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Wahhabi (Arabic: Al-Wahhbyya )or Wahhabism was a reformist movement of Sunni Islam attributed to Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab, an 18th century scholar from what is today known as Saudi Arabia, who advocated a return to the practices of the first three generations of Islamic history. It was initiated to purge Islam of innovations and practices considered to be shirk by the leaders of Wahhabiyya movement. Wahhabism has predominantly influenced Saudi Arabia where people mainly follow Hanbali school of jurisprudence.[1] It is often referred to as a "sect"[1] or "branch"[2] of Islam, though both its supporters and its opponents[3] reject such designations. It has developed considerable influence in the Muslim world through the funding of mosques, schools and other means from Persian Gulf oil wealth.[4] The primary doctrine of Wahhabi is Tawhid, or the uniqueness and unity of God.[5] Ibn Abdul Wahhab was influenced by the writings of Ibn Taymiyya a Hanbali Jurist and questioned medieval interpretations of Islam, claiming to rely on the Qur'an and the Hadith.[5] He preached against a "perceived moral decline and political weakness" in the Arabian Peninsula and condemned idolatry, the popular cult of saints, and shrine and tomb visitation.[5] The term "Wahhabi" (Wahhbya) was first used by opponents of ibn Abdul Wahhab. [2] It is considered derogatory by the people it is used to describe, who prefer to be called "unitarians" (Muwahiddun).[6][7] The terms "Wahhabi", "Salafi" (and also sometimes Ahle Hadith) are often used interchangeably, but Wahhabi has also been called "a particular orientation within Salafism", [2] an orientation some consider ultra-conservative. [8][9]
Contents
1 History o 1.1 Muhammad ibn Abd-al-Wahhab o 1.2 Saudi sponsorship 2 Beliefs o 2.1 Fiqh 3 Criticism and controversy o 3.1 Naming controversy: Wahhabism and Salafism o 3.2 Criticism by other Muslims o 3.3 Attitudes towards Non-Muslims o 3.4 Osama Bin Laden 4 International influence o 4.1 Explanation for influence 5 Notes 6 References 7 Additional reading
8 External links
o
8.1 Critical
History
Saudi sponsorship
Beginning in the last years of the 18th century Ibn Saud and his heirs would spend the next 140 years mounting various military campaigns to seize control of Arabia and its outlying regions, before being attacked and defeated by Ottoman forces. The invasions were justified as the destruction of the villages of polytheists as authorized in the Qu'ran, even though they were attacking fellow Muslims (see Beliefs below). One of their most famous and controversial attacks was on Karbala in 1802 (1217 AH). There, according to a Wahhabi chronicler `Uthman b. `Abdullah b. Bishr:
"[Wahhabis] scaled the walls, entered the city ... and killed the majority of its people in the markets and in their homes. [They] destroyed the dome placed over the grave of al-Husayn [and took] whatever they found inside the dome and its surroundings. .... the grille surrounding the tomb which was encrusted with emeralds, rubies, and other jewels. .... different types of property, weapons, clothing, carpets, gold, silver, precious copies of the Qur'an."[15]
In the early 20th Century, the Wahhabist-oriented Al-Saud dynasty conquered and unified the various provinces on the Arabian peninsula, founding the modern day Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1932.[16] This provided the movement with a state. Vast wealth from oil discovered in the following decades, coupled with Saudi control of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, have since provided a base and funding for Wahhabi missionary activity. When the Saudis took control of Mecca and Medina in 1925, they attempted to demolish the dome of the Prophet's Mosque, in accordance with al-Wahhabi's teachings about idolatry.[17] The Saudi government established the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, a state religious police unit, to enforce Wahhabi rules of behaviour.[1] Afghanistan maintained a similar government ministry from 1992 to the downfall of the Taliban in 2001. It was revived by the Supreme Court of Afghanistan as the Ministry for Haj and Religious Affairs.[18]
Beliefs
Wahhabi theology treats the Qur'an and Hadith as fundamental texts interpreted by the understanding of the first three generations of Muslims and further explained by various commentaries. They subscribe to the understanding of tawheed as propounded by salaf-as-salih (the first three generations of Islam), and further categorized by Ibn Taiymiyyah. First aspect is believing in Allah's Lordship that He alone is our Rabb. Second aspect is that once one affirms the existence of Allah and His Lordship, one must worship Him and Him alone. This is the essence of Islam and Tawheed for pagans of the Prophet Muhammad's time recognized Allah and affirmed His existence. That there is no "Ilah" besides Allah, no deity worthy of worship. Ibn Abd-al-Wahab further explains in his book Kitab-at-Tawheed (book which compiles only Qur'ans and narrations of the prophet) that worship in Islam includes conventional acts of worship like 5 times daily prayers and fasting, etc, Dua (supplication), Istia'dha(seeking protection or refuge), Ist'ana (seeking help), and istigatha (seeking benefits). Therefore, making dua to anyone or anything other than Allah, or seeking supernatural help and protection which is only befitting of a divine being from something than Allah are acts of shirk and contradict tawheed. Ibn Abd-alWahab further explains that Prophet Muhammad (S) during his lifetime tried his utmost to cut all ways and roots towards shirk including explicit banning of wearing talismans, amulets, seeking blessing from objects other than what sharee'ah allows, resorting to astrology, and having excessive love and reverence for saints and graves. The most important of these commentaries are those by Ibn Abd-al-Wahhab (even though he was not among the first three generations) including his book Kitab alTawhid, and the works of Ibn Taymiyyah. Abd-al-Wahhab was a follower of Ahmad ibn Hanbal's school of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) like most in Nejd at the time, but "was opposed to any of the schools (Madh'hab) being taken as an absolute and unquestioned authority" for Book of Allah and prophet Sunnah are the ultimate judge. Therefore, he condemned taqlid.[19] at the scholarly level.
Wahhabism also denounces the practice of blind adherence to the interpretations of scholars and the blind acceptance of practices that were passed on within the family or tribe. Of the most widely used excuse of the pagans around the time of the prophet was that they worshiped idols because they saw their forefathers engaged in that practice. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab wrote in support of the responsibility of the individual Muslim to learn and obey the divine commands as they were revealed in the Quran and the Sunnah.[20]. He upheld the view that blind deference to authority eventually leads one to neglect their direct connection with Qur'an and Sunnah. Islam is not an elitist religion in which one must be bound by priests and rabbis for any recourse to religious texts. He uses as evidence an ayah of the Qur'an in which Allah condemns children of Israel for taking their rabbis as authorities besides Allah. Why? Because they gave supreme authority to scholars without any critical and evaluative mindset and gave ultimate loyalty and connection to the scholars and creation rather than Allah and his revealed texts.
Fiqh
The label of Wahhabism is often contested by so called "Wahhabis" because they argue that their understanding of fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence) is similar to other Sunni Muslims and does not justify a separate label.[21] Two key aspects define a religious group's understanding of Islam: its philosophical approach and cultural background; and, most importantly, the methodology used to derive Fiqh. Sunni Islam has four methodological schools of fiqh, or madhabs: Hanbali; Maliki; Shafi`i; and Hanafi. Like other Sunni Muslims, Wahhabis use these same different approaches. Although Wahhabis are said to mostly follow the Hanbali school of fiqh (or Madh'hab), they do not adhere strictly to any school , hence making them different Islamic jurisprudence. A Madh'hab is not a source of ready answers; it is a methodological approach. These schools differ in the means (the methodology) through which they derive "the answer" to different questions within Islamic jurisprudence, and do not necessarily disagree on the end results. Even non-Hanbali Sunni scholars do not blindly imitate, since as scholars, they have a purpose to inquire and research. A Madhab is only a source of ready answers if a person is not a scholar (lim; plural form, Ulema), then he can refer to an expert's answer, or a madhab's answer if a consensus within exists.
The Wahhabis consider themselves to be 'non-imitators' or 'not attached to tradition' ( ghayr muqallidun), and therefore answerable to no school of law at all, observing instead what they would call the practice of early Islam. However, to do so does correspond to the ideal aimed at by Ibn Hanbal, and thus they can be said to be of his 'school'. [22]
Among those who criticize the use of the term Wahhabi is social scientist Quintan Wiktorowicz. In a footnote of his report, Anatomy of the Salafi Movement,[23] he said:
Opponents of Salafism frequently affix the "Wahhabi" designator to denote foreign influence. It is intended to signify followers of Abd al-Wahhab and is most frequently used in countries where Salafis are a small minority of the Muslim community but have made recent inroads in "converting" the local population to the movement ideology. In these countries, local religious authorities have responded to the growing influence of Salafi thought by describing Salafis as Wahhabis, a term that for most non-Salafis conjures up images of Saudi Arabia. The foreign nature of the "Wahhabis" is juxtaposed to locally authentic forms of indigenous Islam. In this manner, opponents of Salafism inject nationalism into religious discourse by raising the specter of foreign influence. The Salafi movement itself, however, never uses this term. In fact, one would be hard pressed to find individuals who refer to themselves as Wahhabis or organizations that use "Wahhabi" in their title or refer to their ideology in this manner (unless they are speaking to a Western audience that is unfamiliar with Islamic terminology, and even then usage is limited and often appears as "Salafi/Wahhabi").
Other observers describe the term as "originally used derogatorily by opponents", but now commonplace and used even "by some Najdi scholars of the movement."[2]
The Saudi government responded by pointing out: "[It has] worked diligently during the last five years to overhaul its education system [but] [o]verhauling an educational system is a massive undertaking... As with previous reports, Freedom House continues to exhibit a disregard for presenting an accurate picture of the reality that exists in Saudi Arabia." [33] The anti-rightist group "rightweb" also criticized the Freedom House study. It quoted a review of the study by Institute for Social Policy and Understanding (ISPU) which complained the study cited documents from only a few mosques, arguing most mosques in the US are not under Wahhabi influence.[34] ISPU comments on the study were not entirely negative however, and concluded:
American-Muslim leaders must thoroughly scrutinize this study. Despite its limitations, the study highlights an ugly undercurrent in modern Islamic discourse that American-Muslims must openly confront. However, in the vigor to expose strains of extremism, we must not forget that open discussion is the best tool to debunk the extremist literature rather than a suppression of First Amendment rights guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.[34]
Noah Feldman, draws a distinction between what he calls the "deeply conservative" Wahhabis and what he calls the "followers of political Islam in the 1980s and 1990s," such as Egyptian Islamic Jihad and later Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri. While Saudi Wahhabis were "the largest funders of local Muslim Brotherhood chapters and other hard-line Islamists" during this time, they opposed jihadi resistance of Muslim governments and assassination of Muslim leaders because of their belief that "the decision to wage jihad lay with the ruler, not the individual believer".[36]
International influence
According to Western observers like Gilles Kepel, Wahhabism gained considerable influence in the Islamic world following a tripling in the price of oil in the mid-1970s. Having the world's largest reserves of oil but a relatively small population, Saudi Arabia began to spend tens of billions of dollars throughout the Islamic world promoting Wahhabism, which was sometimes referred to as "petro-Islam".[37] According to the documentary called The Qur'an aired in the UK, presenter Antony Thomas suggests the figure may be "upward of $100 billion".[38]
Its largess funded an estimated "90% of the expenses of the entire faith", throughout the Muslim world, according to journalist Dawood al-Shirian.[39] It extended to young and old, from children's maddrassas to high-level scholarship.[40] "Books, scholarships, fellowships, mosques" (for example, "more than 1500 mosques were built from Saudi public funds over the last 50 years") were paid for.[41] It rewarded journalists and academics who followed it; built satellite campuses around Egypt for Al Azhar, the oldest and most influential Islamic university.[42] The financial power of Wahhabist advocates, according to observers like Dawood alShirian and Lee Kuan Yew, has done much to overwhelm less strict local interpretations of Islam [43] and has caused the Saudi interpretation to be perceived as the "gold standard" of religion in many Muslims' minds.[44] Some of the hundreds of thousands of South Asians expats living in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf have been influenced by Wahhabism and preach Wahhabiism in their home country upon their return.[citation needed] Agencies controlled by the Ministry of Islamic, Endowments, Call (Dawa) and Guidance Affairs of Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are responsible for Tableegh to the non Muslim expats and are converting hundreds of non Muslims into Islam every year.[citation needed]
Arab nationalism, which followed the Wahhabi attack on the Ottoman Empire; reformism, which followed a return to Salaf (as-Salaf a-li;) Wahhabi control of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina, which gave Wahhabis great influence on Muslim culture and thinking; the discovery of Persian Gulf oil fields, which after 1975 allowed Wahhabis to promote their interpretations of Islam using billions from oil export revenue.[45]
Notes
1. ^ a b c Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam, Rowan & Littlefield, (2001), pp.469-472 2. ^ a b c d "Wahhabi". GlobalSecurity.org. 2005-04-27. Archived from the original on 2005-05-07. http://web.archive.org/web/20050507090328/http://www.globalsecurity.org/m ilitary/world/gulf/wahhabi.htm. Retrieved on 2008-05-10. 3. ^ Ahmad Zayni Dahlan al-Makkiyy, 1304 A.H. Fitnat-ul-Wahhabiyyah: Proofs for tawassul. 4. ^ Saudi Arabia and the Rise of the Wahhabi Threat 5. ^ a b c Esposito (2003), p.333 6. ^ Hardy, Roger. Analysis: Inside Wahhabi Islam. BBC News 7. ^ Amad S (2007-04-01). "The Wahhabi Myth: Debunking the Bogeyman". MuslimMatters.org. Archived from the original on 2007-05-27.
http://web.archive.org/web/20070527083013/http://muslimmatters.org/2007/0 4/01/the-wahhabi-myth-debunking-the-bogeyman/. Retrieved on 2008-05-09. 8. ^ Washington Post, For Conservative Muslims, Goal of Isolation a Challenge 9. ^ John L. Esposito, What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, p.50 10. ^ Tarikh Najd by 'Husain ibn Ghannam, Vol. 1, Pg. 76-77 11. ^ 'Unwan al-Majd fi Tarikh Najd, by 'Uthman ibn Bishr an-Najdi, Vol. 1, Pg. 7-8 12. ^ Shaikh Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, by Judge Ahmad ibn 'Hajar alButami, Pg. 17-19 13. ^ Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab: His Da'wah and Life Story, by Shaikh ibn Baaz, Pg. 21 14. ^ Shaikh Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab, by Judge Ahmad ibn 'Hajar alButami, Pg. 28 15. ^ Wahhabism - A Critical Essay: Chapter 2 16. ^ Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World, Macmillan Reference USA, (2004), p.727 17. ^ Hamid Algar. Wahhabism: A Critical Essay. Oneonta: Islamic Publications International, 2002. p.43. 18. ^ Claudio Franco (2004-12-07). "Despite Karzai election, Afghan conservatives soldier on". Eurasianet. http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav120704.shtml. Retrieved on 2008-08-04. 19. ^ Mortimer, Edward, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam, Vintage Books, 1982, p.61 20. ^ Cleveland, William L. A History of the Modern Middle East. Third Edition. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004. Page.123. 21. ^ Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement" in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29 (2006): p.235. 22. ^ Glasse, Cyril, The New Encyclopedia of Islam Altamira, 2001, p.407 23. ^ Wiktorowicz, Quintan. "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement" in Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol. 29 (2006): p.235. 24. ^ The Destruction of Holy Sites in Mecca and Medina 25. ^ Saudi Arabia - THE SAUD FAMILY AND WAHHABI ISLAM 26. ^ Nibras Kazimi, A Paladin Gears Up for War, The New York Sun, November 1, 2007 27. ^ John R Bradley, Saudi's Shi'ites walk tightrope, Asia Times, March 17, 2005 28. ^ Amir Taheri, Death is big business in Najaf, but Iraq's future depends on who controls it, The Times, August 28, 2004 29. ^ Abdul Hadi Palazzi. Middle East Quarterly. Summer 2001 30. ^ "Radicalism: Its Wahhabi Roots and Current Representation", Islamic Supreme Council of America 31. ^ Saudi Publications on Hate Ideology 32. ^ quotes from a study "based on a year-long study of over two hundred original documents, all disseminated, published or otherwise generated by the government of Saudi Arabia and collected from more than a dozen mosques in the United States". New Report on Saudi Government Publications at the Internet Archive 33. ^ Turki Al-Faisal (2006-05-22). "Saudi Ambassador responds to Freedom House editorial". Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia. Archived from the original on 2007-08-05.
http://web.archive.org/web/20070805231908/http://www.saudiembassy.net/20 06News/Press/PressDetail.asp?cIndex=297. Retrieved on 2008-05-10. 34. ^ a b "Freedom House". International Relations Center. 2007-07-26. http://rightweb.irc-online.org/profile/1476. Retrieved on 2008-05-10. 35. ^ Natana J. Delong-Bas, "Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad", (Oxford University Press: 2004), p. 279 36. ^ After Jihad : American and the Struggle for Islamic Democracy by Noah Feldman, New York : Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003, p.47 37. ^ Kepel, p.69-75 38. ^ The Qur'an review in The Independent 39. ^ Dawood al-Shirian, 'What Is Saudi Arabia Going to Do?' Al-Hayat, May 19, 2003 40. ^ Abou al Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, HarperSanFrancisco, 2005, p.48-64 41. ^ Kepel, p. 72 42. ^ (Murphy, Caryle, Passion for Islam : Shaping the Modern Middle East: the Egyptian Experience, Simon and Schuster, 2002 p. 32 43. ^ Dawood al-Shirian, 'What Is Saudi Arabia Going to Do?' Al-Hayat, May 19, 2003 44. ^ An interview with Minister Mentor of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew 45. ^ Abou El Fadl, Khaled, The Great Theft: Wrestling Islam from the Extremists, Harper San Francisco, 2005, p.70-72
References
Esposito, John (2003). The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0195125584. Kepel, Gilles (2002). Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. trans. Anthony F. Roberts (1st English edition ed.). Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. ISBN 0-674-00877-4. Saint-Prot, Charles. Islam. L'avenir de la tradition entre rvolution et occidentalisation (Islam. The Future of Tradition between Revolution and Westernization). Paris: Le Rocher, 2008.