[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center
Type of event: Interview
Date: Tuesday, September , 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

TONY PALMIERA
1043EDT

With FAA since 1982 all here at ZNY. Detail as staff specialist, temporary supervisor, tm
coordinator two years, then ATC area b. Worked ra42, or h42 on 9/11. R42 was Dave
Bittiglia.

United was somewhere between Allentown and Stillwater when he sat at ra42.

Saw McCormick was there so knew there was something going on. Ivonna said to sit
down with Dave. Asked Dave a few times what was happening, then looked at data strips
to figure things out. Noticed UAL 175 was on the wrong code in a coast track. Bittiglia
said he thought he had a hijack, but wasn't sure who. From the data it seemed assumed
that it was UAL175. Remembers that someone said boston had a hijack and it might have
been in Kennedy sector. Knew there was something going on, but not much situational
awareness. At the moment he sat down was not aware of first WTC impact. UAL 175 had
turned already, and was northeast of the Philadelphia area. Knew there was a hijack with
another aircraft, and assumed UAL 175 was a mechanical emergency since he didn't think
there could be two hijackings. Did not equate AA11 to being the plane that hit WTC.
Thought maybe there had been a struggle aboard the plane in the WTC. No doubt in mind
that plane being squawking 3321 was UAL175.

The usual indicators of the hijack are the 7500 code or the code word.
With UAL175 track was in a coast mode. In Pamiera's mind it was an emergency. In an
emergency trained not to bother crew, wait for indication of what is happening from pilot.

Explains track of UAL 175.

As headed towards Kennedy thought maybe there was a problem.

Coast data block will move off target. Data block floated an inch of two away from
target. The pound symbol takes the place of the leader lines. One with the 3321
transponder code, another with the coast data block, but associated as one airplane. From
reviewing strips knew it had to be the same airplane since there was no one else in that
airspace.

Yardly Sector goes from 14k to 20k. Data blocks on 55 flashed intruder alert (a limited
data block that shows target, four digit code and an "I" - computer telling you there's an
airplane there that shouldn't be there). Contacts 56 and 56 watching. Calls Tracon liberty
south to inform them. They said they knew about 3321. They took care of coordination
within their facility. Did not call the towers. Spoke to Kingston high of ZBW to hold
them (keep them off of frequency). Then told them they shut down.

UAL 175 climbed back up a few hundred feet. So pilot either knew of collision avoidance
system, or saw delta since they almost crashed.

Didn't want to believe it was a hijacking, was looking for the one thing that would
pinpoint it was an emergency instead. The key realization was when he heard another
plane had hit the towers. At that point no radio, and off code assigned by ATC, and off
course.

"Spin" means not going to take any traffic. Doesn't want any more air crafts on
frequency. Communicated to Kingston to keep aircraft. Wanted to concentrate on 175.
Conversation with Kingston at 125630z.

Regard to hear LaCates, does know ZBW reported a hijack headed towards Kennedy, but
knew nothing of call sign.

1258z. Kingston's reaction was disbelief. They didn't start a dialogue, but when they
called back tells them of possibility of hijack. Usually when airplanes are stopped an
estimate of time and reason are given.

Liberty west, 15 line is NY Tracon on the common phone line (15 is line used to get
through immediately). NY Tracon had been watching 3321.
Post second event (didn't know WTC impact, just knew hit something in downtown
Manhattan).

Thought about bringing airplanes back on line. But after speaking with Dave realized the
space wasn't going to take anymore.

Paul Thumser had Tony call people who weren't working to get them to fill in positions
that had difficulty. In helping get people off sectors that shouldn't be sitting there, used
controllers who were only observing events. Evonna sat at 56, and then Tony took 56.
Stopped all planes. Take what's in air and then no more. Then traffic management made
call to shut everything down.

Pre-9/11 hijack scenarios: code 7500, verbal confirm from pilot, or code word. All from
crew itself. Plane with different unusual characteristics implies there is something wrong
with pilot or airplane, an emergency situation with passenger, but not a hijack. Would tell
supervisor. Supervisor would tell OMIC. Supposed to scramble fighters to escort.
Thought plane would land in Cuba. Trained once a year in DynSim with hijack
simulations.

Never been involved in real life or live hijack exercise.

AA11 - unusual communications from cockpit would certainly change the dynamics.

Never sat as MOS. Vaguely familiar with their position. It's OMIC's job to coordinate
with military in course of hijack.

Post 9/11 have not simulated hijack involving military as a controller.

Thought maybe had read of hijack plane as weapon in a book.

Just knows military needs to do an escort in the case of a hijacking, and prior to 9/11
definitely only to monitor plane, not to shoot it down. Now, post 9/11, no one here at
center has explained that the military may be able to do a hijacking shoot down. Told to
do whatever the military tells them to do in that circumstance. Understands that would
have to work a military aircraft if enters his airspace in a hijacking scenario. Assuming
military action would include engage and terminate order, does believe training is enough
to vector a military aircraft to the hijacked aircraft.

LEARNED:
Capable of landing large amounts of aircraft in a short period of time. Learned that the
military coordination needs to be timely. Learned to assume the worst and then back off
form there. Procedurally learned to notify supervisor immediately, who thought the
OMIC would immediately notify NORAD, and it would be worked out if the initial
instinct was right later.

After position was closed down. Everyone went to fill out statements. Written and oral
statements. Purpose of meeting was to record that, and allow people to vent. Assume
meeting came from facility manager, but Marty Fournier did the recordings.