional critiques often make use of comparisons with the Church and society of the late Middle Ages:
At the end of the Middle Ages, people placed their trust in certificates which guaranteed indulgence. In our time of decadent civilization, people place their trust in certificates which establish that they possess something called "edu~ation."~~

The need for reform is, on occasion, stressed by noting similar reforms, and problems with reforms, which have been experienced by the Church:
Since Bonhoeffer contemporary theologians have pointed to the confusions now reigning between the Biblical message and institutionalized religion. They point to the experience that Christian freedom and faith usually gain from secularization. Inevitably their statements sound blasphemous to many churchmen. Unquestionably, the educational process will gain from the deschooling of society even though this demand sounds to many schoolmen like treason to the enlightenment. But it is enlightenment itself that is now being snuffed out in the schools.60 The secularization of the Christian faith depends on the dedication to it on the part of Christians rooted in the Church. In much the same way, the deschooling of education depends on the leadership of those brought up in the schools.61 From the history of the Church, we know that simply reforming the liturgy is no guarantee of theological renovation.62

lllich frequently uses ecclesiastic comparisons which serve not only to make his point, but which also can hardly help but elicit a smile from his reader:
Equal educational opportunity is, indeed, both a desirable and a feasible goal, but to equate this with obligatory schooling is to confuse salvation with the It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle, than for a man, who acquires this education, to recast his vision of the world from the perspective of a poor mar1.~4
57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64.

Illich, Celebration of Awareness, pp. 69-94. d u Plessix Gray, Divine Disobedience, p. 293. Illich, "Critica a la liturgia de la ensefianza," p. 100. Illich, Deschooiing Society, pp. 35-36. Ibid., p. 36. Illich, "Critica a la liturgia de la ensefianza," p. 105. Illich, Deschooling Society, p. 15. Illich, "Critica a la liturgia de la ensehanza," p. 101.

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These religious metaphors, and dozens like them, show the extent to which his religious faith permeates Illich's life and thought. Not only is this compatible with the medieval ideal, but it is actually quite close to the monastic ideal of the medieval era. lllich himself recognizes this when he says:
I am theologically profoundly conservative. I could teach with deep relish a course in pre-conciliar theology.. . . I would have liked to have lived in the Middle Ages, one of the high points of man's spirit.65

65. Quoted in d u Plessix Gray, Divine Disobedience, p. 273.

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