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CITIZENSHIP CASE 1: MERCADO V. MANZANO 307 SCRA 630 MENDOZA, J.: FACTS: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado (100T votes), private respondent Edu Manzano (103T votes), and Gabriel Daza III (54T votes) were Makati vice mayor candidates in 1998. Despite the margin, the proclamation was suspended while Ernesto Mamarils petition for Edus disqualification was pending. The petition is based on the ground that Manzano misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen. In his answer, Manzano admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in San Francisco, CA in 1955 and has thus acquired US citizenship. It would appear that Manzano holds dual citizenship, being both a Filipino and a US citizen. Sec. 40(d) of the LGC provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. Thus, ruling on the petition, COMELEC Second Division ordered the cancellation of Edus COC. COMELEC En Banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared Manzano qualified to run. Being brought to the Philippines at the age of 6 using an American passport and being registered as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration did not result in the loss of Manzanos Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It was also an undisputed fact that when Manzano attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers proclaimed Manzano as Makati vice mayor on August 31. Mercado files a petition for certiorari. ISSUES: WON Manzano is a Filipino citizen. YES WON dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification. NO HELD: Has Manzano effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship? YES. In Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held that By the laws of the United States, Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor thrice. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government. In Aznar v. COMELEC, the Court applies mutatis mutandis (the necessary changes). When We consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or implied. To recapitulate, by declaring in his COC that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, Manzano has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. Manzanos oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. It may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of Filipino citizens to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli; (2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. Sec. 5, Art IV provides that Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. During the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution, Comm. Blas Ople, concerned that dual allegiance can siphon scarce national capital to other countries in light of Filipino-Chinese citizens bound by a second allegiance to Peking or Taiwan, stressed the difference between dual allegiance and dual citizenship, describing dual allegiance as larger and more threatening than that of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. In including sec. 5, the concern of the ConCom was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. As Fr. Bernas has pointed out: Dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.

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CASE 2: TECSON V. COMELEC G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004 VITUG, J.: Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a precious heritage, as well as an inestimable acquisition,that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it. FACTS: Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe (FPJ) filed his COC on 31 Dec 2003 representing that he was a natural-born citizen, born on 20 Aug 1939 in Manila. Victorino X. Fornier initiated a petition to disqualify FPJ on the ground of material misrepresentation. Fornier alleged that FPJs parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. If Allan F. Poe was Filipino, he also could not have transmitted his citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. ISSUE: WON FPJ is a Filipino citizen HELD: YES. The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. Today, an ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship. The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Having died in 1954 at 84 years old, FPJs grandfather Lorenzo Pou would have been born under Spanish rule and would have benefited from the en masse Filipinization that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. Amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he questioned the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service. What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. If there is neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be reprobated. When the Constitution says: The following are citizens of the Philippines ... Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, the Constitution means just that without invidious distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit ne nos distinguere debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual foundation in the Constitution, serves no state interest, and even imposes an injustice on an innocent child. To hold that the illegitimate child follows the citizenship of his Filipino mother but that an illegitimate child does not follow the citizenship of his Filipino father would be to make an invidious discrimination. Wherefore, the court resolves to dismiss all the petitions.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., concurs, please see separate opinion. The words of the Constitution should as much as possible be given ordinary meaning because it is not primarily a lawyers document but essentially that of the people. As Sec. 3, Art. IV of the 1935 Constitution does not distinguish between a legitimate and an illegitimate child of a Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. Carpio, J., see dissenting opinion. We have repeatedly ruled that an illegitimate child does not enjoy any presumption of blood relation to the alleged father until filiation or blood relation is proved as provided by law. Art. 887 of the Civil Code expressly provides that [I]n all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved. The illegitimate child becomes a Philippine citizen only from the time he establishes his blood relation to the Filipino father. If the blood relation is established after the birth of the illegitimate child, then the child is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since an act is required after birth to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. FPJ is not a naturalborn Philippine citizen since there is no showing that his alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe acknowledged him at birth. The Constitution defines a natural-born citizen as a Philippine citizen from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship. FPJ does not meet this citizenship qualification. Quisumbing, J., joins the dissent of Justices Tinga and Morales; case should have been remanded. Following the suggestion of amicus curiae Justice Mendoza, I am adopting the rule that an illegitimate child of an alien-mother who claims to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural- born citizen if he was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate child with nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship. No evidence has been submitted to show that Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own son at birth. Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged by his father, the only possible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the inescapable conclusion is that he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen. Callejo, Sr., J., please see concurring opinion. Allan F. Poe (1) obtained degrees from UP and the Philippine Dental College, (2) became a leading movie actor in the Philippines, (3) served in the Philippine Army, inducted into the USAFE, fought in Bulacan, was in the Death March and was awarded the Gold Cross by the President, and (4) died with his death cer reflecting political status as Filipino. Allan Poe comported himself as a Filipino citizen, was regarded as such in the community where he

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lived, and was acknowledged to be a Filipino by the Philippine government during his lifetime. The paternity of Allan Poe having been admitted, and his Filipino citizenship having been established, FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen. In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. Jose Ong Jr. did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines. The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons. The petitioners argue that Ong's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship but the Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Ong Chuan of his citizenship after his death and at this very late date just so we can go after the son. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of due process. A dead man cannot speak. Jose Ong Chuan cannot be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. Furthermore, the same issue of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the ConCon of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies. Is Jose Ong Jr. a resident of Northern Samar? Yes. The term "residence" has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966]) CASE 4: BENGSON III V. HRET G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001 The act of repatriation allows the person to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost Filipino citizenship. KAPUNAN, J.: FACTS: Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. However, in 1985, Cruz enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the U.S. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of

CASE 3: CO V. HRET 199 SCRA 692 (1991) GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: FACTS: Respondent Jose Ong Jr.s grandfather Ong Te arrived from China in 1895 and established residence in Laoang, Samar. Jose Ong Jr.s father Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 and was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915. Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in Samar, absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices and eventually got married to natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao in 1932. Jose Ong Jr. was one of their 8 children. In 1955, the CFI of Samar approved his application for naturalization and in 1957, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance. Jose Ong Jr. was at that time a minor of 9 years. Jose Jr. graduated from college, took and passed the CPA Boards and found a job in the Central Bank. Later, he worked at the Ongs hardware business in Binondo but frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days. He married a Filipina named Desiree Lim in 1984. He registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there in 1984 and 1986. In 1987, respondent Jose Ong Jr. ran in the elections for representative in the second district of Northern Samar and was overwhelmingly voted for with a margin of more than 7,000 votes against petitioners Antonio Co and Sixto Balanquit. Upon proclamation, Co and Balinquit filed election protests with the HRET. ISSUE: WON Ong is a Filipino Citizen. YES HELD: Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens. There is no dispute that Jose Ong Jr.s mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen. Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the respondent was only 9 years old. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old. He cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as he was already a citizen. In the case of

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Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990. In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in 1998 by a convincing margin of 26,671 votes over Antonio Bengson III. Subsequently, Bengson filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with the HRET on the ground that Cruz was not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, sec. 6 of the Constitution. HRET dismissed the petition and likewise denied Bengsons MR, thus this present petition for certiorari. ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, may still be considered a natural- born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. YES. HELD: Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time, (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and (5) political economic necessity. Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Panganiban, concurring opinion. Repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. In any case, "the leaning, in questions of citizenship, should always be in favor of [its] claimant."Accordingly, the same should be construed in favor of private respondent, who claims to be a natural-born citizen. Under the present Constitution, private respondent should be deemed natural-born, because was not naturalized. The court likewise has a solemn duty to uphold the clear and unmistakable mandate of the people. It cannot supplant the sovereign will of the Second District of Pangasinan with fractured legalism. In such instances, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the winning candidate's eligibility; to rule otherwise would be to defeat the will of the people. Lastly, the current trend, economically as well as politically, is towards globalization. It cannot be denied that most Filipinos go abroad and apply for naturalization in foreign countries, because of the great economic or social opportunities there. Hence, we should welcome former Filipino citizens desirous of not simply returning to the country or regaining Philippine citizenship, but of serving the Filipino people as well. Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion. The status of being a natural-born citizen at its incipient is a privilege conferred by law directly to those who intended, and actually continued, to belong to the Philippine Island. Even at the time of its conception in the Philippines, such persons upon whom citizenship was conferred did not have to do anything to acquire full citizenship. I reiterate that Sec. 2, Art. IV defines natural-born citizens as " those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Cruz had to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and register his oath with the Local Civil Registry of Mangatarum, Pangasinan. He had to renounce his American citizenship and had to execute an affidavit of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. If citizenship is gained through naturalization, repatriation or legislation, the citizen concerned can not be considered natural-born. Obviously, he has to perform certain acts to become a citizen. CASE 5: Cordora vs. COMELEC; G.R. No. 176947; February 19, 2009 Facts: Gaudencio Cordora accuses Gustavo Tambunting for the election offense of making false claims in his certificate of candidacy relating to his citizenship and as to the residence requirement. Cordora bases his claims from a certification of the Bureau of Immigration that in two instances Tambunting claimed that he is an American citizen upon arrival in the Philippines and upon leaving for the United States that is in 2000 and 2001 respectively. Furthermore, is the fact that Tambunting possesses an American passport which according to him reinforces his claim. Tambunting denies the allegations and presented a copy of his birth certificate showing that he is the son of a Filipino mother and an American father thus confirming that he is a dual citizen. Also Cordura stresses that the fact that Tambunting gained American citizenship means he has lost his residence to run for public office. The COMELEC recommended the dismissal of Corduras claim for which the present case hinges on the Highest Tribunal to rule upon the matter. Issue: Is Tambunting a Filipino citizen, having in mind the allegations of Cordora? Held: The Supreme Court held in the affirmative that Tambunting is aFilipino citizen, regardless of the fact that he is of dual citizen status. He is a Filipino citizen because by the circumstances of his birth, his father being an American follows the place of the birth principle, whilst his mother, a Filipino citizen follows the blood principle or jus sanguinis. It is beyond his control that he is a dual citizen. Nevertheless he can run for public office because the law on the matter in The Local Government Code of 1991 provides that it is not dual citizenship that the law prohibits but that of dual allegiance as held in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano. Furthermore the law regarding the reacquisition of Filipino citizenship does not apply to Tambunting because it only applies to those persons who have been naturalized as citizens of other jurisdictions and desires to reacquire their Filipino Citizenship, whilst under the given facts Tambunting never

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lost it. As to the residency requirement, it need not be stressed because again as the court has already held, Tambunting never lost his Filipino citizenship. CASE 6: Roseller De Guzman vs. COMELEC and Angelina DG. Dela Cruz G.R. No. 180048, June 19, 2009 Ynares-Santiago, J.: 2) Whether petitioner is disqualified from running for vice-mayor in the May 2007 elections. Held: 1. YES. An issue becomes moot when it ceases to present a justifiable controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value. In this case, the resolution of the issue remained relevant because it could significantly affect the outcome of the election protest. In view thereof, a definitive ruling on the issue of petitioners citizenship was clearly necessary. 2. YES. Contrary to petitioners claims, the filing of a certificate of candidacy does not amount to a renunciation of his foreign citizenship. The rulings in the cases of Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable to the instant case because R.A. No. 9225 provides for more requirements. Hence, the law compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. CASE 7: LABO vs. COMELEC

Facts: Petitioner De Guzman and private respondent Angelina DG. Dela Cruz were candidates for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007 Synchronized National and Local elections. Private respondent filed against petitioner a petition for disqualification alleging that he is not a citizen of the Philippines, but an immigrant and resident of the United States of America. In his answer, petitioner admitted that he was a naturalized American. However, he argued that he re-acquired Philippine Citizenship when his application for dual citizenship was approved under Republic Act No. 9225. During the May 2007 elections, private respondent won as vicemayor. Consequently, petitioner filed an election protest on grounds of irregularities and massive cheating. While the said case was pending, the COMELEC ruled to disqualify petitioner stating that he should have renounced his American citizenship before he can run for any public elective position. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was dismissed by the COMELEC for having been rendered moot in view of private respondents victory. Thereafter, the trial court in the Election Protest rendered a decision declaring petitioner as the winner for the Vice-Mayoralty position. As a result, Petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari, alleging that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying him from running as Vice-Mayor. Petitioner invokes invokes the rulings in Frivaldo v. COMELEC and Mercado v. Manzano, that the filing by a person with dual citizenship of a certificate of candidacy, containing an oath of allegiance, constituted as a renunciation of his foreign citizenship. Moreover, he claims that the COMELEC En Banc prematurely dismissed the motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, private respondent claims that the passage of R.A. No. 9225 effectively abandoned the Courts rulings in Frivaldo and Mercado. Issues: 1) Whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing petitioners motion for reconsideration for being moot; and

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship by Lardizabal by quo warranto. He was married in the Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen. Labo returned to the philippines using the Australian passport and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later changed status from immigrant to returning citizen, it was denied since he has not applied for reacquisition of his philippine citizenship. Although no direct evidence wasvpresented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, thelaws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is grantedAustralian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes arenunciation of all other allegiance .

Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.

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Held: The petitioners contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process, simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship. Nor did Australia confer dual citizenship to him.

He is not qualified to vote, much more run for elections as his citizenship is an impediment to his qualification.

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LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT CASE 1: [G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.] TOBIAS vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS BIDIN, J: FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong." Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994. A plebiscite was held, people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect. Petitioners Contentions: FIRST OBJECTION: - Unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. That R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides: "As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same election. - Contravenes the "one subject-one bill" rule. That the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts. - That the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the title of the law. SECOND AND THIRD OBJECTIONS: - Article VI, Sections 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit: "Sec. 5 (1).The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations." "Sec. 5(4).Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section." - That under Section 49 of the assailed law, division of San Juan and Mandaluyong, has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. - That said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. - That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as aforecited. MAIN ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. No. 7675 was constitutional? YES. HELD per contention: 1. Whether it complied with one title one subject rule? YES. - The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. It necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong. A liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. The constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

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2. Whether it violated the limit on the number of representatives in the House of Representatives, which was not more than 250 members? NO. for Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC contending, among others, that she failed to comply with the one-year residence requirement under the Constitution. An order was issued by the COMELEC disqualifying and cancelling her certificate of candidacy. She filed an Amended Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the seven months to since childhood. It was denied because it was filed out of time. In an en banc resolution, the COMELEC declared her as qualified to run and allowed her proclamation should it appear that she is the winner. In another resolution on the same day, it directed that the proclamation be suspended in the event that she obtained the highest number of votes. She obtained the highest number of votes; hence she went to the Supreme Court.

- A reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. 3. What is gerrymandering? Is it present in the case? NO. Gerrymandering, is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him. Other Rulings: - The inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong. - The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. - The contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself. CASE 2: IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS VS. COMELEC GR 119976 September 18, 1995

Issue: Whether or not Imelda Marcos was a resident of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the election

Held: YES

The Court ruled that: for purposes of election, residence and domicile are synonymous. It is only in Civil Law that we keep the distinction between the two which is: Residence where one stays at the moment; involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. Domicile where one stays permanently characterized by actual residence or physical presence at one point, with animus manendi (intent to stay if present) or animus revertendi (intent to return if absent).

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency requirement. (The seven months was merely an honest mistake of petitioner).

Facts: Imelda R. Marcos filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte stating, among others, that her residence in the place was seven months. Cong. Cirilio Roy Montejo, another candidate, filed a Petition

In the case of IMR, her domicile by operation of law or necessity (domicilium necessarium) is Tolosa, since, as a minor she could not choose her domicile, and her father chose Tolosa as their domicile. Her marriage to Ferdinand Marcos did not necessarily result in the loss of that domicile in favor of a new one since (1) a woman follows only the actual residence of her husband and not his domicile and (2) as a rule,

9
change of domicile is proved only by the concurrence of thre eelements, (1) actual removal from original domicile, (2) intent to abandon domicile, and (3) acts effecting that intent. IMR may have practically left Leyte, but the animus revertendi remained as evinced by her celebrating her birthdays, fiestas and important milestones in Tacloban and Tolosa, and her careful cultivation of a political base in that district, thereby negating the last two requirements. Assuming but not conceding that she lost her domicile when, by her acts she proved her intent to follow her husbands domicile, her act of writing the PCGG for the recovery of her ancestral house in Tolosa, and public announcement to represent the 1st District in Congress after she returned from US exile and almost three years before the 1995 elections, showed her decision to re-establish her domicile there (domicilium voluntarium or domicile of choice), satisfying the minimum residency requirement. Hence, the COMELEC erred in disqualifying her. For the purpose of Election Law, residence is the same as domicile. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the old one. To successfully effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) actual change in domicile, (2) bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; (3) acts which correspond with the purpose CASE 3: BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR TRANSPARENCY (BANAT) VS COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 FACTS The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted 15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List System.[6] On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Provided by the Constitution, [t]he Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have recently been quoted in the national papers that the [COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats.[7] On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as winners in the party-list elections Party-List BUHAY BAYAN MUNA CIBAC GABRIELA APEC A TEACHER AKBAYAN ALAGAD BUTIL COOP-NATCO ANAKPAWIS ARC ABONO Projected total number of votes 1,178,747 977,476 755,964 621,718 622,489 492,369 462,674 423,190 409,298 412,920 370,165 375,846 340,151

NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT AND CARPIO, J.: APRIL21, 2009

Proportion of votes received by the first party Equal to or at least 6% Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% Less than 4%

Additional seats Two (2) additional seats One (1) additional seat No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay obtained the following percentage: 1,178,747 - - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2% 16,261,369 which entitles it to two (2) additional seats. WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for the other qualified parties, organizations and coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:

10
No. of votes of concerned party Additional seats for = ------------------a concerned party No. of votes of first party No. of additional x seats allocated to first party This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT). Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal Group submitted his comments/observations and recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)], which reads: COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS: Petitioner Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), in its Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the Constitution prayed for the following reliefs, to wit: 1. That the full number -- twenty percent (20%) -- of Party-List representatives as mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution shall be proclaimed. 2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA 7941 which prescribes the 2% threshold votes, should be harmonized with Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and with Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in that it should be applicable only to the first party-list representative seats to be allotted on the basis of their initial/first ranking. 3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA 7941 shall be applied; and 4. Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the number of seats corresponding to every 2% of the votes they received and the additional seats shall be allocated in accordance with Section 12 of RA 7941, that is, in proportion to the percentage of votes obtained by each party-list group in relation to the total nationwide votes cast in the party-list election, after deducting the corresponding votes of those which were allotted seats under the 2% threshold rule 5. In the alternative, to declare as unconstitutional Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941 and that the procedure

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results are as follows: Party List BAYAN MUNA CIBAC GABRIELA APEC A TEACHER AKBAYAN ALAGAD BUTIL COOP-NATCO ANAKPAWIS ARC ABONO Party List BUHAY BAYAN MUNA CIBAC GABRIELA APEC Percentage 1.65 1.28 1.05 1.05 0.83 0.78 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.62 0.63 0.57 Additional Seat 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Additional Seats 2 1 1 1 1

Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07 -88 on 3 August 2007, which reads as follows:

11
in allocating seats for party-list representative prescribed by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be followed. RECOMMENDATION: The petition of BANAT is now moot and academic. The Commission En Banc in NBC Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of the Canvass of Votes and Partial Proclamation of the Parties, Organizations and Coalitions Participating Under the Party-List System During the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections resolved among others that the total number of seats of each winning party, organization or coalition shall be determined pursuant to the Veterans Federation Party versus COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass of the party-list results. First, the twenty percent allocation the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those elected under the party list; Second, the two percent threshold only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of Representatives; Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats; Fourth, proportional representation the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list organizations.

On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC.[11] ISSUE 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling? MERELY A CEILING 2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? Yes 3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? No 4. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? No If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? No HELD: The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a Philippine-style party-list election has at least four inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For easy reference, these are:

Number of Party-List Representatives: The Formula Mandated by the Constitution Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives shall be composed of district representatives and party-list representatives. The Constitution allows the legislature to modify the number of the members of the House of Representatives. Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives. We compute the number of seats available to party-list representatives from the number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:

12
Votes Guarantee Garnere d Seat d over Total Votes for Party List, in % (First Round) (A) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9[31] 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 BUHAY BAYAN MUNA CIBAC GABRIELA APEC A Teacher AKBAYAN ALAGAD COOPNATCCO BUTIL BATAS ARC 1,169,23 4 979,039 755,686 621,171 619,657 490,379 466,112 423,149 409,883 409,160 385,810 374,288 7.33% 6.14% 4.74% 3.89% 3.88% 3.07% 2.92% 2.65% 2.57% 2.57% 2.42% 2.35% 2.32% 2.13% 2.12% 2.06% 2.02% 1.95% (B) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 Additiona (B) plus l (C), in Seats whole integer s Applyin g the three seat cap 19 20 21 22 23 (Second Round) (C) 2.79 2.33 1.80 1.48 1.48 1.17 1.11 1.01 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (D) 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 (E) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. Number of seats available to legislative districts x .20 = .80 After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list representatives to the total number of representatives, the Constitution left the manner of allocating the seats available to party-list representatives to the wisdom of the legislature. Number of seats available to party-list representatives 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Tota l FPJPM UNI-MAD ABS KAKUSA 300,923 245,382 235,086 228,999 1.89% 1.54% 1.47% 1.44% 1.43% 1.37% 1.37% 1.34% 1.24% 1.23% 1.18% 1.11% 1.07% 1.06% 1.05% 1.03% 1.02% 0.98% 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 55 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.

Ran k

Party

Votes Garnere d

KABATAAN 228,637 ABA-AKO ALIF SENIOR CITIZENS AT VFP ANAD BANAT ANG KASANGGA BANTAY ABAKADA 1-UTAK TUCP COCOFED 218,818 217,822 213,058 197,872 196,266 188,521 177,028 170,531 169,801 166,747 164,980 162,647 155,920

ANAKPAWI 370,261 S ABONO AMIN AGAP AN WARAY YACAP 339,990 338,185 328,724 321,503 310,889

13
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives: The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent Threshold and the Three-Seat Cap We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present. We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.[30] In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall be observed: 1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections. 2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each. 3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated. 4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats. In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every twopercenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats. In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38 , which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55 available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three seats for each party. Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In defining a party that participates in party-list elections as either a political party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major

14
political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector or sectors. The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941: Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, able to read and write, bona fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to continue until the expiration of his term. Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as there is no financial status required in the law. It is enough that the nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be a senior citizen. Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress: The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in the law which will systematically prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives from being filled. The threeseat cap, as a limitation to the number of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure used in Table 3 above. Separate Opinions PUNO, C.J., concurring and dissenting: It will be remembered that the petitioners in Ang Bagong Bayani sought the disqualification of the major political parties on the ground that the party-list system was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented, and not the mainstream political parties, the non-marginalized or overrepresentedThere is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission 19 that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties 20 made it to the top 50. In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today . It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system. IN VIEW WHEREOF, I dissent on the ruling allowing the entry of major political parties into the party-list system. NACHURA, J., concurring: Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is

15
no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative. It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law I submit that, until Congress shall have effected an acceptable amendment to the minimum vote requirement in R.A. 7941, we abide by the sensible standard of "proportional representation" and adopt a gradually regressive threshold vote requirement, inversely proportional to the increase in the number of party-list seats. Thus, at present, considering that there are 55 seats allocated for party-list groups, the formula should be: 100% (Total number of votes cast for party-list) 55 party-list seats The minimum vote requirement will gradually lessen as the number of party-list seats increases. Accordingly, if the scenario we presented above should ever come to pass, and there are 100 seats allocated for party-list groups, then the threshold vote should be 1%, based on the following computation: cEITCA 100% (Total number of votes cast for party-list) 100 party-list seats This is the more logical and equitable formula. It would judiciously respond to the inevitable changes in the composition of the House of Representatives; it would open opportunities for the broadest people's representation in the House of Representatives; and more importantly, it would not violate the Constitution. Thus, with respect to the fixed threshold vote of 2% in Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, I join the Court in declaring it unconstitutional, since all enactments inconsistent with the Constitution should be invalidated. 12 = 1% = 1.818% CASE 4: ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY vs COMELEC. [G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001.] Ponente: Panganiban Facts: COMELEC issued Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 on March 26, 2001. It approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, Six of these groups were established political parties, namely PARTIDO NG MASANG PILIPINO, LAKAS NUCD-UMDP, NATIONALIST PEOPLE'S COALITION, LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO, AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO, LIBERAL PARTY, NACIONALISTA PARTY and PDP-LABAN., and other organizations accused of being pseudo party-list organizations which are actually satellites of the major political parties and of big businesses. "We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or organization to directly participate in this electoral window. "It will be noted that as defined, the 'party-list system' is a 'mechanism of proportional representation' in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections. "However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions." On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that "the names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the 'Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections' and that said certified list be accordingly amended." It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latter's nominees not be proclaimed. On April 11, 2001, Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.

16
Issue: (1) May political parties participate in the party-list elections? (2) Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to 'marginalized and underrepresented' sectors and organizations. Held: (1) Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-list system. We quote the pertinent provision below: "xxx xxx xxx "For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to participate in the party-list system. "xxx xxx xxx" Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones may participate in the party-list elections. (2) Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows: (2)The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in this wise: "SEC. 2.Declaration of Policy. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible." The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable" the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens, 1.who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and 2.who lack well-defined constituencies; but 3.who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole. "Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented" as exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, "labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective sectors. While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of one's bank accounts. While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or

17
related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate association. Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20 percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district elections and the party-list elections. Guidelines Party-List Participants xxx Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino citizens "who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties." Surely, the interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the marginalized and underrepresented. DISSENTS: Vitug: The party-list system is limited to four groups 1) political parties, 2) sectoral parties, 3) sectoral organizations, and 4) coalitions. A political party is an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology, or platform, principles or policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. A sectoral party is an organized group of citizens belonging to identifiable sectors, such as those enumerated in Article 6, Section 5(2), of the 1987 Constitution, which includes the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities and women and those added by R.A. 7941 like the fisherfolk, elderly, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers and professionals. A sectoral organization is a group of citizens who share the same or similar attributes or characteristics, employment, interests or concerns. Coalition is an aggrupation of duly registered national, regional, sectoral parties or organizations for election purposes. And, the polestar in the constructions of constitutions always remains "effect must be given to the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it." The law, in its clear formulation cannot give this tribunal the elbow-room for construction. for Screening Courts are bound to suppose that any inconveniences involved in the application of constitutional provisions according to their plain terms and import have been considered in advance and accepted as less intolerable than those avoided, or as compensated by countervailing advantages. The ponencia itself, in ruling as it does, may unwittingly, be crossing the limits of judicial review and treading the dangerous waters of judicial legislation, and more importantly, of a constitutional amendment. While, the lament of herein petitioners is understandable, the remedy lies not with this Court but with the people themselves through an amendment of their work as and when better counsel prevails. WHEREFORE, I regret my inability to concur with my colleagues in their judgment. I am thus constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petitions. Mendoza: (Other purpose is to give those who cannot win the winner-take-all district elections to have a chance at proportional representation) With due respect, I think the majority misapprehends the meaning of 2 of R.A. No. 7941. The provision reads: SEC. 2. Declaration of Party. The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. What this provision simply states is that the purpose of the party-list system is to promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives and, that to achieve this end, "a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives" shall be guaranteed. Contrary to what the majority claims, 2 does not say that the party-list system is intended "to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House of Representatives. What it says is that the policy of the law is "to promote proportional representation through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations or

18
coalitions thereof,which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations, and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation" to win seats in the House. For while the representation of "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors is a basic purpose of the law, it is not its only purpose. As already explained, the aim of proportional representation is to enable those who cannot win in the "winner-take-all" district elections a chance of winning. These groups are not necessarily limited to the sectors mentioned in 5,i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, the handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. These groups can possibly include other sectors. Indeed, how can there be a "full, free and open party system" if the election for the party list system is to be limited to the sectors which are enumerated in 5 of the law, i.e., labor, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, the elderly, handicapped, women, the youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals? After all, what is provided for is "a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations" each of which is separately defined in 3 of the law. CASE 5: G.R. No. 203766 | April 2, 2013 ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., v COMELEC Note: This case is the prevailing jurisprudence on the interpretation of Sec. 5, Art VI of the Constitution, abandoning the Ang Bagong Bayani (2001) and BANAT (2009) decisions. The SC ruled that the party-list system is no longer reserved for themarginalized and underrepresented sectors and that nominees don't have to belong to the sector that the groups represent. You may want to check the full-text to understand the extensive discussion on the issues. FACTS: These cases constitute 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52 party-list groups and organizations assailing the Resolutions issued by the COMELEC disqualifying them from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections, either by denial of their petitions for registration under the party-list system, or cancellation of their registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. Approximately 280 groups and organizations registered 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Through a Resolution, the COMELEC excluded the names of the 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot because they failed to establish their track record as organizations that seek to uplift the lives of the "marginalized and underrepresented." A Resolution was also passed by the COMELEC disqualifying the remaining 39 petitioners. These 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from the Supreme Court, directing the COMELEC to their names in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Indisputably, the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also non-sectoral parties. The framers intended the sectoral parties to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the party-list system. As explained by Commissioner Wilfredo Villacorta, political parties can participate in the party-list system "For as long as they field candidates who come from the different marginalized sectors that we shall designate in this Constitution." In fact, the framers voted down, 19-22, a proposal to reserve permanent seats to sectoral parties in the House of Representatives, or alternatively, to reserve the party-list system exclusively to sectoral parties. As clearly explained by Justice Jose C. Vitug in his Dissenting Opinion in Ang Bagong Bayani: The indisputable intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to include in the partylist system both sectoral and non-sectoral parties is clearly written in Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution, which states: All 54 petitioners prayed for the issuance of a TRO and/or Writ of Injunction. The SC issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. ISSUES: (1) WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 partylist elections, either by denial of their new petitions for registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of their existing registration and accreditation as party-list organizations. No (2) WON the criteria for participating in the party-list system laid down in Banat v. COMELEC should be applied 13 May 2013 party-list elections. No. HELD: FIRST ISSUE The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in following prevailing decisions of the SC in applying the Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT decisions in disqualifying petitioners from participating in 13 May 2013 party-list elections. However, since the Court adopts in this Decision new parameters in the qualification of national, regional, and sectoral parties under the party-list system, thereby abandoning the rulings in the decisions applied by the COMELEC in disqualifying petitioners, we remand to the COMELEC all the present petitions for the COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register under the party-list system under the new parameters prescribed in this Decision. The Party-List System

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Section 5. (1) The House of Representative shall be composed of not more that two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations. The commas after the words "national," and "regional," separate national and regional parties from sectoral parties. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended national and regional parties to be at the same time sectoral, they would have stated "national and regional sectoral parties." They did not, precisely because it was never their intention to make the party-list system exclusively sectoral. What the framers intended, and what they expressly wrote in Section 5(1), could not be any clearer: the party-list system is composed of three different groups, and the sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups:(1) national parties or organizations; (2) regional parties or organizations; and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. Moreover, Section 5(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution mandates that, during the first three consecutive terms of Congress after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, "one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector." This provision clearly shows again that the party-list system is not exclusively for sectoral parties for two obvious reasons. First, the other one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives would naturally be open to non-sectoral party-list representatives. Second, the reservation of one-half of the party-list seats to sectoral parties applies only for the first "three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution," clearly making the party-list system fully open after the end of the first three congressional terms. This means that, after this period, there will be no seats reserved for any class or type of party that qualifies under the three groups constituting the party-list system. Hence, the clear intent, express wording, and party-list structure ordained in Section 5(1) and (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution cannot be disputed: the party-list system is not for sectoral parties only, but also for non-sectoral parties. RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act, which is the law that implements the party-list system prescribed in the Constitution, provides: Section 3. Definition of Terms. (b) A party means either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. (c) A political party refers to an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office. (d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. R.A. No. 7941 does not require national and regional parties or organizations to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. To require all national and regional parties under the party-list system to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" is to deprive and exclude, by judicial fiat, ideology-based and causeoriented parties from the party-list system. There is no requirement in R.A. No. 7941 that a national or regional political party must represent a "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. It is sufficient that the political party consists of citizens who advocate the same ideology or platform, or the same governance principles and policies, regardless of their economic status as citizens. Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 states that "the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals." The sectors mentioned in Section 5 are not all necessarily "marginalized and underrepresented." For sure, "professionals" are not by definition "marginalized and underrepresented," not even the elderly, women, and the youth. However, professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth may "lack well-defined political constituencies," and can thus organize themselves into sectoral parties in advocacy of the special interests and concerns of their respective sectors. Section 6 of R.A. No. 7941 provides another compelling reason for holding that the law does not require national or regional parties, as well as certain sectoral parties in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941, to represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Section 6 provides the grounds for the COMELEC to refuse or cancel the registration of parties or organizations after due notice and hearing. None of the 8 grounds to refuse or cancel registration refers to non-representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented." The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" appears only once in R.A. No. 7941, in Section 2 on Declaration of Policy. While the policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 broadly refers to "marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties," the specific implementing provisions of R.A. No. 7941 do not define or require that the sectors, organizations or parties must be "marginalized and underrepresented." On the contrary, to even interpret that all the sectors mentioned in Section 5 are "marginalized and underrepresented" would lead to absurdities.

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How then should we harmonize the broad policy declaration in Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941 with its specific implementing provisions, bearing in mind the applicable provisions of the 1987 Constitution on the matter? The phrase "marginalized and underrepresented" should refer only to the sectors in Section 5 that are,by their nature, economically "marginalized and underrepresented." These sectors are: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors. For these sectors, a majority of the members of the sectoral party must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented." The nominees of the sectoral party either must belong to the sector, or must have a track record of advocacy for the sector represented. Belonging to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector does not mean one must "wallow in poverty, destitution or infirmity." It is sufficient that one, or his or her sector, is below the middle class. More specifically, the economically "marginalized and underrepresented" are those who fall in the low income group as classified by the National Statistical Coordination Board. The recognition that national and regional parties, as well as sectoral parties of professionals, the elderly, women and the youth, need not be "marginalized and underrepresented" will allow small ideology-based and cause-oriented parties who lack "well-defined political constituencies" a chance to win seats in the House. On the other hand, limiting to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectoral parties for labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature are economically at the margins of society, will give the "marginalized and underrepresented" an opportunity to likewise win seats in the House of Representatives. This interpretation will harmonize the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 and will give rise to a multi-party system where those "marginalized and underrepresented," both in economic and ideological status, will have the opportunity to send their own members to the House. The major political parties are those that field candidates in the legislative district elections. Major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections since they neither lack "well-defined political constituencies" nor represent "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors. Thus, the national or regional parties under the partylist system are necessarily those that do not belong to major political parties. This automatically reserves the national and regional parties under the party-list system to those who "lack well-defined political constituencies," giving them the opportunity to have members in the House of Representatives. To recall, BANAT expressly declared, in its second guideline for the accreditation of parties under the party-list system, that "while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino citizens belon ging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors xxx to be elected to the House of Representatives. "However, the requirement in BANAT, in its second guideline, that "the political party xxx must represent the marginalized and underrepresented," automatically disqualified major political parties from participating in the party-list system. This inherent inconsistency has been compounded by the COMELECs refusal to register sectoral wings officially organized by major political parties. BANAT merely formalized the prevailing practice when it expressly prohibited major political parties from participating in the party-list system, even through their sectoral wings. Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941 expressly prohibited the "first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress" from participating in the May 1988 party-list elections. Thus, major political parties can participate in subsequent party-list elections since the prohibition is expressly limited only to the 1988 party-list elections. However, major political parties should participate in party-list elections only through their sectoral wings. The participation of major political parties through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies," will facilitate the entry of the "marginalized and underrepresented" and those who "lack well-defined political constituencies" as members of the House. The sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a major political party through a coalition. This linkage is allowed by Section 3 of R.A. No. 7941, which provides that "component parties or organizations of a coalition may participate independently (in party-list elections) provided the coalition of which they form part does not participate in the party-list system." SECOND ISSUE Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the qualifications of party-list nominees. A partylist nominee must be a bona fide member of the party or organization which he or she seeks to represent. In the case of sectoral parties, to be a bona fide party-list nominee one must either belong to the sector represented, or have a track record of advocacy for such sector. In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who desire to participate in the party-list system: First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors; so also must its nominees. In 2009, by a vote of 8-7 in BANAT, this Court stretched the Ang Bagong Bayani ruling further. In BANAT, the majority officially excluded major political parties from participating in party-list elections, abandoning even the lip-service that Ang Bagong Bayani accorded to the 1987 Constitution and RA 7941 that major political parties can participate in party-list elections.

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For the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections, we must now impose and mandate the party-list system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. Thus, we remand all the present petitions to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in the 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following parameters: 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations. 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any "marginalized and underrepresented" sector. 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition. 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be "marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking in "well-defined political constituencies." It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are "marginalized and underrepresented" include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-defined political constituencies" include professionals, the elderly, women, and the youth. 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that lack "well-defined political constituencies" must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the "marginalized and underrepresented," or that represent those who lack "well-defined political constituencies," either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations. 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified. The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1) all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must represent the "marginalized and underrepresented" sectors, and (2) all nominees must belong to the "marginalized and underrepresented" sector they represent. Petitioners may have been disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not represent the "marginalized and underrepresented." Also, petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify, even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. The present petitions should be remanded to the COMELEC not because the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioners, but because petitioners may now possibly qualify to participate in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections under the new parameters prescribed by this Court. CASE 6: LIGOT VS. MATHAY FACTS: Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965), RA 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July 1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and

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in case of elected officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco, the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then, Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum. ISSUE: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to such retirement benefit. HELD: To allow petitioner a retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly. Ligots claim cannot be sustained as far as he and other members of Congress similarly situated whose term of office ended on December 30, 1969 are concerned for the simple reason that a retirement gratuity or benefit is a form of compensation within the purview of the Constitutional provision limiting their compensation and other emoluments to their salary as provided by law. To grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them prohibited emoluments which in effect increase the salary beyond that which they were permitted by the Constitution to receive during their incumbency. As stressed by the Auditor-General in his decision in the similar case of petitioners colleague, ex-Congressman Singson, (S)uch a scheme would contravene the Constitution for it would lead to the same prohibited result by enabling administrative authorities to do indirectly what cannot be done directly. RULING: The Supreme Court vote to dismiss the instant case, first, the case is moot and academic for it is evident from the manifestation filed by petitioners dated April 6, 1992, that they seek to unseat the respondent from his position as Congressman for the duration of his term of office commencing June 30, 1987 and ending June 30, 1992. Secondly, jurisdiction of this case rightfully pertains to the House Electoral Tribunal. Under Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, it is the House Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election returns and qualification of its members. The petitioners appropriate remedy should have been to file a petition to cancel respondent Dazas certificate ofcandidacy before the election or a quo warranto case with the House of Electoral Tribunal within ten days after Dazas proclamation. FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition seeking to disqualify Daza, then incumbent congressman of their congressional district in Makati, from continuing to exercise the functions of his office on the ground that the latter is a greencard holder and a lawful permanent resident of the United States. They also alleged that Mr. Daza has not by any act or declaration renounced his status as permanent resident thereby violating the Omnibus Election Code (Section 68) and the 1987 Constitution (section 18, Article III). Respondent Congressman filed his Comment denying the fact that he is a permanent resident of the United States as evidenced by a letter order of the US Immigration and Naturalization Service, Los Angeles, U.S.A, he had long waived his status when he returned to the Philippines on August 12, 1985. ISSUE: CASE 7: SAMPAYAN vs. DAZA GR NO. 103903, SEPT.11, 1992

Whether or not respondent Daza should be disqualified as a member of the House of Representatives for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code

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officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of the departments, agencies, commissions or boards.

HRET has exclusive jurisdiction over election contests and qualifications of members of Congress Remedies against a disqualified House of Representative candidate: (1) cancellation of certificate of candidacy filed with COMELEC before election; (2) quo warranto case filed with HRET after proclamation

"The President shall have the power to make appointments during the recess of the Congress, whether voluntary or compulsory, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress."

CASE 8. ULPIANO P. SARMIENTO III AND JUANITO G. ARCIALLA, petitioners, vs. SALVADOR MISON, in his capacity as COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, AND GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET, respondents, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, intervenor PADILLA, J p: Petition for prohibition by petitioners who are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of Constitutional Law, to enjoin Salvador Mison from performing the functions of the Office of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursements of Mison's salaries and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

Under this provision of the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint: 1. heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; 2. all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; 3. those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint; 4. officers lower in rank whose appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President alone.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment is valid

The first group is clearly appointed with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Appointments of such officers are initiated by nomination and, if the nomination is confirmed by the Commission on Appointments, the President appoints.

HELD: YES Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution says: "The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other

The second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments, as can be determined through the recorded proceedings of Constitutional Commission. In the case at bar, it would follow that only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them.

HISTORY:

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1935 Constitution: almost all presidential appointments required the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. 1973 Constitution: placed the absolute power of appointment in the President with hardly any check on the part of the legislature. framers of 1987 Constitution struck a "middle ground" by requiring the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments for the first group of appointments and leaving to the President, without such confirmation, the appointment of other officers, i.e., those in the second and third groups as well as those in the fourth group, i.e., officers of lower rank. It is, therefore, clear that appointments to the second and third groups of officers can be made by the President without the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments.

*NOTE: MAY BE DISREGARDED (DISCUSSIONS OF CONSTI COMMISSION) The original text of Section 16, Article VII, as proposed by the 1986 Constitutional Commission: "Section 16.The president shall nominate and, with the consent of a Commission on Appointment, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and bureaus, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain and all other officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of departments"

The word also could mean in addition; as well; besides, too besides in like manner which meanings could stress that the word also in said second sentence means that the President, in addition to nominating and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appointing the officers enumerated in the first sentence, can appoint (without such consent or confirmation) the officers mentioned in the second sentence, contrary to the interpretation that the President shall appoint the officers mentioned in said second sentence in the same manner as he appoints officers mentioned in the first sentence. Rather than limit the area of consideration to the possible meanings of the word also as used in the context of said second sentence, the Court has chosen to derive significance from the fact that the first sentence speaks of nomination by the President and appointment by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, whereas, the second sentence speaks only of appointment by the President. And, this use of different language in 2 sentences proximate to each other underscores a difference in message conveyed and perceptions established.

In the course of the debates on the text of Section 16, there were two major changes proposed and approved by the Commission. On motion of COMMISIONER FOZ: 1. delete the phrase "and bureaus" to exclude the appointments of heads of bureaus from the requirement of confirmation by the Commission on Appointments on the ground that this position is low and to require confirmation would subject bureau directors to political influence. place a period (.) after the word "captain" and substitute the phrase "and all" w/ the phrase "HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT ANY." intended to subject to confirmation only those mentioned in the first sentence The heads of the exec. depts, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution

The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in character. Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly construed. Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to be recognized.

2.

In the case at bar, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII clearly stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein enumerated require the consent of the Commission on Appointments. After a careful study of the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the Court found the use of the word alone after the word President in said third sentence of Sec. 16, Article VII is, more than anything else, a slip in draftsmanship. In the 1987 Constitution, the clear and expressed intent of its framers was to exclude presidential appointments from confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, except appointments to offices expressly mentioned in the first sentence. Consequently, there was no reason to use in the third sentence the word alone after the word President in providing that Congress may by law vest the appointment of lower -ranked officers in the President alone, or in the courts, or in the heads of departments, because the power to appoint officers whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint is already vested in him, without need of confirmation by the Commission on

Discussions on the debate regarding section 16: MR. FOZ:Madam President, my proposed amendment is on page 7, Section 16, line 26 which is to delete the words 'and bureaus,' and on line 28 of the same page, to change the phrase 'colonel or naval captain' to MAJOR GENERAL OR REAR ADMIRAL. This last amendment which is co-authored by Commissioner de Castro is to put a period (.) after the word ADMIRAL, and on line 29 of the same page, start a new sentence with: HE SHALL ALSO APPOINT, et cetera.

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Appointments, in the second sentence. The word alone in the third sentence, as a literal import from the last part of par. 3, section 10, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution, appears to be redundant in the light of the second sentence. This redundancy cannot prevail over the clear and positive intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution that presidential appointments, except those mentioned in the first sentence, are not subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. The position of Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (a bureau head) is not one of those within the first group of appointments where the consent of the Commission on Appointments is required. The 1987 Constitution deliberately excluded the position of heads of bureaus from appointments that need the consent (confirmation) of the Commission on Appointments. Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows: SECTION 35.Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly. All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

Moreover, the President is expressly authorized by law to appoint the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs (RA 1937, Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, Section 601, as amended by PD34 on 27 October 1972). RA 1937 and PD 34 were approved during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, under which the President may nominate and, with the consent of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of bureaus, like the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs. After the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, however, RA 1937 and PD 34 have to be read in harmony with Sec. 16, Art. VII, with the result that, while the appointment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is one that devolves on the President, as an appointment he is authorized by law to make, such appointment. CASE 9 - THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, et al, petitioners, vs. HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

ISSUES: 1.) Whether or not it violated Article VI, Sec. 26(1), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." 2.) Whether or not Sec. 35 of R.A. 7354 violated Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution providing that (2)No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. 3.) Whether or not the withdrawal of franking privileges violates equal protection clause. HELD:

CRUZ, J:

FACTS: Section 35 of R.A. No.7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No. 9228 withdrew the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Register of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

1.) NO. The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the

26
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title. 2.) NO. The petitioners invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment. While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus: A conference committee may deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate. These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference committee. It is a matter of record that the Conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992. 3.) YES. There is violation of equal protection. All persons similarly situated should be treated alike both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It does not require universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in fact result in unequal protection. What the law requires is equality among equals according to valid classification. The postal service office claims that the expense from judiciary with regards frank mails amounts to 73,574,864 as compared to 90,424, 175 total. The respondents are in effect saying that franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not need it much at all but not to those who need it badly. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others especially where theres no substantial distinction. The distinction made is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. * R.A. 7354 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. CASE 10: Comelec vs. Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla

The case at bar provides us with another occasion to stress that with respect to government contracts, statutes take precedence over the public officers freedom to contract.

Facts: Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, alleging that respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 215, Quezon City, committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the (a) Resolution

In 1996, the Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as the "Voter's Registration Act of 1996," providing for the modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list and the appropriate of funds therefor "in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters."

Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 00-0315 approving in principle the Voter's Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS) Project for brevity). After the public bidding was conducted, PHOTOKINA's bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score and was declared the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3252approving the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA, which, in turn, immediately accepted the same.

However, under Republic Act No. 8760the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELECs modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was only P1.2 Billion Pesos.

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Meanwhile, PHOTOKINA, as the winning bidder, wrote several letters to the COMELEC requesting the formal execution of the contract, but to no avail.

Ruling 1. No rule of law is better settled than that mandamus does not lie to enforce the performance of contractual obligations. 2. To spare PHOTOKINA the drudgery of a fruitless pursuit, we deem it appropriate to lay down the principles governing government contracts and to apply them to the instant case. Meanwhile, as PHOTOKINA will later on deduce from the discussion, the contract subject of this controversy is one that can be slain in sight for being patently void and unenforceable. Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."

Then Chairman Benipayo, through various press releases and public statements, announced that the VRIS Project has been scrapped, dropped, junked, or set aside. He further announced his plan to re-engineer the entire modernization program of the COMELEC, emphasizing his intention to replace the VRIS Project with his own version, the Triple E Vision.

In support of its application for writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction, PHOTOKINA adopted the evidence it adduced during the hearing of its application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order. On December 19, 2001, respondent Judge Ma. Luisa Quijano-Padilla issued the first assailed Resolution granting PHOTOKINAs application for a writ o f preliminary prohibitory injunction

It is quite evident from the tenor of the language of the law that the existence of appropriations and the availability of funds are indispensable pre-requisites to or conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts. CASE 11: JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ET. AL. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) in behalf of then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo and Commissioners Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr..

Facts: the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.

Petitioners contend that: (1) a petition for mandamus and prohibition does not lie to enforce contractual obligations, hence, PHOTOKINAs proper recourse before the Regional Trial Court should have been an action for specific performance; (2) respondent judge, by issuing the injunctive writs, already assumed that the VRIS Project was lawfully awarded by the COMELEC to PHOTOKINA, and that there is a valid perfected contract between them, thus, manifesting her prejudgment; and (3) injunctive writs should not be issued when an action for damages can adequately compensate for the injuries.

We now resolve the following substantive issues: 1) 2) Is a petition for mandamus the appropriate remedy to enforce contractual obligations? May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?

On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5 Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."

Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG. Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft

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and Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5. A quo warranto case was filed before the HRET assailing the jusridiction of HRET over the Party list..and its representatives. They claimed that Aangat Tayo was not eligible for a party-list seat in the House of Representatives, since it did not represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them. Issues: Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation;

Ruling: The Supreme court granted the petition. the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. Therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate or Congress and that Judiciary.

Respondent Lucaban and the others with him further pointed out that petitioner Abayon herself was not qualified to sit in the House as a party-list nominee since she did not belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, she being the wife of an incumbent congressional district representative. She moreover lost her bid as party-list representative of the party-list organization called An Waray in the immediately preceding elections of May 10, 2004.

Petitioner Abayon countered that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already confirmed the status of Aangat Tayo as a national multi-sectoral party-list organization representing the workers, women, youth, urban poor, and elderly and that she belonged to the women sector. Abayon also claimed that although she was the second nominee of An Waray party-list organization during the 2004 elections, she could not be regarded as having lost a bid for an elective office.

Also the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation is not absolute or without limitation. CASE 12: ABAYON PALPARAN VS THE HRET These two cases are about the authority of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) to pass upon the eligibilities of the nominees of the party-list groups that won seats in the lower house of Congress.

HRET dismissed the proceeding but upheld the jurisdiction over the nominated representatives who now seeks certiorari before the SC.

Issue: W/N HRET has jurisdiction over the question of qualifications of petitioners..

FACTS: In G.R. 189466, Abayon and Palparan were the duly nominated party list representatives of AAngat Tayo and Bantay respectively. , that won a seat in the House of Representatives during the 2007 elections.

HELD: Yes, The HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees.Although it is the party-list organization that is voted for in the elections, it is not the organization that sits as and becomes a member of the House of Representatives. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, identifies who the members of that House are representatives of districts and party list Once elected, both the district representatives and the party-list representatives are treated inlike manner. The Party-List System Act itself recognizes party- list nominees as members of the House of Representatives, a party

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- list representative is in every sense an elected member of the House of Representatives.

Although the vote cast in a party-list election is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the House of Representatives. Both the Constitution and the Party-List System Act set the qualifications and grounds for disqualification of party-list nominees. Section 9 of R.A. 7941, echoing the Constitution. It is for the HRET to interpret the meaning of this particular qualification of a nominee the need for him or her to be a bona fide member or a representative of his party-list organization in the context of the facts that characterize petitioners Abayon and Palparans relation to Aangat Tayoa nd Bantay, respectively, and the marginalized and underrepresented interests thatthey presumably embody.

What is inevitable is that Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution 9 provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to, among other things, the qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Since, as pointed out above, party-list nominees are "elected members" of the House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.

The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and Palparan.