The Case of the Missing Tanquam: Leibniz, Newton &Clarke Author(s): Alexandre Koyre and I.

Bernard Cohen Source: Isis, Vol. 52, No. 4 (Dec., 1961), pp. 555-566 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science Society Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/228648 . Accessed: 23/04/2013 18:42
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The Missing

Case

of

the

Tanquam:
&

Leibniz,

Newton

Clarke

* By Alexandre Koyre and I. Bernard Cohen **

referred to under the modest title: The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence. This collection consists of five " letters" by Leibniz and a reply to each one by Samuel Clarke, written in 1715-16; they were published by Clarke in 1717, after the interruption of the correspondence by Leibniz' death, as: A Collection of Papers which passed between the late Learned Mr. Leibnitz, and Dr. Clarke, in the Years 1715 and 1716. Relating to the Principles of Natural Philosophy and Religion.1 This battle is especially interesting to the scholar because it presents a serious opposition of two philosophies and not, as in the polemics about the priority in invention of the calculus, a simple clash of two wounded vanities. The war between Leibniz and Newton had begun in earnest by 1705, when Leibniz was accused of plagiarizing from Newton in the discovery of the calculus. By 1710 Leibniz was attacking the Newtonian theory of
Institute for Advanced Study. ** Harvard University. This original edition was published " With an Appendix. To which are added, Letters to Dr. Clarke concerning Liberty and Necessity; From a Gentleman of the University of Cambridge [J. or A. Bulkeley] With the Doctor's Answers to them. Also Remarks upon a Book, Entituled, A Philosophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty [by Anthony Collins]" (London: printed for James Knapton, 1717). Bulkeley's Letters and "The Doctor's Answer to them" have a separate title-page but continue the pagination of the main book, whereas Clarke's "Remarks" upon Collin's book have both a separate title-page and separate pagination. In this edition, Leibniz' and Clarke's texts are printed in both French and English (on facing pages). Extracts from Newton (in Latin and in French with English translations) accompany Clarke's contributions, while there is,
*The

IN the war of the giants, Newton

and Leibniz, the last battle is usually

in the appendix, a selection from Leibniz' writings in French and Latin, with an English translation. For proper texts, the edition made by Andre Robinet is most valuable: Correspondance Leibnitz-Clarke presentee d'apres les manuscrits originaux des bibliotheques de Hanovre et de Londres (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1957). A list of later printings and translations is to be found in a recent edition, by H. G. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, together with extracts from Newton's Principia and Opticks, edited with introduction and notes (Manchester: Manchester Univ. Press, New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. lv-lvi. Clarke himself was responsible for the translation of Leibniz' papers from French into English, while Clarke's replies were rendered into French by de la Roche.

555

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ALEXANDRE KOYRI AND I. BERNARD COHEN

gravity.2 He returned to this topic in a famous letter to Hartsoeker, published in the Journal de Trevoux in 1712, and reprinted in the Journal des Savants and - in an English version - in the Memoirs of Literature. It was in great measure in reply to this criticism that Newton published the concluding " General Scholium" in the second edition of the Principia (1713), while the preface to that edition by Roger Cotes was a further answer to Leibniz' charges that Newtonian gravity is "an occult quality" and that the motion of the planets in the Newtonian system is a perpetual "miracle." 3 Angered by John Keill's articles in the Philosophical Transactions in 1714, reprinted in a French version in the Journal Litteraire,4 and by the anonymous review of the Commercium Epistolicum which Newton had written himself and had published in the Philosophical Transactions,5 Leibniz entered correspondence with Newton in the winter of
2 In his Theodicy, of which an English translation by E. M. Huggard, edited with an introduction by Austin Farrer, was published in 1952 by Yale Univ. Press. In ? 19 (pp. 85-86), Leibniz says: " Thence we see that the dogma of real and substantial participation can be supported (without resorting to the strange opinions of some Schoolmen) by a properly understood analogy between immediate operation and presence. Many philosophers have deemed that, even in the order of Nature, a body may operate from a distance immediately on many remote bodies at the same time. So do they believe, all the more, that nothing can prevent divine Omnipotence from causing one body to be present in many bodies together, since the transition from immediate operation to presence is but slight, the one perhaps depending upon the other. It is true that modern philosophers for some time now have denied the immediate natural operation of one body upon another remote from it, and I confess that I am of their opinion. Meanwhile remote operation had just been revived in England by the admirable Mr. Newton, who maintains that it is the nature of bodies to be attracted and gravitate one towards another, in proportion to the mass of each one, and the rays of attraction it receives. Accordingly the famous Mr. Locke, in his answer to Bishop Stillingfleet, declares that having seen Mr. Newton's book he retracts what he himself said, following the opinion of the moderns, in his Essay concerning Human Understanding, to wit, that a body cannot operate immediately upon another except by touching it upon its surface and driving it by its motion. He acknowledges that God can put properties into matter which cause it to operation from a distance." 3 We have in preparation a study of these letters of Leibniz and Hartsoeker, together with the text of the reply which Newton wrote

but which has never been published. On the relation of these letters to the writing of the General Scholium at the end of Book III of the Principia, see J. Edleston, Correspondence of Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes (London: John W. Parker, 1850), p. 153. 4 These facts about the Newton-Leibniz controversy are not intended to trace the complete chronology of that affair, but only to give the reader some hint of the temper of Newton and Leibniz and their partisans on the eve of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence. A great desideratum would be a fresh study of the Newton-Leibniz controversy, based on a careful examination of the manuscripts and written with less partisanship than most of those done in the past. 5 " An Account of the Book entituled Commercium Epistolicum Collinii & aliorum, De Analysi promota, published by order of the Royal-Society, in relation to the Dispute between Mr. Leibnits and Dr. Keill, about the Right of Invention of the new Geometry of Fluxions, otherwise call'd the Differential Method," Phil. Trans., January 1714/5, 29: 173-224. (The above is the title given in the Phil. Trans., but is, of course, not the exact title of the Commercium Epistolicum [first edition] itself). For a discussion of this work, see I. B. Cohen, " Newton in the light of recent scholarship," Isis, 1960, 51: 489-514. This recensio libri, translated into Latin, was printed as a kind of introduction to the new edition of the Commercium Epistolicum (1722), following the new foreword or Ad Lectorem. A French translation appeared in the Journal Littdraire, Nov./Dec. 1715, 6: 13 ff., 345 ff. In fact the prevailing opinion in the nineteenth century was that this recensio was the work of Newton. His authorship was suggested by the editors of the Philosophical Transactions Abridged, London, 1809, 6: 153, in a note reading: "From the precise and

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THE CASE OF THE MISSING TANQUAM

557

1715-16 through an intermediary, the Abbe Conti. In his first letter, after voicing his complaints about the unfair manner in which he had been treated by the English in the Commercium Epistolicum, Leibniz again accused Newton of having introduced into physics " scholastic occult qualities or miracles." 6 Toward the end of the "Apostle d'une lettre de M. Leibniz, a M. l'Abbe Conti," written at the end of 1715, Leibniz said: M. Newton n'apporte aucune experience, ni raison suffisante pour le Vuide &S les Atomes, ou pour l'attraction mutuelle, generale. Et parce qu'on ne fait pas encore parfaitement & en detail comment se produit la gravite ou la force elastique, ou la magnetique, &c. on n'a pas raison pour cela d'en faire des Qualitez occultes scholastiques, ou des Miracles; mais on a encore moins raison de donner des bornes a la sagesse & a la puissance de Dieu, & de lui attribuer un Sensorium, c choses semblances. Au reste, je m'etonne que les Sectateurs de M. Newton ne donnent rien qui marque que leur maistre leur a communique une bonne Methode.7 Newton, to whom Conti communicated this letter (as he was meant to do), answered by a letter to the self-same Conti in which he defended the Commercium Epistolicum and upheld its judgments. As to the criticism of his " philosophy," he replied to it by a counter-attack: As for philosophy, he colludes in the signification of words, calling those things miracles, which create no wonder; and those things occult qualities,
correct language, from the highly important matter, and from the very strong and able manner of the foregoing composition, it seems to give evidence of its great author, Newton himself." This note, following a printing of the recensio in full in English, pp. 116-153, was probably written by Charles Hutton, one of the three abridgers of this edition of the Phil. Trans. Newton's authorship of the recensio was the subject of an article by Augustus De Morgan, " On the Authorship of the Account of the Commercium Epistolicum, published in the Philosophical Transactions," Philosophical Magazine, Fourth Series, 1852, 3: 440-444. (One of the chief sources of evidence used by De Morgan was a book by James Wilson, M.D., published in London in 1722 and entitled Epistola ad Amicum de Cotesii inventis, apparently reissued with an appendix in 1723.) James Wilson was one of those who had access to unpublished Newton manuscripts; see Brewster's Memoirs of . . . Sir Isaac Newton, Vol. II, p. 75, n. 4. Yet another eighteenth-century scholar who imputed the recensio to Newton was Bishop Samuel Horsley who printed the recensio (in Latin) in vol. 4 of his edition of Newton's Opera. Sir David Brewster (Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 63, n. 1) admitted the recensio to be of Newton's authorship, saying " It was written by Sir Isaac Newton, a fact which Professor De Morgan had deduced from a variety of evidence.." Actually, in addition to these many attributions to Newton, the recensio was said to be of Newton's authorship by J. B. Biot and F. Lefort in their edition of the Commerciuin Epistolicum (Paris: Mallet-Bachelier, 1856). 6 Leibniz to Conti, November or December, 1715, from the extracts given by Alexander (note 1 supra), p. 186. The full texts of Leibniz' and Newton's letters to the Abb6 Conti may be found in Pierre Des Maizeaux, Recueil de diverses pieces, sur la philosophie, la religion naturelle, I'histoire, les mathematiques, &c. par Mrs. Leibniz, Clarke, Newton, & autres Autheurs cielbres, (Amsterdam: chez H. Du Sauzet, 1720), Vol. II, and in Joseph Raphson, Historia fluxionum (London: Typis Pearsonianis, 1715), pp. 97-123, as well as in Horsley's edition of Newton's Opera Omnia, Vol. IV, pp. 595-9. According to a note in A descriptive catalogue of the Grace K. Babson Collection of the works of Sir Isaac Newton (New York: Herbert Reichner, 1950), p. 90, most copies of Raphson's history end at p. 96 and do not contain the correspondence (pp. 97123) of Newton, Leibniz, and their friends and cohorts. 7 Des Maizeaux, op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 9-10, (also printed by Raphson and Horsley). Leibniz adds the further comment, "J'ai ete plus heureux en Disciples."

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ALEXANDRE KOYR]I AND I. BERNARD COHEN

whose causes are occult, though the qualities themselves be manifest; and those things the souls of men, which do not animate their bodies. His harmonia praestabilita is miraculous and contradicts the daily experience of all mankind; every man finding in himself a power of seeing with his eyes, and moving his body by his will. He prefers hypotheses to arguments of induction drawn from experiments, accuses me of opinions which are not mine; and instead of proposing questions to be examined by experiments before they are admitted into Philosophy, he proposes hypotheses to be admitted and believed before they are examined. But all this is nothing to the Commercium Epistolicum. As we see in this defence-counterattack, Newton, though cryptically accusing Leibniz of ascribing to him opinions which he does not hold, does not explicitly refer to the Sensorium. Leibniz, therefore, having dealt with the defense of the Commercium in a second letter to the Abbe Conti, decided to come back to it. This time, however, he chose another correspondent: Princess Caroline (the princess of Wales), a former student of his. Unwittingly, he thus started the battle. Leibniz himself described the origin of the battle with which we are concerned here in a letter to Johann Bernoulli in June, 1716: he tells that after he had been attacked by Keill and Cotes, he wrote a letter to " Her Royal Highness the Princess of Wales . . . saying that philosophy or rather natural theology is declining considerably among the English." 8 An extract from this letter to Princess Caroline, written in November, 1715, forms " Mr. Leibnitz's first paper" in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence; in it Leibniz uses his concern about the status of religion and philosophy in England as a prelude to a direct attack on Newton: 1. II semble que la ReligionNaturelle meme s'affoiblit extremement. Plusiuers font les Ames corporelles; d'autres font Dieu luy-meme corporel. 2. M. Locke, &e ses sectateurs, doutent au moins, si les Ames ne sont Materielles, & naturellement perissables. 3. M. Newton dit que l'Espace est l'Organe, dont Dieu se sert pour sentir les choses. Mais s'il a besoin de quelque Moyen pour les sentir, elles ne dependent donc entierement de luy, et ne sont pas sa production.9
s Leibniz to Bernoulli, June, 1716, trans. H. Alexander (see note 1 supra), p. 189. The original is to be found in Virorum celeberr. Got. Gul. Leibnitii et Johan. Bernoulli Comet mathematicum mercium philosophicum (Lausanne & Geneva: Sumpt. Marci-Michaelis Bousquet & Socior, 1745), Vol. II, p. 381 and in Leibnizens Mathematische Schriften herausgegeben von C. I. Gerhardt, Abt. I, Bd. 3, p. 963 (Halle: H. W. Schmidt, 1855). 9 In the original edition, page 3, the English version of these paragraphs reads: "1. Natural Religion it self, seems to decay [in England] very much. Many will have Human Souls to be material: Others make God himself a corporeal Being. "2. Mr. Locke, and his Followers, are uncertain at least, whether the Soul be not Material, and naturally perishable. "3. Sir Isaac Newton says, that Space is an Organ, which God makes use of to perceive Things by. But if God stands in need of any Organ to perceive Things by, it will follow, that they do not depend altogether upon him, nor were produced by him." The words in England, added in square brackets in paragraph 1 of the English version, presumably by Clarke, agree with the restricted interpretation made by Leibniz himself in his letter to Bernoulli. In the German edition, translated by A. Buchenau and edited by Ernst Cassirer [G. W. Leibniz: Hauptschriften zur

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THE CASE OF THE MISSING TANQUAM

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Such an accusation 10could not, of course, remain unanswered. According to Leibniz' letter to Bernoulli, referred to above. " The Princess of Wales communicated excerpts of this letter to Clarke. He gave her a paper in reply written in English which she sent to me, I replied, he answered, I wrote a second paper; he a third, I, just now, a fourth, that is I answered his third paper." 11 From the correspondence between Princess Caroline and Leibniz, it appears that Clarke had at one time been suggested as the only man capable of making an English translation of Leibniz' Theodicy 12 and that Princess Caroline had sent Leibniz "the two books of Dr. Clarke." 13 In a letter of 10 January 1716, sending Leibniz Clarke's second paper, the Princess said of the replies to Leibniz' papers: " You are right
about the author . . ; they are not written without the advice of Chev.

Newton, whom I should like to be reconciled with you." 14 In his biography of Newton, L. T. More 15 barely mentioned the LeibnizClarke correspondence, but David Brewster devoted several pages to this subject. After quoting the printed extract of Leibniz' letter to Caroline, Brewster observed: These views of Leibnitz having become the subject of conversation at court, where Newton and Locke were in high esteem, the king, who never seems to have had much affection for his countryman, expressed a wish that Sir Isaac Newton would draw up a reply in defence of his philosophy, as well as of his claim to be the original inventor of Fluxions. It was accordingly arranged that Newton should undertake the mathematical part of the controversy, while Dr. Clarke was entrusted with the defence of the English philosophy. The Princess of Wales, therefore, communicated to the Dr. the preceding extracts from Leibnitz's letter, and Dr. Clarke's reply was transmitted to Leibnitz through her Royal Highness. Leibnitz replied to this communication; and after Dr. Clarke had returned his fifth answer to
Grundlegung der Philosophie (Leipzig: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1903, 2d. ed., 1924)], these words are incorporated into Leibniz's text without brackets or parentheses. 10 In the concluding portion of this extract (? 4), Leibniz continues his criticism of Newton-as he had done in his letter to Abbe Conti-by attacking the Newtonian conception that with the passage of time the world-system develops certain irregularities that necessitate the periodic intervention of God for their correction; he opposes to this view his own conception of a pre-established and eternal harmony. We shall not examine this part of the controversy here, but we shall discuss it at length as part of a separate study (in progress) of Newton's statements against Leibniz on the aims and methods of their respective natural philosophies. On this score, see A. Koyre: From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), chap. ix. 11 From ? 2, Appendix B, of Alexander's edition (see note 1 supra), p. 189. 12 Par. 3, Appendix B, ibid., pp. 190-191 (letters from Caroline to Leibniz, 14 November 1715 and 26 November 1715, and Leibniz' reply). 13 The two books in question are the sermons preached by Clarke in 1704 and 1705, "at the Lecture founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle, Esq."; these were titled Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God and Discourse concerning the unalterable obligations of natural religion, and the truth and certainty of the Christian Revelation. First published in 1706, they were several times reprinted. 14 From Alexander's edition, ? 3, Appendix B (Caroline to Leibniz, 10 January 1716), p. 193. 15 L. T. More: Isaac Newton: A Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), p. 601.

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the fifth paper of Leibnitz, the death of the latter on the 14th November 1716, put an end to the controversy.16 Brewster, a page or so later, added the comment, "It is very obvious from the notes on Dr. Clarke's replies to Leibnitz, that he had received assistance on several astronomical points from Newton himself." And in a footnote to this sentence, Brewster informed the reader, " I have found, among Sir Isaac's papers, many folio pages of manuscript containing the same views as those given by Dr. Clarke." These statements of Brewster's are all the more extraordinary in that there are no "astronomical points" as such discussed by either Leibniz or Clarke. (Perhaps Brewster was using the word " astronomical" to include cosmology, the nature of gravity, and the qualities of space.) But, indeed, there are among the Newton manuscripts which we have been studying many drafts by Newton of statements replying to Leibniz' attacks upon his natural philosophy.17 These leave no doubt whatsoever that the source of Clarke's replies to Newton was Newton himself. On this score, Whiston's remark- in his Historical Memoir of Dr. Samuel Clarke- may be pertinent. Whiston was replying to a comment by Arthur Ashley Sykes and wrote: " Dr. Sykes still speaks, as if Dr. Clarke's Philosophy was his own, or of his own Invention: when it was generally no other than Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy; tho' frequently applied by Dr. Clarke, with great Sagacity, and to excellent purposes, upon many Occasions." 18 Further
16 Sir David Brewster: Memoirs of the life, writings, and discoveries of Sir Isaac Newton Thomas Constable and Co., (Edinburgh: 1855), vol. II, p. 285. 17 In this study we give many of the Newtonian draft-statements which contain, inter alia, important autobiographical statements giving the dates of Newton's discoveries. 8i William Whiston: Historical memoirs of the life of Dr. Samuel Clarke . . . (London: sold by Fletcher Gyles and by J. Roberts, 1730), p. 155. On pp. 5-7, Whiston relates the following anecdote of their first meeting: "About the Year 1697, while I was Chaplain to Dr. John Moor, then Bishop of Norwich, I met at one of the Coffee-houses in the Market-Place of Norwich, a young Man, to me then wholly unknown, his Name was Clarke, Pupil to that eminent and careful Tutor, Mr. Ellis, of Gonvil and Caius College in Cambridge. Mr. Clarke knew me so far at the University, I being about eight Years elder than himself, and so far knew the Nature and Success of my Studies, as to enter into a Conversation with me, about that System of Cartesian Philosophy, his Tutor had put him to translate; I mean Rohault's Physicks; and to ask my Opinion about the Fitness of such a Translation. I well remember the Answer I made him; that 'Since the Youth of the University must have, at present, some System

of Natural Philosophy for their Studies and Exercises; and since the true System of Sir Isaac Newton was not yet made enough for that Purpose; it was not improper, for their Sakes, yet to translate and use the System of Rohault, [who was esteemed the best Expositor of Des Cartes,] but that as soon as Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy came to be better known, that only ought to be taught, and the other dropp'd.' Which last part of my Advice, by the way, has not been follow'd, as it ought to have been, in the University: But, as Bishop Hoadley truly observes, Dr. Clarke's Rohault is still the principal Book for the young Students there. Though such an Observation be no way to the Honour of the Tutors in that University, who in reading Rohault, do only read a Philosophical Romance to their Pupils, almost perpetually contradicted by the better Notes thereto belonging. And certainly, to use Cartesian fictitious Hypotheses at this Time of Day, after the principal Parts of Sir Isaac Newton's certain System have been made easy enough for the Understanding of ordinary Mathematicians, is like the continuing to eat old Acorns, after the Discovery of new Wheat, for the Food of Mankind. However, upon this Occasion, Mr. Clarke and I fell into a Discourse about the wonderful Discoveries made in Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy. And the Result of that Discourse was, that I was greatly

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evidence of Newton's personal involvement in the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence may be seen in the fact that some years later, when Des Maizeaux brought out a two-volume collection in French of various Newton-Leibniz papers,l9 Newton wrote - or at least made several preliminary drafts of a letter purporting to have been written by Clarke, explaining the significance of the principal words and concepts that appear in the controversy.20 Clarke's reply to Leibniz' original letter to Caroline deals directly with Leibniz' allegation that, "Sir Isaac Newton says that space is an organ, which God makes use of to perceive things by." Clarke wrote: Sir Isaac Newton doth not say, that Space is the Organ which God makes use of to perceive Things by; nor that he has need of any Medium at all, whereby to perceive Things: But on the contrary, that he, being Omnipresent perceives all Things by his immediate Presence to them, in all Space wherever they are, without the Intervention or Assistance of any Organ or Medium whatsoever. In order to make this more intelligible, he illustrates it by a Similitude: That as the Mind of Man, by its immediate Presence to the Pictures or Images of Things, form'd in the Brain by the means of the Organs of Sensation, see those Pictures as if they were the Things themselves; so God sees all Things, by his immediate Presence to them: he being actually present to the Things themselves, to all Things in the Universe; as the Mind of Man is present to all the Pictures of Things formed in his Brain.... And this Similitude is all that he means, when he supposes Infinite Space to be (as it were) the Sensorium of the Omnipresent Being.21 Somewhat taken aback by Clarke's Reply, Leibniz, in his second paper (p. 24), objects: "3. Il se trouve expressement dans l'Appendice de l'Optique de M. Newton, que l'Espace est le Sensorium de Dieu. Or le mot Sensorium a toujours signifie l'Organe de la Sensation." 22 By no means, Clarke answered (Second Reply, p. 41): " 3. The word Sensory does not properly signify the Organ, but the Place of Sensation. The Eye, the Ear, etc., are Organs, but not Sensoria. Besides, Sir Isaac Newton does not say that Space is the Sensory; but that it is, by way of Similitude only, as it were the Sensory, etc." Leibniz was outraged (troisieme ecrit, p. 64): "10. Il sera difficile de nous faire accroire que, dans l'usage ordinaire, Sensorium ne signifie pas l'Organe de la Sensation. Voicy les paroles de Rudolphus Goclenius dans son Dictionarium Philosophicum. v. Sensiterium: Barbarum Scholasticorum,
surpriz'd, that so young a Man as Mr. Clarke then was, not much, I think, above twentytwo Years of Age, should know so much of those sublime Discoveries, which were then almost a Secret to all, but to a few particular Mathematicians. Nor did I remember above one, or two at the most, whom I had then met with, that seemed to know so much of that Philosophy, as Mr. Clarke." 19 See note 6 supra. 20 Newton's drafts of this letter will be printed with commentary in a separate study, in press. 21 This extract and those that follow are taken from the original edition, in French and in English, of 1717; see note 1 supra. 22 At this point, on page 25 of the printed text, a note accompanies the English translation of Leibniz' second paper, referring the reader back to Clarke's first reply, where Clarke has given " the passage referred to," an extract-together with a rendition into English

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dit-il, qui interdum sunt Simiae Graecorum. Hi dicunt ao8'O7r-'ptov. quo illi fecerunt Sensiterium pro Sensorio, id est, Organo Sensationis."

Ex

Dr. Clarke, however, maintained his position. Witness his interpretation of the meaning of the term Sensorium (third reply, p. 83): " 10. The Question is not, what Goclenius, but what Sir Isaac Newton means by the word Sensorium when the Debate is about the Sense of Sir Isaac Newton's,
and not about the Sense of Goclenius's Book. .. ."

We cannot but agree with Dr. Clarke: the debate is about Sir Isaac
and not about Goclenius....

he is right in asserting that Sir Isaac did not wish to endow his God with organs of perception. To prove this point, the printed edition of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence reproduced the famous passage from Query XX of the Latin version of the Opticks (1706), in which Newton had said (p. 315):
Annon Sensorium Animalium, est locus cui Substantia sentiens adest, & in quem sensibiles rerum species per nervos & cerebrum deferuntur, ut ibi praesentes a praesente sentiri possint? Atq; his quidem rite expeditis, Annon ex phaenomenis constat, esse Entem Incorporeum, Viventem, Intelligentem, Omnipraesentem, qui in Spatio infinito, tanquam Sensorio suo,
and into French-from Quaest. XX in the Latin version of Newton's Opticks (1706), the text of which had been translated from English into Latin by Clarke himself. This Query was published for the first time in this Latin edition, in which the number of Queries was increased from 16 to 24. In the second English edition (1717), these new Queries (17 to 24) were renumbered 24 to 31, and further Queries 17 to 23 were added; certain textual changes were made too. See I. Bernard Cohen and Robert E. Schofield (eds.): Isaac Newton's papers and letters on natural philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958), introduction, pp. 14-15; and detailed study of the textual changes in the Queries, by A Koyre, "Etudes Newtoniennes, II. Les Queries de l'Optique," Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences No. 50-51, 1960. In the text of the Leizniz-Clarke correspondence, immediately following the Latin extract from Quaest. XX, Clarke gives the following English translation: "Is not the Sensory of Animals, the Place where the Perceptive Substance is present, and To which the Sensible Images of Things are convey'd by the Nerves and Brain, that they may there be Perceived, as being Present to the Perceptive Substance? And do not the Phaenomena of Nature show, that there is an Incorporeal, Living, Intelligent, Omnipresent Being, who in the Infinite Space, which is as it were His Sensorium (or Place of Perception,) sees and discerns, in the inmost and most Thorough Manner, the Very Things themselves, and comprehends them as being entirely and immediately Present within Himself; Of which Things, the Perceptive and Thinking Substance that is in Us, perceives and views, in its Little Sensory, nothing but the Images, conveyed thither by the Organs of the Senses?" This version differs in phraseology from that which appears in the English editions of the Opticks (1717, and later), in which this " Query (now numbered 28), reads, in part: Is not the Sensory of Animals that place to which the sensitive Substance is present, and into which the sensible Species of Things are carried through the Nerves and Brain, that there they may be perceived by their immediate presence to that Substance? And these things being rightly dispatch'd, does it not appear from Phaenomena that there is a Being incorporeal, living, intelligent, omnipresent, who in infinite Space, as it were in his Sensory, sees the things themselves intimately, and thoroughly perceives them, and comprehends them wholly by their immediate presence to himself: Of which things the Images only carried through the Organs of Sense into our little Sensoriums, are there seen and beheld by that which in us perceives and thinks." From the reprint of the fourth edition (London, 1730) issued in 1952 by Dover Publications with a preface by I. B. Cohen and an analytical table of contents prepared by Duane H. D. Roller, p. 370. The reason for the discrepancy between these two versions will be presented below, note 25.

Moreover, we cannot but acknowledge

that

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THE CASE OF THE MISSING TANQUAM

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res Ipsas intime cernat, penitusq; perspiciat, totasq; intra se praesens praesentes complectatur; quarum quidem rerum Id quod in nobis sentit & cogitat, Imagines tantum ad se per Organa Sensuum delatas, in Sensoriolo suo percipit & contuetur? 23

There is no reason to assume that Leibniz was not perfectly sincere and honest in his affirmation. Could he have been guilty only of misunderstanding the exact meaning of the word sensorium as used by Newton? Indeed, there is a passage in another Query (XXIV; p. 346) that Clarke does not quote, and that explains that God, being everywhere, can: " Voluntate sua corpora omnia in infinito suo Sensorio movere, adeoq; cunctas Mundi universi partes ad arbitrium suum fingere & refingere." 24 The extract from Query XX of the Latin translation of the Opticks, which Clarke printed in his edition of the Leibniz-Clarke correspondence, and which we have printed above, was not however the first and only version of this text to have been printed. In an example of the 1706 Latin Optice in the library of the Institute for Advanced Study (in the collection assembled by Herbert McLean Evans and given to the Institute by Lessing J. Rosenwald), we have had the luck to find that the final paragraph of Query XX is formulated in a manner that differs profoundly from the version usually encountered. In this copy, indeed, the phrase dealing with the Sensorium Animalium is lacking, and the following one, dealing with
the Sensorium of God is as follows: "Annon Spatium Universum, Sensorium est Entis Incorporei, Viventis, & Intelligentis; quod res Ipsas cernat & complectatur intimas, totasq; penitus & in se praesentes perspiciat; quarum id quidem, quod in Nobis sentit & cogitat, Imagines tantum in

cation of space with the sensorium of God is expressement in the Optice.

Reading this text, we cannot help asking ourselves how Leibniz (1) could possibly have ascribed to Newton the assertion that space is the sensorium of God and (2) could have maintained so positively that this assertion is to be found " in expressed words, in the Appendix to Sir Isaac Newton's Opticks." Have we to assume that Leibniz had " overlooked " the tanquam? That would explain his first pronouncement; but not the second. Moreover, it is difficult to admit that, with his scholastic training, Leibniz could have " overlooked" a tanquam; and even more so that, having made such a terrific blunder, he would have been bold enough to assert that the identifi-

Cerebro contuetur? " A close examination of a number of different examples of the 1706 Optice proves beyond doubt that the text we have just quoted
25 Hence we can explain why the English translation given of Quest. XX by Clarke (see note 22 supra) differs from the version written by Newton and published in the English edition of 1717. The Clarke version was a translation which he had made of the Latin text which he and/or Newton had rewritten after the Latin Optice had been printed and was not Newton's own version which did not appear until the second English edition of the Opticks.

23 For a translation, see the previous footnote. Clarke printed that paragraph (p. 13) in roman type, save for certain words in italics: ". . . Tanquam Sensorio suo, Res Ipsas intime cernat . . ., Imagines tantum ad se per Organa Sensuum delatas . . ." 24 In the later English editions this Latin Query XXIV became Query XXXI, ". . . more able by his Will to move the Bodies within his boundless uniform Sensorium .. (Dover, edition, p. 403).

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564

ALEXANDRE KOYRE AND I. BERNARD COHEN

Animalium tam exquifita fint Arte atq; fit, ut Corpora .,uos ad fines conformatef ut di' Confio fabricata ? fine cientia ?Fierine potuitut Oculus verJfe ipforumPartes Optices fuerit conftrucs ? aut Auris, fine Intelligentia
'

? .ui fit, ut Motus Imferio Corporis o6fequantur Sonorum

Voluntatis?& Unde eft Inftinu; tile quemvocant,in An'i ? nnon SpatiumUniverfum,Senforium eft Entis malibus

Incorporei, Viventis, L Intelligentis; quodres Ipfas

fatus proUtique, f verus omnisin hac Philofophia greffus, non quidem ftatim nos ducit ad Caufe pime cognitionem; at certe propius propiufq; nos ad earn adducit, eaque re permagnieft aftiperpetuo mandus.

cernat & compleaatur intimas, tota f; penitus L in fe refentes ferfpiciat; quarum id quidem, quodin Nrobis contuetur ? fentitL cogitat, Imagines tantum in Cerebro

Queft. 2 . AnnonRadii Luminis exigua funtCorpufcula,e corporibuslucentibus emiffa, & refrata Attraationibus quibufdam,quibus Lumen& Corpora in fe mutuoAgunt? Etenim iftiufmodi corpufcula per Media uniformia tranfmitti debebunt in lineis reatis, fine infledtendo in Umbram ; Quo utiq; Radii Luminis. Poteruntquoq; tranfmittuntur modo diverias habere proprietates, proprietatefq; iftas inter tranfeundum per diverfa Media immutabiles confervare: Quae & ipfa itidem radiorum Luminis eft Natura. CorporapellucidaAgunt in Radios Luminis,per intervallumaliquod interjeaum; quum eos refringunt, refledunt, & infleeuunt:Radiiq;viciffimcorporum iftorum particulas, per interjectum intervallum,agitant, ad ea calefacienda: Atq; aliquod haec quidemAtio & Reatio, qux eft per intervallum S f aliquod
A. The original page 315 of Newton's Optice, 1706.

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THE CASE OF THE MISSING TANQUAM

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ad fines conformatefunt diverfie Qwuos filio fabricata? ipforumPartes? Fierine aotuit,ut Oculus Jne fcientiaOpti? aut Auris,fne Intelligentia cesfuerit con truCtus Sonorum? ? ut Motus f7oluntatis Imperio Corporis ohfequantur .Qi fit,

] I 31[ tamexquifita jtnt Arte atq;Con fit, ut Co'poraAnimalium

? AnU Undeeft InfJinLus i/le qzuern vocant,in Animalilus non Senjorium Animalium,eftlocuscui Subfantiafentiens a prefente fentiripofint? deferuntur,ut ibiprrefentes ;Srum
enfiles rerurn fecies per nervosU cereadeft, U in quemr conAtq; his quidern rite expeditis, Annonex ph^enomenis

OmIntelligentem, Jati,e fe EntemIncorporeum, Jriventem^

Ip:fa intime cernat, penitufq; perficiat, totafq;intra fe pre rerumId quod comple$fatur; quarum fens prSJentes quidem

infinto, tanquam Senforio nifp fuo, res rjentem, quiin Spatio

tantum adfe per in notisfentitI coo Oaganap gtat, Imagines ? Senfuumdelatas, in Senforiolo[uo percipit b contuetur Utiq; fi verusomnisin hac Philofophiafaaus progreffus, non quidemftatimnosducit ad Cauleprimce cognitionem; at certe propiuspropiufq;nos ad cam perpetuoadducit, eaque re permagnieftaefiimandus. eueft.2 . Annon Radii Luminis exigua funt Corpufcula, e corporibus lucentibus emiffa, & refrata Attrationibus quibuldam, quibus Lumen & Corpora Etenimiftiufinodicorpufcula in fe mutuoAgunt? per Mein dia uniformiatranfmitti debebunt lineis retis, fine in Umbram; Quo utiq; modo tranfmittuninfledtendo tur Radii Luminis. Poteruntquoq; diverfashabereproper diu prietates, iftafq; proprietatesintertranfeundum coniervare: Qux & ipfi itiden verfa Mediaimmutabiles radiorumLuminiseft Natura. CorporapellucidaAgunt in Radios Luminis,per intervallum aliquodinterjetum; & eos refringunt, refle6hint, infledunt Radiiq; quum viciffimcorporum iftorum particulas, per interjeeum Sf aliquod.
B. The cancel.

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566

ALEXANDRE KOYR: AND I. BERNARD COHEN

was the original one, and that, at some time after the completion of the printing (but before the binding of the volume), Newton and Clarkefor reasons that we shall not discuss here - decided to delete this and to replace it by another in which the formal identification of space with the Sensorium Dei would be weakened by the introduction of the word tanquam. Accordingly, the page in question was cut out and another was substituted for it. Thus in almost all examples page 315 can readily be seen to be a cancel.25 Did Clarke assume, in his denial of Leibniz' allegation that for Newton space is the sensorium of God, that the early form of page 315 had been so thoroughly destroyed that no trace remained of that first version which had been withdrawn? We have no way of telling, but if this was Clarke's belief, he was quite wrong. For we have found that the Evans-Rosenwald copy of the 1706 Optice is not unique. Of the two examples of this edition to be found in the Babson Collection one has the cancel while the other has the original page 315.26 The copy in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, also has the original page 315, while one of the copies in the Cambridge University Library contains both the cancel and cancellandum, one following the other.27 It is certainly curious furthermore, that although a cancel was substituted for page 315, no similar alteration was made with respect to the other mention of God's sensorium in Query XXIV. Since four out of eighteen examples of the 1706 Optice examined by us still have the original page 315,28 it is surely not outside the bounds of possibility that Leibniz too had encountered such a copy. Can we not go a step farther and assume that it was the earlier discarded text that expressed Newton's real conviction?
26 See A descriptive catalogue of the Grace K. Babson Collection of the works of Sir Isaac Newton and the material relating to him in the Babson Institute Library, Babson Park, Mass., with an introduction by Roger Babson Webber (New York: Herbert Reichner, 1950). The Latin edition with the original page 315 is catalogued as No. 137, Copy 1, whereas the copy with the cancel is Copy 2. 27 Pressmarked: M.9.31. 28 These are the copies in the Bibliotheque Mazarine Nationale (Paris), Bibliotheque (Paris), British Museum, Columbia University, New York Public Library, the Evans-

Rosenwald copy in The Institute for Advanced Study, the copies in the collections of David P. Wheatland (Cambridge, Mass.) of Harrison D. Horblit (New York City), and of Prof. E. N. da C. Andrade (London), and the copies in the Babson Institute (Babson Park, Mass.; two copies), the Princeton University Library, the Library Company of Philadelphia, the Bodleian Library (Oxford), Trinity College (Cambridge), the Royal Society of London and the two copies in the Cambridge University Library (one of which, pressmarked Adv.b.39.4, comes from Newton's library and has the cancel of p. 315).

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